EMR0010.1177/1754073920930781Emotion Review Vol. X No. XReddy 930781research-article2020

SPECIAL SECTION: THE HISTORY OF

Emotion Review Vol. 12 No. 3 (July 2020) 168­–178 © The Author(s) 2020 ISSN 1754-0739 DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073920930781 10.1177/1754073920930781 The Unavoidable Intentionality of : The https://journals.sagepub.com/home/emr History of Emotions and the Neurosciences of the Present Day

William M. Reddy Department of History, Duke University, USA

Abstract

The “problem of emotions,” that is, that many of them are both meaningful and corporeal, has yet to be resolved. Western thinkers, from Augustine to Descartes to Zajonc, have handled this problem by employing various forms of mind–body dualism. Some psychologists and neuroscientists since the 1970s have avoided it by talking about cognitive and emotional “processing,” using a terminology borrowed from computer science that nullifies the meaningful or intentional character of both thought and . Outside the Western-influenced contexts, emotion and thought are not seen as distinct kinds of things. Here a solution of sorts is proposed by thinking of as a dynamic activity that declares and stirs emotions at the same time. As such, its dynamism may help historians to understand the dramatic changes and trends they investigate.

Keywords , basic emotions, constructionism, imaging, intentionality, reductionism

What place does the history of emotions hold in today’s interdisci- and also why, only now, its rejection is beginning to seem immi- plinary geography? Some historians treat it as an aspect of cultural nent. On closer examination, it appears that this theory draws history. However, some of the principal introductory texts to this some of its strength from a centuries-old theme of Western intel- new field insist historians must go beyond the relativism common lectual history, a common-sense belief that dates all the way back among cultural historians. They must also provide a critical history to the ancient Greeks. This is the belief that there are natural things of the psychological theories of emotions (Boddice, 2018, p. 34; called affects (Konstan, 2006, 2020). However venerable this Gross, 2006; Plamper, 2015). The need for such a critical reading belief, one cannot ignore two troubling facts that raise about is all the more apparent when one takes a close look at the presup- the very existence of a category of “natural” emotions. positions of the theory of emotions that have had the greatest cur- First, thanks to research on “emotions” realized in the field rency among neuroscientists in recent years. of European history, it is now quite well known that every sig- “Basic emotions theory,” as it is called, is itself a very signifi- nificant cultural transition in the European past has been accom- cant historical phenomenon. Its prominence, although not unchal- panied by fundamental transformations in the domain of, as it lenged, has endured for almost 40 years in the disciplines of has been variously called, “,” “sentiment,” “affect,” cognitive psychology and the neurosciences. This longevity is “,” and so on. Thus, the experienced by medieval itself something of a in a research domain where novel monks gave way to the melancholy of early modern humanists, methods and theories abound, and 5-year-old research reports are which in turn was supplanted by by the 19th century often considered obsolete. This theory states that there are roughly (Frevert, 2011). Second, from the 1980s on, anthropologists six basic emotions that are natural phenomena, and thus ahistori- began to question whether there was an equivalent to “emo- cal. All other emotions are blends of these six. From which it fol- tions” among non-Western societies. Their research showed, lows that the history of emotions, strictly speaking, has no content. more often than not, that, outside the West, people do not oppose Happily for the historian of emotions, it is not difficult to point something called “emotions” to something called “reason” or out the weaknesses of the theory; these weaknesses are in fact so “thought,” as if these represented separate parts or “faculties” of obvious that one must ask why this theory has had such a long life, the self (Besnier, 1990; McElhinny, 2010; Reddy, 2001).

Author note: This is a translation of an article that appeared originally in French in Sensibilités: Histoire, critique, et sciences sociales, No. 5 (2018), pp. 83–97. The author has made minor changes of format, eliminated footnotes, added some references.

Corresponding author: William M. Reddy, Department of History, Duke University, Box 90719, Durham, NC 27708, USA. Email: [email protected] Reddy The Unavoidable Intentionality of Affect 169

