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Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung

Center for Studies

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

“ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: WHO BENEFITS?”

By

Faith Omokegbe Gabriel

A thesis presented to the Center for European Integration Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

Master of European Studies – Governance and Regulation

to achieve the degree of a Master of European Studies

Bonn, 31 August 2017

First Supervisor: Prof. Stephen Calleya

Second Supervisor: Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt ACRONYMS

EU

EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System

FRONTEX European Border and Agency

FTFs Foreign Terrorist Fighters

GNA Government of National Accord

HRW Human Right Watch

IOM International Organisation for Migration

ISIS Islamic State

ILO International Labour Organisation

LADDER Local Authorities as Drivers for Development and Raising awareness

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

MSF Médecins sans Frontières

MENA and North

MOAS Migrant Offshore Aid Station

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

SAR Operation

TCN Third Country National(s)

UNFPA Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for

UN United Nations

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms...... 2

1. Introduction...... 4

2. Methodical Approach...... 7

3. Migration Overview...... 8

I. The Historic Analysis of the Politics of Migration between Africa and ...... 10

II. A Survey of Illegal Migration ...... 11

4. Migration Routes in the Mediterranean ...... 13

5. Types and Causes of Migration...... 16

6. A Survey of the Case of ...... 24

I. Italy policy style...... 27

II. The role of NGO on the Central Mediterranean sea vs code of conduct ...... 31

7. Illegal Migration as a Gateway to Security Threat...... 34

8. EU Policy on Illegal Migration...... 38

I. An assessment of EU policy as regards the Declaration ...... 41

9. Recommendations...... 43

10. Conclusion...... 46

References...... 49

3 1. INTRODUCTION

From the map above1, the Mediterranean Sea connects three continents (Africa, Europe and the Middle East), which is a complex sea “broken up by Islands, interrupted by peninsulas, ringed by intricate coastlines”2. Over the years, this geographic proximity has increasing threats and opportunities. Although, the strategic perspective can be viewed at least from four different angles: “the Western Mediterranean from the to the Gulf of Sirte, linking to the Maghreb, the Adriatic sea linking Italy to the , the Aegean sea connecting , and and the Eastern Mediterranean basin” linking into the area of Israeli- Arab ongoing conflict3. The Mediterranean is already a geo-strategic area where several roots of insecurity threaten to escalate and put regional and international stability at risk. The regional trends that need to be urgently addressed include “collapse of failed States, illegal migration, the

1 Source: https://www.welt-atlas.de/map_of_mediterranean_sea_4-634

2 In the words of Fernand Braudel, see Calleya 2013

3 Security Challenges in the Euro-Med Area in the 21st Century, Stephen Calleya, Routledge, (2013) pp 4 4 increase of terrorists’ activities, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the proliferation of all types of weapons and increasing state of economic disparity between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean etc”4.

The absence of a security arrangement in the Mediterranean has resulted in a security vacuum in this geo-strategically sensitive part of the world. This security vacuum creates opportunities for forces of insecurity to strive with the proliferation of arms in a region “where military procurement is already one of the highest in the world”5.Throughout history, the Mediterranean has continuously been at the centre of international relations. The end of the Cold led some analysts to believe that the Mediterranean would be marginalised in global relations. The enlargement of the EU towards the east, the rise of in , and the emergence of and as leading economic developing countries further cemented this perception (Calleya: 2013).

Also, it is the location of the more than six decade old conflict between Israel and Palestine. The of 20116 has also unleashed a period of revolution that has further attracted international attention to the Mediterranean. The long list of threats and risks that need to be addressed and managed in a coherent manner requires an institutional design that can cope with such serious demands. A more stable security situation across the Mediterranean can be achieved with a better coordination between the multitudes of sub-regional groupings across the basin7.

Since the end of the Cold War and especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks, there has been a continuous perception in Europe of a threat from the Middle East. Alarming headlines in the international media focusing on instability in the Middle East and regular arrival of hundreds of illegal migrants from the southern shores of the Mediterranean to Europe highlight such a trend8. Also, the media has focused on the emergence of an Islamic jihad against the West, due to 4Ibid pp 6

5Ibid pp 1

6 Started with Tunisia then other countries followed like , , ,

7 Ibid ,pp 10

8 Ibid 5 the ever increasing number of illegal migrants that have sought to seek a better life in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean.

During the first decade of the new millennium, negative perceptions of the Middle East have been further fuelled by constant images of violence and terror activities including Islamic extremists preaching hatred against the West (, Lebanon), terrorists displaying contempt from human rights (Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Israel), brutal dictators flush with billions of dollars of oil money often seeking to purchase all types of weapons and Muslim leaders and lasses determined to establish Islamic states with laws that go against secular Western standards of civilisation9.

Nevertheless, there is an ever increasing threat of through the Mediterranean which is organised by criminal networks. These criminal networks are well organised, well equipped and connected to security forces throughout the region. This is a €250 Million business per year10 counting on the ‘fees’ collected by these criminal networks or human traffickers. Addressing this issue is essential as the number of migrants is certain to rise in the decades ahead as the sub-saharan state struggle to cope with the rising expectations of their respective populations. For example, since the stepping down of Gambian President Yahya Jammeh after 22 years rule, this political shift has brought hope, peace and stability to Gambians wishing to travel to Europe for a better life. Instead of traveling to Europe, they prefer to stay home to build their economy. Data from the IOM shows a decrease of the Gambians since February 2017. A constant revise of a forward and inclusive EU migration must be in view to tackle the roots causes of illegal migration through the Central Mediterranean Sea. One should bear in mind that the EU will need “20 million work force between 2010 – 2030 workers that its demographic trends cannot produce” (Calleya: 2013).

Generally, the debates in Europe about migration have been profoundly influenced by the crisis. In 2015, 1,003,124 people were reported by IOM (2016) to have arrived in the EU via the Mediterranean Sea routes with 3,771 people reported dead or missing. This ever

9 Ibid, pp 11

10 Ibid pp 14 6 increasing flow narrative is linked to national security matters and rise in terrorists activities in Europe.

Thus, the term security has broad interpretations but for the purpose of this research work, the focus will be in the words of Prof. Barry Buzan, security complex, which is defined as a “set of States whose major perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved from one another”’11. The term security is far more complex than the traditional realist politico-military perspective as developed by the Copenhagen School. The more multidimensional nature of security required a more comprehensive analytical lens through which security challenges could be examined and addressed. It also introduced a constructivist approach to international security through the concept of ‘securitisation’. The purpose of ‘securitisation’ is to reach a precise understanding of who securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why with what results and not least what conditions”12. In this regard, illegal migration through the Mediterranean Sea with the increase in terrorist activities is seen as a security threats against European values, culture, peace and stability rather than the economic views or the demographic imbalance concerns.

2. METHODICAL APPROACH This research work is divided into 7 sections. Section 1 discusses migration overview in a general sense of migration in the world, the historical analysis of migration between Africa and Europe as dated back in the 1920s and a survey of illegal migration in Europe. Section 2 focuses on the general overview of the three routes on the Mediterranean Sea and an analysis of migrants, search and rescue mission and death tolls on the Sea. Furthermore, the focus of this work is more on the central Mediterranean route leading to Italy. Section 3 discusses the two categories of migration and the roots causes of migration to Europe and from Africa with available statistics. Also, this section discusses why illegal migration is a problem. Section 4 analyses the case of Italy, looking at its transition period from being an country to immigration county as regards the effects played by illegal migration, regularisations of illegal

11 Ibid pp 1

12 Ibid 7 migration effects to the economy, immigration policy and style and the role of NGOs on the Central Mediterranean Sea and the revised code of conduct for NGOs. Section 5 analyses the fears and concerns as a result of illegal migration seen in Europe as a gateway to increasing security threats. Section 6 discusses the EU policy on illegal migration with focus on its general overview on this policy and then an assessment of Malta declaration as regards where reviews can be applied. Then, section 7 given general recommendations to the problems identified on the course of the research. Finally, this research work ends with conclusion of points raised.

Academic materials, official data from international organisations like UN agencies, European Union, HRW, etc and reliable media sources which was verified from official outlets were used to confirm recent happenings as regards the topic mentioned above. For the purpose of work, illegal migrants will be used instead of irregular migrants which in context refers to the same security threat.

3. MIGRATION OVERVIEW In order to understand the context of this work, some essential background terms are defined. According to IOM, “migrant is defined as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal ; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what are the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is”.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, “mixed migration flows means people traveling with different background and motivation through same route, such as refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, unaccompanied minors , environmental migrants, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants”. Which is the case at the Mediterranean area today. The question of illegal migrants is broadly interpreted by a sovereign state.

Emigration – means to leave one's country to live in another country. An emigrate is the person performing the action of emigration. Immigration is the action to move to another country to live permanently. An immigrant is the person performing the action of immigration.

8 Since the existence of man, man has always move from one place to another in search of foods, protection, better living conditions, better environmental conditions or better life. This is further enhanced by globalisation and freedom of capital, persons, goods and services (4 Freedoms) as in the case of the EU. As long as man lives on planet earth, migration will continue. The constant question always arising are: will this movement be voluntary or involuntary and / or legal or illegal migration. How will host countries handle these arrivals? The politics of implementation of immigration policy as against economic and social benefits. The fear of Islamist terrorists as an invasive agenda. Economic migrants seeking the status of refugees and asylum seekers. Who really benefits from this movement, the state, the economy, the migrants or the citizens?

According to UNFPA, in 2015, 244 million people about 3.3 percent of world’s population lived outside their country of origin in which most are economic migrants. According to International Labour Organisation (ILO) nearly 73 percent of the working age migrant population were migrant workers. This figures show the drive of migrants in search for better conditions is predominately high and has fundamentally impacted the economic growth of various countries.

