Human Rights in Cambodia: The Situation in 2013
Article 1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (the “Constitution”) commits Cambodia to the principles of pluralism and liberal democracy, while Article 31 provides that Cambodia will “recognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenants and Conventions related to human rights, women’s and children’s rights.”
The human rights situation has deteriorated in 2013 despite the fundamental rights guaranteed under international and Cambodian law. Cambodian citizens are regularly targeted, harassed, charged with criminal offenses and subjected to politically motivated persecution for speaking out against oppressive government policies. Throughout 2013, land activists, media professionals, union leaders, and human rights workers across the country were subject to legal threats, arbitrary arrest and death threats. Amidst this worsening situation, there have been some promising developments in 2013. In the months preceding the National Assembly (“NA”) elections, held on 28 July 2013, thousands of people, including many young Cambodians, took to the streets in support of the main opposition party—the Cambodian National Rescue Party (“CNRP”). This new lack of self-censorship amongst the youth, who did not directly experience Cambodia’s tragic past, is extremely promising for the future of human rights and the development of the country. There was little unrest and no resurgence of the physical backlash from the authorities as was widely seen during the last elections. However, the tide may be affected by the Royal Government of Cambodia’s (the “RGC”) current violent crackdown to silence these rising voices.
The following is a brief overview of the current situation of human rights and the state of democracy in Cambodia.
Freedom of Expression Freedom of expression is one of the cornerstones of democracy and is necessary for good governance and political participation. Nevertheless, the situation of freedom of expression in Cambodia is dire. Restrictive legislation, media censorship and judicial harassment of those who speak out, lead to a culture of silence.
While freedom of the press is guaranteed under Article 41 of the Constitution, this is not reality. Cambodia was ranked 143rd out of 170 countries in the 2013 World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders.1 This is Cambodia’s lowest ranking ever, having fallen 26 places from 2012, due to a government crackdown on freedom of expression and freedom of the press this past year. This included the summoning of journalists to Court based on provisions of the Penal Code rather than the Law on the Press 1995 (the “Press Law”). The Penal Code, which came into force in
1 Reporters without Borders, ‘2013 World Press Freedom Index: Dashed Hopes After Spring’ (2013) http://bit.ly/19KwqUS.
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2010, contains several provisions which unjustifiably restrict freedom of expression and compromise Cambodia’s obligations under international human rights law and the Constitution. These provisions, usually relating to defamation and incitement, are regularly used as a tool to crack down on free speech by journalists, human rights workers, opposition politicians and human rights defenders.2
“Traditional media” – namely print media, radio and television – is the most established form of media, yet in Cambodia this is also the form of media that is subject to the most stringent levels of control and censorship; the RGC heavily influences most media channels. All television stations, most radio stations, and the foremost Cambodian newspapers are either owned or controlled by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (the “CPP”) or individuals aligned with the ruling party, thereby ensuring the RGC’s control over the dissemination of information.3 Thirty newspapers are published on a regular basis in Cambodia, and it has been mostly newspaper journalists who have been the subject of government actions to impose censorship.4 There are 74 radio stations officially registered in Cambodia;5 most are CPP-influenced.6 There are three independent radio stations in the country,7 and one of them, Beehive, has faced repeated restrictions, and has been shut down on various occasions. Mam Sonando, the owner, has been arrested three times, most recently on bogus charges of secession and incitement to take up arms, related to a land dispute in Kratie province. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison on 1 October 2012,8 although he was released with some of the most serious charges dropped by the Court of Appeal on 14 March 2013.9
While Cambodia has one of the lowest Internet connectivity rates in South-East Asia,10 its usage is increasingly on the rise and there has been a surge in the use of social media sites and platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Independent media outlets are disseminating information online and bloggers are spreading opinions and ideas, many of which are critical of the RGC. However, the relative absence of restrictions of online content in Cambodia, which has allowed for this rapid increase in online activism and information-sharing, may soon be threatened. The vulnerability of this freedom became clear in February 2013 when Phel Phearun was summoned and threatened with defamation charges after criticizing the police through a Facebook post.11 A similar occurrence took place in November 2013, when Cheth Sovichea was arrested and threatened with defamation charges due to his criticism of a military police chief on Facebook.12
In May 2012, the RGC announced that it is drafting its first ever Cyber Law to regulate and to limit the use of the internet. One of the reasons for the adoption of such a Cyber Law is to prevent “ill- willed people… from spreading false information.”13 The law is in the early stages of drafting and has
2 CCHR, ‘Repression of Expression: The state of free speech in Cambodia’ (Report) (September 2013) http://bit.ly/1lBgmal. 3 CCHR, ‘New Media and the Promotion of Human Rights in Cambodia’ (Report) (July 2012) http://bit.ly/1cn3O4h. 4 CCHR and others, ‘Cambodia gagged: Democracy at Risk?’ (Report) (September 2010) http://bit.ly/1iv3C7Z. 5 Royal University of Phnom Penh Department of Media and Communication, ‘Cambodia Communications Review 2011’ (2011)
2 not yet been made available to the public, but fears abound that such a law could be extremely damaging to freedom of expression online in Cambodia.