In of these well-documented discoveries in other disci- experimental methods. These researchers admire the primacy plines, basic emotions theory continues to have a tenacious hold that basic emotions theory attributes to measurable data. By on the thinking of a large number of psychologists and neurosci- basic emotions theory, the only emotions that exist are those entists. Their fidelity to this theory is all the more surprising that can be observed through facial expressions. Clinical psy- given that the theory rests on not very solid grounds, even by the chologists have found the theory to be fatally flawed for its standards of their disciplines. Since 1990 it has been the target of inability to handle “” such as , benev- trenchant critiques, and several studies have all but discredited it. olence, , , or . Most disorders that clinicians The tenacity of basic emotions theory raises several crucial deal with unfold in social contexts, after all (Tangney & questions. First, has the reductionism of this theory impeded Fischer, 1995). progress in neuroscience research? This is a question for its practitioners, and also for the growing number of historians who are taking a close look at the history of experimental psychol- The Challenge of Anthropology ogy (Biess & Gross, 2014; Dror, 2016; Dror, Hitzer, Laukötter, In anthropology, a certain number of researchers have been & León-Sanz, 2016). Second, if human beings are not biologi- working since the 1980s on the cultural shaping of emotions—or cal organisms equipped with biochemical computers, and if we as one puts it sometimes, the cultural construction of emotions. set aside all traditional dualist responses of the mind–body type Their approach, as with clinicians’, is diametrically opposed to (which are, it seems, categories that only Westerners have found the postulates and methods of Ekman’s theory. Their ethno- it worthwhile to rely on in analyzing human nature), then what graphic work has been inspired by psychoanalytic theory, as well kind of beings are we? If, in effect, neither reductionist methods as by the thought of Clifford Geertz or Michel Foucault. Some nor interpretive methods permit us to maintain a separation anthropologists who rely on clinical psychology do admit the between thought and emotions (as we will see in what follows), existence of basic emotions, but they all agree that one can find how and by what method are we to proceed? a panoply of emotions that are specific to each cultural context. Among these cultural emotions are local equivalents of the social emotions of Western clinicians (Levy, 1973; Lutz & Abu- Grandeurs and Miseries of Basic Emotions Lughod, 1990; Rosaldo, 1980). There are regulatory emotions Theory, 1970–2018 and emotions that are morally admirable (Reddy, 2008). On the The Theory and Its Critics atoll of Ifaluk, for example, in the early 1980s, Catherine Lutz found that the emotion called fago was a kind of sad moti- Basic emotions theory was elaborated in the years from 1971 to vating care of another—similar to tenderness or maternal love 1983 by Paul Ekman, Wallace V. Friesen, Carroll E. Izard, and in English usage. Although sad, fago was praised as morally Robert W. Levenson, and was subsequently defended with energy good (Lutz, 1988). by Ekman and others. The theory in its original form privileges the On Bali in the 1980s, anthropologist Unni Wikan discovered status of a very limited list of emotions, presumed to be genetically that an emotion crucial for physical health was called mue cedang, programmed: surprise, , , , , and the “bright face.” The face, for the Balinese, was not a mask for (Ekman, 1973, 1980; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Ekman & Friesen, displaying or hiding the interior self, it was above all one of the 1971; Ortony & Turner, 1990). These emotions are neither learned “faculties” of the self (to borrow a Western expression). Mue nor voluntary, but hard-wired, that is, realized by the activation of cedang was a sort of thought-emotion anchored in the face which certain structural elements in the brain. According to this theory, could, from there, spread to other parts of the self. This thought- these emotions exist independently of all cultural configurations or emotion was viewed as an essential instrument for maintaining discursive grids, and express themselves by distinct configurations internal peace. Internal peace was precious to the Balinese, of the muscles of the face, and often by certain states of activation because its absence rendered an individual vulnerable to black of the autonomic nervous system (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, magic worked by persons who secretly hated them. According to 1983). Thus, they can be found in all human populations, expressed opinions expressed to Wikan, more than half of deaths on Bali always in the same fashion, no matter what the historical context. were the result of black magic (Wikan, 1989, 1990). According to this theory, finally, all other emotions are only Sanskrit, like Balinese, does not admit of a distinction mixtures of these six. Those we talk of habitually are only mix- between thought and emotion, instead dividing what we would tures of these six emotions. Of course, one can find different sets call emotions into two contrasting fields. There are, first of all, of “” at work in different cultures, which rules pre- bhavas, transitory states of daily life. Some of them are close to scribe when to display or to hide certain emotions or emotional those common in European-origin languages, such as joy or mixtures. But only these rules of expression can vary across time despair. Other bhavas are not emotions at all, such as cruelty, and space; emotions are governed by neurophysiology and trembling, or sweat. Contrasting with bhavas are the rasas. change only through evolution. Ekman has presented himself as These sublime extracts or perfumes derived from bhavas are the the heir of Darwin, although some have raised about his kind of that gods and heroes have and that devotees and reading of Darwin’s path-breaking work published in 1872, The esthetes (rasikas) strive to feel. Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (Gross, 2010). Among the devout, one tastes rasa as the result of an effort Ekman and associates’ theory has attracted most support of prayer and meditation, or by participating in rituals of the from cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists who rely on great temple festivals. Cultivated women and men once tasted 170 Emotion Review Vol. 12 No. 3

