Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research

Volume 3 Article 12

October 2020

Influence in the aceF of Changing Interests: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020

Casey Stickel

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Recommended Citation Stickel, Casey (2020) "Influence in the aceF of Changing Interests: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020," Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 3 , Article 12. Available at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus/vol3/iss1/12 Stickel: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020

Influence in the Face of Changing Interests: U.S.–Iranian Relations 1953-2020

Casey Stickel Seton Hall University

Abstract come would be after the U.S.’s blatant attack on Iranian leadership. Popular opinion in the U.S. Despite American presidential rhetoric ex- was divided, with some believing that the killing tolling the virtues of establishing democracy in of Soleimani was necessary retribution for his past Iran, there has been strong evidence to prove that action and others worrying that it would disrupt this has not been the true intent of the United the already fragile nature of U.S.-Iranian relations. States’ foreign policy in the region. Rather, since It is in the aftermath of this attack, amid global 1953, the United States’ primary goal in Iran has uncertainty, that I decided to write my thesis on been to maintain a regime and environment that the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. Importantly, is favorable to the facilitation of American inter- the killing of Qasem Soleimani was not isolated ests regardless of the regime type. While these from the past. It reflected a long-standing pattern American interests have ranged from oil settle- of U.S. intervention within the country, propelled ments, the repulsion of communism, containment by a multitude of reasons. By beginning with the of revolutionary sentiment, and others, the basal 1953 Coup d’etat´ in Iran, one can see the patterns objective has remained the same throughout the of U.S. action in subsequent watershed incidents period of 1953 to the present. While the 1979 Ira- within Iran and between the two countries. nian Revolution proved to be a disruption to the United States’ ability to maintain their interests 2. The 1953 Coup: Origins in the region, this paper will argue that the event did not signify a significant shift in the United The 1953 coup d’etat´ and overthrow of demo- States’ overarching policy of maintaining influ- cratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh and the ence in Iran from the pre- to post-revolutionary subsequent consolidation of power by Moham- period. mad Reza Shah demonstrates the initiation of the United States’ broader policy of American influ- ence in the region. The event also shows how 1. Introduction the establishment of a regime favorable to Amer- ica helped facilitate American foreign policy in- America is currently standing at the precipice terests of the era such as the repulsion of com- of its relationship with Iran. On January 3, 2020, munism and favorable oil settlements. As declas- Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed via an sified documents and public statements through airstrike, assassinated by the United States. This presidential press releases and newspapers will was a landmark interaction between the two coun- show, while overt action and rhetoric are impor- tries. As the United States and Iran hung on the tant for understanding the public’s reactions to- brink of war, the world waited to see what the out- wards certain events, covert documents and action

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will demonstrate the true intention of the United sitated collaborators within Iranian society. Reli- States regarding the 1953 Coup and the subse- gious leaders known as the ulama, Iranian press, quent events the U.S. directly caused and influ- politicians, and others who would also benefit enced within Iran. from the plan aided in the CIA’s mission. Dr. As the 1953 Coup was unfolding, it was not Donald Wilber’s Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq immediately evident that foreign powers, such as of Iran, a declassified CIA history outlining the the United States and Great Britain, had an inte- coup, serves as a roadmap for understanding in- gral role in the overthrow. However, in the subse- ternal collaboration that assisted in the ousting of quent days and weeks afterwards, the involvement Mossadegh. Alongside the United States’ intense of the United States was difficult to deny. In a propaganda campaign, directed through the Ira- declassified, internal Central Intelligence Agency nian press by the CIA Art Group, the agency’s (CIA) document it explains, “enough talkative Tehran station was also “authorized to spend one people, including many Iranians were privy to million rials a week in purchasing the cooperation segments of the operation to make it relatively of members of the Iranian Majlis.”4 The ulama easy for journalists to reconstruct the coup.”1 The were also motivated to act against Mossadegh, United States was also identified as an instrument who had sought to reduce their power through- in the coup by the Soviet newspaper Pravda which out his tenure as Prime Minister. The document wrote in 1953 that the “United States intrigues also notes how religious leaders, such as Ayatol- and finances had lain behind earlier stages of the lah Boroujerdi, were motivated by the operation Shah’s coup.”2 The United States did not acknowl- to make a “pro-Shah statement,” to increase fa- edge their role in the 1953 Coup until much later vorable sentiment towards him.5 Thus, the United when the CIA released further documents on the States and Great Britain worked alongside multi- event in 2013.3 However, it was common knowl- ple groups in Iranian society who were also mo- edge in Iran that the U.S. had a part in the over- tivated, be it through political, religious, or eco- throw of Mossadegh. Not only would this mu- nomic reasons, to oust Mossadegh. tual understanding among the Iranian public fo- ment anti-American sentiment, it would also taint 3. The 1953 Coup: American Interests the Pahlavi government as colluders with foreign The United States’ motivations for the over- influences within the country. throw of Mossadegh differed from those of the The takeaway from the 1953 Coup is more internal, Iranian collaborators. Most scholars nuanced than the United States simply acting on take a two-pronged approach when understand- their own accord to overthrow Prime Minister ing the motivations of the United States in the Mossadegh. The operation was not only planned 1953 Coup.6 First, there is the argument that alongside and aided by Great Britain’s MI6, but the United States intervened to repel communism also by Iranian parties with their own motivations from the country as they viewed an encroaching for Mossadegh’s removal. For the United States Tudeh party as a threat to their regional economic to infiltrate and overthrow Mossadegh there neces- interests and as a quasi-insurgency group backed

1Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier 4Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953, Donald Mossadeq of Iran, 19-20. Wilber. The National Security Archive, 1954, 26. 5Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier 2“Moscow Says U.S. Aided Shah’s Coup,” The New York Mossadeq of Iran, 65-66. Times, August 20, 1953. 6Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and 3Malcolm Byrne, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York: The Coup,” The National Security Archive, August 19, 2013. New Press, 2013), 5.