In November 2012, the RGC issued a circular demanding the closure of all Internet cafes within 500 meters of an educational facility, which would have resulted in the closure of almost all existing Internet cafes.14 Although the circular was overturned in December 2012 after popular outcry, in December 2013, it was reported that provincial authorities in Siem Reap were “shuttering more than 40 internet cafes in Siem Reap district […] after parents repeatedly lodged complaints with authorities that children were wasting time gaming online.”15 While it is unclear whether the closure of cafes in Siem Reap is related to the 2012 Circular, it nevertheless indicates a worrying development with regards to repression of online freedom at the local level.
The Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association Overall, the Law on Peaceful Assembly (the “Demonstration Law”), a reformed version of which was adopted in 2009, is relatively protecting the right to peaceful assembly. However, there are some concerns about its application and the broad terminology used in some of its provisions, which can curtail the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.16 In addition, the authorities, especially outside of Phnom Penh, are not necessarily aware of the law and therefore employ outdated provisions to restrict NGO meetings and peaceful community demonstrations.
In 2013, peaceful demonstrations regularly turned violent with disproportionate force used by the state security forces. Demonstrations were violently repressed, with authorities using electroshock weapons, guns, tear-gas, water cannons, and batons, to beat and disperse protesters. Shootings by security forces at demonstrations led to the death of two people and left one person paralyzed and at least 16 others injured. Countless numbers of demonstrators have been beaten, with three women suffering miscarriages.17 Many such demonstrations have been among garment factory workers, who have been regularly protesting and striking against low wages and poor working conditions and land and housing rights activists facing eviction. In November 2013, a protest by garment workers of the SL Garment Factory in Meanchey district in Phnom Penh led to a woman being shot dead by security forces and nine others injured. In addition to excessive use of force by authorities, over 40 demonstrators were arrested, including monks.18
Moreover, the garment sector in Cambodia is plagued by rampant disregard for, and violations of, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, starting with employers failing to conduct good-faith bargaining with unions. Over the past several years, Cambodia has been increasingly seen as a dangerous country in which to be a trade unionist with independent, legitimate labor unions facing severe pressure and working in a ‘violent climate of terror and impunity.’19 A first draft of a Law on Trade Unions was introduced by the Ministry of Labor in early 2011. After concerns were raised by civil society groups and trade unions regarding some of the
14 Kounila Keo, ‘Cambodia Bans Internet Cafes Near Schools,’ (Global Voices, 19 December 2012) http://bit.ly/K7AJj5. 15 Thik Kaliyann, ‘Internet cafes closed because kids ‘absorbed’’ The Phnom Penh Post (5 December 2013) http://bit.ly/1aIZJnY. 16 See: CCHR, ‘Law on Peaceful Assembly’ (Factsheet) (August 2011) http://bit.ly/1bBbNqL. 17 See CCHR, “Excessive Use of Force Against Demonstrators in 2013 in Cambodia,” (Briefing Note) (January 2014), http://bit.ly/1eIegTU 18 Johua Lipes, ‘Woman shot dead by Cambodian police in protest clampdown’ Radio Free Asia (12 November 2013) http://bit.ly/1erpIDd. 19 One World Action & SOLIDAR ‘Decent Work? The Cambodian Garment Industry’ (August 2007).