rasa through appreciation of works of art, poetry, or theater. kiffe mon mari” which could be roughly translated “I relish my Thus, the everyday love- called rati, belonging to the domain husband.” How can such a domain be grasped with a theory that of bhava, corresponds with the divine love-lust that unites the only admits of six elements—excluding love, pride, , god Krishna with the human woman Rhada, or that unites Shiva shame, bitterness, relief, gentleness, laughter, or what in French is with his consort Parvati. This divine love-lust is called shrin- called ricanerie (vile ironic laughter), etc.? (On the surprising his- gara rasa (Ali, 2004; Lynch, 1990; Reddy, 2012). tory of nostalgia, see Dodman, 2017.) In virtually all the non-Western cultural contexts so far One of the weaknesses of Ekman’s experimental method— examined, thought and emotion are not distinguished (Koziak, which enabled him and his associates, seemingly, to confirm his 2000; McDaniel, 1995; McElhinny, 2010). But there is one con- theory with studies on many continents—is the use of what is stant: an ever-present concern to form, to habituate, to regulate. called “forced-choice” responses. James Russell has critiqued One might say that “reason” is just a Western example of an this method eloquently. By this procedure, subjects are shown admirable regulatory emotion, similar to the bright face of the six photographs of faces whose expressions have been carefully Balinese or the bēya (social knowledge) of the Ilongots, or the posed by the experimenter to represent each of the six basic rasa of the Sanskrit tradition. Historical and ethnographic emotions (Russell, 1994). Subjects are then told to select one of research suggests that the most general feature of the life of the six words to correspond to each of the expressions. They cannot self across the world is not the opposition between reason and go outside the list, nor can they use a word more than once. passion, but a concern with disciplining that expresses itself Russell argues that this method significantly biases the results. through the valorization and repetition of certain emotions When subjects are free to choose any word they wish to describe judged to be admirable or preferred, precisely because they the same photographs, their responses vary widely, revealing function as regulators of other emotions. the richness of the emotional vocabulary of the language in use. Anthropological research of the 1980s and 1990s also shows that the lexicon of emotions varies markedly from one The Silence of Historians cultural context to another, and translations across languages are often quite inexact, even misleading (Reddy, 2001, pp. Unlike clinical psychologists and anthropologists, historians, 1–20). Kunta (shame) among the Pintupi of Australia around with only a few exceptions, proved reluctant to discuss the sub- 1980, for example, only approximated “shame” as defined by ject of emotions, on the assumption that they could not leave any Helen Block Lewis in a celebrated study of 1971 (Ciccone & tangible or textual trace in our sources.1 Some did not think it was Ferrante, 2015; Lewis, 1971; Myers, 1986; Tangney, 1995). the historian’s task to breathe life back into the dead words of the For the Pintupi, according to Fred Myers, kunta is a regula- documents (Tanner, 2008). There was no group of historians sim- tory emotion that helps individuals determine whether other ilar to the specialists in “psychological anthropology” grouped emotions are appropriate to a situation or not (Myers, 1986, around the journal Ethos, who have continued to draw on clinical pp. 120–124). Lewis, on the contrary, distinguished guilt psychology and whose noteworthy figures include Robert I. Levy from shame, the former responding to an individual act, the (1973), Arthur Kleinman (1981), Gananath Obeyesekere (1990), latter enveloping the whole self. Lewis’s distinction, still used Bambi Chapin (2014), or Tanya Luhrman (2000, 2012). Under by clinicians today, does not apply outside contemporary the circumstances, it is no surprise that the attempt to launch psy- Western or Western-influenced contexts. Even Europeans did cho-history in the 1970s was soon pronounced a failure (Stone, not understand shame in this way prior to the modern era 1979). A few historians took an in emotions, but most (Reddy, 2012). preferred Marxian or Weberian approaches that privileged institu- Another remarkable finding of ethnographic and historical tions, structures, class consciousness, or processes of rationaliza- research: with few exceptions, languages tend to possess a rather tion.2 Stearns and Stearns (1985) boosted historians’ interest in large vocabulary for naming all that relates to “emotions.” In gen- emotions substantially by pointing to the existence of a vast eral, semantic analysis of a given language’s emotional lexicon advice literature by moralists and etiquette experts that told peo- proves difficult, running into numerous contradictions (see e.g., ple what they ought to feel and how to strive for proper feeling. Alstola, Jauhiainen, Sahala, & Lindén, 2018; Heider, 1991). It is worth noting that the growing influence of Michel There are several partial synonyms for each “emotion,” and anto- Foucault in the 1980s and thereafter gave many historians nyms for some that are not shared by all the partial synonyms. new reasons for avoiding discussion of emotions, at least at The situation in French is typical. For amour (love), the website first. If the very existence of the individual subject is just a www.CNRTL.fr gives as synonyms: passion, attachement, ten- secondary effect of a certain discourse, or the surface phe- dresse, inclination, penchant, dilection, coup de foudre, and nomenon of a certain episteme, then to examine the supposed dévouement. The slang website www.dictionnairedelazone.fr depths of individual experience in the past is about the same provides additional partial synonyms: kif, love, croque, among as telling fairy tales. Moreover, Foucault himself said very others. Each of these words has a separate, if overlapping, aura of little about emotions (e.g., Foucault, 1966). Of course, he associations. In using one of them, one can designate (or attempt opened up a whole range of new topics for historians—includ- to shape?) a unique affect. A friend who tells us, “J’aime mon ing the history of insanity, of incarceration, of sexuality. And mari” (I love my husband) communicates the image of a senti- research in these new areas, as well as into gender, helped ment quite different from “J’ai un attachement profond pour mon compel historians finally to pay attention to the cries and mari” (I have a profound connection with my husband) or “Je whispers of emotional life. Reddy The Unavoidable Intentionality of Affect 171

