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Asian Thought on 's Changing International Relations

Korean responses to historic narratives of Sino-Korean relations and China's new international relations thinking

Introduction

This paper will provide a short overview of the long history of Sino-Korean relations and discuss how this historical legacy affects current Korean attitudes towards China’s rise and changing role in the East Asian region. For much of its history had been subordinated (sometimes willingly, in other cases unwillingly, and usually nominally) to the Sinocentric world order. All this changed with the occupation of Korea by the Japanese between 1910 and 1945 and the subsequent (1950-3) that ended Korea’s (at least its southern half’s) historical subordination to Chinese political and cultural hegemony. More recently the response of Korea towards China’s revival and changing international role has been complex and varied. When China talks about the re-establishment of a ‘Confucian’ world order in East and the wangdao of the daguo,1 it immediately triggers suspicion among of China’s long-term ambitions and ‘hidden motives’ (usually exacerbated by disputes over historical territorial claims and Korean memory of past Chinese interventions in the Korean peninsula). And yet this suspicion goes hand in hand with the practical acknowledgement (at least among upper levels of Korea’s governing elite) that China is the largest economic partner of both and that the growth of Chinese influence on Korea in the future is highly probable. How to react to this uncomfortable reality and historical legacy is the focus of Korean think-tanks and policy-planners. The article will analyse some of their thoughts and responses to China’s expanding international relations with a special focus on the Korean peninsula.

The Narratives of ‘Chinese Aggression’

The Korean peninsula has historically been exposed to varying levels of ‘Chinese’2 cultural and political influence. Right at the very dawn of recorded Korean history (or rather what is often perceived to be the beginning of Korean history) the dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) historian asserted that the king of the / Chaoxian (probably located in what is now ), whom Sima Qian calls Man, was a leader of Chinese migrants from the kingdoms of and Qi to Joseon (Shiji 115.2985). Sima Qian reports that Man agreed to be an outer vassal of the Han and was authorized to impose order on the barbarians (Man Yi) of the east. In return for his services the prefect of Liaodong was instructed to provide the king with material aid that enabled him to expand his kingdom over an area stretching thousands of in all directions (Shiji 115.2986). Thus established in power with Han aid, Sima Qian records, the kings of the dynasty of Man (founder of the royal line of Joseon) consistently refused to present themselves at the imperial court to pay homage.3

With this act of defiance from Joseon and subsequent Chinese invasion and takeover of Joseon, was born the first of the 4 major historical narratives that continues to affect Korean responses to China’s contemporary rise, the narrative of an aggressive, expansionist China threatening Korean independence and self-determination. Throughout his narrative of the conflict between the Han Empire and Joseon, Sima Qian interestingly does not once apply to the state of Joseon the epithet Man Yi (barbarian). As Gi notes, Sima Qian clearly regarded the kingdom as being part of the sinocentric world order and the ruling dynasty at least, which is supposedly from the Yan kingdom in origin, to be civilized.4 It is not an exaggeration to note here that Koreans fear and many believe rightly or wrongly that the modern Chinese share the same sinocentric and chauvinistic attitudes of Sima Qian, this time towards modern Korea. Thus, the narrative of a threatening China persists strongly in the collective Korean psyche, especially among the policy planning elite and politically conservative intellectuals.5 The Chinese invasion of Joseon during the reign of Han Wudi established four commanderies in what is now Northern Korea in 108 BC. The impact of this early Han penetration into what is now Korea was immense and led to the sustained sinification of all of in succeeding centuries.

During the subsequent period (ca. BC-668 AD) of Korean history more peaceful Chinese migration to the Korean peninsula continued. According to the Samguksagi entry for the 38th year of King Bak Hyeogeose of , it is claimed that refugees from Qin settled in Jinhan, that is south-eastern Korea.6 In the same Samguksagi the entry for the 11th year of King Sansang of /Koguryo (in Northern Korea and southern ) records that a certain Ha Yo from what is now Northern China defected to Goguryeo with 1,000 migrants.7 However, with the establishment of the more aggressive and expansionist (589-618 AD) and after it the (618-907 AD), the narrative of ‘Chinese military interventions’ in the Korean peninsula was resumed at least in the eyes of Korea’s nationalist historians who will be mentioned shortly. With the substantial support and cooperation of the kingdom of Silla (in what is now modern south-eastern Korea) these interventions eventually led to the destruction of two of the three ‘Korean’8 kingdoms (Baekje in 660 AD and Goguryeo in 668 AD). The history of these bloody wars and the determined ‘Korean resistance’ to ‘Chinese aggression’ during this period have been particularly emphasized of late and etched in the collective Korean historical memory by compulsory history lessons in schools and also by the Korean media through popular period dramas such as KBS Dae Jo Yeong (2006-7) that glorified Goguryeo’s heroic resistance to Tang ‘China’ and was produced with the deliberate aim of countering China’s historical revisionism (the so- called Northeast Project, 동북공정).9