3 language and provisions in the draft law,20 the draft law was shelved. However, it appears the law was submitted for review by the Council of Ministers in late 2013 and may be passed by the NA in early 2014.
Freedoms of assembly and association were further threatened in the form of a proposed Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (“LANGO”). Drafts of this law allow for the closure of NGOs and associations that were found to harm ‘national unity, culture, customs and traditions of the Cambodian national society’.21 Drafts of LANGO also fails to provide for the protection of the fundamental rights given by the Constitution and international human rights treaties of which Cambodia is a signatory.22 Although LANGO has temporarily been shelved, it is likely that it will be re-introduced in 2014.
Persecution of Activists and Human Rights Defenders Although protected under Cambodia’s Constitution and the Penal Code, the situation for Human Rights Defenders (“HRDs”) in Cambodia is dire, with authorities continuing to react harshly to their activities. HRDs include land and housing rights activists, trade unionists, journalists and NGO workers; they face harassment, intimidation, violence and legal action to silence their dissent. The security situation and level of risk faced by Cambodian HRDs markedly deteriorated in 2012. The RGC cracked down dramatically on the work of HRDs in the run up to the NA elections in July 2013, with violations of the rights of HRDs generally overshadowed by a cloud of impunity.
Despite requirements under international human rights law, no independent, national mechanism exists in Cambodia to protect and promote the rights of HRDs. NGOs provide some support to HRDs – including legal aid and humanitarian support. However, the limited capacities and resources of NGOs mean that, in many cases of violations, especially those that occur in remote areas far from the capital of Phnom Penh, support for HRDs can be non-existent.23
On 27 December 2012, Yorm Bopha, a prominent land rights activist, was imprisoned for her activism regarding the development of the Boeng Kak Lake in Phnom Penh, from which many families were evicted from their homes. She was sentenced to three years imprisonment for “intentional violence with aggravating circumstances.” Yorm Bopha was repeatedly threatened by authorities because of her involvement in the Boeng Kak Lake campaign and was beaten several times and shocked twice by electric stun batons while protesting peacefully.24 In June 2013, the Court of Appeal ruled that Yorm Bopha was not a direct perpetrator of the assault but the instigator
20 See for instance, http://bit.ly/1blDQP1. 21 Bridget Di Certo, ‘Civil society: Cambodia’s treatment of NGOs faulted’, The Phnom Penh Post (Phnom Penh, 2 May 2012) http://bit.ly/1eGl4RK. 22 CCHR, ‘The LANGO and the Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Cambodia’ (Fact Sheet) (October 2011) http://bit.ly/1iSyFe9. 23 CCHR and Article 19, ‘Defending the Defenders: Security for Cambodian Human Rights Defenders’ (Report) (19 June 2013) http://bit.ly/19KD1P8. 24 Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), ‘Human Rights Defender Profile: Yorm Bopha,’ (Briefing Paper) (December 2012) http://bit.ly/1dUYzYP.
4 behind it, and reduced her sentence to two years, and on 22 November 2013, Yorm Bopha was released on bail by the Supreme Court, pending a new hearing at the Court of Appeal.25
Land Rights Land and housing rights – are among the most prominent human rights problems faced by Cambodians throughout the country. Despite land rights’ reasonable protection under international and domestic law, including in the Land Law 2001, individuals’ right to land and associated rights are violated at a phenomenal rate, often with impunity for the perpetrators. In seeking to increase exports in the name of national development, the RGC is exploiting Cambodia’s natural resources and has been extensively granting economic land concessions (“ELCs”)for the purposes of industrial agricultural use. By the end of 2013, approximately 16.6% of land in Cambodia had been granted through ELCs to foreign and domestic companies and members of the political elite, for industrial development.26 The granting of ELCs often leads to violent forced evictions and resettlement implemented with little respect for human rights and due process of law.
