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Sotatekninen Arvio Ja Ennuste 2025 STAE 2025 Osa 1 978-951-25-1889-0 1 Puolustusvoimien Teknillinen Tutkimuslaitos Julkaisuja 14 Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2025 STAE 2025 osa 1 Teknologian kehitys Toimittajat Mikko Kari Arto Hakala Elisa Pääkkönen Markku Pitkänen Puolustusvoimien Teknillinen Tutkimuslaitos Ylöjärvi 2008 Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2025, osa 1 2 © Puolustusvoimien Teknillinen Tutkimuslaitos Taitto: Heidi Paananen/TKKK Kansi: Annele Palonen/TKKK ISBN 978–951–25–1889–0 ISSN 1457–3938 Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2008 Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2025, osa 1 3 SISÄLLYS ALKUSANAT...................................................................................................................... 11 1. TIEDONSIIRTOTEKNOLOGIAT ......................................................................... 12 1.1 LYHENTEET ..................................................................................... 12 1.2 JOHDANTO ..................................................................................... 13 1.3 KIINTEÄN VERKON TEKNIIKOIDEN KEHITTYMINEN VUOSINA ... 13 1.3.1 Avoin Internet -malli ....................................................... 15 1.3.2 Suljettu all-IP –malli eli Next Generation Network ............. 16 1.3.3 All Ethernet -malli ............................................................ 18 1.3.4 All Optical -malli .............................................................. 20 1.4 LANGATTOMAT TEKNIIKAT ........................................................... 21 1.4.1 Laajakaistainen liityntäverkko........................................... 21 1.4.2 Laajakaistaradioverkot...................................................... 22 1.4.2.1 Kolmannen sukupolven matkapuhelinverkot... 23 1.4.2.2 Kolmannen sukupolven jälkeiset laajakaista- radioverkot ..................................................... 24 1.4.2.3 Ad hoc ja mesh-verkot.................................... 26 1.4.2.4 Neljännen sukupolven järjestelmät .................. 27 1.4.3 Always Best Connected (ABC).......................................... 31 1.4.4 Ambient / reconfigurable heterogeneous networks .......... 33 1.4.5 Viive- tai katkossietoinen verkotus.................................... 35 1.5 VERKONHALLINTA ......................................................................... 36 1.5.1 Elementtihallinta.............................................................. 37 1.5.2 Liikkuvuuden hallinta ....................................................... 37 1.5.3 Turvallisuuden hallinta...................................................... 38 1.5.4 Palvelutason hallinta ........................................................ 39 1.5.5 Hallintatavat .................................................................... 39 1.5.5.1 Manageripohjainen hallinta............................. 39 1.5.5.2 Politiikkapohjainen.......................................... 40 1.5.5.3 Autonominen tai vertaishallinta....................... 40 1.6 VERKKOPALVELUT.......................................................................... 41 1.6.1 Palvelimet: proxyt (SIP jne.)............................................... 41 1.6.2 Gridit / P2P / Semanttiset verkot....................................... 42 1.6.3 Kuljetusprotokollat ja runkoverkko................................... 43 1.7 PITKÄN TÄHTÄIMEN VERKKOJENKEHITYSPOLUT ...................... 44 1.7.1 Kehitykseen vaikuttavia tekijöitä....................................... 44 1.7.2 Verkkotekniikoiden ja verkotuksen kehittyminen .............. 45 1.7.3 Langaton laajakaista 2020 .............................................. 48 1.7.4 Laajakaistautopiat ja dystopiat ......................................... 51 1.8 SOTILASRADIOTEKNIIKAN OMINAISPIIRTEITÄ ............................ 53 1.8.1 Radiotekniikan kehittyminen............................................ 53 1.8.2 Radion toteutusarkkitehtuurit .......................................... 54 1.8.3 Radion signaalinkäsittelymenetelmät................................ 58 1.8.4 Hajaspektritekniikka......................................................... 59 1.8.5 Tulevaisuuden sotilasaaltomuodot.................................... 61 1.8.5.1 Adaptiiviset aaltomuodot................................ 61 1.8.5.2 Hyvin laajakaistaiset aaltomuodot ................... 62 1.8.6 Sotilasradioiden kehittyminen .......................................... 63 1.8.7 Antennitekniikan kehittyminen ........................................ 64 1.8.8 Tiedonsiirron kehityksen vaikutukset sotilaskäyttöön – yhteenveto.. 65 1.9 LÄHTEET.......................................................................................... 68 2. SENSORITEKNOLOGIAT................................................................................... 