Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research Volume 3 Article 12 October 2020 Influence in the aceF of Changing Interests: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020 Casey Stickel Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus Recommended Citation Stickel, Casey (2020) "Influence in the aceF of Changing Interests: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020," Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 3 , Article 12. Available at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus/vol3/iss1/12 Stickel: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020 Influence in the Face of Changing Interests: U.S.–Iranian Relations 1953-2020 Casey Stickel Seton Hall University Abstract come would be after the U.S.’s blatant attack on Iranian leadership. Popular opinion in the U.S. Despite American presidential rhetoric ex- was divided, with some believing that the killing tolling the virtues of establishing democracy in of Soleimani was necessary retribution for his past Iran, there has been strong evidence to prove that action and others worrying that it would disrupt this has not been the true intent of the United the already fragile nature of U.S.-Iranian relations. States’ foreign policy in the region. Rather, since It is in the aftermath of this attack, amid global 1953, the United States’ primary goal in Iran has uncertainty, that I decided to write my thesis on been to maintain a regime and environment that the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. Importantly, is favorable to the facilitation of American inter- the killing of Qasem Soleimani was not isolated ests regardless of the regime type. While these from the past. It reflected a long-standing pattern American interests have ranged from oil settle- of U.S. intervention within the country, propelled ments, the repulsion of communism, containment by a multitude of reasons. By beginning with the of revolutionary sentiment, and others, the basal 1953 Coup d’etat´ in Iran, one can see the patterns objective has remained the same throughout the of U.S. action in subsequent watershed incidents period of 1953 to the present. While the 1979 Ira- within Iran and between the two countries. nian Revolution proved to be a disruption to the United States’ ability to maintain their interests 2. The 1953 Coup: Origins in the region, this paper will argue that the event did not signify a significant shift in the United The 1953 coup d’etat´ and overthrow of demo- States’ overarching policy of maintaining influ- cratically elected Mohammed Mossadegh and the ence in Iran from the pre- to post-revolutionary subsequent consolidation of power by Moham- period. mad Reza Shah demonstrates the initiation of the United States’ broader policy of American influ- ence in the region. The event also shows how 1. Introduction the establishment of a regime favorable to Amer- ica helped facilitate American foreign policy in- America is currently standing at the precipice terests of the era such as the repulsion of com- of its relationship with Iran. On January 3, 2020, munism and favorable oil settlements. As declas- Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed via an sified documents and public statements through airstrike, assassinated by the United States. This presidential press releases and newspapers will was a landmark interaction between the two coun- show, while overt action and rhetoric are impor- tries. As the United States and Iran hung on the tant for understanding the public’s reactions to- brink of war, the world waited to see what the out- wards certain events, covert documents and action Published by eRepository @ Seton Hall, 2020 1 Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 12 will demonstrate the true intention of the United sitated collaborators within Iranian society. Reli- States regarding the 1953 Coup and the subse- gious leaders known as the ulama, Iranian press, quent events the U.S. directly caused and influ- politicians, and others who would also benefit enced within Iran. from the plan aided in the CIA’s mission. Dr. As the 1953 Coup was unfolding, it was not Donald Wilber’s Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq immediately evident that foreign powers, such as of Iran, a declassified CIA history outlining the the United States and Great Britain, had an inte- coup, serves as a roadmap for understanding in- gral role in the overthrow. However, in the subse- ternal collaboration that assisted in the ousting of quent days and weeks afterwards, the involvement Mossadegh. Alongside the United States’ intense of the United States was difficult to deny. In a propaganda campaign, directed through the Ira- declassified, internal Central Intelligence Agency nian press by the CIA Art Group, the agency’s (CIA) document it explains, “enough talkative Tehran station was also “authorized to spend one people, including many Iranians were privy to million rials a week in purchasing the