INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY

JOURNAL

INDIANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Volume 10 Number 2

May, 1985

F521_146_VOL 1 O_N02 Indiana Military History Journal is published by the Military History Section of the Indiana Historical Society, 3 I 5 West Ohio Street, Indianapolis 46202. Editorial offices for the Journal are at the Department of History, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907. Gunther E. Rothenberg is editor; Kevin Reid editorial assistant. All contributions should be sent to this address. Manuscripts should be prepared in accordance with The University of Chicago A Manual of Style (13th edition). The Indiana Historical Society, the Military History Section, and the editor disclaim responsibility for statements of fact or opinions made by contributors.

The Indiana Military History Journal serves as the organ of the Military History Section and carries news of the Section as well as articles, documents, pictures, and book reviews relating to Indiana's military past, the military history of the Old Northwest, and the activities of Hoosiers in the armed forces of the United States in war and peace. In addition, the Journal will carry articles on military history topics in general which impacted on the state or region. It is hoped that the Journal will increase the reader's appreciation of the military heritage of the stateand the nation.

Military History Section Board of Directors

Mr. Wayne Sanford, Chairman Mr. Thomas B. Williams III 8718 Old Town Lane Drive 3203 Dogwood Lane Indianapolis 46260 Carmel 46032

Col. Jerry L. Sargent (USA, Ret.), Vice-Chairman Col. William Scott (USA, Ret.) 334 Grovewood Place 6433 Hoover Rd., Apt. A Beech Grove 46107 Indianapolis 46260

Dr. Gunther E. Rothenberg, editor Maj. William J. Watt Department of History 2240 Rome Drive Apt. B Purdue University Indianapolis 46208 West Lafayette 47906 Rev. William 0. Harris Dr. George W. Geib 723 Clarendon Place 4737 Cornelius Avenue Indianapolis 46208 Indianapolis 46208

Col. J. Robert Sutherlin (USA, Ret.) 6078 Garver Road Indianapolis 46208

The Journal is sent to members of the Indiana Historical Societywho participatei n the Military History Section. All the material in this Journal is copyrighted. Copyright, 1984, Indiana Historical Society.

Cover: This painting depicts the repulse of Col. Drummond's column on August IS, 1814, as described by Major Johnathan Kearsley in this issue's lead article66The Memoirs of Johnathan Kearsley: A Michigan Hero from the War of 1812," edited by John C. Fredriksen. Courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society. NOTES FROM THE CHAIRMAN

Mark your calendar for these coming events:

(I) Military history sessions at the Indiana Historical Society Spring History Conference, May 17 & 18, Clifty Falls State Park, Madison, Indiana. The Military History Section will sponsor two sessions on Saturday, May 18. John Crago of Huntington, Indiana, will deliver a presentation at 9:30 that morning entitled "Recollections of a Bataan Death March Survivor," and that afternoon at 1:30 Arville Funk of Corydon, Indiana, will discuss "A Hoosier on the Doolittle Raid ( 1942)." (2) The Fall History Conference, September 7-8. The location will be announced later. (3) Seminar on the Philippines in World War II, September 21. The seminar will be held at the World War Memorial in Indianapolis. There will be morning and afternoon sessions, and an authentic Filipino lunch will be served at the Rice Bowl Restaurant. (4) Indiana Historical Society Annual Meeting, November 2, 1985, Indianapolis. Notices for theseevents will bemailed to section members astheir individual times approach. Finally,the chairman wishes to remind all thosewho have not yet renewed their 1985 Society memberships to do so as we look forward to an interesting and active year.

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3 THE MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY: A MICHIGAN HERO FROM THE WAR OF 1812

Edited by John C. Fredriksen•

Introduction The limping, one-legged figure of Johnathan Kearsley was a familiar sight to the inhabitants of early Detroit. A native of Pennsylvania, Kearsley had previously been Collector of Internal Revenue in that state until the repeal of such taxes eliminatedhis office.He arrivedat Detroitin 1819 to assume the role of Receiver of the U.S. Land Office and held that position for the next thirty years. In office Kearsley was well regarded for his conscientious administration of the public trust and applauded for his upright character and personal integrity in private life. These assets were not lost on the public who, in 1819, elected Kearsley the third Mayor of Detroit and in 1836 made him Regent of the nascent Universityof Michigan. The memory of his civic accomplishments is preserved in that city by a street named in his memory as well as by a tributary of the Flint River which is named after him. For these and other reasons the name of Kearsley has become intimately associatedwith the history of both the territory and the infant state of Michigan. Kearsley's relocation from the cultivated clime of Pennsylvania to the raucous frontiers of Michigan was a clear success story, but one in which the "Old Major," emerges as a somewhat quixotic cause­ celebre. Kearsley may have hobbled about as a result of an old war wound, but the heavycrutches upon which he labored frequently became the painful extension of a cantankerous and fiery disposition. The perils of managingthe U.S. LandOffice in a frontier area illustratethis point clearly.Many settlers from the East shared the peculiarYankee characteristic of bantering and beating down the price of objects for sale, including land, and they would often try their hand on the "Old Major"-sometimes with unforseen results. One day, having exhausted all patience and persuasionwith a refractory customer, Kearsleytried the expedient of applying one of his crutches over the head of his antagonist. The enraged stranger responded with flailingfists. A third party, perhaps sympathetic to the sight of a cripple being bludgeoned, steppedforward to intervene but wasstopped by an onlooker who blithely exclaimed,"Let him alone, he is doing Land Office business ..,, Another celebrated example was Kearsley's pique with the Detroit Fire Department. Many Fire Chiefs were unwilling to ride their shiny, horse-drawn engines down the rutted, muddy, and unpavedstreets of early Detroit. They chose insteadthe tactic of running their vehicles down the broad wooden sidewalks ad­ joining such routes. Fires were contained, but the practice usually resulted in a trailof splintered planks and long lines of picket fences demolished by the engines'wheel hubs. This result immediately spurred the ire of the no-nonsense Kearsley, who rapidly became a most valiant defender of sidewalks and picket fences. Whenever a fire alarm sounded, he would rush out and take a stand in the middle of the sidewalk, defiantly waving his crutch to warn off the approachingfiremen. If passing the Kearsley residencebecame unavoidable, it was a common procedureto dispatch two fleet runnersahead of the engine to lift the old soldier to prevent his being run over.2 If the redoubtable Kearsley could hold his own against speculators and fire engines, he held a special terror for the students and faculty of the newly established University of Michigan. The Major had a reputation for scholarship, being an 1811 graduate of Washington College, so from 1836 to 1850 he was appointedUniversity Regent. In this capacityhe maintained an unofficial,but close,personal supervision over university affairs. Being something of a martinet, Kearsley was notorious for conducting the oral

• Mr. Fredricksenholds an M.A. in AmericanHistory from the University of Michigan and is the author of the forthcoming Free Trade and Sailors' Rights:A Bibliography on the War of 1812. In this article Mr. Fredricksen pr esents the Memoirs of Johnathan Kearsley. The punctuation and spelling have been retained as in the original and only such correctionsas were necessary for the sake of clarity were made.

4 MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY 5

examination of each graduating student in Latin. He gave them a very hard time and soon earned the appellation ..Maj or Tormentum," from 11majora tormenta," the name given big guns in a Latin 11Life of Washington."3 His relentless interrogations incited a widespread plot among membersof one graduating class. The day priorto graduationand running K.earsley'sgauntlet, severalstudents broke into the Super­ intendent's office, pilfered the files and absconded with a list of merits and demerits intended for the Major's inspection. Upon the discoveryof the break-in the next morning,constables were summoned and arrests were promised while K.earsley11pounded the woodensidewalk with his woodenleg, thundering for someone's head."" Much to his discomfiture, K.earsley was forced to grant certificates to his students, examination or not. While admired for his administrativeabilities, and renowned for his aplomb in the face of adversity, Michigan historians are not always cognizantof the fact that Johnathan K.earsleywas a highly respected officerduring the War of 1812. Indeed, the limp which was his trademark bears eloquent testimonyto the distinguished services rendered in that conflict. Born in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania,on August 20, 1786, K.earsley was the son of a Revolutionary war officer and had secured a commission as a First Lieutenant in the artillery shortlybefore the outbreak of war. He enjoyed a promising start,for he had the good fortune of being attached to the staff of Winfield Scott. K.earsley was actively engagedand nearly captured at the debacle at Stoney Creek on June 6, 1813, and later servedas aide to Generals Lewis and Williams. He was presentduring General Wilkinson's descentdown the St. Lawrenceand participated in the disastrous encounter at Chrysler's Farm on November 11, 1813. The following year, on April 12, K.earsley effected a transfer from the artillery to the command of the Fourth Rifle Regiment, which had been assigned to the defense of Fort Erie, Ontario. This post was closely besieged by the British, and K.earsley participated in severalintense and costly skirmishes outside the walls. K.earsleywas conspicuous in the successfulsortie of September 17th, but receiveda wound which required the amputation of his leg. Despite grave disability he was retained in the peacetime establishment, but his painful wounds necessitated early retirement. The newly uncovered memoirs of Johnathan K.earsley are importantto historians for several reasons. First, becausenarratives of the War of 1812 are so few in number,the document throws new and revealing light on such obscure but important encounters as Stoney Creekand Fort Erie. This is especially true in Kearsley's description of the decisive American victory at ConjoctaCree k, an event which then, as now, has received scant attention from historians. Secondly, Kearsley's tale is enhanced not only by its impartial tone but also by Kearsley's relentless criticism of American generalship. Whereas most textual accounts of Fort Erie remainsuperficial and laudatory, K.earsleyproffers the readera criticalexamination from the standpoint of one forced to endure its deficiencies. Finally, Kearsley's fateful transfer from the artillery to the infantry brought him into the ranks of the United States Rifle Regiment, one of the fore­ most units of its time. This veryelite, but little known, precursor to the Green Berets of a later day, was actively engaged throughout the War of 1812.' K.earsley'sis the firstsuch narrative to document the day to day activities of this fighting unit, revealing in great detail their tactics, discipline, and operational ex­ cellence.In their totality,Kearsley's memoirs supply new details on specificcombat operations,provide a rare glimpse at an elite but forgotten Army regiment, and accuratelyrecount the experiences, hardships, and sacrifices of a Michigan hero from the War of 1812. His memoirs are in the Lucius Lyon papers, which are held at the Clements Library at the Universityof Michigan. The Memoirs of Johnathan Kearsley