A final point: Few of the historians who have turned toward Writing as a simple “physicist,” as Descartes put it, he found the emotions have taken inspiration from psychoanalysis. The lacu- “primitive passions” to be intermediate phenomena between nae in Freud’s account of emotions is partially to blame. Uffa body and spirit. His list of passions is, like Ekman’s, formulated Jensen has argued that Freud saw the adult emotions arising in a spirit of reductionism: , love, , , joy, from infantile crises. But in his discussions of these crises, there and sadness. Descartes like Ekman speaks of the human being is no attempt to explain where infantile emotions come from as a mechanism. But he warns his readers that the machine is (Jensen, 2008). For example, why should the sexual desire of not the whole thing. Thinking substance and extended (mate- the infant necessarily provoke or against the rial) substance were so different that their combination in the father? To make this link requires rather sophisticated cogni- human case seemed miraculous, and remained mysterious to tions—perhaps too sophisticated—including the idea of an Descartes, despite his efforts to account for it (Baertschi, 1992; authority without appeal as well as the idea of an inveterate Gaukroger, 1995, pp. 384–405). Today, as well, the question of resistance. Can such a sentiment, or rather such a conviction, the relation or bridge that unites body and mind, mechanism and arise “naturally” in the infantile psyche? In effect, the emotions intentionality, reflex and reflection, remains unresolved. This of early infancy are simply presumed to possess a self-evidence dichotomy was destined for a long posterity. and a primitive intensity. And so was the idea of the unchanging physiological basis of Yet psychoanalysis remains a fruitful terrain for the formula- emotions. For Freud, emotions were much more varied and rich tion of hypotheses about social and cultural history, as exempli- than for Ekman. But both agreed that they were fixed, unchang- fied in the celebrated works of Norbert Elias (cf. Deluermoz, ing. Each emotion is a force that pushes us to act and lies beyond 2012), Erik Erikson (e.g., Erikson, 1962), Peter Gay (e.g., Gay, the reach of any analysis. One word is enough to describe it: 1984–1998), Michel de Certeau, Julia Kristeva, or Carl Schorske. fear is always fear; jealousy is in all times and places jealousy. But it is perhaps the work of sociologist Norbert Elias, Über den A smile is understood in all languages. Prozeß der Zivilisation (1939), on the history of manners, that The problem is that this is simply not true. It is enough, to has best articulated psychoanalytic theory onto the preexisting convince oneself of this point, to watch a video of an Odissi preoccupations of historians and sociologists with the rise of the dance by Nandini Ghosal, in which she represents the goddess state, social class, or commerce. He showed how social struc- Durga, as Durga does battle against the ferocious demon tures and psychic structures could gradually transform each Mahishasura (Ghosal, 2008). In a first phase of the dance, other. Elias’s analysis came to the attention of historians from the Nandini Ghosal interprets the goddess’s reception of arms given 1970s on, and continues to inspire thinking today, especially her by all the gods. A sad smile (weakness? fear?) fixed on her among medievalists who have completely dismantled his chro- face. All the gods together could not defeat the demon. With nology, jettisoned his teleology, and gained a whole new their united energy they have created Durga and now they arm approach to courtly culture in the process (Rosenwein, 2002; see her, their last . In a second phase, the dancer portrays Durga also Boddice, 2018, p. 28). on the attack. She shoots arrows one after the other, then she slashes the demon with her sword. What is that emotion on the face of Durga during the time she kills off the demon blow after The Theory of Basic Emotions Within the blow? Calm? Surprise? Eyebrows lifted, eyes wide open, mouth Western Cultural Arena closed, her face framed by an elaborate coiffure, she shows inflexible determination and unchallengeable mastery over the Theoretical Rigidity and Historical Variability most powerful of all deities—that is one possibility. Some day, it will be necessary to write a critical history of the As different as Freudian psychoanalysis and Ekman’s exper- cultural configuration “reason/emotion” in the West. We are not imental theory are, they have in common a refusal to explain the yet there. But historical research does permit one to lay out surplus of meaning that human emotions can acquire, and in roughly some groundlines. Well known is the ancient Greek doing so they refuse to envisage the variations of emotions in mistrust of the “passions,” as evidenced by the example of history. Worse still, the works of Peter Gay or Norbert Elias, Stoicism, as well as the Christian transmutation of the medieval both consistent followers of Freud, cannot adequately take into period, which produced its own dualism between reason and account the slow modifications of the domain of emotions passion. By this revised dualism, from Augustine on, one distin- across the centuries, to say nothing of following the shifts in the guished between emotions dangerous to salvation and those frontiers of this domain. One has to ask if the melancholy of which, turned towards God, went far beyond cold reason. Richard Burton in the 17th century could have been experienced According to Augustine, only God’s grace enabled human in the same fashion as the depression of the Diagnostic and beings to resist passionate impulses (Boquet, 2005; Boquet & Statistical Manual V (DSM-V; cf. Sullivan, 2016). One has to Nagy, 2015; Brown, 1987; Brundage, 1987; Reddy, 2012). ask if Calvin’s zeal was identical to the zeal of Jonathan Edwards It was not until the 17th century, with the emergence of (Bernat & Gabriel, 2013; James, 1902, pp. 217–258). mechanist philosophies in the works of René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and others, that a subsequent transformation of the rea- The Universal That Cannot Be Named son/passion dualism appeared (Dear, 1988; Gaukroger, 1995; Schneewind, 1998). Descartes’ theory of the passions is in effect Of course, we must realize that there are also continuities a precursor of Ekman’s theory (Descartes, 1649; Meyer, 1991). across the centuries. Any attempt to theorize emotions as pure 172 Emotion Review Vol. 12 No. 3