Not surprisingly perhaps the historical narrative of Tang ‘Chinese aggression’ and intervention in Korean affairs has been taken by academics such as Shin Bok Ryong of Geonguk University as a veritable historical model for current ‘Chinese territorial ambitions’ vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula. Shin asserts that the territorial ambitions of Tang Taizong are reminiscent of the current Chinese historical, revisionist stance towards the kingdoms of Goguryeo and .10 He is adamant that modern China seeks to imitate the irredentist policies of Taizong and is using the Northeast Project (동북공정, a state sponsored ‘academic’ project that anachronistically and for political reasons labeled Goguryeo and Balhae as ‘Chinese provincial regimes’) to establish historical claims to North Korea in the same way that Taizong used history to justify Tang occupation of Goguryeo territory in Liaodong.11 This fear of Chinese aggression has also given rise to the prediction among Korean policy planners of the likelihood of renewed Chinese military intervention in the case of the collapse of the North Korean dictatorship. Bak Changhee of Gukbang University argues that China has traditionally viewed the Korean peninsula as its sphere of influence and will intervene to protect its vested interests in North Korea.12 He also asserts that China’s ultimate strategic goal is to expand its power further into the Korean peninsula, separate from its alliance with the US and establish a pro-Chinese government in the whole of the peninsula.13

The recent Chinese support for North Korea (quite apparent) and perceived snub of South Korea during the recent Cheonanham incident when North Korea torpedoed and sunk the South Korean warship Cheonan, have only heightened such fears. Yi Sanghyun from the ministry of foreign affairs argues that China’s rise and continued support for North Korea’s dynasty presents a potential threat to South Korea’s security, that China’s ambition is to turn Korea into a buffer zone and dominate the East China Sea (excluding other powers such as the USA from east Asian waters), that China might be planning to use the Northeast Project as a smokescreen to justify territorial ambitions in North Korea, and that China’s so-called ‘peaceful rise’ might not be so peaceful after all.14 He also asserts that China’s recent behaviour towards Korea conceals a desire to view Sino-Korean relations in the light of the tributary relations that existed between Korea and China in the pre-modern, ‘feudal’ era, i.e. that it is an expression of arrogance. He therefore proposes that the US-Korea alliance must be maintained for Korea’s security and to contain China’s possible future ambitions. However, given the economic importance of China to Korea a certain amount of balancing and hedging is required diplomatically, he argues, to somehow lessen Chinese disapproval of the US-Korea military alliance.15

A more radical anti-Chinese rhetoric can be found in the work of Gang Hyo Baek. Gang argues that the Chinese empire has historically been a threat to Korea, that the current Chinese ‘empire’ under the communists is a neo-imperialist state which is a military and economic threat not just to Korea but to the wider Pacific community, and that Korea is woefully unprepared for the inevitable renewal of Chinese expansionist tendencies in the western Pacific and also the Korean peninsula.16 A fear of Chinese maritime expansion and territorial ambitions towards the Korean island of Ieodo (이어도) and Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zones in the East China Sea has also been raised by academics engaged in Korean naval defence planning. Cha Do Hee for instance emphasizes the fact that the US and China are engaged in a power struggle over naval hegemony in and that in order to defend Korea’s maritime borders, trade routes and economic interests in the East China Sea a strengthening of the U.S.-Korea military alliance and the expansion of Korean naval capacity are needed to counter China’s growing expansionist ambitions.17

