Attitudes towards Turkey’s Europeanisation Process among Turkish Immigrants in Europe
MA Thesis in European Studies
Identity and Integration Track
Graduate School of Humanities
University of Amsterdam
Author: Şölen Aslan
Student Number: 11310324
Main Supervisor: Dr. Claske Vos
Second Supervisor: Dr. Marjet Brolsma
July, 2017
Acknowledgements
This study would not have been completed without the encouragement and guidance of many people. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my MA thesis supervisor Dr. Claske Vos for her unfailing guidance and insightful feedback through the process of writing this thesis. I would also like to sincerely thank my family for providing me with an immense support throughout my education. I foremost must thank the respondents who agreed to participate in my research as their contribution is indispensable to the purpose of this thesis.
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ABSTRACT
Turkey as a country in the circumference of Europe and with strong historical and cultural connections to the continent has made significant efforts to fulfil requested criteria through socio-economic and cultural convergence with the EU Member States. However, the process seems to be failing. Therefore, this study aims to present a different perspective to the reasons behind this failure and specifically focuses on the attitudes of Turkish immigrants who reside in Europe. The study begins with an introduction regarding the relevance of the subject. It then explores the essential framework for placing Turkey in relation to Europe, understanding the extent of the EU as a representative of Europeanness, the differences between Turkish and European identities as well as issues that potentially affect the process negatively. In the light of these matters, the study concludes with the analysis of the feedback from Turkish immigrants in Europe as a group often neglected whose opinions about Turkey’s integration to Europe bear significance in terms of being exposed to the values of both Turkish and European cultures. In general, the study aims to contribute to the academic discussion of Turkey’s troubled European integration process from the perspective of Turkish immigrants in Europe.
Keywords: Europeanisation, European Union, Turkey, immigration, identity, integration
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Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Topic choice motivation…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..2 1.2 How to define Europeanisation……………………………………………………………………………………………………………....5 1.3 Brief timeline of Turkey’s relationship with Europe ...... 8 Chapter 2: Positioning Turkey and Europe...... 11 2.1 Is Turkey a European country? ...... 11 2.2 EU as the representative of Europeanness……………………………………………………………………………………………..15 2.3 Turkey as an EU member: motivations of both parties…………………………………………………………………………..18 Chapter 3: Question of Identity ...... 24 3.1 European identity ...... 24 3.2 European identity vs. National identity…………………………………………………………………………………………………..26
3.3 Measuring different facets of European identity…………………………………………………………………………………….27
3.4 Turkish identity from the European viewpoint: Othering…………………………………………………………………………28
3.5 Turkish identity from the Turkish perspective…………………………………………………………………………………………29
3.6 Rethinking Identity in the Context of Migration……………………………………………………………………………………...32
Chapter 4: Obstacles in Turkey’s EU Integration...... …………………………………………………………………………….37
4.1 Issue of Geography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..37
4.2 Issue of Demographics……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....38
4.3 Issue of Economy…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..39
4.4 Issue of Human Rights and Democracy………………………………………………………………………………………………….41
4.5 Religious Concerns………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..43
4.6 Negative Public Opinion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..45
Chapter 5: Stance of Turkish Immigrants in Europe……………………………………………………………………………………..50
5.1 Aims of the research…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….50
5.2 Profile of the target group…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….51
5.3 Methodology ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….52
5.4 Perceptions on Turkey…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..53
5.5 Perceptions on Europe………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….56
5.6 Perspectives on the EU membership…………………………………………………………………………………………………….58
Chapter 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….63 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..66
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Turkey will not become a member of the union today or tomorrow… It will be a long, difficult, and tortuous journey”
(Olli Rehn, EU Enlargement Commissioner on June 29, 2005)1
It has been twelve years since the EU commissioner has made this statement about Turkey’s accession process. Current picture does not seem to be portraying any improvement.
Turkey and Europe have been neighbouring each other for centuries and sharing history together. However, both parties are considered to represent different forms of civilisation even though Turkish soil has been land to European civilisation’s main pillars like the Roman Empire as well as Ottomans conquering and ruling over European land. The question of how two societies that are so close in distance and maintain relations on various levels can be considered wide apart in culture and civilisation is an interesting topic to be considered. Turkey and Europe represent quite contrary concepts therefore “clash of civilisations” has been a topic of discussion between Christian, democratic, modern, secular, developed Europe and Muslim, oriental, developing Turkey. Within this framework, if Europe is to be defined by civilisation of secular modernity then it can be argued that there is possibly no room for Turkey in Europe unless Turkey manages to undergo extreme Europeanisation in the cultural sense of the word. However, with the recent refugee crisis between Europe and Turkey followed by the Dutch- Turkish diplomatic crisis, Turkey’s enthusiasm to do so seems far gone while European states utterly claim negative opinions towards Turkey’s current situation.
Based on current attitudes of authorities, one could imagine that the negotiations between Europe and Turkey should have a breakdown. However, as the significant other of Europe, Turkey raises questions regarding what European identity is and what are its limits. Similarly, Europe raises questions of how westernised and modern a society Turkey is and serves as an idealistic goal Turkey should strive for. Therefore, this discussion will continue to occupy minds of academics and diplomats.
1 Casanova, Jose. "Long, Difficult and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization." Constellations 13, no. 2 (2006): 234.
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Inspired by this discussion, the present thesis aims to answer the following research question: What is the stance of Turkish immigrants in Europe regarding Turkey’s troubled European integration process?
In order to answer the above mentioned research question, the thesis is organised in six chapters including multiple subheadings. The first chapter introduces the motivations for the existing research topic then sets the stage by explaining the literature concerning Europeanisation and timeline of Turkey-Europe relations. The second chapter tries to answer the questions of identity where Europeanness versus Turkishness and effects of migration are elaborated. The following chapter aims to position Turkey in relation to Europe as well as investigating representativeness of the EU and prospects of Turkey’s EU membership. The forth chapter includes the obstacles that can be blamed for Turkey’s failure in Europeanisation process. The topics 4th chapter touches upon ranges from geography, demographic, economy, religion to democracy and negative public opinion. After building this knowledge foundation relevant to the topic, the next chapter analyses the finding of the questionnaire answered by Turkish immigrants in Europe. This chapter serves as the main chapter that directly answers the actual research question. Consequently, the thesis ends with the conclusions derived from the overall study.
1.1 Topic Choice Motivation
In this section, the motivations behind focusing on the given topic will be explained. Political and social reasons that make this topic interesting will be demonstrated. In addition to that, similar studies will be pointed out in order to prove the originality of this specific topic in comparison to the others and its possible contributions to the field.
Several decades had passed until Turkey finally gained access through Europe’s gate in Brussels in 2005. The European Commission has decided to start the accession negotiations with Turkey which would result in wide-ranging outcomes for the future of both parties. This process meant to be a test for Turkey’s ability to integrate with the required political, economic and cultural reforms overall aim of which was to bring Turkey closer to the standards of Europe. The process also served as a means to display the extent of the European Union’s future geopolitical and strategic expansion policy. The commencement of the process can be suggested to have refuelled a pre-existing debate on a political, academic and social level about European cultural unity as well as the question of what European identity really entails and who is included in it.
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Turkey’s prospective EU membership has captured a vast amount of attention. Features such as its geographical size, big economic market accompanied by the possibility of economic development in addition to its location at the crossroads of the Middle East, Asia and Europe caused Turkey to seem distinctive from the rest of the candidate countries. However, from the perspective of the European Union, Turkey’s candidacy has triggered a more extensive and belated debate on the future condition of the European Union. The reason why Turkey became an enabler of such a wider discussion can be explained by the prejudices towards it as a neighbouring country so close in distance yet distant in numerous factors which will later be discussed. Nicolaidis2 describes Turkey as Europe’s “tainted mirror” that brings the hidden fears of the European community to the surface. This description might also explain why Turkey’s accession process has been a so tortuous.
Until recently, the progress reports issued by the European Union have shown that Turkey exhibited progress in complying with the required EU reforms and standards. However due to decline in Turkey’s democracy, Syrian refugee crisis that caused tension between Turkey and the EU as well as emergence of a coup d’état on July 15, 2016 which led to antidemocratic implementations and declaration of state of emergency, Turkey’s accession process has been in decline. In addition to these political events, EU Member States do not seem to gain any support from their citizens towards Turkey’s accession to the union. Moreover, opinions about the EU seem to have changed over the years among European citizens who outspokenly indicate that they demand their wishes to be considered by their governments.
There are numerous studies carried out to find more about the opinions of the European Member States’ citizens towards Turkey’s integration with Europe. To name a few, Gerhards and Hans3 carried a survey among citizens of 27 Member States whereas McLarren4 studied opinions from 15 west European countries. Studies are not limited to the attitudes of the EU citizens. Opinions of Turkish citizens regarding EU accession have also been topic of academic discussion such as the study carried out by Güreşçi5 and many others. This thesis will focus on the attitudes of Turkish immigrants in Europe. According to the data presented on the website of the Turkish
2 Nicolaidis, Kalypso. "Europe’s Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy Status After Helsinki." In Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, edited by Keridis, Dimitris and Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, 267-68. Dulles: Brasseys, 2001. 3 Gerhards, Jürgen and Hans, Silke. "Why Not Turkey? Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries." Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 4 (2011): 741-766. 4 McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." European Union Politics 8, no. 2 (2007): 251-278. 5 Güresci, Ertugrul. "Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği (AB) Ilişkileri Sürecinde Kamuoyunun Tutumu Ve Değerlendirilmesi." Dogus Universitesi Dergisi 7, no. 1 (2006): 78. 3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs6 “the population of Turkish people living abroad exceeds 5.5 million people, 4.6 million of which live in Western European countries”. As a group of people who have been exposed to the elements of both Turkish and European governance and cultures, their attitude is relevant in terms of finding out the cultural and political nuances that may create a significant difference and even hinder Turkey’s Europeanisation process. This thesis differs from similar studies on the same topic in a few dimensions: first one was explained above which suggests that most of the studies regarding Turkey’s Europeanisation struggle focus on the attitudes of European citizens whereas this specific thesis focuses on a neglected community. The other dimension would be the scope or the extent of the study. For instance, Yağbasan7 has studied “Attitudes of Turks in Europe Regarding the EU”. Although this is an important study on the topic, it only focuses on Turkish immigrants who reside in Germany, whereas the present thesis focuses on multiple West European countries including the Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland.
The main question of this thesis which deals with the stance of Turkish immigrants in Europe regarding Turkey’s troubled Europeanisation process is relevant to discuss especially after the recent events. Over the last few decades, Turkey’s EU accession has not only been a political debate but also a question of cultural and social norms of integration which involved ordinary citizens. Everyone has an opinion so strong about Turkey’s Europeanisation process or even its Europeanness in the first place; a debate which has never been stronger for other countries who started EU accession negotiations. Turkey seems to be classified as a strong image of the ‘other’ for Europeans. While Europe stands for values such as democracy, human rights, diversity, freedom and rule of law, recently Turkey seems to be associated with political corruption, instability, disrespect for minority rights and dictatorship. This symbolizes crucial differences between two parties who are so close geographically yet so distant in political, economic and social levels. This issue which will be discussed further later, has been surveyed from various perspectives including political and social aspects. However, the Turkish diaspora consisting of immigrants and refugees in Europe is often neglected or confined to the limits of the country they live in when it comes to academic analysis. As an immigrant group, they seem to be very strong and outspoken when it comes to voicing their opinions about Europeans and Turkey. Also, in the recent wave of events, Turkish diaspora in Europe have significantly affected Turkey’s politics with their votes. The ones who often praise Turkey for being better and greater
6 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa. 7 Yagbasan, Mustafa. "Avrupa'Daki Türklerin AB Hakkındaki Görüşleri: Almanya Özelinde Bir Alan Araştırması." Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi 7, no. 2 (2008): 102-3. 4 than Europe and voted for the change of Turkish constitution seemed reluctant to leave Europe and go back to Turkey.8 Whenever a political dispute takes place between Europe and Turkey, Turkish immigrants find themselves in the streets of Europe for protest. All of these resulted in drawing the conclusion that Turkish diaspora residing in Europe must have more to say in Turkey’s Europeanisation process. Therefore, this thesis is based on the survey that examines the stance of Turkish immigrants living in Europe who are exposed to both Turkish and European sides of the story with their first-hand experience. So, studying this topic would inevitably contribute to the field of European Studies in terms of bringing a new approach and dimension to the discussion about how Turkey’s Europeanisation process is perceived.
1.2 How to define Europeanisation
At this point, it is significant to touch upon the definition of Europeanisation and what it entails in order to make a better sense of Turkey’s case. Europeanisation is a crucial notion in the context of this thesis which is also mentioned in the title. Understanding what it entails in academic discussion as well as the perspective taken in the present thesis would be beneficial for the reader to place certain evaluations made throughout the thesis and prevent any possibilities of uncertainty.
Initially, this section summarises diverse conceptualisations and definitions of Europeanisation. In that, different explanations regarding what it is and the criticisms towards those are stated. Firstly, Europeanisation is explained as a term to define ‘EU-isation’ or implementation of EU regulations from top-down and bottom-up angles. Then, it is discussed as a part of European integration process. Ultimately, Europeanisation is discussed from a broader perspective which relates it to more general issues of culture, social norms, identity formation which is the approach employed in this thesis.
Europeanisation is a popular term in the context of European Studies. Explicitly, it can be defined as the process of adopting European Union regulations, structures or directives into an existing structure. In a broader sense, conceptualization of Europeanisation is extended within the realm of academic literature to cover shared values, formal or informal rules, identities and top-down or bottom-up policy discourse.
8 See http://imp-news.com/tr/news/32538/avusturyada-tc-vatandasligindan-cikma-kuyrugu for news about Austrian Turks (73% of whom voted in favor of Erdogan’s AKP) queuing to leave Turkish citizenship after the notice that dual citizens would be faced with legal charges. 5
Generally, its definition often depends on what context it is used in. Olsen9 argues that it is a fashionable concept for which multiple definitions exist and adding his suspicion about whether it was worth bothering with given the vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the concept. Similarly, Flockhart suggests that it “seems to emerge from obscurity … and policy-related ‘euro-speak”.10 Despite the hesitations, many academics defend the idea that Europeanisation is a useful term to explain important European trends.11 As trendy as it is, Europeanisation nevertheless refers to a “process of change” as suggested by Flockhart.
