DOCSLIB.ORG

Cryptography Study Notes

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cryptography Study Notes Cryptography Study Notes by Steven Gordon School of Engineering and Technology CQUniversity Australia This book is available as: HTML: sandilands.info/crypto/ PDF: sandilands.info/crypto/crypto.pdf Crypto 20.03 14 May 2020 (r1863) Contents List of Figures vii List of Tables xi Glossary xiii I Introduction1 1 Introduction3 2 Cryptography Concepts and Terminology5 2.1 Security Concepts...............................5 2.2 Cryptography Concepts...........................6 2.3 Cryptography Notation and Terminology..................8 II Tools and Techniques9 3 Software Tools 11 3.1 Linux and Ubuntu.............................. 11 3.1.1 Hex and Binary Viewer: xxd..................... 11 3.1.2 Arbitrary Precision Calculator: bc................. 13 3.1.3 Random Numbers........................... 15 3.1.4 Hash Functions............................ 16 3.1.5 Bash Scripts.............................. 16 3.2 OpenSSL................................... 17 3.2.1 Overview of OpenSSL........................ 17 3.2.2 Common Operations......................... 17 3.2.3 Listing Ciphers and Algorithms................... 18 3.2.4 Random Number Generation with OpenSSL............ 19 3.3 Python..................................... 20 3.3.1 Cryptography Package........................ 20 3.3.2 PyCipher Package.......................... 20 4 Statistics for Communications and Security 23 4.1 Binary Values................................. 23 4.2 Counting.................................... 25 i ii CONTENTS 4.3 Permutations and Combinations....................... 26 4.4 Probability.................................. 28 4.5 Collisions................................... 30 5 Number Theory 31 5.1 Divisibility and Primes............................ 31 5.2 Modular Arithmetic.............................. 34 5.3 Fermat’s and Euler’s Theorems....................... 37 5.4 Discrete Logarithms............................. 37 5.5 Computationally Hard Problems....................... 40 III Symmetric Key Encryption 43 6 Classical Ciphers 45 6.1 Caesar Cipher................................. 45 6.1.1 Caesar Cipher Definitions and Examples.............. 45 6.1.2 Brute Force Attack on Caesar Cipher................ 48 6.2 Monoalphabetic Ciphers........................... 50 6.2.1 Monoalphabetic Cipher Definitions and Examples......... 50 6.2.2 Brute Force Attack on Monoalphabetic Cipher........... 51 6.2.3 Frequency Analysis Attack on Monoalphabetic Cipher....... 51 6.3 Playfair Cipher................................ 54 6.4 Polyalphabetic Ciphers............................ 57 6.5 Vigenère Cipher................................ 57 6.6 Vernam Cipher................................ 59 6.7 One Time Pad................................. 60 6.8 Transposition Techniques........................... 62 7 Encryption and Attacks 65 7.1 Encryption Building Blocks......................... 65 7.2 Attacks on Encryption............................ 68 7.2.1 Aims and Knowledge of the Attacker................ 69 7.2.2 Brute Force Attacks......................... 69 7.2.3 Cryptanalysis............................. 70 7.2.4 Measuring Security.......................... 72 7.3 Block Cipher Design Principles....................... 73 7.4 Stream Cipher Design Principles....................... 78 7.5 Example: Brute Force on DES........................ 79 7.6 Example: Brute Force on AES........................ 81 7.7 Example: Meet-in-the-Middle Attack.................... 82 7.8 Example: Cryptanalysis on Triple-DES and AES............. 87 8 Data Encryption Standard 89 8.1 Overview of the Data Encryption Standard (DES)............. 89 8.2 Simplified-DES................................ 89 8.3 Details of DES................................ 96 8.4 DES in OpenSSL............................... 101 CONTENTS iii 8.4.1 DES Encryption Basics in OpenSSL................. 101 8.4.2 Symmetric Key Encryption Padding and Modes of Operation.. 104 8.4.3 DES OpenSSL Exercises....................... 107 8.5 DES in Python................................ 107 9 Advanced Encryption Standard 109 9.1 Overview of AES............................... 109 9.2 Simplified-AES................................ 111 9.3 Simplified-AES Example........................... 116 9.4 Details of AES................................ 116 9.5 AES in OpenSSL............................... 118 9.5.1 AES Encryption Basics in OpenSSL................. 118 9.5.2 AES Performance Benchmarking.................. 