Under the acts of Congress passed in the winter of 1811-12, for the increase of the army to the war establishment, Major Kearsleywas appointed on the 6th of March 1812 a First Lieutenant of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery-entered immediately upon the recruiting service, under orders of Col. Izard6 and soon afterwardswas appointed by the Secretary of War, and without his own (Maj. K's) knowledge, Asst. Qur. Master General, and attachedto the head quarters of Col. Izard at Philadelphia where he remained part of the summer of 1812 in discharge of this staff duty. Toward the fall of that year, Lieut. Col. (now General) Winfield Scott marched for the Niagra frontier. The company to which Maj. Kearsley was attached was not recruited be­ cause both he and his Captain were attached to Col. Izard's staff. The Major, with a view to the campaignof 1813, having been prevented from accompanying the detachment in 1812 as above 6 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL noticed, resigned his staff appointment, returned to his company, then partially recruitedand stationed at Fort Mifflin, received the recruits of his company as they arrived and engaged in the drill of the company daily during the winter. On the I st of March, 1813, Major Kearsleywas appointed Adjutant of the Regiment and the battalion, under the command of Lieut. Col. Scott, 1 and marched for the Niagra frontier. The battalion proceeded on foot, exposed to all the inclements of the season and badness of roads, to New York, embarked on the Hudson, was intercepted by the ice between West Point and Newburgh, debarked and marched by land to Albany and thence to the Niagra frontier near Fort Niagra. An attack upon Fort George and descent upon Canada was then immediately contemplated. For some days previous to that descent Maj. Kearsley was permitted to join Captains Archer3 and Townson9 at the Salt-batteryand the Fox-battery, so calledfrom which batteries, with hotshot and shells, the buildings within Fort George wereburned and the British garrison compelled to evacuate. May 27, 1813 was fixed upon, by Genl. Dearborn,•o as the day for landing on the Canada shore. The place selected was a precipitous bank (perhaps IS or 20 feet high) of Lake Ontario, from one or two miles above Newark, or the debouche of the Niagra river. To Lieut. Col. Scott, then Adjutant Genl. of the army, was confidedthe distinguished post of commander of the advance corps in landing. Maj. Kearsley(as his adjutant) accompanied the advance and in the same boat with Col. Scott. The result of that landing, the severity of the conflictwith the British troops, covered as they were by the bank of the lake, and their repulse, are matters of history-it is sufficient for the present purpose to say that the boat, in which Genl. Scott and Maj. Kearsley were, occupied that position which Genl. Scott has ever occupied, the front and face of danger; they were in it and landed together. Upon the repulseof the enemy they were pursued towards Queens ton until Genl. Scott, with his command, was ordered by Genl. Lewis•• to fall back upon Fort George. Two or three days after, the same troops forming the advance, a brigade commanded by Genl. Winder12 marched in pursuit of the enemy up the lake, toward Burlington Heights, whereit was understood that they had halted and were entrenched. Upon this march the advance werealmost hourly brought into contact and skirmished, with videttes and pickets of the enemy. On the afternoon of the second day, about June 8, 1813, when between Forty Mile Creek and Stoney Creek, the ad­ vance of which Maj. K. was still the adjutant, cameinto warm conflictwith pickets of the enemy and kept up a running fire, with occasional severe fighting, in which many were killed and wounded, until the British and the advance troops of the Americans had crossed Stoney Creek towards Burlington Heights. Here the advance was recalled and bivouaced for the night on Gate's farm. Genl. Chandler1l here joined the army and being seniorto Genl. Winder, assumed the command. On this occasion, Maj. Kearsley, being called on by the Brigade Major of Genl. Chandler for a detail from the advance, composed of Maj. Forsyth's•" riflemen and two companies of the 22nd Infantry and four companies of the 2nd Artillery, acting as light infantry, to serve as the picket guard, remonstrated against selecting these troops, firstbecause they were excessivelyfatigued from the severe duties and fightingduring the day, to which the other troops had not beenexposed; and more specificallybecause the riflemenof Forsyth had never been disciplined to picket .guard duty, and would therefore, probably, where ever they might be stationed, lie down and go to sleep. The Brigade Major however persisted in his de­ mand and Maj. Kearsley personallyvisited Genl. Chandler and remonstrated,represen ting his apprehensions of the consequences likely to ensue from confiding the army to the keeping of troops who, in the language of Maj. Forsyth, "had never performedguard duty in their life." Genl. Chandler however replied "that his arrangements for the night had been made and could not be changed." The result showed how well founded were the apprehensions of Maj. Kearsley. A company of the riflemen under Capt. Van Swearingen, as of Virginia, a company under command of Capt. McFarland,16 afterward killed at Chippewa, and a company of the 2nd Artillery, all from the advance, formed the picket guard. Van Swearingen and his riflemen MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY 7 took up their quarters in a church and went comfortably to sleep, in the pews thereof. No censure was ever attached to these Riflemen:-braver men and braver partizan troops than those of Maj. Forsyth never appeared in any fieldwhere fighting was their queue. But theirs was emphatically the discipline of fighting, each for himself and all against the foes of liberty and their country. A night attack was made by the British, led by Harvey•' and Vincent•s of the British army. The pickets were surprized, Van Swearingen and the Riflementaken prisoners, Capt. Mills of the infantry severlywounded and most of the pickets taken prisoners. The British hastened upon the advance of the army almost before they had any alarm. Towson with his field pieces was stationed in the road and was pouring in a destructive fire of grapeand canister through the dark upon the British column led by Col. Harvey, when he was ordered by Genl. Winder to change the direction of his fire from the main road, where Harvey was approaching, as it after­ wards appeared, upon a meadow, where the advance was warmly engaged with the British column under Vincent-thus the advance of the American army was placed between two most galling and destructive fires-Vincent with his British column in front, and the grape and canister from Towson's pieces in the rear and upon the left flank. Such was the difficulty of extricating in any way the advance, that, after having many killed and wounded by the grape and canister of Towson's pieces, they were obliged to break and almost singly fall back upon their own army. In the meantime Harvey advanced and capturedtwo of Towson's pieces in the road, the fire of which had been turned from that road as above mentioned. The Generals, Chandler and Winder, with Maj. Vandeventer and several other officers, were taken prisoners. A just tribute to the memory of a gallant officer, long since deceased, constrains the writer to particularize an act of Capt. McChesneyl9 who, with his company of the 16th Infantry, pursued the retreating British and nobly retook from them one of Towson's field pieces; the other piece was beyond his reach, being a piece taken at Saratoga from Burgoyne. In this battle, so severely contested by the advance of the army against superior numbersand placed as they were between two fires,surrounded by the darkness attendant upon the hours of from 12 to 4 o'clock in the morning,Ma j. Kearsley nobly did his duty. He promptly formed the troops for action, hastily summoned as they were from the grass of the meadow, their only bed, and fatigued by severe marching and almost continual skirmishing the day before, and, in ascer­ taining the relative position of the forces about to engage he approached within twenty feet of the troops of Vincent, deployed from their column of march into a line and advancing at charge bayonet, until he was enabled to discover by the plates and pompoms of the British that this body of men was not a battalion commanded by Col. J. L. Smith20 (then a Major) which had occupied the left of the advance in the evening order of encampment, but which had beenwith­ drawn to another position about 9 o'clock in the evening without the knowledge of Major Hindman21 who commanded that position of the advance. Maj . Kearsley was ordered by Hindman to inform Smith of his position, that he might form upon his left. This brought Maj . K[earsley] in contact with Vincent of the British and not, as he supposed, with Smith of the American army. A well known fa ct moreover confirmedby Maj. Kearsley in the opinion that he approached Col. Smith, viz: Col. Smith had become proverbial in the army for duty on horse­ back. Vincent was mounted, and therefore Maj. K[earsley] had no hesitation in adressing him, in the dark, as Smith. This, however, he did with great cautionand presence of mind; "Don't fire," (said he) "We are friends." "What friends?" replied Vincent. "Friends," rej oined Maj. Kearsley. "Charge!" vociferated [some]one, who seemed on the left flankand who commanded them in accents which could not be mistaken as having beenaqu ired on that isle which not only furnishes two thirds of the army and navy of Great Britain, butwhich fills the ranks and mans the decks of our own army and navy with breasts as brave and freeas the gallant sons of that na­ tion who alone with truth assert that they are freeand independent, and they by their deeds have ever shown that they are both ready and able to maintain these assertions-"Charge (said this son of Erin) the d -m-d Yankees."-Not hesitating a moment to understand the character of the 8 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

troops from the hint, thus so unequivocally expressed, Maj . Kearsley instantly retumed and reported to Ma j. Hindman the result. The advance were then in line for action and the command to fire was immediately given. Thus commenced the action which terminated as above mentioned. The Americans retained the field;the British retreated. Genl. Vincentwas unhorsed, and such was his ignorance of the result, that it was stated he procured a French blanket capot and did not rejoin the British army at Burlington Heights until some two or three days after; his horse and chapeau were found on the field of battle. Generals Chandler and Winder being prisoners, the command of the army devolved upon Col. Byrne of the Dragoons, the only Col. with the army. This officerdeclined this command, alledging that he was an officer of cavalry and unacquainted with the duties appropriateto the corps. The army fe ll back a mile or two, when a contention for rank took place between the respective Lieut. Colonels present, of whom there were five or six; nothing could therefore be decided on, as there was no one clearly in command of the others. Instead, therefore, of immediately pursuing the enemy, as should have been done, to Burlington Heights, where it was afterwards understood that they designed to surrender, the Americans returned to Forty Mile Creek. Genl. Lewis,accompanied by Genl. Scott, there joined the army, and it was intended to march for Burlington, but at that moment the British fleetappeared off Forty Mile Creek and destroyed the boats of the Ameri­ cans, containing the military stores and provisions of the army. Thus divested of ammunition and provisions and moreover ordered by Genl. Dearborn,who was at Fort George & had seen the British Fleet sail up the lake in the direction of Burlington Heights, the army retreated to Fort George. Genl. Dearbornas signed as the reason for this that he believed it to be the design of the Britishfleet to take the British army at Burlington on board the fleetand thus prevent its capture. And moreover that finding Fort George but very inadequately defended by the Ameri­ cans, the British might land, recapture Fort George, and that the American army, then in the enemy's country and without provisions or military munitions, must necessarilyfa ll, without a struggle, into the hands of the British. A precipitate retreat was therefore made to Fort George, with little additional loss except that which happened to the advance, now become the rear of the retreating column, from the hostile Indians who annoyed their flank from the impending heights existing on that road . The army arrived at Fort George during the summer of 1813. The British werereinforced and invested Fort George by a cordon of breastworks, artillery and pickets, extending at intervals of distance, from Queenston to Four Mile Creek at the lake shore. Maj. Kearsley acted during this summer in the various capacities of Adjutant of 2nd Artillery, commandant of one of the companies of that regiment, garrison major under General Porter of the Light Artillery who commanded in Fort George, and for a time as Brigade Major to General Williams,24 proverbially known as "thunder and lightning Williams" from his speech, on the discussion of the question of war in Congress. In the fa ll of 1813, Genl. Wilkinson2s arrived and assumed the command at Fort George; soon after the army, protectedby the fleet, embarked at Fort George in boats and vessels for Sackett's Harbor. Genl. Scott was selected by Genl. Wilkinson to the post of honor, as it was that of danger, to remain with a garrison of about three hundred men in defense of Fort George. The British army still remainded in front of that fort, and it was expected they would attack and attempt to storm it by a coup de main, probably in the night, and immediately proceed by water or otherwise to Kingston in aid of that place upon which it was supposed Genl. Wilkinson mediated a descent from Sackett's Harbor. Maj. Kearsley re­ mained with Genl. (then Col.) Scott at Fort George, until the British broke ground and marched for Kingston by the head of Lake Ontario. Genl. Scott immediately dispatched Maj. Kearsley in pursuit of Genl. McClure26 of the militia, who with about 450 Indians had pursued the retiring British. At about twenty miles distant, in the enemy's country, Maj. Kearsley over­ took Genl. McClure with the request from Genl. Scott that Genl. McClure would return to Fort George for the purpose of taking command. Genl. McClure accordingly returned and Genl. Scott agreed to the order of Genl. Wilkinson, that as soon as the enemy should withdraw from MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY 9

Fort George, with or without attacking that place,[they should] cross the Niagra and march for Sackett's Harbor. It was then about the first of November, the roads were in an almost impas­ sable state, yet a forced march was maintained during some fo urteen days during which time it rained nearly every day and the sun was seldom seen within that period . Within some thirty miles of Sackett's Harbor, Genl. Scott met with the Secretary of War, Genl. Armstrong.27 The army under Genl. Wilkinson had left Sackett's Harbor, designing to descend the St. Lawrence and join the army of Genl. Hampton2B at St. Regis or in that neighborhood,having it in view to capture Montreal. A fa ll and wintercampaign thus opening, as was anticipated, Genl. Scott ob­ tained permission for Maj. Kearsley and himself to join the army of Genl. Wilkinson. The detachment continued to march to winter quarters at Sackett's Harbor under Maj . Hindman, and Genl. Scott, with Maj. K[earsley], proceeded without delay by day or night and joined the army of Genl. Wilkinson, upon the St. Lawrence, above Prescott. A command of the elite ad­ vance corps was immediately assigned Genl. Scott. A fo rtuitous circumstance a fe w days after­ wards, threw Maj . Kearsley into the action at Chrysler's, where Gen. Covington29 was killed. Near Cornwall, the army under Wilkinson not meeting, as was arranged, that of Genl. Hampton, crossed the St. Lawrence and encamped in latitude 45°N at the French Mills. Here the rigors of that climate were nobly sustained by the army in tents, until about the first of January 1814. Genl. Scott was ordered to Norfolk with Maj. K[earsley] fo r the purpose of marching a battalion of the 2nd Artillery to the Niagra frontier prepatory to the campaign of 1814. Genl. Scott was promoted that winter, 1813-18 14, to the rank of Brigadier, having been previously appointed Col. of the 2nd Artillery, [since] Izard [was] promoted . The order to proceed to Norfolk (as respected Maj. K[earsley]) was therefore countermanded at Philadelphia and he was ordered on the recruiting service with permission to chose his rendezvous. At Lancaster, Penn. he opened a rendezvous for recruits, where without the prospect of participating in the campaign of 1814, he met Col. James Gibson,Jo a fel low soldier of the previous campaign, who had recently been appointed to the command of the 4th Rifle Regiment of Riflemen. The Colonel strenuously urged Maj. Kearsleyto consent to a transfer to his regiment. To this Maj . Kearsley assented upon the condition that he should be furnished the necessary officers, be allowed the choice of place to recruit a company, and , upon effecting that object,be permitted to join the army on the Niagra frontier in the approaching campaign. The transfer was made; Maj. Kearsley proceeded in March to Geneva, N.Y., was joined by two subordinate lieutenants and opened a rendevous for recruiting at Geneva, and two or three other neighboring villages. The observation is not intended to derogate from the character of the citizens of Geneva, when it is stated as a fa ct, that after every effo rt that an officerof the U.S. Army, though per­ sonally a stranger, could make, Maj. Kearsley was unable to obtain a house or single room in that village, in which to open a rendezvous and before which he could suspend the appropriate emblem, the national flag. Not discouraged, however, he procured from the public stores of a Quartermaster, Maj. Rees, then absent at Sackett's Harbor, the tents and camp equipage necessary, pitched his tents in the suburbs of the village, hired musicians and commenced recruiting. This service was undertaken with such success that, within three months, when General Brown3t passed Geneva on his way from Sackett's Harbor to the command on the Niagra frontier, Maj. K[earsley] obtained the permission of the General to follow him with his company, and he, accordingly, soon after marched, with one hundred and thirty three riflemen, to Buffalo. Maj. L. Morganl2 was then at Buffalo in command of about the same number of the 1st Regt. Riflemen. These detachments of the I st and 4th were united under the command of Maj. Morgan and signally distinguished themselves. Their first engagement, at Conjockta Creek, in its important results, seems never to have been duly noticed or appreciated, not the memory of Morgan properly estimated. The British, a force consisting of about I ,300 men, were landed during the evening on Squaw Island and thence landed about one o'clock upon the American shore below Conjockta. Maj. Morgan had been apprized , the afternoon of the 10 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