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by the Soviets. In addition, the U.S. saw the a favorable oil settlement with the Prime Minis- growing possibility of the Soviets gaining influ- ter.10 In addition, the United States had also been ence with the Mossadegh government. A declas- shaken by the growing oil nationalization in Latin sified CIA document states, “Tudeh support for American countries and sought to prevent a simi- the Prime Minister indicates that the Communists lar occurrence in Iran.11 Initially the United States consider that his return to power will best promote rejected the British government’s request and de- their objectives.”7 The United States viewed Iran cided to continue trying to settle the oil dispute as a struggle between themselves and the Soviet with Mossadegh.12 However, with the promise Union in the broader fight of the Cold War. To of increased influence in the Anglo-Iranian Oil gain Iran as an ally for either side would mean a Company by helping the British, the Americans greater foothold in the Middle East, which was in- were further incentivized to accept the offer for creasingly becoming a hotbed for proxy wars be- covert intervention alongside the British. Even- tween the two nations. The Tudeh party served as tually, they agreed to help orchestrate the coup the primary, organized communist threat in the re- against Mossadegh. gion and their support of Mossadegh worried U.S. Retrospectively, in 1954, Eisenhower spoke officials to a great extent. about the Iranian coup a year after its toppling of Only days before the August 1953 Coup oc- the Mossadegh government. “We were faced in curred, the New York Times reported on Eisen- Iran with a situation that was highly dangerous to hower’s and the United States’ intent on block- the world.”13 He also stated that “the situation in ing communism within the country. This motiva- Iran ‘greatly ameliorated’ as a result of the agree- tion was known in Iran, whose own citizens and ment between that nation’s Government and the journalists had been aware of the United States’ foreign oil companies.”14 It is evident that the sta- interests within the region. In July 1953 the ar- tus of oil and economics in the Middle East was in- ticle stated, “Non-communist editorials accused variably linked to the American government’s in- Mr. Eisenhower of supporting British imperial in- terest in repelling communism within the region. terests.”8 A noticeable shift in American policy The Soviet Union had historically been embroiled towards Iran occurred in a flurry of meetings in in the oil conflict with Great Britain. The Cold the days before the coup. The same Times ar- War served to exacerbate the contentious nature ticle highlighted how the Tudeh party, “insisted of the two countries’ relationship within Iran. The on attributing sinister motives to the visit” despite goal of anti-communism is also mentioned specif- American statements to the contrary.9 ically in the British request for U.S. aid for the The other concern which prompted the United coup.15 By backing the British in the struggle States to intervene in Iran was over oil settlements for economic hegemony in the region, the United in the region. This concern is highlighted in a de- classified State Department document from 1952 10Department of State, Proposal to Organize a Coup which outlines how the British requested aid from d’etat in Iran, Byroade, Freedom of Information Act Elec- the United States to overthrow the Mossadegh tronic Reading Room. 1952, 2. 11Abrahamian, The Coup, 79. government, citing their grim outlook on reaching 12Abrahamian, The Coup, 147. 13Joseph Loftus, “Eisenhower Bars Preventive War; 7Central Intelligence Agency, The Iranian Situation, Hopeful on Peace,” The New York Times, August 12, 1954, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 1953, 3. 14Loftus, “Eisenhower Bars Preventive War; Hopeful on 8“Eisenhower Draws Fire of Iran Press,” The New York Peace.” Times, August 9, 1953, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 15Department of State, Proposal to Organize a Coup 9“Eisenhower Draws Fire of Iran Press.” d’etat in Iran, 2.

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States was not only aiding their ally and repelling years following the 1953 coup, this pattern would communism, but also laying a foundation of pro- become increasingly apparent in the U.S.’s inter- West and inherently pro-capitalist sentiment. actions with the Shah. So, the overthrow serviced American foreign In the period following the overthrow of policy in two key interests, in addition to begin- Mossadegh, the United States worked to shape the ning the trend of overarching American influence Iranian government into one that supported Amer- within Iran. Following the nationalization of oil in ican involvement within the country. One can an- the region, the United States was offered the op- alyze the interactions between Mohammad Reza portunity to directly intervene in Iranian politics Shah and U.S. government officials as evidence through their operation alongside MI6 and Iranian for the United States’ motivation. As David Col- collaborators. Following their orchestration of the lier explains, “The United States supported and 1953 coup in Iran, the United States became the funded the shah’s efforts to centralize power and primary foreign influence in the country. This al- took action to protect his reign from other possi- lowed them to begin exercising policy goals which ble threats.”17 In moments where the Shah tried to began in the forms of economic and political in- subvert U.S. interests and either ignore attempted terests. Economically, the United States sought to policy reform pushes by U.S. government offi- destroy the goal of Iranian oil nationalization and cials or enter into talks with the Soviet Union, gain influence in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. the United States pulled back on their demands of Politically, the United States wished to suppress the Shah.18 Through the interactions between the communist sentiment within the country as part of Shah and the United States, one can analyze how their larger part in the Cold War. the priority of the United States lay in the main- tenance of the Pahlavi government, prioritizing a 4. Post-Coup: The Shah and the U.S. regime that would create a favorable environment for U.S. influence rather than one that would pro- In the years post-coup, it would become in- mote democracy. creasingly apparent that the United States would One of the most striking examples of how the prioritize the aid of whatever form of govern- United States enabled Mohammad Reza Shah’s ment that would best facilitate their interests in continued leadership in Iran is the CIA-assisted the region. Evidently, despite Eisenhower’s ear- creation and facilitation of the SAVAK. The lier rejection of Mossadegh’s request for eco- SAVAK served as the secret police for the Shah, nomic support shortly before the 1953 Coup, he arresting and executing dissenters that tried to fo- 16 later accepted Prime Minister Zahedi’s outreach. ment revolution against his regime. The United This demonstrates the stark difference between the States, motivated to maintain the Shah’s power United States’ relations between Mossadegh and and presence in Iran, had aided in its creation. As Zahedi. Clearly, the United States was more with- Collier explains, “American specialists trained vir- holding to Mossadegh, who had served as a road- tually the entire first generation of recruits, who block for the pursuance of U.S. interests in Iran. effectively and mercilessly restricted all forms In contrast, Zahedi had been installed, in part, by of internal opposition.”19 The part that the CIA the United States as a Prime Minister who would 17 aid in the facilitation of American interests. In the David R. Collier, Democracy and the Nature of Amer- ican Influence in Iran, 1941-1979, Contemporary Issues in 16“Iran Seems Stunned by Eisenhower Note,” The New the Middle East (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University York Times, July 12, 1953, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Press, 2017), 154. Also see Anthony Leviero, “President Pledges Emergency 18Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ- Relief to Iranian Premier,” The New York Times, September ence in Iran,177. 2, 1953. 19Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ-