This process of change is often observed from two angles. One of them is the idea that Europeanisation is the impact of the EU and implementation of its standards on other countries. Whereas from a broader perspective Europeanisation can be viewed as a “process of cultural, political and organisational change along European lines, within and beyond the borders of Europe”.12
Ladrech, states that Europeanisation happens whenever political dynamics of Europe become the norm for domestic policy-making processes. In his own words, Europeanisation can be defined as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making”.13 If understood from this point of view, Europeanisation should require a top-down implementation procedure. With a similar approach, Buller and Gamble explore wider conceptualisations of the term. They consider it to refer to “a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics”.14 Overall, these perspectives reflect the idea that Europeanisation has to do with top-down implementations of EU policies on domestic levels, therefore, making Europeanisation an indispensable element of the European integration process. However, it should be kept in mind that Europeanisation is an interactive process which employs bottom- up and top-down procedures of integration not only on governmental level but also on other
9 Olsen, Johan. "The Many Faces of Europeanisation." Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 5 (2002): 921- 22. 10 Flockhart, Trine. "Europeanisation: The Myths and the Facts." Public Policy Research 13, no. 2 (2006): 86-87. 11 For instance, Buller, Jim and Gamble, Andrew. "Conceptualizing Europeanisation." Public Policy and Administration 17, no. 2 (2002): 4-24.; Olsen, Johan. "The Many Faces of Europeanisation." Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 5 (2002): 921-952. 12 Flockhart, Trine. "Europeanisation: The Myths and the Facts." Public Policy Research 13, no. 2 (2006): 89. 13 Ladrech, Robert. "Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France." Journal of Common Market Studies 32, no. 1 (1994): 70-71. 14 Buller, Jim and Gamble, Andrew. "Conceptualizing Europeanisation." Public Policy and Administration 17, no. 2 (2002): 6-7. 6 levels. In other words, concentrating on top-down procedures alone is not sufficient and bottom- up procedures are also needed within an EU context.
In another working definition, “Europeanisation is domestic change caused by European integration”.15 The term has set a major academic agenda as well as political. Some researchers such as Börzel focus mostly on the effect of European norms in the field of policy making and governance. However, it cannot be the ultimate definition of it as the definition of Europeanisation should also highlight the change in social structures ad identities. Therefore it is beneficial to bear in mind that Europeanisation entails more than “EU-isation”.16
From a euro-centric point of view, Europeanisation can also be regarded as the idea that “Europeanisation is a natural extension of a euro-centric perspective that naturally holds European ideas and culture as superior” 17 as well as thinking that superior culture is generated in Europe and should be exported to the Middle East and the rest of the world. This is an idea that existed within the concept of Eurocentrism. Therefore, it can be said that Europeanisation is not a new phenomenon although it has been recently more popular as a term within the academic corpus. Flockhart also argues that “before Europe could embark on the current processes of EU-isation and Europeanisation, it had to be Europeanised!” emphasizing the idea that Europe’s passage to modernity required the continent to enrich itself with the existing information in other parts of the world before it could impose its own values.
In addition to these more conventional approaches to the concept of Europeanisation, there are more general interpretations that consider it to include “processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”.18 This might seem as a broad definition. Broader definitions can be criticised in the sense that broader definitions tend to stretch borders of concepts. However, Radaelli argues that Europeanisation is a difficult concept to define and can be used in multiple contexts. The question that he asks is that if everything can be touched
15 Vink, Maarten. "What is Europeanisation? and Other Questions on a New Research Agenda." European Political Science 3, no. 1 (2003): 63. 16 Ibid. Concentrating on requirements coming from Brussels. “Yet, it must be recognised that 'European integration' in itself covers a wider range of processes and institutions. “ 17 Flockhart, Trine. "Europeanisation: The Myths and the Facts." Public Policy Research 13, no. 2 (2006): 87-88. 18 Radealli, Claudio. "Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change." European Integration Online Papers 4, no. 8 (2000): 8-9. 7 by Europe and its norms to a certain extent, then anything can be Europeanised in one way or another given the statement that Europeanisation can be the source of “cultural change, new identity formation, policy change, administrative innovation and even modernisation”19. In the midst of the chaos of all different definitions of Europeanisation, what matters is the approach employed throughout this thesis in order to build a framework for material that will be discussed and the analysis that will be carried in the following chapters of the thesis.
The perspective employed in this thesis whenever Europeanisation is mentioned refers to a broader one. Turkey’s Europeanisation process is definitely a broader concept that is not limited to formal integration with EU due to the fact that citizens of both Turkey and the EU are very much involved in the process and what the consequences might be in their daily, cultural and social lives. Having in mind the historical passage from being Europeanised into the process of EU-isation and Europeanisation, what matters it the current state. Turkey as a candidate for EU membership agreed to the rules and regulations of Europeanisation politically and culturally. Within the framework of the present thesis, Turkey’s Europeanisation process will be discussed from a broad perspective with specific attention paid to the cultural aspects rather than political.
1.3 Brief Timeline of Turkey’s Relationship with Europe
In order to shed more light on the contemporary events, it is useful to look back on the history. Historically, Europe and Turkey have always had ties in one way or another. What is known as Turkey now was once the property of the Ottoman Empire. Since then it has been serving as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East and Asia as well as a barrier which hinders these distinct cultures from confronting each other.
“The importance of Turkey for Europe is rooted in the historic ties between the two sides, dating back to Ottoman times. Be it through war, diplomacy, commerce, art, cuisine, or intermarriage, Turkey has always been an integral part of Europe’s history. Over centuries, relations between the two were characterized by cooperation and convergence in the fifteenth through to the seventeenth centuries”.20 In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire participated in the Concert of Europe.21 The relationship between the two parties has always been a combination of
19 Radealli, Claudio. "Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change." European Integration Online Papers 4, no. 8 (2000): 8-9. 20 Tocci, Nathalie. Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown. Brookings: Center on the United States and Europe, 2014. 21 “The Concert of Europe, also known as the Congress System or the Vienna System after the Congress of Vienna, was a system of dispute resolution adopted by the major conservative powers of Europe to maintain their power, oppose revolutionary movements, weaken the forces of nationalism, and uphold the balance of 8 cooperation and conflict. Even though it is argued by some that Turkey does not belong to Europe, Ottoman Empire was named the “sick man of Europe”22 at the time. In line with pragmatic and strategic purposes, Turkey was included in Aristide Briand’s Commission of Enquiry for European Union within the scope of the League of Nations, whereas it was excluded from the more idealistic pan-Europe proposal presented by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.23
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Europe was taken as a role model in the remodelling process of the new Turkey by the founding father of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In his philosophy, Kemalism, ideas such as modernity, democracy, secularism and so on which are attributed to be European values play a vital role. So, the new Turkey was built and revived on the basis of European values.
In 1949, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe. As a Pan-European organisation established by the Treaty of London main aim of it was to protect human rights as well as promote rule of law and democracy. Three years later in 1952, Turkey became a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). At the time during the Cold War, Turkey was a pivotal ally for Europe as it shared borders with the Soviet Union. Thereafter, Turkey enhanced its economic relations with the European continent and “has been knocking on Europe’s door … full of high hopes and good intentions”.24
In 1963, Turkey signed the Association Agreement with European Economic Community. Following that, Turkey submitted a request for full membership in 1987 which resulted in rejection by the European Commission in 1989 owing to the fact that Turkey’s democracy suffered from major deficiency. This reasoning is still valid today as one of the leading factors that impedes Turkey’s Europeanisation process. It is also notable that the same year Morocco also applied for full membership and the Commission has decided that unlike Morocco, Turkey was an eligible candidate for a prospective membership.25 When Turkey entered the EU customs union, hopes were up again for Turkey’s membership. Nevertheless, European Council
power.” in Elrod, Richard. "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System." World Politics 28, no. 2 (1976): 159. 22 Lewis, Bernard and Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. 23 “Coudenhove-Kalergi is one of the fathers of the idea of a unified Europe. After his visit to Turkey and meeting with M. K. Atatürk, he involved Turkey and the Balkans within his 1934 writings about political Europe.” Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, “Turkey and the Idea of a European Union in the Inter-War Years, 1923-39,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 3 (2009): 425. 24 Pamuk, Orhan. In Kars and Frankfurt. Istanbul: Nation, 2005. Nobel Prize winner, Turkish literary writer. 25 Commission opinion on Turkey’s request for accession to the Community, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (89) 2290 final, Brussels: 20.12.1989. 9 emphasized that despite being eligible, Turkey did not meet the EU membership standards. Finally, in 1999, European Council entitled Turkey to the long-pursued candidacy whilst not initiating the accession negotiations which was applied to the rest of the countries within the enlargement process such as East European countries, Malta and Cyprus.
Turkey’s reform impulse gained momentum after 2001. This was for some a “silent revolution”26 in the country. This silent revolution of reforms in the country convinced European Council to decide that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria, therefore accession talks could commence in October 2015.27 Interestingly, after the opening of accession negotiations, Turkey has lost pace in its silent revolution of reforms.28
As the only accession process that lasted over a decade, Turkey’s case has been full of constraints. Advocates of turkey’s membership defend the idea that Turkey acquires the potential to drastically transform EU’s conventional geopolitical image. Without a doubt, it would mark a historical moment in global history in the sense that it would be the foundation of a new bridge between wider Muslim world and Europe. The question here is whether Europe and its citizens want that bridge to be built or not. For this purpose, Turkey would provide a significant geopolitical leverage for Europe. However, it would also bring problems to be solved in the long run such as democratic issues, corruption allegations, gender inequalities, low literacy rates, a declining currency and the backlash of European citizens all of which will be discussed in the following chapters. That is why Turkey has been required to formally Europeanise if it wishes to be a part of the European Union However, it can be argued that Turkey’s experience with European integration or in other words Europeanisation has been quite contested since the beginning. Regardless of how long the period has taken or its assertiveness, the process has not reached an ultimate conclusion yet until this day.
26 Ahtisaari, Martti, Kurt Biedenkopf, and Albert Rohan. Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise: Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004.http://www.emmabonino.it/campagne/turchia/english.pdf. 27 Kubicek, Paul. "Political Conditionality and European Union's Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey." Democratization 18, no. 4 (2011): 920. 28 Arısan, Nilgün. "What Went Wrong in the Turkey-EU Relationship?" In Another Empire?, edited by Öktem, Kerem and Kadıoğlu, Ayse and Karlı, Mehmet. Istanbul: Bilgi University press, 2015.
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CHAPTER 2: POSITIONING TURKEY AND EUROPE
In order to understand the concepts and assumptions made in this thesis, following chapter tries to position Turkey and Europe including the EU on a mental map. It is argued that whether Turkey can be considered European depends on various factors all which take us to the answer that history and geography are not enough criteria. The second subheading about EU as the representative of Europeanness, opens up questions of identity and argues that what Europeanness means is an individual assessment while the EU can only represent legislative aspects and tries to produce a common identity as its mission. Finally, the last section touches upon advantages and disadvantages both parties might gain from furthering their relations.
2.1 Is Turkey a European Country?
This section tries to formulate an answer to the long-lasting question of whether Turkey can be classified as a European country and where it is actually situated geographically and culturally in relation to the European continent. The answer to this question can be formulated depending on a variety of factors; namely geography, culture, history and acceptance of other European countries.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s landmass declined to the extent where only 3 percent of it was within European continent. Nevertheless, this small area is home to 11 percent of Turkey’s population as well as the city of Istanbul which is Turkey’s cultural and economic hotspot.29 Obvious from the geographical maps, Turkey lies on the line dividing Europe and Asia with its national territory belonging to part of both continents. As for Europe, there is no dispute about its borders to the west, north or south. However, those to the east remain uncertain and open to discussion both academically and politically. Obviously, this is a question beyond geography which cannot provide a final answer by itself.
The encounter of Turks with European civilization dates back to the conquest of Istanbul. Turks entered Anatolia in the 11th century and founded the Ottoman Empire which led to the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. As a result, Ottomans or Turks became heirs to the Eastern Roman Empire and Byzantine as well as a very rich and established Greco-Latin and Judeo-Christian culture existing in Anatolia.30 Anatolia is a region within the borders of modern day Turkey and houses
29 Aydin, Senem. Türkiye’nin Tam Üyeliğinin Avrupa Birliğine Ve Türkiye Ye Katkıları. Istanbul: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 2002. 30 Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. New Approaches to European History. Vol. 24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
11 historical sites such as Ephesus, Mount Ararat where Noah’s Ark rested, Troy. It is also connected to historical figures such as Herodotus, Aesop, Saint Nicholas and so on. Antioch was where Saint Paul preached to the very first Christian congregation. Saint Paul who caused Christianity to extend beyond the limits of Judaism was born in Tarsus in Anatolia.31 The examples above are part of European cultural heritage too and remind us that what was once the cradle of European heritage and civilisation is now at the heart of Turkey.
Apart from being home to significant elements of European heritage, the Ottoman Empire was an essential part of European politics for a long time. The Ottoman Turks played crucial roles often as conquerors and at times as an ally of major European powers such as France. There were also times when the Ottoman land became a safe haven for the oppressed in Europe as in 1492 when the Ottoman Empire provided shelter for Jewish refugees from Spain. This event might serve as an example that reflects the Ottoman tradition of letting members of different religions live side by side and granting them rights in return for their loyalty. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was invited to join the European Concert after the Crimean war in 1856 to decide for Europe’s destiny alongside powers such as France, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia serves proof that it was a part of European history and politics.
This event that brought recognition for Turkey as a European power coincided with the period when successive Sultans put a great deal of effort into westernizing their empire. This westernizing phenomenon began in the first half of the 19th century with hopes to revive the empire that was on the verge of collapsing. The reforms that were part of westernizing efforts were mainly inspired by France which paved the way for the modernisation of the armed forces, abolition of certain institutions, centralisation of state administration, founding a postal service and the printing of paper money for the very first time, making elementary education mandatory. Although they were not wholly fulfilled, the reforms can be said to have changed the character of the empire.