previous, of the crossing of the British troops to Squaw Island , and the riflemen had been silently marched through the woods, to the point where the road from the Falls of Black Rock crossed the Conjockta.The bridge across that stream was taken up and a temporary breastwork was made by piling one upon the other the logs of an old building which stood near that place. The riflemen were then conducted, out of view of the enemy, until the former reached Black Rock. There were at this time a fe w Americans, with two or three guns, occupying Black Rock. From thence the riflemen were marched around on the margin of the river and lake back to Buffalo, making as much noise with trumpets, music, &c. as could be conveniently made, in order to arrest attention from the British on the opposite shore and induce them to the conclu­ sion that the entire force upon the American shore would be stationed for the approaching night at Buffalo.No sooner had Maj. Morgan reached Buffa lo and the men had taken a hasty meal than they were marched secretly through the wood s again to the breastworks at Conjockta, there to await the approach of the British. The enemy approached about twelve or one o'clockin the morning, by the road which runs not fa r distant from the river. The ground from below was rather ascending until the road approached near the creek and then descended to it. The British advanced until the head of their column was within some twenty paces of the stream and, discovering that the bridge was destroyed, halted and sent forward about a dozen men to replace the plank. The night was clear star-light, but without a moon, and the riflemen, who occupied lower ground that where the enemy halted, could discern the motions of the enemy and were themselves undiscovered. No sooner had the platoon reached the bridge fo r the purpose of its repair, than the signal from Maj. Morgan's whistle, produced a discharge, deliberate and unerring, from every rifle. The British column, so fa r as it had advanced to the height of the ground or beyond it to the creek, was literally decapitated,not a man in view left standing. The fire of the riflemenfrom the entire line of their breastwork had been concentrated upon the head of that column and hence, probably, none escaped. The men, who had been pushed forward to replacethe bridge,jumped into the channel under the bridge and escaped unhurt, and were capturedafter the action, being the only prisoners taken by the riflemen in this affair. The British fe ll back, deployed into line and discharged several rounds of musketry (they were without artillery) but no return was made to their fire. The enemy again fe ll back and formed a column, beingunable to cross the stream in line, and advanced in the direction of the bridge: again a concentrated discharge or two was made from the rifles, with the like effect as at the first, and the riflemen, after reloading, suspended their fire until the signal from Maj. Morgan should be given. The reason for this sus­ pension of a continued fire was two fold , first, because after one or two discharges, the enemy fe ll back out of view and again, had a fire been continued, the position and especially the comparative small force of the riflemen would have been discovered. The British might thus have been induced either to remain upon the ground until daylight, which it was most un­ accountable they did not, or might have attempted to ford the creek at some point above. After some three or more attempts to cross the bridge, the enemy retreated to their boats, carrying off for the most part their dead and wounded. Being protected, as the riflemen were, by the log breastwork, their loss was trifling. Capt. Hamilton, JJ a gallant son of Pennsylvania was killed and two lieutenants wounded, with a veryfew men killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy, as afterwards admitted, was very great. So disproportionate was the handfull of riflemento the 1300 British, that Maj. Morgan did not hazard an instant pursuit, and not until it was ascer­ tained that the enemy were embarking that the riflemen reached the shore of the river, and some of the British, it was understood,were killed and wounded in their boats upon the river, retreat­ ing to Squaw Island. The consequences of this repulse were most important to the American Army, at Fort Erie. After the investment of that fort by the British, all the provisions for the subsistance of the Americans were stored at Buffalo. Even the bread was baked daily there and with the other ra­ tions was carried across to Fort Erie. MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY 11

To destroy these provisions at Buffalo, and thus cut off all means of subsistence from the American army, was the design contemplated by the British in landing near Conjockta. The importance attached to the object and to its success may be inferred from the largenessof the force employed. The skill in planning and the firmnessin the execution by the riflemen defeated the designs of the British and saved the entire Americanarmy. The detachment of the First Rifle Regiment, commanded by Maj. Morgan, now crossed the Niagrariver and joined the armyin Fort Erie, Major Kearsley remained, with his detachment of the 4th regiment of riflemen, engaged in transporting all the flour, pork, &c. belongingto the U. States, intended for the sup­ port of the army at Fort Erie, to a place of greater safety near the lake shore and above the mouth of Big Buffalo Creek-these provisions being considered unsafe at Buffalo, as it was apprehended the British would renew the attempt to destroy them. They were carried to the Buffalo Creek and transportedacross in a flat boat or scow. Major Kearsley, with his men, sta­ tioned himself in the marsh, beyond the little streamand between it and the large creek,without tents and in the grass; during the night, removing the bridge and through the day engaged in transporting the provisions. Thus two or three days were occupied, until all thesestores were removed to the lake shore and thence across to Fort Erie. Maj. Kearsley crossed with his command about the firstday of August-day not recollected precisely. Immediately upon his joining the I st regiment, with his of the 4th, GeneralGaines34 issued an order for an attack upon one of the pickets and batteriesof the enemy, from which our pickets had been much annoyed by the Glengary light infantry and Indians of the British. Thus commenced a series of very warmly contested actions or skirmishes, between the combatants, renewed almost daily in which many were killed or wounded on both sides. The truth is, that although no great or permanent good was to be attained, yet this enabled Genl. Gaines to issue daily an order on morning parade, which order no doubt reached the newspapersof the day, if not the War Department, setting forth the gallantry of his troops and showing that although closely besiegedin Fort Erie, the Genl. was not only defending the place but constantly engaged offensively against the enemy. Thus many valuable lives were lost and the servicesof more lost to their country, when most needed by wounds. On the 13th of August, Major L. Morgan was killed. A rifle or musket ball, shot obliquely from the left,struck him on the left temple and passed through his head. He fell instantaneously dead, leaving no more gallant soldier his survivor. The noble little Morgan, or as he was called from his stature, had a soul as expanded and courage as great as that tenanted in the largest breast. Major Kearsley was at his side when he fell. Maj. Morgan's last words were "Kearsley, don't expose yourself, the enemy have marked us individually and are firing at us." The next moment he fell. They were a few paces in the advance of the chain of riflemen,who were extended and acting independently; that is, each man loading and firing when prepared and upon his object selectedand marked at some tree; for it will be observed that all this severe fighting from day to day, betweenthe British light troops and Indian allies and the riflemen, was about what Genl. Gaines called "feeling the enemy." The riflemen were therefore commanded to "Feelthe enemy" and allowed to continue the contest against whatever force might be brought to the aide of the enemy, until the office[r] commanding believed it to be consistent with his reputation and that of his riflemen, to with­ draw. No reinforcements of artillery or infantry were sent by Genl. Gaines to support the rifle­ men, when [as] usually happened, that almost immediately upon the onset, the British forces fell back upon the embankments and batteries of their line and were thus supported by about one thousand men. To advance further was impossible on the part of the riflemen, and here they were engaged against these overwhelming odds until their retreat, in the opinion of the Ameri­ can army, might not be considered disgraceful to the riflemen who had been engaged. When Maj. Morgan fell, he and Maj. Kearsley were a few paces in advance, as has been stated, of the line, and as it was the uniform habit never to leave upon the fielda riflemanwhen killed or wounded, Maj. Kearsley instantly ordered two men forward to take up the body of Maj. Morgan: they were both wounded, the enemy being only from forty to sixty paces distant, 12 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

and two others were brought forward for the same purpose; of these one was killed and the other wounded. A fifth man was ordered to the task who, with Maj. Kearsley, succeded in taking off the bodies of Morgan and the private. Major Kearsley had five rifles in his hands of those killed and wounded, before they succeeded in securing these bodies. The reason why the bodies of the killed or wounded riflemen were invariably removed,at all hazard, was that a rifleman might be assured that under no ordinary circumstances, would be left to the mercies of the Indians, or if killed, that his body would not be mutilated,perh aps his heart torn out and suspendedupon a tree, as was done in some circumstances in terrorism to the riflemen who might perhaps engage the enemy the following day upon the same ground. Thus were the riflemenengaged almost daily during many daysin this severeand wasting, yet fruitless warfare. Many valuable soldiers were killed and wounded. This loss was the greater and the more irreparable, becauseevery man then in the army was a tried soldier and habituated to danger, and because the American army there consisted of only about fifteen hundred effec­ tive men, without expectation of any immediate reinforcement, and the British ammounted to about three times that number. And above all, the British had so closely invested Fort Erie, that an attack was daily expected and every measure should have been adopted to exempt the Americans from danger and fatigue, and thus keep them, as far as possible, fresh and confident to meet such an attack. How far the daily engagements of the riflemen and their being carried into camp killed or wounded tended to have a contrary effect may readily be imagined. On the night, or rather about twelve or one o'clock of the morning,of the fifteenthof August ( 1814) the British made an attack upon the batteries and breastworks of the Americans, and at adjoining Fort Erie. The night attack was not unexpected. The British had kept up an unceasing fire of ball, shells and congreve rockets for three days and two nights previous. And it was well known that this practice was generally if not universally, in British tactics, followed by an attempt to storm the works of their enemy. The British forces, then under the command of General Drummond,3S were divided into four columns of about twelve hundred men each. Their right column composed of the DeWatteville regiment, made a somewhat circuitious march to their right and reached the lake shore about one mile above Towson's battery, which formed the left flank of the American forces. The centre column of the British, commanded by Lt. Col. Drummond (not Genl. Drummond) moved directlyforward upon Fort Erie. Their left, commanded by Lt. Col. Scott of the British, marched by the road leading up the Niagra river shore, designed to attack the right flank of the Americans, [which was] stationed behind a breastwork extending a distance of two or three hundred yards from Fort Erie to the river. The left and centre columns of the British appeared to await the onset of their right column, as this had not only the greatest distance to march, but more time was indispensible for its combined movement by land and water. When this column reached the lake shore, part was embarked in boats, designed to attack the Americans from the river in their rear, and especiallynear the rear of Towson's battery, while the other part should attack this same battery in front. The riflemen were stationed behind the breastwork near Towson's battery; this breastwork extended from Fort Erie on the right to Towson's battery on the left, with occasional traverses for protection against the balls, bombs and rocketsof the besiegers. The coup de main, or onset of the British, was first attempted against the guns and batteries of Towson, but failed, after repeated attempts; in part from their ladders being too short1oreach the other side of the ditch to the top of the parapet of the battery, and from the want of fascines, gabions, or other materials upon which to rest their scaling ladders and thus increase the height to which the assailents might ascend, but owing perhaps mainly to the extraordinary alacrity and courage with which Capt. Towson's company servedtheir guns. So quick was the succession of dischargesas to attain for the battery, forever after, the name of "Towson-'s lighthouse. .., Contemporaneously with this, that part of the column which descended in the boats, attempted to land above and below the abatis, which extended from Towson's battery, upon the rockyshore to the edge of the lake. To the defense of this point the riflemen were ordered in the commencment of the attack. The MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY 13

