Korean Responses to Historic Narratives of Sino-Korean Relations and China's New International Relations Thinking
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Asian Thought on China's Changing International Relations Korean responses to historic narratives of Sino-Korean relations and China's new international relations thinking Introduction This paper will provide a short overview of the long history of Sino-Korean relations and discuss how this historical legacy affects current Korean attitudes towards China’s rise and changing role in the East Asian region. For much of its history Korea had been subordinated (sometimes willingly, in other cases unwillingly, and usually nominally) to the Sinocentric world order. All this changed with the occupation of Korea by the Japanese between 1910 and 1945 and the subsequent Korean War (1950-3) that ended Korea’s (at least its southern half’s) historical subordination to Chinese political and cultural hegemony. More recently the response of Korea towards China’s revival and changing international role has been complex and varied. When China talks about the re-establishment of a ‘Confucian’ world order in East Asia and the wangdao of the daguo,1 it immediately triggers suspicion among Koreans of China’s long-term ambitions and ‘hidden motives’ (usually exacerbated by disputes over historical territorial claims and Korean memory of past Chinese interventions in the Korean peninsula). And yet this suspicion goes hand in hand with the practical acknowledgement (at least among upper levels of Korea’s governing elite) that China is the largest economic partner of both Koreas and that the growth of Chinese influence on Korea in the future is highly probable. How to react to this uncomfortable reality and historical legacy is the focus of Korean think-tanks and policy-planners. The article will analyse some of their thoughts and responses to China’s expanding international relations with a special focus on the Korean peninsula. The Narratives of ‘Chinese Aggression’ The Korean peninsula has historically been exposed to varying levels of ‘Chinese’2 cultural and political influence. Right at the very dawn of recorded Korean history (or rather what is often perceived to be the beginning of Korean history) the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) historian Sima Qian asserted that the king of the Joseon/ Chaoxian (probably located in what is now North Korea), whom Sima Qian calls Man, was a leader of Chinese migrants from the kingdoms of Yan and Qi to Joseon (Shiji 115.2985). Sima Qian reports that Man agreed to be an outer vassal of the Han emperor and was authorized to impose order on the barbarians (Man Yi) of the east. In return for his services the prefect of Liaodong was instructed to provide the king with material aid that enabled him to expand his kingdom over an area stretching thousands of li in all directions (Shiji 115.2986). Thus established in power with Han aid, Sima Qian records, the kings of the dynasty of Man (founder of the royal line of Joseon) consistently refused to present themselves at the imperial court to pay homage.3 With this act of defiance from Joseon and subsequent Chinese invasion and takeover of Joseon, was born the first of the 4 major historical narratives that continues to affect Korean responses to China’s contemporary rise, the narrative of an aggressive, expansionist China threatening Korean independence and self-determination. Throughout his narrative of the conflict between the Han Empire and Joseon, Sima Qian interestingly does not once apply to the state of Joseon the epithet Man Yi (barbarian). As Gi notes, Sima Qian clearly regarded the kingdom as being part of the sinocentric world order and the ruling dynasty at least, which is supposedly from the Yan kingdom in origin, to be civilized.4 It is not an exaggeration to note here that Koreans fear and many believe rightly or wrongly that the modern Chinese share the same sinocentric and chauvinistic attitudes of Sima Qian, this time towards modern Korea. Thus, the narrative of a threatening China persists strongly in the collective Korean psyche, especially among the policy planning elite and politically conservative intellectuals.5 The Chinese invasion of Joseon during the reign of Han Wudi established four commanderies in what is now Northern Korea in 108 BC. The impact of this early Han penetration into what is now Korea was immense and led to the sustained sinification of all of Northeast Asia in succeeding centuries. During the subsequent Three Kingdoms period (ca. 1st century BC-668 AD) of Korean history more peaceful Chinese migration to the Korean peninsula continued. According to the Samguksagi entry for the 38th year of King Bak Hyeogeose of Silla, it is claimed that refugees from Qin settled in Jinhan, that is south-eastern Korea.6 In the same Samguksagi the entry for the 11th year of King Sansang of Goguryeo/Koguryo (in Northern Korea and southern Manchuria) records that a certain Ha Yo from what is now Northern China defected to Goguryeo with 1,000 migrants.7 However, with the establishment of the more aggressive and expansionist Sui Dynasty (589-618 AD) and after it the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), the