ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 1, pp 25± 51, 1997

Migrants,refugees and foreign policy: preventionand intervention strategies

MYRONWEINER&RAINERMU È NZ

Geographicand social mobility are crucialelements characterising open soci- eties.Democratic societies uphold the right of theircitizens to choosetheir place ofresidence and place of work, including the right to emigrate to another country.In contrast, totalitarian regimes prevent their citizens from emigrating oreven travelling abroad, or forcethem to settle in certain areas andto take up assignedjobs while excluding them from other economic opportunities. During theCold War these restrictions were a sourceof con¯ict between East and West. Communistcountries rightly feared a mass exodusof dissatis®ed citizens, while manypeople living under communist rule secretly hoped for an opportunity to leave.The Western countries, for their part, made it a pointto keep their borders openfor migrants from communist countries, as wellas forsome refugeesfrom othercountries with authoritarian regimes or civil wars, such as Chile,El Salvadorand Iran. Theperspective changed dramatically with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the disappearanceof the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Now many governmentsof east Centraland Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Southand Southeast Asia and Latin America regard the possibility of their citizensemigrating to Western Europe or to the USA as anopportunity for reducingunemployment, earning remittances and reducing demographic pres- sures. Theresponse in theWest has beento introducerestrictive border regimes toprevent unwanted mass immigrationfrom the less developedcountries in the southand east. The in¯ ux bothof labourmigrants or ofpersecutedcitizens from theseregions is seen as athreatrather than as apotentialgain. The fact that in thepast the countries of Western Europe often pro® ted economically from organisedlabour migration hardly plays a rolein the contemporary public debate.Instead, migration has becomean issue ofsocial welfare, employment andwages, national identity and cultural diversity. Onepart of the debate deals with the consequences of migration for the receivingsociety, particularly how to integrate immigrants. The other part of the debatedeals with ways and means tocontroland reduce international migration. Herethe focus is mainlyon creating more ef® cientborder regimes, stricter asylumprocedures and the reduction of illegal immigrants. Much less attention is paidto root causes insending countries and in ways in which Western

MyronWeiner is FordInternational Professor at theDepartment of PoliticalScience, MassachusettsInstitute ofTechnology, 30 Wadsworth Street, Cambridge, MA 02139-43-8,USA, email , [email protected] . ; RainerMu ÈnzisProfessorof Demography, Humboldt University, LehrstuhlBevo Èlkerungswissenschaft,Unter den Linden6, Berlin 10099 Germany, email , rainer 5 [email protected] .

0143-6597/97/010025-27$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 25 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ democraciescould or should ameliorate conditions in countries that generate large¯ owsof refugees,asylum claimants and economic migrants. This question has onlyrecently become part of the foreign policy agenda. For the USA itis principallyMexico, Haiti, Cuba and other countries of the Caribbean that have beenof concern;for Germany it istheentire region to theeast, including Central andEastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey and the successor states ofthe former SovietUnion. Facedwith an increasing number of asylum seekers, refugeesand illegal migrants,the industrialised countries of the West have become increasingly concernedwith the need to develop prevention and intervention strategies towardscountries that actually or potentially generate mass emigration.Policy makers are payingincreased attention to the political and economic circum- stances thatdrive large numbers of people to leave their country. 1 Indeed, the unwanted(and in many cases involuntary)¯ owof people across international boundariesis nowa globalissue, as muchof a concernfor developing as for developedcountries. In 1995 there were, according to the US Committeeon Refugees,15.3 million refugees worldwide, with all but 2.8 million located outsideEurope and North America. Other sources putthe number of worldwide refugeeshigher and the ® guresfor Western Europe as highas fourmillion de facto refugees,inclusive of thosewho ¯ edformerYugoslavia. A largernumber, 20to 25 million, were internally displaced persons, many of whomwould have ¯edtheir countries if they had the means. 2 No® guresare availableon the numberof undocumented and irregular migrants worldwide, but it is estimated thatthe USA has overthree million, increasing yearly by 200 000 to 300 000; andamong the less developedcountries, India and South Africa both receive largenumbers of illegal or irregular migrants. Thereare threepossible responses tothese ¯ ows.One is toseek better instrumentsof control, to establish and enforce stricter border regimes and restrictivemigration and refugee laws, to try to repatriate those who enter unlawfullyor do not qualify for asylum. A secondis toaccept and absorb a certainnumber of refugees and economic migrants and to address thesocial, economicand political consequences posed by the ¯ ows.A thirdresponse is to developprevention and intervention strategies towards countries that actually or potentiallygenerate mass emigration.This article address thelatter question, focusingon the policy instruments available to states seekingto affect the internalconditions of countries that generate large unwanted migration ¯ ows. Particularattention will be given to the policy options for the USA and Germany,principally because these two countries are nowthe largest recipients ofimmigrants in the world, 3 andboth are concernedwith how foreign policy (includingforeign economic policies and development aid) can be linked to refugeeand immigration policies. Many of the policy options considered here are,of course, relevant for other countries and, in some instances,for inter- nationalinstitutions. Germanyand the USA havean interest in prevention and intervention strategiestowards countries of origin for two reasons. The ® rst is amatterof nationalself-interest. Both the USA andGermany have been bene® ciaries of migration.But they have also been faced with substantial and partially unwanted 26 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY

¯owsof individuals across theirborders. For the United States, the ¯ owsare legalmigrants (predominantly from Asia and Latin America) and illegal migrantsand refugees from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean island states andalso from more distant areas, includingVietnam and China. For Germany,the ¯ owsare principallynew labour migrants (small numbers from Centraland Eastern Europe allowed to stayfor 12± 18 months),family members (spouses,minor children of already established immigrants and recognised refugees),ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, asylumseekers fromseveral parts of theworld (mainly Turkey and the Balkans), Jewishimmigrants from the Ukraine, Russia andCentral Asia (accepted as quota refugees)and displaced persons from former Yugoslavia living in Germany undertemporary protection. Some of the asylum seekers qualify,but many do notunder the current legal situation. Althoughborder controls and admission procedures have been tightened, smugglingillegal migrants into the USA andmany European countries has becomea lucrativeinternational business. Though the bene® ts ofmigration for thereceiving countries are oftenunderestimated and there is atendencyto hold migrationresponsible for many of the de® ciencies of Western societies and economies,in both the USA andGermany migration and refugee ¯ owsare of popularconcern and have generated a series ofpolicy responses. The ¯ owsare generallyconcentrated in some regionsof the receiving countries, and local communitiesoften have to bear the social, economic and ® nancialcosts of absorption. Thesecond reason is humanitarian.The predominant view of the Western powersduring the Cold War was thatmilitarily strong communist regimes constituteda threatto world peace. This has inpart given way to the present concernwith the disintegration of states andits obvious consequences. The 1991±95 wars inBosnia and Croatia, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria,political repression and violence against Kurds in Turkey and ethnic Albaniansin Serbian held Kosovo, inter-ethnic wars inRwanda and Burundi, warlordismin Somalia, deteriorating economic and unsatisfactory political conditionsin Cuba and Haiti, a secessionistmovement and Russian repression inChechnya, civil wars inTajikistan and Afghanistan, and an irredentist war betweenAzerbaijan and Armenia for the control of Nagorno-Kharabakch ,have forcedpolicy makers toaddress theissues ofhuman and minority rights violations,ethnic cleansing, genocide, stagnant economies, deteriorating envi- ronmentsand refugee protection. Con¯ icts within states, once falling within the purviewof traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, are nowregarded as an issue forthe larger international communityÐ in part because of humanitarian concernsover the loss ofcivilian lives, in part because of the risk that violent disputeswithin states mayspill across internationalborders, and in part because thesecon¯ icts generate migration and refugee ¯ owsacross borders.But while disquietover these conditions is high,the public and policy-makers in both countriesare reluctantto put their soldiers at risk or to take actions that might incurhigh political and ® nancialcosts whenthey do notperceive direct links or threatsto their own national interests. Still, in certain cases (egCuba and Haiti forthe USA; Bosniaand Turkey for Germany; Algeria for France), actual 27 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ migration¯ owsand the fear thatmany more people might try to enter their territoriesmake it more likely for developed countries to be concerned about political,humanitarian and ecological conditions in sending countries. Policiesto address theseconcerns can help save livesbut they can also impose aburdenon countries granting protection. Economic sanctions on countries that violatehuman rights or international borders, for example, harm exporters, increaseunemployment, and raise pricesat home; the use ofmilitary power to separatecontestants in an internal war or to punish an aggressor, though more orless effectivein the cases ofHaiti, Iraq and the Bosnian Serbs, remains problematic,risky and, in most cases, politicallydif® cult to accept. Many of thesepolicy instruments, it should also be noted, in¯ ict harm on innocent civiliansin the countries of origin that actually or potentially generate further migration¯ owsand thereby lose the goodwill of many citizens in the target country.For both Germany and the USA, therefore,the quest is forlower-cost foreignpoliciesÐ both politically and ® nanciallyÐthat will change conditions withincountries that generate large ¯ owsof refugees,expellees and/ oreconomic migrants. CanGermany, the USA andother Western countries in¯ uence countries whoseinternal conditions have put people to ¯ ight,and can potential emigrants andrefugees be motivated not to leave their countries or, if they have left, to returnhome voluntarily when conditions have become acceptable again? What policyinstruments are availableto the USA, Germanyand other Western countriesthat might in¯ uence governments to make efforts to reduce human rightsviolations, protect minorities, end internal warfare, or improve economic conditionsso that large numbers of people need not leave their home country? Outsidepowers can, in some circumstances,play a rolein changing the conditionsthat force people to leave their home countries. The role can be supportive,in the form of emergency assistance, development aid, trade or investment.It can also take the form of intervention in the internal affairs ofa statethrough diplomacy, the withdrawal of support, economic sanctions, even militaryintervention. Policy makers mustconsider what actions can be taken whenhuman rights violations, ethnic repression and civil wars threatenthe lives ofmany people and catalyse mass exoduses. 4 Finally,even when ways and means ofinterferingwith internal conditions of countriesgenerating large ¯ ows ofinvoluntarymigration are availableor, for that matter, intervention is justi®ed, actionis notnecessarily obligatory. States with the capacity to act must weigh thepolitical, monetary and human costs ofprevention and intervention and considerthe likelihood that the proposed measures willbe effective. Thereis avarietyof instruments and alternative strategies for addressing the conditionswithin countries that actually or potentially generate large-scale economicemigration, political refugees, displaced persons and other involuntary migrants.These include the use oftrade, foreign investment and development assistance tostimulate improvements in the wages and employment of sending countries;guest worker programmes and remittance ¯ owsas awayto reduce economichardship and migration pressure; incentivesto migrants or their governmentsto facilitatethe reintegration of returninglabour migrants, irregular migrantsand rejected asylum seekers totheir home countries; international 28 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY assistance tofacilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees after favourable changesin their home country; various types of ` safe havens’to provide in-countryor third country places of protection for refugees; exitcontrol policies;political and diplomatic strategies to improve human rights standards andminority rights in order to reduce refugee ¯ ows; and,® nally,military intervention. Someof these instruments and policies are intendedto reduce future ¯ ows (tradeand investment, for example); others are intendedto deal with political oppressionand civil or interstate wars thatare forcingpeople to ¯ ee (examples are mediationand military intervention). Some policies that Germany, the USA andother receiving countries might adopt are relativelylow cost (legal or politicaladvice and the use ofmonitorsin othercountries to protect human and minorityrights), while others can incur very high costs bothfor the intervening countriesand the target country if effectively implemented (trade sanctions or militaryintervention). Diplomatic pressures topersuadeforeign governments not tomistreat their citizens may work for some countriesbut not for others. Some policiescan be bilateral (border agreements and exit controls), while others requirecollective international action in order to be effective. Some policies haveworked reasonably well in the past (international assistance, including large-scalerelief programmes enabling target populations to stay in their home countriesor to facilitate the return of refugees), while others appear less ef® cacious(® nancialinducements to migrants to return home). Some policies mayreduce migration ¯ owsin the long run (trade, investment and development assistance toexpandemployment) but in the short run may enhance the potential forincreased migration. Some new restrictive policies (introducing carrier sanctions,excluding claimants from ` safe countries’and forcing transit countries toexercisegreater control over exit) have, in fact,reduced the number of asylum claimantsbut raise questionsabout whether and where persecuted individuals canbe adequately protected. Whichpolicies are appropriatealso depends on theconditions that potentially generateout¯ ows. Clearly, there are differencesamong authoritarian regimes thatviolate individual political rights, regimes that persecute religious and ethnic minorities,failed or collapsing states thatare unableto provide protection for theircitizens, 5 wars ofsecession, civil con¯ icts, revolutions, rapidly decaying economiesand ecological disasters. Not all conditions are amenableto political, economic,military or humanitarian interventions at acceptable costs. Fewgovernments have been intellectually or bureaucraticallywell equipped to address thequestion of policies towards countries of origin. Many policies adoptedby Germany and the USA mayhave inadvertently generated additional refugeeand other migration ¯ owsas aresultof what has oftenbeen character- isedas thelaw of unintended consequences. 6 Guestworker policies that the USA establishedwith Mexico during World War II created¯ owsand networks that continuedeven after the policies were terminated, and the guest worker pro- grammeGermany started in the late 1950s led to similar unintended conse- quences.Inconsistent US policiestowards Cuba, Haiti and Central America, and Germanpolicies towards the former Yugoslavia have played a rolein creating ¯owsfrom these countries that were not at all anticipated by policy makers. 29 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ

USpolicymakers arguedthat the admission of Cubanrefugees would undermine theCuban regime, but they also reasoned that similar ¯ owsfrom El Salvador wouldstrengthen that country’ s governmentby relieving unemployment and providingforeign exchange through remittances. The Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe( OSCE)contributed,with German participation, to the stabilisationof Macedonia by promoting policies to protect the ethnic Albanian minoritybut, so far,has failedto develop and promote similar measures to protectSerb minorities in Croatia and Kurds in Turkey. Inboth countries policy makers needto ® ndmore effective ways of integrat- ingmigration and refugee issues intotheir foreign policies. In the USA experts fromthe Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration within the Department ofState, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the Justice Department,have had little involvement in foreignpolicy deliberations related to migrationand refugees. It took the crises inCuba and Haiti for the National SecurityCouncil and the Department of State’s PolicyPlanning staff tobring in policymakers withsome expertiseon migrationissues. Germany’s assistance to ethnicGermans in Russia andKazakhstan is regardedby the German govern- mentas adomesticissue andis thereforehandled by the Ministry of theInterior, notthe Foreign Of® ce; theadmission of asylumseekers isregulatedby aspecial federalof® ce attachedto the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Commis- sioneron Foreigners (Ausla ÈnderBeauftragte) is administrativelyattached to the Ministryof Labour and Social Affairs. On the federal level, then, there is no overalland comprehensive administrative competence for migration affairs. It is inthis context of limited experience and limited conceptual thinking about the relationshipbetween migration and refugee policies, on the one hand, and foreignpolicies, on the other, that we shall examine alternative development, preventionand intervention strategies.

Trade,foreign investment anddevelopment assistance Themost promising policy instrument outside powers can use tostimulate the economiesof sending countries, thereby improving production, wages and employmentso as toreduce emigration pressure, is anexpansion of trade. 7 In theory,the effect of policies to lower trade barriers, end protection against labour-intensiveimports and give preferential access togoods produced in anothercountry is toexpand production and investment in the country of origin, providemore employment and, for the country of destination, eliminate some low-wagejobs that might attract migrants. Inthe short run, however, a reductionin tradebarriers can result in theclosing downof protected industries and an increase in unemployment in both the countryof origin and the country of destination. The removal of trade barriers betweenthe United States and Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),forexample, is expectedto result in a loss ofemployment inMexico’s agriculturalsector, especially in corn production, since corn is more cheaplyand ef® cientlyproduced in the USA. Moreover,the development spurredby free tradecan sometimes increase incentives to emigrate. Higher 30 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY incomesmake it easier to® nanceemigration and lead to rising expectations. Developmentinduces migration from rural to urban areas andthus sets inmotion aprocess ofstepmigration. Although development provides more jobs, in some sectors oftheeconomy labour opportunities may deteriorate. Lastly, with greater developmentcomes anincrease in communicationand information about oppor- tunitieselsewhere. The historical evidence is overwhelmingthat the short-term effectof increased development is more,rather than less, migration.South Korea,Taiwan, Hong Kong, Turkey and Puerto Rico generated large numbers of migrantsas theireconomies expanded under the impetus of trade and foreign investment.In time,however, as developmentcontinues, emigration declines and returnmigration sets in,as theexperiences of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece demonstrate.But, notes Martin, how great the increase in emigration will be duringthe period of economictake-off (the period of the migration ` hump’) and atwhat point emigration will decline are hardto predict. Developedcountries adopt trade restrictions to preventcompetition, declining pro®ts anda rise inunemploymentin theprotected sectors, but the effect is often toincreasepressure foremigration from countries whose goods and services are therebyexcluded. The European Union’ s agriculturalpolicies, for example, reduceincome and employment opportunities in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere ineast Centraland Eastern Europe as wellas inparts of the Third World; similarly,the USA’ spoliticallymotivated boycott of Cubanexports and Cuba’ s touristindustry contributes to emigration from that country. The termination of suchrestrictive trade policies and politically motivated boycotts, by improving employmentin population-sending countries, may contribute to a reductionof emigrationpressure. Threatsto deny development assistance, halt foreign investment and impose restrictionson travel and trade have been used to exert pressure onstates that violatethe human rights of their citizens or become security threats to their neighbours.The use ofthesepolicies to effectpolitical change is contentious,in partbecause there are costs fordomestic exporters, investors and consumers, in partbecause they are dif®cult to enforce, and in part because their ultimate effects are notalways certain. 8 TheUS andEuropean trade boycott of Serbia,the UStradeboycott of Cuba,and restrictions on trade with Iraq and Iran have had littleimpact on the human rights policies of these countries, and in some instancesthe effects mayhave been the opposite of whatwas intended.The US tradeembargo on Cuba, for example, may have contributed to the exodus of Cuba’s middleclass andthereby reduced the chances for economic and political reforms.However, in certain cases theseembargoes have turned out to be effectivein the long run. It is clearthat economic sanctions against Serbia (in combinationwith NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs) haveincreased the country’s willingnessto support joint US± European peace initiatives in Bosnia andto tolerate the deployment of IFOR groundforces. And the fact that Iraq was effectivelyprevented from selling oil has madeit easier toidentify and dismantle partsof itsmilitary potential. Boycotts have had or may have an impact in other cases becausethe targets are speci®c andlimited and the targeted country or companycan modify its behaviour at a relativelylow cost. Examples here includethe German consumer boycott of Shell petrol to prevent dumping the 31 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ

BrentSpar oil platform in the North Sea, boycotts of hand-loomedrugs produced bychild labour in developing countries and the US boycottof goods made in Chinesejails. Theimpact of development assistance is atleast as problematicas theimpact oftradeand foreign investment. Many Third World governments are dominated byrapacious elites more concerned with their own prosperity than that of their countries.Much development aid has goneinto projects that serve theinterests ofinvestors from the donor countries but do little to expand employment in the receivingcountries. Food aid, though crucial in cases ofemergency, has often broughtdown local prices and hurt the creation or expansion of agricultural sectors inThird World countries. The same is truefor agricultural products exportedat dumping prices by the EU. Martinreports on an International LabourOrganisation ( ILO)andUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)studyof the capacity of overseas developmentassistance tominimise unwantedemigration that points to the bene® ts ofexpanding agriculture and increasingsupport for education and health care. 9 Thestudy emphasised that targeteddevelopment assistance canbe an instrument to induce governments to improvesocial infrastructure, adopt labour absorption investment strategies, and promoteeconomic liberalisation; it also noted that aid can be used as leverage forchanging the policy framework of countries with high potentials for emi- gration.But, the study concluded, development assistance is notordinarily an effectiveinstrument for the short-term reduction of emigration.At thesame time itis clearthat, in cases ofdisaster, food supply and humanitarian aid do have thatshort-term effect. TheGerman government has targetedeconomic assistance atethnic Germans inRussia, Kazakhstan and Kirgiztan and, more broadly, at the regions in which theseminorities reside. The objective is toencourage ethnic Germans to remain wherethey are orresettle in designated parts of Russia ratherthan take advantageof the legal opportunities to migrate to Germany and claim German citizenship.The aid programme is partof alargerset ofpoliciesregarding ethnic Germansin Central Europe and the CIS countriesthat includes an annual admissionsquota (200 000 to 220 000 per year) for ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler),®nancialassistance andagreements with the governments of Russia,Kazakhstan, Kirgiztan and Ukraine to allow for local or regional self-administrationor some forms ofculturalautonomy in Germancommunities. Germanpolicy makers expectthat, despite such efforts, a largeproportion of theethnic German diaspora in the former Soviet Union will migrate to Germany overthe next 15 years andthat, in practice, the aid programme assists ethnic Germanswhile they wait in the queue. In fact, Germany’ s effortsto support German-languageteaching and cultural institutions in the former Soviet Union andin other ways to assist ethnicGermans could increase rather than decrease emigrationbecause these programmes reinforce German ethnic identity and induceindividuals of mixed parentage and remote ethnic ties to try to claim AussiedlerAussiedler status.At the same time,it is worthnoting that the readinessof ethnic Germans in Poland to emigrate has beengreatly reduced as aresultboth of political and economic liberalisation and the Polish authorities’ recognitionof their minority status and of legal changes in Germany making it 32 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY muchmore dif® cult for ethnic Germans in Poland to obtain Aussiedler status. Someethnic Germans have even returned to Poland, and as aresultof this re-migrationthe number of people with dual citizenship (Polish and German) in Polandhas risenfrom 170 000 to 200 000. Financialpayments to governments and communities for the purpose of improvingwages, employment and economic conditions do notalways slow the paceof emigration, but, as discussedbelow, economic assistance canplay a usefulrole in refugeerepatriation and in¯ uencing the exit policies of otherstates. Andthere is nodoubt that in countries such as Italy,Portugal, Spain or Greece, overalleconomic growth as aresultof EUmembership,in combinationwith EU fundsfor regional development, have reduced the number of emigrants and increasedreturn migration.

Guest workerpolicies Somepolicy analysts have suggested that programmes to admit foreign guest workersfor a limitedduration can serve notonly to provide employment for individualforeign workers but to improve economic conditions in sending countriesthrough remittance ¯ owsand private investments from labour migrants thatmight reduce the pressure forlegal and illegal immigration. For host countries,guest worker programmes can provide for the orderly short-term use offoreign labour without incurring the disadvantages of illegal migration or havingto allocate funds for the integration of the migrants. Most immigration specialistsagree, however, that a legalentry policy for labour migrants will not completelyclose the back door to entry, though it shouldbe notedthat Germany has beenmuch more successful thanthe USA inpreventing the establishment of alargeirregular labour force. Usually, guest workers are employedin periodsof temporaryeconomy-wide labour shortages, or shortages in particular industries, occupationsand regions, without being permitted to claim permanent settlement statusimmediately. TheUSA andGermany have shared a similarapproach towards guest workers,Germany through an of® cial policy and the United States through inadvertence.Germany initiated the recruitment of guest workers in the 1950s and1960s and terminated it in 1973, when the demand for foreign workers declinedas aresultof the ® rst oilprice shock and the baby boom generation’ s entryinto the labour market. Most of the guest workers who were recruited between1955 and 1973 returned home, but some remainedand were joined by theirfamily members (husbands,wives and dependent children below age 16). Theresult was that,even after the recruitment ended, the total number of foreignersdiminished less thanexpected. Those who stayed became permanent legalresidents and de facto immigrantswhose situations have become similar to thoseof US immigrantsholding green cards. As forthe USA, in1964 it terminated its wartime-initiated guest worker (bracero)programme,but those who had come earlier (and legally) had created anetworkthat enabled family members andfriends to come later (many illegally).Though some migrantscontinued to enter legally under special 333 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ agriculturalworkers’ programmes, employers also began employing illegal migrantsfrom Mexico because they worked harder and for lower pay than Americansor legal aliens would. The result was apersistentstream ofillegal migrants,particularly to the agricultural and service sectors oftheeconomy. As longas unemploymentlevels remained low in the USA, policymakers and administratorswere reluctant to provide the resources necessary tomonitor the bordersor enforce sanctions against employers who illegally hired migrants. But inthe mid-1980s, when the number of illegal migrants in the USA was inthe four-to-sixmillion range, it became a salientpolitical issue. Is itpossible to formulate and implement policies that would create real incentivesfor the return of labour migrants to their countries of origin? Under whatconditions might they work? The German experience shows that both thesudden recruitment stop of 1973 and limited ® nancialincentives for thosereturning voluntarily (1983± 84) have reduced signi® cantly the number of foreignersworking in that country. One could argue that a system allowing labourmigrants to reclaim their social security contributions when leaving the countrywould be an even more effective and credible solution. Under such conditions,contributions to social security would serve as aforcedsaving scheme forworkers who return home before they reach pensionable age. It has alsobeen suggested that employers contribute to a payrolltax for employing foreignworkersÐ money that could be deposited in pension and social security programmes,workmen’ s compensationschemes, andother social welfare pro- grammesÐpartly to reducethe incentives to hireforeign workers over local ones butalso to cover the long-term costs associatedwith immigration and the integrationof labour migrants and their families. InGermany, contract workers in the construction sector coming from low- wagecountries like Portugal and Ireland have become a majorpolitical issue. In principle,the EU givesthem and their Irish and Portuguese employers free access tothe German construction market. However, the German government wouldlike to make sure thatthese contract workers are paidaccording to Germanstandards in order to protect the local construction industry and its employees.But, so far,minimal wages for EU contractworkers in the construc- tionsector have been vetoed by employers’ associations representing other industries. TheUS andGerman experiences suggest that, once initiated, labour migration andguest worker policies cannot be terminated overnight. Indeed, once begun, foreignlabour migration alters labour markets so as togenerate a demandfor low-wagelabour. Moreover, the abrupt termination of these programmes often resultsin ` anticipatorysettlement’ when some guestworkers realise that they willnot be able to return if they leave. Successful reintegration of labour migrantsis mostlikely under conditions of economic growth, political stability andimprovements in the internal labour market in the country of origin. Italy, afoundingmember of the EU, is onegood example. The others are Greece, Spainand Portugal, which successfully joined the EU whenthey opened their countriesto political and economic change after the fall of their authoritarian regimes.Millions of Italians, Greeks, Spaniards and Portuguese who had been workingin Northern and Western Europe sooner or later returned home. 34 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Germany’s currentguest worker programme for the employment of limited numbersof project-tiedand seasonal workers from Poland and other Central and EastEuropean countries, introduced in 1990, is intendedto help Poland and otherneighbouring countries establish market economies by providing a certain numberof workers with short-term project-related opportunities to earn money inGermany. The German and Central European governments regard the policy as mutuallybene® cial, reducing costs (egfor seasonal work during harvests), transferringknow-how and providing income to dependent family members at homewithout permanently relocating workers. Most experts agree that, so far, theseguest worker policies have not resulted in an increase in the number of illegalresidents in Germany, as theyhave elsewhere, because of Germany’ s internalcontrols and its highly regulated labour market. Moreover, seasonal and contract-tiedworkers from Central and Eastern Europe, as wellas commuters workingin the border areas, are notpermitted to bring their families, are not allowedto stay for more than a limitedperiod of time and must (like all other foreignersresiding in Germany) have valid passports showing the date and port ofentry. But the strongest argument for the policy is thatit furthers the larger process ofincorporating Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the EuropeanUnion after the year 2000. After an initial transitional period, this wouldultimately lead to free movementof labour between these countries and WesternEurope, as thereis nowamong the other members ofthe European Union.If Poland,the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the EU, thiswould encouragemore direct foreign investments but also channel additional EU subsidiesto these countries and further reduce migration pressure.