British who attempted to land and who penetratedthe abatiswere met and either killed or taken by the riflemen, and those who made the like attempt immediately below the abatis shared a similar fa te; so that, very soon, those in the boats, finding the attempt to land in vain, desisted and continued their descent, landing belowand joining the reserveunder General Drummond. Thus after twenty minutes or half an hour of severe fighting, the British officercommanding their right column sounded the retreat of that column. At this signal, the riflemen were ordered by Gaines immediately to take position on the right flankin support of the infantry therewho had been severely pressed by the left column of the British. That column repeatedly charged upon the breastwork of this flank and were repulsed with great slaughter by the infantry. The British infantry when once repulsed, fell back beyondthe reachof the Americanfire, halted and again fo rmed column and renewed the attack; thus they were repulsed and again made the onset fo ur or five times incessently. In the meantime, Lieut. Col. Drummond, who led the centre British column, had succeded in crossing the ditch, scaling the parapetof the principle bastion and had entered the embrasures,at the mouth of the cannon,an d, having put to the bayonet or taken prisonerall who manned their pieces, thus silenced them and became possessed of them and also of the entireenceinte of this fo rtification. It seemedfrom subsequent observation(for the night was so dark that nothing could be seen, and the muskets of the British were supplied with wooden flints, if the expression be allowed, to prevent their firing) that Lieut. Col. Drummond immediately on gaining possession intended to turn the fireof a twelve pounder which occupied the embrasureat which he entered, upon the infantry who defended the right flank of the Americans. In attempting to traverse this piece, it beingvery dark, it is believed that a slow match which stoodin a linstock burning near a chest of ammunition, the lid of which was open, was accidently turned over into this chest and thus occasioned an explosionnot only of the ammunition in this box but also communicated to the magazine which was below the plat­ fo rm and this produced a general blowing up of the different platforms and all the men both captors and captures whether then dead or living. That this explosion wasentirely accidentalwas the generalopinion of all who werepresent or near the spot, and this was the account given by some of the British officers who werein the Fort at the time and who, though much burned, were not seriously injured . Lieut. Col. Drummond seemed to have been killed, probably before the explosion occured, as he bore the mark of apparently a bayonet wound in his breast which occasioned his death. Capt. Williamsl6 and Lieut. McDonoughl7 of the Second Artillery were killed, the former however, survived until twelve o'clock of the following day. These gallant officersboth died from wounds received be­ fore the explosion. About this time it beganto rain and was extremely dark. Immediately upon the occurence of the explosion Maj or Kearsley and Capt. Birdsall with all the riflemen entered the fort through the gates which were open or ascended the flank of the bastion above men­ tioned, in order to preventthe British of this centrecolumn, who still remained outside the ditch and who had not entered with Lieut Col. Drummond, from taking possession. In attempting to scale the wall or at the moment he gained the top, according to his own statement, Birdsall re­ ceived a ball, believed to have been, through the darkness or confusion of the moment, fired by a rifleman. It entered near the mouth and fracturing very severely, the under jaw and teeth, came out behind and near the point of the jawbone. Thus was the servicede prived of another gallant officer. Capt. Birdsall, however, recovered very slowly and was finally shot by an assassin when on parade at or near Albany.ls The nature and frequency of the conflictsin which the riflemenwere engaged rnay be inferred from the fact that, offour oficers and one hundred thirty three men of the Fourth Riflemenwho crossed the Niagra to Fort Erie, only thirty eight men and a third Lieutenant remained when Major Kearsley was wounded-all save these being either killed or wounded. The right column had long since, probably one or two hours before, retreated . The left after the explosion, their commander, Lieut. Col. Scott, being killed as was said, made no further onset on the right flank of the Americans; and the centre column of the British were,as already 14 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

stated,part blown up and had in part retired without making further attempt to take the fort. The platform of the battery was replaced, as well as the darkness would permit, a twelve pounder restored to its embrasure and preparations made for defense, by Colonel, then Capt. Fanning of the 3rd Artillery. Capt. Fanning39 had been stationed with his company in a small battery or redan on the left and near Fort Erie, and soon after the explosion, enteredthe fort. About two hundredand fifty dead bodies were thrown over the walls and parapets into the ditch and outside the walls. Day soon after dawned and an apalling scene presented itself-some dying, others groaning under their wounds and dead bodies heaped upon them, othel{s] burnt and blind, manycrying out for water to slake their burning thirst, in short every form of human suffering and misery. In removing the wounded, the fable was fearfully realized. Those who had a fractured leg were mounted upon the shoulders of others, whose eyes were burned to a temporary if not lasting blindness, and thus half conducted the footsteps of the blind and both were removed to a place of safety, and afterwards to the general hospital at Williamsville. In this affair Maj . Kearsley received a wound from a bayonet in the forehead, over the left eye, the scar of which he bears to this day as a memento of the closing sentence of the order issued by General Drummond and found in the pocket of Col. Drummond, "the General recommends the free use of the bayonet." After this night attack the riflemenwere still occupied by order of General Gains in "Feeling the enemy." A general sortie was planned by Genl. Gaines upon the batteries of the enemy and Maj . Kearsley, as senior officer in command of the detachment of the First and Fourth rifle­ men, was furnished with a profile of the disposition of the troops; the riflemen were placed in front one hundred paces and the infantry, marching by the flanks of platoons, were to follow. The egress of the troops was near Towson's battery, on the extreme left, and the riflemen,being fully aquainted with the grounds, proceeded in the direction of a principle battery of the enemy without difficulty. The infantry, facing the right, attempted to follow, but immediately on entering the dense forest and encountering wet ground and much old fallen timber, they were thrown into confusion and the obstacles and impediments werevery soon found to be insupur­ able. The infantry were accordingly recalled and returned wherethey had marched out. In the meantime, the riflemen, uninformed of this countermarch, advanced steadily toward the batteries and pickets of the enemy and commenced the engagement, expecting to besupported by the whole body of infantry. After being engaged for some time and the infantry not appear­ ing, Maj. Kearsley was suddenly suprized at hearing the discharge of musketry in his rear and within the American breastworks. His first and immediate apprehensions were that while the American forces had evacuated their left, the British, informed of the movement by some spy, had entered on the right, and thus a conflict was waging within the breastwork or near it, between the British and American forces. An officerwas dispatched to learn the facts, who re­ turned with the information that the infantry had moved within the breastworks and were dis­ charging their pieces which had been loaded prior to their movement, and that Genl. Gaines re­ quested Maj . Kearsley with his command to return. Soon afterwards, a sortie took place, in which the Americans suffered severely in men and especially in officers. Lieut. Yates of the riflemen was killed and Maj . Kearsley so severely wounded as to render the amputation of a leg necessary. Owing to hope,on the part of the sur­ geons, of saving the limb, amputation was deferred seven days. Infection was greatin the mean time and indications of mortification commenced. The amputation was performed,but so late that every capillary useful, sixteen in number, required a ligature . Mortificationstill progressed and the entire inner flap sloughed before it was arrested. After severalmonths he was enabled to set out for his home upon a matress in a carriage accompanied by his father, who had come to Williamsville for him. On the way, [the] process of expoliation of the bone, at the end of his wound, commenced and he was detained several months and did not reach the residence of his father until January, 1815. His wound remained open and running, accompanied with occa- MEMOIRS OF JOHNATHAN KEARSLEY 15

sional sloughing of bone attending with spasms and acute pain, until August, 1815, beingnearly one yearafter the wound was received. The wound then healed, leaving however a very bad stump and attended with unceasing pain, greater or non mitigated, through life. For his military services and conduct in action, Maj. Kearsley was twice brevetted-first as Captain, taking date from the night attack, and secondly as Major of Riflemen, ranking from the date of the sortie in which he was wounded, and subsequently he was appointed Assistant Adjutant General. Soon after the war Maj. Kearsley was appointed, by William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, under the administration of Monroe, one of the collectors of internalrevenue and direct tax, in Pennsylvania, and designated Collector for the now resident taxesfor that state. The repeal of the tax laws, after the close of the war, which had rendered them necessary, brought the collection of these revenues and with them the office of Collector, to an end. Major Kearsley, beforethe close of his duties as Collector, was tenderedthe appointment of receiver of Public monies for the Land Office at Detroit, which officehe has filled,from July 9th, 1819, to the present time, with fidelity to the government and entire satisfaction to the public.40

NOTES

I Enos Goodrich, "Our Pioneer Debating Society," Michigan Pioneer, XI (1887), 262. 2 George B. Catlin, The Story of Detroit (Detroit: The Detroit News, 1923), 675. 3 Wilfred Shaw, The University of Michigan (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920), 39. 4 Kent Sagendorph, Michigan: The Story of the Un iversity (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1948), 43. 5 The Rifle Regiment was established in 1808 and wore as its badge of distinction a green coat with blackfa cings, as opposed to that ofthe regulars who wore blue. They were armed, not as is popularly supposed, withthe long, unwieldy "Kentucky long rifle"but with a much shorter weapon of Jaeger derivation, the Harper's Ferry Model l803. While no official unit history exists, the activities of some of the leaders and component companies of the regiment warrant recognition. A good sketch of the most popular officer is Richard Patterson, "Lieut. Col. Benjamin Forsyth," North Country No tes, Nov. 1974. See also Sarah Lemmon, Frustrated Pa triots: No rth Ca rolinians and the Wa r of 1812 (Chapel Hill, NorthCarolina: University of NorthCarolina Press, 1973 ). For the reg iment's most celebrated encounter, consult J. Evans, "Forgotten Battle of the War of 18 12: The Battle of Big SandyRiver," Magazine of AmericanHistor y, XXIX (1893), 524-27; seealso T. W. Haight, "The Battle of SandyCreek," Jeff erson County HistoricalSociety Trans­ actions, III (1895), 25-31. 6 George Izard, 1776-1 828. This controversial officer rose to Major General during the war. See Gabriel H. Manigault, "Military Career of General George Izard," Ma gazine of American History, XXI (1888), 465-72. 1 Winfield Scott, 1786-1866. The best biography of this eminent American warrior remains Charles W. Elliot, Winf�eld Sc ott: The Soldier and the Ma n (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937). 8 Samuel Archer, 1790- 1825 . 9 NathanTowson, 1784-1854.The best review ofhis militarycareeris Sketch ofthe Life of GeneralNa than To wson, Un ited States Army (Baltimore: N. Hickman, 1842). 10 Henry Dearborn, 1751-1829. Dearborn was subsequently censured for activities in this region and forced to resign. Consult Richard A. Erney, The Public Life of Henry Dearborn (New York, 1979). 1 1 MorganLewis, 1754-1844. Lewiswas another officerto resign as a consequence for operations in this region. See Julia Delafield , Biographies of Francis Lewis and Morgan Lewis(New York: A. D. F. Randolph and Company, 1877). 12 William H. Winder, 1775-1824. An apologia of his performance is Statement by Colonel William H. Winder, of Occurences on the Niagara Frontier, in 1812 (Washington, D.C., 1829). 13 John Chandler, 1762-1841 . 14 Benjamin Forsyth, 1760?-1814. 15 Henry Van Swearingen, d. 1819. 16 Daniel McFarland, 1787-1814. Mc Farland was killed at Lundy's Lane,not Chippewa. See John M. Crombie, "The Papers of Daniel McFarland ," We stern Pe nnsylvania Historical Magazine, LI (1968), 101-25. 11 John Harvey, 1778-1852. 18 John Vincent, 1765-1848 . 19 John Machesney. 20 Joseph Lee Smith, 1779- 1846. His account of Stoney Creek can be found in a biographical sketch at the St. Augustine Historical Society, Florida. 21 Jacob Hindman, 1789-1827. A sketch of this meritorious officer is "Biography of Colonel Jacob Hindman," Portico, III (1816), 38-52. 16 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

