Migrants, Refugees and Foreign Policy: Prevention and Intervention Strategies

ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 1, pp 25± 51, 1997 Migrants,refugees and foreign policy: preventionand intervention strategies MYRONWEINER & RAINERMU È NZ Geographicand social mobility are crucialelements characterising open societies.Democratic societies uphold the right of theircitizens to choosetheir place ofresidence and place of work, including the right to emigrate to another country.In contrast, totalitarian regimes prevent their citizens from emigrating oreven travelling abroad, or forcethem to settle in certain areas andto take up assignedjobs while excluding them from other economic opportunities. During theCold War these restrictions were a sourceof con¯ict between East and West. Communistcountries rightly feared a mass exodusof dissatis®ed citizens, while manypeople living under communist rule secretly hoped for an opportunity to leave.The Western countries, for their part, made it a pointto keep their borders openfor migrants from communist countries, as wellas forsome refugeesfrom othercountries with authoritarian regimes or civil wars, such as Chile,El Salvadorand Iran. Theperspective changed dramatically with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the disappearanceof the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Now many governmentsof east Centraland Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Southand Southeast Asia and Latin America regard the possibility of their citizensemigrating to Western Europe or to the USA as anopportunity for reducingunemployment, earning remittances and reducing demographic pres- sures. Theresponse in theWest has beento introducerestrictive border regimes toprevent unwanted mass immigrationfrom the less developedcountries in the southand east. The in¯ ux bothof labourmigrants or ofpersecutedcitizens from theseregions is seen as athreatrather than as apotentialgain. The fact that in thepast the countries of Western Europe often pro® ted economically from organisedlabour migration hardly plays a rolein the contemporary public debate.Instead, migration has becomean issue ofsocial welfare, employment andwages, national identity and cultural diversity. Onepart of the debate deals with the consequences of migration for the receivingsociety, particularly how to integrate immigrants. The other part of the debatedeals with ways and means tocontroland reduce international migration. Herethe focus is mainlyon creating more ef® cientborder regimes, stricter asylumprocedures and the reduction of illegal immigrants. Much less attention is paidto root causes insending countries and in ways in which Western MyronWeiner is FordInternational Professor at theDepartment of PoliticalScience, MassachusettsInstitute ofTechnology, 30 Wadsworth Street, Cambridge, MA 02139-43-8, USA, email , [email protected] . ; RainerMu ÈnzisProfessorof Demography, Humboldt University, LehrstuhlBevo Èlkerungswissenschaft,Unter den Linden6, Berlin 10099 Germany, email , rainer 5 [email protected] . 0143-6597/97/010025-27$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 25 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ democraciescould or should ameliorate conditions in countries that generate large¯ owsof refugees,asylum claimants and economic migrants. This question has onlyrecently become part of the foreign policy agenda. For the USA it is principallyMexico, Haiti, Cuba and other countries of the Caribbean that have beenof concern;for Germany it istheentire region to theeast, including Central andEastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey and the successor states ofthe former SovietUnion. Facedwith an increasing number of asylum seekers, refugeesand illegal migrants,the industrialised countries of the West have become increasingly concernedwith the need to develop prevention and intervention strategies towardscountries that actually or potentially generate mass emigration.Policy makers are payingincreased attention to the political and economic circum- stances thatdrive large numbers of people to leave their country. 1 Indeed, the unwanted(and in many cases involuntary)¯ owof people across international boundariesis nowa globalissue, as muchof a concernfor developing as for developedcountries. In 1995 there were, according to the US Committee on Refugees,15.3 million refugees worldwide, with all but 2.8 million located outsideEurope and North America. Other sources putthe number of worldwide refugeeshigher and the ® guresfor Western Europe as highas fourmillion de facto refugees,inclusive of thosewho ¯ edformerYugoslavia. A largernumber, 20to 25 million, were internally displaced persons, many of whomwould have ¯edtheir countries if they had the means. 