118 9.5.3 AES OpenSSL Exercises....................... 119 9.6 AES in Python................................ 120 10 Pseudorandom Number Generators 121 11 Block Cipher Modes of Operation 123 11.1 Block Ciphers with Multiple Blocks..................... 123 11.2 Electronic Code Book............................. 124 11.3 Cipher Block Chaining Mode........................ 124 11.4 Cipher Feedback Mode............................ 125 11.5 Output Feedback Mode............................ 126 11.6 Counter Mode................................. 127 11.7 Feedback Characteristics of Modes..................... 128 11.8 XTS-AES................................... 128 IV Public Key Cryptography 133 12 Public Key Cryptography 135 12.1 Concepts of Public Key Cryptography................... 135 13 RSA 139 13.1 RSA Algorithm................................ 139 13.2 Analysis of RSA................................ 144 13.3 Implementations of RSA........................... 147 13.4 RSA in OpenSSL............................... 148 13.4.1 RSA Key Generation in OpenSSL.................. 149 13.4.2 RSA Signing in OpenSSL (Sender)................. 152 13.4.3 RSA Encryption in OpenSSL (Sender)............... 153 13.4.4 RSA Decryption in OpenSSL (Receiver).............. 153 13.4.5 RSA Verification in OpenSSL (Receiver).............. 154 13.4.6 RSA OpenSSL Exercises....................... 154 13.5 RSA in Python................................ 154 iv CONTENTS 14 Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange 155 14.1 Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm.................. 155 14.2 Analysis of DHKE.............................. 158 14.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack on DHKE.................... 159 14.4 Implementations of DHKE.......................... 161 14.5 Diffie–Hellman in OpenSSL......................... 161 14.6 DHKE in Python............................... 165 15 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 167 15.1 Overview of Elliptic Curve Cryptography.................. 167 15.2 Applications of Elliptic Curve Cryptography................ 174 15.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography in OpenSSL.................. 175 V Authentication 177 16 Hash Functions and MACs 179 16.1 Introduction to Hash Functions....................... 179 16.2 Properties of Cryptographic Hash Functions................ 181 16.3 Introduction to Message Authentication Codes............... 184 17 Authentication and Data Integrity 187 17.1 Aims of Authentication............................ 187 17.2 Authentication with Symmetric Key Encryption.............. 188 17.3 Authentication with Hash Functions.................... 189 17.4 Authentication with MACs.......................... 191 17.5 Digital Signatures............................... 193 VI Key Management 195 18 Key Distribution and Management 197 18.1 Recommended Key Sizes........................... 197 19 Digital Certificates 199 VII Advances in Cryptography 201 20 Quantum Computing and Cryptography 203 20.1 Quantum Computing............................. 204 20.2 Quantum Algorithms............................. 206 20.3 Issues in Quantum Computing........................ 209 20.4 Quantum Cryptography........................... 211 20.5 Cryptography in the Quantum Era..................... 212 CONTENTS v VIII Additional Resources 213 A Cryptography Assumptions and Principles 215 A.1 Assumptions.................................. 215 A.1.1 Encryption.............................. 215 A.1.2 Knowledge of Attacker........................ 216 A.1.3 Authentication with Symmetric Key and MACs.......... 216 A.1.4 Hash Functions............................ 216 A.1.5 Digital Signatures........................... 216 A.1.6 Key Management and Random Numbers.............. 216 A.2 Principles................................... 217 B Data Formats 219 B.1 Common Data Formats............................ 219 B.1.1 English Alphabet........................... 219 B.1.2 Printable Keyboard Characters................... 219 B.1.3 Binary Data.............................. 220 B.1.4 ASCII................................. 220 B.1.5 Hexadecimal.............................. 221 B.1.6 Base64................................. 221 B.2 Conversions using Linux........................... 222 B.3 Conversions using Python.......................... 222 C Organisations and People in Cryptography 227 C.1 Organisations in Cryptography and Security................ 227 C.1.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology.......... 227 C.1.2 International Association for Cryptologic Research......... 