22 James Bum, d. 1831, of South Carolina. Several of his letters relative to Stoney Creek are in the Charles J. Ingersoll Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 23 Moses Porter, 1775-1822. According to one source, the nickname of this officer was ..Old Blowhard." See Mordecai Meyers, Reminiscences 1780-1814, Including In cidents in the Wa r of 1812 (Washinaton, D.C.: The Crane Company, 1900), 21. 24 David R. Williams, I n6-1830. Williams was a prominent War Hawk from North Carolina.See HarveyT. Cook, The Life and legacy of David Roggerson Willia ms (New York, 1916). 2s James Wilkinson, 1755-1825. The best account of Wilkinson's ineptitude remains James R. Jacobs, The Tarnished Wa rrior: Major General Ja mes Wilkinson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1981). 26 George McClure, 1771-1851. A sketch of his subsequent depredations along the Niagara can be found in his Causes of the Destruction of American To wns on the Nillgara Frontier (Bath, New York: Benjamin Smead, 1817). 27 John Armstrong, 1758-1843. The best and most recent account of this controversial figure is Edward C. Skeen, John Armstrong, Jr. , 1758-1843: A Biography (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981). 28 Wade Hampton, 1752-1835. The most recent narrativeof his military fa ilure is Allan S. Everest, The Wa rof/812 in the Champlain Va lley (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981). 29 Leonard Covington, 1768-1813. The only biography of this officer is Nellie W. Brandon and John W. W. Drake, eds., Memoir of Leonard Covington (Natchez, Mississippi: Natchez Printing and Stationary Company, 1928). 30 James Gibson, 1784-1814. A highly accomplished officer, Gibson was slain at the sortie from Fort Erie on September 17, 1814. 31 Jacob Jennings Brown, 1775- 1828 . Although a figurecrucial to the study of this and later American military his- tory, no satisfactory biography or treatise on him exists. 32 Lodowick Morgan of Maryland. 33 Joshua Hamilton. who died on August 31 of wounds received. The British lost 54 casualties. l4 Edmund P. Gaines, 1777-1849. The best biography is James W. Silver's Edm und P. Gaines, 1777-1849: Frontier General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949). 3s Gordon Drummond, 1771-1854. 36 Alexander J. Williams, 1790-1814, the son of West Point Superintendent John Williams. 37 Patrick MacDonough, 1786-18 14. For an account of his career, see Isabelle M. O'Reilley,.. A Hero of Fort Erie," Buffa lo Historical Society Publications, V (1902), 63-93. 8 3 Benjamin Birdsall, shot by a soldier on July 12, 1817. For details on his murder consult Harriet Weed,ed., Life of Thurlow We ed (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1884), 63-66. 39 Alexander C. W. Fanning, 1768-1846. 40 Kearsley died in Detroit on August 31, 1859. THE SPANISH MARCH ACROSS INDIANA TO FORT ST. JOSEPH: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

By William Collins•

Make it known to posterity and to whomsoever shall see these presents, that in virtueof the war declared between the most high, most August, and most powerful monarch and my sovereign, Charles Ill, invincible King of Spain (whom Godkeep), and George III, King of Great Britain, I have entered by force this very day, month, and year, despite our enemies (whom I have taken prisoners of war) with a detachment of 120 men into the post of St. Joseph of English possession situated on the right bank of the river by the same name which flows into Lake Michigan.'

Thus declared Lieutenant Eugene Poure, leader of the Spanish expedition, on February 12, 1781, as by right of conquest he made the traditional claim of possession of the fort and surrounding territory. What was the purpose of this attack? What was the historical signifi­ cance of this event? Before consideringthese questions, we must examine the geographicaland political situation in the Mississippi Valley. After November, 1762, the Mississippi Valley situation changed significantly. The French who had controlled the huge territoryof Louisiana were decisively beaten by the British in the French and Indian war. France, in an effort to retain a foothold on the continent, turned over New Orleans and their lands west of the Mississippi to Spain in November, 1762, before going to the Paris Peace Conference of February, 1763, where they would lose the rest of their North American territory. Spain accepted this "left-handed gift" from their Bourbon cousins with some reluctance. Afterall, the defenses of Spain werealready stretched out, and additional land to defend meant higher economic and manpower demands on the strained Spanish treasury. A move to the western bank of the Mississippi would put them "eyeball to eyeball" with the British on the other side of the river. Spain had lost Cuba during the war which they had entered as allies of France with some reservations. While Great Britain had exchanged Cuba, vital to Spain's control of the Carribean, for Florida, Spain still felt shortchanged. On the other hand, Spanish Louisiana would present a formidable barrier to British westward expansion. The transfer of Louisiana from French to Spanish rule was slow and painful and accompanied by confusion, indifference, and even outright rebellion. Only Spain's ability to re­ cruit and retain the services of capable and knowledgeable Frenchmen made the transition possible. The French had controlled the Indians through trade and presents, a policy the Spanish tried to follow with the assistance of French administrators.2 The Spanish would meet a severe challenge from British traders for the friendship and patronage of the many Indian tribes. The Spanish took over the French trading posts on the right bank of the river-ArkansasPost, Ste. Genevieve, and a small company post just south of the confluence of the Missouri and the Mississippi called St. Louis des Illinois. Most of the French mid-valleysettlements had been on the left bank of the Mississippi, along the Wabash to the east, up to the Great Lakes in the north, and in the territory generally covered by the term British Illinois. Faced with the prospect of being under English rule these Frenchmen crossed into Spanish Illinois (today's Missouri) and soon St. Louis was a maj or strategic outpost protecting Spain's new frontier. While it could not be considered a bulwark against British (or later American) expansion, it would serve to delay the British and protect the approaches to Santa Fe via the Missouri and Arkansas rivers.

• Professor Collins teaches history at Purdue University. An abbreviated version of this article was read at the George Rogers Cla rk Trans-Appalachian Frontier History Conference, October 20, 1984.

17 18 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

Spanish commanders burdened by government regulation, lacking in manpower and financial resources, had to maintain friendly relations with the Indians while competing with vigorous British traders. These aggressive hordes of British and French-Canadians, many employees of the North West Fur Company, backed by cheap tradego odsand relatively free of government regulations had the advantage. The Spanish understood the mission system, mining, agriculture, and ranchingwhich they controlled by their"legal"and long-tested institu­ tions. Now they were playing agame which the British understood-asdid the British colonials. Tensions increased as the British colonists revolted for their independence, and when George Rogers Clark's Virginians moved into the Mississippi Valley the wa r was brought to the door­ steps of the Spanish. Spanish governors had been instructed to cooperate with the American belligerents, and relations between the Spanish commander at St. Louis, Fernando De Leyba, and Colonel Clark were cordial. J Despite repeated British warnings, the Spanish had been supplying the American colonists with arms and ammunition, food, and money from New Orleans.4 One of these British threats was delivered by GeneralHenry Hamilton when he retook Vincennes in December, 1778 . However, this threat was removed when Clark recaptured the town on February 24, 1779. Nevertheless, St. Louis was now vulnerable to British attack. The Spanish had not been neutral in supplying England's enemies. De Leyba's position became truly hazardous in June, 1779, when Spain broke off diplomatic relations with England . The formal declaration of war wa s made in July, 1779, but this news didn't reach St. Louis until February, 1780. De Leyba hastened to prepare the defenses of his city. A combined British and Indian assault on St. Louis was repulsed in May, 1780, with the assistance of George RogersClark.s It was in response to this British action that Spain made its greatest offensive move in the Upper Mississippi Valley throughout the Revolutionary war-the attack on Fort St. Joseph. The British post of St. Joseph was located sixty miles from the mouth of the St. Joseph River near the presentlocation of Niles, Michigan.6 The French had built and garrisoned a fort on the site of a Jesuit mission only to lose it to the British following the capitulation of Montreal in 1761. A few years later the fort was overrun by Indians during the Pontiac uprising. When Pontiac reluctantly yielded , to English power the village was reoccupied by Michilimackinac traders and used as a supply point for merchandise and munitions. St. Joseph remained rela­ tively peaceful until it was raided seve ral times during the American Revolution. In each case the attackers were pursued and punished by British militiamen and their Indian allies. The last attack prior to the Spanish expedition was led by Jean Baptiste Hamelin. The detachment composed of men from Cahokia surprised and plundered the village. When they began to retreat toward Chicago they were overtaken by British lieutenant Dagneau de Quindre and a group of Potawatomis who killed or captured all but three of the raiders.This affair took place in December, 1780, about one month before the Spanish excursion. Lieutenant Governor Francisco Cruzart sponsored the Spanish attack on St. Joseph. FernandoDe Leyba had died shortly after his successful defense of St. Louis and was replaced by Cruzart. It was the second term for this popular commander who promised aggressive action against the British as well as continued friendly relations with the Indians and Americans. Cruzart placed the St. Joseph expedition under the command of Captain Eugene Poure. Ensign Charles Tyson was second-in-command, and Louis Chevalier, who was fa miliar with St. Joseph, was chief interpreter. The entire party consisted of sixty-five militia soldiers and sixty Indians. The greatchiefs Herturno and Naguiquen led the Indians.7 St. Joseph, according to a census of the post taken in June, 1780, was a village of fi fteen houses occupied by a popula­ tion of forty-eight, mostly French or half breed. It was the nearest Britishes tablishment to St. Louis at this time. In August, in an effort to strengthen this post the British authorities appointed Dagneaude Quindre as lieutenant and Indian agent in the vicinityof St. Joseph. Sit was this officer who led the Potawatomis in the rout of the Cahokian raiders. Cruzart sentthe Poureexpedition on the way to St. Joseph on January2, 1781.9 Spiritswere SPANISH MARCH ACROSS INDIANA 19

high as the main body of Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Indians left St. Louis. Several of the French-Canadian voyageurs broke out in jovial singing as they began paddling up the Mississippi. However, the going became more difficult as they progressed slowly against the current. As they moved into the Illinois river the weather became extreme. Wet snow blew into their faces and the ice floats on the river called for dexterous use of pole and paddle. With great relief they delayed in the vicinity of the present Peoria. Here, on January9, they werejoined by Jean Baptiste Malliet and twelve militiamen whom Cruzart had stationed in a small outpost along the Illinois River. The party pushed on up the river to a small settlement called Los Pes, close to a point where their route along the river turned sharply to the east. It was now August 20, and they had traveled eighty leagues from St. Louis. Thus far they had kept to the water, but from this point, as the river was frozen over, it was necessary to continue the journey on foot. Poure distributed to each man a sufficientquantity of food for his own subsistence, ammuni­ tion, and all the trade goods he could reasonably carry. The boats and left over food needed for the return wereconcealed near the river. The remainder of the merchandisewas loaded on a few horses, presumably obtained from the settlement. Trade goods were necessary because the party expected and did meet several groups of Indians who normally owed their allegiance to the British. It was fortunate that Louis Chevalier was well versed in Indian languages. By reasonable negotiations and timely gifts he prevented these hostile bands from impeding their progress, for otherwise it would have been difficult to complete the mission. The arduous overland trek covered over a hundred thirty leagues of difficult terrain. Poure followed the Illinois east to a point south of present-day Joliet. Near Goose Lake Prairie he turned southeast to follow the Kankakee River. He could not take a direct route across the frozen prairies to his objective in winter and expect to survive. For shelter and fuel, as well as water, he was compelled to follow the course of rivers and the woods which border them. At today's Kankakee, Illinois, the partyfollowed the river northeast then east crossing into what is now Indiana, though they knew the entire region as "the Illinois." The Spaniardsentered Indiana along the snowy banks of the frozen Kankakee at a spot now partof La Salle Fish and WildlifeArea just south of present Schneider and pushed patiently to the northeast in the teeth of winteryblasts. As Cruzart reported, "They suffered in so extensive a march and so rigorous a season, the greatest inconvenience from cold and hunger. "t o Poure followed the river as it turned southeast through frozen fields and denseundergr owth. Several small Indian bands, met in that part of the journey, were readily persuaded by presents to regard the situation from an impartial point of view. Near today's Dunns and Dunns Bridge the party turned northeast and continued over snow-covered prairies, those with heavier loads broke through the crust but only ankle deep. The horses slipped and fellseveral times along the icy river banks, and several bags of trade goods were lost or broken. Near present South Bend they crossed at the usual portage route from the Kankakee to the St. Joseph River. After twenty days of forced marching in enemy territory the party at last arrived two leagues from their objective where they encamped at nightfall. The commander sent a young Potawatomi, named Lajes, to persuade the two hundred Potawatomis who resided in St. Joseph to remain neutral during the attack. Poure promised them half of the booty taken from the fort. Lajesreported the success of his negotiations to the commander who prudently took precautions in case the Pota watomis failed to keep their promise. Early the next morning, the 12th of February,the detachment hurried across the ice opposite Fort St. Joseph, and in a spirited assault capturedthe post before the startledenemy could take up arms. They captured a merchant named Duquier and several of his employees, apparently the only persons there other than the Indians. With greateffort the Spaniardsprevented their Indian allies from killing the English prisoners. Having made precautions to secure the post, Pouredistributed the goods found at the post to the Indians of his partyand those who lived in St. Joseph in order to fulfill his promise. There was a great deal of merchandise to be divided among the Indians. The commander did not permit his soldiers to share in the booty. Cruzart 20 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