2 No® guresare availableon the numberof undocumented and irregular migrants worldwide, but it is estimated thatthe USA has overthree million, increasing yearly by 200 000 to 300 000; andamong the less developedcountries, India and South Africa both receive largenumbers of illegal or irregular migrants. Thereare threepossible responses tothese ¯ ows.One is toseek better instrumentsof control, to establish and enforce stricter border regimes and restrictivemigration and refugee laws, to try to repatriate those who enter unlawfullyor do not qualify for asylum. A secondis toaccept and absorb a certainnumber of refugees and economic migrants and to address thesocial, economicand political consequences posed by the ¯ ows.A thirdresponse is to developprevention and intervention strategies towards countries that actually or potentiallygenerate mass emigration.This article address thelatter question, focusingon the policy instruments available to states seekingto affect the internalconditions of countries that generate large unwanted migration ¯ ows. Particularattention will be given to the policy options for the USA and Germany,principally because these two countries are nowthe largest recipients ofimmigrants in the world, 3 andboth are concernedwith how foreign policy (includingforeign economic policies and development aid) can be linked to refugeeand immigration policies. Many of the policy options considered here are,of course, relevant for other countries and, in some instances,for inter- nationalinstitutions. Germanyand the USA have an interest in prevention and intervention strategiestowards countries of origin for two reasons. The ® rst is amatterof nationalself-interest. Both the USA and Germany have been bene® ciaries of migration.But they have also been faced with substantial and partially unwanted 26 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY ¯owsof individuals across theirborders. For the United States, the ¯ owsare legalmigrants (predominantly from Asia and Latin America) and illegal migrantsand refugees from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean island states andalso from more distant areas, includingVietnam and China. For Germany,the ¯ owsare principallynew labour migrants (small numbers from Centraland Eastern Europe allowed to stayfor 12± 18 months),family members (spouses,minor children of already established immigrants and recognised refugees),ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, asylumseekers fromseveral parts of theworld (mainly Turkey and the Balkans), Jewishimmigrants from the Ukraine, Russia andCentral Asia (accepted as quota refugees)and displaced persons from former Yugoslavia living in Germany undertemporary protection. Some of the asylum seekers qualify,but many do notunder the current legal situation. Althoughborder controls and admission procedures have been tightened, smugglingillegal migrants into the USA and many European countries has becomea lucrativeinternational business. Though the bene® ts ofmigration for thereceiving countries are oftenunderestimated and there is atendencyto hold migrationresponsible for many of the de® ciencies of Western societies and economies,in both the USA and Germany migration and refugee ¯ owsare of popularconcern and have generated a series ofpolicy responses. The ¯ owsare generallyconcentrated in some regionsof the receiving countries, and local communitiesoften have to bear the social, economic and ® nancialcosts of absorption. Thesecond reason is humanitarian.The predominant view of the Western powersduring the Cold War was thatmilitarily strong communist regimes constituteda threatto world peace. This has inpart given way to the present concernwith the disintegration of states andits obvious consequences. The 1991±95 wars inBosnia and Croatia, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria,political repression and violence against Kurds in Turkey and ethnic Albaniansin Serbian held Kosovo, inter-ethnic wars inRwanda and Burundi, warlordismin Somalia, deteriorating economic and unsatisfactory political conditionsin Cuba and Haiti, a secessionistmovement and Russian repression inChechnya, civil wars inTajikistan and Afghanistan, and an irredentist war betweenAzerbaijan and Armenia for the control of Nagorno-Kharabakch ,have forcedpolicy makers toaddress theissues ofhuman and minority rights violations,ethnic cleansing, genocide, stagnant economies, deteriorating envi- ronmentsand refugee protection. Con¯ icts within states, once falling within the purviewof traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, are nowregarded as an issue forthe larger international communityÐ in part because of humanitarian concernsover the loss ofcivilian lives, in part because of the risk that violent disputeswithin states mayspill across internationalborders, and in part because thesecon¯ icts generate migration and refugee ¯ owsacross borders.But while disquietover these conditions is high,the public and policy-makers in both countriesare

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