227 C.1.3 Australian Signals Directorate.................... 227 C.1.4 National Security Agency...................... 227 C.1.5 Government Communications Headquarters............ 227 C.1.6 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.......... 227 C.1.7 Internet Engineering Task Force................... 227 C.2 People in Cryptography and Security.................... 228 C.2.1 Diffie, Hellman and Merkle...................... 228 C.2.2 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman..................... 228 C.2.3 Alan Turing.............................. 229 C.2.4 Claude Shannon............................ 230 C.2.5 Hedy Lamarr............................. 231 C.2.6 Phil Zimmermann..........................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Models and Algorithms for Physical Cryptanalysis
    MODELS AND ALGORITHMS FOR PHYSICAL CRYPTANALYSIS Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktor-Ingenieurs der Fakult¨at fur¨ Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik an der Ruhr-Universit¨at Bochum von Kerstin Lemke-Rust Bochum, Januar 2007 ii Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Christof Paar, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany External Referee: Prof. Dr. David Naccache, Ecole´ Normale Sup´erieure, Paris, France Author contact information: [email protected] iii Abstract This thesis is dedicated to models and algorithms for the use in physical cryptanalysis which is a new evolving discipline in implementation se- curity of information systems. It is based on physically observable and manipulable properties of a cryptographic implementation. Physical observables, such as the power consumption or electromag- netic emanation of a cryptographic device are so-called `side channels'. They contain exploitable information about internal states of an imple- mentation at runtime. Physical effects can also be used for the injec- tion of faults. Fault injection is successful if it recovers internal states by examining the effects of an erroneous state propagating through the computation. This thesis provides a unified framework for side channel and fault cryptanalysis. Its objective is to improve the understanding of physi- cally enabled cryptanalysis and to provide new models and algorithms. A major motivation for this work is that methodical improvements for physical cryptanalysis can also help in developing efficient countermea- sures for securing cryptographic implementations. This work examines differential side channel analysis of boolean and arithmetic operations which are typical primitives in cryptographic algo- rithms. Different characteristics of these operations can support a side channel analysis, even of unknown ciphers.
    [Show full text]
  • Environmental DNA Reveals the Fine-Grained and Hierarchical
    www.nature.com/scientificreports OPEN Environmental DNA reveals the fne‑grained and hierarchical spatial structure of kelp forest fsh communities Thomas Lamy 1,2*, Kathleen J. Pitz 3, Francisco P. Chavez3, Christie E. Yorke1 & Robert J. Miller1 Biodiversity is changing at an accelerating rate at both local and regional scales. Beta diversity, which quantifes species turnover between these two scales, is emerging as a key driver of ecosystem function that can inform spatial conservation. Yet measuring biodiversity remains a major challenge, especially in aquatic ecosystems. Decoding environmental DNA (eDNA) left behind by organisms ofers the possibility of detecting species sans direct observation, a Rosetta Stone for biodiversity. While eDNA has proven useful to illuminate diversity in aquatic ecosystems, its utility for measuring beta diversity over spatial scales small enough to be relevant to conservation purposes is poorly known. Here we tested how eDNA performs relative to underwater visual census (UVC) to evaluate beta diversity of marine communities. We paired UVC with 12S eDNA metabarcoding and used a spatially structured hierarchical sampling design to assess key spatial metrics of fsh communities on temperate rocky reefs in southern California. eDNA provided a more‑detailed picture of the main sources of spatial variation in both taxonomic richness and community turnover, which primarily arose due to strong species fltering within and among rocky reefs. As expected, eDNA detected more taxa at the regional scale (69 vs. 38) which accumulated quickly with space and plateaued at only ~ 11 samples. Conversely, the discovery rate of new taxa was slower with no sign of saturation for UVC.