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played in the SAVAK demonstrates a clear dis- influence or status within the region. Understand- regard for democracy in the country in favor of ing the 1953 Coup d’etat´ and the resulting actions consolidating the power of the Shah. The SAVAK of both the United States and the Iranian govern- served an important role in the maintenance of ments can serve as a contributing factor to the oc- American interests in the region, enforcing sta- currence of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Paving bility by quashing dissent as well as suppressing the way for the revolution was also growing anger communism by eliminating members of the Tudeh and distrust towards the Pahlavi Dynasty. The party. While this damaged the reputation of Amer- United States’ intervention within the region and icans from the view of Iranian citizens, it served to the government were also important factors con- strengthen the trust between the Shah and Amer- tributing to the 1979 revolution as their status as ica. the leading foreign influence in Iran increased the With the support of and assistance from the public’s anger towards the Shah. The governmen- United States government, the Shah worked to- tal interference by the United States, as well as wards implementing policies that would further centuries of meddlesomeness from Great Britain facilitate the actions of the United States within and Russia, culminated in an environment of dis- Iran. However, the intent of American foreign dain towards the presence of foreign powers in the policy was aimed towards the repulsion of com- region. munism and oil settlements rather than the spread of democracy. Maintaining influence in Iran also 5. The 1979 Revolution: Rebellion Against secured the United States important access to the Foreign Intervention Persian Gulf, important both economically and militarily. The United States vied for authoritar- The 1979 Iranian Revolution was initially un- ian stability rather than veritable democracy as an tethered to a religious cause. The revolution unstable Iran would have inhibited the U.S. from served as a call-to-arms for many unique groups pursuing its goals within the country. Regard- across the country from students to communists ing oil interests, the Shah had paved the way for to women and more. It was aimed at the evi- American companies to take over the oil market.20 dent U.S. influence within the Pahlavi regime and In response, $400 million in aid was sent by 1956 Iran overall. Ruhollah Khomeini quickly rose as from the United States to Iran.21 the leading opposition to the Shah, fomenting na- tionalist sentiment within the population that took Granted, there were shortcomings with some a direct attack to foreign influence, particularly failures to fully implement U.S. policy and ini- in regard to the United States. He saw himself tiatives in Iran on the part of the Shah. As the as a “vanguard” of the “universal class” and pro- Shah continued to consolidate his own power, Col- moted a widespread message that served as a call lier explains, “the shah ensured that all dissatis- to arms for many different groups of people.23 faction focused on him.”22 However, the United This push against the United States by Khomeini’s States government continued to back him, seeing populist uprising served as the most outward re- no other candidate or possibility to improve their jection of American influence within Iran. While interactions with the Shah had not always gone ac- ence in Iran, 161. cording to U.S. interests, the Pahlavi Dynasty was 20Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ- ence in Iran, 157. the United States’ best option for influence in the 21Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ- ence in Iran, 157. 23Maryam Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World: 22Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influ- Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution (Pluto Press, ence in Iran, 165. 2007), 50.

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country. The 1979 Revolution disrupted this influ- 1979 to January 20, 1981, this 444-day event fur- ence and pushed the United States to evaluate its ther sparked outrage from America.27 Just two strategy for the region. days after the event began, President Jimmy Carter In the public sphere, the United States made wrote personally to Ayatollah Khomeini to ask apparent its condemnation of the revolution. U.S. for the release of the U.S. hostages. He fur- officials were both upset by the anti-American ther wrote, “The people of the United States de- nature of the revolution, as well as its religious sire to have relations with Iran based upon equal- rhetoric that set the new Khomeini regime as anti- ity, mutual respect, and friendship.”28 The mes- thetical to the heralded Christian values of Amer- sage from the Iranian student group who orches- ica. In a more economic sense, Americans were trated the hostage crisis was clear, however, that also concerned by unrest in the country disrupt- they disagreed with Carter’s outlook on the U.S.- ing American business interests and oil produc- Iranian relations, for the past, present, and fu- tion. A 1978 New York Times article writes, ture. The group, known as the Followers of the “The upheaval has already meant the loss of bil- Imam’s Line, responded to the meetings between lions of dollars in military orders, property dam- American diplomats and the revolutionary Iranian age and delayed payments and has caused worries government with a radio broadcast stating, “Can about loans made by American banks.”24 While we forget all the U.S. agents who’ve been the the early stages of the revolution certainly inter- worst kind of criminals and now they send these fered with the success of American foreign pol- dirty characters?”29 The hostage crisis demon- icy in the region, the most public and concerning strated that U.S. relations with the Iranian people event for U.S. officials was yet to come. had substantially degraded over the past decade, stemming from the 1953 Coup and the resulting 6. The Iranian Hostage Crisis growing distrust of foreign powers in the country. The Iran hostage crisis had an indisputably On November 4, 1979 an Iranian stu- negative affect on U.S. domestic policy, specif- dent group, the Muslim Student Followers of ically in the 1980 presidential election. As the Imam’s Line, infiltrated the U.S. embassy the hostage crisis stretched on through the final in Tehran and took American embassy staff years of Carter’s presidency, it weighed heav- hostage.25 With support from Ayatollah Khome- ily on his reelection chances. Interestingly, af- ini, they demanded that the Shah be returned to ter the November election, religious leader Hojat Iran from the United States.26 This event sparked ul-Islam Asghar Mousavi Khoeiny was quoted as a stark change in rhetoric regarding the U.S.’s saying, “We would have reached a solution ear- opinion on the revolution. While mostly quiet lier if Carter, who was already in power, had been about the early stages of the event, President elected...With Reagan’s victory, this will need a Jimmy Carter was quick to react publicly to the long time.”30 Despite the fact that Iran publicly hostage situation. Occurring from November 4, held a stance wavering between apathy and annoy- ance at the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the 24Ann Crittenden, “Iran Unrest a Nightmare For Many U.S. Concerns: Other Major Arms Deals Dropped Turmoil 27“Significant Dates in the Hostage Crisis.” in Iran Hurts U.S. Companies Problems for Smaller Compa- 28Jimmy Carter, “Letter from Jimmy Carter to Ayatollah nies,” The New York Times, 1978. Ruhollah Khomeini Regarding the Release of the Iranian 25“Significant Dates in the Hostage Crisis,” The New York Hostages,” November 6, 1979, National Archives. Times, 1981. 29John Kifner, “Iran Demands Shah,” The New York 26“Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Times, November 8, 1979, sec. Archives. Hostages,” The New York Times, November 5, 1979, sec. 30“Iran Says Reagan Victory Prolongs Hostage Crisis,” Archives. The New York Times, 1980.