On 7 May 2012, the RGC set about to rectify existing problems surrounding concessions, and issued a moratorium on ELCs known as “Directive 1.”27 The Directive calls for the prohibition of new ELCs, the evaluation of all existing ELCs, and the revocation of ELCs found to breach legal and contractual provisions.28 However, a crucial loophole exists within the moratorium. ELCs that were under consideration when the moratorium was announced are excluded from its application.29 This was exacerbated by the fact that the RGC failed to provide information on how many ELCs were under consideration when the moratorium was announced.30
Part of Directive 1 objective was also to address the lack of ownership of land titles of the Cambodian’s population. During the Khmer Rouge regime land titles were destroyed leaving the Cambodian population title-less and thus, more vulnerable to land evictions and land grabbing. To address this issue, in 2013, Prime Minister Hun Sen new accelerated land titling campaign to be implemented by youth volunteers continued. However, numerous concerns have been raised concerning the highly politically influenced nature of the program, the exclusion of disputed areas and reports of youth volunteer forcing indigenous communities to accept private land title instead of collective land titles.
Forced evictions are conducted with no due process of law and are becoming increasingly violent, with communities’ homes often bulldozed or burnt down. It is deeply concerning that reports of the RGC deploying State security forces to violently protect land concessions are equally increasing. In one such case, in Oddar Meanchey Province, the Angkor Sugar, Tonle Sugar Cane and Cane and Sugar Valley companies employed the services of Battalion 42 of the royal Armed Forces of
25 CCHR and OMCT, ‘CCHR and OMCT welcome today’s Supreme Court decision to temporarily release Yorm Bopha and call on the Court of Appeal to promptly hear her case and clear her name’ (Press Release) (22 November 2013) http://bit.ly/19WZ6tZ. 26 CCHR, ‘Land Reform Policy Report: Findings from Roundtable Discussions and Policy Platforms’ (July 2013) http://bit.ly/1inGTWX. 27 Order on the Strengthening Measure and Effectiveness of Economic Land Concession Management No. 01BB (May 2012) (“Directive 1”), http://bit.ly/1hcN4lm 28 Ibid. 29 ADHOC, A Turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resources Rights in Cambodia in 2012’ (February 2013), http://bit.ly/1eFH8wu 30 Ibid.
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Cambodia to set up road blocks, burn and bulldoze villages, destroy homes, kill livestock, loot crops and beat, threaten, intimidate and arrest villagers.31
This force has been met by communities campaigning for recognition of their rights and the compensation packages which they are owed and there has been a surge in demonstrations and rallies. In 2013, land rights demonstrations were often met with excessive use of violence by security forces and land rights activists were charged and threatened on regular basis. However, the lack of an effective and independent dispute mechanisms and the lack of the independence of the judiciary means that impunity is rampant, fuelling the ongoing conflicts.
Evictions have a particularly devastating impact on indigenous peoples, women and children, but also the environment.
Fair Trial Rights and the Cambodian Judiciary Although there have been steady improvements in the adherence to some of the procedures that underpin fair trial rights, many areas of concern remain. One of the major issues that impacts upon fair trial rights in Cambodia is the lack of separation of powers and the continued influence that the executive exert on the judiciary. There is a widening gap between the guarantees and standards set out in the Constitution in terms of the status of the judiciary and the guarantee for fair trial rights. As this gap widens, the space for criticism and debate is shrinking, as the courts are used as political tools to silence opposition and dissent.