In the International Migration report (2015), high-income countries host more than two thirds of all international migrants. These two thirds live in either Europe or Asia. In 2015, the figures of international migration are as follows 76 million in Europe, 75 million in Asia, 54 million in , 21 million in Africa, 9 million in and the , and finally 8 million in the . Of the top twenty destinations of international migrants worldwide, 9 were in Asia, 7 in Europe, 2 in and 1 each in Africa and Oceania. The above analysis explains why Europe will remain destination for migrants as a result of geographic proximity to Africa and the Middle East and economic benefit derivatives.

In addition, it is interesting to note that migration has also become an important component of in countries where fertility has declined. According to UNFPA, in some parts of Europe, migration is mitigating population declines related to low fertility and aging population. Furthermore, migration is seen as an increasingly contributor to development. Migrants make important contributions to the economic prosperity of their host countries and the flow of financial, technological, social and human capital flow back to their countries of origin

9 helps to reduce and stimulate economic development there as well. Thus, it is clear that both emigration countries and immigration countries could be of great benefit to each other if immigration policies are better managed and implemented coherently.

I. THE HISTORIC ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE To answer the question of the historic analysis of the politics of migration between Africa and Europe dating back to the 1920s during and after the World War One is analysed in the views of Hansen and Jonsson (2011). Stating that after the war was the first time that European politicians and diplomats negotiate on how to limit the number of Africans in Europe, while at the same time recognising that Africans were needed, as soldiers, in Europe. Presumed demographic ‘imbalances’ (i.e. population surplus or deficit) have been used to justify vastly different migration policies. But migration makes the EU’s relation to Africa exceptional also in a historical sense. At that time, issues of migration were seen in the context of a co-European colonial effort in Africa, which has been channeled to be at the benefits of Europe be it emigration from Europe to Africa or . That is, European integration was inseparably with the “Eurafrica project”. Still in the authors’ views, this historical dimension is precisely what is lacking in existing scholarly analyses of European migration, which are usually governed by a present day perspective. Stating also the existence of some hidden undefined perceptive of the Eurafrican project, “an ingrained belief that the presence of Africans in Europe was an absurdity, an offense, whereas the presence of Europeans in Africa was a necessity” (Hansen and Jonsson, 2011:27). This vividly shows that the EU migration policies was largely shaped by demographic projections to its benefits. Today, the reverse is the case with more migrants coming from a continent that once was receptive to Europe. Even though, the question of the legal and illegal migrants tends to fuel the debates on migration from Africa. However, EU insists its engagement in Africa is guided by “interdependence” and commitment to a “mutually beneficial partnership of equals” that will promote development, economic growth, democratic governance, human rights, peace and prosperity in the continent.

10 In addition, in Brussels - 1951, the provisional intergovernmental committee for the movement of migrants from Europe was created, today called (the International Organisation for Migration, IOM). In 1950s, Robert Rochefort (1954) states that, Robert Schuman's former chief of Cabinet and diplomatic Counsellor to the Intergovernmental committee for the movement of migrants, a coordinated effort was needed to help overcrowded, , West , Italy, Greece and to encourage its population to resettle in Africa. Of course, a plausible reason for the preference may be because of Eurafrican project which was defined as a political project (Hansen and Jonsson (2011).

According to Jean Fremigacci (2005),states that African leaders were fiercely opposed to this which will deprive native of work and to avoid some degree of racism. Hansen and Jonsson explains that the historic analysis of the politics of migration involving Africa and Europe was based on demography projections and seen more like the “servant of neo- colonial system of unequal exchange”.

On a contrary, today, the politics of immigration in the EU have become increasingly associated with other issues such as national security and terrorism especially with the presence of radical Islam as a major threat.

II. A SURVEY OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION An illegal immigrant is a person who either enters a country illegally, or who enters legally but subsequently violates the terms of their visa, permanent resident permit or refugee permit. Geddes and Scholten (2016) explains that illegal migration means migration that is not authorised by migration laws and policies in destination countries. It is important to note that it is not so much the personality or character of the individual migrant - for example, an or a high skilled labour migrant or a low skilled worker - that matters in immigration policy, but rather the ways in which they are viewed by institutions and organisations in the countries to which they move. These can then shape wider social perceptions of the value of migration and migrants irrespective of the actual qualities, skills and attributes that they possess. The authors further argue that defining immigration and immigrants are political matter, which

11 lies with the sovereign state which is mostly based on the political, economic and social needs of the State.

The fear of illegal migrants in host countries is expressed by Jahn and Straubhaar (1999), stating that illegal migrants are not registered in official records, thus they avoid contact with government and formal sectors. Also, illegal migrants break laws and rules and clearly challenge the credibility of judicial systems and confidence in constitutionally derived power and authority. Their presence also conflicts with public transfer systems. Illegal foreign workers do not pay direct income taxes, but on the other hand use public goods or publicly subsidised services like schooling or medical treatment or their children. ‘Illegal’ compete with ‘legal’ for job opportunities but have the possibility to avoid certain obligations, cost, taxes and fees compulsory for legal workers. These legal, economic and social provocations make it easily understandable that politicians and voters are not willing to accept the phenomenon of illegal migration. In contrast, the authors expressed that most of the data on illegal migration are sometimes politically biased and misused.

The prevailing issues about illegal migration is as a result of the crude law of demand and supply that plays out in specific sectors of economy as will be discussed in the case of Italy. This situation can be reversed only if the formal system is able to produce and distribute the goods and services required by all members of the society then can informal solutions be less relevant and thus less pervasive. In addition, the strong perception that, the supply of and demand for illegal foreign workers create an economic market for illegal migration. And a political market for the supply and demand of border controls and labour market regulation as in the case of most southern European countries remains an open debate (Baldwin-Edwards & Arango, 1999). This further shows that the solution starts in bridging the gap between the supply and demand with legal migrants.

In addition, the behavioural pattern of illegal migrant as analysed by Baldwin-Edwards (1999) which is categorised into four groups. First, migrants can enter a country illegally by crossing border, either by avoiding border controls or sometimes with the help of smugglers and labour trafficking or by using false documents. Second, migrants might have entered the country legally

12 but they stay illegally; either they entered with a tourist visa but did not leave and overstayed, or they entered as asylum seekers and stay even if their application has been rejected. Third, migrants might have entered legally, they might live under regular conditions but they could lose their legal status as a consequence of administrative or political changes in granting residence permits. The same might happen to refugees once they lose their status because their country of origin has moved back to more peaceful conditions with no danger to life for minorities. Thus, they are no longer granted a permit to stay and they become illegal if they do stay. Fourth, migrants could enter legally, stay legally, but they might work illegally. It is important to establish that Illegal work does not concern foreigners only. Similarly, citizens are active in the underground economy or work illegally without declaring it, in order to avoid social security contribution and income taxes.

4. MIGRATION ROUTES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN According to the International Organisation of Migration13 (IOM), 116,692 migrants and refugees entered Europe as at 6 August 2017 by sea with almost 85 percent arriving Italy and other Greece, Cyprus and . This is compared with the 263,446 arrivals across the region through 6 August 2016 as seen in the table below.

TOTAL ARRIVALS BY SEA AND DEATHS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 2016 - 2017

1 JANUARY – 6 August 2017 1 JANAURY – 6 August 2016

Country of Arrivals Deaths Arrivals Deaths arrival

Italy 96438 2,240 (Central Med. 99727 2,713 (Central Med. route) route)

Greece 11713 160888 383 (Eastern Med. route) Cyrus 358 45 (Eastern Med. route) 345

(as of 8/07)

13 See weekly update of IOM migration flow 13 Spain 8,183 120 (Western Med. 2,476 97 (Western Med. route) route) (as of 30/06/16

Estimated 116692 2405 263436 3193 Total

Data on deaths of migrants complied by IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. All numbers are minimum estimates. Arrivals based on data from respective governments and IOM field offices.

Looking at the data, shows that there is a slightly (3.3 per cent) fewer in the numbers of migrants in comparison with the previous year. IOM observes that there is slower traffic to Italy during mid-summer, and fewer deaths. This narrative of 'invasion' and ever increasing mixed migration is echoes by the fear of terrorists and political interest. Jahn and Straubhaar (1999) expressed that most of the data on illegal migration are politically biased and misused, which is echoed in the case of Italy. Furthermore, the authors argue that, some countries might have incentives to record exaggerated figures to get international financial assistance or to legitimise political actions against illegal migrants. Other countries might be afraid of high figures because they could transmit the signal to foreigners that it is relatively easy to be an illegal migrant in that particular country. A practical example is the case of Italy calling for burden sharing of migrants from the Mediterranean in July 2017 or else they will give these migrants temporal visas to entry other EU countries, because their facilities have been overstretched. Also, complaining that other Member states have left them alone to suffer with the refugee crisis. A country with a high tolerance is more likely to be affected by than under similar conditions with strict enforcement of immigration laws.

Over the years, migration routes in the Mediterranean Sea have evolved and according to FRONTEX there are three main routes namely: the central, western, and eastern Mediterranean routes.

14 Central Mediterranean Route has continually received migration influx since 2008 and tagged the most tragic route with high numbers of causalities heading to Italy from Libya. Though there was a drop of migrants in 2015 as a result of the Syrians shifting to the Eastern Mediterranean route and shortage of boats by smugglers. The networks is well established in Libya, which remains the point of departure by sea to Europe. Even though there is a long antecedents until 2010. The nation prosperity gave good job opportunities to migrants from African countries. However, with the collapse of Gaddafi regime in August 2011, the flow almost entirely stopped. By 2013, smugglers network had reorganised and took advantage of the failing state of Libya without law enforcement to continue their criminal activities. Migrants mostly on this route are from Tunisia, Nigeria, Somalia, Eritrea and Sub-Saharan countries. Illegal border crossings on the Central Mediterranean route also includes disembarkation at Apulia and Calabria. Illegal migration via Libya is entirely dependent on the services provided by smuggling network.