discursive constructions appears doomed to failure. Beyond except by relying on her capacity as a conscious and reflective discourse strictly defined (signs syntactically arranged into human being, and also, by the way, as a person sharing an ade- sentences, propositions), there is the body, there is blushing, quate linguistic competence with the experimenters. sweat, the shudder, adrenalin, the furrowed brow—signs that In psychology, meaning-making (assigning values to voxels cannot be treated as entirely arbitrary or conventional, even if and color, to event-related potentials, cardiovascular, respira- they lend themselves to varied meanings with a flexibility that tory, or perspiration changes, and so on) happens during meas- we still do not fully grasp (Jackson et al., 2019). urement. Even in the simplest and most rigorous experiments, The new concept of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), for one must always instruct participants and count on their good example, designates, in all probability, something universal—a in following instructions. To be sure, there are statistical capacity to be struck, shocked, altered, by episodes of extreme tests that reveal “outliers,” aberrant data that reflect a partici- violence or of danger that is extreme and/or prolonged. No pant’s failure to understand or to follow the rules. But even a doubt, the French knights at the Battle of Agincourt (1415) tra- perfect consensus does not guarantee that results will be proba- versed crises that differed in many respects from those faced by tive of human nature, which is psychology’s proper subject. the soldiers of the French Third Republic at Chemin des Dames Such a consensus may result from the fact that researchers and in 1917. But it also seems certain that there are real resemblances participants share a similar vocabulary that classifies reality in based on the “psychophysiology” of a body-person who must some arbitrary fashion, or they may share a theory of the self confront destructive chaos (Das, 1998). Because the role of cog- that influences local understandings of the instructions given by nition is so profoundly enmeshed with the responses of this experimenters or influences their fashion of understanding their body-person, even its most intense responses, one cannot exclude own responses to stimuli. the likelihood that there are continuities across time and space Some humanists have pointed out this invariant barrier, one based on a shared logic or meaning, as well as continuities based that the neuroscientists often prefer to pass over in silence (Gross on shared features of physiological activation or pathologies of & Preston, 2014; Reddy, 2014). For example, measuring reaction memory (Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002). What is cognitive times (RT) depends on the willingness of participants to respond (cultural, historical), what physiological, is a question we cannot as fast as possible. That one is supposed to strive to win a race is answer at the present time. However, we can at least refrain from easy to explain in a capitalist society of the Western type, where closing the question prematurely by the dogmatic imposition of individuals are habituated to competition in all domains of daily an abstract principle. life. But with a group of participants who regard the idea of win- Is it possible to compare certain cognitive contents common in ning as dangerous or impolite, or politically risky, participants infancy—such as that fire is hot or a blade cuts—with other purely might well slow their responses so as not to their comrades. “logical” principles such as that “the whole is always greater than Suppose that the participants in an experiment included the the part,” which Pierre Bayle liked to recite as an example of a Duchess of Urbino and a number of courtiers, bishops, and ladies universally self-evident truth? (cf. e.g., Bayle, 1686). The concept in waiting of the Urbino court of the early 16th century—the of trauma derives originally from psychoanalysis; PTSD was vali- court depicted vividly by Baldassar Castiglione in his famous dated in the DSM IV and subsequently it was widely adopted for Book of the Courtier (1528). It would not be surprising to find designating a state presenting a relatively fixed array of character- that the RT of the duchess was the smallest, or that the ladies of istics (Fassin & Rechtman, 2007). One can discover traces of these the court beat the men. A good courtier is not supposed to distin- characteristics and witnesses’ accounts of their effects in docu- guish himself too blatantly in the presence of the duchess and her ments from every period of history—yet that does not demonstrate ladies. Quite the contrary, one must always display at court a cer- the existence of the “syndrome” itself outside of the present period, tain nonchalance incompatible with striving to win or excel. in which the mental health disciplines have immense influence on Researchers try to insure that their participants have a uni- official thinking (Audoin-Rouzeau & Becker, 2000; Kuijpers & form social and cultural background. But this goal itself is van der Haven, 2016). defined according to criteria that are cultural and intentional. There is, in reality, no way to escape the vicious circle of dis- courses and their interpretation to arrive at data that would be, Basic Emotions and the New Technologies somehow, purely material and “objective.” Worse still is the of Brain Imaging case of those experiments that rely on the data of self-reports. Speaking to people who will serve as participants in experi- The Unavoidable Recourse to Hermeneutics ments and listening to what they say are daily necessities in all If the question is to understand how to examine the relation branches of psychology and the neurosciences, just as much as between mechanism (body, organism) and meaning (soul, dis- in sociology or anthropology. course), then the new technologies for tracing the “activations” in the interior of the brain cannot offer us the least bit of help. Invisible Emotions There is a very simple reason for this: Access to intentionality, or to meaning, does not pass through a switch or a neuronal Setting these difficulties aside for a moment, let us recall that, pathway or a synapse. Meanings and intentions cannot be over the last 25 years, brain imagery has contributed in a deci- observed, except by talking with the person under observation, sive way to the debate over basic emotions theory. Without Reddy The Unavoidable Intentionality of Affect 173

resolving the difficulties posed by modern body–mind dual- “locationist” hypothesis (also referred to as “functional segrega- ism, brain imaging has disappointed the expectations of tion” or “function specificity”). Ekman’s disciples. A good example is a meta-analysis carried The commenters offered only limited support for Lindquist out by a team of researchers led by Kristen A. Lindquist, and et al.’s (2012) alternative hypothesis, however. Their proposed published in 2012, “The Brain Basis of Emotion: A Meta- alternative was to think of emotions in terms of “psychological Analytic Review,” in Behavioral and Brain Sciences constructionism.” Their results, they believed, were consistent (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, & Bliss-Moreau, 2012). The authors with the idea that emotions, taken individually, are not natural assembled raw data from 234 studies dealing with emotions in kinds, and with the idea that “even categories like emotion, cog- the brain, derived from 656 sets of scans. These studies all nition, and perception are not respected by the brain” (Lindquist dealt with the “activation” of parts of the brain. By “activa- et al., 2012, p. 139, emphasis in original). Obviously, this con- tion” is meant an increased use of oxygen (in fMRI scans) or clusion is in perfect agreement with the constructionism that a of sucrose (in PET scans). good number of anthropologists have adopted to make sense of The authors of the meta-analysis note that most of these their fieldwork on emotions. We witness here an unexpected studies dealt with only one emotion and often focused on one convergence between a social science fundamentally dependent part of the brain, or a very small number of brain regions, that on hermeneutics, that is, the work of interpretation, on the one they already believed to be involved in that emotion. Thus, stud- hand, and on the other, an experimental science that, on the con- ies of fear responses often focused on the amygdala, or responses trary, relies on “objective” measures generated by advanced of disgust on the insula (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 123). This digital imaging. kind of study presupposes, and thus cannot prove or disprove, the existence of a one-to-one relation between one structure in the brain and one basic emotion. Many if not most adherents of Popularizing Emotional Constructionism: basic emotions theory expected brain imaging to show that each The Transportation Safety Administration basic emotion was to be supported by its own structure or sub- (TSA) Versus the General Accounting Office structure. They expected the most likely location of such struc- (GAO) Report of 2013 tures would be the subcortical parts of the brain, considered to be more “primitive,” because found in the brains of many sim- It is evident, then, that the Ekman approach is facing difficul- pler vertebrates. ties. Suppose one were to accept a strict reductionist view But a study that looks only at subcortical structures cannot according to which all human experience and human history determine the validity of basic emotions theory. It is true that, if could be explained by a sufficiently detailed examination of the one finds the amygdala to be activated when participants are series of physiological states that human brains have traversed shown photographs of snakes, the finding does not disprove (e.g., Smail, 2007). Suppose that one also accepted the hypoth- basic emotions theory, but neither can it prove the theory. esis of Lindquist and associates, which is, we must remember, The meta-analysis by Lindquist and associates suggests, on fully compatible with this kind of reductionism. It would follow the contrary, that each emotion is associated with the activation that a very large role must be reserved for the influence of lan- of a network of brain regions. And, although each emotion guage, discourses, habits—“culture” in short—in the experi- appears to activate a different network, often the differences are ence that each person has of herself, and that each person has of slight. Numerous regions show up in the networks of a range of her own emotions and of the emotions of others. emotions. The amygdala, for example, displays activation dur- The database that Lindquist and associates (2012) drew on ing emotions reported by participants as anger, disgust, fear, has served as the starting point for several other studies (Barrett , and sadness—five of the six “basic” emotions. et al., 2007; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Lindquist & Lindquist and associates also distinguished between tests Barrett, 2008). In 2016, Lisa Feldman Barrett, key member of involving the perception of emotion (what emotion is displayed the teams behind all these studies, launched a campaign to pop- by a face or a bodily response) and the experience of the same ularize their new findings and their psychological construction- emotion by the participants. In this way, they found that the ist hypothesis. Her 2017 book, How Emotions Are Made amygdala is more sensitive to the experience of disgust than to (Barrett, 2017a) has met with considerable success and attracted the perception of anger, and to the perception of anger than to considerable media attention.3 the experience of fear. This success does not, for the moment, equal that which The insula and other structures examined in the meta-analy- Ekman has enjoyed. This is especially true in view of the fact sis are equally associated, each in a complex and variable way, that, since 1988, Ekman developed a method for detecting lies with a range of affective responses. The authors conclude that based on the measurement of slight movements in facial mus- the results of their meta-analysis do not agree with the predic- cles. This method of lie detection, directly linked to basic emo- tions of basic emotions theory. Appearing with their article in tions theory, was taken up by the U.S. Transportation Security Behavior and Brain Sciences were 28 comments from other Administration (TSA) after the September 11, 2001 attacks in neuroscientists. All commenters agreed that the meta-analysis New York and Washington, DC. The TSA hoped to train experts constituted a solid refutation of the idea of one-to-one mapping capable of seeing tell-tale muscle movements in the faces of between emotion and structure—that is, of the “modular” or persons who were lying to TSA officials. A program of research 174 Emotion Review Vol. 12 No. 3