    [Show full text]
  • Non-Interactive Key Establishment in Wireless Mesh Networks
    Chapter 1 Non-Interactive Key Establishment in Wireless Mesh Networks Zhenjiang Li†, J.J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves †∗ zhjli,jj @soe.ucsc.edu { } †Computer Engineering, University of California, Santa Cruz 1156 high street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA Phone:1-831-4595436, Fax: 1-831-4594829 ∗Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) 3333 Coyote Hill Road, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA Symmetric cryptographic primitives are preferable in designing security protocols for wireless mesh networks (WMNs) because they are computationally affordable for resource- constrained mobile devices forming a WMN. Most proposed key-establishment schemes for symmetric cryptosystem assume services from a centralized authority (either on-line or off- line), or involve the interaction between communicating parties. However, requiring access 1 c Springer, 2005. This is a revision of the work published in the proceedings of AdhocNow’05, LNCS 3738, pp. 164-177, Cancun," Mexico, Oct. 2005. 2This work was supported in part by the Baskin Chair of Computer Engineering at UCSC, the National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-0435522, the U.S. Army Research Office under grant No. W911NF-05-1-0246. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies. 1 2CHAPTER 1. NON-INTERACTIVE KEY ESTABLISHMENT IN WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS to a centralized authority, or ensuring that correct routing be established before the key agreement is done, is difficult to attain in wireless networks. We present a new non-interactive key agreement and progression (NIKAP) scheme for wireless networks, which does not require an on-line centralized authority, can establish and update pairwise shared keys between any two nodes in a non-interactive manner, is configurable to operate synchronously (S-NIKAP) or asynchronously (A-NIKAP), and has the ability to provide differentiated security services w.r.t.
    [Show full text]
  • Mesh Segmentation Guided by Seed Points
    Bulletin of the JSME Vol.9, No.4, 2015 Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing Mesh segmentation guided by seed points Xue JIAO*, Huixin ZHANG* and Tieru WU* *Institute of Mathematics, Jilin University Changchun, Jilin130012, China E-mail: [email protected] Received 3 January 2015 Abstract Segmenting 3D models into meaningful parts is a fundamental problem in computer graphics. In this paper, we present an algorithm which is guided by the mesh vertices for segmenting a mesh into meaningful sub-meshes. First, a candidate set of feature points is selected to highlight the most significant features of the model. After that, a diversity measure is calculated by using Hausdorff distance. The collection of seed points we defined is a subset of the candidate set. The collection of seed points consists of two parts, namely, the basic point and lucky points. By maximizing the diversity measure between the seed set and candidate set, an appropriate seed point is selected. Based on the collection of seed points, the segmentation process can be guided by these seeds. Because humans generally perceive desirable segmentations at concave regions, and the geodesic distance and curvature are well-known noise sensitive. Considering the above factors, in order to partition the target into meaningful parts, we define a distance function between each pair of mesh vertices. This function is formed by arc length, angular distance and curvature-related correction term. We have tested the method developed in this paper with 3D meshes from the Princeton segmentation benchmark. Moreover, our segmentation method also has been compared with other methods.