Western Mediterranean Route is the to Spain route by sea. In 2015, thousands of sub-saharan migrants tried to climb over the fence in the Spanish enclave of Melilla. Illegal migrants on this route fluctuates between 6,500 - 10,231 from 2008 to 2016, as a result of various measures put in place to curb the influx. It is worthy to note that this route also faces challenges with drug smugglers and cocaine dealers towards a lucrative market in the EU. The different measures used to curb the flow are as follows: cooperation between Spain and Morocco, bilateral agreements with Mauritania and Senegal which includes a agreements, more coastal patrols and installed maritime surveillance system along its southern border. Migrants through this route are from Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria and Mali.

Eastern Mediterranean Route has seen an increasing number of migrants, in 2015 over 885,000 migrants arrived EU through this route. Due to the increasing and conflicts in the Middle east is the reason for the outburst of the influx. The vast majority arrives on several Greek Islands, especially on Lesbos. Throughout 2015, Frontex deployed more officers and vessels to the Greek Islands to assist in patrol and registration of migrants. In December 2015, Frontex launched Poseidon Rapid Intervention to assist Greek authorities after a request. Most

15 migrants from this route originate from Syria, , Somalia and small amount from sub Saharan Africa. The EU – Turkey agreement has also help to reduce the influx through this route.

UNHCR data for midyear report of 2016 shows that Turkey, Lebanon and have received much higher numbers of people fleeing conflict than EU member States. UNHCR further reveals that 2.8 million refugees live in Turkey, 2.8 million in Lebanon and 755,892 in Jordan. In contract, to EU which now host 2.1 Million refugees (Geddes and Schloten; 2016).

With focus on the central Mediterranean route and reason for these illegal migration shows that Illegal migration will remain a major security issues for quite some time to come, if the disparity between this regions is not addressed. Recently, the common assessment of the issue has evolved. It is now considered a common issue, not Europe against the Mediterranean partners, but rather an issue where all regional partners will collectively have to fight criminal networks of major importance. Therefore, there is a need for a dialogue at a political level, between the EU and the South of the Mediterranean and between the sub-Saharan Africa (Calleya: 2013).

5. TYPES AND CAUSES OF MIGRATION Migration is broadly categorised into voluntary migration and forced migration. From the table below in a glance, one can see the pull and push effect of the types of migration.

VOLUNTARY MIGRATION

PUSH FACTORS TYPES PULL FACTORS Joblessness; bad Labour migration New work / job; Better working conditions / bad conditions / pay pay Sinking living Economic migration Social stability / affluence standards /poverty; (example of rich country) (general situation of poor countries)

16 FORCED MIGRATION

PUSH FACTORS TYPES PULL FACTORS Religious / ethnic Political / Civil war Refugees Safety and freedom from conflicts; ; persecution, human rights abuse, xenophobia; human or generally from violent rights violation conflicts Heavy environmental Environmental refugees Safe Haven: security of damage; drought: nourishments and / or health hunger, health risk ( Egypt 96% dessert) Endangered basic needs / Economic refugees Social stability / Security poverty survival

Under international law as stated in 1951 Geneva Convention on the rights of stateless people to which all EU member states are signatories gives forced migrants who are fleeing persecution protection. On a contrary, only a small number of international migrants fall within the remit of this convention. Migration policy is made within institutional settings that do not always facilitate the translation of policy objectives into policy outcomes (Geddes & Scholten: 2016). An interesting debate is, are migrants voluntary or forced if they leave their countries as a result of unemployment and poverty? Should economic migrants be treated as forced migrants or priority should be given to forced migrants than economic migrants? This creates a perception that the flexibility on immigration policy depends solely on the economic and political situation of the host country.

This is due to the fact that there is a thin line between formulation of policy objectives and implementation, there exist the political decision making process with 28 Member states who might agree or disagree on the migration policy. For example, the , , Slovakia and never agreed to relocation of the 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece,

17 Italy and Hungary to other EU member state but were outvoted due to the decision making process (Geddes & Scholten: 2016). Even though their votes were outweighed, their position is still fixed on this issue on the acceptance of migrants and that why the problems persists today even the infringement procedure levied against them, their refusal to take these migrants in the name of resettlement still stands.

To answer the question of the tackling the roots causes of migration is discussed in three category namely: demographic imbalances of a country, the economic and social effects and finally the political instability and conflicts.

Demographic imbalances: from the 1920s onward, on the continents has been used to authorise vastly different policies of migration management. Similarly, EU has always wanted to import labour from Africa but the EU also wants full liberty of choice in deciding who and how many to admit so as to effectively organise migrants to those sectors presently lacking labour shortages. Also, the EU's migration policy towards Africa at the early stage is not of EU- African win-win dynamics and African development gains, but rather of how Brussels, in a practical sense, believes itself capable of generating a win-win dynamics between its own security-oriented fight against illegal migration on the one side, and its neoliberal for growth and competitiveness on the other. In the 1930's during the economic depression, Africa was discussed as a solution for Europe's problem of overpopulation in the view of the Philosopher Max Grunewald (1935; Hansen and Jonsson: 2011). Guernier (1933); Hansen and Jonsson (2011) suggested a three step strategy to reduce the overpopulation in Europe: First to select the brightest brains and send them to Africa to draw up concrete plans and projects of development. Then these will prepare ways for “troupes de choc”, like engineers, contractors, entrepreneurs, builders to 'improve the standard of life in Africa'. The final stage with the 'Eurafrican order' is mass migration of an annual 500,000 people between the ages 30 to 50 years about twenty million people to Africa (Hansen and Jonsson 2011). However, today the reverse is the case with the decline of the working age group in the EU more intake of labour migrants from poor countries are needed to meet the overall economic growth, the functioning of the internal market and competitiveness of the EU enterprises (Hansen and Jonsson: 2011).

18 According to the Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2016), In order to assess the growing demographic imbalance in Europe a diversity of data was observed such as the economic performance, population age composition, employment levels for young people, women and older persons, investment in research and development and also pollution of the atmosphere with carbon dioxide, a climate gas . Stating that all countries in the EU are faced with problems that they need to solve, some have good ideas. But others are with no possession of 'a magic formula' for the growing demographic imbalances.

Furthermore, the assessment shows that best scores were given to regions in , which is led by with the high fertility rates, exceptionally prosperous and highly developed nation. Also, , , , UK, Benelux countries, and , Germany's southern regions, Austria, some regions in northern Italy and northeastern Spain have relatively stable demographic structure as well as high aggregated value added, good education and impressive employment levels. In contrast, remote rural regions scored low rating for instance southern Italy or Greece are affected with low fertility rates, massive outward migration of young people and marked the aging of the remaining population.

Due to low fertility rates in Italy and Germany, they will thereby need the highest net rates of immigration to maintain their working-age population at a constant level. The more equality given for both men and women in working life, the more children are born. Education is the most important capital to provide jobs in Europe. University graduates are less likely to be unemployed than people with low education levels, and unskilled workers account for a particularly high share of the long term unemployed.

One special challenge facing European societies is immigrant qualification and levels of integration, which remains a relevant aspect of the migration policy that needs to be addressed. According to the UN world population projection suggests that Africa has the highest population growth rate, and between 2015 and 2050, Africa is expected to account for more than half of the world's population. A good indication for the reason of the ever increasing flow from Africa to Europe is as a result of rise in unemployment, rise in poverty, low standard of living, political instability and unattractive economic benefits.

19 However, migration can contribute to reducing slowing the long-term trend towards population aging. Because international migrants14 tend to comprise larger proportions of working-age persons compared to the overall population which is a positive net migration. In addition, supporting entrepreneurial investment in Africa and Europe will address the increasing rising unemployment rate which answers to the rising poverty level and low standard of living.

Economic and social problems: according to International Migration report 2015, of the 157 million international migrants born in a middle income country, nearly 49 per cent were residing in a high-income OECD country, 28 per cent in a high-income non-OECD country, 20 per cent in another middle-income country and 3 per cent in a low-income country. Migrants from high- income OECD countries were primarily residing in other high-income OECD countries (83 per cent), while migrants from high-income non-OECD countries were almost evenly split between high-income OECD countries (46 per cent) and middle-income countries (49 per cent). Over half of all migrants originating from low-income countries were living in a middle-income country (57 per cent), compared to 19 per cent in high-income OECD countries, 5 per cent in high- income non-OECD countries and 19 per cent in other low-income countries. This clearly shows that inequalities of income and wealth is essentially the drive for economic migration. That is the gap between the rich and poor and the gap between the rich countries and poor countries will continue to contribute to reason for migration. Migration is a phenomenon that comes about wherever there is an economic, political or social differential between region of origin and region of destination. The above statistics further shows that people naturally move to countries where they find the best economic benefit.

Jahn and Straubhaar (1999) explain the economic answer of illegal migration is categorised into two points. First point is based on the response to inefficient (too costly) market regulations which favours illegal migration. Stating that some migrants and some employers think it is “economically beneficial to break laws” then to bear the consequence of fines or punishment which is based on the microeconomics of the market of illegal immigrants. This further shows, there is an oversight of people willing to enter income countries. For whatever reason, ‘the

14 Migrants crossing borders to work and live 20 already there's’ (natives, former immigrants) do not want to accept open borders and free immigration. They define an , declaring who is able to enter, stay and work and what would be the consequences of breaking the law. To become illegal workers in reality, there is also a need for a demand for illegal foreign workers. Second point focuses on the “optimal degree of illegal migration is greater than zero”. This means that beyond a certain level the costs of avoiding illegal migration by control measurement becomes more expensive than the damage that is caused by illegal migration. Therefore, it is cheaper for a society to accept some illegal migrants but to ‘save’ the exorbitant cost of ‘complete’ border controls or the negative impacts if an extremely severe enforcement of internal controls. This further shows the politico-economic approach for the host country. Politician or the law makers choose an immigration policy to the country’s economic benefit. The authors further stressed that, those winners from legal and illegal immigration tend to be skilled workers and owners of capital. In the views of the analysts, if immigration law is to be enforced the bargain is usually between skilled workers, owners of capital and unskilled native workers (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango: 1999).