These fears which may seem exaggerated to some are nonetheless understandable when the historical narratives of past Chinese military interventions in the Korean peninsula are taken into consideration. These particular narratives of Chinese ‘aggression’ both past, present and possibly also the future are especially favoured by the more conservative elements of the Korean policy planning elite, but the perception that China is a potential threat to Korea’s future security is quite widespread among Korea’s policy planners in general who favour maintaining Korea’s close military ties to the US as a counter-weight to China’s rise and regard the Chinese rhetoric of ‘peaceful rise’ with some suspicion as merely a smokescreen designed to conceal a more aggressive agenda. As China increasingly emphasizes its new role in international affairs (which some Korean academics view as a prelude to China’s engagement in the 19th century and early 20th century Great Power politics), that assertiveness merely enhances the collective fear among most Korean policy planners who remember all too well what usually happened in Korean history when China became assertive about its prerogatives as a major power. The one weakness in the arguments of the ‘China threat’ advocates (and to some extent the Korean policy planning elite in general) is that they tend to view China solely from a historical perspective, in some cases even from the perspective of the , and are not particularly receptive towards current developments in international relations thinking among Chinese policy planners and intellectuals. Ironically enough the lack of knowledge and understanding of actual Chinese intentions, motives and thinking also characterizes what could be categorized as the pro-Chinese elements in Korea’s left wing intellectual elite. We will address their views below.

The Narratives of Peaceful co-existence in the Sinocentric World Order

Sensitivity to ‘threats’ from China due to the historical memory of past Chinese military interventions in Korea, however, is sometimes in conflict with another very different historical narrative of China-Korea relations. In medieval Korea China was not always the source of naked aggression. Koreans during the and Joseon dynasties (918-1910 AD) did not see association with China as something to be afraid of. For instance the beginnings of Sino-Korean contacts were pushed back artificially to the very dawn of East Asian history via the legendary story of the migration of the sage Gija (; 箕) to Korea during the Shang-Zhou dynastic transition. During the Goryeo and Joseon dynasties, the Korean government offered state sacrifices to this Gija, who supposedly brought to Korea.18 Koreans, especially during the sinophile Joseon dynasty took great pride in this association with Chinese civilization, which in their eyes and also they hoped in the eyes of the Chinese lifted their country above the status of (eastern barbarians).19 As a matter of fact after the fall of the ‘legitimate’ Ming dynasty and its takeover by the ‘barbarian’ Manchus in the 17th century, the Yangban elite of the Joseon dynasty considered Korea to be the sole bastion of Chinese civilization or rather Neo-Confucian civilization and eagerly adopted for themselves the mantle of ‘Little China’ (소중화).20

The legend of Gija which played such an important role in the Joseon articulation of Korea’s self-image to the outside world before the 19th century was probably a fictitious story invented by the Chinese21 during the late Warring States or Han period in order to explain the high level of material culture (which was attributed to the civilizing influence left by Gija) that the Chinese encountered as they expanded east. It is revealing that the earliest stories about Gija mention no such immigration from China to Joseon on his part22 and the attribution of Chinese ancestry to the ancient rulers of Korea was part of the wider Chinese practice of ascribing a Chinese ancestor to all neighbouring, foreign peoples.23 However, what is noteworthy is the extent to which this sinification of Korea in the Chinese imagination was fully embraced by the Koreans as part of their identity. The migration of small numbers of Chinese to Korea was almost without exception welcomed by the Korean ruling elite of all dynasties and time periods before the 19th century. It was seen as an opportunity to absorb China’s ‘superior’ civilization and with the prevailing mood of and sadaejui (serving the great, i.e serving China24) during the Joseon dynasty even the confusion of Korea and China (that is regarding the two countries as part of the same civilized Confucian community) was at times encouraged. Korea’s tributary relationship with China was thus not seen as a mark of national humiliation and subjugation, but as the natural order of things which guaranteed Korea’s inclusion in the civilized Confucian family of nations with China as the father figure.