The influence from Europe was not over with the end of reforms era. Particularly France and England influenced the Young Ottomans movement which suggested the idea of establishing a constitutional state and explicitly questioned the notion of liberty and citizenship rights. Eventually they had to withdraw due to a strong opposition by the Sultan. This ideal of liberty, citizenship right and the idea that the land was the fatherland or motherland as Turks would call
31 Aydin, Senem ‘The self-definition of Europe: where does Turkey stand?’ Turkish Policy Quarterly 2, no.4 (2003): 8-9. 12 it, not the property of the Sultan reappeared with the Young Turks movement. This movement was not only supported by the western elite but also deeply influenced by European intellectuals and schools of philosophy. The most significant accomplishment of the Young Turks movement was the legacy that led to building of Turkish national identity in combination with a persistent trend of westernisation.32 For them westernisation/Europeanisation was an imperative factor for Turkey’s survival after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
These ideals or ideas were the pillars of the reforms endorsed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the war for national independence. Atatürk can be seen as the strongest figure in Turkish history who believed that civilisation referred to European civilisation and following the footsteps of civilisation meant being a modern state. Atatürk explains clearly during one of his speeches: “Peoples who are not civilised are condemned to remain under the domination of those who are. And civilisation is the West, the modern world, of which Turkey must be part if she wishes to survive. The nation is determined to adopt exactly and completely, both in substance and in form, the way of life and the methods which contemporary civilisation offers to all nations”.33 On the way to catching up with the European civilisation, Atatürk abolished Caliphate, Ulema and Sultanate, adopted the Swiss Civil Law, replaced Arabic alphabet with Latin alphabet, replaced words of Arabic or Persian origin with pure Turkish ones, changed from lunar to solar calendar, granted women the right to vote, renounced the Sharia law, established a democratic parliament, switched the weekly off-day from Friday to Sunday.34 These reforms are criticized for eliminating Islam and the rule of religious institutions from the state, especially recently. Turkey is currently facing a time period where the President never lets a day pass without making multiple references to Islam during his speeches or public appearances which tends some groups to think that Turkey has now turned its face toward the Middle East in contrast to the days when Atatürk pointed at the west and Europe for inspiration. In his reforms, he tried to turn religion into a personal issue which helped Turkey develop into a secular state, a vital feature of European countries. Unfortunately, the extent of Turkey secularism is highly debated and seems to deteriorate let alone developing.
In terms of culture, Islam has been a crucial element of Turkish life. Islam does not only affect the spirituality but also plays a role in civil, political and judicial aspects which obstructs the
32 Kamran, Tahir. “Young Turks Movement&1908 Revolution.” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 29, no.1 (2008): 105. 33 Quoted in Ahtisaari, Martti, Kurt Biedenkopf, and Albert Rohan. Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise: Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004.http://www.emmabonino.it/campagne/turchia/english.pdf. 34 Ünsal, Artun. "Atatürk’s Reforms: Realization of a Utopia by a Realist." New Delhi, 28 November 1981, 1981. 13 distinction between temporal life and religious life35 particularly in Turkey’s case. Therefore, it can be said that Atatürk’s reforms “created a secular republic out of the ruins of the ottoman monarchy – formed a culturally dualistic society in Turkey by introducing western cultural elements into the Islamic lifestyle”.36
Briefly, there are some criteria to assess whether Turkey is European or not. From the information provided previously, Turkey can be classified as a country that has a landmass within the borders of European continent. But, being European is not confined to the limits of actual borders. History and heritage also play a role in being named European i.e. all EU countries would agree to sharing certain historical heritage. Given the historical events and knowledge provided, it is obvious that Turkey or previously the Ottoman Empire was invited to European political events as a decision maker, was home to essential elements of European heritage, even belonged to the greatest European empires. However, geography and historical connection do not still confirm the Europeanness of Turkey which is mainly due to the fact that history is already past and geography is not visible from people’s living rooms. Therefore, what matters in deciding whether Turkey is European or not is daily factors that are visible and sensible to anyone. This takes us to the issue of today’s culture. Turkey has always had a dualistic culture. It was always connected with Islam and Middle Eastern traditions but also some groups in the country tried to keep up with modern civilisation and European values of secularism and democracy. Turkey’s evolution from a country established on Atatürk’s western reforms to a moderate Islamic country can be traced back to 2002 when, the lasts representative of political Islam, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) came to power.37 In addition to this political change, Turkey’s demographic change provided support for political Islam in the country. According to TUIK reports, “the population growth rate has been higher among the rural population as well as among urban groups with rural origin, both of which have conservative and more religious inclinations”.38 With the effect of these factors, on the one hand Turkey has tried to Europeanise its values and daily life but on the other hand the population in favour of traditional values and Islam started to grow which led to a dualistic culture. The
35 Esmer, Yilmaz. "Islam, Gender, Democracy and Values." In Changing Values, Persisting Cultures: Case Studies in Value Change, edited by Petersson, Thorleif, 289. Boston: Brill, 2008. 36 Evrensel, Ayse. "Turkey’s Possible Membership of the European Union from a Cultural Perspective." Eurasian Geography and Economics 54, no. 3 (2013): 300-1. 37 Hurd, Elizabeth S. "What is Driving the European Debate about Turkey? ." Insight Turkey 12, no. 1 (2010): 185-86. 38 Evrensel, Ayse. "Turkey’s Possible Membership of the European Union from a Cultural Perspective." Eurasian Geography and Economics 54, no. 3 (2013): 310.
14 dualistic nature of Turkey is the factor that outlaws geographical of historical evidence that hint at Turkey’s Europeanness.
As a result of that, acceptance of other incontestable European countries has a great value in terms of formulating a final statement about whether Turkey is welcome in their club. Although public opinion polls suggest that 55.3 per cent of Turks believe that harmonization with the EU will improve standards for democracy and human rights and 53.7 percent further believe that economic and social conditions will improve with EU membership,39 Gerhards and Hans state in their study of 27 EU countries about their opinion on Turkey’s EU membership that more than two-thirds of EU citizens feel that the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too significant to allow it to join the EU.40
The stance of European countries toward Turkey’s membership to the EU in addition to the dualistic culture of Turkey and current policies of Turkish government that moves Turkey gradually towards the Middle East outweigh the fact that Turkey has geographical and historical ties with Europe. These two elements are not enough to make Turkey count as a European country as long as crucial European values are missing in its daily and cultural spheres. As Franz Fischler proposes Turkey is a “sui generis society, far more oriental than European”.41
2.2 EU as the representative of Europeanness
It is generally assumed that the main criteria required to officially confirm whether Turkey is European or can be Europeanised is the European Union membership process. Therefore, it is essential to analyse what the EU indeed represents and to what extent. In doing so, first of all we need to explain what Europeanness entails and then go deeper into where EU is situated within the context of Europeanness as a regional representative.
As a concept so relevant and frequently mentioned, it is significant to highlight what is understood by Europe. According to Neave, “There are few subjects so controversial as that of Europe. This is hardly surprising, since there are almost as many interpretations of what Europe was, is, and should be, as there are interests arising among those who debate such matters.”.42
39 BBC, Monitoring Europe, 2007. 40 Gerhards, Jürgen and Hans, Silke. "Why Not Turkey? Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries." Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 4 (2011): 741-743. 41 Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, Head of the Cabinet of former EU Commissioner Franz Fischler, “Does ‘Muslim’ Turkey Belong in ‘Christian’ Europe?” Discussion, "National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 13, 2005. 42 Vergara, Javier. "The History of Europe and its Constituent Countries: Considerations in Favour of the New Europe." Journal of Social Science Education 6, no. 1 (2007): 18. 15
Obviously, it is not a simple task to come up with a definite definition of Europeanness which is also due to the fact that many global phenomena have manifested in the continent affecting peoples and cultures. This makes it harder to eliminate which elements to include or exclude in the definition. Among those supranational phenomena one can list Roman, Greek, Christian, Renaissance, Reform, Rationalism, Enlightenment, Secularism, Liberalism and Modernism ideals and many more which have shaped not only the European intellectual and cultural revolution but also echoed universally.
Throughout its development from Greek mythology into its contemporary context, the idea of Europe and Europeanness has been used to portray more than a geographic entity. Beyond all, it has been a cultural entity sustained by concepts such as liberty, regulating according to ethical norm of life, justice, good and the order with discipline and authority. “One need only go out from Europe in any direction to feel the reality of its cultural identity”.43
Now that what Europeanness might entail is clear, it is significant to locate the position of the European Union within representation of Europeanness on an international and official stage. In an arena where the word global is highly fashionable, the EU can be said to be the global face of Europe and the countries that are part of it. In that sense, the EU can be called the “normative European power”44 despite being contested. Clearly, while representing that power, the EU takes on a mission to spread and protect European values. Pinning down what these values are for the EU takes us back to the Lisbon Treaty: “Article 2 TEU reminds us that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”.45 Throughout the EU history, different articles have made references to various aspects of European values; for instance, the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, put great emphasis on democracy and protection of human rights as the top benchmark for any possible EU membership.46
In simplified terms, it can be derived that EU operates in a dual way; suggesting that the EU has to work with both national and supranational values. However, it is good to note that the
43 Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste and Richard Mayne. Europe: A History of its People. London: Viking, 1990. 44 Diez, Thomas. "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe." Millenium 33, no. 3 (2005): 613. 45 Herlin-Karnell, E. “The Eu as a Promoter of Values and the European Global Project” German Law Journal 12, (2012). 46 European Council Meeting in Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993, reached at http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/72921_en.pdf. 16
EU accepts some national values as European ones but as remarked in “Article 4(2) TEU (the national identity clause), national values can also form part of a national identity and then are no longer European.”.47 This clearly tells that even though the EU is often seen as the ultimate representative of Europeanness, each member still preserves their national character which makes the whole equation of representation of values even harder to grasp.
Although this study primarily focuses on EU as a representative of European culture and values, it also acts as a political, humanitarian, and economic representative. Within the framework of the EC (European Community), the EU became one of the leading participants in global economy during the last half of the 20th century. In that sense, “the Union plays four distinct international roles in this realm, namely that of a leader of sustainable development and a model of successful and comprehensive integration, the largest shareholder in global trade, provider of the largest development assistance, and donor of the largest humanitarian aid”.48
Moreover, the European Union acts as a single entity on international political arena which is agreed by its member states; which is secured under the name of Common Foreign and Security Policy. “The policy encompasses an array of measures to influence the international environment, including diplomacy, sanctions, and responding to crises that occur outside the EU”.49
Nevertheless, in the case of Turkey’s Europeanisation process and the stance of Turkish immigrants towards it, the hierarchy of importance is reversed. This is because of the fact that Turkey has already had established relationships as far as economic and security-related cooperation with the EU is concerned. Additionally, Turkey often suffers from cultural othering when asked in Eurobarometer50 surveys, cultural or civilizational aspects gain more importance and relevance.
The European Union is a vital representative of the countries located on the European continent. The membership to the union is never limited to geographical proximity. It always requires adhering to certain values and standards that are specific to the its peoples. However, the extent of its representation can be criticized in the sense that each country would naturally have their
48 Zieba, Ryszard. "International Roles of the European Union." Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej 6, no. 1 (2012): 68. 49 Keukeleire, Stephan and MacNaughtan, Jennifer. The Foreign Policy of the European Union. The European Union Series. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 50 EU Commission. Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 81, 2014., available at http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_publ_en.pdf. 17 own peculiarities and it would not be logical to argue that the EU can cover all of those. The European Union is a valid as an official representative with a great degree of authority. The EU can represent European governance, administration, democracy and rule of law however it could never fully represent the whole cultural aspect of Europeanness while definitions of who counts as a European is as many as the number of individual European citizens. Therefore, being named as one of its members can be seen as an indicator of being European at least in a legal and official framework rather than on a cultural or social level.
2.3 Turkey as an EU member: motivations of both parties
Given the fact that being an EU member can be regarded as an indicator of being European, then Turkey’s membership to the EU would undoubtedly confirm that Turkey has managed to Europeanise itself. Such a possibility would present not only considerable challenges but also a substantial amount of opportunities for both the EU and Turkey. The likelihood of rejection or acceptation to the Union would bring certain pros and cons for both parties. Therefore, assessing these bears significance in terms of clarifying the likely consequences in the future as well as positioning different approaches to the process. In this section, the prospects of Turkey’s membership shall initially be discussed from the perspective of the EU and then Turkey.
Turkey is a big country of more than 79 million people.51 Turkey’s population and specifically the percentage of Muslims within that population are the main concerns that leave question marks on minds. In addition to that, President Erdogan’s Islamist political background creates a source of concern for the EU and many Europeans who are hesitant about his government’s commitment to indispensable European values such as secular democratic polity.52 Turkey’s admission to the EU would serve as a tool the break the “Christian Club”53 image of the EU. In a way, it would prove the EU’s inclusivity and tolerance as a society, adding more reality to the motto of “united in diversity”54 based on EU’s common values of respecting human rights,
51 Exact population is 79,814,871 according to 31 January 2017 report published by TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute) available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do. 52 David L. Phillips, “Turkey’s Dreams of Accession,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (2004): 86. 53 A term often used by Turkish media and politicians when referring to the EU. “Dorothee Schmid, with the French Institute of International Relations, responds: “The expression Christian Club has been used quite often by Turkish analysts or politicians when they talk about their relations with the European Union, ever since the very beginning of negotiating entry. So, even from the start, the Turks feared being rejected by the EU for cultural, or more precisely religious reasons.” available at http://www.euronews.com/2011/10/06/is-the- european-union-a-christian-club. 54 “It signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent's many different cultures, traditions and languages.” See https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/motto_en. 18 liberty, rule of law and democracy. This way, the EU could possibly present an alternative to radical Islamist closed society models that are exclusive and illiberal. “In the great cultural debate of the twenty-first century, all too often fuelled by ignorance and prejudice and misused by criminal phenomena such as international terrorism, a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multi- faith Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the “Clash of Civilisations” is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind”.55 This way Europe as a soft power would build a bridge between the Islamic world and the Western world. However, it is good to bear in mind that it is more than a mere image that the EU tries to produce and maintain. Sacrificing certain values that Europe has collectively built over centuries for the sake of creating a positive, tolerant image would not be rational, which might explain the backlash received from European citizens when Turkey’s membership possibility is justified by the above mentioned reasoning.
For some, Turkey’s membership would further prove the compatibility of democracy alongside Islam. However, it is significant that Turkey is a unique example among its Muslim neighbours, namely Syria, Iraq, that are located in the same Middle Eastern region. Based on its diversified cultural roots since the Ottoman era, two centuries of Western orientation process intensified with Atatürk’s revolutionary move to secularism and democracy, it would not be realistic to think that Turkish model can easily be transferred to other Muslim countries. If only Turkey could somehow manage to distance itself from daily Islamic propaganda by its leading politicians and refuel its former effort to Europeanise in line with EU regulations, then it would demonstrate to the Islamic world that it is indeed attainable to formulate answers for the dilemma of consolidating traditional and religious manners with universally adopted principles of civilised societies.