The obvious explanation for the tolerance of illegal immigrants is a non-traded benefit as a result of their services into a specific sector. With increasing illegals entering the economy, the supply of labour in that sector will increase and therefore wages will decrease. These lower labour costs are of benefit to the rest of the society which therefore tolerates those illegal immigrants. Using a cross country approach (Bratsberg: 1995), shows that illegal immigration flows are more sensitive to changes of GNP per capita than legal immigration. Therefore, illegal immigration depends even more than legal migration flows on the economic conditions in the sending and receiving countries. Consequently, it can be seen as a very flexible reserve of labour.

The fundamental element in understanding the determinants of illegal immigrants is the behaviours of employers and measures taken by the government. Employers of illegal immigrants can face severe penalties such as money fines, when they are detected by internal controls. However, other forms of punishment also exist such as exclusion from public contracts. Consequently, employers hire illegal immigrants up to the point where the marginal benefit for them is equal to the marginal expected loss when such behavior is discovered. For wage setting

21 this means that illegal will get a salary below their marginal productivity and below the wage paid to legal workers.

The fact that the economically optimal level of illegal immigration is greater than zero stresses the need for a specific policy on illegal immigrants. Some illegal immigration is beneficial, too much is not. Illegal migrants have some qualification not possessed by legal migrants and they will take job opportunities not taken by legal workers and will do other jobs more cheaply. So, at least for a certain level of illegal immigrants, they will increase the welfare of the receiving countries as a whole. As the benefits are not equally distributed in the society, a bargaining procedures will decide to what extent illegals are accepted and how severe should be controls and punishments. Since in the 80’s the economic analysis of illegal migration have concentrated on either the employment impacts of illegal immigration (international migration legal or illegal) or on the effects of illegality (focus on the analysis of illegal work as in the underground economy), does not matter if workers are citizens or foreigners.

To the answer the question, why illegal immigration to date is a problem is categorised into five points. First, Illegal immigrants do not receive or pay into the national social security system. Unlike illegal immigrants, legal immigrants are integrated into the economy. Therefore, illegal immigrants’ direct impact on publicly financed activities is clearly negative. This is the case in Italy, Spain, and Greece. Illegal immigrants use public welfare programmes, education or medical treatment without paying taxes. Therefore, there is an increase on tax burden of natives and legal immigrants. Second, a rather legalistic string of arguments builds on the assumption that a state cannot tolerate illegality with its jurisdiction. If it does so, it suffers a decline in its legitimacy which spills over to other areas (eg tax honesty). This argument says that the state must enforce all given laws, however, it does not explain how the laws come into existence. Third, Illegal immigrants are often pushed into the areas of the shadow economy. There is much concern that they tend to commit more criminal acts than other foreigners because they have less to lose and are more ready to accept risks. Hence, this line of arguments says that illegal immigrants commit more crimes and make life for natives and legal immigrants more dangerous. Fourth, Illegal immigrants are subject to exploitation, because they have 'weak legal position'

22 which gives them a lesser bargaining positions. Arguments of this kind are often incorporated into systemic theories of migration. For instance, in the case of producing tradable goods (manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, mining, trade, hotels, transport and utilities etc sector), exploitation of foreign labour takes place in the foreign country, in the case of non-tradable goods (construction, finance and real estate, barber shop, salons and Public services), cheap labour is imported into the industrialised country. Fifty, there exist the competition of legal immigrants and minorities on the labour market with illegal immigrants. As long as this trends continues, it reduces the opportunities for those who follow the rules (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango:1999)

Political instability and conflicts in many countries of the Mediterranean region tend to encourage the flow of illegal immigration. As already discussed in the introductory section that the geographical proximity of these continents then to drive migrants to the safest continent at the moment. For example, in the past, Arab-Israeli conflict, war in Algeria and the Gulf War; and the ongoing conflicts war in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism has cause migrants to migrate to Europe, which seems to be the safest for now. Moreso, after the horrific attack of September 11, 2001 and the Arab Spring 2011 in the North Africa, the Middle East has never been the same with the continuous military intervention by NATO members and terrorists attacks. This fight against terrorism has led to increasing refugees’ crisis and different cells of terrorist groups growing in Europe. For instance, the Spain van terror attack in August 2017 was organised by a terrorist cell unit in Spain in which the perpetrators are mostly Moroccans, even though ISIS claims victory further shows the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into Europe. Even though these young children were raised in Spain, they were still radicalised by the Imam at the Mosque who resided in Spain (Albdelbaki Es Satty, a Moroccan born preacher who accidentally died in Alcanar, trying to manufacture explosives)15. This picture shows vividly that extreme measures are necessary to monitor those under surveillance, the preaching by Imams, online and offline materials of radical Islam. Furthermore, environment degradation as a result of wars and climate changes make these countries inhabitable and encourages migration.

15 See article on RT, Imam suspected of organising Spain attacks avoided , was labeled 'no threat', 23 6. A SURVEY OF THE CASE OF ITALY A brief history of immigration policy in Italy can be dated back in the 1950's and 1960's, where there was large scale emigration from Italy to other European countries with an estimates of 8 to 10 percent of population relocating. The transition to being immigration country began in 1980's and accelerated in the 1990's accompanied by the development of immigration policy. Italy was once an emigration country that moved to immigration country. According to Jahn and Straubhaar (1999), there has been an expansion of an Italian underground economy since 1984 and half a million illegal foreigners are illegal workers.

History has shown that workers from Italy were an important component of the 'reserve army' of labour that fueled post-war economic reconstruction in countries such as , France, Germany and . It was also at the pressing of the Italian government that free movement for workers was developed as a core EU principle in the 1950s. (Geddes and Schloten; 2016). These perspectives shows that the migration has its positive benefits to a nation if managed well. Looking at the world in a broader sense, migration has made tremendous impact economically and socially to the existence of a nation state. Though there are pressing question that still need insightful views, the question of legality and illegality after deriving the benefits from these people. When the negative impacts outweighs the positive effects, what can be done? Should the media hike of 'invasion' and terrorism be analysed objectively?

There is no doubt that Italy is considered a 'Frontline' country because of its geographical position to the Mediterranean Sea. It has been an increasing terrifying experience for migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya with rubber dinghy, overcrowded boats recording high numbers of death. Among other tragedies, for example in October 2013, more than 360 men, women and children mainly from Eritrea, Somalia and died 120 kilometers off the coast of Italian Island of . This tragedy shows the negative effects of risk involved crossing the Mediterranean.

According to Geddes and Scholten (2016), the two important ideas that is clear in European immigration politics are as follows; first, Italy is under siege from migrants and criminal

24 that facilitate their movement. Second, Italy is at a geographical porous southern border and a gateway to the rest of the EU. These narrative is played out in domestic politics and have encouraged xenophobic (Northern League) led by in EU politics. In July 2017, a group called 'Defend Europe’, believe that NGOs search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean act as a “pull factor,” encouraging migrants to take to the sea because they know they will be rescued and carried to Europe. They claim these NGOs “are working as water taxis, ferrying migrants from the Libyan shore to Italy, and basically cooperating with human traffickers. Although, 'Defend Europe' claim they will rescue and return migrants back to Africa. It is interesting to note that through crowdfunding they were able to raise more than $150,000 to charter a 130-foot ship called the C-Star, which they plan to use to monitor the rescue missions in the Mediterranean. However, the hire ship had a technical fault and halt operations16. Migrants are drawn to Italy due to social and economic transformation. A vivid picture is given by Geddes and Scholten (2016) stating that in 1990, only 100,000 resident foreign citizens lived in Italy but by 2012 there was increase to 4.3 million. However, the post 2008 economic crisis had powerful effects on Italy, which led to further emigration to other European countries.

In addition, the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors that benefit from illegal immigrants are, industry, construction, agriculture, hotels and restaurants, housekeeping, street-hawking and self- employment: this involves a range of activities including which is predominate in Italy (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango:1999).

To respond to the question of informality and illegality in Italy; a person can be employed in a building site or as a domestic worker either formally (taxes and social contribution paid) or informally (taxes and social contribution unpaid). Looking at the statistic given by Geddes and Scholten (2016) of contribution of the informal economy in Italy from 1999 to 2007 show an estimate of 27 percent of national income. This compared to estimates of 12.5 percent, 15 percent and 16 percent in Britain, France and Germany respectively, shows the economic benefits derived from informality.

16 See article, This group wants to ‘defend Europe’ from migrants at sea, 25 Geddes and Scholten (2016) argue that the advantages of informality and illegal migration arise from a tradeoff between the lower costs from employers who avoid tax and social costs and the benefits from migrants who obtain employment and earn more than they would in their country of origin. For States, the tolerance of some informality can be less costly than strict controls and tight social regulation.

According to Baldwin-Edwards (1999), there are three preconditions to large workers in the underground country in the southern Europe which includes Italy. First, the coexistence of high and low productivity sectors, partially corresponding with the urban-rural division. Second, the rapid transfer of indigenous workers from high to low productivity sectors, often through internal migration. Third, a rapid decline in the rural population in the 1970s to date. This clearly show that these economic sectors cannot raise wages or they will become internationally noncompetitive, therefore their very survival depends on the works of the often illegal immigrant labour. It is important to note that four countries (Spain, Italy, Greece and ) located in the southern Europe heavily dependent on tourism, which creates a problem for the implementation of a tight immigration policy as a result of colonial ties and geographic position.

Since the 80's, regularisation have been an essential policy tool in Italy. Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) argue that frequent regularisations could encourage more illegal migration which has been the case. Although, Geddes and Scholten (2016) argue that this the principal policy instrument used by southern Europe to portraits the common EU policy response less effective. According to Geddes and Scholten (2016), between 1986 and 2014 in Italy around 1.4 million migrants – had their status regularised. It is interesting to note that almost half of these regularisation occurred between 2002 to 2005. These regularisations are considered as creating a back door into EU. Though, Spanish regularisation in 2005 led to protests from other EU member states because it was seen as creating a back door entry. Evaluating these facts from history portraits a picture why some Member States have refused the resettlement plan from Italy, because they are classified more of economic migrants not forced migrants. Moreso, the fear that some terrorists are amongst them has eaten deep into the debate of the illegal migration crisis.