This ‘harmonious’ historical narrative of Sino-Korean relations like the opposite narrative of military hostilities mentioned above, has also affected Korean perceptions of contemporary China. In particular among the radical left-aligned political and intellectual groups in Korea, which traditionally favoured Communist China and treated Kim Il Sung, the former North Korean dictator, with an inordinate reverence befitting a quasi-cult-leader, the narrative of a peaceful and benign ‘communist’ China is particularly favoured. The almost fanatically pro-Northern (종북), ex- ‘Marxist-nationalist’25 groups who masquerade under names such as the Pyonghwa- Tongil Yeonguso (평화통일연구소 Research Institute for Peaceful Unification) consistently argue that Korea should end its ‘slavish subjugation’ to the ‘imperialist’ USA and achieve ‘independence’ and ‘self-determination’ by terminating the South Korea- USA military alliance and accepting the new ‘multilateral world order’ under the ‘benign leadership’ (영도) of the Chinese communist party, a semi-restoration of the old sinocentric world order.26

Less radical left wing intellectuals in Korea do not openly advocate the complete end to military cooperation with the US, but nonetheless see China’s rise as an opportunity for Korea rather than a threat. The rise of China is seen as an opportunity to end the ‘Cold War mentality’ of South Koreans towards North Korea and the ‘threat’, if there is any, is seen as not dangerous to Korea, but to the ‘hegemonic’ US and its ally . China is seen as a non-threatening responsible international player who will play a vital role in balancing out excessive US and Japanese influence in Korea. Seo Young even asserts that the establishment of pro-Chinese governments in both North and South Korea via Chinese ‘efforts’ is not contrary to Korea’s national interests and accepts without serious scrutiny the official assurances from Beijing that China does not seek hegemony and will never behave like a hegemonic power .27 Such thinking on the part of Korea’s left wing intellectuals encourage them to tentatively accept the notion of an East Asian regional union (somewhat reminiscent of the Chinese demand for an East Asian regional order that excludes non-Asians, i.e. the US from East Asia) and contemplate the formation of an institutionalized collective security apparatus for East Asia, naturally embracing China.28

Furthermore, increasing emphasis has been put on East Asian regionalism, regional economic union and the establishment of an East Asian ‘peace structure’ (i.e. the acceptance of the North Korean demands for a formal peace treaty with the US).29 As if by coincidence, almost simultaneously with these calls for a regional ‘supra- national’ identity (which at least marked somewhat of an ideological break among moderate left wing intellectuals from their past preoccupation with nationalism as an article of faith30) came the more or less academically sound attempts to re-evaluate the nature of Korea’s past tributary relations with China, to paint it in a more favourable light as a systemic network within a ‘civilization community’.31 However, this scholarly agenda was then quickly utilised politically and ideologically to present the argument that Korea’s past inclusion in the sinocentric continental order (i.e. the tributary system in which Korea paid to China) was not such a bad thing after all (since it did not deprive Korea of its actual autonomy) and that South Korea’s removal from this continental order and alignment with the antithetical maritime order established by the Americans and the Japanese is a aberration of the natural order of things.32

By painting Korea’s alignment with the ‘continental powers’, i.e. China and North Korea as the natural order of things, sanitizing as far as possible the history of Sino- Korean relations, and persistently pandering to China’s foreign policy interests these left-wing ideologues form a strong counter-weight to the generally pro-US sentiments of the majority of the South Korean policy planning elite. The irony of course is the fact that these left wing intellectuals who are so vocal when it comes to ‘nationalist’ issues are rendered mostly silent whenever the ‘nationalist’ issues involve China. In such circumstances they have been noted for trying to minimize any negative attention towards China.33 In order to effectively achieve this their strategy has been to minimize the danger from China and constantly magnify the danger from Japan (that perennial enemy of the Korean people in the collective Korean historical memory due to Japan’s invasion and brutal rule of Korea between 1910 and 1945) in order to inflame nationalist sentiments in the opposite direction away from China.34 The US is persistently presented as the boggy-man that did not sufficiently punish Japan for its war crimes and in fact actively encouraged Japan’s revival, which obstructed Korea’s destiny to become a strong unified communist state under Kim Il Sung by intervening against the North Korean ‘liberators’ and their Chinese allies during the Korean War.35

The Nationalist narrative of Sino-Korean relations

The third historical narrative that arguably exerts the greatest influence on the Korean perception of the rise of China is the nationalist narrative. The above-mentioned respect among Koreans for all things Chinese in pre-modern Korea was abruptly brought to an end by the intrusions of the Western colonial powers and Imperial Japan in the 19th and early 20th centuries. China at least from the 1950s onwards was no longer regarded as the fountain of all civilization, but increasingly despised as a poor, backward, communist country that had invaded Korea during the Korean War. The rejection of most aspects of Chinese influence36 and the rise of (tinged with racialism that attributed a pure genetic origin to all Koreans (단일민족) and tried to reject historically attested injection of foreign blood into the Korean gene- pool37) also led to the instinctive repugnance among Koreans of being mistaken for Chinese by outsiders or by the Chinese themselves.