was launched to improve the reliability of such detection, and a between the idea of subcortical “hubs” and the conclusions of television series appeared based on this research, dramatizing anthropologists and, more recently, historians on the apparent fact the work of such a lie-detection expert, Lie to Me (2009–2011, that the domain of emotions, as understood in Western and on the Fox Network). Western-influenced regions, is not distinguished from the domain But the scientific results of this research have remained dis- of thought outside the West. Moreover, these experimental find- appointing. According to a U.S. Government Accountability ings cohere with the findings of anthropologists and historians Office (GAO) report of 2013, despite the expenditure of $900 that the domain of emotions has been subject to great variations million, the experts trained by the TSA were able to accurately of definition and of subdivision across the centuries and from identify liars only 57% of the time, that is, only 7% above region to region. chance level. Lisa Feldman Barrett, then, turned to popularizing her teams’ research results at an opportune moment. And she will doubtless continue to undermine the favorable opinion still Reductionism and Intentionality enjoyed by basic emotions theory among a very large propor- The Contributions of Ruth Leys tion of the public. In addition to Lindquist, Barrett, and other members of their In a discussion such as this one, the recent book by Ruth Leys teams, there are a number of other neuroscientists who have dis- repays close attention. Published at the end of 2017, The Ascent tinguished themselves by offering refutations of basic emotions of Affect is a masterful display of erudition that presents and theory, especially in its “locationist” version. Noteworthy is critiques with equal intelligence a series of philosophical, liter- Luiz Pessoa, who published a book in 2013 that assembled the ary, neuroscientific, and historical works. Concerned with the results of numerous research reports he and others have carried meaning or intentionality of affects, Leys, with a few brush- out on the amygdala and other subcortical structures. Rejecting strokes explores the advantages and disadvantages of theories the idea that the amygdala is responsible for fear or anger, of a number of thinkers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paul Pessoa suggests that several of the subcortical structures have Griffiths, Craig Delancy, and Phil Hutchinson. She then analy- been transformed during a long process of evolution. According ses, in turn, the theories of emotion of the most influential to Pessoa, one must resist any hypothesis that sees them as more experimental psychologists since the 1950s (Silvan S. Tomkins, “primitive,” or as parts of a “reptilian brain” or a so-called “lim- Paul Ekman, Richard S. Lazarus, Robert Zajonc, Alan J. bic system.” These kinds of hypotheses, by the way, are quite Fridlund, and António Damásio, among others), with respect to compatible with the Augustinian vision of a soul constantly the simple question: How does this theory handle the “problem menaced by a body full of turbulent animal appetites and pas- of emotions.” As formulated by Phil Hutchinson, this problem sions (Brown, 1987, pp. 46–58, 387–427). results from the fact that each emotion, even those that seem According to Pessoa (2013), the location beneath the cortex natural, that is, corporeal or neurophysiological in origin, pos- of several structures—including the amygdala, the hypothala- sesses an evident meaning, they are about something (Leys, mus, the pulvinar, and others—is well suited to their taking on 2017, p. 4) This is the same problem that Descartes found so the function of “hubs” which coordinate the operation of diverse difficult to resolve. parts of the cortex. Their “massive” direct two-way connections With the development of cognitive psychology based on to most of the cortical regions are compatible with Pessoa’s laboratory experimentation, psychologists launched a debate in “hub” hypothesis. The amygdala, in particular, according to 1980 on this old question. On one side, the partisans of “appraisal Pessoa, appears to be charged with the distribution of attentional theory,” and on the other, the partisans of theories anchored in resources according to the needs of the moment. There is per- neurophysiology. Leys brings out the multiple paradoxes and haps no “function” one could think of that could be “higher” ironies of the debate. For the one side, each emotional episode than that. If one is concentrating on a difficult text, it is perhaps crystalizes around a judgment or appraisal, that is, a cognition at the level of the amygdala that the presence of a fly, the sound about the pertinence or value, vis-à-vis oneself or one’s inter- of an alarm, or the peripheral impression of an angry face are ests, of a situation, object, or event. Without cognition, no emo- registered, via the amygdala’s connections with numerous lev- tion. On the other side were those who preferred to see affect as els of the visual and auditory cortices. A signal from the amyg- a system of responses that functioned independently of the cog- dala sent on to the “executive” centers of the prefrontal cortex nitive system. This party insisted, in consequence, that affect is can ensure that the fly, the alarm bell, the face become a “dis- essentially physiological. Among them were partisans of basic traction” for the reader, disturbing her work and simultaneously, emotions theory, as one might expect. perhaps, saving her life. Pessoa’s book is not aimed at a larger In the 1980s, the latter group, under the leadership of Robert reading public, but it does pull together the results of a large Zajonc, saw in evidence of the extraordinary speed of certain number of studies he and other neuroscientists have carried out emotional responses, and in their capacity to mobilize bodily on animal and human subjects, including both lesion studies and responses outside the person’s awareness, strong indications of imaging studies. the independence of the emotional system. According to Zajonc, As with Barrett, Lindquist, and associates, Pessoa and his such emotional “judgments” could not possibly be personal or team members are resolutely reductionist in their presuppositions meaningful—that is, intentional—because the individual had not and methods. But, again, one finds a remarkable convergence had the time to determine their meaning, much less to decide on Reddy The Unavoidable Intentionality of Affect 175