    [Show full text]
  • Differential and Linear Attacks on the Full WIDEA-N Block Ciphers (Under
    Differential and Linear Attacks on the full WIDEA-n block ciphers (under weak keys) Jorge Nakahara Jr Universit´eLibre de Bruxelles (ULB), Dept. of Computer Science, Belgium [email protected] Abstract. We report on differential and linear analysis of the full 8.5- round WIDEA-n ciphers for n 2 f4; 8g, under weak-key assumptions. The novelty in our attacks include the use of differential and linear rela- tion patterns that allow to bypass the diffusion provided by MDS codes altogether. Therefore, we can attack only a single IDEA instance out of n copies, effectively using a narrow trail for the propagation of differ- ences and masks across WIDEA-n. In fact, the higher the value of n, the better the attacks become. Our analyses apply both to particular MDS matrices, such as the one used in AES, as well as general MDS matrices. Our attacks exploit fixed points of MDS matrices. We also observed a curious interaction between certain differential/linear patterns and the coefficients of MDS matrices for non-trivial fixed points. This interac- tion may serve as an instructive design criterion for block cipher designs such as WIDEA-n. The authors of WIDEA-n suggested a compression function construction using WIDEA-8 in Davies-Meyer mode. In this setting, the weaknesses identified in this paper can lead to free-start col- lisions and even actual collisions depending on the output transformation of the hash function. Keywords: wide-block cipher, cryptanalysis, WIDEA-n, free-start collisions. 1 Introduction In [6], Junod and Macchetti presented a Wide-block version of IDEA cipher [7] called WIDEA-n, combining n instances of the 8.5-round IDEA cipher joined by an n×n matrix derived from a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Design and Performance of Chinese OSCCA-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms Louise Bergman Martinkauppi∗, Qiuping He† and Dragos Ilie‡ Dept
    On the Design and Performance of Chinese OSCCA-approved Cryptographic Algorithms Louise Bergman Martinkauppi∗, Qiuping Hey and Dragos Iliez Dept. of Computer Science Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH), Karlskrona, Sweden ∗[email protected], yping95 @hotmail.com, [email protected] Abstract—SM2, SM3, and SM4 are cryptographic standards in transit and at rest [4]. The law, which came into effect authorized to be used in China. To comply with Chinese cryp- on January 1, 2020, divides encryption into three different tography laws, standard cryptographic algorithms in products categories: core, ordinary and commercial. targeting the Chinese market may need to be replaced with the algorithms mentioned above. It is important to know beforehand Core and ordinary encryption are used for protecting if the replaced algorithms impact performance. Bad performance China’s state secrets at different classification levels. Both may degrade user experience and increase future system costs. We present a performance study of the standard cryptographic core and ordinary encryption are considered state secrets and algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, SHA-256, and AES-128) and corre- thus are strictly regulated by the SCA. It is therefore likely sponding Chinese cryptographic algorithms. that these types of encryption will be based on the national Our results indicate that the digital signature algorithms algorithms mentioned above, so that SCA can exercise full SM2 and ECDSA have similar design and also similar perfor- control over standards and implementations. mance. SM2 and RSA have fundamentally different designs. SM2 performs better than RSA when generating keys and Commercial encryption is used to protect information that signatures. Hash algorithms SM3 and SHA-256 have many design similarities, but SHA-256 performs slightly better than SM3.
    [Show full text]
  • Ipsec VPN Solutions Using Next Generation Encryption
    IPSec VPN Solutions Using Next Generation Encryption Deployment Guide Version 1.5 Authored by: Ben Rosenblum – CCIE #21084 (R&S, SP) IPSec VPN Solutions Using Deployment Guide Next Generation Encryption THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The following information is for FCC compliance of Class A devices: This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class A digital device, pursuant to part 15 of the FCC rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment. This equipment generates, uses, and can radiate radio-frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with the instruction manual, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. Operation of this equipment in a residential area is likely to cause harmful interference, in which case users will be required to correct the interference at their own expense. The following information is for FCC compliance of Class B devices: The equipment described in this manual generates and may radiate radio- frequency energy.