This nationalist narrative of Sino-Korean relations has had a profound impact on contemporary Korean perceptions of China. The most revealing side-effect of this nationalist narrative is the current on-going dispute over between Korea and China. The revisionist Chinese claims to what the Korean public regards as historical Korean states such as Goguryeo and Balhae (동북공정),38 has in recent years sparked an emotional response among nationalist Koreans and needlessly heightened anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. The claims to Goguryeo and Balhae are part of China’s concerted effort to strengthen its historical-territorial claims39 on its borders and also to allay its own internal security concerns.40 However, this assertiveness on the part of China has offended large sections of the Korean population in South Korea, who like their mainland Chinese counterparts were heavily indoctrinated by the East Asian version of state-sponsored, nationalist, pseudo-historical semi-propaganda.41

Interestingly this nationalist vision of Korea as a racially pure nation divorced from the rest of Asia was arguably a Korean adaptation of and reaction to Japanese nationalism and prejudice towards Koreans during the early twentieth century. This nationalism which used to be the preserve of right wing Korean political movements, however, was soon also adopted by the Korean communists as a means of establishing their own legitimacy to the Korean people. Because both the right and left had become so imbued with nationalist rhetoric and ideology, neither the pro-Chinese left- wing intellectuals nor the right wing business leaders could afford to remain consistently silent on the Goguryeo and Balhae controversy, though they both tried for different reasons to trivialize the issue. Since both the left and the right of the political spectrum have built their political legitimacy on being the more genuine ‘nationalist’ and minjok (민족,race) conscious group, none could avoid entirely the pitfalls that come with using nationalism as their rallying cry, especially when foreign relations with a neighbouring colossus such as China were concerned.

The extent to which nationalism still governs Korean political life can be fathomed by the remarkable change in the attitude of the Korean public towards China before and after the controversy arose. Before the controversy became widely known to the Korean public in 2004 public perception of China was very favourable. In fact China was in every poll taken, deemed the more important country to the future of Korea ahead of the United States. However, once the controversy erupted in earnest in the Korean press and mass media public perception of China worsened dramatically. So much so that the majority of Koreans now favour the continuation of the US-Korea military alliance and disapprove of China.42 The prickly issue of national pride was enough to start a wave of Sinophobia in Korea which persists to this day.

Narrative of the contemporary ‘historic’ revival of China and the pragmatic approach

The fourth and final historical narrative of Sino-Korean relations is the current economic rise of China from the 1990s onwards.43 The fact that China is now no longer the ‘backwards, poor’ country that it used to be and the recognition among Koreans of this new wealth and power among the Chinese have both contributed to the mellowing of Korean attitudes (at least official government attitudes) towards the Chinese. In the late 1990s and the early years of the 21st century this had the effect of strengthening the hand of the pro-Chinese elements of the left-wing political alignments in Korea and at the same time endangering the viability of the US-Korean military alliance. US- Korea relations in contrast to the robust relations with China and most of all with Kim Jong Il, hit an all time low during the presidencies of the two consecutive left wing presidents Kim Dae jung and Roh Moo Hyun.

The pro-Chinese stance among the influential left wing South Koreans had the real potential to swing Korea in the direction of Beijing away from the current Korea- Japan-America alliance,44 with immense geopolitical implications. During the sinophile Roh Moo-hyun presidency in particular the ruling Uri party (the main left- wing coalition) consistently cultivated closer ties with Beijing at the expense of the traditional ties between the US and South Korea. While the left-wing was in power, according to one internal poll, among the new incoming legislators 63 percent were reported to have picked China as the most important nation for South Korea and expressed a dim view of the United States.45 However, the change in government under the conservative Lee Myung-Bak presidency from 2008 onwards has definitely slowed or arguably even reversed this political drift of South Korea towards Beijing. Yet given the volatility and the sharp polarization of Korean politics,46 should the left- wing regain power in this year’s presidential elections the drift towards Beijing among Korea’s political elite may recommence, regardless of the low esteem with which China is now held among the Korean public in general.