The most recent trial monitoring data collected by CCHR has shown some improvements, with few issues reported in relation to having adequate time to prepare a defense32 and the absence of any statements by judges regarding the innocence or guilt of the accused before the verdict had been announced.33 Aside from these improvements however, overall there has been little or no change in adherence to fair trial rights. Judges often fail to properly advise defendants of their statutory rights and when defendants are reminded of their rights, judges routinely fail to give adequate explanations to them. Such failures are of particular concern when levels of legal representation remain low for alleged misdemeanors. 34 Also worrying is the continued prevalence of pre-trial detention despite the presumption of bail required under both Cambodian and international law, with unacceptably high findings in juvenile cases.35
It is also of concern that the political position of the defendant seems to play a larger role than his or her innocence. Chhouk Bandith is a high level member of the RGC, who was only charged for causing “involuntary bodily harm” after confessing to firing a gun into a crowd of demonstrators. Authorities failed to apprehend him, and sentenced him in absentia to 18 months imprisonment and a fine of 38 Million Riels (approximately US$9,500).36 His sentence was upheld by the Court of Appeal in
31 LICADHO and Equitable Cambodia, “Petition about Cambodian sugar concessions filed with the Thai National Human Rights Commission, Cambodian NGOs allege serious abuses linked to Thai sugar giant, Mitr Phol Sugar Corporation,” (Press Release) (30 May 2013) http://bit.ly/1asDi57. 32 CCHR, ‘Sixth Bi-annual Report: Fair Trial Rights in Cambodia’ (Report) (4 December 2013) http://bit.ly/1k9t0BU. 33 Ibid 34 Ibid 35 Article 203 CCPC; also see CCHR, ‘The Use of Pre-Trial Detention in Cambodian Courts’ (Briefing Note) (July 2013) http://bit.ly/19JQqUt. 36 See: CCHR, Legal Analysis of the Criminal Case Against Ex-Bavet Governor Chhouk Bandith and Police Chief Sar Chantha Arising from the Shooting of Kaoway Factory Workers on 20 February 2012’ (Legal Analysis) (23 November 2013) http://bit.ly/1deRsOt.
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November 2013, but he remains on the run, with the authorities seemingly doing little to arrest him. In contrast, activists, who lack political support, are routinely arrested and otherwise targeted by the authorities, such as in the case of Boeng Kak Lake activist Yorm Bopha discussed above.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) is a hybrid court created by an agreement between the RGC and the United Nations (“UN”) and with jurisdiction over the senior leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea and those suspected of being most responsible for grave violations of national and international law committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979. In 2010, Case 001 concluded with the conviction of Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch). Duch was convicted for crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions for his role in the establishment and operations of the notorious S-21 detention center and the killing fields at Choeung Ek. After his initial sentence of 35 years was appealed by the Co-Prosecutors, he received a life sentence.37
In 2013, the ECCC finished hearing the first “mini-trial” of Case 002, known as Case 002/01,38 and is expecting a verdict in early 2014. The case currently involves Nuon Chea, the former Chairman of the Democratic Kampuchea National Assembly and Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and Khieu Samphan, the former Head of State of Democratic Kampuchea. The case initially involved two additional defendants: Ieng Thirith, former Social Action Minister, who was ruled unfit to stand trial due to her severe dementia,39 and Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, who passed away on 14 March 2013.40
The procedure for beginning the next mini-trial in Case 002 – Case 002/02 – has also been the subject to much debate, with many fearing that procedural concerns, fair trial rights issues and the age of the defendants may prohibit future mini-trials. Moreover, two additional cases – Cases 003 and 004 – have been surrounded by controversy with suggestions of government interference and an unwillingness to investigate allegations against five further suspects. While defense lawyers have been assigned to represent the suspects in these cases, the suspects remain still to be named and progress is slow.
Although the ECCC has great potential to leave a positive legacy to the domestic Cambodian court system, dwindling foreign funding and stalling tactics by the RGC, including refusal to cover its financial responsibility41 is placing this prospect in jeopardy.
Business and Human Rights The garment industry is a key pillar of Cambodia’s economy. There are approximately 558 garment factories operating in Cambodia, which employ about 475,107 people.42 According to the
37 See: CCHR, ‘Good and bad at the ECCC as Duch’s prison sentence is extended to life’ (Press Release) (3 February 2012) http://bit.ly/1aAhbei. 38 Case 002 has been severed in as of yet unknown number of mini-trials. Read more: CCHR, ‘Severance of Proceedings in Case 002 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (Briefing Note) (October 2013) http://bit.ly/19CdwlC. 39 See: ECCC, ‘Case 002’ http://bit.ly/1e0ml7S 40 CCHR, ‘Death of Ieng Sary should act as a wake-up call’ (Press Release) (14 March 2013) http://bit.ly/1k9DRM9. 41 Human Rights Watch, ‘Cambodia: Government Obstructs Khmer Rouge Court’ (News) (5 September 2013) http://bit.ly/1cn6BKN. 42 CCHR, ‘Map of Garment Factories and Supply Chains’ (2013) http://bit.ly/1luzf1o.