In order to have a greater say in global politics, another opportunity for the European Union would be the use of Turkey’s geopolitical significance as a part of its security strategy. “Turkish accession would considerably strengthen the Union’s capabilities as foreign policy actor”.56 Within the framework of the EU’s “A Secure Europe in a Better World”57 security strategy as
55 Ahtisaari, Martti, Kurt Biedenkopf, and Albert Rohan. Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise: Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004. 56 Ibid. 57 Purpose of the strategy is explained in the Commission report dated 12 December 2003 as such: “This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world”. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 19 well as the “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood”58 concept, southern and eastern periphery of the continent is highly emphasized in terms of preserving the security of the EU as well as its citizens. In that sense, Turkey would contribute as a new dimension to the EU’s foreign policy efforts in critical regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, Mediterranean and South Caucasus due to Turkey’s geo-political and geo-strategic position. The recent Syrian refugee crisis between the EU and Turkey has served evidence in proving this point. Located at a critical position on the doorway to Europe, the only means to control the Syrian refugee influx to Europe was Turkey which was very well recognized by Erdogan’s government and even opened negotiations for a visa and monetary assistance deal59 between two parties.
The EU can definitely gain more control and power in the Middle East, a region of interest for Europe for historical and security related reasons, through Turkey. Without a doubt, having Turkey as an ally or a member would enhance Europe’s political weight in the region especially in efforts to peacebuilding and stabilising this critical region. This can be an advantage but on the other hand it can also pose political and security related dangers to the continent in terms of drawing Europe into conflicts of the Middle East which are often triggered by terrorist organisations such as ISIS60 which has performed several terrorist attacks in various cities in Europe and Turkey.
In addition to improving EU’s political and security related position, Turkey can contribute to Europe’s economy with its growing market, rich resources and a young, qualified work force. With a population of almost 80 million currently, its consumers’ market is huge compared to
58 In this Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (Brussels, 11.3.2003), the need for such a concept is explained as such: “On 1 May 2004, the European Union will enter a new and historic phase. An enlarged Union of 25 countries, with a combined population of more than 450 million and GDP of almost €10000 billion, will fundamentally increase the political, geographic and economic weight of the EU on the European continent… New patterns in the movement of people, capital, goods and services will increase diversity in culture and traditions. Beyond the EU’s borders, enlargement will change the shape of the EU’s political and economic relations with other parts of the world.” Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf. 59 News column by Icduygu, A., Toktas, S. March 2016, “In order to limit the flows of refugees and irregular migrants, the EU and Turkey agreed upon a “one in, one out” deal in March 2016. Based on this agreement, all new irregular migrants who arrive on the Greek islands through Turkey as of 20 March 2016 would be returned to Turkey starting on 4 April 2016. The deal aims to prevent unauthorised migrants from entering Europe through improper channels. In exchange, the EU has agreed to a payment of €3 billion to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, which will fund the support and aid efforts including housing, food, employment, education and healthcare for the Syrian migrants. In addition, visa requirements for Turkish citizens were to be lifted by the end of June 2016, “provided that Turkey fulfils all benchmarks required for such a lift”. Available at https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/after-eu-turkey-refugee-deal-perspective-turkey, also see http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_syrian_crisis_en.pdf. 60 Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 20 many EU member states and creates a high potential market for the goods produced in the existing EU countries. “After joining the European Council’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) in January 2004, in a Council decision dated 23 January 2006, Turkey was advised to ‘fully commit at all levels to the fight against corruption, including by strengthening all institutions involved, as well as coordination between them’ (European Council 2006)”.61 Based on this piece of information, one can still argue that granting EU membership to a country often shaken with corruption news is not the only alternative in order to benefit from Turkey’s economic potential. It can very well be used as a market with certain agreements or privileges to facilitate easier trade without bringing in any allegations of corruption which is quite contrary to tightly-observed European governance and administration standards.
Turkey’s Europeanisation is a process with mutual consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to look at it from Turkey’s perspective as well. Obviously Turkey has had to undergo certain reforms and procedures as a part of its official Europeanisation in addition to cultural aspects of the process. On this topic, President Erdogan has numerously repeated that Turkey is performing these reforms for its own sake and not to “please Brussels”. Regardless of who the efforts are for, Turkey still tries to harmonise with Europeanisation process through EU regulations although the efforts have lessened due to anti-Europe policies of the current government. These efforts hint at the opportunities Turkey may have seen in a prospective EU membership.
The benefits of joining the EU are various for Turkey. The foremost one is an economic opportunity associated with the stability of a united democratic system. “The European Union is the world’s biggest capitalist marketplace, the world’s biggest trading power, and – along with the United States – one of the two most influential political actors in the world”.62 Given that, the European Union also provides its members with economic stability by maintaining the free transfer of goods and services. So obviously Turkey would gain new and significant trade pathways as an EU country than as an independent one.
With an EU membership, Turkey would be an active participant in certain critical military and civilian missions or projects conducted by the EU. Such an opportunity would definitely
61 Adaman, Fikret. "Is Corruption a Drawback to Turkey's Accession to the European Union? ." South European Society and Politics 16, no. 2 (2011): 312. 62 McCormick, John. The European Union: Politics and Policies. 5th ed. Colorado: Westview Press, 2013. 21 enhance and strengthen Turkey’s position in the global arena.63 The candidacy process has brought in many needed reforms for Turkey. Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, comprehensive political reforms have taken place. “Important steps have been taken in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, freedom of thought and expression, non-Muslim religious foundations and their rights of acquiring and disposal of property, broadcasting and education in languages and dialects that are traditionally used in daily lives of Turkish citizens”. 64
All European citizens have the right to freely live, work, study and travel in any other EU member states. Therefore, more importantly, Turkish citizens could benefit from social privileges, primarily the ability to travel freely within Europe without any visa requirements. This would create a great social priority for Turkish citizens who wish to make use of many financial and social opportunities created by the EU.
Equality and social inclusion have been crucial European values. The European Union always aims to raise the standards of equality, freedom, secularism, democracy so on. As a member, Turkey could inevitably enjoy these standards on a deeper level. Moreover, becoming an EU member would erase Turkey’s image as a country of “moderate Islam”. Being called a moderate Islamist country is deeply upsetting for a significant part of the population. “For secularist protesters in Turkey, moderate Islam seems to be more dangerous than radical Islam”.65 Therefore, becoming a member could detach Turkey from its Islamic neighbours in the Middle East and bring it closer to a secular and religiously diverse Europe. However, nowadays the voices that criticise EU accession are being heard more frequently in Turkey. These voices usually belong to the nationalist and moderate Islamist part of the community and seem to be gaining political power as the ruling party (AKP) has changed its EU harmonisation policies drastically in recent years.
So far, these points aim to demonstrate possible consequences and motivations of Turkey’s EU membership for both parties. However, so many barriers exist on the way especially taking into account the deceleration in Turkey’s enthusiasm as well as EU’s increasing reluctance due to
63 Aydin, Senem. Türkiye’nin Tam Üyeliğinin Avrupa Birliğine Ve Türkiye Ye Katkıları. Istanbul: İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 2002: 43. 64 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Relations Between Turkey and the European Union,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa. 65 Somer, Murat. "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy." Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1271-73. 22 recent political events. These barriers blocking the pathway to Turkey’s Europeanisation process shall be further discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: QUESTION OF IDENTITY
Assuming that the process of Europeanisation is beyond adopting EU legislation directs us to the question of identity that is essential in understanding how and why identity is a vital actor in Turkey’s failing attempts as well as being a factor in growing negative public reaction from the European citizens whose share similar identity components. This chapters tackles important subjects such as othering through Said’s Orientalism theory. Within Europeanness, the popular arguments regarding national identity overarching European identity are discussed. In order to understand what makes Turkish identity different, it is examined from both the perspective of Europeans as well as Turks with a historical approach touching upon the phases it has been through. Most importantly, the final section ties the topic into the concept of migration as the target group of the research is an immigrant diaspora. This makes it possible to understand identity formation of our target group in better light by assessing how migration might have changed their original identity.
3.1 European identity
Although the concept of an existing European identity is hardly new, recent wave of refugees in the continent as well as the threat of terrorism brought about by the revival of jihadi movements in the Middle East, and xenophobia followed by an increase in nationalism stimulate a renewed debate. The current debate focuses on exploring the extents of Europeanness and who is included in it in contrast to Europe’s others. The reason that triggers such debate might be the shared anxiety of the continent that the age-old “significant others”66 might affect or harm the European society. “The dominant other in the history of the European state system remains ‘the Turk’. (…) ‘The Ottoman’ had the military might, the physical proximity, and a strong religious tradition that made it a particularly relevant other in the evolution of the (…) society that evolved from the ashes of Western Christendom and took up a pivotal position in the forging of European identities”.67 Fighting against the significant other requires a sense of unity and “collective identities can provide existential meaning for people, and can therefore give additional stability during periods of upheaval”.68 Therefore, in this
66 See Smith, Anthony D. Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach. London: Routledge, 2009, concept of “significant other” at https://smerdaleos.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/187370296-anthony-d- smith-ethno-symbolism-and.pdf. 67 Neumann, Ivor. Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation. Vol. 9. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 68 Wintle, Michael. The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography. Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography. Vol. 44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 24 period of stress caused by multiple terrorist acts aiming at Western societies, there seems to be a renewed urge to redefine Europeanness which has created a populist argument placing national identity before the European one.
In the context of European identity, sharing common memories and markers of culture, heritage and history plays a significant role in shaping certain common values for citizens of the European continent. However, it should not be neglected that values that form common identities in any setting are rarely stable and take different forms over time depending on the circumstances and past experiences. As far as its definition is concerned, “identity is a construct often used in social and political discourse that is borrowed from psychology and refers to the way in which individuals define themselves as separate and distinct based on their beliefs, behaviours, and attitudes”.69 Historical heritage, cultural notions, social values and political entities can be listed among the factors that contribute to the process of identity formation. “It (identity) is also a basis for classifying others as members of separate and disparate groups based on differences in beliefs, behaviours, and values”.70 In the light of these definitions, it can be derived that European identity includes a set of norms, beliefs and values but it certainly refers to a broader and changeable concept.
The idea of Europe as a unity with a common identity has been an age-old concept. Therefore, it is no easy task to deeply analyse when it indeed emerged and how it really changed over the centuries. It is also “not a simple question of drawing a geographical line, since its borders have occupied an important role in making of the European identity”.71 Europe as a continent has included and excluded various parts in the circumference of the geographical entity and has been a stage for numerous ground-breaking historical events.
“More important than identity is the process by which the people recognize themselves as belonging together because they come to share, but also modify and reinterpret those values and principles which are the framework within which they pursue their interests and goals”.72 “Focusing on the definition of identity as applied to Europe – a generally positive, non- combative and non-exclusive background feeling of membership and of sharing of some values
69 Samovar, Larry and Porter, Richard and McDaniel, Edwin. Communication between Cultures. 7th ed. Boston: Wadsworth, 2010. 70 Bruter, Michael. Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 71 Mikkeli, Heikki. Europe as an Idea and an Identity, edited by Campling, Jo. 1st ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 72 Cerutti, Ferio and Lucarelli, Sonia., ed. The Search for a European Identity: Values, Policies and Legitimacy of the European Union. London: Routledge, 2008. 25
– historically it can be argued that Europe has had an identity or identities in the past, to which many Europeans have felt a degree of allegiance at various times”.73 As Wintle agrees this European identity certainly exists from outside, in the eyes of the Japanese for example, or even the Americans, in a way that it doesn’t work for other continents. However, it is difficult to convince some people that such values exist due to the fact that “many see it as fundamentally opposed to, and designed to undermine, their national allegiance”.74 Obviously, existence of a common European identity is not doubtful. Yet, defining the line between where national or European identity begins or ends continues to be a challenge.
3.2 European identity vs. National identity
At this point it is significant to bear in mind the concept of overarching identities75 which can embrace national identities without confronting them, in the same way, for instance, as national identity need not conflict with loyalty to extended family or kin-group. In our case, universal values such as gender and religion. do not necessarily have to interfere with one’s European or national values One can very well identify with, for instance, their national Dutch values along with certain aspects of European values which would obviously have similar core principles due to shared heritage. One element of one’s identity can be stronger but it does not mean that they cannot coexist. However, certain opposition to the idea of collective identity is present among the scholars of nationalism. Anthony Smith on the other hand argues that “there is and can be no proper loyalty to a European state, no common myths and symbols, no meaningfully shared common ideology, history or culture.” What is meant by European values does not entail loyalty to a “European state” but to certain set of values that formed as a result of common history and heritage. The difference between cultural identity and national identity should be acknowledged properly. “National identity is founded on the ideology of integration: its aim is to legitimately link the nation with the nation state. [Cultural identity] has several layers: it has elements of cultures, subcultures and countercultures operating side by side”.76 Therefore, cultural identity is highly complex as a concept which bears signs of multiple elements that an individual identifies with. Whereas national identity is structured more around narratives of
73 Wintle, Michael. The Image of Europe: Visualizing Europe in Cartography and Iconography. Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography. Vol. 44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 74 Wintle, Michael. Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present. Perspectives on Europe Series. Aldershot: Avebury, 1996. 75 Smith, Anthony D. "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity." International Affairs 68, no. 1 (1992): 58. 76 Delanty, Gerard. "Is there a European Identity?" Global Dialogue 5, no. 3 (2003): 76.
26 national history and heritage. So, the boundaries of national identity are clearer compared to cultural identity.