However, it is apparent that most policy planners in are in favour of a non- radical, pragmatic approach towards the rise of China. The two words that feature most commonly in their lips is ‘balancing’ and ‘hedging’. The consensus seems to be that Korea cannot do without either China or the US and that a conflict between the two is the most dangerous thing to Korea’s best interests. Not only would such a conflict or rivalry negatively impact Korea’s economy, but it will endanger Korea’s security as well. Yet, there is a collective dismay among policy-planners at the fact that despite the reality of Korea’s dependence on both China (economically) and the US (militarily), Korea does not have any leverage on US-China relations and must be dictated to by the two titans. The center-left of the consensus (that Korea needs both China and the US and cannot afford to pick sides) argues that Korea should practice a nuanced and savvy diplomacy47 that uses the value of Korea’s co-operation or lack thereof to extract the maximum amount of concessions from Beijing. By toying with the prospect of allying with China’s neighbours and rivals such as Japan, , and the US, this group believes that Korea can use ‘dalliance’ as ‘blackmail’ to counteract any hostile intentions from China and achieve equal treatment from Beijing.48 In other words should China turn out to be much more powerful in the future they leave open the possibility of switching sides to China and ending the military pact with the US, provided that it can be done on Korea’s terms.

On the other hand the center-right of the consensus believes quite firmly that China will not quickly overtake the US in terms of both economic and military power and that the safest bet is the engage with China, but stand firm within the framework of the US-Korea military alliance. By dallying with an alternative arrangement with China Korea risks finding itself without a dependable ally in a highly volatile international situation.49 This center-right of the consensus for now seems to have the upper hand in Korean policy planning circles and their dominance will likely persist into the near future.

Although this practical and pragmatic approach is definitely admirable and to be preferred over any adventurism based on ideological considerations, what is still wanting in Korean policy planning circles and also among the Korean intellectual elite, is a thorough and in depth analysis and understanding of the ideas espoused by Chinese thinkers that influence Chinese foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis Korea and the rest of the world. Analysis of Chinese thought on foreign policy is currently based on Western analyses, which obviously does not exactly concur with the Korean situation vis-à-vis China. A strategic or diplomatic mistake on the part of the US in its relationship with China will likely only cost the US some minor reverses in terms of its influence on lesser states in maritime East Asia. For Korea any such mistakes could well prove to be devastating to either the economy or national security. Analyses that are specific to how international relations involving China and China’s policy thinking will affect the position of Korea from a Korean perspective are therefore urgently needed.

An attempt to understand the internal dynamics of China’s political organisation and the impact that this has on Chinese foreign policy decision making has been attempted.50 Shin Bong Su and So Jun Seop briefly and superficially engage with the concepts used in international relations thinking by Chinese intellectuals and discuss in passing terminology such as wangdao, peaceful rise, daguo and multipolarity.51

However, most intellectuals on the Korean left have more often than not simply adopt these terms as useful signs for their own internal Korean audience rather than engage deeply with their meaning to Chinese policy planners and in Chinese international relations thinking. The right wing intellectuals have opted to follow the American interpretation of Chinese thinking rather than directly approach the Chinese sources, which also seriously hinders an accurate assessment of China’s intentions.

Conclusion

Most Korean intellectuals and policy planners struggle to balance the four historical narratives of Sino-Korean relations, when formulating Korea’s response to the rise of China. Neither the left nor the right are free from any of the four narratives. The left obviously tries its best to downplay the narrative of aggression on the part of China, while the right seeks to magnify it. The left tends to amplify the narrative of peaceful co-existence, while the right seeks to conveniently skirt over the narrative. Both of the intellectuals on the right and left are still gripped by the racial politics and nationalist thinking of the 19th and 20th centuries and are only now gradually freeing themselves from entanglement with the nationalist narrative of Sino-Korean relations. The new narrative of China’s historic revival also troubles the intellectual elite of Korea. The left seeks to magnify the practical economic reasons for drawing closer to China while the right points to the military necessity of remaining under the protection of the US. Yet the still pervasive influence of nationalism among the Korean public means that the pro-Chinese arguments of the left based on the rationale of the economic importance to Korea of maintaining Sino-Korean cooperation, have serious limitations. The only way to counter the nationalist Sinophobia from the right is to also employ nationalism to attack the Japanese and the US alliance as anti-nationalist. Overall the Korean elite has chosen the pragmatic but highly uncertain path to the future, a path that involves the maintenance of the balance of power which theoretically, if managed properly, would better favour Korea’s chances of survival. What they propose is hedging or rather sitting on the fence approach, waiting to see who will emerge on top after the US-China rivalry has run its course. In other words maintain good relations with both the US and China as long as possible and then if forced to choose, pick the winning side, or better still never put the country in a position where it has to choose between the two. But is that sustainable? The dilemma and concerns of the Korean policy planning elite are likely to become the common concern of all Asia-Pacific nations in the near future.