26 In the eyes of Geddes and Schloten (2016), irregularity and informality raise three important points that demonstrates the important elements of internal politics of immigration in Italy. First, illegal migration shows the per-eminence of market and social factors, rather than the state in labour migration and demonstrates limits to control. Second, there exist an economic pull factor of strong demand for migrant’s workers in the country. In Italy, there was demand from small- scale manufacturing companies in the north, as well as from agricultural employers. In Italy, there is a continued demand in the domestic and healthcare sectors is strongly related to the structure of the welfare state and a reliance on family and household provisions. This creates a vivid picture of why there is a strong presence of women migrants in the care and domestic sectors. Women migrant workers have play a key role in sustaining and reproducing this types of welfare and care provision in Italy. Third, this system influences the labour market controls with a high degree effects on both the “migrants who have little political power” and employers “who tend to be well organised and politically influential”.

As a form of policy response, legalisation of illegal immigrants in Italy is not a cure for serious structural factors which perpetuate, encourage or even require the illegal employment of workers (Baldwins-Edwards and Arango: 1999).

I. ITALY IMMIGRATION POLICY STYLE In the 90's the Italian government adopted the key elements of EU policy and in March 1998 joined the . During the 1980s, Italian immigration policy concentrated on legalising and regularising migrants flows rather than reducing them (Pugliese, 1998: 5 -28 as cited in Geddes & Scholten, 2016:182). The Martelli law of 1990 was the first immigration legislation that focus mainly on illegal migration. This law was aimed at creating a visa system to limit inflows while also strengthening border controls and making provisions for increased . The non-soviet bloc countries were given right to asylum through this Martelli law then regularisation was initiated.

According to Geddes & Schloten (2016:182) the failure factor of the Martelli law was identified by Reyneri (1998:314) stating that it did not address illegal migration but rather sent a message

27 that Italy was relatively open to illegal flows. In Italy, the centre-left government in 1998 introduced the Turco-Napolitano law which maintained strict elements linked to Italy's EU obligations through reinforced measures dealing with entry, residence and expulsions. The whole idea is to eliminate the back door recruitment to a 'managed system' through an annual immigration quota, a sponsorship scheme17 and creation of reception centres for illegal immigrants. However, the right wing parties had wanted to be classified as a crime but the left resisted it. One can clearly see, that the benefits from the flow through the economic contribution to the economy influences the political debate and the legislation of immigration policy. It is interesting to note that the politicisation of migration and the tension between right and left has distinguished Italy. In 1998, the Centre-right government led by 's Forza Italtian party opposed the Turco-Napolitano law and on assuming office, immediately sought to replace it with a stricter measure focused on border controls. The Bossi-Fini law (Xenophobic and Post fascist leaders) chose a more security driven approach with the elimination of the sponsorship scheme and linking of work and residence permits would last only as long as the contract of employment.

At a glance below are the amendments:

WHAT WHERE WHEN – TIME FRAME

Suspected illegal entrants Detained in reception centres Increased from 30 to 60 days

Undocumented migrants 6months to 1 year in prison second time arrest

Third arrest 1 to 4 years behind bars

Family reunification Only foreigners with work contracts would be able to back family members for admission

17 A scheme that allowed Italian citizen to legally resident foreigners, regions, local administration, unions and voluntary organisations to sponsor migrants who would be issued with a temporary permit. 28 Permanent residence Increased from 5 to 6 years

Despite the discrepancies between the center left and centre-right government on a security- driven legislation in Italy, regularisation is still the “most suitable instrument to repair the disfunctionalities of the Italian migration regime” (Fintelli, 2013:49-50 as cited in Geddes and Scholten 2016:183). Without a doubt different measures have been taken to manage or control the growth of illegal entry but an arguable view is “whether the greater emphasis on security and border controls” has further given the need for a back door entry.

According to Einaudi (2007), regularisation is seen to provide a basis for family reunion and a stabilisation of the immigrant population. Thus, the impact is seen economically and socially with the recruitment of migrants In Italy which tends to limits state capacity to regulate admissions. Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) states that Italy is heavily dependent on tourism which shows why there exist a problem for the implementation of a tight immigration policy.

The various analysis of the case of Italy can be seen through the eyes of Jahn and Straubhaar's (1999) in 'a survey of the economics of illegal migration' focusing on the need for a good labour market policy valid to fight illegal employment. Thereby, creating an economic strategy that disallows the supply of and demand for illegal foreign workers especially in the agricultural, construction, hotel and tourism and healthcare sector but rather a political market for the supply and demand of border controls and labour market regulations. Geddes and Scholten (2016) argues that the internal controls necessary to tackle relatively high levels of informality could be politically costly because they would impinge on the lives of employers (employing migrants in their businesses) and ordinary Italian citizens (employing migrants in their homes). Hollifield's (2006) as cited in Geddes and Schloten (2016) argues that external control or cooperation with the EU could constrain domestic ideas and institutions with the necessary measures. From the various views, the problem in Italy can be seen as having relatively weak internal controls concerning the demand of and supply of illegal migrants.

29 According to IOM below are the known entry point and exist point in Italy:

Entry points: Main ports of disembarkation are Augusta, Catania, Pozzallo, Trapani and Lampedusa (), Reggio Calabria and Vibo Valentia, (Calabria), Cagliari (Sardinia), Salerno and Naples (Campania), with few autonomous landings recorded in the southern part of Apulia (Lecce), Sicily (Portopalo di Capo Passero) and Sardinia (Teulada)..

Exit points: Migrants arrived by sea and trying to move on towards other European countries are tracked in formal camps and informal transit points close to border areas with neighbouring countries (France, Switzerland and Austria). Migrants are often stopped or pushed back to Italy when found on streets or trains close to Italy. Ventimiglia (Italy/France border) and Como (Italy/Switzerland) are the two border cities where most transiting migrants are gathering, and where official transit centres have been opened. Over the last month, increasing tensions between humanitarian needs of migrants outside formal reception centers and authorities’ controls have been registered in border areas as well as in Rome and Milan (main transiting hub towards North). The hotspot in Taranto is reported to receive weekly buses of migrants blocked by the Italian authorities at border areas to prevent them to move outside the country. .

As of 30 June, the status of relocation of migrants in total is 7,390 persons from Italy. In the first 6 months of 2017, there have been 4,736 departures (56% of all departures from Italy). Overall, main countries of destination for relocated migrants are Germany (40%), (11%), Switzerland (10%), (10%), the Netherlands (9%), followed by France, Portugal, , Belgium, Spain and others with lower numbers.

After the tragic death of 360 people at the coast of Lampedusa, Italy in October 2013. With the financial support from EU, Italy launched Mare Nostrum which is a search and rescue operation. In late 2014, even though there was unwillingness to continue funding the project by the British government who argued that since the operation begun 150,000 people have been rescued, it is seen as a pull factor to smuggling networks for the transportation of migrants.

Similarly, different measures have been taken to control illegal entry or influx but the extent of illegal immigration depends on the ability and willingness of a country to enact its immigration

30 laws. For instance, permanent control of entry, exit residence and working permits. Moreover, some countries tolerate illegal migrants more easily because they assume that they act only as transit hosts and that most of its foreigners are moving ahead to another destination country. For example, some eastern European countries with regard to movements to Germany eg .

II. THE ROLE OF NGO ON THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN SEA VS CODE OF CONDUCT According to Amnesty International Report June 201718, a brief history of the role of Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the Central Mediterranean Sea is analysed as giving private rescue operations that is funded by civil society. Stating that the first NGO to send vessel (the Phoenix) is the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) operating jointly with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) medical team to assist refugees and migrants on board. Its activities is dated between August to September 2014 and between 2 May and 28 September 2015 to date. Since the beginning of the works of gap-filling responsibility of the NGOs, nine (9) NGOs vessels have been operating in the Central Mediterranean namely, MOAS (Malta), MSF (France), (Germany), Life Boat (Germany), (Spain), , Sea- Eye (Germany), Sea-Watch (Germany), SOS Mediterranée (France). However, with the event of the revised code of conduct by Italy, MSF and Life Boat suspends it activities in July 2017 because several commitments could result in a “decrease in efficiency and capacity of the current SAR with dire humanitarian consequences”19.

In addition, on 22 June 2015, "the EU launched EUNAVFOR MED, a joint military operation with the mission to "identify, capture and dispose of vessels used by smugglers and traffickers" in order to "disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean".

Generally, It is on record that at the end of 2015 rescue at the sea was 152,343 people, providing a breakdown as follows (41,341 - the Italian coastguard, 29,178 - Italian Navy, 6,290 - Italian Custom police including with assets co-financed by Frontex, 16,158 - merchant ships, 20,063 -

18 Report titled : A Perfect Strom - the failure of European policies in the Central Mediterranean

19 http://www.msf.org/en/article/msf-committed-saving-lives-mediterranean-will-not-sign-italian-code-conduct 31 NGO rescue boats; 15,428 - Frontex Triton assets - excluding Italian assets and 23,885 - EUNAVFOR MED and foreign navies. The statistics of death or missing at the sea are 2014 - 3,165 persons, 2015 - 2,876 persons, 2016 – 4,581 persons (Amnesty International: June 2017) and as at 16 August 2017 IOM states that the death toll is 2,410 persons. The activities of the NGOs has no doubt contributed to reducing the death toll as seen from the figures. But Is the SAR mission really a pull factor or compliance to International law? Can this revised code of conduct reduce the increasing influx of migrants?