Migrationand refugee return policies Manymigration and refugee policies adopted by Germany, the USA andother industrialcountries are intendedto be temporary, that is, to permit individuals toremain in thecountry for a limitedperiod of timeand then return home or to athirdcountry. These policies include the provision for temporary asylum. Governmentsalso allow individuals to enterthe country to seek asylumwith the provisionthat if theirrequests are rejectedthey will be required to leave.Return migrationpolicies include return incentives paid to the individual migrant, or reintegrationassistance, which may be paid to the migrant or to his or her government.The expectation behind these policies is thatrefugees or displaced personswill no longer be at risk if they go home and that with ® nancial assistance returningmigrants can be eased backinto the home economy. RosemarieRogers, in her evaluation of these programmes, concludes that decisionsto return are in¯uenced much more by the political and economic situationsin the home countries than by return incentives or reintegration assistance targetedat returnees. 10 Moreover,in some cases, theso-called reinte- grationassistance givento thehome government for housing, vocational training orother purposes does not reach the returning migrant but is pocketedby the government.One good example of this is thepayments made by Germany to Romaniain order to speed up the return of Gypsies, who are discriminated againstand sometimes even violently attacked at home but are notaccepted as 35 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ politicalrefugees in Germany. Gypsies repatriated to Romania do not seem to havepro® ted from these funds. Amongdeveloping countries, asylum almost always involves the assumption thatrefugees will sooner or later return home, which makes fora greater willingnessto admitanyone seeking protection against political repression, civil wars andviolence. In theseinstances, repatriation becomes more likely when the violencehas subsided,refugees consider it safe toreturn and donor countries providefunds for mine clearance, transportation and aid to facilitate resettlement throughthe development of local infrastructures. Rogers reports that when civil wars haveended and violence abated, international assistance tofacilitate the voluntaryrepatriation of refugees to developing countries has beenamong the mostsuccessful returnprogrammes. To date, the most successful international efforthas beenthe Comprehensive Plan of Action for Southeast Asia, a multilateralprogramme that led a greatmany Vietnamese to return home. In Africalarge numbers of refugees have also returned home when con¯ icts have ended,notably to Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. Funding repatriationby nongovernmental organisations and the UNCHR is moneywell spent. AmongWestern industrialised countries, asylum has oftenbeen granted on a permanentbasis. Individuals who do not qualify for asylum are sometimes grantedtemporary permission to stay (this is knownas `B’statusin Western Europeand as TemporaryProtected Status ( TPS)intheUSA). Germany provided suchtemporary protection to largenumbers of Bosnianswho did not technically qualifyfor asylum under the Geneva Convention. In the USA, TPS was granted tomany asylum seekers fromEl Salvador who were not regarded by immi- grationauthorities to havea `wellfounded fear ofpersecution’ but who had left becauseof the increasing level of violence and deteriorating economic condi- tions.Though the con¯ ict in El Salvador has endedand political and economic conditionshave improved, relatively few individuals and families granted temporaryprotection have returned or are likelyever to return home. On 31 December1994, TPS was terminatedfor an estimated 187 000 Salvadorans, but itis expectedthat many of themwill be ableto `adjust’their status with the help ofimmigrationlawyers. Indeed, the return rate has beenso lowthat members of Congresshave indicated that in future they will oppose the use oftemporary protectedstatus. For the USA atleast the political viability of temporary protectedstatus for people in ¯ ightdepends on the political will to repatriate whenconditions in the home country make it possible.

Externalsafe havens Whena large-scaleemigration by sea fromHaiti began in 1991, following a militarycoup against the elected government, the US CoastGuard picked up the Haitians,reviewed their asylum claims on board ship, and returned rejected asylumseekers toHaiti.In July 1994 the Clinton administration announced that Haitianspicked up at sea wouldbe transported to the US navalbase at GuantanamoBay in Cuba, where they could present their asylum requests. Thosegranted asylum could remain in Guantanamobut could not enter the USA. 36 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Theinterdiction/ safe havenpolicy was subsequentlyextended to Cubans in August1994 after the Cuban government declared that it wouldno longerpatrol thebeaches to prevent ` raftpeople’ from setting out for south Florida. A safe havenfacility was alsoestablished in Panama. Both Haitian and Cuban rafters weretransported to the safe havens,where they were provided with minimum shelter,food, clothing and medical care. The USA announcedthat the rafters wouldnot be eligible to apply for refugee status nor could they seek admission totheUSA as immigrantsunless they returned to their home country, where they couldthen apply to USconsularof® cials. The deterrence policy worked. Within daysafter the rafters werede¯ ected towards the safe havens,the exodus from bothcountries declined to a trickle. Forthe USA theexternal safe havenwas attractivebecause it provided basic protectionto anyone who sought refuge yet deterred people who were not at high risk.It should be noted that UNHCR endorsedthe US proposalfor external safe havensbecause they provided protection within the framework of the UN RefugeeConvention. However, opposed to interdictions at sea withforcible repatriation,it objected when the USA subsequentlyengaged in that practice withregard to Haitians. Externalsafe havensare, of course,little more than refugee camps locatedin athirdcountry, with the difference that an external power assures theirsecurity andprovides for their assistance. The USA was ina uniqueposition of having asuitableterritory under its military control and was furtherable to negotiatean arrangementwith Panama to permit Cubans and Haitians to live in camps erectedat the US bases inthat country. Some European countries have consideredsimilar arrangements to deal with the eventual case ofmass ¯ights fromAlgeria and elsewhere in north Africa, but from today’ s perspectiveit is clearthat appropriate locations would not be available. The European states do nothave any offshore facilities comparable to the US bases inPanama and Guantanamo,and it would be dif®cult to ® ndcountries prepared to ` rent’space forthe construction of refugee camps inthe absence of anyclear indication that thecamps wouldbe temporary.On the other hand, the fact that West European countriesinvited the Central and East European countries to sign the Geneva Conventionand later applied the safe thirdcountry status to themhas ledto the build-upof larger numbers of refugees and displaced persons in countries such asCroatia,Hungary and Slovenia. As far asmigration¯ owsare concerned,these countriesserve as anew cordonsanitaire (ifnot an external safe haven)for WesternEurope. Governmentscan provide ® nancialsupport to other governments for holding refugeeswho might otherwise attempt to cross bordersto seek asylum.Germany provides® nancialassistance toPoland in an effort to halt the ¯ owof would-be labourmigrants and asylum seekers intoGermany from East European countries, theBalkans and the Third World. Japan does not admit refugees but is generous ingranting assistance tocountries that accommodate them. In these instances, however,the external power does not provide security for camp residents. Afterthe landing of US troopsin Haiti and the restoration of the elected governmentof President Aristide, the Haitian camp dwellers were informed thatthey had to return home. Financial incentives were provided initially, and 37 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ subsequentlythe remaining adults were forcibly repatriated. (Children were not repatriatedbut could come to the USA). Inan effort to empty the Panama and Guantanamocamps, the US governmentreversed its earlier position and permit- tedCubans in the camps toseek admissionto the USA anddecided to count theiradmission against a newlyintroduced immigration quota allotted to Cuba. Onereason the external safe havenoption has beenregarded as politically attractiveis thatthe USA ®ndsit dif® cult to enforce the return of rejected asylumseekers andindividuals granted temporary asylum. Legal review pro- cesses are time-consumingand costly; rejected asylum seekers often® ndways toslip into the economy illegally with the help of US employers;individuals grantedtemporary asylum often ® ndlegal means toregularise their status; and itis politicallydif® cult and, from a humanitarianpoint of view,sometimes even morallyquestionable to engage in forced deportations. The external safe haven optionis, therefore, politically attractive, can provide protection in accordance withthe UN RefugeeConvention and represents a formof burden sharing under whichone country provides protection and assistance ina secondcountry to individualsfrom a thirdcountry. Thedown-side to external safe havensarises whenprotection is notprovided toall who seek it,or the screening of asylumseekers is notin accordance with theUN Convention,or individuals are forciblyrepatriated when there is arisk totheir safety, or the facilities provided are belowacceptable UNHCR standards. Unlessthese conditions are metÐand they rarely areÐ external safe havens merelyprotect the receiving country without protecting individuals in ¯ ight.

