In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden-Baden 2010, pp. 201-211. Tim Potier Nagorno-Karabakh: Ever Closer to a Settlement, Step-by-Step Conflict settlement is about much more than the settlement itself. Not only must it satisfy all sides, being tempered by mutual compromises (each side feeling that the others have given something), but it must be regarded as broadly fair and just, functional and worth the effort required to make it work. In this respect, any constitutional settlement will depend on more than the personal relations and good will of the respective leaderships. Electorates matter, and the military can spoil things. Moreover, external forces – fre- quently a number of competing external forces – need to have reached their own separate accommodations. In any case, however successful the settle- ment proves, leaderships will inevitably change. Conflict may provide opportunities, but it usually results in much heav- ier costs. Perceived past injustices may be remedied, historical scores settled, territory won, but lives are lost, and new resentments therefore generated. The wounds inflicted may last a lifetime, personal ambitions are frustrated by the requirement to perform front-line service, trading relations are fractured, and economies damaged – all of which leaves an unpalatable legacy for fu- ture generations, for whom any settlement is inscribed only in print and other inanimate forms. Along with a great capacity for creativity and good, human beings have also been endowed with an almost insane desire for destruction. War appears to be as natural as any other form of conflict, and will never be abolished. The best that can be hoped for is that it is kept to a minimum. History may one day conclude that the Armenians got their war. A century of anger, frustration, and bitterness found its pretext, in 1988, as the Soviet Union was embarking on its own implosion, with demands for the “liberation” of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan – from the Turks.1 That war was won, much territory seized, but Armenia and the Armenians have yet to enjoy or feel their independence: A state that has known only a con- dition of war is not a living, breathing state.2 The year 2009 marks the 15th anniversary of the ceasefire procured via the Bishkek Protocol.3 In that time the faces may have changed, but, on the 1 On 20 February 1988, a session of the 20th convocation of delegates of the Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Oblast adopted a resolution seeking the transfer of Karabakh from Soviet Azerbaijan to Armenia. 2 Since the cessation of hostilities, Karabakh armed forces have continued to control seven districts beyond the region’s former Soviet boundaries: (clockwise) Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan, Kubatli, Lachin, and Kelbajar. 3 The “Participants of the meeting held in May 4-5 in Bishkek […] call upon the conflicting sides to come to common senses: cease to fire at the midnight of May 8 to 9 [1994]”, The 201 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden-Baden 2010, pp. 201-211. ground at least, little else has.4 However, progress has been and continues to be made. Both the current and previous Armenian and Azeri leaderships may have been unwilling to acknowledge it, even face-to-face, but the character and features of any settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh are beginning to emerge.5 That settlement will not come quickly. First, both sides will have to begin to reconcile themselves to the compromises required. Second, the people of both countries (including the population of Nagorno-Karabakh) will have to be prepared to accept those compromises. Third, third parties will also have to be ready. All of this will take some more years yet, but a start has been made. The current Minsk Group co-chairs6 may be frustrated by the slow rate of progress, but the Group should be credited for the solid, sustained, and real achievements of recent years. Before the leaderships can begin to reconcile themselves, a degree of stability and consistency is required in what is “put on the table”. The concepts have been clarified, with details being exchanged since the presentation of the first three rejected proposals in 1997-98.7 The current framework, known as the Madrid Principles,8 is a continuation of the work arising from the “Prague Process”, which began with a meeting be- tween the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Prague in April 2004.9 The next stage is to begin to add flesh to those concepts and, over a Bishkek Protocol, 5 May 1994, available online at: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/ nagorny-karabakh/keytexts15.php. 4 The President of Armenia is currently Serzh Sargsyan, who assumed office on 9 April 2008. He was preceded by Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008) and Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991-1998). The President of Azerbaijan is currently Ilham Aliyev, who assumed office on 31 October 2003. He was preceded by his father Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003), Abulfaz Elchibey (1992-1993), and Ayaz Mutalibov (1991-1992). 5 Up to the end of 2009, Presidents Sargsyan and Aliyev had met on eight occasions: The first instance was on 6 June 2008 in St Petersburg on the sidelines of a CIS summit; the second occasion was on 2 November 2008 near Moscow, which led to the signing of the Moscow Declaration; the third was on 28 January 2009 in Zurich on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum, Davos; the fourth meeting took place on 7 May 2009 in Prague on the sidelines of the Prague EU “Eastern Partnership summit”; the fifth on 4 June 2009 in St Petersburg on the sidelines of the 13th St Petersburg International Economic Forum; the sixth on 17 and 18 July 2009 in Moscow; the seventh on 8 October 2009 in Chişinău on the sidelines of a CIS summit; and, most recently, the Presidents met again on 22 Nov- ember 2009 at the French consulate in Munich. 6 Bernard Fassier (France), Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), and Robert Bradtke (United States). 7 The Minsk Group “package deal” proposal of July 1997; the Minsk Group “step-by-step deal” proposal of December 1997; and the Minsk Group “common state deal” proposal of November 1998. 8 This is a framework agreement (“Fair and Balanced Basic Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict”) that was presented to the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Madrid on 29 November 2007. It comprises a “phased-package” approach: The elements of a settlement are agreed on simultaneously, but implemented successively, with one key aspect – the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh – being decided subsequently by referendum. 9 The “Basic Principles for the Peaceful Solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict” were outlined in a communiqué issued by the co-chairs on 3 July 2006: “The principles are based on the redeployment of Armenian troops from Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, with special modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin districts (including a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh), demilitarization of those territories, 202 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden-Baden 2010, pp. 201-211. period of time, to transmit them to the Armenian and Azeri people. The co- chairs have been very successful in emphasizing that there is broad under- standing between the sides on most issues, whilst acknowledging that there is a very small number of items over which further time and discussion will be required.10 For reconciliation to be able to begin, it is essential for civil soci- ety actors, who will gradually be brought into the peace process, to have something to share. Peace will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The militaries will step to one side – to an extent – and borders will be reopened. Communications will be restored, from tele- communications to air links. Trade will be given the opportunity to flourish. Prior to that peace, the future may be foreshadowed by the opportunity for people from each side to meet and to visit each other’s countries, as well as in the form of cultural exchange in the fields of art, music, and literature. A globalized world will disdain and ultimately defeat any attempts at ethnic, linguistic, or religious apartheid. A settlement in Karabakh will allow Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to return, not only to places from which armed forces have recently departed, but also to other, more cen- tral (and central to the dispute) regions. Eventually, “displaced” Azeris will be entitled to return not only to the seven occupied districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, but to Karabakh itself.11 The more general peace that and a referendum or population [sic] vote – at a date and in a manner to be decided through further negotiations – to determine the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Deployment of an international peacekeeping force and a joint commission for imple- mentation of the agreement would be established, and international assistance would be made available for demining, reconstruction, and resettlement of internally displaced per- sons in the formerly occupied territories and the war-affected regions of Nagorno- Karabakh. Certain interim arrangements for Nagorno-Karabakh would allow for inter- action with providers of international assistance. The sides would renounce the use or threat of use of force, and international and bilateral security guarantees and assurances would be put in place. Regarding the vote to determine the future status of Nagorno- Karabakh, the Co-Chairs stressed that suitable pre-conditions for such a vote would have to be achieved so that the vote would take place in a non-coercive environment in which well-informed citizens have had ample opportunity to consider their positions after a vig- orous debate in the public arena.” The full text of the communiqué is available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/crises-conflits_1050/haut-karabagh_ 13520/communique-du-groupe-minsk.-03.07.06_38824.html.