    [Show full text]
  • A Framework for Fully-Simulatable H-Out-Of-N Oblivious Transfer
    1 A Framework For Fully-Simulatable h-Out-Of-n Oblivious Transfer Zeng Bing, Tang Xueming, and Chingfang Hsu ✦ Abstract—We present a framework for fully-simulatable h-out-of-n where i1 < i2 <...<ih 6 n. The receiver expects to oblivious transfer (OT n) with security against non-adaptive malicious h get the messages mi1 ,mi2 ,...,mih without leaking any adversaries. The framework costs six communication rounds and costs information about his private input, i.e., the h positive at most 40n public-key operations in computational overhead. Com- integers he holds. The sender expects all new knowledge pared with the known protocols for fully-simulatable oblivious transfer that works in the plain mode (where there is no trusted common learned by the receiver from their interaction is at most reference string available) and proven to be secure under standard h messages. Obviously, the OT most literature refer to is 2 n model (where there is no random oracle available), the instantiation OT1 and can be viewed as a special case of OTh . based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption of the framework is Considering a variety of attack we have to confront the most efficient one, no matter seen from communication rounds or n in real environment, a protocol for OTh with security computational overhead. against malicious adversaries (a malicious adversary Our framework uses three abstract tools, i.e., perfectly binding com- mitment, perfectly hiding commitment and our new smooth projective may act in any arbitrary malicious way to learn as much hash. This allows a simple and intuitive understanding of its security.
    [Show full text]
  • The Celeblain of Celeborn and Galadriel
    Volume 9 Number 2 Article 5 6-15-1982 The Celeblain of Celeborn and Galadriel Janice Johnson Southern Illinois University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore Part of the Children's and Young Adult Literature Commons Recommended Citation Johnson, Janice (1982) "The Celeblain of Celeborn and Galadriel," Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature: Vol. 9 : No. 2 , Article 5. Available at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol9/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Mythopoeic Society at SWOSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature by an authorized editor of SWOSU Digital Commons. An ADA compliant document is available upon request. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To join the Mythopoeic Society go to: http://www.mythsoc.org/join.htm Mythcon 51: A VIRTUAL “HALFLING” MYTHCON July 31 - August 1, 2021 (Saturday and Sunday) http://www.mythsoc.org/mythcon/mythcon-51.htm Mythcon 52: The Mythic, the Fantastic, and the Alien Albuquerque, New Mexico; July 29 - August 1, 2022 http://www.mythsoc.org/mythcon/mythcon-52.htm Abstract Reviews the history of Galadriel and Celeborn as revealed in unpublished materials as well as The Lord of the Rings, The Silmarillion, Tolkien’s Letters, and Unfinished alesT , and examines variations and inconsistencies. Additional Keywords Tolkien, J.R.R.—Characters—Celeborn; Tolkien, J.R.R.—Characters—Galadriel; Patrick Wynne This article is available in Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R.