Hyun Jin Kim

1 Means literally the ‘way of the king of the great/big country’, generally understood in Chinese and Korean intellectual circles to mean the ethical and benign ‘Confucian’ type leadership of a Great Power. 2 Not in the modern sense of the inhabitants of the of China, but in the historical and cultural sense of those who inhabited what for the sake of convenience historians often tend to identify as ‘Chinese’ imperial or dynastic states. The same principle applies to all references to dynasties such as Han, Sui, Tang, Ming etc. in this article and also to ‘Korean’ states such as Goguryeo, Silla etc. These were by no means nation states in the modern sense and should not be confused with the modern Peoples’ Republic of China or the Republic of China () or the Republic of Korea. 3 Gi (2005), 6, argues that the submission of Wei Man (the surname Wei does not appear in the Shiji, but only appears in a later 3rd century source, the Weilue) to the imperial court was genuine and should be taken seriously and not simply as a diplomatic gesture. 4 Gi (2005), 41. 5 As we shall see shortly this fear of Chinese aggression among Korea’s intellectual elite was revived in Korea in modern times by China’s military intervention in support of North Korea during the Korean War (1950-53) and exacerbated by China’s recent one-sided support again of North Korea after the Cheonanham Incident in 2010. 6 Kim Pu-sik, Samguk-Sagi, vol. 1, tr. K.L. Lee (1998), 65. 7 Kim Pu-sik, Samguk-Sagi, vol. 1, tr. K.L. Lee (1998), 353. 8 Again as with the use of the terms ‘Chinese’ and ‘China’ when referring to the Han and Tang empires, the use of the terms ‘Korea’ and ‘Korean’ to describe these ancient kingdoms is problematic since ‘national consciousness’ and ‘nation states’ that terms like ‘China’ and ‘Korea’ evoke are modern constructs and are anachronistic to the first millennium AD. 9 http://www.kbs.co.kr/drama/daejoyoung/about/plan/index.html 10 More on this shortly 11 B.R.Shin (2012), 19 and 49. 12 C.H. Park (2012), 221-2. 13 C.H. Park (2012), 225 and 228. 14 S.H. Yi (2012), 277-8. 15 S.H. Yi (2012), 280-83. The same view is also espoused by T.H. Kim (2012), 355, 365-6. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the kind assistance given to me by Professor Kim who provided me with valuable reference material and also shared with me his opinions on the current state of Sino-Korean relations and the views of the Korean policy planning community. 16 H.B. Gang (2012), 93-101, 211-24. 17 Cha (2012), 253-90. Similar concerns regarding the challenge presented by China’s maritime ambitions and its effect on the security of Korea’s own maritime interests and trade routes can be found in J.H. Yi (2007), 238-42. 18 The earliest reference to Gija and his fictitious ties with Joseon can be found in the Shangshu dazhuan (尚書大傳) and Sima Qian’s famous Shiji, see Shim (2002), 271–305, especially 274-5. 19 For Sinocentrism and Chinese attitudes towards the ‘barbarians’ see H.J. Kim (2009), 34, 60-69. 20 Kim Haboush (1988), 21-28. 21 Bugin (1990), 116. As Nelson (2006), 49, argues, there is nothing that can be identified as Shang or Zhou in eastern Liaodong and Korea in the archaeological record before the Warring States Period. 22 See Hinsch(2004), 81-103, in particular 101 ff. for further details. 23 Kim (2009), 137-39. 24 For a very balanced analysis of the Joseon-China tributary relations and Sadae before the 19th century see Larsen (2008), 29-35. 25 The idiosyncratic and certainly ironic mixture of Communism or rather the ‘Kimilsungism’ (garbled North Korean version of Marxism-Leninism) with Korean nationalism, which is a characteristic feature of North Korean ‘ideology’, is analyzed in detail by Andrei Lankov in his Asia Times article: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/NK02Dg01.html. This bizarre propaganda still has a powerful grip on many radical left-aligned groups in South Korea.