3.3 Measuring different facets of European identity
The values that constitute the foundation of European identity are various including symbols, attitudes, institutions and heritage. Within this framework, the European Union can be classified as the leading actor in the institutionalization procedure of the European values. In order to realize and analyse the measures to which such values are internalized by the European citizens, some researchers such as Bruter77 focus on Eurobarometer surveys. Whereas others raise critical views about the survey by stating: “Eurobarometer selects and frames questions in ways that systematically produce “integrationist” outcomes … therefore blurs the line between research and propaganda”.78 All European Commission reports, in the last decade, regarding the views of citizens on Europe (Eurobarometer) cover a part titled “European identity” which gives the percentage of the Union citizens who identify themselves as European. The data provided in a Eurobarometer survey,79 where the proxy measure for European identity is to “feel European”, indicates that 74 per cent of all respondents feel as European and 32 per cent feel European to a great extent. It also demonstrated that 94 per cent of Europeans feel attached to their national identity of the country of their origin along with 91 per cent declaring allegiance to a regional identity. The survey concluded that for Europeans democratic values as a political cultural factor constitute the most significant element of defining European identity. Second one on the list is geography which in a way implies the importance respondents ascribe onto residence within the physical European space. High level of social protection is the next most stressed value on the list. This result can be attributed to the fact that “many individuals base their European identity on the ability of the EU to distribute public goods and social benefits”.80 Another substantial issue often discussed as an evidence to existence of common European values is common history and culture which is pronounced by great many of the participants. These findings provide evidence that some Europeans rely on cultural values to determine their European identity as distinct from the remainder of the world. Bruter carried out a research81 to
77 Bruter, Michael. Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 78 Höpner, Martin and Jurczyk, Bojan. "How the Eurobarometer Blurs the Line between Research and Propaganda." MPIfG Discussion Paper 15, no. 6 (2015): 5 June 2017-17. 79 See Eurobarometer 71. Future of Europe: 2010: European Commission, 2010.at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_future_europe.pdf. 80 Hooghe, Lisbet and Gary Marks. “European Union?” West European Politics 31, no. 1-2 (2008): 108. 81 Bruter, Michael. Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005: 188. 27 prove the existence of European values. Bruter assessed the responses of the subjects to the information or symbols related with Europe and specifically the EU and compared them with the responses given in reaction to national symbols in terms of both political and civic values. The research found out that respondents favoured the use of an EU passport and showed support for European sports teams in international competitions; they also believed that the EU flag should be placed next to their national flags.
Scholars also share similar observations with regards to what kind of values the European identity might include. Paul Valery suggests that “there are three factors which constitute the true European identity: law and order, Christian faith and the critical sprit of Greece”.82 Into this equation, Hoggart and Johnson added “the stress on the significance of critical reason”.83 “Other compilers quote human rights, democracy and government by the people as major values uniting the Europeans”.84 In addition, John McCormick lists “secularism, multiculturalism, abolition of capital punishment and life satisfaction”85 as common European values. Later, the results of the survey carried as a part of this thesis will reveal that these values are considered to be the opposite of Turkish values or the ones that Turkey lacks. Therefore, Turkey is often pointed at as the ‘significant other’ for Europe.
3.4 Turkish identity from the European viewpoint: Othering
After painting a picture of what European identity may look like according to leading scholars of the field, it is significant to position Turkish identity in relation to or in contrast with it. Obviously, it is necessary to note that there are numerous versions of Turkishness defined by various factors such as race, religion, gender, age, geography and history. These constructions of identity change over time and are a result of individual experience. Therefore, this section will focus on more generic and historically evidenced elements of Turkish identity that are relevant in terms of the Europeanisation process.
Turkey’s character is shaped ‘different’ culturally, historically and politically compared to European countries. As European identity is connected to the existence of an ‘other’, this other needs to be inherent of Europe. So, the European representation of that other would be marked
82 Valery, Paul. The European, History and Politics. The Collected Works of Paul Valery. Vol. 10. London: Routledge, 1962. 83 Hoggart, Richard and Douglas W. J. Johnson. An Idea of Europe. London: Chatto & Windus, 1987. 84 Mikkeli, Heikki. Europe as an Idea and an Identity, edited by Campling, Jo. 1st ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 85 McCormick, John. "Habermas, Supranational Democracy and the European Constitution." European Constitutional Law Review 2, no. 3 (2006): 398. 28 by this very fact. Othering has been a mechanism to produce identity and maintain it which applies at individual and group levels. Appointing someone or a group as the other forms a fundamental step in collective identity construction as well as national identities. From this perspective, Europeanness or identities in general gain meaning within social constructionist terms. For a better understanding of Turkey’s position as a significant other against Europe, Said’s Orientalism should be studied. He defines Orientalism as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the “Orient” and most of the time “the Occident”.86 This signifies the fact that oriental societies play a vital role in shaping collective European identity by means of ‘us’ (Europeans) against ‘them’ (non-Europeans).87 Othering also deals with power relations. In that sense, Oriental communities are formed as the uncivilised other and become the tool to confirm the rational European identity.88 Even though Turkey shares common memories with Europe, Turkey as a country in close proximity to Europe and a representative of the Orient serves as a ‘significant other’ or the ‘other within’ for European identity. “Because of its character and preconditions, it is not to be expected that in future, Turkey will be able to transform itself into a ‘European country’, since a mere technical, economically and institutionally oriented ‘Europeanisation’ is not sufficient”.89 For instance, in Burke’s conception, there is no room for the Turks in the European cultural order and he sees it as “wholly Asiatic”.90
Even though Turkey can manage to Europeanise itself in certain aspects, it might never achieve to transform its Turkish identity into a Europeanised identity. The answer to the question of whether Turkey culturally belongs to Europe or not cannot be found in Berlin nor Paris, Amsterdam or Rome, but only in the very roots of Turkish identity. So, the next section examines the roots of it.
3.5 Turkish identity from the Turkish perspective
Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, people living in the region that is now Tukey were the subjects of the Sultan. Only a selected few could be part of the ruling elite. Religious, regional
86 Said, Edward. Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. 87 Ibid. 88 Edgar, Andrew and Peter Sedgwick. Key Concepts in Cultural Theory. Key Concepts Series. London: Routledge, 1999. 89 Giannakopoulos, Angelos. "What is to Become of Turkey in Europe? European Identity and Turkey’s EU Accession." Perceptions SAM 9, no. 1 (2004): 60-61. 90 “He had never before heard it held forth, that the Turkish empire was ever considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe. They had nothing to do with European power; they considered themselves wholly Asiatic… They despised and condemned all Christian princes, as infidels, and only wished to subdue and exterminate them and their people.” Burke, recorded in Hansard 1816: vol. 28, cols. 76-77. 29 and ethnic pluralism was slightly evidenced via millet system.91 The Sultan was also the caliphate of Islam which assigned a great deal of significance on the role of the Ottomans in the eyes of the Muslim communities in the Middle East. “The Ottoman Empire declined through a combination of imperial overstretch, internal corrosion, external powers, and because it did not industrialize fast enough, while others did.”92 So, the Sultan had to cede power to the liberal Young Turks in the beginning of the 1900s. By the time Atatürk’s plan to replace sultanate with a nation-state and modernise the society was in action, the social and economic development of the new republic was almost 100 years behind the European countries. While the efforts of Kemalism continued to bring reforms that aim at Europeanising the society that has been under Eastern influence for centuries, Islam continued to be strong symbol in the Turkish identity. The crescent in the Turkish flag is a religious symbol, implying the continuity of the Ottoman period as well as the red colour symbolising the blood of the martyrs who died for the land as a very obvious representation of nationalism. These two elements seem to play a significant role in the formation of Turkish identity. Atatürk’s secularism principle tried to tone the religious voices down and give everyone religious freedom. Even though principle of secularism is still present by law, one can easily imagine the street pressure in a country like Turkey where 98 percent identify as Muslim. That is why even though these standards that mainly originated in Europe exist in Turkey, the practice and the support from the majority of the society is lacking.
Turkey’s landmass is situated on Middle East, Europe, Asia, Black Sea and Mediterranean regions which brings along certain pros and cons. Being affected by cultures of such diverse regions, Turkey is enriched and diversified culturally and ethnically. Turkish politics heavily depends on Turkish nationalism whereas 15-20 percent of the population is constituted by the Kurdish community. In addition to the Kurdish group which also includes ethnicities such as Zazas and Assyrians who speak their own language, Armenians, Greeks and Circassians each constitute about 1 percent of the population.93 Recently, Syrian refugees as well make up a certain percentage in Turkish population. When categorised into religious groups, 98 percent
91 “According to the Quran, Christians and Jews were people of the Bible who were not forced to convert to Islam but allowed to live under the Muslim arrangement with certain prohibitions while practicing their religion and paying the cizye and military exemption tax. The Ottomans allowed the “religions of the book” to be organized in millets: The Orthodox Christians or Rums, the Armenians, and the Jews. Non-Muslims had to be part of a millet to be considered citizens of the empire. In the 19th century, millet additionally came to denote such modern concepts as nation and nationality.” in Efrat Aviv. “Millet System in the Ottoman Empire”, Islamic Studies. (2009) DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195390155-0231. 92 Wood, Steve. "Turkey and EUrope: Identity and Other Crises." Turkish Studies 14, no. 2 (2013): 280. 93 Wood, Steve. "Turkey and EUrope: Identity and Other Crises." Turkish Studies 14, no. 2 (2013): 283-4. 30 of the Turkish population is listed as Muslims, 25 percent of whom identify as Alevi94 and most Alevis do not like being counted among the Muslim population as they do not fully accept and follow the essential rules of Islam. Armenian and Orthodox Christians, and Jews combined constitute 2 percent. Constantly pressured under themes such as ethnic and religious difference, President Erdogan proclaims that all groups are “equal and first-class citizens” in his speech that ironically starts out by saying “my dear Muslim brothers and sisters”.95
Discussion of identity is a one of the favourite concepts in Turkish political agenda as there are many ethnic and religious minorities in the country. “Implicit rather than emphasized in some studies, a dichotomy of republicans, loyal to the Kemalist state, and people who prioritize religious (predominantly Sunni Islamic) values or doctrine as guiding principles, has become the predominant theme in scholarly inquiry, media commentary, and diplomatic observation, rivalled only by the Kurdish issue”.96 However, the results of a 2006 survey are interesting: 67 percent of the respondents said that they identify more with modernisers than fundamentalists. 16 percent said the opposite. 63 percent of the respondents said that they see no conflicts between being a devoted Muslim and living in a modern society while 29 percent argued the opposite. When it comes to which identity component is overarching, 43 percent saw themselves as first Muslim then Turkish. As for democracy, 43 percent of people expressed their opinion that democracy was only suitable for the West.97 These results can signal the inclinations of typical Turkish identity traits which of course are not valid for everyone but still provides a degree of insight.
Briefly, Turkish identity has undergone profound changes over the centuries from the Ottoman era until today. Turkish identity bears the traces of Eastern and Western cultures with many conflicts and fusions between the two. The Ottoman state system was multi-ethnic and did not let the division between religious or ethnic minorities and the common Ottomans disappear thereby retained separate ethnic and religious identities within itself. Following the fall of the
94 “The Alevis of Turkey are one of the largest, most mysterious, and least familiar religious minorities of the Middle East. their adherence to Islam is in doubt. They have little use for the Qur'an which they believe is missing hundreds of verses. They do not attend mosque, and they ignore many of the Islamic regulations. Alevis had a rough time of it during the Ottoman period but their status improved with the Republic, which they enthusiastically backed. A profound change took place in the 1970s, when a new generation of Alevis, growing up in the cities and well-educated, turned to leftist politics as a hallmark of their identity” in a review by Daniel Pipes (2000), Middle East Quarterly, Olsson, T. et al. (1988), Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives, Swedish research Institute in Istanbul. 95 (Hürriyet Daily News, January 4, 2011). 96 Wood, Steve. "Turkey and EUrope: Identity and Other Crises." Turkish Studies 14, no. 2 (2013): 272-291. 97 Ruby, Robert. Can Secular Democracy Survive in Turkey?. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2007 at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/470/can-secular-democracy-survive-in-turkey. 31
Ottoman rule after the WWI, newly founded Turkish Republic took on a unitary approach that encouraged even forced separate cultures within its borders to mix together and form a single national and cultural identity. To a certain degree, it can be argued that this idea of mixing different groups under defined values could not achieve cultural homogenisation, instead resulted in contemporary conflicts that involve Muslim and conservative culture of the Anatolia (region that falls on the Middle Eastern region of Turkey) against cosmopolitan thinking and lifestyle of the western part of the country mainly including Istanbul. Even though Turkey is listed as one of the most westernised out of majority-Muslim countries, it is clearly seen that there is a huge identity clash between Turkey and the European states. Turkey still has a long way to go in terms of strengthening certain aspects of its common identity such as democracy, secularism, liberty, respect for human rights. No matter how much bureaucratic harmonisation is achieved, it will not be possible for Turkey to finalise its Europeanisation process fully until these values are deeply entrenched into Turkish identity. Nevertheless, people who identify with characteristics of Turkish identity may go under changes after migrating to a different location. In the next section, the effects of migration on identity construction shall be discussed further.
3.6 Rethinking Identity in the Context of Migration
The selected target group for the investigation of the question of this thesis is Turkish immigrants in Europe and it is essential to understand the components or evolution of their identification in order to interpret the results of the questionnaire that they replied to. Therefore, assuming that these people would fully identify with Turkish identity or European identity would not be fair as identity can take different forms depending on various factors such as time or place. This section will analyse if and how immigration affects identity formation in general.
Migrants can serve as a specifically useful lens through which Europeanisation processes can be viewed from two ways: “by providing a view from the outside as in the case of those who have left the continent, or by providing a view from the margins of the European societies within which they live”.98 Within this framework, Turkish immigrants in Europe or Euro- Turks99 provide a lens that enables us to see the individual Europeanisation processes of people
98 Logemann, Jan. "Europe – Migration – Identity: Connections between Migration Experiences and Europeanness." National Identities 15, no. 1 (2013): 7. 99 The name used in the research done by Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat. "Euro-Turks: A Bridge, Or a Breach, between Turkey and the European Union?" Istanbul Bilgi University Centre for Migration Research, 2004. 32 who are daily engaged with Turkey but also look at it from an outside perspective within a European setting.