narrative of ‘Chinese military interventions’ in the Korean peninsula was resumed at least in the eyes of Korea’s nationalist historians who will be mentioned shortly. With the substantial support and cooperation of the kingdom of Silla (in what is now modern south-eastern Korea) these interventions eventually led to the destruction of two of the three ‘Korean’8 kingdoms (Baekje in 660 AD and Goguryeo in 668 AD). The history of these bloody wars and the determined ‘Korean resistance’ to ‘Chinese aggression’ during this period have been particularly emphasized of late and etched in the collective Korean historical memory by compulsory history lessons in schools and also by the Korean media through popular period dramas such as KBS Dae Jo Yeong (2006-7) that glorified Goguryeo’s heroic resistance to Tang ‘China’ and was produced with the deliberate aim of countering China’s historical revisionism (the so- called Northeast Project, 동북공정).9 Not surprisingly perhaps the historical narrative of Tang ‘Chinese aggression’ and intervention in Korean affairs has been taken by academics such as Shin Bok Ryong of Geonguk University as a veritable historical model for current ‘Chinese territorial ambitions’ vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula. Shin asserts that the territorial ambitions of Tang Taizong are reminiscent of the current Chinese historical, revisionist stance towards the kingdoms of Goguryeo and Balhae.10 He is adamant that modern China seeks to imitate the irredentist policies of Taizong and is using the Northeast Project (동북공정, a state sponsored ‘academic’ project that anachronistically and for political reasons labeled Goguryeo and Balhae as ‘Chinese provincial regimes’) to establish historical claims to North Korea in the same way that Taizong used history to justify Tang occupation of Goguryeo territory in Liaodong.11 This fear of Chinese aggression has also given rise to the prediction among Korean policy planners of the likelihood of renewed Chinese military intervention in the case of the collapse of the North Korean dictatorship. Bak Changhee of Gukbang University argues that China has traditionally viewed the Korean peninsula as its sphere of influence and will intervene to protect its vested interests in North Korea.12 He also asserts that China’s ultimate strategic goal is to expand its power further into the Korean peninsula, separate South Korea from its alliance with the US and establish a pro-Chinese government in the whole of the peninsula.13 The recent Chinese support for North Korea (quite apparent) and perceived snub of South Korea during the recent Cheonanham incident when North Korea torpedoed and sunk the South Korean warship Cheonan, have only heightened such fears. Yi Sanghyun from the ministry of foreign affairs argues that China’s rise and continued support for North Korea’s Kim dynasty presents a potential threat to South Korea’s security, that China’s ambition is to turn Korea into a buffer zone and dominate the East China Sea (excluding other powers such as the USA from east Asian waters), that China might be planning to use the Northeast Project as a smokescreen to justify territorial ambitions in North Korea, and that China’s so-called ‘peaceful rise’ might not be so peaceful after all.14 He also asserts that China’s recent behaviour towards Korea conceals a desire to view Sino-Korean relations in the light of the tributary relations that existed between Korea and China in the pre-modern, ‘feudal’ era, i.e. that it is an expression of arrogance. He therefore proposes that the US-Korea alliance must be maintained for Korea’s security and to contain China’s possible future ambitions. However, given the economic importance of China to Korea a certain amount of balancing and hedging is required diplomatically, he argues, to somehow lessen Chinese disapproval of the US-Korea military alliance.15 A more radical anti-Chinese rhetoric can be found in the work of Gang Hyo Baek. Gang argues that the Chinese empire has historically been a threat to Korea, that the current Chinese ‘empire’ under the communists is a neo-imperialist state which is a military and economic threat not just to Korea but to the wider Pacific community, and that Korea is woefully unprepared for the inevitable renewal of Chinese expansionist tendencies in the western Pacific and also the Korean peninsula.16 A fear of Chinese maritime expansion and territorial ambitions towards the Korean island of Ieodo (이어도) and Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zones in the East China Sea has also been raised by academics engaged in Korean naval defence planning. Cha Do Hee for instance emphasizes the fact that the US and China are engaged in a power struggle over naval hegemony in East Asia and that in order to defend Korea’s maritime borders, trade routes and economic interests in the East China Sea a strengthening of the U.S.-Korea military alliance and the expansion of Korean naval capacity are needed to counter China’s growing expansionist ambitions.17 These fears which may seem exaggerated to some are nonetheless understandable when the historical narratives of past Chinese military interventions in the Korean peninsula are taken into consideration.