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International Monetary Fund, in 2011 the garment industry earned Cambodia US$3.75 billion. In 2012, that figure rose to US$4.6 billion.43
However, despite the growth of the Cambodian garment industry, evidence shows a severe worsening in the factories working conditions over the last three years. According to the International Labour Organisation’s Better Factories Cambodia (“BFC”) program, improvements are not being made in many areas, including fire safety, child labor, and worker safety and health, which may be attributed to the rapid growth of the industry.44 In 2012, only 12% of the factories complied with legal overtime policies, and women, who constitute the majority of the workforce, were threatened with dismissal after they got pregnant, motivating abortion in several cases. In addition, companies continue to ignore fire drills and workers are not sufficiently trained on emergency procedures. Finally, union leaders are often targeted by factory ´owners, and are violently beaten by law enforcement when striking outside the workplace. Many of them face dismissal, or have been in fact fired because of their activities.45
State of Democracy in Cambodia There were some notable improvements in 2013 regarding the state of democracy. In 2012, the Sam Rainsy Party (the “SRP”) and the Human Rights Party (“HRP”) merged to form the CNRP in an attempt to consolidate opposition votes and to pose a more formidable and concerted challenge to the CPP in the upcoming national elections. A number of additional political parties exist; however, the typically win very few seats, if any.
In the lead up to the NA elections held on 28 July 2013, King Norodom Sihamoni granted Sam Rainsy, opposition leader of the CNRP who had previously been exiled, a royal pardon at the request of Prime Minister of Hun Sen, a positive step towards inclusiveness.46 In addition, there was a marked decrease in electoral-related violence upon previous years and increasing social media usage rates in Cambodia allowed for a more lively exchange of information and political views.47 However, the Ministry of Information banned all the radio stations from broadcasting foreign radio program during election campaign period48 and the lead up to the elections was marked by an unequal capacity to campaign between the opposition and the CPP.
Despite these improvements, following the elections there were serious allegations of voter fraud and systematic unfairness in the election process, sparking calls for an independent election inquiry.49 At the end of 2013, elected CNRP parliamentarians had yet to take their seats in the NA, boycotting it on the grounds that the elections were allegedly fraught with irregularities, and the CNRP was holding regular mass demonstrations against the RGC.
The 2013 NA elections saw the CPP win 68 out of 123 seats in the NA. Combined with the results of the Commune/Sangkat Council elections of June 2012, where the CPP took 8,292 out of 11,459
43 ‘Cambodia urges to boost country’s exports’ Xinhua News (6 June 2013) http://bit.ly/1aBmhKh. 44 BFC, ‘Thirtieth Synthesis Report on Working Conditions in Cambodia Garment Sector’ (July 2013) http://bit.ly/IfXmC8. 45 CCHR, Roundtable Discussion on ‘Business and Human Rights in Garment Factories in Cambodia’ (Phnom Penh, 27 February 2013). 46 The Electoral Reform Alliance, ‘Joint Report on the Conduct of the 2013 Cambodian Elections’ (Report) (17 December 2013) http://bit.ly/18YJEPT. 47 Ibid. 48 See CCHR: ‘The Ministry of Information ban all the radio stations from broadcasting foreign radio program during election campaign period’ (FoEX Alert) (29 June 2013) http://bit.ly/1e0u5Xy 49 Human Rights Watch, ‘Independent Election Inquiry Needed’ (Press Release) (10 September 2013) http://bit.ly/Kk3CcT.
8 seats, and of the Senate Elections of January 2012, where the CPP won 39 out of 61 seats, 50 these figures illustrate the monopoly that it holds on political power in the country at both the national and sub-national level. Commune/Sangkat Councils51 serve the local affairs for the interests of the communes and act as an agent of government, performing tasks designated or delegated by the RGC. A cornerstone of the 2004 Rectangular Strategy for Growth, the RGC’s policy of decentralization and de-concentration has cemented the importance of Commune Councils to the development of Cambodia. These communes are responsible for electing the country’s 13,000 village chiefs, and vote for the country’s provincial and district council members and for some of the members of the Senate.