cooperation segments of the operation to make it relatively of members of the Iranian Majlis.”4 The ulama easy for journalists to reconstruct the coup.”1 The were also motivated to act against Mossadegh, United States was also identified as an instrument who had sought to reduce their power through- in the coup by the Soviet newspaper Pravda which out his tenure as Prime Minister. The document wrote in 1953 that the “United States intrigues also notes how religious leaders, such as Ayatol- and finances had lain behind earlier stages of the lah Boroujerdi, were motivated by the operation Shah’s coup.”2 The United States did not acknowl- to make a “pro-Shah statement,” to increase fa- edge their role in the 1953 Coup until much later vorable sentiment towards him.5 Thus, the United when the CIA released further documents on the States and Great Britain worked alongside multi- event in 2013.3 However, it was common knowl- ple groups in Iranian society who were also mo- edge in Iran that the U.S. had a part in the over- tivated, be it through political, religious, or eco- throw of Mossadegh. Not only would this mu- nomic reasons, to oust Mossadegh. tual understanding among the Iranian public fo- ment anti-American sentiment, it would also taint 3. The 1953 Coup: American Interests the Pahlavi government as colluders with foreign The United States’ motivations for the over- influences within the country. throw of Mossadegh differed from those of the The takeaway from the 1953 Coup is more internal, Iranian collaborators. Most scholars nuanced than the United States simply acting on take a two-pronged approach when understand- their own accord to overthrow Prime Minister ing the motivations of the United States in the Mossadegh. The operation was not only planned 1953 Coup.6 First, there is the argument that alongside and aided by Great Britain’s MI6, but the United States intervened to repel communism also by Iranian parties with their own motivations from the country as they viewed an encroaching for Mossadegh’s removal. For the United States Tudeh party as a threat to their regional economic to infiltrate and overthrow Mossadegh there neces- interests and as a quasi-insurgency group backed 1Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier 4Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953, Donald Mossadeq of Iran, 19-20. Wilber. The National Security Archive, 1954, 26. 5Central Intelligence Agency, Overthrow of Premier 2“Moscow Says U.S. Aided Shah’s Coup,” The New York Mossadeq of Iran, 65-66. Times, August 20, 1953. 6Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and 3Malcolm Byrne, “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York: The Coup,” The National Security Archive, August 19, 2013. New Press, 2013), 5. https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus/vol3/iss1/12 2 Stickel: U.S.--Iranian Relations 1953-2020 by the Soviets. In addition, the U.S. saw the a favorable oil settlement with the Prime Minis- growing possibility of the Soviets gaining influ- ter.10 In addition, the United States had also been ence with the Mossadegh government. A declas- shaken by the growing oil nationalization in Latin sified CIA document states, “Tudeh support for American countries and sought to prevent a simi- the Prime Minister indicates that the Communists lar occurrence in Iran.11 Initially the United States consider that his return to power will best promote rejected the British government’s request and de- their objectives.”7 The United States viewed Iran cided to continue trying to settle the oil dispute as a struggle between themselves and the Soviet with Mossadegh.12 However, with the promise Union in the broader fight of the Cold War. To of increased influence in the Anglo-Iranian Oil gain Iran as an ally for either side would mean a Company by helping the British, the Americans greater foothold in the Middle East, which was in- were further incentivized to accept the offer for creasingly becoming a hotbed for proxy wars be- covert intervention alongside the British. Even- tween the two nations. The Tudeh party served as tually, they agreed to help orchestrate the coup the primary, organized communist threat in the re- against Mossadegh. gion and their support of Mossadegh worried U.S. Retrospectively, in 1954, Eisenhower spoke officials to a great extent. about the Iranian coup a year after its toppling of Only days before the August 1953 Coup oc- the Mossadegh government. “We were faced in curred, the New York Times reported on Eisen- Iran with a situation that was highly dangerous to hower’s and the United States’ intent on block- the world.”13 He also stated that “the situation in ing communism within the country. This motiva- Iran ‘greatly ameliorated’ as a result of the agree- tion was known in Iran, whose own citizens and ment between that nation’s Government and the journalists had been aware of the United States’ foreign oil companies.”14 It is evident that the sta- interests within the region.