their relevance or formulate intentions with respect to them. are intended to favor “involuntary” experiences of a whole series Zajonc’s argument could have provided support for the traditional of emotions. stance of historians toward emotions, according to which, they As we have seen, the result of more than 20 years of research are phenomena outside the reach of the discipline, and, in any with new brain imaging technology tends to confirm the argu- case, of very limited interest for understanding historical events. ments of the partisans of “appraisal theory,” assuming one On the other side, under the leadership of Richard S. Lazarus, accepts the meta-analyses of the teams that have worked with the partisans of “appraisal theory” insisted that a response to a Lindquist and Barrett or the conclusions that Pessoa has inde- stimulus, however rapid, had to be a cognition of some kind— pendently arrived at. Repetition is supposed, then, to offer a and this included responses that put the body into a state of kind of bridge by which intentional acts of an individual can mobilization (due to surprise, , rage, etc.). Otherwise, play a decisive role in the fashioning or shaping of the shifting these responses themselves would be incomprehensible to the networks of brain activation. person who underwent them.4 Leys picks up the argument made by Alice M. Isen and Gregory Andrade Diamond in 1989, according to which “experiments increasingly are showing that The Vast Construction Site of the meaning and interpretation do play a role in cognitive process- Neurosciences ing that otherwise fits the definition of ‘automatic,’ and that That many neuroscientists continue to rely on the approach of automatic processes can be interrupted or modified” (Isen & Ekman and his colleagues (e.g., Agid, 2013; Eagleman, 2011) Andrade Diamond, 1989, pp. 138–189, as quoted in Leys, 2017, can be explained in part by the marked tendency of neurosci- p. 183). Isen and Andrade Diamond further suggested that “the entists to specialize. This tendency is easy to understand in automaticity of affective reactions was the result of ‘overlearn- view of the huge size of the nervous system (100 billion neu- ing’ or repeated exposure, producing effects of apparent irresist- rons, according to recent estimates) and also of the vast ibility” (Isen & Andrade Diamond, 1989, pp. 138–189, as resources devoted to research in this field (87,294 neurosci- quoted in Leys, 2017, p. 185). ence articles were listed in the pubmed.gov database in 2015 alone, as opposed to 47,383 in 2005; figures from Chudler Learning by Repetition: A Bridge Between website “Neuroscience for Kids” at http://faculty.washington. Mechanism and Intentionality edu/chudler/what.html). New paradigms, as they are called, emerge constantly, here In other words, according to Isen and Andrade Diamond, emo- and there, in the diverse domains of this grand scientific enter- tional responses that are rapid and apparently involuntary can be prise. As a result, when neuroscientists turn their efforts to relatively involuntary in the short term. But they result from a exploring larger themes than those covered in their own labora- great number of repetitions (“overlearning”). tories, they may not be better informed of what is happening in This remark, which Isen and Andrade Diamond did not a neighboring domain than any other outsider. If so, they may develop into a theory, nonetheless constitutes a mandate for his- fall back on verities learned in graduate school. torians, anthropologists, or sociologists who are undertaking But without a doubt there is another factor: a professional research on emotions. Obviously, such repetitions include those repugnance to abandon models that offer ways to operational- which an individual cannot avoid, such as the connection ize measurement. In this respect, Ekman’s models retain con- between the growl of a dog and the dog’s subsequent attack. siderable advantages, because they permit one to measure Other repetitions are voluntary and intentional. Intentionality “emotions” (as defined by the models) by means of the move- also attaches to those repetitions that are the product of collec- ments of facial muscles, by changes in skin conductivity, or tive practices, such as the repetition of Christmas carols every heart rate. In this way, one may simply define out of existence winter in the piped-in music of shopping centers in predomi- the question that concerns Ruth Leys: Whether one can dis- nantly Christian regions. Such repetitions across a whole life cern and thus explain that kind of coordination that gets give the traditional repertoire of Christmas music the capacity to established between persons’ intentions, which are insepara- recall and also to reactivate positive and negative sentiments ble from their “cognitions,” and the activations of the nervous that a person first and/or frequently experienced in this season. system. Responses to collective practices of repetition are “involun- Ruth Leys offers a compelling analysis of the inappropriate tary” in two senses: (a) involuntary with respect to the norms and adoption of computer terminology that seems to have occurred imperatives that virtually oblige musicians and shopping center by spontaneous accord among experimental psychologists in managers to select pieces expected by the public; (b) involuntary the course of the 1970s. Was this a question of metaphor or because the individual is expected to embrace certain normative reductionism? It is often difficult to say. But to talk of “cogni- intentions in a “cultural” context in which she cannot escape such tive processing,” whether in series or in parallel, has become an repetitions. One is tempted to call certain emotions, then, volun- almost universal habit, accepted by many without fully realizing tarily involuntary. One might consider, for example, those emo- that this way of talking sets aside the question of intentionality tions that one decides to cultivate simply by embracing the life of without resolving it (Bickhard, 2015; Brette, 2019; Taylor, a monk or the career of a state trooper. Institutions organize and 1971). Talk of “processing” in effect ends up hiding “the prob- require, as a condition for their survival, collective practices that lem of emotion” as formulated by Phil Hutchinson. 176 Emotion Review Vol. 12 No. 3