CPP dominance over government institutions has seriously undermined the provisions in the Constitution and other relevant legislation that safeguard the democratic process and human rights: a politically pliant judiciary is utilized to harass opposition figures; powerful senators are able to ride roughshod over the land rights of communities; and security services serve the interests of the elite at the expense of the urban and rural poor. In addition to the lack of independence and transparency of the electoral process and the control by the CPP of all organs of state, Cambodian politics is characterized by widespread marginalization and alienation of segments of Cambodian society which have so much to offer to the country: women, youth and small businesses.52
The dominance of the CPP in all aspects of politics results in an electoral process that is not independent and rarely transparent. Extensive CPP control over all government institutions and over the electoral process – via a National Electoral Committee (“NEC”) that is far from independent – has significantly impeded the opposition’s ability to become a counterbalance in Cambodian politics. Moreover, political campaigning in Cambodia often revolves around personalities, with political parties traditionally being little more than projections of party leaders. As a result, during political campaigns, voters are encouraged to vote for individual personalities rather than on substantive policy issues and party platforms.
This is exacerbated by the stifling of the political opposition over the past 20 years, which has resulted in those parties tending to promote radical causes, including strong anti-Vietnamese rhetoric, as a last resort to win votes.53 Moreover, while the opposition parties seek to project themselves internationally as the defenders of democracy, the combination of failing leadership, limited organization, and poor funding has contributed to the opposition being mostly a reactive force that criticizes government actions without offering alternative and forward-looking policies.
Women’s Political Representation The RGC has committed itself to promoting gender equality through Target 7 of Goal 3 of the Cambodian Millennium Development Goal (“CMDG 3”), which seeks to “eliminate gender disparities in public institutions” by increasing the proportion of seats held by women in various governmental
50 Sok Khemara, ‘Senate Voting Along Party Lines, as Expected: Analysts’, Voice of America: Cambodia (31 January 2012) http://bit.ly/1dv7Cy2. 51 CCHR, ‘Commune Councils’ (Factsheet) (2012) http://bit.ly/18YJLe5; CCHR, ‘Law on Administrative Management of Communes/Sangkats’ (Factsheet) (2012) http://bit.ly/1lBhKcX. 52 Ou Virak, ‘In With the New,’ Southeast Asia Globe (June 2012) 52. 53 Ou Virak, ‘Cambodia’s Political Merger: Maximising the Potential,’ The Phnom Penh Post (1 August 2012) http://bit.ly/Klw11H.
9 and administrative bodies.54 The targets are to increase female representation in the NA and Senate to a minimum of 30% and in the Commune/Sangkat Councils to a minimum of 25% by 2015.
In July 2013, the NA elections, which occur every five years, presented Cambodia the final opportunity to achieve CMDG 3, Target 7. However, for the first time in twenty years, female representation in the NA decreased, from approximately 22% in 2008 to 20% in 2013. This is highly disappointing as it halts a trend of increasing female representation since 1993, where female representation in the NA stood at only 6%.
Cambodia has a relatively positive legislative and policy context for achieving gender equity in politics, such as Neary Rattanak I-III, and the National Strategic Development Plan I-II (“NSDP”), both of which provide an extensive outline of the goals, activities, monitoring indicators, conducting agencies and resources for the promotion of gender equality.55 However, the results from this year’s NA elections highlight a distinct lack of policy implementation and commitment from the RGC. Furthermore, entrenched gender stereotypes continue to hinder womens’ access to engaging in politics. Gender inequality in Cambodia has become institutionalized, and until mechanisms are implemented that combat cultural norms and challenge gender stereotypes, gender initiatives will remain superficial and largely ineffectual.