Amnesty International further states that, in 2016 the Italian coastguard coordinated 1,424 SAR cases 52% more than in 2015 and 46.5% more than in 2014. As of January to July 2017, NGOs coordinated 40% rescue operations on the sea20. For the past two years the role of NGOs position on the sea is usually between 20 and 50 nautical miles from Libyan Coasts which has saved several lives. Even though some politicians accuse NGOs of colluding with smugglers which serves as a pull factor for migrants, is still an ongoing debate.

After consultations with NGOs, European Commission and relevant authorities the 12 points commitment was revised and signed by 7 NGOs except for Life Boat and MSF21. In addition MSF, states that due to the means at their disposal the commitment that vessels should disembark survivors to a place of safety as a rule instead of transferring migrants to other ships will create unprecedented limitations. As a consequence, it will reduce the presence of NGOs in an already insufficient gap-filling responsibility, which will lead to more mass drownings. Furthermore, MSF argues that the presence of armed police officers on board is a breach of the “fundamental humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality”. Again, this will subjugate organisations to the political interests of EU member state. Some of the fears of Amnesty International and HRW22 on the draft code of conduct was addressed in the revised version in order not to impede rescue operations and priority of Italy.

20 https://www.savethechildren.it/blog-notizie/le-ragioni-cui-abbiamo-firmato-il-codice-di-condotta-le-ong- impegnate-nel-mediterraneo

21 http://www.msf.org/en/article/msf-committed-saving-lives-mediterranean-will-not-sign-italian-code-conduct

22 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/12/eu-draft-code-sea-rescues-threatens-lives 32 Generally, it is important to note that illegal entry into Libya is criminal by Libyan law and anyone found guilty are given fines and can also face prison sentence. In Libya, there is no asylum framework (asylum-seekers and refugees) which means automatic detention applies to illegal migrants. According to UN agencies and Amnesty International, there have been several records of human rights violation, , ill-treatment, beatings, exploitation and sexual violence by guards in government-run detention centres or those run by armed groups outside the control of the government (Amnesty International; 2017).

Despite Libya having been part of the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Libya has not the capacity of the search and rescue due to the conflict and political instability of the country. However, it is necessary to note that peace and stability in Libya is an essential tool for the success of any coordination of SAR operations. The political instability in Libya has further contributed to the increasing migration influx through the sea. According to personal experience gathered by Amnesty International, migrants prefer to cross the sea than go through the Sahara desert back to their countries of origin.

Moreso, Amnesty International suggests that a similar 2015 operational coordination of Italian authorities should be in place in the Mediterranean Seas and should be driven by search and rescue operations rather than push back to Libya State. Save the Children claims they were forced to respond if - “we would rather stop our search and rescue operations completely, and risk people drowning, than return migrants and refugees back to Libya?” On 15 August 2017, the vessel, run by Proactiva Open Arms was operating 27nm from Libyan shores, an area which many believe to be International waters. Due to the Libyan authority confrontation, they left for the fear of their safety and security23. Though in the capacity of gap-filing vaccum which essentially should be the State, is under serious threat in the view of looking for solution to curb the influx of migrants on the Mediterranean. Hostilities to NGOs by the Libyan authorities as a result of the new Libyan SAR zone is not the way either because insecurity of NGOs team could lead to their withdrawal which lead to further loss of lives. This seems to be the card played by the EU, death in the camp of others and not theirs.

23 See: save the children response to reported hostilities towards NGO vessel operated by Proactive Open Arms 33 What is then the preferred policy to limit the influx? Is striving for peace in Libya a key factor? What are the options against the fear of invasion by terrorists? Peace and stability seems to be an essential tool for the control of the migration influx because the death of Gaddhafi this problem was controllable. As already stated above that, in July 2017, there was a slight decrease in the influx into Italy but an increasing number in Spain. This data shows that either the measures taken by the EU needs to be changed or modified because migrants or smugglers just change routes rather than deter the influx24. Has the EU strategy planned on border controls rather than search and rescue mission being successful? Who then really benefits terrorists, citizens or Member states?

7. ILLEGAL MIGRATION AS A GATEWAY TO SECURITY THREAT The challenge of terrorism is not a new security phenomenon; however, since the horrific attack of September 11, 2001 in the US, this form of combat has taken new dimension. The Post – Cold War world has, however, unleashed international terrorist operatives whose mandate knows no borders. Al-Qaeda, ISIS and similar terrorist cells are present everywhere, including along the borders of the Mediterranean, in Europe and easily radicalised individuals through online materials.The ideological content of Islamism is Islamic fundamentalism, which, on the one hand, is a theological teaching and a movement to restore certain primary values, norms and relations that were proclaimed in history (these can be religious, ethical, family, domestic, etc). It is important to note that not all are terrorists or radicalised but those exposed to radicalised Islam have to tendency to commit the act of terror in the name of being sympathetic to extremism or recruited by ISIS (Le Beau: 2013).

According to Sergei Sarkisyan (Le Beau: 2013), in the opinion of a number of experts, including analysts of the security services of France and Germany, almost all Islamic communities in Europe contain a certain percentage of radicals. This points “the simple conclusion that the degree of radicalisation and the level of dissemination of the ideas are in direct proportion to the size of the Muslim Diaspora”. It is worthy to note that the money factor plays

24 Source: Migratory flows in July: Numbers fall in Italy, remain high in Spain - Frontex 2017 34 an insignificant role in the recruitment of naturalised or long established immigrants to Europe, but plays relatively larger role in finding potential terrorists in the latest wave of immigration, especially from North African countries. A good example is the arrest in Spain, in May of 2007, of 14 Moroccan citizens and two Algerians, who recruited penniless immigrants from the Maghreb to go to terrorist training camps, or even straight to and Afghanistan25. In addition, just from January to August 2017 , Europe has experienced 8 attacks26 just to name the major attacks either claimed by ISIS or sympathiser to extremism or lone terrorists and in most cases chatting “Allahu akbar”,

Timeline Terror attacks

03/02/17 (France)

18/03/17 Paris (France)

22/03/17 (UK)

07/04/17 Stockholm (Sweden)

22/05/17 Manchester (UK)

03/06/17 London (UK)

18/07/17 Triple attack - Barcelona and Cambrils (Spain) then house explosion

19/07/17 Turku (Finland)

The worrisome concerns are the identities and age group (usually 17years old to last 30's) of these perpetrators, either they were asylum-seekers, or rejected asylum-seekers, or North African descent, or from North African countries or from the Middle East. These terror attacks further show that Europe is potentially a target as ISIS loses ground in the Middle East. Some analysts

25 See the chapter by Sergei Sarkisyan, Recruitment by Terrorist Organisations in Europe’s Muslim Communities, pp 184

26 RTE, timeline - Terror attacks in Europe, updated 17 August 2017 35 have argued that the attacks in Europe is a call for the Western Powers to leave the Middle Eastern territories. Could this be a lasting solution to this growing epidemic?

There is no doubt that due to the refugee crisis and the open door policy presented by Germany, has encouraged some ISIS fighters to return to Europe, in guess of seeking refuge or returning home. This feared perception can be seen as evidence in several attacks in Europe. For example, the Berlin terror attack on 19 December 2016 at the Christmas Market was committed by Amri, 24 yrs who was rejected asylum and plans was on going to deport him to Tunisia. Also, a Syrian 27 years old failed asylum seekers committed suicide in July 2016 at Ansbach, Bavaria killing 15 people, terror claimed by ISIS. Similarly, in the terror case in Spain in August 2017, organised by an Iman - Albdelbaki Es Satty27 - a Moroccan born preacher who was detained in 2010 for committing crimes against and was sentenced to four years and one month behind bars. However, he served from 2012 to 2014 without details why the term was reduced. It is recorded that during his time in jail he made contact with Rachid Aglif one of the jihadists behind the Madrid train bombings in 2004. In 2015, he escaped expulsion for drug trafficking and the list goes on. This growing epidemic raises a lot of questions concerning the capacities of the security agencies to act promptly. Do the security agencies need more staff? Which means more jobs for the Member States. In most cases these men are under surveillance by security agencies but in reality it seems difficult to curb these attacks. Is extreme vetting and monitoring of Imams, migrants or returning foreign terrorists fighters (FTFs) a possible solution?

According to Annie Machon, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bfv), which is the domestic security agency in Germany, says that they estimated about 10,000 Salafist - fundamentalist Islamist were in Germany and 680 are currently under investigation because they were potentially radicalised and potentially violent28. This shows that the intelligence agency is going through an ever increasing battle against terrorism. With the increasing attacks in Britain, Brussels, France and Germany speaks volume of a new threat and fear of lone wolf attackers and radicalised individuals.

27 Source RT - Imam suspected of organising Spain attacks avoided deportation, was labeled 'no threat'

28 See - European Knee-Jerk reaction - Arab psycho or criminal is sees as terrorist', RT, 3 August, 2017 36 Furthermore, Europol’s Chief Rob Wainwright, in February 2016 said that between 3,000 and 5,000 EU citizens trained in Islamic state terror camps have returned back into Europe from the Middle East. Nonetheless, Wainwright refused to link the ongoing terror threat with the refugee crisis. Though he states that 'Europe is currently facing the highest terror threat in more than 10 years'. He further states that there is an expectation by ISIS to stage attack in Europe 'with the aim of achieving mass groups’ attacks'. This is clear in the August 2017 Spain terror attack at a popular street in Barcelona killing 13 people and injuring more than 100 persons. The Second attack in Cambrils injuring seven people, one of whom later died29. It is necessary to state the over 2,500 Muslims in Spain were on the street supporting the victims and condemning Islamist terrorism, which shows a proactive way to show the world what true Islam stands for30. On the other hand, is this march convincing to bring unity?