At the moment the Turkish immigrant diaspora constitutes the biggest migration group in Europe. This process dates back to the World War II. After the WWII, Europe was experiencing a period of post-war economic crisis followed by an economic expansion policy.100 This period required a range of hand-skilled jobs as well as a workforce that was consistently available which led to creation of guest worker programs within a legal framework. Despite facing with hardships including “low wages, loneliness, unattractive working conditions, and near- guaranteed potential for overt discrimination”,101 Turkish guest workers remained undeterred from the pursuit of living in Europe. This was mainly due to housing, job and service shortages in Turkey in 16900s and 1970s. Compared to their relatives back in Turkey, it can be argued that they chose “being among the wealthiest in their communities, with their children having much better educational opportunities than they did”.102 The journey that started out as a seasonal work agreement extended with the rising number of family reunification procedures and due to employers who did not wish to send these guest workers back after paying for their transportation, training and integrating them into their workplace. Even though their work permits expired, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy acknowledged the growing number of requests from the Turkish guest workers and their employers and agreed to establish “councils and ombudsmen for migrant affairs that deal with bilingual education, school busing, remedial employment programs, and affirmative action policies”.103 These establishments were in hopes to incorporate a ‘troubled’ population as deemed a threat by the native Europeans at the time into the European lifestyle. This immigration trend continued as more workers brought over the rest of their family members and more got married to wives from Turkey “because Turkish women from local German communities were considered to be too Western”.104 That explanation alone can prove that within the Turkish immigrant community, people realise the changes in their identity formation. These families continued to have children and brought along young children who were
100 Sari, Ö. (2003). Migration and Development: The Case of Turkish Migration to Germany. German Policy Studies, 1-17. 101 Katzenson, E. (2016) "The Patterns and Impacts of Turkish Immigration to the European Union, “Claremont- UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2015, Article 6. 102 Sari, Özlem. "Migration and Development: The Case of Turkish Migration to Germany." International Journal of Academic Development 5, no. 2 (2003): 14. 103 Martin, Philip. "EC-92 and Immigration Issues in Europe." In Defence of the Alien 14, (1991): 43. 104 Mueller, Claus. "Integrating Turkish Communities: A German Dilemma." Population Research and Policy Review 25, no. 5/6 (2006): 425. 33 inevitably exposed to European way of life instead of Turkish. For some, these second generation immigrants were assimilated whereas for others their integration was a success. No matter how excellent their German is, they would still be seen as immigrants which leave their integration process wounded. While at the same, the Turkish relatives that they left behind never fully believe that they did not assimilate into Europeans. Therefore, Euro-Turks seem to be a group of people struggling in a vicious cycle of deciding who they really identify with and where they belong to.
The dialectic interaction between social categorisation which refers to categories that form borders between us and them and self-representation which indicates interpersonal differentiations is a significant issue in terms of analysing the effects of migration.105 According to some researches,106 even though recognising one as belonging to a group generates membership, it is never definitive or absolute. Mainly because individuals prefer varying ascriptions as self-defining in dissimilar situations, migration being one of the most obvious example of such situations. Without a doubt, assigned roles, expected behaviours evolve across place and time; so does the representation, perception and definition of identity. This type of shift is especially explicit in the context of migration. Jenkins argues that the better description of identity would be “something that individuals do rather than have”,107 as a product of process not property. Following the social constructionist approach,108 identity results from negotiating given conditions, institutional frameworks and social contexts. Therefore, identification patters among immigrant groups vary to a great extent ranging identifying with country of origin, mother tongue, religion or the host culture or both. In a migration context ethnicity and religion become particularly significant as markers of identity as they can be appropriated in a subjective manner.109 However, most immigrants depict their integration process into their new environment as a “total event”110 as often total reconstruction of identity is inevitable. When immigrant leave their original homeland, they also leave behind their social status, financial status, community networks and acquaintances which they would have to rebuild from scratch
105 Deaux, Kay. "Reconstructing Social Identity." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19, no. 1 (2016): 4. 106 Stryker, Sheldon and Serpe, Richard. "Identity Salience and Psychological Centrality: Equivalent, Overlapping or Complementary Concepts?" Social Psychology Quarterly 57, no. 1 (1994): 32. 107 Jenkins, Richard. Social Identity. 3rd ed. London: Taylor&Francis, 2008. 108 Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of of Knowledge. Penguin University Books. Penguin University books; repr ed. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972. 109 Verkuyten, Maykel and Yildiz, Ali Aslan. "National (Dis)Identification and Ethnic and Religious Identity: A Study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33, no. 10 (2007): 1448–50. 110 Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. London: Cohen & West, 1966. 34 in their new community where they have no history whatsoever. Faced with an unknown public sphere full of meaningless images, feeling lost and alone without a reference is a common starting point for almost every immigrant. The life immigrant live can be described as a line between idealisation and disillusionment in both of the homes that they try hard to attach themselves to. Their identity is bound to change at the borderland they live in which creates an undone situation of not yet belonging here but also no longer there. People still dare to face such difficult emotional conditions.
Most immigration acts, or specifically Turkish immigration to Europe, aims to increase the standards of one’s life. As discussed previously, Turkey seems to be lacking in certain areas such as freedom, human rights, social or political stability, rule of law, and secularism, immigrants see European countries as an escape into a better life of opportunities for their children and families. This is a factor that keeps these people going further persistently despite all the hardships.
One of the factors that make the shift in identity harder for Turkish immigrant diaspora is the issue of religion. Immigrants in Europe still appear more marginalized than ‘others’. With the effect of the 9/11, the shift from ‘immigrant’ to ‘Muslim’ has been even sharper. The “presupposed anti-modernity of Islam”111 is thought to be imbalanced with the standards of democratic, secular and progressive Europe.112 Moreover, especially Muslim women in a migration context are often portrayed as victims of their ethnic culture, oppressed by patriarchal structures of their community which is an indispensable element of Middle Eastern societies, including traditional Turkish family structure.113 The hijab is considered to be a marker of disinclination to Europeanise or integrate with the European community. On the other hand, for some Turkish immigrants wearing hijab, covering their head is a way to visually demonstrate their original identity even though they learn the new language, go to school and live a relatively integrated life. So veiling can be seen as a vital practice in constructing a heterogeneous identity which can be defined as “identity performance”,114 exhibiting one’s identity components.
111 Buitelaar, Marjo. "‘I Am the Ultimate Challenge’." European Journal of Women’s Studies 13, no. 3 (2006): 259-276. 112 Erel, Umut. "Gendered and Racialized Experiences of Citizenship in the Life Stories of Women of Turkish Background in Germany." Chap. 8, In Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Europe, edited by Andall, Jacqueline. 1st ed., 155-176. Oxford: Berg, 2003. 113 Okin, Susan Moller. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? edited by Nussbaum, Martha and Cohen, Joshua and Howard, Matthew. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999. 114 Klein, Olivier and Spears, Russel and Reicher, Stephen. "Social Identity Performance: Extending the Strategic Side." Personality and Social Psychology Review 11, no. 1 (2007): 32-34. 35
It is clear that identity is not something that we are born with, it is rather something that the societies we live in or the conditions we face with shape over time and across place. Having in mind that each individual can shape their identity with whichever component they find more relatable, it is possible to generalise certain aspects of a group identity just like it has been done for European identity or Turkish identity. However, obviously Turkish immigrants or immigrant groups in general tend to integrate with their new environment through a range of shifts and changes in their identity construction. While the possibility of EU membership for Turkey seems far-fetched, it is good to note that EU is already faced with the Turkish immigrant diaspora, the largest non-EU minority in Europe with substantial numbers in countries such as Netherlands, Germany and France. The identity processes of this group is significant in terms of showing an example of what it would look like if Turkey made it past the doors of the EU as well as providing an insight into what Turkey’s Europeanisation process looks like on community level.
In the light of these information, understanding the concepts of Europeanness and Turkishness as well as how identity is formed under the effect of migration will play a significant role in interpreting the stance of Turkish immigrants living under the shade of European identity in the following sections of this thesis.
36
CHAPTER 4: OBSTACLES IN TURKEY’S EU INTEGRATION
Throughout 1990s, the European Union was discussing its policy priorities. Possible options were either widening which was means the possibility to expand to the Eastern Europe by the end of the Cold War or deepening which refers to strengthening political integration within the existing Union to build on achievements of the Maastricht Treaty.115 By 2004, the EU decided to carry on both of the strategies and in May 2004, ten new members joined the union which became the largest expansion in its history. By December of the same year, Turkey started its accession process which has been seen by many as the most troubled process so far. Although it is a far-fetched possibility, prospect of Turkey’s membership presents many challenges and obstacles. Most explicit and common shortcomings on the way include arguments that it is too populous, too poor, too Middle Eastern, too authoritarian and too Islamic compared to Europe. So obviously, arguments are framed around democracy, and geographical, economic, cultural, political and religious concerns.
4.1 Issue of Geography
Presumably the weakest argument that provides an obstacle in Turkey’s Europeanisation process is the geographical argument. Principally, this criterion was resolved when Turkey became a candidate and started negotiation process; therefore, there is no official basis for a geographical argument. “D’Estaing’s theory that ‘Turkey is not a European country’ … does not bear much weigh today”116 within a geographical framework.
Although 95 percent of its landmass is located in Anatolia, which has been geographically called Asia Minor or the Middle East, Turkey has a small portion of its territory in Southeast Europe. This territory neighbours Bulgaria and Greece. Even though it is not the capital city, Istanbul is located right at the Bosporus Strait connecting the continents of Europe and Asia. The largest city in Turkey, Istanbul being home to more than 14 million people,117 serves as the modern metropolitan face of the country. In 2010, Istanbul was chosen as the European Capital of Culture. Apparently, Turkey has much reason and evidence to be geographically regarded within European continent.
115 Kubicek, Paul. "Political Conditionality and European Union's Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey." Democratization 18, no. 4 (2011): 926. 116 Tarifa, Fatos and Adams, Benjamin. "Who’s the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering Europe should Let Turkey in." Mediterranean Qarterly 18, no. 1 (2007): 52-74. 117 According to data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute, reached at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do. 37
If the argument on geographical grounds is taken as the primary obstacle in Turkey’s success in the European accession process, what about the Southern Cyprus and Malta in the Mediterranean? The list of similar examples can be extended with French Guiana in South America, or Dutch Antilles in the Caribbean whose citizens are officially EU citizens but have no geographical proximity to Europe. As a matter of fact, there has been no official rejection to Turkey ever from Brussels unlike Morocco whose application was rejected due to geographical objections by the European Council.
The geographical positioning of Turkey is a given fact. Turkey has been home to Eastern Roman Empire and many important figures of the Christian narrative which are significant elements of European cultural and historical heritage. Also, it is without a doubt that Turkey could completely transform geopolitical and strategical footprint of Europe and improve its role in the global politics. For some, this is not enough of an advantage when compared to the cons Turkey would come with. Nevertheless, whether Turkey is European or how much it belongs to Europe by the same token as Georgia or Ukraine is beyond the reach of geography and enters the zone of political assessment along with cultural analysis. So, it is more about the perceptions of Turkey and what it is associated with rather than where it is situated.
4.2 Issue of Demographics
Turkey is a big country with a population of almost 80 million people.118 The concern about the demographic balance within the EU is an interesting argument. The argument is not limited to the number of population but also the constellation of it. The factors such as Islam and economic instabilities that come within the demographic package of this heavily populated country shall be discussed in the next sections.
In the less likely case of Turkey’s EU membership, it would soon become the most populous country in Europe leaving Germany behind which would completely alter the balance of power in the European Parliament whose seats are proportioned according to the population of each member state.119 Therefore, Turkey could attain an enormous power over shaping European policy making processes based on the fact that the EP has the authority to control the EU budget. Briefly, Turkey demographics create an obstacle that concerns many European states in terms of preserving the existing balance of power and not giving the last say to a highly contested
118 Exact population of Turkey is 79,814,871 according to 31 January 2017 report published by TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute) available at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do. 119 For more, see the section ‘Allocation of Seats’ in the Composition of the European Parliament by the EP via http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/583117/IPOL_IDA(2017)583117_EN.pdf. 38 country like Turkey when it comes to policy making decisions. However, Turkey’s young population could also be turned into an economic benefit in an aging European workforce. The economic concerns shall be the topic of the next section.
As mentioned in the second chapter, Turkish demographics also come with a wide variety of ethnic and religious minorities including Kurdish, Zaza, Alevi communities. Addition of such different minorities to the EU might also present a challenge for an already minority-rich Europe in terms of producing new minority policies.
120 Table 1: List of European Union Member States by Population
4.3 Issue of Economy
The Europeanisation process of such a large country like Turkey obviously raises economic questions in mind. Even though it is already in cooperation with the EU as a member of the customs union, the Turkish economy is far from stability; it struggles with high rates of public debt and unemployment as well as an instable banking sector. Despite efforts of the government, the inflation rate is growing in addition to the decrease in the value of the Turkish Lira against currencies such as euro and USD.121
The agricultural sector holds the highest potential as it employs 35 percent of the working population. However, it is estimated that Turkey’s accession would annually add 13,8 billion
120 Source: Population on 1 January 2016 by Eurostat accessed via ec.europa.eu/eurostat. 121 “The currency, which lost 17 percent against the U.S. dollar during 2016 to claim the title of the second- worst performing emerging market (EM) currency for the year after the Argentine peso, saw its woes increase further following the publication of a critical note from credit rating agency Moody's” via news titled “Turkish lira plumbs record lows against the dollar on economic and political fears” by www.cnbc.com (10.01.2017). 39
USD to the EU’s farm subsidy bill122 which is regarded as a burden for many Europeans. European citizens objected such a burden and demanded EU diplomats to take their opinion into consideration.
As for the GDP (gross domestic product) per capita of Turkey in comparison to other candidate countries was not lower than the GDP of the East European countries who survived the communist era as seen in the table provided below.
In the light of this piece of information, we can argue that Turkey could also progress as much as these other candidates at the end of the process and become a desirable market for foreign investment provided that there was also sufficient political stability. Currently, many European states are also struggling with stagnant growth and unemployment. That is why providing financial aid for Turkey’s economic growth which is supplied through European tax payers is not desirable at all.
Another economic concern for European citizens which was not raised for other candidates is the massive Turkish immigration that might happen. Obviously, Turkey differs greatly from the 10 countries that joined the union in 2004. Aside from its social structure, Turkey’s population and territory is even bigger than ten of them combined. One German foreign ministry official once stated humorously that “Berlin is already the second largest Turkish city in the world. We do not want it to become the largest”.123 Europeans fear that the Turkish population will flood the European countries to seek employment therefore limiting the natives’ chances of finding one as under the Treaty of Nice, citizens of EU states can freely work, live and travel within the EU.
However, the Turkish population is very young apart from being large and growing compared to the aging and shrinking populations of many European countries. In this situation where
122 Ahto Lobjakas, “EU: Union Struggles to Contain Turkey Accession Debate,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 10 September 2004. 123 Cited in Wiarda, Howard J. “Where Does Europe End Now? Expanding Europe’s Frontiers and the Dilemmas of Enlargement and Identity.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 12, no. 1 (2005): 93-4. 40
Europe is facing a demographic deficit,124 Turkey’s population could be used in the benefit of Europe’s development. Wanting to benefit from that also requires having a more multi-ethnic approach to the issue of European expansion which is up to European citizens themselves as the taxpayers. However, the obstacles do not end with the economic drawbacks. The factors affecting Turkey’s failure is much more complex.