In order to achieve gender equity in politics, concrete action by the RGC, all political parties and civil society in Cambodia must be taken. This should include targeted efforts pertaining to affirmative action mechanisms, anti-discrimination legislation and initiatives, gender-sensitive initiatives and capacity-building and support networks
Minority Rights Geographic isolation in resource rich areas of the country and a failure of the Land Law 2001 framework to adequately provide for collective land ownership have meant that ethnic indigenous minorities in Cambodia are particularly affected and threatened by the extensive sale of Cambodian land to private companies through the form of ELCs. These communities thus often come under the threat of forced evictions and – similarly to other communities – have little access to reparations or remedies. In addition, the process of awarding private land titles – rather than communal or collective ones – is causing the erosion of traditional practices and beliefs.56 Names of minority groups are also still used frequently as insults, including by senior members of the government and politicians. In November 2012, CPP lawmaker Chheang Vun called Human Rights Party (“HRP”) President Kem Sokha a “Bunong” – the name of an ethnic minority from northeastern Cambodia – to describe him as “uncivilized” on the floor of the NA.57 After pressure from civil society and in particular the Cambodian Indigenous Youth Association, Chheang Vun pledged to apologize during the next meeting of the NA.58
The problems are deep-rooted: under Chapter III, the Constitution grants political rights and civil liberties to “Khmer citizens”, denying the same to minority groups in Cambodia. Due to being
54 United Nations Development Programme Cambodia, Millennium Development Goals, http://bit.ly/1hhb5H. 55 Ministry of Women’s Affairs, ‘Neary Rattanak III’, (2009), 15-16; RGC, ‘NSDP I’, (2006), 5; and ‘NSDP II’, (2010), ii-iv 56 Ben Woods and Phorn Bopha, ‘Ethnic minorities risk more than just land’ The Cambodia Daily (6 December 2012) http://bit.ly/1luvBED. 57 Eang Mengleng, ‘CPP lawmaker to apologize for insult to Bunong minority,’ The Cambodia Daily (30 November 2012) http://bit.ly/1gAIJFb. 58 Ibid.
10 displaced in the past and a lack of paperwork, it is difficult for minorities to demonstrate their ancestry.59 It has been reported that under the current citizenship law, minorities are unable to successfully demonstrate that they are Cambodian citizens,60 and so have to resort to paying large bribes.61 The end result is that Cambodian domestic law purports to legitimately deny ethnic minorities many of their basic human rights.
Similarly, racist sentiment continues against Vietnamese nationals living in Cambodia. It has been reported that expressions of Vietnamese identity are sometimes responded to with animosity and that politicians occasionally employ anti-Vietnamese minority slogans.62 On 10 December 2013, International Human Rights Day, during an opposition rally, Sam Rainsy made a speech during which he allegedly discriminated against Vietnamese people, stating that they are taking Khmer jobs and land.63 Moreover, Cambodia, a country with a recent history of benefiting from the international refugee framework itself, continues to ‘repatriate’ members of persecuted minorities fleeing Vietnam – these include Christian Montagnards and ethnic Khmer Krom.64
Finally, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) Cambodians continue to suffer from discrimination and abuse, including violence and hate crimes, discrimination in the education sector, the workplace and the health sector, and social and familial exclusion.65 While homosexuality is not criminalized in Cambodia, the lack of anti-discrimination and anti-hate crime legislation and of policies and strategies to address discrimination against LGBT people means that those subjected to discrimination and violence have little legal recourse.
59 Daniel Phan, ‘Cambodia’s Ethnic Vietnamese Seek Tribunal Justice,’ The Jakarta Globe (15 March 2012) http://bit.ly/1cSOqh7. 60 Minority Rights Group International, ‘The World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ http://bit.ly/19ZqTa9. 61 Daniel Phan, ‘Cambodia’s Ethnic Vietnamese Seek Tribunal Justice,’ The Jarkarta Globe (15 March 2012). 62 Minority Rights Group International, ‘The World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ http://bit.ly/19ZqTa9. 63 CCHR, ‘CCHR issues clarification on its open letter to CNRP leadership on the subject of discrimination,’ (Press Release) (18 December 2013) http://bit.ly/1f7LQr0. 64 CCHR, ‘False Promises: Exploring the Citizenship Rights of the Khmer Krom in Cambodia’ (Report) (July 2011) http://bit.ly/19M8x1M. 65 CCHR, ‘Coming Out in the Kingdom’ (Report) (2010) http://bit.ly/1lK4eUl.
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