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hostage crisis came to a sudden end as he was be- revolution are a threat to key US interests. . . ing sworn into office. In a show of protest against Iranian-supported unrest could lead to sabotage Jimmy Carter, who had long negotiated with the and strikes by oil workers, since Shias inhabit hostage takers and confronted Iran about human many of the oil-producing areas of the Persian rights abuses, the hostages had been released sym- Gulf states.”33 The impact of this statement is bolically the moment Carter was no longer presi- two-fold. First, that the United States needed to dent. In fact, senior U.S. politicians agreed that seek a way to suppress the influence of Iranian the prolonged and unresolved nature of the crisis Revolution on neighboring states. Secondly, a had resulted in the loss of Jimmy Carter.31 To- key goal of U.S. influence remained maintaining gether, the 1979 Revolution as well as the hostage a position in the Persian Gulf that would be eco- crisis sent a wave of disruption to U.S. foreign pol- nomically beneficial in regard to the oil industry. icy, as it was tied domestically to the presidential Although the nature of their interests in Iran was election as well as on-the-ground in Iran. shifting, the United States sought to maintain influence through the destabilization of Iranian 7. Post-1979 Revolution: American Policy Dis- hegemony. In response to the hostage crisis, the turbance United States had begun implementing a system of sanctions against the country to try and exert Despite the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the economic pressure and coercion for release of the hostage crisis creating major tensions between the hostages.34 These sanctions would serve as the two nations, it only served as a disturbance for the basis of economic influence over Iran that would United States’ overall mission of maintaining in- persist into the twenty-first century. However, fluence in the region. In fact, in President Jimmy the United States did not stop at sanctions in the Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address, he reit- post-Revolutionary period and turned to more erated the importance of the Persian Gulf region in drastic measures in an effort to contain the unrest American policy and interests. He said, “Let our that had been fomented in Iran, as Panah explains. position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any In addition, there was an effort to regain influence outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf in the region through resetting the balance of region will be regarded as an assault on the vi- power. tal interests of the United States of America.”32 The United States still managed to shape politics 8. Regional Disruption: U.S. Policy and the and the economy within Iran. This is not to say Iran-Iraq War that the United States saw the Khomeini regime as the ideal situation to facilitate their foreign policy The United States more aggressively disrupted agenda within the country. geo-politics in the region through their instigation Khomeini’s pan-Islamic, anti-imperialist and aid in prolonging the Iran-Iraq War (1980- rhetoric and ideology of exporting the revolu- 1988). While the United States cannot be wholly tion also served to threaten the U.S.’s ability to targeted as the sole reason for the outbreak of the maintain influence. A declassified 1980 CIA war, an analysis of weapons trading, regional po- document explains, “Iran’s efforts to export its litical moves, and covert action reveals that the U.S. played a major role in the conflict. In ad- 31“Carter Aide Ties Defeat To Hostage Crisis in Iran,” The New York Times, 1980. 32Jimmy Carter, “Address by President Carter on the State 33National Foreign Assessment Center, Iran: Export- of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress” (Speech, ing the Revolution, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Joint Session of Congress, Washington D.C., January 23, Reading Room. 1980, iii. 1980). 34Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World, 76.