4.4 Issue of Human Rights and Democracy
Violating democracy and human rights are the primary reasons why Turkey currently fails at reaching the European standard. Turkish government ruled by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has implemented numerous reforms in efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and align with European social and legislative standards at the start of the Europeanisation process, however this is not effective nowadays. Among those reforms were abolition of death penalty,125 prohibiting torture in prisons, permission to broadcast TV programs in Kurdish126 and so on. At the time, during his speech at Oxford University on 28 May 2004 Erdogan explained their efforts as making “European values Ankara’s values”.127 As actions speak louder than the words, many Europeans are still sceptical about Turkey’s commitment to the Europeanisation process which is currently stated by the government officials to be fading away compared to the efforts in the beginning of the 2000s.
Although Turkey has shown willingness to a certain degree, improvement of human rights remains a huge block in the Europeanisation process. This is mainly due to the observation that Turkey’s efforts are just skin deep and Turkey’s values indeed do not match with those of Europe. Values such as democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, gender equality are entrenched in the European identity as a result of many historical experiences Europeans shared together which has been explained further in the previous chapter. Regardless of Turkey’s proximity to the continent, as a Muslim and partly Middle Eastern country, Turkey watched the
124 “According to the UN Population Division, today less than 12 percent of the population of the globe lives in Europe, and UN projections indicate that by 2050 less than 7 percent will. By the end of the twenty-first century Europe’s population will make up less than 4 percent of the population of the world.” Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. The Last Days of Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007: 67. 125 “Turkish parliament abolished the death penalty except in times of war on 3 August 2002. On 9 January 2004 Turkey signed protocol 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, including during wartime.” Quoted in Tarifa, Fatos and Adams, Benjamin. "Who’s the Sick Man of Europe? A Wavering Europe should Let Turkey in." Mediterranean Qarterly 18, no. 1 (2007): 67. 126 “January 2, 2009 Turkey has launched its first 24-hour Kurdish-language TV station in what the government called a democratic new era for minority Kurds” via http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2352569 127 Reached at www.sant.ox.ac.uk/areastudies/lectures/Erdogan.pdf 41 periods like the Renaissance or Reform from a distance. Therefore, Turkey has not walked the exact memory path as other European countries. So this scepticism among Europeans is in a way proven with the criminal charges Turkey takes against many journalists for their liberal opinions.128 In a country where high school students are arrested for writing their opinion against corruption allegations about Erdogan and his cabinet, the concept of democracy of human rights can only exist in the text books.129
Under the European influence, one of the major steps taken was the end of the fight between Turkish arms and PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). In the period between 1980s and 90s, Turkey managed to suppress the rebel actions of PKK which also brought along many incidents of torture and other human rights abuses against the Kurdish minority in the country. Under the watchful eye of the EU and its representatives following Turkey’s harmonisation process, the government had to take steps in protecting cultural rights of the Kurdish minority such as opening the Kurdish TV channels and allowing Kurdish lessons at some universities. As a result of this somewhat positive scene, the Kurds managed to open up their political party and represent their ideas in the parliament. However, with the change in Turkish government’s EU policies, the Kurdish party leaders have been in prison130 since the wave of arrests after the coup attempt on 15 July 2016 which is such a disgrace for any democratic country. The list of human rights and democracy abuse can be extended further as it is a daily occurrence in Turkey. However, given the positive steps taken in the beginning of the Europeanisation process, it can be argued that the process was definitely a winning proposition for Turkey’s democratic improvements. Knowing that the actions of the government is being closely observed urged Erdogan’s government to be more careful with what they promote in their policies. Now that the process has been so long and torturous for both sides, the unwillingness of the Turkish side
128 (23 March 2017) “Scores of imprisoned Turkish journalists face a Kafkaesque nightmare of legal limbo, farcical charge sheets, maltreatment and even solitary confinement in the country that locks up more reporters than any other in the world.” Via https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/23/turkish-journalists- solitary-confinement-maltreatment-jail. 129 (25 December 2014) “Turkish police have arrested a 16-year-old high school student in the city of Konya on charges of insulting President Tayyip Erdogan… He slammed the ruling AK Party government and Erdogan personally over corruption allegations, as a crowd surrounding him chanted "everywhere is bribery, everywhere is corruption".” Via http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-teenager-erdogan- idUSKBN0K30KO20141225. 130 (4 November 2016) “Turkey arrests pro-Kurdish party leaders amid claims of internet shutdown: Selahattin Demirtaş, HDP co-leader known as the ‘Kurdish Obama’, held with at least 11 MPs as post-coup crackdown continues. The two joint leaders of Turkey’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic party (HDP) have been detained along with at least 10 MPs because of their reluctance to give testimony for crimes linked to “terrorist propaganda”. Via https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/turkey-arrests-pro-kurdish-party-leaders- mps.
42 often creates disputes with the European side such as the recent Dutch-Turkish crisis131 following the Syrian refugee crisis.
Turkish democracy and abuse of human rights is the biggest obstacle in Turkey’s Europeanisation process as it affects not only the governance of the country but also the values it is mentioned together. Lack of implementation of democracy and preserving human rights lies at the core of the stagnation of Turkey’s Europeanisation process. Breaking the scepticism in Europeans’ minds under the shadow of all these news of undemocratic actions seems far from happening. All there is left is the hope that Turkish government finds the willingness again to integrate with Europe and thereby improve the situation of democracy and human rights in the country which is urgently needed for the sake of political and social stability in Turkey.
4.5 Religious Concerns
As a matter of fact, religion does not play an official role in the decision process of the EU, yet for many Europeans the question of whether a Muslim country such as Turkey would fit in or blend with the European community. Whether the Turkish Islam is indeed compatible with European perception of secularism, democracy and human rights is a significant question. Although religion is never a criterion within the framework of Copenhagen criteria, particularly after the 9-11 attacks in the USA the concerns about Islam and Muslim world have increased in the western world. This has contributed to the hesitation about whether Turkey’s Islamic structure is coherent with the European cultural and political structure.
In official surveys, Turkey’s population is often announced to be 99 percent Muslim. However, it is significant to note that the government officially recognises only three religious minorities; namely Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Jews. Rest of the population is counted as Muslim which is ridiculous for a so-called secular and democratic country. As mentioned previously in this thesis, the Alevi minority132 (almost 20 percent out of 99 percent) is also included in the Muslim category despite following none of the requirements of Islam. According to the “Religious Life in Turkey” research carried out by the Turkish Presidency of
131 (15 March 2017) “Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been intent on rallying the roughly 4.6 million expatriate Turks living in western Europe to vote in an upcoming Turkish constitutional referendum. The Dutch barred the diplomat from entering, also pointing to security concerns. Erdogan accused the country of Nazism and likened the Netherlands to a "banana republic." He also called for sanctions adding that "Nazism is still widespread in Europe”. Via http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/13/europe/turkish-dutch-tensions-explained/ 132 Alevi rituals include men and women praying together through poetry, oratory and dance. Turkish government considers Alevism as a heterodox sect of Islam. 43
Religious Affairs,133 only 42.5 percent of the population worship according to Islamic rules. The rest identify as Muslims but do not practice any of the requirements. Obviously, the concept of Islam is very different compared to other Muslim countries in the Middle East. Turkey has somewhat managed to modernise itself and let the women in veils and miniskirts walk alongside. However, it is not enough to prove that Islam is not effective in the public sphere and the mind of the Turkish citizens. Even though they do not practice it, as a part of their cultural upbringing, most people take offence in anything said or done against Islam which is often manipulated by the government.
As for Europe, the EU defines itself as a system of values and actions based on freedom, democracy and human rights as well as respect for cultural and religious diversity. At first glance, there seems to be no reason to exclude a country on the grounds of religious difference. However, the cultural and religious aspects of the debate about Turkey’s failure in Europeanisation process is frequently depicted as a dispute between the group who sees the EU as a Christian club and those who are more tolerant towards a “religiously pluralistic identity”.134 Nevertheless, it can be suggested that rejecting Turkey’s accession is not only based on the idea of preserving a Christian Europe but it has also become a symbol that carries the domestic European angst particularly towards Islam and politics of religion. In line with this argument, Casanova states that “the public debates in Europe over Turkey’s admission have shown that Europe is actually the torn country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer the question whether European identity, and therefore its external and internal boundaries, should be defined by the common heritage of Christianity and Western civilization or by its modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, political democracy and tolerant and inclusive multiculturalism.”.135
Religion as an effective factor in a nation’s cultural structure plays a significant role in culture related arguments as well. For instance, Turkish leaders often state that they are ready to fulfil economic and political criteria but not specifically cultural ones which was also voiced by the enlargement commissioner Rehn as such: “it will be a very long and difficult journey, European values need to become reality in all walks of life, in all corners of the country, before Turkey
133 Religious Life in Turkey research results via Presidency of Religious Affairs, https://diyanet.gov.tr/en/home. 134 Hurd, Elizabeth S. "What is Driving the European Debate about Turkey? ." Insight Turkey 12, no. 1 (2010): 185-186. 135 Casanova, Jose. "Long, Difficult and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization." Constellations 13, no. 2 (2006): 240-41. 44 can join the European Union”.136 However, it is never clear what is meant by the European values apart from certain concepts of ideas as it is changeable for any individual in different contexts as discussed previously. For some, the Christian heritage of the continent is certainly among those values and Turkey has simply become one of the reflectors and case studies of such arguments.
Huntington defines Turkey as a classic example of a “torn country”, a country with a dominant Muslim culture whose leaders wish to shift it towards the west.137 For him, such task is not possible to be fulfilled. For a Muslim country to completely shift to the western ideals of civilisation, first of all political and economic leaders should be supportive of such a move. Second, public needs to be willing to redefine its identity. And lastly, the elements of the “host civilisation” in this case Europe should be open to embrace the “convert”.138
In the case of Muslim Turkey, it fulfilled the first criterion by voluntarily making reforms in the beginning of the process. But current situation is what matters and it seems that the willingness has disappeared greatly. Secondly, Turkish public does not seem at all to be willing to redefine its values according to Christian heritage of the European continent, instead building more sympathy for their Ottoman roots which was a rival for Europe. Thirdly, the host community or in other words European citizens do not show any interest in embracing Turkey as obvious from the results of many surveys which shall be further discussed in the next section.
4.6 Negative Public Opinion
Degrees of support for European integration and enlargement varies greatly within the EU. Although policy making process does not allow any direct public involvement, generally decisions are made in parallel with what is acceptable for the majority of the European citizens.139 Therefore, public opinion especially towards certain candidates influences and frames the official decisions of the EU. Uniting or enlarging the scope of the European continent seems far from being complete with candidates like Turkey waiting in line in addition to the fact that this type of policies has lost their priority position in the agendas of many European
136 During a press conference on 30 June 2005, via http://www.abig.org.tr/en/ “Turkey Must Embrace EU Reforms ‘In all Walks of Life.’ 137 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, N.Y: Simon & Schuster, 1996: 144-9. 138 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, N.Y: Simon & Schuster, 1996: 144-9. 139 Eriksen, Erik Oddvar and Fossum, John Erik. "Democracy through Strong Publics in the European Union?" JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 3 (September, 2002): 420-21. 45 countries. Turkey case in particular faces a complexity. Previously, fulfilling the accession criteria was sufficient which no longer is true.140 Now, the process is more complex; “understanding the links between public opinion and enlargement is indispensable for assessing the integration capacity of the EU”.141 In line with this argument, this section will take a look at the public opinion as an obstacle in Turkey’s Europeanisation process.
It is obvious from the literature and public surveys that the European citizens have never been too excited about the enlargement policies of the EU.142 However, with the increasing scepticism towards the whole of the EU project itself among Europeans, the support has hit the bottom. Within this framework, perceptions of the European citizens towards Turkey has become significant.
In the previous sections, the possible pros and cons of Turkey’s Europeanisation have been discussed from both perspectives. However, none of the advantages that may be gained with Turkey’s accession to the ‘club’ seems to be effective in changing the negative public opinion. In order to explain this, “McLaren suggests that group conflict over resources explains the European public’s attitudes towards Turkey’s accession to the EU”.143 Moreover, there are some factors that solely apply to Turkey’s case. Economic or geographical concerns might apply to any country in the process of EU accession. However, Turkey’s specific case is more than EU-isation and also has to do with culturally and politically Europeanisation. In this framework, perceived cultural differences sets Turkey apart from rest of the candidates as it is the only one with a big Muslim population. This fact feeds into the concerns about invasion of political Islam in Europe. “Public support to Turkey’s accession seems to be shaped by the interplay of the perceived material costs, specifically loss of resources to a group thought to be alien, and feelings of hostility to the foreign”.144 So, it can be said that identity and norm based
140 Hatipoglu, Emre and Muftuler, Meltem and Karakoc, Ekrem. "Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’s EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis." Maxcap Working Paper Series 4, (2014): 8-10. 141 Toshkov, Dimiter and Kortenska, Elitsa and Dimitrova, Antoaneta and Fagan, Adam. "The 'Old' and the 'New' Europeans: Analyses of Public Opinion on Enlargement in Review." MAXCAP Working Papers 2, (2014): 3-41. 142 Eichenberg, Richard C., and Russell J. Dalton. "Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration." International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 507. 143 McLaren, Lauren. "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU." European Union Politics 8, no. 2 (2007): 267-9. 144 Hatipoglu, Emre and Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and Karakoç, Ekrem. "Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’s EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis." Maxcap Working Paper Series 4, no. 1 (2014): 23-24.
46 factors combined with prospective material costs and cultural gap lie at the centre of negative public perception towards Turkey.
Understanding the extent of negative public opinion, surveys that provide numbers and percentages play a significant role. Eurobarometer145 surveys carried out by the European Union itself are an excellent source for that purpose.
The table below demonstrates the level of general public support from the European countries for Turkey’s EU accession which is beneficial in portraying a general image of the support level.