Autonomoussafe areas Attheclose of the Gulf war, the United Nations named as safe areas tworegions withinIraq, one in thesouth, occupied by IraqiShiites, the other near the border ofTurkey, occupied by Iraqi Kurds. These areas wereclosed to Iraqi troops, administrationand aeroplanes. Those who live within these territories could governthemselves, and their security was guaranteedpartly by theUSA andits alliesin accordance with UN SecurityCouncil resolutions and partly by their ownability to defend themselves as longas theIraqi government remained unableto use itsair force or deploy heavy weapons in the areas concerned. Intrusioninto the safe areas byIraqi armed forces orplanes was tobe met by alliedmilitary force. Operation Provide Comfort, as theallied programme is called,did not formally partition Iraq since neither the Kurds nor the Shiites weregranted independence, but these safe areas werein effect granted autonomy withoutsovereignty by theinternational community. Both areas could,though at averylow level, economically sustain themselves and have ready access to internationalfood aid and some economicassistance. In principle, the arrange- mentswere meant to betemporary.The protected status would be endedand the Iraqigovernment would be free toresume governanceof theseregions once Iraq adheredto the Security Council resolutions and no longerthreatened the security ofthe Kurds and Shiites. Thesesafe areas werecreated under special conditions, notably the military defeatof Iraq,the proximity of these areas tocountries through which trade and 38 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY assistance could¯ ow,and the demonstrated willingness and capacity of outside powersto use militaryforce to protectthem. However, two developments eroded theprotection of thesafe areas. TheTurkish military and nationalistic parties in Turkeyregarded the northern safe area as adangerousmodel for Kurdish autonomyin eastern Anatolia and were particularly concerned when Turkish Kurdsecessionists usedthe safe area as abase fortheir armed con¯ ict with Turkey.In early 1995 Turkish troops invaded the safe zonesin search ofKurdish guerrilla® ghtersfrom Turkey, with considerable loss ofcivilian life for both IraqiKurds and Kurdish refugees from Turkey. The Western allies were unwillingor unable to take action because Turkey is a NATO member and Westernforces keepingthe Iraqis at bay operate from military air bases in Turkey. Thestatus of the safe area innorthern Iraq was furthereroded in September 1996when Iraqi troops moved into the Kurdish regional capital at Erbil at the behestof Massoud Barzani, the leader of one of the two major Kurdish groups (theKurdish Democratic Party ( KDP)),whosought Iraqi support to counter his Iranian-supportedKurdish opponent (the Patriotic Union of Kurds( PUK)) led by JalalTalabani. The result was there-establishment of Iraqicontrol over the north inalliance with the KDP.TheUSA, whichhad earlier removed most of its militaryground forces, assisted inthe evacuation of Kurdish civilians who hadbeen employed by the US toprovide assistance tothe Kurds. The USA counteredthe Iraqi move not by militaryaction in thenorth but by extendingthe no-¯y zonein thesouth in orderto deter Iraq from threatening Kuwait. It is now uncleartherefore whether the northern region remains an autonomous safe area underexternal military protection.

Internal safe havens Conditionswere even more delicate when the United Nations declared that selectedregions of Bosniawould be designated` safe havens’to whichrefugees could¯ ee.As BarryPosen writes, safe havenswithin countries depend on militarypower to defend them (air support and sometimes ground forces), a capacityto airlift food and other supplies or suf® cientcontrol of land transport routesto allowdelivery on theground, transportation to movepopulations to the protectedzones, and, above all, a highlevel of credibility that force will be employedto protect them. Unless these conditions are met,an area cannotbe designateda safe havenwith any assurance thatthose who live within it will be safe (forthis reason, a safe havencan hardly be usedto provide security for local militiasengaged in combat). The Security Council designated six areas ofBosnia assafe havensand thereby induced Muslim refugees from other parts of Bosnia tomove to these regions, but the UN andits UNPROFOR forces wereneither capablenor willing to create the conditions that would have guaranteed protec- tion.The result was thatSerb forces occupiedtwo of the so-called safe areas withimpunity, and the Bosnian residents were either forced to ¯ ee orexecuted. InZepa and Srebrenica, according to US intelligencereports, 4000 to 6000 unarmedmale civilians became victims of mass executions,some ofthemin the 39 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ presenceof UN peacekeepingforces. In other safe havens,such as Sarajevo, thousandsof civilians were seriously wounded or killed by Serbian snipers and mortarattacks over the years. Hundreds of thousandshad to live without water, energyand sometimes even food. All this suddenly stopped when NATO, after severalyears ofdeliberation,decided to attack Serbian military installations with airstrikes. Thefailure of safe havensin Bosnia (and similar failures in Rwanda) should notbe regarded as evidencethat they cannot work. If experienceis, as Oscar Wildewrote, another word for failure, then there is muchto be learnedfrom the Bosniancase. Anarea cannotbe made safe merelyby international declaration or,for that matter, even by an agreement among the armed adversaries. An externalforce has tohave the capacity and demonstrated willingness to provide protectionand ensure the delivery of supplies. We should recall that West Berlin,surrounded by Sovietand GDR forces formore than 40 years,constituted asafe area forits residents and GDR refugeesonly because the USA andits NATO allieswere willing and prepared to providesupplies and use militaryforce inits defence if necessary.

`Safe’ countries andexit controlpolicies Inthelate 1980s and early 1990s the end of communismin eastern Europe, but alsothe growing tensions and armed con¯ icts in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbian-held Kosovoand Turkey, led to a massive increasein the number of asylum applications® ledin Germany. In 1992 over 400 000 persons sought asylum in Germany,78% of all asylum claims in Western Europe. The largest number of applicantswere from former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. For some ofthem, the intention was largelyto seek employment.Others, including Gypsies(Romania), Muslims (Bosnia, Bulgaria), Kurds (Turkey) and Albanians (Serbia/Kosovo)were ¯ eeingdiscrimination and repression; still others, from Bosnia,Croatia and Turkey, sought to escape internalwars. Inresponse to this new in¯ ux, the German Constitution was amendedto includethe safe thirdcountry principle, under which any asylum seeker entering Germanywill be returnedto the country through which he orshe passed ifthat countrycan provide protection or at least regular asylum procedures. Countries canbe classi® edas `safe’ ifthey are notknown to violate the civil rights of their citizensand are signatoriesto the Geneva Convention. Thus in Germany the success orfailure of anasylum application now depends as muchon a claimant’s travelroute as onthe reasons for® ling.Since many asylum seekers passed throughPoland, Germany signed a readmissionagreement with Poland but for the® rst twoyears limitedthe number of people who were returned and at the same timeprovided Poland with a subsidyof DM120 million. A similar agreementwas signedwith the Czech Republic, which received DM60 million. BarbaraDietz reports that the ® nancialaid was intendedto create facilities for transitrefugees, strengthen border security, equip the police and develop an adjudicationsystem forasylum claimants. Theeffect of the amendment to the German constitution, the readmission agreementsand other border control measures (includingcarrier sanctions) was 40 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY asubstantialdecline in the number of people entering the German asylum system.In 1995 the number dropped to 127000. Germany had, in effect, created a new cordonsanitaire arounditself. Another consequence has beenan increase inthenumber of irregularmigrants in Poland,the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.Some individuals who are restrictedfrom entering Germany have preferredto stay in these countries rather than to return home. Each of these countriesis thusattempting to improve readmission procedures with neighbour- ingcountries. Poland, for example, has concludedreadmission agreements with Bulgaria,the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine,and there are nowbilateral agreements between most countries of Centraland Eastern Europe. Othereffects are alsoevident. The adoption of thesafe thirdcountry principle byGermany, in combination with a series ofreadmission and bilateral cooper- ationagreements, has ledto arestrengtheningof bordercontrols in thecountries thatlie between Germany’ s easternborder and the successor states oftheSoviet Union.After the fall of communism most of these countries had temporarily liberalisedborder controls and travel restrictions. The safe thirdcountry prin- ciple,combined with the growing number of readmission agreements, has also ledto new forms ofchaindeportation. Some asylum seekers now® nallyend up inthe country from which they had ¯ edwithout ever entering a regularasylum procedure. As discussedearlier, in August 1994 the USA reversedits long-standing policyof automaticallywelcoming Cubans seeking refuge in theUSA. President Clintonannounced that the Coast Guard would take those who ¯ edto the US navalbase atGuantanamo Bay. Subsequently, the United States and Cuba signed amigrationagreement providing that the United States would admit up to22000 migrantsper year and in turn Cuba would ` takeeffective measures ineveryway itpossibly can to prevent unsafe departures using mainly persuasive methods’ . Cubanpolice then resumed patrolling roads leading to the beaches and arresting personscarrying rafts. Coast Guard interdictions of CubansÐwhich had reached 37000in the few months before the agreementÐ ended as Cubansstopped leaving. TheUS arrangementwith Cuba constitutes an effort to negotiate an exit controlagreement with a migration-and refugee-producing country. With less success, theUSA has alsosought to persuade the Mexican government that it shouldcontrol its borders so thatindividuals can leave only through mutually designatedborder crossings. Germany has negotiatedwith Poland and the Czech Republicbilateral cooperation in bordercontrol in orderto prevent illegal border crossingsby third country nationals, and its readmission agreements with Romaniaand Vietnam are intendedto speed up repatriation of Romanian and Vietnamesenationals. As partof these agreements some countrieshave been willingto make ® nancialpayments to the countries of origin or to transit countries.For example, as noted,Germany made one-time payments to its neighbours,intended, it should be emphasised, not to stop Czechs andPoles fromentering Germany but to prevent asylum seekers andother migrants from othercountries from crossing the borders. A similarpayment has beenmade to Romania.And in the case ofVietnam, Germany made it clear that future 41 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ developmentassistance woulddepend on that country’ s willingnessto readmit largenumbers of itsnationals, originally recruited as guestworkers by theGDR, whomGermany now wants to send back. Inits negotiations with the USA Cubaunsuccessfully pressed foran end to the UStradeembargo, but the Cuban government will surely raise theissue again. Mexicohas notbeen willing to designateand enforce points of exit to theUSA. However,it has tightenedits own immigration controls so as torestrict the entranceof CentralAmericans, many of whomwould subsequently travel to the USAforwork. Since 1990 Mexico has summarilyexpelled more than 100 000 personsa yearalong its southern border. The USA has providedfunds to the MexicanMigration Service for the purpose of sending back third country nationals.The USA alsoreimbursed the Mexican government for accepting and sendingback boatloads of Chinesenationals interdicted by theUSA. Whilethere is notyet a formaltreaty between Mexico and the USA concerningthe return ofthirdcountry nationals transiting through Mexico, the two countries have been cooperatingon asylumclaims by Cubansand other third country nationals. This informalarrangement between the USA andMexico and the formal arrangement betweenGermany and Poland demonstrate that governments can cooperate in regulatingthe ¯ owofasylumclaimants and transit migrants from third countries. (Itis obviouslypolitically dif® cult and undesirable for open and democratic societiesto impose exit restrictions on their own citizens.) Areexit control agreements a violationof the Helsinki Agreement, the UN Conventionon Human Rights or the UN Conventionon Refugees? During the ColdWar, the Western powers rightly regarded the exit control policies of the SovietUnion and other communist countries as violationsof basichuman rights andconsequently pressed forliberalisation of travel restrictions and emigration procedures.With the end of theCold War and the subsequent rise inthenumber ofasylum seekers, governmentshave sought ways to reduce the number of entrantswithout at the same timeviolating international norms with respect to refugees.The Dublin Convention, signed by Germany and other European states, soughtto achieve these objectives. It provided that asylum seekers couldseek asylumin only one of thesignatory countries or incountries that adhered to the UNConventionon Refugees. Exitagreements are neitherinherently good or bad but depend on the conditionsin the signatory states andthe safeguards the agreements incorporate. Forexample, the policy that individuals should only apply for asylum through embassies andconsulates does not credibly safeguard individuals in either repressiveauthoritarian countries or failing states. Similarly, penalties against carriers fortransporting individuals without passports and visas mayexclude genuineasylum seekers. Theinsistence on the use ofdesignated ports and airportsof exitdoes not violate the Helsinki Agreement on the right of exit,but suchrestrictions do constitute violations if authoritarian regimes prevent their citizensfrom leaving. Likewise, the designation of a countryas `safe’ provides noassurance thatindividuals in that country are notin need of protection from persecutionby the government or organised groups or that it has anadequate asylumreview procedure, even though in principle the conception requires such guarantees.(Indeed, several of the countries declared ` safe’ donot meet these 42 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY conditions.)And, as noted,it is alsopossible for asylum seekers whoare sent backto a `safe’ thirdcountry through ` chaindeportation’ to end up in the countryfrom which they have tried to escape. Thefact that most West European countries, including Germany, are sur- roundedby ` safe’ countriesreduces an individual’ s chancesof successfully claimingpolitical asylum in a countrylike Germany. As mentionedabove, in combinationwith stricter controls at ports, airports and borders, this has ledto asigni®cant reduction in the number of new asylum seekers inGermany (from 436000 in 1992to 127 000 in 1994).Most other West European countries report similartrends. But the large number of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia,Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, Georgia, Russia andTurkey suggeststhat Western Europe has solvedits ` asylumcrisis’ ofthe early 1990s atthe expense of individuals in con¯ ict-ridden areas. Thusthere remains the dif®cult conceptual task of providing protection for individuals who need it but alsoprotecting states againstlarge and uncontrolled in¯ uxes of individuals who use asylumprocedures when they seek tomigrate for reasons ofeducation, employmentor family reunion. Invariably, a balancewill have to be sought, with,perhaps, more attention to less conventionalprocedures for identifying and assistingindividuals at risk. This would include the presence of international monitorswithin countries where there are reportsof human rights violations and thenomination of individualsfor refugee status by internationalnongovernmen- talhuman rights organisations, a procedurealready adopted by the government ofAustralia. It would include designated exit points agreed upon with demo- craticbut not with authoritarian regimes, and legal assistance programmesto enabledemocratic governments to establish improved asylum adjudication proceduresand no repatriation to countries that lack such procedures. And it wouldrequire international monitoring arrangements that offer assurances that rejectedasylum claimants will not be penalised when they are returnedto the countriesfrom which they have ¯ ed.