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dition, to realign its influence within Iran, the U.S. Eastern states through a policy of pan-Islamism. turned to regional destabilization through the in- The sincerity of Khomeini’s intentions, however, stigation of groups opposed to the revolution. A were questioned and other rulers in the Middle Washington Post article reported on missions to East feared that this sentiment would lead to the damage the image of Khomeini, “One was de- demise of their regime. His rhetoric, “alarmed the signed to gather intelligence about Iran and sup- leaders of the Arab states, who feared for the secu- port Iranian exiles.”35 In the post-Revolutionary rity of their own regimes.”38 To prevent the spread period, the United States took a covert, but ag- of revolutionary sentiment, the United States be- gressive stance against the Iranian government and gan a period of what Maryam Panah refers to as sought to damage its image and influence through rapprochement with Iraq in the late 1970s in an covert missions not only in Iran, but also through- effort to not only reset the balance of power within out the Middle East. Thus, even prior to the Iran- the region, but also in an effort to end the hostage Iraq War and the Iran-Contra affair, the United crisis post-1979.39 As tensions grew between Iraq States worked tirelessly to influence the nature and Iran due to historical religious conflict as well of politics in Iran. The affair was just one part as territorial disputes, the United States facilitated of a larger seven-year mission to gain favor with the sale of engines and jets to Iraq all while ac- different aspects of Iranian government.36 One knowledging the strong probability of a war be- specific instance even reflected the United States’ tween the two nations.40 goal of communist repulsion within Iran wherein the CIA released the names of KGB agents in Iran 9. American Policy Exposed: The Iran-Contra to the Khomeini regime, resulting in the deaths Affair of around 200 people.37 This indicates that de- spite the 1979 Revolution disrupting their immedi- After growing tensions between the two coun- ate ability to continue exerting influence in Iran to tries erupted in 1980, resulting in what would be- pursue their foreign policy goals and protect their come a nearly decade-long military conflict, the interests, the United States was quickly able to re- United States continued to support Iraq covertly through weapons sales to Iraqi President Saddam gain the ability to affect the communist agenda 41 within Iran despite the disruption. In addition, al- Hussein. However, in an effort to destabilize the though the United States was opposed to Khome- region the United States was also involved in sell- ini’s regime, it would play into its anti-Communist ing weapons parts to Iran through an Israeli proxy nature to ensure that the U.S.’s own foreign policy to fund the US-supported Contras in Nicaragua, goals were met. in what later would become known as the Iran- Contra affair.42 In a 1992 New York Times article Simultaneous to maintaining influence within a State Department official was quoted in regard Iran, as the previously mentioned CIA document referred to, a key goal in U.S. foreign policy re- 38William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, A History garding Iran became the containment of revolu- of the Modern Middle East, vol. Fifth edition (Boulder, CO: tionary sentiment. Khomeini had made clear his Westview Press, 2013), 360. 39 hope to export the revolution into nearby Middle Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World, 79. 40Panah, The Islamic Republic and the World, 80. Also see Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle 35Bob Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor With Khomeini, East, 431-432. Exiles,” Washington Post, November 19, 1986, 2. 41Seymour Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early 36Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor With Khomeini, Ex- in Its War Against Iran,” The New York Times, January 26, iles,” 1. 1992, The New York Times Archive. 37Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor With Khomeini, Ex- 42Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War iles,” 2. Against Iran.”

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to the regional weapons trading as saying, “We in Lebanon at the time, which was thought to have wanted to avoid victory by both sides.”43 been potentially connected to Iran.46 The Iran-Contra affair was an example that However, more revealing are the National demonstrated the United States’ mission to hold Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) outlined influence in Iran in the form of arms dealing and in the Report of the President’s Special Review regional destabilization. While the rhetoric main- Board that list the key U.S. interests in Iran. The tained outwardly by American President Ronald 1987 list mainly focuses on repelling communism, Reagan condemned Iran and supported Iraq in the securing economic/oil security through land and conflict, the covert actions revealed that the United political stability, as well as improving the human States had also been supporting Iran through il- rights situation in Iran. Notably mentioned are licit weapons trading that violated previously en- the goals of: “preserving Iran as an independent acted embargoes and restrictions against the coun- buffer between the Soviet Union and the Persian try. This further serves as evidence that through Gulf,” “An early end to the Iran-Iraq war without covert weapons trading to both nations, the intent Soviet mediation or change in the regional balance of the United States was to continually destabi- of power,” and “Movement toward the normaliza- lize the region in an effort to suppress hegemonic tion of Iranian-American relations.”47 There was power by Iraq and Iran. With both countries weak- a clear opposition of opinions with whether the il- ened, the United States would be able to possess licit sale of arms to Iran would truly further U.S. greater influence over oil in the region as well interests. Early on, communiques between Caspar as contain revolutionary sentiment from spreading Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense at the time, outside of Iran. and Robert McFarlane, the National Security Ad- Spearheaded by the National Security Coun- visor during the Iran-Contra deals, reveal Wein- cil and the CIA, what was first referred to as the berger’s disagreement with the plan. He wrote that Iran Initiative began in 1985 and first was targeted the arms sales would lead to “a possible alteration at intelligence collection.44 The mission then suc- of the strategic balance in favor of Iran.”48 How- cessively used Israel as a go-between for missile ever, the Director of Central Intelligence made transport to Iran and used the subsequent prof- clear his approval of the plan by writing that the its to fund the Contras in Nicaragua.45 The Iran plan would, “enhance U.S. leverage in order to en- Initiative missions took place despite the fact that sure that the USSR is not the primary beneficiary Iran had been subject to embargoes and sanctions of change and turmoil in this critical country.”49 by the United States which should have prohib- The dialogues between various departments ited this action. An explanation for the Iran Initia- and key figures within the Reagan administration tive and weapons trading despite public rhetoric reveal the disagreement in how to best preserve against Iran can be tied to multiple causes. First and pursue U.S. leverage and influence in Iran. and foremost, as a direct explanation to the rea- While some, such as Weinberger, viewed the plan sons behind the weapons dealing, the U.S. govern- as unwise and a disruption of the balance of power, ment pointed towards the hostage crisis occurring 46President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi- 43Hersh, “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War dent’s Special Review Board, Edmund Muskie, John Tower, Against Iran.” and Brent Snowcroft. 1987, I-1. 44Central Intelligence Agency, Statement of William H. 47President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi- Webster Regarding the Iran-Contra Matter, William Web- dent’s Special Review Board, B-8. ster. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, 48President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi- 1987. dent’s Special Review Board, B-10. 45Central Intelligence Agency, Statement of William H. 49President’s Special Review Board, Report of the Presi- Webster Regarding the Iran-Contra Matter. dent’s Special Review Board, B-10.