reported that Poure then scattered, destroyed, and wasted three hundred sacks of com, a quantity of tallow, and other food supplies that the enemy had therein storage, "without doubt for some expedition that they had planned against us."ll D'!ringthe occupation which lasted twenty-four hours, the Spanish flagwas kept flying,and Poure and his officers prepared and signed the document formally taking possession of the post. This accomplished, they took their departure. The following day British lieutenant Dagneau de Quindre arrived at St. Joseph but was unable to induce the Indians to go in pursuit. The Indians insisted on going in the opposite direction-to Detroit whereaccording to a British report they went to exculpate themselves "for having suffe red the enemy to carry off their traders. "12 The return trip of the expedition while difficult was without incident. The detachment reached St. Louis on the 6th of March without the loss of a single man. On the English side two prisoners who had attempted to escape were overtaken by the Indian allies and killed. Poure presented the document authenticating the legality of possession by conquest and the English flag to Cruzart thus ending the expedition. The capture of Fort St. Joseph was but a minor incident in the Spanish actions during the American Revolution. St. Joseph was an insignificant post, and the British regarded the attack as a mere nuisance. They reported , "The attack on St. Joseph was nothing more than an outrage committed by a band of marauders and of little consequence ."ll Then why the fuss? Many his­ torians have written about this episode, and there is a noticeable divergence of opinion as to the object of the expedition. Edward G. Mason in an article entitled "The March of the Spaniards Across Illinois" stressed the diplomatic importance of this event on the Peace of Paris, 1783 . Clarence W. Alvord in his "The Conquest of St. Joseph, Michigan by the Spaniards in 1781," contended that the expedi­ tion was based on revenge and plunder. Frederick J. Tegga rt in "The Capture of St. Joseph, Michiganby the Spaniards in 1781," stated that the purpose was a "spoiling attack" to prevent a possible British attack on St. Louis. And, Lawrence Kinnaird in "The Spanish Expedition against Fort St. Joseph in 1781, A New Interpretation," while finding some merit in each account, felt that the attack was part of Spanish Indian policy.l4 Mason, basing his premise on an account found in the Gaceta de Madrid, March 12, 1782, stated that the expeditionwas inspiredand directed from Madrid. He explained that, as the war progressed,Spain became more and more unfriendly to the United States "until it was apparent that nothing less than the entire valley of the Mississippi would satisfy the ambition of the Spaniards. Their conquests of Baton Rouge and Natchez weremade to serve as a basis fo r title to the whole eastern side of the Lower Mississippi, as fa r as the Ohio. They needed something more, in order that they might include in their demands that which was afterwards known as the Northwest Territory. "IS Mason was more emphatic than any other historian in his insistence that the expedition could be explained only as a result of diplomatic and political motives. He pointed out, correctly, that Spain was at war with Great Britain for her own interestsand that the idea of American independence was extremely unwelcome. Recognition of American colonies in revolt was per se a dangerous precedent with respect to Spain's own reckless colonies. •6 Mason noted that Benjamin Franklin, our minister to Versailles, was quick to see the meaning of the Spanish action. Franklin wrote to Robert Livingston in April, 1782, "I see by the newspapers that the Spaniards having taken a little post called St. Josephpretend to have made a conquest of the Illinois country. In what light does this proceeding appearto Congress? While they (the Spaniards) decline our proffered friendship, are they to besuf fe red to encroach on our bounds and shut us up within the Appalachian mountains? I begin to fear they have some such project."l7 John Jay, our representative in Madrid, supported Franklin'sopinion by calling attention to the care with which the Spanish commander of the expedition had taken possession of the territory for Spain.as It was chiefly through Jay that the St. Joseph affair be- SPANISH MARCI:I ACROSS INDIANA 21

cameknown to historians in the United States as he senta copy and a translation ofthe Madrid Gazette to Livingston. The Spanish account of the expedition was published in the Secret Jo urnals of Congress and in Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution.19 According to Masonthe policy and aims of Spain during the Revolution, and the use which was made of the expeditionto St. Joseph in support of the same, make it reasonablycertain that the attack originated in Spain. He wrote, "How little did those light-hearted soldiers and their red allies know that they were but pawns in the greatgame whereof the players wereat Paris and Madrid ."2o The diplomatic interpretationwas bitterly attacked by Clarence W. Alvord who directed his criticism chiefly against Mason and historians who accepted his version.21 Alvord indicated that there was a connection betweenthe attack on St. Josephin 1781 and the ill-fated Hamelin expeditionsent out by Augustin de Ia Balme in 1780. He statedthat the purpose of the Spanish expedition was to retaliate against the British for the attack on St. Louis and for the defeat of Hamelin. He belittled Mason's version as being based on no more information on the subject than "a brief description in the Madrid Gazette."22 Alvord noted that the newspaperaccount was based on the following points: First, the expedition was sent out by the Spanish commandant at St. Louis. Second, the company was composed of Spanish soldiers and Indians. Third, the commander was a Spaniard.Fourth, some Englishmen and propertywere captured. Fifth, the country was takenpossession of in the name of Spain. Lastly,the enterprise was all part ofa scheme to strengthen Spain's claim to territoryeast of the Mississippi. Alvord stated that there was sufficient reason to suspectthe truth of almost every one of these points. His account of the affair is essentiallyas follows: a French officernamed Augustin de Ia Balme came to Illinois to raise a force of Frenchmen to attack Detroit and invade Canada.23 One de­ tachmentreached and captureda small post at Miami only to be attacked by Indians who killed De Ia Balme and thirtyof his men.24 In the meanwhile his other detachment composed of men from Cahokia under Hamelin plunderedSt. Joseph. They, too, were overtakenwith four killed, two wounded, and seven taken as prisoners.2s The survivors returned to Cahokia where they incited their countrymen to avenge the death of their fe llow citizens. Appeals were made to the people of St. Louis who werealso French. An expedition of twenty Cahokians and thirty men of St. Louis and two hundredfriendly Indians set out twenty-eightdays after the firstCahokian party met its defeat. They wereaccompanied by Louis Chevalier, who was on friendly terms with the Potawatomis. Chevalier induced these Indians to remain neutral,and St. Joseph was easilysurprised and plundered. The British officers were unable to convince the Potawatomis to pursue the invaders as they had done before.26 This version was based largely on a letter written to Colonel Slaughter by CaptainMc Carty whom Alvord believed to have been living in Cahokia during the winter of 1780 and 1781. Alvord stated that the leader of the expeditionwas John Baptiste Malliet ofPeoria rather than Eugene Poure. He believed that the Spaniardshad little or nothing to do with the affair and as­ serted that "thereis no evidence that the taking of St. Joseph was in accordance with the instruc­ tions from the home government or even from the governor of Louisiana."27 Professor Frederick Teggart of the University of California challenged the accuracy of Alvord's conclusion. Continuing the acrid controversy Teggart asserted that Alvord's "explanation of the event must benoticed , not becauseof it having any merit or probability, but because the author speaks with the prestige of a professor in the University of Illinois."28 He then proceeded to discredit the evidence used by Alvord in much the same way that Alvord had discredited Mason's article. He criticizedAlvord's sources and his selectiveuse of other sources, particularly his failure to point out that Malliet was in the service in Spain. Using Spanish manuscripts Teggart claimed that Mason's interpretation was essentially correct. From the documents Teggart showed that the Madrid Gazette account used by Mason was a complete although shorter version of Cruzart's official report of the incident. He supported Mason's contention that the affair was a shrewddiplom atic move orderedfr om Madrid, and discussed 22 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

the reaction of Franklin and Jayto the news of the attack. In addition Teggart fe lt that Cruzart also intended the expedition as a "spoiling attack" to prevent a possible British move to St. Louis. Cruzart's correspondence showed how ominous the English preparations for a second attack on St. Louis appeared to him.29 Teggart cited a letter from Patrick Sinclair, British Lieutenant-Governorat Michilimackinac, to General Haldimand in regardto the failure of the attack on St. Louis in May. Sinclair stated, " A like disaster cannothappen next year, and I can venture to assure your excellency that one thousand Sioux . . . . will be in the fieldin April under Wabasha."30 Teggartalso wrote that the advantage resultingfrom the success of the St. Joseph expedition,according to the Spanish account of 1782, was that the destruction of the magazine of provisions and goods which the British had at St. Joseph, made itimpossible for them to execute their plan of attacking St. Louis. The account also said the appearance of a Spanish fo rce served to intimidate the Indians in the vicinity, and to oblige them to remain neutral, "which they do at present. "31 Teggart concluded his thesis by pointing out that if any­ thing was needed to complete the evidence it was supplied by the fact that Cruzart had before him the example of George Rogers Clark who, in 1779, had undertaken a similar march fora similar purpose. On December 17, 1778, Hamilton retook Vincennes from the Virginians. He then set about making preparations for a spring attack on the Illinois settlements. To ward off this blow Clark resorted to the bold expedient of leading his men two hundred miles across country in mid-winter. He took Vincennes again on February 24. It seems probable that this example had an important influence on Cruzart's determination. Professor Lawrence Kinnaird also of the University of California and again using documentation from Spanish sources attempted to reconcile the conflicting accounts of the previous writers.While finding merit in each account, he felt something was missing.Kinnaird agreed with the Mason and Teggart version of the marchto St. Joseph while agreeingthat the Cahokians and some of the Indians desired revenge and plunder as advocated by Alvord. He made a careful check of the documentary material used by the others in order to determine whether any fa ct had been overlooked or misinterpreted. Although he concluded that their research had been well done, the search did result in the finding of one important clue. Cruzart'sreport of the expedition writtento Miro, August 6, 1781, and usedby Teggartin his account, began with the foliowing sentence, "On January 2nd of the present year, as I have written to the governor on the lOth of the same month and year, Don Eugene Poure, ... left this city of San Luis with a detachment of sixty-five militia and about sixty Indians."32 Apparently Cruzart had written a letter to the governor of Louisiana on January 10, 1781, a letter written while the raid was in progress. Mter a long and exhaustive searchthe letter was found in the Louisiana papers deposited in the Bancroft Library, University of California. In his letter Cruzart said the attack was requested by Milwaukee chiefs Heturnoand Naquiguen and that not to have consented would have demonstrated Spanish weakness and may have caused them to change sides. He pointed out that it was the custom of Indians to side with the strongest force. Secondly, he continued, to go to St. Joseph, seize the fort, English commissioners, the merchandise, and the provisions would have the effect of terrorizing the surrounding nations.JJ Kinnaird stated that among the motives which induced Cruzartto yield to the urgings of the Indians was the hopethat the destruction of supplies at St. Joseph would make an attack on St. Louis in the spring much more difficult. However, concludes Kinnaird, this was not sufficientcause to warrantthe undertaking. He fe lt the whole affair was a manifes­ tation of Spain's Indian policy. Further, Kinnaird noted that the very existence of the settle­ ments in Spanish Illinois depended upon maintaining friendly relations with neighboring Indian tribes. Indian alliances for frontier defense had already been used by the Spaniardsin Texas and lower Louisiana against both the Apaches and the English. It would appear that unless Cruzart had concealed informationfrom his superiors theexpedition di d not originate with Cruzart but was proposed by Indian chiefs. It was not planned by diplomats in Madrid, nor by irate Frenchmen from Cahokia bent on revenge. It was not sent outto establish Spanish SPANISH MARCH ACROSS INDIANA 23

claims to territoryeast of the Mississippi, nor did Cruzart dispatch it primarily to prevent an expected attack on St. Louis. A careful examination of these historical interpretations shows that it is not "begging the question" to find meritin each article. However, with the exception of Kinnaird, the confidence each writer placed on his own explanation, the bitterness with which he defends his point of view, and his presumption of infallibility, almost bordering on arrogance, lead one to consider this point. History is a question of time. With determined research a historian can finddoc u­ ments to show why the Spanish soldiers were sent to St. Joseph, but that is not enough. What did the statesmen and diplomats of 1782 believe was the reason for the attack? What Franklin and Jay believed two hundredyea rs ago is more important than what we know now. Thereis no question that the American negotiators believed the expedition had been undertaken in accordance to directions from Madrid, and, of course, the Spanish diplomats took advantage of this situation. The King of Spain sent a message expressing satisfaction with the capture of St. Joseph and instructions that the officers in charge be rewarded.34 Vergennes, the French Prime Minister, saw the possibilityof giving the land west of the Appalachiansto Spain instead of Gibraltar which they could not capturefrom the British.3S During the peace negotiations of 1782 Spain opposed the efforts of the United States to secure the Mississippi as her western boundaryand was supported by France. The Americandiplomats finallyovercame this opposi­ tion by making a separate treaty with Great Britain. Spain, however, refused to acknowledge officiallythe western claims of the United States until the signing of Pinckney's treaty in 1795.36 In this light we can consider the importance of the attack on St. Joseph. It did not change his­ tory, but it had historical importance. As John W. Caugheypointed out, the conquest of the Baton Rouge-Natchez region and the temporary occupation of St. Joseph were factors in the Anglo-Spanish struggle for controlof the Mississippi and dominant influence over the Indians of the area. He wrote that "In 1781, after the St. Joseph expedition, it appeared that the duel had beensettled in fa vor of Spain."37 Spain controlled the westernbank of the Mississippi and the eastern bank south of the Ohio. Above the Ohio the Spaniardsand Americanswere in an informal joint control.38 Only the clever diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and John Adams and their making of a separatepeace with Great Britain thwarted the Spanish ambitions to control the entire Mississippi Valley. 24 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