Political strategies toreduce refugee¯ ows Theworldwide increase in the number of refugees, people with temporary protectedstatus and internally displaced persons has beena burdenprimarily for theThird World, the Caucasus regionand the successor states offormer Yugoslavia.But the ¯ owsare alsoa matterof concern to advanced industrial countries.One reason, as notedearlier, is humanitarian,particularly a concern forcivilians caught in the cross® re ofopposing militias and for refugees in camps thatlack adequate supplies of food, water, shelter and medical facilities. Theurge to do something, especially when these conditions are nightlytele- visionfare, is particularlystrong in Western democratic societies. Humanitarian concerns,rather than national security interests, led the international community totake steps (inadequatethough they proved to be) to provide humanitarian assistance inSomalia and Rwanda. Otherreasons are morepragmatic. Violence within and between the successor states ofthe Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has generateda refugee¯ owinto WesternEurope and aroused broader security concerns. Germany, the USA and 43 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ othermembers ofthe European Union and NATO havesought to ® nda wayto endthe con¯ icts in former Yugoslavia and to monitor closely events in Russia andthe other successor states ofthe Soviet Union. In addition, geographic distancesare less ofa barrierto refugee ¯ ows,with the result that refugees in theThird World are nowable to seek asylumin the USA, Germanyand other Westerncountries. Tamils ¯ eeingfrom civil war in Sri Lanka, Algerians fearful ofIslamic terrorists, Turkish Kurds in con¯ ict with their government, Afghans ¯eeinga civilwar and Nigerian, Iranian and Iraqi opponents of their govern- mentshave sought refuge in the West. In 1994 nearly 150 000 asylum applica- tionswere ® ledin theUSA, thelargest number from Central America and China. In1983 Europe had about 70 000applicants for asylum; in 1992 there were 685000 applicants, with the largest number by far applyingto Germany.In 1994 thetotal number fell to 323000. By 1992European governments were spending anestimated $7.5 billion (compared with $2.4 billion in 1985) on handling asylumclaims and providing social assistance. Since then, as aresultof tighter controlsat pointsof entryand very low recognition rates, the number of people askingfor political asylum in Western Europe, as wellas thenumber of undecidedcases, has becomemuch smaller. At the same timethe number of refugeesand internally displaced persons has growndramatically in Bosnia, Serbia,Russia andother successor states ofthe USSR. Ananalysis of the determinants of refugee ¯ owsby Myron Weiner reveals thatinternal con¯ icts rather than wars betweenstates are theprincipal generators ofpopulation ¯ ight. 11 Thesecon¯ icts include wars ofsecession byterritorially basedethnic groups or wars ofcentral or local governments against such groups(Chechens, Kurds, Eritreans, Southern Sudanese, Sri Lankan Tamils, Serbs,Croats, Bosnian Muslims), attacks against territorially dispersed ethnic groups(Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda, Burundi), non-ethnic civil wars (Tajikistan, Mozambique,Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Liberia, Algeria) and political persecutionby authoritarian regimes (Iran, Iraq, China). The most striking ®nding,however, is thatthe number of refugees has beenincreasing more rapidlythan the number of countries producing refugees, from an average of 287000 refugees per con¯ ict in 1969 to 459 000 in 1992. If thenumber of internallydisplaced persons is addedto the total, then the average number of refugeesand displaced persons per con¯ ict increased from 400 000 in 1969 to857 000 in 1992. It should also be noted that in the 1980s the number of con¯icts increased (after declining in the 1970s) and the number of refugees percon¯ ict was alsorising before the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of theCold War. Thegrowth in the number of refugees per con¯ ict is theresult of several factors: naturalpopulation increases, so that, at least in the Third World, more individualsare vulnerableor at risk of becoming involved in political or ethnic con¯icts; improvementsin transportation, making it easier forpeople to ¯ ee; greaternational and global communication, which makes individualsmore aware ofthe risks ofremaining and the opportunities for leaving. Perhaps the most importantfactor in the rising refugee ¯ owis theincreasing level of violence towardscivilian noncombatants that is associatedwith internal con¯ icts. The largenumber of weaponsand troops in Yugoslaviaand the USSR at the time of 44 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY theirdissolution and the ¯ owof arms intothe Third World has madeit easier forsecessionist movements and ethnic minorities to turn violent and for governmentsin turn to respond with destructive force. The increased use of antipersonnelminesÐ an estimated 200 million worldwideÐ has hada particu- larlydevastating impact on civilians and generated massive ¯ightsfrom rural areas.12 Thelevel of development is areasonablygood predictor of refugee ¯ ows. Seventeenof the 30 countries that produced large numbers of refugees during thepast few decades ranked in the bottom ® fthof theworld’ s poorestcountries andmany others were in the second quintile. It is as likely,however, that the highlevels of violent political con¯ ict within these societies are factorsin their persistentpoverty. In the 1950s and 1960s a numberof countries with low per capitaincomes and high levels of violence (through internal con¯ icts or wars) experiencedrapid economic growth after their regimes became stable, though notnecessarily democratic, notably South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia. There are alsoa numberof countrieswith originally relatively high per capita incomes (byThird World standards) that have generated signi® cant numbers of refugees, includingBosnia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Iraq, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbai- janand Turkey. TheUSA, theUnited Nations and NATO andother regional organisations have yetto establish effective policies that can reduce the level of violence towards civiliannoncombatants in internal con¯ icts. Among the possible policy instru- mentsare theexchange of military weapons for debt reduction; arms buyback arrangementsas aconditionfor development assistance; aninternational agree- mentto ban the production, sale anduse ofantipersonnel mines, and a greater investmentof international resources toimprovemethods of mine detection and removal;an agreement among major arms-producing countries not to sell small arms todeveloping countries where levels of con¯ ict are high;the rapid and comprehensiveuse ofair power against any side in a con¯ict that employs artilleryor missiles againstnoncombatants; the establishment of militarily protectedsafe areas withincountries at war; thetransfer by international agenciesof threatened populations to safer regionswithin a country;the use of sanctionsand blockades to prevent arms andmunitions from entering countries withhigh levels of violence;and the use ofUNpeacekeepersor NATO forces to removeartillery and small arms fromcombatants. While clearly these measures cannotend the violence and refugee ¯ owsassociated with internal wars and ethniccon¯ icts (machetes can also be destructive),they may reduce the number ofcasualties and refugees and facilitate the return of refugees at a laterstage. Whatis missingin therecent discussions of howto end the violence in areas likeBosnia, the Caucasus, Afghanistan or Central Africa are strategiesfor dealingwith internal con¯ icts comparable to the strategies for managing con¯icts between the superpowers during the Cold War. In dealing with internationalcon¯ icts, German, US, andother Western analysts and politicians stilldraw on balance-of-powerthinking and notions of deterrencethat have less relevancefor dealing with internal wars. The traditional realpolitik view that governmentsneed only concern themselves with the foreign policies of other countries,not with how they treat their citizens, seems inadequatewhen 45 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ internalwars producelarge numbers of victims and refugee ¯ owsand even threatento engulf neighbours. Howthen can Western policy makers provideincentives (or sanctions) to encouragegovernments to strengthen their democratic and legal institutions and respecthuman rights, including the rights of minorities? How should they respondto the demands of ethnic groups for secession fromauthoritarian or democraticregimes? What position, if any, should policy makers taketowards Islamicmovements that seek tooverthrow governments with which Western countrieshave friendly relations? In more country-speci® c terms,what can or shouldGermany and the USA doto end the violent con¯ ict between the Kurds andthe government of Turkey, a con¯ict that generates a refugee¯ owinto Germanyand violent con¯ icts between Kurds and Turks living in Germany? What,if anything, can the countries of Western Europe do to reduce the prospectsof con¯ ict between the governments of the Baltic states andtheir non-citizenRussian minorities? How might France deal with the Islamic move- mentin Algeria, with its threat of refugee ¯ owsand terrorism within France? Shouldthe USA, Germany,other European powers and the United Nations remainneutral in these internal disputes so as tobe effective mediators, or are thereconditions under which outside powers should throw their support behind oneside in an effort to end a con¯ict? Theprospects of inclusion in the European Union and NATO orof free trade agreementswith the EU are incentivesto the countries of Central and Eastern Europeand the former Soviet Union to meet a speci®c set ofeconomic and politicalconditions, including the liberalisation of their economies, respect for individualrights and fair treatment for minorities. Most of thegovernments (and citizens)of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states andother successor states totheformer Soviet Union are eagerto have the bene® ts oftrade,foreign investment,economic assistance, cultural and political ties and security that they believecan result from being a partof an enlarged European political and economicentity. That leverage has alreadybeen used by theEU, theCouncil of Europe,and by the OSCE initsÐ so farÐvery limited success inalleviating tensionsbetween the governments of Estoniaand Latvia and the ethnic Russians livingon the territory of these states andbeing denied citizenship and political rights.The Western Contact Group in former Yugoslavia has alsorestrained Croatiawith the threat that inclusion within the EU is conditionalon Croatia’ s goodbehaviour, a threatthat also had limited impact. Whether the prospect of joining NATO canbe used as anadditional incentive to promote better domestic behaviourÐaposition put forth by several German and US analystsÐis more contentious,because NATO enlargementraises questionsabout a newsecurity divisionwithin Europe. At thesame time,the example of Turkeymakes itclear that NATO membershipdoes not automatically improve democracy and respect forhuman and minority rights. Theinternational community has nocomparable bene® ts toinduce good behaviourfor the governments of non-European states. Moreover, neither the USA,Germany,nor their European allies regard internal warfare outside Europe withthe same collectiveconcern, though it should be noted that each Western countrywatches (if only for domestic reasons) theinternal con¯ icts in at least 46 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY oneother country or region in the third world: Germany monitors Turkey; France,Algeria; and the USA, Mexicoand the Caribbean islands. The sources ofcon¯ icts outside Europe are so individualisedÐdisputes among contending warlords;secessionist movements; ethnic violence; uprisings by indigenous peoples;predatory authoritarian elites; and suppression of opposition parties, ethnicminorities and political dissidentsÐ and the instruments that external powerscan use toinduce individuals and groups to behave are solimited that itwould be unrealistic to seek ageneralstrategy for resolving them. Clearly, thereis nosubstitutefor addressing each con¯ ict individually. In some instances, arms canbe withheldfrom contending forces toreducethe level of violence, but inother instances, outside powers might end the con¯ ict more rapidly by supportingone side of the con¯ ict, as has beenthe case informer Yugoslavia, wherethe USA andother Western governments have backed Croatia and the BosnianMuslims. The threat of international punishment for war crimes might detersome participants,but in other instances predatory elites might be paid to gointo exile (eg as occurredin Haiti). Withholding recognition of a new governmentmight induce some rulersto respect human rights but have no effect onothers. Humanitarian assistance canprotect noncombatants but under some circumstancesmay prolong the con¯ ict by inducing one side or the other to continueto ® ghtknowing that its population will be fed. The international communitymay oppose ethnic cleansing, but there are timeswhen international mediatorsmight press forthe partition of a countryand an exchange of populationsin an effort to save thelives of peoplewho would otherwise remain withoutcredibly enforced protection. Freedom of the media is desirable,but thereare momentswhen the United Nations or other intervening organisations mightattempt to close down local radio and television stations that incite ethnic violence.Making appropriate policy choices requires not only a detailedunder- standingof thespeci® c forces atwork in a particularcase butthe willingness of externalactors to rethink many of their basic assumptions.