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the Director of Central Intelligence viewed it as ance of power in the region as well as protect U.S. a way to maintain the U.S. interest in the con- regional interests such as oil. tainment of communism. As evidenced by his- tory, the plan resulted in a large scandal for the 11. Further Disruption: Bush’s Axis of Evil Reagan administration as it revealed the lack of agreement and communication between not only George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union the different branches of the United States Intelli- speech, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, gence Community, but also the different branches added vitriol to the rhetoric of the United States of government as Congress was left uninformed towards Iran. During this speech, Bush used the until the information leak. The Iran-Contra affair phrase “Axis of evil” to refer to several countries revealed how the U.S. would have to decide be- around the globe, Iran included. The main topic tween pursuing different interests, such as the re- of the State of the Union was the recent 9/11 at- pulsion of communism or maintaining balance of tacks and the efforts of the United States against power, with an Iranian regime that was not openly terrorism. As President Bush described, the “Axis diplomatic and friendly towards America. of evil” were states that supported terror groups as well as were threats to America.52 Specifi- 10. Khatami’s Dialogue of Civilizations: Ira- cally related to Iran, Bush stated, “Iran aggres- nian Policy into the 90s sively pursues these weapons [of mass destruc- tion] and exports terror, while an unelected few The relationship between Iran and the United repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.”53 States entered a period of rapprochement in the It set Iran, as well as Iraq and North Korea as late 1990s. With the election of Iranian Presi- enemies of the United States and antithetical the dent Khatami in 1997, Iranian foreign policy to- American ideal of freedom and peace. In re- wards the United States took on a more diplo- sponse, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi matic nature. President Khatami was noted for was quoted by CNN as saying, “The Islamic Re- his popular statement of, “We want to have a dia- public of Iran considers these remarks as inter- 50 logue of civilizations.” Despite the fact that Iran ference in its internal affairs.” Interestingly, this had been sanctioned by the United States since calls back to Iranian rejection of foreign influence, the Iranian Revolution, Khatami sought open di- specifically American influence, within its internal alogue with the United States in an attempt to al- affairs. Iran viewed Bush’s comments as an attack leviate tensions between the two countries. How- on its sovereignty. Interestingly, there was inter- ever, Khatami’s proverbial olive branch did not nal debate within Bush’s press team on whether majorly change the outlook of the United States or not to include Iran within the “Axis of evil” as on the region. While Khatami attempted to reopen the country and Bush made the final decision to dialogue with the United States, the U.S. contin- keep the country on the list.54 Including Iran in 51 ued to reinforce its Middle Eastern allies. Sim- the “Axis of evil” served to instigate further ag- ilar to the isolationist policies in response to the gression between the two countries as well as hurt 1979 Revolution, the United States sought to con- tain the influence of Iran. The containment of Iran 52George Bush, “President Bush’s 2002 State of the intended to ensure that Iran did not disrupt the bal- Union Address” (State of the Union Address, Joint Session of Congress, Washington D.C., January 29, 2002). 50Douglas Jehl, “Iranian President Calls for Opening Dia- 53George Bush, “President Bush’s 2002 State of the logue with U.S.,” The New York Times, December 15, 1997, Union Address.” sec. World. 54Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “What the 51“President Khatami Addresses America,” The New York Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran,” Middle East Journal 61, Times, January 8, 1998, sec. Opinion. no. 3 (2007): 421–40, 423.

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American public opinion of Iran by portraying the newed Middle East policy was the use of coercive country as an aggressor, antithetical to U.S. inter- diplomacy to promote the denuclearization of Iran ests.55 rather than Bush’s use of inflammatory rhetoric to- In the years following, the “Axis of evil” wards the country. This effort served to restore speech had an impact on the significant cool- the balance of power in the region, as it would ing of relations between the two countries. An- be in the U.S.’s interest to restrict the prolifera- other factor in this cooling was the presidency tion of nuclear weapons, particularly in Iran. Pres- of Iranian Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a conserva- ident Barack Obama stated, “Make no mistake: A tive who opposed the United States. Much of Ah- nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be madinejad’s rhetoric was inflammatory towards contained.”58 The JCPOA would allow for a re- the United States and sought to goad George W. laxation of economic sanctions against Iran in ex- Bush into public debates. One example of this change for strict limitations on their nuclear stock- was Ahmadinejad’s proposed debate against Bush pile and uranium development capabilities. at the United Nations General Assembly meeting. The JCPOA, in fact, aligned with previous A 2006 CNN article wrote, “Ahmadinejad himself policies that sought to maintain American influ- has taken steps to engage the president, sending ence in Iran. As the United States was the main him a letter earlier this year and, late last month, sanctioning force against Iran, the lifting of these calling for a ”direct television debate” between the sanctions would increase Iranian public approval leaders.”56 Much of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric also of the American government.59 In addition, the pertained to tensions surrounding the Iranian nu- reopening of economic trade between the two clear program. The United States was growing nations would be favorable to the United States concerned over the potentiality of a nuclear Iran. economy. These economic benefits would in- In a break from George W. Bush’s policies, the crease U.S. influence over Iran, aligning with the following American presidency of Barack Obama overarching U.S. goal of maintaining influence in would confront this issue on a diplomatic, multi- the country. The JCPOA also allowed for the national effort. United States to be a core creator of the conditions under which the Iranian nuclear program would 12. Nuclear Talks: The JCPOA be limited in its scope.60 It also placed a great amount of power into the hands of the United The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Nations Security Council as well as a newly cre- (JCPOA) was agreed upon on July 14, 2015 and ated Joint Commission, removing Iran’s sovereign 57 was adopted on October 18, 2015. The JCPOA power over its nuclear program and placing it into marked a turn in the United States’ rhetoric to- the hands of an international body in which the wards Iran. A significant shift from the policies of United States was immensely powerful.61 George W. Bush, Obama-era foreign policy that The JCPOA represents an important point in was oriented towards Iran sought renewed coop- post-1979 U.S.-Iranian foreign policy. The period eration on the public, international stage. The central point of President Barack Obama’s re- 58Obama Warns Iran on Nukes (United Nations: Associ- ated Press, 2012). 55Daniel Heradstveit and G. Matthew Bonham, “What the 59“Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran,” 425. July 14, 2015, Iran Sanctions, U.S. Department of State, 56“No ‘steel-Cage, Grudge Match’ between Bush, Ah- Main Text, 14. madinejad,” CNN, September 7, 2006. 60“Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” 57“Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Archive and Joint Com- Annex III, 1. prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Archive,” U.S. Depart- 61“Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),” ment of the Treasury, accessed April 20, 2020. Annex IV, 1.

