THE ATTITUDE OF THE DRUZES AND CALAWIS VIs-A-vIS ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN SYRIA AND LEBANON

KAIS M. FIRRO

This paper investigates the attitude of two religious communities in Syria and Lebanon, Druzes and cAlawis, vis-a-vis nationalism and Islam within the territorial state. Although the origin and the beliefs of the cAlawis and the Druzes are important for an understanding of the religious characteristics which ethnicized the two communities, the paper will focus on the political patterns by which the elites of the two communities tried to maximize their influence within the larger political community or the nation state. The paper argues that these patterns were fostered during the Mandatory Period (1920-1946) when the intellectual elites of the two communities adopted ideologies which would facilitate their integration within "a wider ethnie"l. When explaining the ability of the Druzes and cAlawis to adapt to changing political situations, many scholars point primarily if not exclusively to the principle of taqiyya2 as practised by both com• munities throughout their history. Taqiyya thus is not only the practice of pretending to follow the dominant religion, Sunni Islam, but also of joining the side that seems likely to win:

Therefore, it is not surprising ... that the 'Alawis ... could at certain times present themselves as Sunnis and at other times as Shi'is and likewise in politics where they present themselves as Marxist revolu• tionaries, pan-Arab nationalists or supporters of Syrianism (the national Syrian party of Antiin Sa'ada).3

The same idea can be found in writings of non-Druze scholars who refer to the Druze taqiyya: "It is hard to distinguish between the practice of taqiyya [among the Druzes] and everyday political oppor-

I The term is used by Smith 1988, 156. 2 Literally it means prudence and carefulness, but is usually translated into English as dissimulation. Originally, it was practised by the Shi'i Muslims who adopted in times of stress the outward forms of Sunni Islam in order to protect their inward Shi'i faith. 3 Laurent and Annie Chabry, Politique et minorire au Proche-Orient. Les Raisons d'une Explosion, Cairo 1991 [Arabic translationl, 251. 88 KAIS M. FIRRO tunism".4 Such focus on taqiyya when developing theories about the behavioral patterns of the (Alawis and Druzes5 ignores the socio• economic development factors that determine the political attitude of ethno-religious communities. According to these theories, the ethno• politics of the two communities are derived from the primordial ele• ment, taqiyya, which enables the two communities to pretend an attachment to new ideologies, while preserving their communal identi• ties. Although it is outside the scope of this article to trace the classi• cal debate between primordialists and instrumentalists, a few words on the theoretical aspects relating to the ethno-religious politics of the Druze and (Alawi elites in Syria and Lebanon will prove helpful. Our main question is, where do we place such ethnopolitics with regard to the two opposed schools of thought in ethnic studies? Of course, ethnicity as instrument could not begin ex nihilo; it has to come from somewhere. It may well stem from the ability of human beings to create collective entities through imagination, or what Durkheim calls the adoration of their own camouflaged images. In other words, every collective entity - tribe, religious community, and nationality - is imagined since it exists only in the minds of those who created it. Tribes, communities and nationalities do not exist as concrete subjects or objects, though usually they are referred to as such. For example, we say, "the community feels, wants and behaves" or "is influenced by economic, political and social factors". In fact, only people who belong to these imagined entities can perform acts and be influenced by acts. Even the "givens" of Geertz or the "core" of Smith6 which

4 J. Teitelbaum, "Ideology and Conflict in a Middle East Minority: the Case of the Druze Initiative Committee in Israel", Orient 26, 1985, 342-343. 5 A representative example of studies which rely solely on taqiyya in their explana• tion of behavioral patterns is that of A. Layish, "Taqiyya among the Druzes", AAS 19.3, 1985, 245-281. The author sees taqiyya as the key towards understanding the whole behavioral patterns of the Druzes. 6 As one of the staunchest defenders of the primordialists, Geertz stresses the primordial sentiments which, according to him, characterize the collective entities, whether they are racial, tribal or ethnic. Primordial sentiments stem from the "givens" or "being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of language, and following particular social practices" (c. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States", Old Societies and the New States; The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. by C. Geertz, New York 1963, 109). Smith argues "that the 'core' of ethnicity, as it has been transmitted in the historical record and as it shapes individual experience, resides in [the] quartet of 'myths, memories, values and symbols' and in