Military intervention: its uses andlimits Militaryintervention has beenemployed to change the regimes and conditions withinstates generatingrefugee ¯ ows.The USA sentits armed forces intoHaiti toreplace the military government; Tanzania invaded Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin;Vietnam attacked and brought down the brutal Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia;India invaded East Pakistan in support of the movement for an independentBangladesh; and the USA andits allies repulsed Iraqi forces from Kuwaitand then established militarily protected safe areas forthe Kurds and Shiiteswithin Iraq. Collectiveinternational action is noteffective when none of theoutside parties regardsmilitary intervention as essentialto itsown national interests. Under this circumstance,the local adversary, as BarryPosen notes, usually has moreat stake,superior endurance and greater willingness to accept more costs and damagethan do the interveners. 13 Thusthe USA withdrewfrom Somalia (and earlierfrom Lebanon) after the death of some ofits military personnel, and in 47 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ

Bosniaand Croatia between 1992 and 1995 UN militaryforces largelylimited theirrole to protecting the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and pulled back fromplaying a coerciveor protectiverole when their forces werethreatened by BosnianSerbs andvirtually overrun by Serbian militia in the ` safe zones’of Zepaand Srebrenica and by the Croatian army in the Kraijna and Western Slavonia. Duringthe Cold War, deterrence (or dissuasion) proved to be amoreeffective instrumentfor maintaining peace than compellence (or coercion) once a con¯ict was underway. Western governments and international institutions have a poor record,however, of anticipatingor preventing internal wars andmass population ¯ights.They are usuallynot ready to act until the level of violence is already highand atrocities or humanitarian disasters are coveredby in¯ uential mass media.Coercion to compel a settlementis ordinarilydif® cult, even more so whenregional and international armed forces are poorlycoordinated and individualstates maketheir own assessment ofwhat level and type of forces theyare preparedto provide and how high a riskthey should take. In many cases, theamount of ground forces neededto halt genocide or force the separationof opposing armies isgreaterthan a singlecountry or theinternational communityis preparedto provide. If theintervention is restrictedto air strikes, itis notalways clear which targets would compel a determinedarmed group to haltits attacks. Beforethe wars inSomalia and Bosnia it appeared as ifinternational force couldbe effective in the delivery of humanitarian supplies to noncombatants evenin the midst of amilitarycon¯ ict, but when one side views all young male civiliansas actualor potentialcombatants or considerscivilians of theother side as hostagesand hence regards their protection as apartisanact, then even humanitarianmissions become dif® cult. Nor is itpossible for international forces toseparate soldiers unless the contending armed groups have negotiated a cease® re andagreed on lines of control. The recent experiences of the United Nationsand Western military forces inBosnia, Somalia and Rwanda have providedpainful lessons aboutthe limits of international armed intervention undertight constraints. Thelimits, it should be noted, are as muchpolitical as theyare military. NeitherGermany nor the USA is politicallyprepared to commit military forces unlessit believes its own national interests to be at stake. The use ofGerman militaryforce within the Balkans and elsewhere is unpopularin Germany because,according to opinion polls, a majorityof Germans do not want to see theirarmy, navy or air force ® ghtingin a foreigncountry. The US publicis reluctantto put its military forces inharm’ s way,with the result that threats from localforces andterrorist groups have successfully deterred the USA fromusing itsmilitary power in internal wars. The international community is particularly ambivalentand indecisive when a civilwar erupts as aresultof a secessionist movementthat threatens to break up an existing state. And the slaughter of one peopleby another in a fratricidalethnic con¯ ict may make ineffective the kind oflimited short-term intervention that governments and their military forces prefer,particularly when the international community is unwillingto support one sideor another in the con¯ ict. 48 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Governmentsare, however, prepared to use militaryforce to protect their own borders,not only against armed interventions but now against irregular migrants as well.Austria, for example, though unwilling to use groundforces abroad, employsthem at its own borders. Similarly, the US Congresshas appropriated dramaticallyincreased funds for patrolling the US± Mexican border and for the interdictionof rafts andships at sea carryingasylum claimants. After the fall of manyauthoritarian regimes that prevented their citizens emigrating or travelling abroad,border control has takenon a newpost-Cold War dimension.