NOTES

1 "Spanish Act of Possession for Valleys of the St. Joseph and IUinois Riven," February 12, 1781, in Louisiana Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California(hereafter cited BL). Spanish maps show the present Kankakee River to be part of the Illinois River. 2 Details and expansion of these interpretations may be found in John Francis Bannon. The Spa nish Borderlands Fr ontier, 1513-1821 (New York, 1970). General treatments of this period include Lawrence Kinnaird, Sp ain in the Mississippi Va lley, 1765-1794, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1946-1949) and John Francis McDermott,ed. , TheSp anish in the Mississippi 1762-1804 (Urbana, 1974). 3 See Clark-Leyba correspondence, Archivo General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba, Seville, Spain. Most of these papen are contained in George Rogers Clark Papers, 1781-1783 (Springfield, IL, 1926). 4 Spanish contributions to the American Revolution arefound in James G. Randall, "The George Rogen Clark's Service of Supply," Mississippi Va lley Historical Review, VIII, 256-263 ; James Alton James, "Oliver Pollock, Financier of the Revolution in the West, ibid, XVI, 70-71; Oliver Pollock, "Deposition, June 8, 1808," in James M. Wilkinson, Me moirs of My Own Times, II, Appendix I. 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 18 16); as well as the Spanish work by Juan F. Vela, Esp ano ante /o lndep endencia delos Estados Unidos, 2 vols. (Lerida ,GrBflcas Academia Mariana,192S). 5 For information concerning the British attack upon St. Louis in May, 1780, consult John Francis McDermott, "The Myth of the 'Imbecile Governor': Captain Fernando de Leyba and the Defenseof St. Louis in 1780," in his The Sp anish in the Mississipp i Va lley, 1762-1804 (Urbana, 1974), 314-412; Abraham P. Nasitir, "The Anglo-Spanish Frontier during the AmericanRevolution, l778- 1783," inJournolofthe 0/inois HistoricalSociety (Springfield, l908-), XXI (1928), 311-32 1; and James A. James, "The Significanceof the Attack on St. Louis, 1780," in Mississippi Valley Historical Society, Proceedings II (1908-1909}, 199-217. 6 Haldimandto DePeyster, August 10, 1781, "The Haldimand Papen," in Michigan Pioneerand Historical Society, Collections (Lansing 1877- 19 1 S), X (1888), 417; ReubenG. Thwaites, Francein America , 1497-1763 (New York, I 90S), 290. Daniel McCoy stated thatthe site of Fort St. Joseph was in "the third ward of the present cityof Niles, Michigan." He also published maps showing the location ofthe fort. McCoy."Old Fort St. Joseph," in Michigan Pioneerand His­ torical Society, Collections, XXXV (1907), S49, SSO-SS I. 7 "EI Hertumo" is the Spanish venion of the French "Le Toumeau." Both Milwaukeechiefs were weD-known for their hostility to the British and aided the Spanish in their defense of St. Louis. See Cruzart to Galvez, November 13, 1780, BL; DePeyster to Haldimand, May 2, 1779, Michigan Historical Society. Collections, IX. 380; andReuben G.

Thwaites, ed.• "British Regime in Wisconsin," State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Collections (Madison, 18S4-), XVIII, 384, n. S3 . 8 Michigan Historical Society, Collections, IX, S61; IX, 368, SS3 ; X, 439; and XIII, S3 . 9 This account of Poure's expedition is based on the official Spanish report. See Cruzart to Miro, August 6, 1781, BL. 10 Ibid. II Ib id. l l Indian Council at Detroit, March 11, 1781, reported by DePeyster. Michigan Historical Society, Collections, X, 4S3-4SS. 13 State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Collections, XI, 163. 14 Mason's article is in The Magazine of American History, XV, 457-469; Alvord's, in TheMissouri Historical Review, II, 195-21 1; Teggart's, in The Missouri Historical Review, V, 214-228; and Kinnaird's, in The Mississippi Va lley Historical Review, XIX, 173-191 . 15 Mason, 464. 16 Several French officials also saw the dangerof involvement in Revol ution. Baron Turgot, ComptrollerGeneral of Finances, and his successor Jacques Necker vehementlyopposed the war. Turgot insisted that war with Great Britain would drive the nation into bankruptcy and that the revolutionary virus would lead to the weakening and collapse of the Ancient Regime. See John Richard Alden, The American Revolution 1775 -1783 (New York, 19S4 ), 182, quoting

Oeuvres de Mr. Turgot •..9 vols. (Paris, 1808-1811 }, VIII, S34�; and David Schoenbrun, Triumph in Paris: The Exp loits of Benja min Franklin (New York. 1976}, 102. The diplomacy of the American Revolution and the eventual peace treaty is covered in Samuel F. Bemis, The DiplomtJcy of the American Revolution (New York, 193S). 17 Benjamin Franklin to Robert R. Livingston, April 12, 1782, in Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionory DiplomtJtic Correspondence of the United States (Washington, 1889), V, 300. Seealso Jared Sparks, ed., DiplomtJtic Correspondence of the American Revolution (Boston, 1829-1830), VIII, 76-78 . 18 John Jay to Livingston. April 28. 1782, Wharton, V, 364. 19 Secret Journols of Congress, VI, 64-67; Sparks, VIII, 76-78. 2o Mason, 469. 21 Among historians who accepted Mason's version were William Poole. Justin Winsor, Claude Van Tyne,Reuben G. Thwaites, and Daniel McCoy. SPANISH MARCH ACROSS INDIANA 25

22 Alvord, 197. n De Ia Balme chose FortOuiatanon (a replica of which can be fo und in West Lafayette, Indiana)as his place of rendezvous ..and here the little band assembled on the eighteenth of October, and the white flag of France unfurled ." Alvord, 203, who givesas his source&p ort of Canadian Archives, 1887, 184. Also see Cruzartto G&tvez, November 12, 1780, BL. 24 Michigan Historical Society, Collections, XIX, 58 1; and Cruzart to oalvez, November 21 , 1780, BL. 25 Account of Lieutenant Governor DePeyster in Michigan Pioneerand Historical Society, Colkctions, XIX, 367 . 26 Alvord, 205-206. 27 Alvord, 210. 21 Teggart, 224-225 . 29 Cruzart to oatvez, November 13, 1780, BL. 30 Sinclair to Haldimand, Michilimackinac, July 8, 1780, Michigan Historical Society, Colkctions, IX, SS9. 31 Teggart, 223 . 32 Cruzart to Miro, August 6, 1781, BL. 33 Cruzart to oatvez, January 10, 1781, BL. 34 Jose de Galvez to Bernardode Galvez, January IS, 1782, in Thwaites, British Reg�. XVIII, 430-432 . 35 Teggart, 174; Alden, 253. Theentire diplomatic maneuvering of Vergennes isdiscussed in Bemis,Diplomacy, and the Spanish attitude in Vela, Esp ana ante Ia lndependencio. 36 Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney's Tr«�ty (Baltimore, 1926), 38-41. 37 John W. Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana, 1776-1783 (Gretna, Louisiana, 1972), 169-170. 31 American historians once claimed that Clark's conquest of the Illinois country gave the UnitedStates a claim to the "Old Northwest." Howeverthis is not valid sincethere were no American posts northof the Ohio in 1782 . Some insisted that forts on the south bank of the Ohio, particularly those built and defended by Clark,constituted a claim to strategic control. John Richard Alden &tated both positions areassailable. Franklin, Jay, and John Adams apparently never used either argument. See Alden. The American &volution, fn. 24, p. 259. THE GENERAL AND THE SERGEANT IN VIETNAM: A REVIEW ESSAY

The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. By General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1984. Pp. 236. Maps, bibliography, index. No price given).

Vi etnam Let ters. By Sergeant Allen E. Paul. (Richmond, Indiana: Privately printed, 1st ed. 1978, 2nd ed ., n.d. Pp. 93 . Illustrated . No price given).

It is now twelve years since American troops were withdrawn from combat in South Vietnam and over ten years since North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong fo rces entered Saigon, mark­ ing the end of a long conflict-thefirst war which the United States lost. And it has taken over a decade to come to terms with this experience. The war, its conduct, and its conclusion have raised large questions-was the defense of South Vietnam a vital American interest, was it a "moral" war, and was its conduct appropriate and effective? Much of the sound and fury generated during these long years has now died down, and inflamed tempers have cooled some­ what. But especially for soldiers and also for all of us who are concerned with the "Common Defense" there remains one overriding question-the problem of how a large , lavishly equipped army, supported by an unprecedented quantity of airpower, with firepower far exceeding the levels of World War II and Korea, and with unchallenged naval superiority in and off-shore, could be defeated by a second rate, relatively underdeveloped nation, albeit one enj oying substantial support from all segments of the communist world . Answers to some, though certainly not all, of these questions are suggested in these two books, written by men at opposite poles of the army's hierarchy. Bruce Palmer, Jr., is a retired four star general who commanded II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFV), the largest combat command in that theatre, and who later served as deputy to General William Westmoreland, commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and as Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. On the other end stood Sergeant Allen E. Paul, who enlisted in 1967 and served with the 1st Air Cavalry Division, part of II FFV, fr om April, 1968, to April, 1969. Still, the books have much in common. GeneralPalmer was a professional soldier, fighting the war his country sent him to conduct, while Sergeant Paul was not a draftee , but a true volunteer, both in enlisting originally and then in volunteering for line duty, because, as he wrote in one letter, 66I feel that each man should pull his share in Nam." Both men, observant and intelligent, also share a feeling that there were large ambiguities and problems-opera­ tional, tactical, and moral-in the massive U.S. presence in South Vietnam, resulting in a peculiarand ambivalent war. For Sergeant Paul, the war did not long remain a glorious adven­ ture, and he also discovered , as did all of us who served in the infantry inthis and other conflicts, that despite all the technology and firepower, in the end it was-and probably still remains­ the little man with the rifle and bayonet who had to go forward and, although trusting in his comrades and thanking Godfor fire support and helicopters, still had to face the "sharp end of the stick" alone. Again, and this was true of all wars, he soon became frustrated with the conduct of the war, albeit at the platoon, company, and battalion level. The frustration was also fe lt by General Palmer, who concluded that the army was committed to operations against an elusive but combative enemy while lacking clear objectives and aims, and that it was unprepared, untrained, and unequipped for the type of war which it was forced to fight. Curiously, then, the two books have much in common and tend to support each other at least in some basic conclusions. But while Paul's book is a collection of letters to his parents and his