Another interesting case to consider occurred in May 2017, Salman Abedi, a 22 year old Briton of Libyan descent, committed suicide bombing at the Manchester concert in London, who had visited Syria and Libya before the attack and who must have been radicalised during his visit. This clearly show the fear must European have against the refugees or illegal migrants is justifiable, even though not all the illegal migrants are radicalised. This increasing fear concerns the next generations of kids or teenagers who might easily be radicalised to commit more attacks is worrisome. What can really be done to avoid further security threats? Taking this security threat as normal gradually shows a cross road of no solution, which cannot be sustainable for a long time before citizens will revolt by taking laws into their hands.

In contrast, it is interesting to also look within the growing threat amongst the returning FTFs who are EU nationals. On the 29 June 2017, the European presents the 8th report progress on countering radicalisation - online and offline of terrorist and returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The methods includes identifying and removing online terrorist contents. However, a more challenging task is the EU nationals returning FTFs and their families to EU. Some are battled hardened combatants, while others are disillusioned teenagers. Among those returning are

29 Source - RT, Police still searching for one person after Barcelona attacks

30 See RT, 1000s Muslims march against Barcelona terrorism 37 increasing numbers of children, some of them born abroad. The RAN manual gives enormous responses to returnees and their families focusing on an overall approach of creating a tailor made approach for each returnee, an immediate risk assessment, multi-agency case management, mechanism coordination across government agencies and communication strategy. Of course, one can argue that the returning of foreign terrorist fighters poses high degree of threats as illegal migrants. Thus, a combination of returning FTFs and illegal migrants’ fears is what seems to be unbearable and unimaginable for the future of Europe.

Ruth Mueller et al. (2016) argues that the geographic proximity and longstanding political and economic ties mean that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is of great importance for Europe. Increasing destabilisation in the region would further hinder the process of constructive exchange. The rise in refugee numbers from MENA countries would also increase the danger of terrorist attacks and relocate the region’s conflicts to Europe. Conversely, stabilising the region would create key markets for both economies31.

8. EU POLICY ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION There is no doubt that the EU policy has influence migration, immigration and policy dynamics in Europe especially in Italy over the years. Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) note that EU pressure have played a general role in policy development in all Southern European countries. The authors further state that in the case of Italy, EU's impact has particularly been on the strict aspects of policy on external frontier controls. This clearly show the EU competence is focused on the regulatory issues associated with and not on distributive issues such as entry levels and migrants progress on arrival in Member States. Moreso, the Treaty of Lisbon affirms that exclusion of the EU from matters relating to immigrant integration (Geddes & Scholten: 2016).

The EU and Member states are committed to borders security and repressive immigration policy. A clear picture of role play is seen as member states control admission to their territory by TCN migrants. The role of the EU is based on operations which support policy development and

31 See - MENA: a region in Crisis, The influence of demographic change on developments in the Middle East and North Africa, and what this means for Europe 38 border control capacity. It is important to note that new Member state are required to show the legal and administrative capacity to regulate borders as a condition for membership. (Geddes & Taylor, 2013; Geddes & Scholten: 2016). The European Union and its Member States have progressively laid out a stronger and more articulated policy response to save lives and better manage migratory flows in the Central Mediterranean.

In 2015, the Commission presented a broad European agenda on Migration. A permanent EU presence at sea has since been established, rescuing hundreds of thousands of people. Following the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015, the EU has stepped up its cooperation with partners in Africa, including through the “Migration Partnership Framework”, launched in June 2016, which has taken cooperation with key countries of origin and transit to a new level. “An External Investment Plan for Africa and the neighbourhood” has also been created to support this new approach and has the potential to raise €44 billion in investments - and up to €88 billion if Member States contribute.

The European Union's support to rights-based migration management in Libya includes capacity- building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard, as well in supporting the Libyan authorities (GNA) in providing essential services to the Libyan population, displaced persons, migrants and refugees through ongoing programmes worth over €20 million. The EU further supports Libya through its Common Security and Defence missions such as EUNAVFOR Med, and EUBAM Libya.

Operation Triton is the successor of , which is coordinated by Frontex and with support from 18 Schengen member states. Triton operation is a border security mission with limited mandate and not involved in SAR operation. It was launched in November 2014 with a budget of 2.9 Million euros per month.

However, Calleya (2013) argues that continuing with the current policy of neglect in the areas of integration of immigrants runs the risk that many EU countries will see as an increase of the new form of immigrant ghettos and security threats, which are characterised by extreme social marginalisation and exclusion and often have little to do with the traditional black ghettos in the

39 US or other urban ethnically defined communities such as ‘little Italies’ or ‘little Polands’. A comprehensive integration policy will also require more efforts to integrate immigrants into the national labour market. Policy measures like the development of skills enhancement programmes and the creation of job placement centers for immigrants. Moreover, there is a need to provide young immigrants with adequate educational programmes so as to facilitate their access to the labour market. About 70 to 80 per cent of undocumented immigrant landing in EU apply for political asylum, which shows a challenge that connects all member states.

Nevertheless, there is need for the revision of the Dublin rules to include corrective burden sharing mechanism or responsibility sharing. However, will the inclusion of this clause actually change the stands of Member States with the increase in terror attacks? In September 2015, EU member states agreed to a scheme to relocate up to 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece, Hungary and Italy but there were tensions within the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania opposed the scheme but were outvoted which has also raised major implementation challenges on the migration policy in EU (Geddes and Scholten: 2016).

Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999) argues that the Treaty of included the in the EU treaty and transferred some important competences from the national to the common EU level. On the other hand, the internal enforcement, the weight of employer sanctions or the possibility to carry out regularisations remains within national competences.

In a nutshell, Member States in the EU face heterogeneous picture of illegal immigration as a result of own national specific problems. For example, southern European countries are more concerned with illegal migrants from Africa than the northern European countries, while eastern or western countries are more concerned with other immigration issues due to demographic imbalance or economic reasons. However, the flows from Italy or other border countries concerns all member states now because the Schengen policies further show how closely connected national migration policies have become. How best can the authorities reduce or even stop illegal immigration at the external borders or within the country by internal controls through enforcement of residence and work permits?

40 I. AN ASSESSMENT OF EU POLICY AS REGARDS THE MALTA DECLARATION According to the Malta Declaration in February 2017, a key element of a sustainable migration policy is to ensure effective control of the EU external border and stem illegal flows into the EU. Indeed, from the statistics discussed above, there has been fluctuations in the migration flows due to various mechanisms that have been used to curb illegal migration on the Mediterranean. Thus, ten (10) areas was given priority by the Commission: First, training, equipment and support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies through Operation SOPIA and Seahorse Mediterranean Network. Second, further efforts to disrupt the business model of smugglers through enhanced operational action with Libyan countries on the coast, International and regional organisations. Third, support where possible the development of local communities in Libya especially in coastal areas and at Libyan land borders on migratory routes, to improve socio-economic situation. Fourth, seeking to ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions in Libya for migrants, together with the UNHCR and IOM. Fifty, supporting IOM in significantly stepping up assisted activities. Sixth, enhancing information campaigns and outreach addresses at migrants in Libya and countries of origin and transit. Seventh, helping to reduce the pressure on the Libya's land borders, working both with the Libyan authorities and all neighbours of Libya. Eighth, keeping track of alternative routes and possible diversion of smugglers' activities through cooperative efforts with Libya's neighbours and the countries under the Partnership Framework. Ninth, continuing support to efforts and initiatives from Individual Members States directly engaged with Libya, in this respect the EU welcomes and is ready to support Italy in its implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Tenth, deepening dialogue and cooperation on migration with all countries neighbouring Libya, including better operational cooperation with Member States and the European Border and Coast Guard on preventing departures and managing returns.

John Redwood argues that the Malta declaration has two main problems. First is the EU is shifting the responsibility to stem the rapid flow of migrants across the Mediterranean to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. Stating that a government that is struggling to exert control over Libya, which remains a deeply divided country with a rival government in

41 Tobruk and areas of the country under tribal and rebel control. No doubt it will welcome the money promised to strengthen its coastguard and for related purposes, but can it spend it nationally to achieve the EU’s aims? Will it be tempted to spend it for other purposes related to its own difficult position? The second is the request for a policy to return people who have already arrived in the EU following illegal routes. How are they going to do this? Why do they bring people into the EU in the first place if they want to take them back to countries like Libya? What will they do if they refuse? What is expected under International law? These are salient questions that the EU must considers in this policy direction in order to create a tailor made response to this influx. Will increasing information and outreach campaigns help deter more migrants when they hear woes with sounds and pictures of this horrific journey of doom?

LADDER32 also, expresses disappointment on the 'Malta declaration stating that: First, a focus on Libya-shows that efforts is made to keep migrants out of Europe, which a 'double wall', one at the Libyan Borders and the second at the European ones. They are extremely concerned for the situation for migrants within Libyan Borders and the stability and safety of the country with such vulnerable populations. Second, the policy of return ensuring respect for international law and Human rights - they reiterate that the focus of the action plan should be focused on “assisted voluntary Return rather than forced return”; Third, instead of deferring smugglers at the risk of creating new dangerous routes for migrants, they suggest a more safe and regular channels of migration to Europe which increase safety of migrants; Fourth, a focus of security measure, a short-term and unsustainable policy - the allocation of international funding should tackle with a long term and increased funding to development aid and humanitarian assistance to tackle the root causes of migration and ensure stable and safe countries for people to live in.