But, according to Leys, the problem goes deeper. The fact In the Western tradition, when one speaks of reason as a fac- that debates continue, without any sign of progress and the fact ulty of human nature, one wants to refer to Reason 1 and Reason that new data are easily read differently by each side, strongly 2 at the same time, but, most often, speaking of reason is unnec- suggests the existence of a break between two sets of presup- essary except in contexts where one seeks to persuade people to positions, between two epistemological approaches. In the end, conform to Reason-2, that reason so often presented as an admi- the problem is a lack of agreement on a primordial question: rable moral standard, and which warrants being called a norma- What kinds of proof should one be searching for? If the debate tive emotional style, or an emotional “regime” (Boddice, 2018, is really an epistemological one, it is useless to search for pp. 80, 193–201). answers in new evidence or to assemble meta-analyses of 235 The expression of emotions is dynamic. The words and ges- articles, or of a thousand, or 10 thousand. tures that one chooses to use have an immediate effect on the allocation of attentional resources (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 193; Kagan, 1984). One devotes more attention to the attitudes and Is It Permissible to Retain the Concept of intentions associated with the . Often the Emotion? result is that this emotion becomes clearer, more intense. But the opposite can also happen. The expression of emotion ought To conclude, can we retain the concept of emotion? Only provi- therefore to be considered an act that changes the world. For this sionally, it would appear. However, historians are quite familiar reason, I have proposed that any emotional expression be called with retaining notions “provisionally.” The concept of emotions is an “emotive,” by analogy with the well-known concept of “per- a key concept, in widespread use in the social sciences and human- formative” proposed by J. L. Austin—that type of utterance that ities today. Like the concept of “sexuality,” of “social class,” of is the act that it refer to, such as “I promise you that . . .” or “I “gender,” of “identity,” and so on, it is a concept that the historian swear that . . .” Expressing an emotion declares and stirs emo- cannot use with its present-day significance beyond a certain range tions at the same time. of contexts without risk of anachronism. The anachronisms that This dynamism is such that every community must be con- the concept of emotion can give rise to are quite glaring, in fact, to cerned with managing, if possible, the habits of emotional any historian with a minimum of critical awareness. expression of its members. To ensure a minimum of unity and To trace the limits of the contexts within which anachronism effective communication—even that minimum necessary for can be avoided in using the concept of emotions is a principal coherent conflict and debate—a community must attempt to task of any history of emotions, just as with any history of gen- impose one or more “emotional styles.” At some point, the nor- der, sexuality, science, politics, and so on. matively approved emotives may lose their effectiveness, and, An age-old assumption that reason and emotion are opposed, in that case, a community can be thrown into crisis. A search for often conflicting faculties of the self, warrants critical investiga- new emotional styles begins. Perhaps a subordinate style, only tion (Boddice, 2018, pp. 85, 96). In Western history, it is worth partially elaborated, will replace the style of the dominant noting, the concept of reason has been habitually used for cen- milieu, and in this way help certain challengers to get ahead. turies with two quite different meanings, meanings which have Considered from this dynamic perspective, the study of the his- often been treated as identical. One could name them Reason 1 tory of emotions can prove useful, ultimately, for understanding and Reason 2. “Reason 1” is a concept that applies to any series that dynamism of history which new cultural historians were of propositions or statements that are tied together by rules one unable to come to grips with. can articulate, whether these rules are called “axioms,” “logic,” “dialectic,” or “language games.”5 “Reason 2” is an emotional style distinguished by a continual and successful effort to Declaration of Conflicting Interests remain calm (a word that should be included in any list of affects The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the admired in Western contexts). Calm, in principle, permits a research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. period of reflection before one takes decisions or expresses one’s sentiments or views. Reflection, in this sense, is usually understood as a manner of thinking that consists in constructing ORCID iD a sort of image of one’s own person as if one were another being William M. Reddy https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0929-1663 capable of examining oneself intimately. The procedures employed in Reason 1 must agree with artic- ulated rules or rules that could be, in principle, articulated. But Notes the procedures of Reason 2 are vague, mysterious, learned more 1 One may think here of Philippe Ariès, Georges Duby, Jean Delumeau, by imitation or reading works of poetry or fiction. Reason 2 Jacques Le Goff, Arlette Farge, or Alain Corbin; see, for further dis- ought to be included in any list of regulatory emotions, along- cussion, Mazurel (2014). side of kunta (among the Pintupi in the 1980s), mue cedang 2 One more noteworthy exception is Raymond Williams’s work to understand the history of “structures of feeling”; see especially (among inhabitants of Bali in the 1980s), bēya (social knowl- Williams (1975). edge among the Ilongots of the 1970s), song (justified anger 3 Her Ted Talk of December 2017 (Barrett, 2017b) had gathered over among inhabitants of Ifaluk in the 1980s), and others (see 4.4 million views as of June 18, 2019. Reddy, 2008, for more examples). 4 On this controversy, see Leys (2017, pp. 128–219). Reddy The Unavoidable Intentionality of Affect 177

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