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following the 1979 Revolution was hallmarked effective denuclearization of Iran. by an outward condemnation of the Iranian gov- ernment while declassified documents revealed 13. Relation Deterioration: Trump’s Presi- covert relations between the two countries, such dency as in the Iran-Contra affair. Political sway was maintained, as the Iran-Iraq War demonstrates, While relations between Iran and the United primarily through U.S. influence on the balance States had been deteriorating since the U.S.’s with- of power within the region. While this period drawal from the JCPOA and the growing non- was overtly aggressive and anti-Iranian, Obama- compliance of Iran in reaction, overt military ac- era policy demonstrates a shift in public rhetoric tion immediately brought tensions to a head.65 to realign U.S. policy. While the intended out- The assassination of Qasem Soleimani on Jan- come did not change, the JCPOA maintained the uary 3, 2020 through a direct order from President policy of influence in the region, the approach Donald Trump caused shock worldwide.66 The was markedly different. This also aligned with attack occurred on Iraqi soil, striking the Bagh- Obama’s broader foreign policy of multilateral ac- dad International Airport and killing three Irani- tion and withdrawal of troops from the Middle ans and two Iraqi officials.67 President Trump East region. rationalized the strike by stating that “Suleimani In a sharp departure from previous presiden- was plotting imminent and sinister attacks on tial policy, Donald Trump dismantled the JCPOA American diplomats and military personnel.”68 and moved to return to a more outwardly antago- Despite this statement, many American officials nistic relationship with Iran. As President Trump as well as Iranian officials doubted the veracity had voiced his opposition to the deal early on in of the reasoning and were unsure that Soleimani his presidency and in 2018 he fully withdrew the had actually been plotting any action against the United States from the deal.62 While at the time United States. Deeper analysis into the decision all other parties stated they would remain com- to airstrike Qasem Soleimani is limited due to the pliant, the withdrawal of the United States placed confidential nature of relevant documents as well stress upon the main appeal of the deal which was as the lack of information and intelligence that has the removal of U.S. sanctions from Iran. The pres- been made available through public statements. ident repeatedly referred to the JCPOA as “a hor- In reaction to the assassination, tensions im- rible one-sided deal that should have never, ever mediately escalated between the two countries to been made.”63 He opposed the deal, stating that it a point of near war. Iran reacted with a strike on did not do enough to halt nuclear development and a U.S. military base in Iraq that did not kill any- that it ignored the political wrongdoings of Iran.64 Opinions in America over the withdrawal from the 65“Iran News: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani An- nuclear deal were mixed, with some agreeing that nounces Partial Withdrawal from 2015 Nuclear Deal,” ac- the deal had been unfavorable to the U.S. while cessed April 24, 2020. others believing that the deal was integral for the 66“Outrage in Iran After Killing of Suleimani: Here’s What You Need to Know,” The New York Times, January 62Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He 5, 2020, sec. World. Long Scorned,” The New York Times, May 8, 2018, sec. 67Tom O’Connor and James Laporta, “Trump Orders U.S. World. Drone Strike Killing Iranian General Who Had ‘Plans to 63Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Attack’ American Diplomats and Military,” Newsweek, Jan- Long Scorned.” uary 2, 2020. 64Rick Gladstone, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? And 68“The Killing of Gen. Qassim Suleimani: What We Why Does Trump Hate It?,” The New York Times, October Know Since the U.S. Airstrike,” The New York Times, Jan- 5, 2017, sec. World. uary 3, 2020, sec. World.

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one.69 These actions only added to the tension port Bahraini insurgents which may have endan- that had been growing since Trump took office. gered the United States Fifth fleet in the country.75 As an article from Al Jazeera hypothesized that However, Soleimani also worked with the United Trump’s actions, “weakened reformist forces who States at times. In the wake of 9/11 Soleimani favour integration with the world and emboldened aided the United States by working alongside political factions who advocate against normal- the U.S. to combat the Taliban.76 That rela- ising ties with Western countries.”70 In addition, tionship shifted for the worse following George Iran immediately announced that it would aban- Bush’s speech on the “axis of evil.”77 Throughout don compliance on one of the main tenets of the Soleimani’s time with the Quds Force, he worked JCPOA which was the “limitations in production” to further Iranian interests with some of his ac- of uranium.71 Rhetoric around the U.S. being an tions directly interfering or even harming Ameri- unfair foreign influence in the country also rose can interests in the Middle East. During the Iraq yet again as citizens complained that U.S. sanc- war, Soleimani was responsible for many attacks tions and economic coercion had resurged dur- against American forces.78 In response to these ing Trump’s presidency to negatively affect Iran.72 actions and others, the United States reacted by Adding to this rise in tensions between the two assigning the Quds Force the classification of a countries was the deployment of 3,000 U.S. troops terrorist group.79 to the Middle East immediately following the air So, while a strong argument could be strike on Soleimani.73 This increased the senti- made that the airstrike assassination of Qasem ment that there was a probable impending armed Soleimani was antagonistic, short-sighted, and ill- engagement between the two nations. advised, it was not completely out of line with While there are doubts regarding a recent plot past American action. While this direct strike on against the United States, actions in Soleimani’s Soleimani was certainly the most direct and overt past have demonstrated a persistent threat to U.S. act of aggression between the two countries, it was interests in Iran and the Middle East. Soleimani not without precedent. In cases throughout the had been an adversary of American interests for history of relations between the two countries, the years in the Middle East. As the head of the Quds United States has acted against Iranian leadership Force, Soleimani had facilitated the weaponiza- when its interests were threatened. However, this tion of insurgency forces around the region that action certainly deviates from previous intentions have been in opposition to U.S. interests.74 For to work diplomatically with Iran, such as in the example, in 2016 Soleimani had sought to sup- case of the JCPOA. The outwardly aggressive na- ture of the airstrike set a new tone for U.S.-Iranian 69 Tara Kangarlou, “Despair, Defiance in Iran after US relations. The act maintained the trend American Killing of Qassem Soleimani,” Al Jazeera, February 4, 2020. 70Kangarlou, “Despair, Defiance in Iran after US Killing action taken to protect U.S. interests in the region, of Qassem Soleimani.” 71“Outrage in Iran After Killing of Suleimani: Here’s 75Erdbrink, “Iranian General, Denouncing Move by What You Need to Know,” The New York Times, January Bahrain, Threatens ‘Bloody Intifada.’” 5, 2020, sec. World. 76Aaron Blake, “When the United States and Qasem 72Kangarlou, “Despair, Defiance in Iran after US Killing Soleimani Worked Together,” The Washington Post, January of Qassem Soleimani,” Al Jazeera, February 4, 2020. 3, 2020. 73Paul Shinkman, “Trump to Send 3,000 More Troops to 77Blake, “When the United States and Qasem Soleimani Middle East Amid Iran Escalation,” US News & World Re- Worked Together.” port, January 3, 2020. 78“Iran’s Qasem Soleimani: Why the US Had Him in Its 74Thomas Erdbrink, “Iranian General, Denouncing Move Sights,” BBC News, January 3, 2020, sec. Middle East. by Bahrain, Threatens ‘Bloody Intifada,’” The New York 79“Iran’s Qasem Soleimani: Why the US Had Him in Its Times, June 21, 2016, sec. World. Sights.”