    [Show full text]
  • Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture TCG Public Review
    Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture Family “2.0” Level 00 Revision 01.50 September 18, 2018 Committee Draft Contact: [email protected] Work in Progress This document is an intermediate draft for comment only and is subject to change without notice. Readers should not design products based on this document. TCG Public Review Copyright © TCG 2006-2019 TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture Licenses and Notices Copyright Licenses: Trusted Computing Group (TCG) grants to the user of the source code in this specification (the “Source Code”) a worldwide, irrevocable, nonexclusive, royalty free, copyright license to reproduce, create derivative works, distribute, display and perform the Source Code and derivative works thereof, and to grant others the rights granted herein. The TCG grants to the user of the other parts of the specification (other than the Source Code) the rights to reproduce, distribute, display, and perform the specification solely for the purpose of developing products based on such documents. Source Code Distribution Conditions: Redistributions of Source Code must retain the above copyright licenses, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright licenses, this list of conditions and the following disclaimers in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Disclaimers: THE COPYRIGHT LICENSES SET FORTH ABOVE DO NOT REPRESENT ANY FORM OF LICENSE OR WAIVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, BY ESTOPPEL OR OTHERWISE, WITH RESPECT TO PATENT RIGHTS HELD BY TCG MEMBERS (OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES) THAT MAY BE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS SPECIFICATION OR OTHERWISE. Contact TCG Administration ([email protected]) for information on specification licensing rights available through TCG membership agreements.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to the Commercial Cryptography Scheme in China
    Introduction to the Commercial Cryptography Scheme in China atsec China Di Li Yan Liu [email protected] [email protected] +86 138 1022 0119 +86 139 1072 6424 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S. © atsec information security, 2015 Disclaimer atsec China is an independent lab specializing in IT security evaluations. The authors do not represent any Chinese government agency or Chinese government-controlled lab. All information used for this presentation is publicly available on the Internet, despite the fact that most of them are in Chinese. 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S. 2 Agenda § Background on commercial cryptography in China § Product certification list § Published algorithms and standards § Certification scheme § Conclusions 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S. 3 What is “Commercial Cryptography”? 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S. 4 OSCCA and Commercial Cryptography − What is “Commercial Cryptography” in China? − “Commercial Cryptography” is a set of algorithms and standards used in the commercial area, e.g. banks, telecommunications, third party payment gateways, enterprises, etc. … − In this area, only “Commercial Cryptography” certified products can be used. − Constituted by the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) − Issued and regulated by the Office of the State Commercial Cryptography Administration (OSCCA) − Established in 1999 − Testing lab setup in 2005 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S. 5 OSCCA Certified Product List Certified product list (1322 items): http://www.oscca.gov.cn/News/201510/News_1310.htm 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S. 6 Certified Products and Its Use − Security IC chip − Password keypad − Hardware token including Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), One Time Password (OTP), and its supporting system − Hardware security machine / card − Digital signature and verification system − IPSEC / SSL VPN Gateway − Value Added Tax (VAT) audit system 6 November 2015, Washington DC, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • CXCR4-SERINE339 Regulates Cellular Adhesion, Retention and Mobilization, and Is a Marker for Poor Prognosis in Acute Myeloid Leukemia
    Leukemia (2014) 28, 566–576 & 2014 Macmillan Publishers Limited All rights reserved 0887-6924/14 www.nature.com/leu ORIGINAL ARTICLE CXCR4-SERINE339 regulates cellular adhesion, retention and mobilization, and is a marker for poor prognosis in acute myeloid leukemia L Brault1, A Rovo´ 2, S Decker3, C Dierks3, A Tzankov4,5 and J Schwaller1,5 The CXCR4 receptor is a major regulator of hematopoietic cell migration. Overexpression of CXCR4 has been associated with poor prognosis in acute myelogenous leukemia (AML). We have previously shown that ligand-mediated phosphorylation of the Serine339 (CXCR4-S339) residue of the intracellular domain by PIM1 is implicated in surface re-expression of this receptor. Here, we report that phosphorylation of CXCR4-S339 in bone marrow (BM) biopsies correlated with poor prognosis in a cohort of AML patients. To functionally address the impact of CXCR4-S339 phosphorylation, we generated cell lines-expressing CXCR4 mutants that mimic constitutive phosphorylation (S339E) or abrogate phosphorylation (S339A). Whereas the expression of CXCR4 significantly increased, both CXCR4-S339E and the CXCR4-S339A mutants significantly reduced the BM homing and engraftment of Kasumi-1 AML cells in immunodeficient mice. In contrast, only expression of the CXCR4-S339E mutant increased the BM retention of the cells and resistance to cytarabine treatment, and impaired detachment capacity and AMD3100-induced mobilization of engrafted leukemic cells. These observations suggest that the poor prognosis in AML patients displaying CXCR4-S339 phosphorylation can be the consequence of an increased retention to the BM associated with an enhanced chemoresistance of leukemic cells. Therefore, CXCR4-S339 phosphorylation could serve as a novel prognostic marker in human AML.
    [Show full text]