26 BOOK REVIEWS 27

fiancee and while he is not concerned, except incidentally, with the political and strategic pic­ ture, Palmer's volume is quite the opposite. There is almost no personal experience mentioned; instead, it is a cool, detached, if on occasion critical, history of the United States' role in Vietnam, albeit one restricted to the U.S. Army's activities. Little or no attention is given to the USMC, the USAF, or to the role of the various civilian agencies so heavily involved in the conflict, especially the CIA and the numerous combat and intelligence elements it sponsored. Palmer's war is the war of the big unit; Special Forces operations are not mentioned. For that matter, and somewhat to the reader's surprise, no mention is made of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) or to the various allied contingents from South Korea, Thailand, and Australia. In other words, Palmer's book gives the big picture, as seen by one of the most senior field commanders. But within these limitations, and they are important, it still remains a very good book, providing perhaps the best analysis of the war to date. To be sure, the general in some respects follows what now has emerged as the army's official line-namely that the war was not primarily a counterinsurgency campaign, but a "mid­ intensity" conflict in which the main objective should have been the destruction of the enemy's main combat forces. Had this objective been achieved, he feels, pacification would have followed, and South Vietnam would have been saved. Palmer, however, is far too intelligent not to realize that this was by no means the entire picture. He recognizesthat "in retrospect the U.S. government during the first stages of American involvement in the mid- 1950s and early 1960s, was slow to recognize the nature of the conflict in Southeast Asia." Lacking personnel with experience in the region, 'influenced by unreliable, overoptimistic assessments of progress ..•successive U.S. administrations seriously underestimated the situation in those crucial early years" and continued to do so for the duration. He concludes that ultimately the causes of America's defeat were political and diplomatic and that if the army was committed to combat without clear political and military objectives, this was the fault of the civilian leader­ ship. Failing a clear objective, American troops were obliged to follow a strategy of slow escalation and attrition, which relinquished the initiative to the enemy. He does concede that the U.S. Army doctrine, depending on mass and firepower, sustained by what he terms "unwise, unsound, and wasteful manpower and logistic policies," also was unsuited to the war, but he also argues that the army's operational performance was sound and that higher commanders performed efficiently. There are, even within the military community, serious reservations on these points. He does concede also that on the tactical level, and perhaps this in the end is the real test, there emerged some major shortcomings. And in a conflict fought without clearly defined fronts in an alien, often hostile, environment, and in an attritional mode, much depended on the quality of company and platoon leadership and on maintaining unit cohesion. And both of these two critical elements the U.S. Army was unable either to produce or to retain. Palmer blames lack of support at home as well as manpower policies for many of these problems. He is, of course, right on both points, especially regarding the rotation policy which, in his words, contributed to the "slow, steady, deterioration of experienced leadership." Yet, the army also was responsible for this policy, originally initiated to provide as many officers as possible with experience of command in combat conditions. Some critics have called this part of an overall military alignment towards career-management and not leadership suitable per­ haps for a major corporation but not for a fighting army. Sergeant Paul, usually not overly concerned in his letters with matters of high-level policy, came to similar conclusions. He realized that in the end it was the "enlisted men that win wars. Some of these officersjust really tee me off!" Also, he was not aware of the declining morale. "As I sit here," he wrote to his fiancee on May 21, 1968, ''I canhear the fellows in the next bunker talking about the U.S. policy in Nam and why we arehere. Some sure have good feelings why we should leave. Sometimes I wonder myself if it is all worth it." 28 INDI ANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

Sergeant Paul was, it should be remembered, a genuine volunteer, and it also should be con­ ceded that until about 1969, American combat pelformance remained at an acceptable level in general.Yet, should he not have been told why he was there? This was a function well within the army's capabilities and not subject to high level civilian decisions, but nobody,it would appear, seemed to care. "As I try to look at this war in the right light," Sergeant Paul wrote, "sometimes it becomes quite hard.It seems to me (from what I have seen) that the South Vietnamesedon't seem to careone bit whether they'refree or not and somehow it seems weird to me to lose a lot of lives for a lost cause." And yet, a few weeks after this letter, Paul decided to ask for transfer out of a base assignment to duty as a forward artillery observer, even though he had few illusions left. "The South Vietnamese people here only seem to think of sex and smoking pot and taking the G.l.'s money." But he still felt an immense pride in his country and was willing to do his very best. Perhaps why in the end the leaders failed to make the most of men of this type deserves more thought than General Palmer has given to it . Paul, for the most part then, had an unfavorable view of the native population, a feeling he shared with many of his comrades, and in fact, the massive American presence in Vietnam, together with different standardsof living and a culturalgap that rarely was bridged, created resentment on both sides. This, of course, was predictable; even in World War II many European allies were not as happy to have large masses of Americans present as fond remembrancesnow have it. As General Palmer notes, there were chargesthat "American entry into Vietnam was no different from the former French presence, and consequently the United States was tarred with the same colonial brush." This, perhaps, was unavoidable, though it is less clear why, after some involvement for ten years, when in 1965 major U.S. Army elements were committed to combat, "we did not comprehend the depth of the Viet Cong insurgency in certain areas."And this was a failure of intelligence for which the highest militaryechelons can not really shift the blame. As former Special Forces officers have charged, and with some jus­ tice, the army just was not willing to listen to men in actual contact with thelocal population, and once large elements were in action it was too late to shift direction and operational methods. Sergeant Paul eventually returned from the war, somewhat disillusioned, and glad to get home. He had done his duty' the best way he could, and his letters end when his tour is about to end. Palmer, of course, has other conclusions. He believesthat the army had a bad replacement system, the rotation policy, combined with the tendency to put its most educated people into highly technical base assignments away from combat. Sergeant Paul, one of the few college graduatesamong the "grunts" also encountered this problem. "When I reported to this battery, the captainsaid that since I was a college grad and older, I may find it hard to get along with the common person (of which the whole battery is made up)," but Paul also found that these "common people" were the ones "fighting for America, not the rich and upper crust." Still, it was not a good system, and both writers agree on this. Overall, though, Palmer seems to feel that in the future American forces should only be engaged in combat when the objective is clear, when popular support is assured, and when the need for action is overriding. Whether such conditions can always be achieved seems, to this reviewer, somewhat dubious. Both books have their limitations, but together they areimportant for theirunderst anding of what went on in Southeast Asia. What criticism the reviewer has offered doesnot diminish the very real contribution made by both of these books. Within its limitations, GeneralPalmer's book is by far the best exposition of the U.S. Army's actions, written by a thoughtful and intelligent officer, while Sergeant Paul's modest lettersshow us the perspectiveof an intelligent and patriotic young man, among the best the Hoosier state has produced.

GER BOOK REVIEWS 29

Pigb oat 39: An American Sub Goes to Wa r, by Bobette Gugliotta (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1984. Pp. 224. Illus., index, bibliography, maps. $19.50).

The United StatesNavy has had units in Asian waterssince at leastthe middle of the nine­ teenth century. There are, however, veryfew works on the men and women who served in Asia, especially during the era between World War I and II. Kemp Tolley's Ya ngtze Pa trol (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973) gives a glimpse of life on the China station,but mainly from an officer'sper spective. Richard McKenna's novel, TheSand Pebb/es(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984 reprint of 1962 ed .), gives a fictionalaccount of enlisted sailors in China. Bobette Gugliotta, the wife of a retired Navy submarine officer, has produced an intesting nonfiction account of his life in the Navy during 1940 and during the first confused months of the war. Gugliotta's husband served in an old S-hoat, the S-39, homeported in the Philippines. The author felt that a "rounded picture of what submarine life was like on board an obsolete, cantankerous S-hoat" had not been written (xi). In order to give the "rounded picture," Gugliotta contacted as many former crew members of the S-39 as possible, both officers and enlisted men. She also contacted the wives of the men who served aboardthe pigboat. In short, Gugliotta's account relates how officers, enlisted men, and their wives viewed duty in the U.S. Navy. At least three quartersof the book is devoted to the everyday life of the men and women who came in contact with the S-39 . Eachspring units of the old Asiatic Fleet would depart the Philippines and cruisethe coast of China, arriving back in the islands in the fa ll. The S-39 usually touched at Tsingato and Shanghai. The crew of the S-39 and their wives looked forward to their annual stayin China. The exchange rate at the time was nineteen Chinese dollars to one U.S. dollar, and the wide openlife in China appealed to most sailors. The wivesen joyed shopping and living in the type of luxurynot normally availableto militarywives, even in the Philippines. Some aspects of life in China, however, were not so pleasant.Rachel Coe was being pulled in a rickshawwhen the man pulling the cart dropped dead. "A hundred hands reached toward the pitiful figure, but not to help; as though he were merelya traffic obstruction, fingerscia wed him off to one side, the head thumping against the cobbles. . . . In a second,a dozen others were pushing and shoving fo r the privilege of pulling her .... The people at the hotel were right. You simply had to put ... [the poverty] out of your mind" (21-22). After December?, 1941, the S-39 made fivecombat patrols. Two of the patrols were madein the Philippine Islands area.The other patrols weremade as the ailing pigboat made her way to Java and thence to Australia. In Australia,she operated out of Brisbane, and on her last patrol, on August 14, 1942, she ran aground on a reefnear New Guineaand was abandoned when it be­ cameevident that it wa s not possible to save her. Most of the patrols consisted of simply trying to keep the boat operating and in tryingto endurethe stifling environment of the small pigboat. The S-39, despite all of her mechanical problems, managed to sink two merchantmen during her short combat life. The officers and men of the old Asiatic Fleet were noted for their unorthodox ways and approaches to duty. The men of the S-30 seem to be the perfect exampleof this stereotype.For example, near Albany Gulf off of Luzon, when large numbers of Japaneseships were observed within the Gulf, many problems seemed to prevent a normal attack approach by the S-39. Japanese warships patrolled the entrance,which prevented a daylight surface approach; going in at night on the surface wasn't possible becausethe S-hoat sonar couldn't be used unlesssub­ merged; and the periscope was inadequate at night. The skipper of the S-39 decided the approach could be taken with a human periscopeand he approached the torpedo and gunnery officer with his plan. 30 INDIANA MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

"Guy, it would be a naturalfor you .... We'll go in submerged afte r dark but with the radio mast up; you can sit on it with binocularsand con the boat into firingposit ion. You'll be more accuratethan the periscope,and you'll bein contact with me by telephone. This way we should get a goodfiring setup"(101) . Fortunately for the officer, the S-39 was divertedbefore the plan could be implemented. Gugliotta's use of her husband's expertise in submarinesand her style of writing makes the technicalaspects of submarine operations very clear and understandable. The author's use of the interviews of former Navy men may delight old saltswith the useof the nauticaljargonand slang of other old sailors. The book is enhanced with good contemporary photographsof most of the men and women who areintrod uced in the narrative. There are verygood maps and a diagramof the old S-39. Gugliotta notes that thereare no "heros in Pigb oat 39 unless everyoneis. Little peopleadd up to big events andface them like heros" (xii). The author has accomplished the task ofshowing the everyday life of the men and women that werea part of the U.S. Navy just prior to the out­ breakof World War II. This book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Navy in the twentieth century.

Dennis L. Noble Purdue U Diversity

The Army on the Eve of the Civil Wa r. Two volumes. By George T. Ness, Jr. (Manhattan, Kansas: MA/ AH Publishing, 1983. Pp. 338 and 312. Notes, Index. $25 .00 per volume).

For George Ness, this publication was a labor of love as well as an effort to filla need in the historiography of America"s regular army. After thirty years of research in practically every primary source imaginable, he has produced a handbook on the composition, size, and per­ sonnel of the army just before the Civil War. Unfortunately, he did not offer us anything more. Ness should be commended for attempting this project. He gives us a good schematic picture of the pre-Civil War army, presenting a variety of data: the numberof units, posts, and men; descriptions of uniforms, arsenals, and duty stations; some views of the soldiers' sociallif e; and biographical sketches of dozens of officers of all ranks. To an extent, Ness successfully fills the need mentioned above; such basic data as he presents is essential to any understanding of the regulars at the beginning of the sectional war. But we must wait fo r someone to do something with this material. Ness avoids analysis and concentrates on description. He makes no attempt to explore the reasons for the army's small size, the political influences on appointments, the strategic reasons for stationing troops, the tactical thinking of officers, the state of logistical and administrative arrangements, or officer training and education. Ness is unconcerned with recent studies regarding civil-military rela­ tions in early America, such as Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the Wa r of 1812 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), which shed light on why the pre-Civil War army was influenced so greatly by political forces, a fact Ness often bemoans. This is not to deny the book's usefulness. Civil war military historians and students of the U.S. army in the nineteenth century will find it helpful and often interesting, although not pleasant to read. The book has no real narrative; Ness jumps from topic to topic in an encyclopedic fashion. The fact that the index consists mostly of name references to army BOOK REVIEWS 31

officers illustrates the encyclopedic nature of his work. Considering the very slight his­ toriographyon the subject, however, one should take the book seriously fo r its strengths while recognizing its many weaknesses. A word is in order concerning the book's physical condition. MA/ AH Publishing has given military historians many significantstudies, and its role in making works available that may not have been suitable for academic or commercial presses should becommended. Yet, there is little need to settle for substandard work, even in these cases. This book is not published, but consists of photocopies of a typed manuscript. Several typographical errors are so badly corrected as to obliterate the words, and the notes for Volume I are at the end of Volume 2. The note citations are so cursory as to be very difficultto decipher, particularly in the absence of a bibliography. Considering the stiff price of these volumes, it would not have been too much to have expected better, and it could have been done with relatively little trouble.

Earl J. Hess Purdue University Indiana Historical Society Non profit Org. Indiana Military History Journal U.S. Postage 31 S West Ohio Street PA ID Indianapolis, IN 46202 Indianapolis, IN. Permit No. 3864