Looking critically at the Malta Declaration some measures as analysed above need to be revised in order to get a progressive solution on the Central Mediterranean route. Knowing that illegal migrants is considered as a crime in Libya; why should migrants be sent back to die in the country rather than on the sea. More emphasis should be laid on creating peace and stability in

32 LADDER consortium is composed of 27 Co-applicants (coming from 20 countries: 16 Members States and 4 from the neighborhood and the Balkans) that will be actively involved in the implementation of the project in order to enable Local Authorities to act as drivers for DEAR policies. 42 Libya from a regrettable action from NATO countries. Illegal sale of arms and weapons to rebels fighters in the Libyan territory should be curb to established peace and security in the Libya and the region. An aggressive information sharing and outreach campaigns through all media outlet showing the various woes and horrific conditions of crossing the desert and the Mediterranean sea and living conditions in the reception camps should be published in country of origin and country of transit which is constantly essential to reorient the mind of potential migrants and families. Furthermore, there seems to be no doubt that the necessary resources to execute the objectives as outline in Malta declaration is available in the Official Development Assistance for Africa amounts to €31 billion during this financial year. The Commission has taken the decision to mobilise an additional €200 Million for the North Africa window with priority on Libya. Even though, peace and stability cannot be bought, direct coordinated investment is important to tackle the flow from the country of origins of migrants because the statistics of Libyans amongst the influx is very limited.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS EU Member states must insist and cooperate with allies to ensure peace and stability in the Libya and the Middle East because when the wars stop, the refugee crisis will be reduce to the minimum.

EU Member states should collaborate with countries of origin or transit of migrants and implement an aggressive media campaign showing the woes, testimonials and risks of journeying through the desert and crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Promoting legal routes and benefits rather than the illegal routes. There is a deer need for the media to play the role of educating the citizens and parents, especially the region or state that has the highest numbers of illegal migrants. The country of origin of migrants show the disparity and instabilities in the countries that urgently need assistance, therefore, there should be a strengthened Partnership Framework agreement. Similarly, ensure an effective and secure financial transfer funds mechanism and Global partnership between EU and sources countries.

43 Strengthen external and internal border controls by regular vetting, monitoring and registration of migrants or citizens can help close the gap between a restrictive control rhetoric and an expansionist immigration reality. Also, closing the gap between the legal and illegal economic benefits to the economy and regulations can further reduce the incentives for illegalities;

Restructure the rehabilitation procedure for these migrants where extreme vetting and counseling of migrants on issues that concern, life history, work experience, skills, possible economic contribution to the economy, reasons for taking this dangerous journey, future ambition, etc. These rehabilitation centres should teach the language of the country as to proper integrate these migrants, entrepreneurship and mentoring should be provided based on area of interest because no man is born empty. Informing them of the rules governing the country and possibility of repatriation in views of misconducts. EU member states should encouraged individual return package and structural assistance to country of origin. The EU should focus its efforts on the reforms that stand the best chances of improving the economic and employment situation in the target countries. No country can do this alone as tackling such a transnational phenomenon as illegal migration requires sufficient resources and international diplomatic leverage (Calleya: 2013). Adopt a comprehensive long term plan on integration of immigrants such as employment, economic, social consequences, education, housing, social security and medical benefits.

With the increase in terror attacks, EU member states should sensitise their children of radical Islam and terrorism. Continuous education of online terror contents and monitoring of radicalised Individual contents. This strategic in turn creates more employment in a country that employs more personnel to get the job done. Member states should ensure the emotional, psychological and cultural rehabilitation of FTFs in the EU and ensure that they mentally stable to live among normal people.

European Member States must set up a dedicated and proactive search and rescue mechanism to support Italy and recognise the country’s laudable efforts to save lives at sea in the face of an insufficient response from other European Member States.

44 With regards to the creation of a Libyan MRCC and Libyan search and rescue area, a stable Libya is necessary to ensure its smooth running. The Libyan coastguard should not carry out SAR outside Libyan waters, ensure safety and security of NGOs from the EU. They should accept the immediate mechanism to ensure constant monitoring of their conduct and operation at sea and ensure transparency and accountability process in case of breaches of international law rules. Also, EU Member States and institutions should have a conditional working cooperation relationship pending when Libya ratify the Refugee convention, recognise UNHCR and allowing access to all detention places of humanitarian agencies. EU Member States should ensure that NGOs performing the task of search and rescue missions can continue to contribute to saving live in compliance with relevant international law and standards and Italy's code of conduct (Amnesty International; 2017).

A fundamental incentive for illegal work is the deductions for taxes and social security systems which can reach up to 60 percent of actual income. Tax evasion and illegal employment is stressed in European case. Employer sanctions form the key instrument in decreasing illegal immigration, no work permit no work; Sanction employer of illegal migrants to fight illegal migration is to deregulate the European labour markets. Bridging the gap between productivity and net payments is one way to reduce illegal practices on the labour market. That means reducing direct taxation of income and social security contributions from the employee and the employer implying a shift to increased taxes on consumption. The only long term strategy available to lower illegal immigration is to remove the economic incentives to employ migrants (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango: 1999). A better alternative for immigration of both skilled and unskilled labor through temporary workers programs as a way of limiting illegal migrants in the underground economy;

Border protection is relatively costly and not very efficient. A complete control of the border is impossible to achieve. On the other hand, border controls are extremely important for their signally effects. People within the country feel safer, people outside feel not free to enter. So, the solution is to find an optimum. It needs some border controls but their costs should not exceed their potential benefits measured in terms of the apprehensions and deterrent effects.

45 10. CONCLUSION Migration will remain a constant element of our lives as long as man lives because of the search of better life, better conditions and environment. Migrants tend to move to countries where the economic and social benefits is high which includes Europe. The Mediterranean Sea has for many generations seen a number of threats and opportunities to the surrounding countries. Even though economic migrants amount to the highest in the world, illegal migrants tend to question the judiciary and political system of a sovereign state. There is no doubt that the principal issue of the control of entry, stay and work of foreign people lies with national sovereignty. Illegal immigrants challenges national control mechanisms and are an extreme provocations to national authority. They test border guards and once inside the country penetrate the underground economy, where they become evasive of taxes, social security contributions and overstretched basic amenities meant for legal migrants.

The root causes of migration as a result of demographic imbalances can be addressed with attractive parenting packages for the citizens and migrations of the relevant skill and persons into the right sector not forgetting the challenges of the source country or transit country. Wars and conflicts in the Middle East has been the major drivers of mayhem and the refugee crisis in Europe, when Europe can influence the US and other allies military interventions in the region then there will be hope for the end of this migration crisis. The influx from sub-saharan Africa is majorly driven by economic reasons which with entrepreneurial investment and education in the region, the matter will be solved or even reduced to the minimum.

Generally, the economic factor has always played a great role in the implementation and change of immigration policies. An economically much more efficient way to handle illegal immigration and illegal work starts at the economic roots of illegal employment of illegal foreigners. Illegal immigrants work very often without written de facto contracts. If labour is not available on the official labour market, employers have to recur to illegal sub-markets. Opening up the labour market and giving easier access to newcomers is an appropriate strategy.

46 Illegal employment of natives and of foreigners is the consequence and not the cause of inefficiencies in the labour market. Finding and eliminating the cause and nature of these inefficiencies present the only possible long term strategy to lower the economic incentives for illegal immigration. A good labour market policy is the only valid strategy fighting illegal employment and will more or less automatically cure the most obvious problems of illegal migration. Or to put it briefly, make European labour markets work efficiently and most of the negative impacts of the illegal work of foreigners will vanish. Illegal migrants contributed to the transition of Italy from an emigration country to an immigration country since in the 50s.

Illegal migrants has always been part of Italy immigration policy process for many decades but as a result of the refugees crisis the narrative has changed to rather hostility. Nevertheless, there is an increasing fear that the rise in refugee numbers from MENA countries would also increase the danger of terror attacks and relocate the region’s conflicts to Europe. Even though the Malta declaration is committed to stability in Libya, how will this be achieved is still in the open. In order to generate lasting solution in Libya, requires some EU member states to stop sales of arms to countries that influence conflicts in the region. There is no doubt that once there is peace and stability in Libya other problems in curbing the flow will follow suite.

Extreme vetting, registration and rehabilitation of illegal migrants will ensure possibilities for assisted and voluntary return packages for economic migrants are measures that strengthen the fight against illegal migration. It is understandable for forced migrants due to security threat to life and properties leave their home country so sending them back will be suicidal and hypocritical. An aggressive media campaign in countries of origin and transit educating parents, families and friends can deter more economic migrants taking this dreadful journey and can be tagged shameful or disgraceful when caught. The emergence of security threats as a result of the refugee crisis with several cases of migrants involved in the terror attacks in Europe further shows the disapproval and bias against migrants in general. The fear of radical Islam as an invasion through the open door policy has eaten deep into a debate. The terror attacks has not help either than to show that ISIS is losing ground in the MENA and it is looking for other breathing places to strives in Europe.

47 In order to tackle the immense security challenges like terrorism, illegal migration, proliferation of arms, explosive manufacturing, unbiased and sustainable education is necessary to keep citizens informed. The known causes of radical extremists should be addressed and not politicalised. The EU counter-terrorism unit should step up its game in preventing the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment of citizens33. Furthermore, the four pillars of the EU counter-terrorism strategy should be actively implemented.

On a final note, (Calleya: 2013) concludes that only by standing up for progress and serious development across the sub-saharan Africa and Middle East, by promoting democracy, freedom and the observance of human rights can the developed states of the Western world undermine those championing intolerance and campaigns of terror.

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53 An Eides statt versichere ich, dass die Arbeit

Illegal Migration in the Mediterranean Sea: who benefits? von mir selbst und ohne jede unerlaubte Hilfe angefertigt wurde, dass sie noch keiner anderen Stelle zur Prüfung vorgelegen hat und dass sie weder ganz, noch im Auszug veröffentlicht worden ist. Die Stellen der Arbeit – einschließlich Tabellen, Karten, Abbildungen usw. –, die anderen Werken dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, habe ich in jedem einzelnen Fall als Entlehnung kenntlich ge¬macht.

I declare by oath that the thesis,

Illegal Migration in the Mediterranean Sea: who benefits? has been prepared by me alone and only with permitted means of help, that it has not been submitted to any other institution for evaluation, and that it has not been published either in whole or in part. All instances in the thesis – including tables, charts, graphs, etc. – where other works have been quoted verbatim, paraphrased or consulted, have been clearly indicated as references.

(Place, Date, Signature)

Bonn, 31 August 2017, Faith Gabriel

54