• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

The Arbitrability and Enforceability of a Successorship Provision in a Collective Bargaining Agreement Under the Railway Labor Act: Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines I. INTRODUCTION The Railway Labor Act (RLA)' "must be considered as . .a valua- ble aid toward eliminating interruption of service in the transportation industry and hence valuable to all the public."2 This Comment will give a brief overview of the RLA. Next, it shall focus on the effect of the RLA on the arbitrability of a dispute regarding a successorship provision negotiated between an airline and a union. Both parties' arguments will be reviewed and compared, although the final judgment of the case is still questionable because the United States Supreme Court is consider- ing a petition for writ of certiorari at the time of this. writing. Finally, this Comment will recommend a final disposition of the case and offer the likely outcome as an illustration of why the RLA requires revision. II. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT "A basic tenet of American labor relations has been the vesting of exclusive representation rights in the representative selected by a major- ity of the employees in a particular bargaining unit."' Originally enacted in 1926, the Railway Labor Act included this concept of majority repre- sentation and extended authorization to the National Mediation Board (NMB) to resolve representation disputes in the airline industry." In the RLA, Congress has "left to the discretionary authority of the National Mediation Board the determination of eligible voters, the determination of craft or class bargaining units and the certification of representa- tives." 5 No judicial review is expressly provided for in the Act.' 1. 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1982). 2. C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 144 (2d ed. 1961). 3. Eischen, Representation Disputes and Their Resolution in the Railroadand Airline Industries, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES 23 (1976) [hereinafter RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY]. 4. RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY, supra note 3. The 1936 amendment extended the NMB authority to the airline industry without substantial tailoring. Id. For a discussion of why airlines were brought under the coverage of the RLA, see Comment, Airline Labor Policy, The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J. AIR L. & Com. 461, 461-63 (1951). 5. RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY, supra note 3, at 28. JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 5:1 19891 The RLA is a product of the customs and practices already estab- lished by both labor and management in the railroad industry.7 The RLA's purposes are twofold: to prevent the interruption of interstate commerce and to promote a stable relationship between labor and man- agement in the transportation industry.' In Western Airlines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Jus- tice O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court summarized the three classes of labor disputes recognized under the RLA and their re- spective dispute resolution procedures as follows: "Minor" disputes involve the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. Minor disputes are subject to arbitration by a System Board of Adjustment. 45 U.S.C. § 184 ...... Major" dis- putes involve the formation of collective-bargaining agreements, and the resolution of such disputes is governed by § 6 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 181. "Representation" disputes involve defining the bargaining unit and de- termining the employee representative for collective-bargaining. Under § 2, Ninth, of the Act, the National Mediation Board has exclusive jurisdiction over representation disputes. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 181.8 A grievance characterized as "minor" must be referred to an appropri- ate system, group, or regional board of adjustment as stipulated by sec- tion 1.84.0 The adjustment boards are bipartisan; they generally are comprised of an equal number of labor and management appointees, 6. Id. But see Green & Rutledge, The FederalCourts as Super-Arbitration Tribunals: Judicial Review of Non-Reviewable Railroad Labor Grievance Awards, 37 LAB. L.J. 387 (1986). 7. RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY, supra note 3, at 23. 8. The purposes of the RLA are the following: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of griev- ances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. 45 U.S.C. § 151a. 9. Western Airlines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 480 U.S. 1301, 1302-03 (1987). The RLA itself does not recognize the terms "major" and "minor" for the dis- putes, but this classification has been applied since the Supreme Court case of Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). See Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Indus- try: Toward a New Judicial Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1003, 1005 n.20 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry]. 10. 45 U.S.C. § 184. RAILWAY LABOR ACT with an impartial chairperson appointed to break a tie." "Where a mi- nor dispute arises and the parties are unable to resolve it through negoti- ations . ., the arbitrator has primary and exclusive jurisdiction to inter- pret the agreement of the parties and make the appropriate award." 2 "In virtually all minor disputes, the court will relay the matter to the appropriate adjustment board and absolve itself of jurisdiction."' 3 Disputes are labelled "major" where there is no collective bargaining agreement, "or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and there- fore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the contro- versy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to the assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past.' 4 Section 6 of the RLA mandates an explicit procedure for intended changes of collective bargaining agreements, including "at least thirty days notice of an in- tended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."' 5 If the parties do not agree, they may utilize a mediator from the NMB.' 6 If an amicable settlement cannot be reached and ei- ther party declines to submit to binding arbitration before the NMB,"7 a thirty-day "cooling-off" period is imposed, prohibiting any alteration of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.' 8 However, if a dispute "threaten[s] substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service," the NMB shall notify the President so that an "Emergency Board" may be created to investigate and report the dispute within thirty days.' 9 Another thirty-day "cooling-off" period is imposed following the Board's report to the President."0 Section 2, Ninth of the RLA governs representation disputes." Upon request of either party, the NMB shall investigate such dispute and cer- tify the individual(s) or organization(s) designated and authorized to re- present the employees involved in the dispute." Beyond general direc- II. Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry, supra note 9, at 1008. 12. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Republic Airlines, 761 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985). 13. Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry, supra note 9, at 1009. 14. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). 15. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). 16. 45 U.S.C. § 155(a), First (1982). 17. 45 U.S.C. § 155, First (1982) provides that the NMB must endeavor to induce arbitration if a settlement through mediation is unsuccessful. 18. Id. For a brief overview of collective bargaining under the RLA, see McDonald, Airline Management Prerogativein the Deregulation Era, 52 J. AIR L. & Com. 869, 882- 85 (1987). 19. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). 20. Id. 21. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1982). 22. Id. JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 5:1 1989] tives, section 2 provides no specific procedures nor any particular guidelines to which the NMB must conform during its investigation.2 3 The NMB is "authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees in- volved, or to utilize any other appropriate method . .[that] shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, in- fluence, or coercion exercised by the carrier."2'4 The NMB itself may designate who may participate in the election, or it may assign this duty to an appointed committee of three neutral persons.2 5 A federal district court does not have the authority to review the NMB's decision of certi- fication of representatives for collective bargaining." III. ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS v. DELTA AIR LINES Recently decided before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Association of Flight Attendants v. Delta Air Lines2" presented the issue of whether the termination of a union's certi- fication due to a merger renders moot the union's request to arbitrate a grievance involving representation issues under a successor clause. Addi- tionally, the court determined whether an arbitrator could award dam- ages to the Appellant (AFA) if the arbitrator found that the Appellee (Western/Delta) had breached the collective bargaining agreement.28 A.

Load more

  18

Copy Link