70 2.1 JOHDANTO .................................................................................... 70 2.2 OPTISET SENSORIT ......................................................................... 71 2.2.1 UV-alueen sensorit........................................................... 71 Sotatekninen arvio ja ennuste 2025, osa 1 4 2.2.2 Näkyvän valon alueen sensorit ......................................... 72 2.2.3 NIR-alueen sensorit .......................................................... 72 2.2.4 Valonvahvistimet.............................................................. 72 2.2.5 Termisen IR-alueen sensorit .............................................. 74 2.2.6 Laseretäisyysmittarit ......................................................... 75 2.2.7 Laservaroittimet ............................................................... 76 2.2.8 Lasertutkat....................................................................... 76 2.2.9 Laservastatoimet.............................................................. 77 2.2.10 Suurenergialaserit ............................................................ 78 2.2.11 Tekniset läpimurrot ja käytettävyys ................................... 78 2.3 RF-SENSORIT................................................................................... 79 2.3.1 Passiiviset RF-sensorit ....................................................... 79 2.3.1.1 COMINT-sensorit............................................. 79 2.3.1.2 ELINT-sensorit.................................................. 82 2.3.2 Aktiiviset RF-sensorit (Tutkat) ........................................... 85 2.3.2.1 Yleistä............................................................. 85 2.3.2.2 Tutkien ennustettu kehitys tarkastelukaudella.. 86 2.4 MAGNEETTISET JA SÄHKÖISET SENSORIT ................................... 90 2.4.1 Sensorien käyttökohteet .................................................. 90 2.4.2 Sensoritekniikka............................................................... 92 2.4.3 Teknologisen kehityksen vaikutukset ................................ 93 2.5 AKUSTISET, SEISMISET JA PAINEANTURIT .................................... 95 2.5.1 Sensorien käyttökohteet .................................................. 95 2.5.2 Sensoritekniikka............................................................... 96 2.5.3 Teknologisen kehityksen vaikutukset ................................ 98 2.5.4 Akustisten, magneettisten ja sähköisten anturien kehitys- trendit ............................................................................. 99 2.6 SENSORITIEDON KÄSITTELY........................................................ 100 2.6.1 Signaalinkäsittely ......................................................... 100 2.6.2 Datafuusio..................................................................... 103 2.7 MERKITTÄVÄT KEHITYSTRENDIT JA JOHTOPÄÄTÖKSET .......... 106 3. ENERGIAN TUOTTO, SIIRTO JA VARASTOINTI............................................. 109 3.1 JOHDANTO ................................................................................... 109 3.2 ENERGIALÄHDE- JA ENERGIATEKNOLOGIATRENDIT ................ 110 3.3 NYKYISET JA LÄHIAJAN RATKAISUMALLIT TAISTELUKENTÄN SÄHKÖN HUOLLOLLE................................................................... 112 3.3.1 Aggregaatit (Gensets) .................................................... 112 3.3.2 Sähkökemialliset kennot ................................................ 112 3.3.3 Primäärikennot eli paristot ............................................. 113 3.3.4 Sekundäärikennot eli akut.............................................. 114 3.3.5 Sähkön tuotanto- ja varastointijärjestelmät energia- ketjun osana.................................................................. 116 3.4 UUDET SÄHKÖTUOTANTOTEKNOLOGIAT.................................. 119 3.4.1 Perinteiset moottorit ...................................................... 119 3.4.2 Stirling-moottorit ........................................................... 120 3.4.3 Mikroturbiinit................................................................. 121 3.4.4 Pienet tuuligeneraattorit ................................................ 121 3.4.5 Aurinkokennot............................................................... 122 3.4.6 Polttokennot.................................................................. 124 3.4.7 Termosähköinen konversio............................................. 125 3.4.8 Yhteenveto.................................................................... 126 3.5 VARASTOINTITEKNOLOGIAT ....................................................... 128 3.5.1 Yleiskatsaus sähkön varastointiteknologioihin ................ 128 3.5.2 Superkondensaattori...................................................... 130 3.5.3 Vauhtipyörät.................................................................. 131
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