Conclusion Ourprincipal argumentÐ perhaps to state the obviousÐ is thatinternational migrationand refugee movements are foreignpolicy, not simply domestic, issues. Nevertheless,citizens and policy makers are alltoo often unaware that if theywant to secure theirborders against unwanted population ¯ ows,this cannot bedone simply by unilateral decisions to regulate entry. Land and sea borders cannotbe totally sealed, labour markets draw in people from neighbouring countrieswith lower wages, individuals often have justi® ed legal claims to familyreuni® cation, and most Western and Third World governments recognise thatrefugees with a wellfounded fear ofpersecutionshould be givenprotection. Thereis alsoa widespreadhumanitarian concern with the high level of violent con¯ict that exists in many countries, the brutal clashes ofethnicgroups, and the violationsof human and minority rights by governments. Somepolicies aimed at improving conditions within sending countries so as toreduce refugee and migration ¯ owsare moreef® caciousthan others. Their effects varyover time, some havehigher costs thanothers, and some remain experimental.Policies that contribute to an improvement in employment and wagesin other countries have the long-term effect of decreasingemigration, but theshort-term effect of such policy might well be to increase the ¯ owof migration.Trade, investment and development assistance toexpand employ- ment,increase wages and promote economic growth are partof the armory of instruments,but thus far theyhave proven to be more useful in persuading governmentsin countriesof originto adoptparticular development policies than inconvincing them to provide their citizens with greater political rights. Nevertheless,the US andGerman governments and members ofthe European Unionare notwithout policy instruments for trying to induce Turkey to respect theminority rights of Kurds,the Baltic states torespecttheir Russian minorities andRussia torespect its minorities, including ethnic Germans. The desire of countriesto becomemembers oftheEuropean Union and NATO enablesWestern Europeanstates todemand respect for human and minority rights. Thenegotiation of exit controls with sending countries, subject to the limitationthat they do notimpede the exit of thosewho have a wellfounded fear ofpersecution, is ausefulpolicy, but such agreements are likelyto require ®nancialcontributions and other assistance tothe population-sending countries. Thereare opportunitiesfor cooperative agreements between countries of origin anddestination, consistent with human rights considerations, to inducecountries oforigin to promote orderly departure procedures. Buffers, in the form of safe 49 MYRON WEINER &RAINER MU È NZ thirdcountries, and militarily protected safe areas withincountries can protect individualsat risk, while deterring those who are not,but one must be cognisant ofthe variety of limitations, costs andpotential failures associated with these arrangements.Return schemes are alsoa usefulpolicy tool, though they work bestfor the repatriation of refugees at the end of a con¯ict and are less useful inproviding the integration of returning labour migrants. Policies aimed at loweringthe level of violence against civilians in countries engaged in a civil waror in political repression against opponents are worthgreater attention than theyhave thus far received,particularly if advanced industrial countries are preparedto use theireconomic leverage and military power to impose restric- tionson combatants and themselves refrain from the sale ofminesand weapons. Thesepolicy options offer no magic panaceas. Each case requiresa careful analysisof what is appropriate.There are alwayscosts andrisks as wellas possiblebene® cial outcomes, and what may work in one case maynot in another.Once adopted, policies must be monitored, and in some instances,the timehorizons are long.Policy makers inthe USA andGermany should pay closerattention than they have in thepast to linking migration and refugee issues tothe full range of foreign policy tools in order to in¯ uence conditions within countriesthat force people to leave.

Notes Thisessay draws fromthe conclusion to our jointly edited book, Migrants,Refugees and Foreign Policy: US andGerman Policies Towards Countries of Origin (Providence,RI: Berghahn Books, forthcoming 1997), preparedfor the project on German andAmerican Refugee andImmigration Policies of the American Academy ofArts andSciences, fundedby the German American Academic Council.A draftof thisessay was reviewed bythe project’ s studygroup on policies towards countries of origin, which included Heinz Jurgen Axt,Christopher Mitchell, Volker Ronge, Barbara Dietz, Elmar Honekopp,Philip Martin, Rosemarie Rogers andFrank D Bean.We are alsograteful to the members ofthe steering committee ofthe project for their suggestions,Klaus JBade,Kay Hailbronner,David A Martinand Peter HSchuck.

1 Sincethe end of the cold war there has beena veritableexplosion in the literature onthe causes and consequencesof internal con¯ icts, muchof it focusing on ethnic con¯ icts. Amongthe particularly useful recent worksare MichaelE Brown(ed), EthnicCon¯ ict andInternational Security ,Princeton,NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993;Milton J Esman &ShibleyTelhami (eds), InternationalOrganizations and Ethnic Con¯ ict,Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1995;Ted Robert Gurr, Minoritiesat Risk: AGlobalView ofEthnopolitical Con¯ icts ,Washington,DC: US Instituteof Peace Press, 1993;Ted Robert Gurr & Barbara Harff, EthnicCon¯ ict inWorld Politics ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1994;Charles William Maynes, `Containingethnic con¯ ict’ , ForeignPolicy ,90,1993, pp 3± 21; Stephen Van Evera,` Hypotheseson nationalismand war’ , InternationalSecurity ,18(4),1994, pp 5± 39. 2 USCommittee forRefugees, WorldRefugee Survey 1996 ,Washington,DC 1996.For other data on worldwiderefugee ¯owssee TheUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ( UNHCR), The State of theWorld’ s Refugees:The Challenge of Protection ,London:Penguin Books UNHCR, 1993; UNHCR, The State ofthe World’ s Refugees:In Search of Solutions ,New York:Oxford University Press, 1995;and the annual WorldRefugee Surveysof the US Committee forRefugees. 3 In1990 the United States had21 million foreign-born residents, (8.5% of total population), plus another three millionor more illegalmigrants. In 1995 seven million foreigners (8.6% of totalpopulation) and more thanthree millionethnic German immigrants( Aussiedler),anadditional 3.9% of total population, were livingin Germany. 4 Foran examination of the normative issues, see Laura WReed &Carl Kaysen, EmergingNorms ofJusti®ed Intervention ,Cambridge,MA: American Academy ofArts andSciences, 1993. 50 MIGRANTS, REFUGEES AND FOREIGN POLICY

5 See IWilliam Zartman (ed), CollapsedStates: The Disintegration and Restoration of LegitimateAuthority , Boulder,CO: LynneRienner, 1995; and Gerald BHelman &StevenR Ratner,` Savingfailed states’ , ForeignPolicy ,89,1992± 93, pp 3± 20. 6 Foran analysis of the ways inwhich US foreignpolicy generated refugee ¯ows,often inadvertantly, see MichaelS Teitelbaum& MyronWeiner (eds), ThreatenedPeoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration andUS ForeignPolicy ,New York:W WNorton,1995, pp 13± 38. 7 Forthis section on trade, aid and investment we havedrawn heavily from Philip Martin, ` Economic instrumentsto affect countriesof origin’, inRainer MuÈnz&MyronWeiner (eds), Migrants,Refugees and ForeignPolicy . 8 Forthe use ofeconomic policies as sanctionssee KimberlyElliot & Gary Hufbauer,` New approachesto economicsanctions,’ in ArnoldKanter &LintonBrooks (eds), USInterventionPolicy for the Post-Cold War World:New Challengesand New Responses ,New York:American Assembly,1994, pp 132±158; and Lori FislerDamrosch, `Thecivilian impact ofeconomic sanctions’ , inDamrosch (ed), EnforcingRestraint: Collective Interventionin Internal Con¯ icts ,New York:Council on Foreign Relations, 1993, pp 274± 315. 9 Martin,` Economicinstruments to affect countriesof origin’ . 10 Rosemarie Rogers,` Migrationreturn policies and countries of origin’in Kay Hailbronner,David A Martin, andHiroshi Motomura (eds), ImmigrationAdmissions: The Search for Workable Policies in Germany and theUnited States (Providence,RI: Berghahn Books, forthcoming 1997). 11 MyronWeiner, ` Badneighbors, bad neighborhoods: an inquiry in the causes ofrefugee ¯ows’, International Security,July1996, pp 1± 39. 12 Jeffrey Boutwell,Michael T Klare &Laura WReed (eds), LethalCommerce: TheGlobal Trade in Small Arms andLight Weapons ,Cambridge,MA: American Academy ofArts andSciences, 1995. 13 BarryPosen, ` Militaryresponses to refugee disasters’ , InternationalSecurity ,July1996, pp 72± 111. See alsoRichard Betts, ` Thedelusion of impartial intervention’, ForeignAffairs ,73(6),1994, pp 20± 33.

Peace Review EDITOR Robert Elias, Peace and Justice Studies, University of San Francisco, USA Peace Review is a quarterly, multidisciplinary, transnational journal of research and analysis, focusing on the current issues and controversies that underlie the promotion of a more peaceful world. Social progress requires, among other things, sustained intellectual work, which should be pragmatic as well as analytical. The results of that work should be ingrained into everyday culture and political discourse. We define peace research very broadly to include peace, human rights, development, ecology, culture and related issues. The task of the journal is to present the results of this research and thinking in short, accessible and substantive essays. Volume 9, 1997, 4 issues. ISSN 1040-2659.

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