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but in a markedly different way than years past. States has mainly been exerted through hostile In regard to the Soleimani airstrike, relations rhetoric and aggressive military and foreign pol- between Iran and the United States may take on icy action. While there have been differences in a more overtly aggressive direction as we move action due to changing agendas and opinions of further into the twenty-first century. If President presidents throughout American history, all have Donald Trump is reelected, tensions between the consistently worked to maintain U.S. influence in two countries may continue to rise. While aggres- Iran in the pursuit of interest-based foreign policy. sive rhetoric and covert action is not a new oc- References currence in the history of U.S.-Iranian relations, the measure to publicly assassinate a high-ranking Abrahamian, Ervand. The Coup: 1953, The CIA, member of the Iranian government was a large de- and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Rela- viation from the past. While the full extent of tions. New York: The New Press, 2013. CIA and Trump policy operation within Iran is not yet known due to its classified nature, the United Blake, Aaron. “When the United States and States, however, will most likely maintain their Qasem Soleimani Worked Together.” Wash- half a century long trend of pursuance of main- ington Post, January 3, 2020. taining influence in the region. Bush, George. “President Bush’s 2002 State 14. Conclusion of the Union Address.” State of the Union Address presented at the Joint Session of While the interests of the United States have Congress, Washington D.C., January 29, changed over the years, the U.S. has consistently 2002. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- tried to maintain their grip in Iran to pursue for- srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm. eign policy goals. In the 1950s, those goals in- cluded favorable oil settlements and the repulsion Byrne, Malcolm. “CIA Confirms Role of communism. With the 1979 Iranian Revolu- in 1953 Iran Coup.” The National tion the U.S.-backed Shah was ousted. This event Security Archive, August 19, 2013. served as a disruption to the U.S.’s ability to di- https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ rectly influence the Iranian government. How- NSAEBB435/. ever, the U.S. continued to exert influence through Byroade. “Proposal to Organize a Coup d’etat contact with the Khomeini regime as well as the in Iran.” Department of State, November 26, use of regional state and non-state actors to ap- 1952. Freedom of Information Act Elec- ply further pressure on the newly formed govern- tronic Reading Room. ment. As the nature of relations shifted, the United States moved to maintain influence through re- “Carter Aide Ties Defeat To Hostage Crisis in gional disruption in the Iran-Iraq War. Using sanc- Iran.” New York Times. 1980. tions and embargoes, the United States was able to apply pressure on Iran economically while George Carter, Jimmy. “Address by President Carter W. Bush’s rhetoric did so politically. During the on the State of the Union Before a presidency of Barack Obama, this economic pres- Joint Session of Congress.” Speech pre- sure was used to sway the Iranian government into sented at the Joint Session of Congress, signing the JCPOA, pursuing the U.S. interest of Washington D.C., January 23, 1980. nuclear containment in Iran. Finally, throughout https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ the Trump presidency, the influence of the United frus1977-80v01/d138.

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Carter, Jimmy. “Letter from Jimmy Carter Iran.” Middle East Journal 61, no. 3 (2007): to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Re- 421–40. garding the Release of the Iranian Hostages,” November 6, 1979. National Hersh, Seymour. “U.S. Secretly Gave Archives. https://www.archives.gov/global- Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against pages/larger-image.html?i=/historical-docs/ Iran.” New York Times, January 26, doc-content/images/carter-letter-iran- 1992. The New York Times Archive. hostages-l.jpg&c=/historical-docs/doc- https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/ content/images/carter-letter-iran- us-secretly-gave-aid-to-iraq-early-in-its-war- hostages.caption.html. against-iran.html.

Cleveland, William L., and Martin P. Bunton. A “Iran: Exporting the Revolution.” National For- History of the Modern Middle East. Fifth edi- eign Assessment Center, 1980. tion. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013. “Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Collier, David R. Democracy and the Nature of (JCPOA),” July 14, 2015. Iran Sanctions. American Influence in Iran, 1941-1979. Con- U.S. Department of State. https://2009- temporary Issues in the Middle East. Syra- 2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa cuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2017. “Iran News: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Crittenden, Ann. “Iran Unrest a Nightmare For Announces Partial Withdrawal from 2015 Many U.S. Concerns: Other Major Arms Nuclear Deal.” Accessed April 24, 2020. Deals Dropped Turmoil in Iran Hurts U.S. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear- Companies Problems for Smaller Compa- deal-iran-announces-partial-withdrawal- nies.” The New York Times. 1978. 2015-pact/.

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