26 J.G. Gang and G.H. Park (2012), 64-6, 73, 419. 27 Seo (2006), 17, 46-7. 52-4. 28 S.H. Yi (2006), 297-324. 29 N.J. Yi (2005), 406, 411-2. 30 A bizarre consequence of the North Korean flirtation with nationalism as an alternative means of attaining legitimacy in the eyes of Korean people and the wholesale embrace of nationalism by the left- wing South Korean elite under the influence of North Korean propaganda. 31 Y.H. Jeong (2005), 83. G.T. Yi (2007), 228-37, suggests that Sino-Korean tributary relations can be viewed as diplomatic gestures and should neither be used for nationalist rhetoric nor be a cause of inferiority complex among Koreans. 32 J.S. Kim (2011), 85. 33 Gyeonghyang Sinmun, Ohmy News, Hangyeoreh Sinmun, MBC News network, Pressian, Media Today, etc., all favour the left of the political spectrum and have shown a marked reluctance to criticize either the North Koreans or their Chinese patrons in Beijing. In contrast their criticisms of the US and Japan have been extremely vigorous. Most of the news agencies cited above for instance denied the North Korean involvement in the recent Chonanham incident and rapidly adopted the Chinese official position towards the incident while rejecting the position espoused by the South Korean government and most of the international community. Their influence among the younger generation of Koreans is also very strong and may well at some stage contribute to the growing support for Chinese interests in Korea. 34 J.S.Kim (2011), 215-61. 35 J.S.Kim (2011), 261. 36 For instance the abrupt disconnect with the story of Gija founding Joseon and the removal of references to Gija in history books in South Korea, see Chen (2012), 233. 37 For a critique of this racialism in Korean historical scholarship see Pai (2000). See also G.W. Shin (2006). 38 This highly publicized and acrimonious dispute between China and Korea over ancient history is also mirrored by an equally acrimonious disagreement over more recent history between Korea and Japan which receives treatment in Kimijima (2000), 203-225. 39 These claims are in turn buttressed by the growing nationalist sentiments of the Chinese people. For Chinese nationalism see Townsend (1996), 1-30, especially 17 ff., and Duara (1996), 31-55. For a critique of the pseudo-historical approach adopted to legitimize modern territorial claims see (2001), 121. See also Chang (2001), 5-13. 40 For detailed analyses of this dispute over Koguryo and its significance see Hays Gries (2005), 3-17, and Chen (2012), 227-241. See also http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrei-Lankov/2233 and http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2631 for further discussion. 41 For excellent analyses of the dispute over ancient history between China and South Korea and the negative effects of nationalist indoctrination in both countries see S.S. Yi (2001), 19-34,186-88; J.O. Yi (2005), 12-23. 42 J.H. Jeong (2011), 360. 43 For a good analysis of this rise and what it implies see Horner (2009), 1-21, 145-56, 183-91. For the history of the evolution of South Korea-China diplomatic and economic relations see Chung (2007). 44 See Kurlantzick (2007), 132. 45 Ibid. 46 See Rozman (2009), 1-9, esp. 2-6. 47 J.H. Jeong (2011), 431-38. 48 So (2012), 392-405. 49 Sohn (2012), 198. See also T.H. Kim (2012), 366. 50 T.H. Yi (2007). 51 B.S. Shin (2011), 20 and 63, on the meaning of wangdao and the Chinese reinterpretation of the western concept of hegemonic power. See also So (2012), 296-304, for a discussion on the Chinese understanding of the terms daguo (great power) and ‘peaceful rise’.

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Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s: Kim, H

Title: Korean Responses to Historic Narratives of Sino-Korean Relations and China's New International Relations Thinking

Date: 2014

Citation: Kim, H. (2014). Korean Responses to Historic Narratives of Sino-Korean Relations and China's New International Relations Thinking. Horesh, (Ed.). Kavalski, (Ed.). Asian Thought on China's Changing International Relations, (1), pp.173-191. Palgrave Macmillan.

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/215925

File Description: Accepted version