Member states Support for Turkey’s Opposition to Turkey’s accession Accession Germany 21% 74% Austria 10% 80% France 21% 70% Netherlands 39% 53% Spain 42% 33% Greece 26% 74% Cyprus 16% 80% Finland 31% 66% Table 2: Public Support in the European Union for Turkey’s Accession.146
This figure proves that SEE countries that started their journey around same time as Turkey all had higher rates of support compared to Turkey which adds to the reality of how acutely sceptical Europeans are of Turkey’s ability to integrate with Europe.
When the European citizens were interviewed about why they think Turkey does not belong to Europe in Eurobarometer 66.1, they were all unanimous in that Turkey lacked in respect for human rights and needed to improve its economy as well as the fact that cultural differences were too much to handle. Also, three fourths of the citizens stated that they expect an increased wave of migration from Turkey if the process continues. Interestingly, as seen in the table
145 “The Standard Eurobarometer was established in 1974. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to- face interviews per country. Reports are published twice yearly. Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged.” Via http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm. 146 Source; Support for enlargement data from EuroBarometer 79.3, 2013. Support for Turkey’s accession data from EuroBarometer 63.4, 2005, QB2.12. 47 below, majority of the citizens believe that Turkey partly belongs to Europe historically and geographically. In line with the previously discussed positive contributions that Turkey could make, citizens agree that Turkey would rejuvenate European population and strengthen its security policies by opening up the doors of the Middle East as is seen the table below.
Table 3: Citizens’ Attitudes towards Different Propositions About Turkey.147
So basically, in the light of these surveys, respect for human rights, cultural differences, economic gap and the concerns about immigration seem to be the main sources of the objection. Many European citizens fear that their national culture would be under threat through the shift in demographics as a result of immigration from Turkey. Some researches illustrate that such fears about losing their culture turn citizens into Eurosceptics148 as well as the fact that cultural factors have a stronger effect on attitudes towards European integration than economic ones.
It is also important to realise where the cultural concerns stem from. It may refer to various areas of culture such as language, value systems or religion. In Turkey’s case, religious difference is very well suited to explain the great amount of scepticism from the European citizens when compared to attitudes towards other countries. According to the European Values Study,149 many European citizens have negative opinions towards Muslims rather than immigration itself from countries of other faiths. It can be assumed that European fear that the
147 Source: Gerhards, Jürgen and Hans, Silke. "Why Not Turkey? Attitudes Towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries." Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 4 (2011): 741-743. 148 McLaren, Lauren. "Public Support for the European Union. Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?" Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 (2002): 551-566. 149 Strabac, Zan and Listhaug, Ola. "Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe: Multilevel Analysis of Survey Data from 30 Countries." Social Science Research 37, no. 1 (2008): 268-70. 48 values Muslims live with are fundamentally opposed to their own values such as secularism and gender equality by for instance urging women to wear head covers and not sending children to co-ed schools and so on.
Briefly, the European citizens have a negative perception of Turkey’s Europeanisation process mainly due to cultural differences which are harder to integrate than political or economic differences. Still, the considerable effect of political conditionality should not be neglected either. Therefore, negative public opinion is the biggest hindrance in the process that cannot be overlooked.
49
CHAPTER 5: STANCE OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE
The thesis so far has tried to illustrate generally academic opinions about Turkey’s troubled Europeanisation process. However, this chapter will analyse the stance of the Turkish diaspora living, working and establishing families all over Europe as a result of migration. Currently, Turkish immigrants are onto third generation most of whom prefer to identify as European but do not deny having emotional or cultural ties with Turkey. These people are exemplary in the sense that they are familiar with what European integration entails on an individual level. Also, Turkish immigrant diaspora is highly significant as they observe the whole story from an in- between position, living in Europe but also interacting continuously with Turkey. Despite the community’s alleged integration efforts, very strong and popular stereotypes prevail in each member state defending the idea that Turkish community does not fit socially, culturally, politically and economically into the European public sphere. Even though the portrait each immigrant paints is different depending on their education, background or occupation, these stereotypical arguments stem from the ways in which Turkish immigrants have been perceived in Europe for decades. Such perceptions include ideas like “Turks are radically Islamist, nationalist, culturalist and conservative; that the Turks in Turkey are looking forward to seeing the opportunity to flee to the EU once the full membership is done; and that Turks do not have a democratic political culture based on equality, human rights, free market economy and participation.”.150 The voices of the host European communities have been the topic of numerous research in the field of European and migration studies. However, the stance of the Turkish diaspora in Europe is often neglected. Observing the whole situation from both Turkish and European media outlets, personally experiencing the outcomes of positive or negative steps in the process, the opinion of the Turkish community in Europe matters greatly in terms of providing an angle different than local politicians or academicians. Therefore, in this section the perceptions of the Turkish immigrants in Europe will be evaluated through a series of questionnaire questions.
5.1 Aims of the research
This study aims to investigate how Turkish immigrants living in Europe perceive Europe and Turkey as well as the Europeanisation process that has been going on for Turkey for decades. In line with this aim, social, political and cultural discourses of Turkish diaspora in Europe
150 Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat. "Euro-Turks: A Bridge, Or a Breach, between Turkey and the European Union?"Istanbul Bilgi University Centre for Migration Research, 2004. 50 concerning Turkey-Europe relations will be mapped out. Immigrants with Turkish origin form a rather heterogeneous group in Europe with regards to their purposes of migration in addition to their political, ethnic, religious or cultural dispositions. Therefore, one of the strong premises of this study was that this diverse group would both pose support and reservation when it comes to perceptions concerning Turkey and Europe and the Europeanisation process as a whole. Understanding the general stance among Turkish diaspora in Europe may help us figure out the possible outcomes of what would happen if Turkish people were to become a citizen of the EU and tried to integrate with European norms of life. Another premise of the present study is to find out whether this group of immigrants can contribute to the argument about Turkey’s Europeanness. If it is true that Turkey shares common values with Europe, then these people should perceive less difference between the two as a group exposed to both of them. Having in mind that diasporic movements in Europe regarding Kurdish and Alevi issues revived the political agenda in Turkey, another aim would be to analyse if there is a certain trend of ideas that could form a diasporic movement in Europe that might possibly revive the Europeanisation process for Turkey.
5.2 Profile of the target group
The target group for the study is the immigrants of Turkish origin who reside in a European country. Generally speaking, there is a common belief among Europeans that Turkish immigrants and their children do not integrate into cultural, social and political life in the countries they settle in. However, the Euro-Turks research151 displays that Turkish immigrant diaspora in Europe put a lot of effort into integrating with Europe by learning the language or working. Yet, interestingly their opinions regarding Turkish politics and religion in general become more conservative compared to their relatives they leave behind in Turkey.152 In one way or another, “contemporary Turkish origin migrants and their descendants in Western Europe can no longer be simply considered temporary migrant communities who live with the ‘myth of return’, or passive victims of global capitalism who are alienated by the system and swept up in a destiny dominated by the capitalist West”.153 On the contrary, Turkish immigrants are permanently established in Europe with their families and businesses. While this group faces a great amount of prejudice by Europeans, Turkish people even invent a new word to describe
151 Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat. "Euro-Turks: A Bridge, Or a Breach, between Turkey and the European Union?" Istanbul Bilgi University Centre for Migration Research, 2004. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 51 them which is ‘almancı’154 in order to stress their alienation from their origin. So the target group of the study suffers from an ‘in-between’ syndrome suggesting that their identity is neither fully in line with Europe nor Turkey.
As for the specific features of the participants of the study, it consists of 50 people who migrated to Europe from Turkey for various purposes. Among these purposes are family reunification, study, “political reasons” and employment. It is significant to note that 60 percent of the participants had lived in the big cities of Turkey namely Istanbul, Ankara, Bursa and Izmir before they migrated to Europe. The rest of the participants stated that they had migrated from cities like Tunceli, Sivas, Mersin, Bingol located in the East Anatolian region of Turkey which is less developed economically and suffers more from terrorism.
The participants are not limited to a single European country as their place of residence. So the target group’s countries of residence range from Austria, Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, the UK to Greece. As for their occupations, 30 percent of the participants are students, the rest involves labourers, teachers, project managers, cooks, e-commerce managers and unemployed people. In addition, the age group ranges from 18 to 55. Also, the gender distribution is equal in the group with 25 women and 25 men which was not done intentionally but happened to be the case. The target group aims to demonstrate the diversity within the immigrant diaspora. In such a diverse group with very distinct backgrounds, it is hoped to come across many different opinions and various perceptions regarding Turkey’s Europeanisation process which may in the help us specify certain trends.
5.3 Methodology
The survey has been carried out in multiple steps, In the initial step, an extensive literature related to the situation of Turkish immigrants in Europe and Turkey’s Europeanisation process has been studied. From the data included in these literature, certain assumptions have been mapped out as to what kind of trends might be specified from the answers of the participants and whom to include in the survey and what questions to ask them. In the next step, the questions have been prepared in the form of an online questionnaire155. The questions were written both in English and Turkish providing a chance for participants to answer in Turkish more comfortably. The questionnaire consists of two sections: personal questions section which
154 It can be translated as ‘German-like’ but refers to all Turkish immigrants in Europe. The term comes with many stereotypes regarding from their way of clothing to their accent. 155 The online questionnaire can be reached via https://goo.gl/forms/AS3blXGr99LSZvWa2. 52 helps categorise the participants in terms of their age, occupation, and country of residence. Whereas the second section involves subject specific questions regarding their perceptions of Europe and Turkey which help determine any trends of thought. The participants were asked to provide clear and brief answers to all questions most of which asks for a number of key words that come to their mind. After collecting the answers from the participants, the final step deals with the translation of the answers given in Turkish, grouping and evaluation of the findings to come up with a conclusion.
The findings have been grouped into three categories namely group’s perceptions about Turkey and Turkish values, perceptions about Europe and Europeanness and finally the EU membership. This is done so as an attribute to previous chapters discussing literature related to identity and EU accession in order to display whether the Turkish immigrants agree/disagree or construct a separate line of argument. The questions related to each category have been analysed individually.
5.4 Perceptions on Turkey
This part mainly focuses on how the respondents perceive Turkey and associated values. Turkish immigrants’ perceptions on Turkey is generally shaped by factors such as their background, social status, length of stay in Europe. In addition, from the data provided by the participant answers, Turkish immigrants seem to have quite rational and reflective perceptions about Turkey.
What would you consider typical Turkish values?
This question was generally replied to within a cultural, religious and political context. In terms of culture, participants named “hospitality, family-oriented, not valuing science and culture, collectivism, sincerity, tourism, traditionalism, food culture, warm people, traffic”. Among these, hospitality and traditionalism were mentioned by 40 percent of the participants. Interestingly, having a collective identity was also written by 20 percent of the respondents. So, tradition, hospitality and collective identity formation seem to be the main trend in explaining typical cultural elements of Turkish values.
Religion constitutes another significant framework for Turkish immigrant diaspora in Europe. According to the participants in their own words “religious ignorance, religious injustice, religious pressure under the name of modern Islam, having more mosques than schools, bigotry, piety” form part of Turkish values. So religion is often used next to negative concepts such as
53 injustice, pressure or ignorance. This is a similar ideology presented in the previous chapter about the huge obstacle that religion creates as well as being a source of negative public opinion.
Within the political context, Turkish immigrants mention “too much interference, censorship, peer pressure, lack of individualism, injustice, mixed society, nationalism, being paranoiac in election period, heroism, unity and solidarity, patriotism, inequality” among Turkish values that define Turkey for them. This touches back on the vital lack in democracy and human rights in Turkey. Even though these concepts exist in the Turkish constitution as essential values, the answers also indicate the lack of implementation which is parallel with the EU progress report156 on Turkey.
It is interesting to note that immigrants whose views are more positive about Turkey in general compared to their opinions regarding the EU or Europe, seem to state more positive features or stay neutral by only touching upon “hospitality, family orientation, nationalism” or in another case “religiousness and sincerity”. On the other hand, immigrants who criticize Turkey’s Europeanisation efforts in the following sections seem to state more negative aspects of Turkish values such as “censorship, religious pressure, injustice, lacking individual identity”.
What characteristics make Turkey European or not?
Whether Turkey is European or not is often studied from the perspective of Europeans. This time, Europe’s Turkish residents were asked to evaluate that. Interestingly, the highest degree of consensus was reached in the answers to this specific question. 70 percent of the participants directly responded with one word being “none”. Others stated some conditions in order for it to be European such as “democracy should come first”. One person suggested that only “Istanbul” makes Turkey European, a few participants touched upon “geographical position” making it European. Exceptionally, 6 percent of the people argued that “it does not have to be European, it is great the way it is with its cultural variety and educated population”.
The stance of European citizens as well as the academic discussion surrounding Turkey’s Europeanness have been discussed before which all pointed at the fact that even though Turkey has a shared past and geographical proximity with Europe, its values and cultural patterns do not necessarily fit into European norms. The trending opinion among Turkish immigrants in Europe seem to be very much in line with the same thought. Having seen and experienced both
156 For the key findings of the report see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6039_en.htm. 54 cultural realms, they too agree that Turkey does not indeed have many characteristics that make it European.
The answers to this question may be a great source for understanding how Turkish immigrants define Europe from an insider perspective. Reflecting back on the previous section on Othering, the respondents generally perceive Turkey as the ‘other’ implying that Europe is whatever Turkey is not. They also highlight the issue of democracy and human rights which was mentioned above as the core problem in Turkey’s Europeanisation process. Majority of respondents argue that Turkey has to work on its democracy before this question can even be considered.
If you moved back to Turkey, would your quality of life change? If so, in what aspects?
Life in Turkey differs greatly from life in Europe from the way streets look to the purchasing power of people. Among many concerns regarding Turkey’s troubled Europeanisation process are economic standards and quality of life. European citizens do not find the standard of life quality present in Turkey compatible with the European quality of life.
The responses from the Turkish diaspora ranged from “would never go back” to “it wouldn’t change”. However, the percentage of people who say that they would never consider moving back is quite high in comparison to the other end of the scale. Former statement came from 80 percent of people who also added that if they did go back, “it would be hard to re-integrate, I would be a victim to unlawful prosecutions, it would negatively affect my financial status, I would lose many social rights, my freedom as a woman would be gone, I would not be able to write and criticise freely” and so on.
So another trend that is easily specified in the questionnaire is the fact that Turkish diaspora does not consider leaving Europe and believe that quality of life in Turkey is considerable low compared to Europe which again proves the perceptions of European citizens who fear many Turkish citizens would immediately migrate to Europe for better opportunities in case it was granted membership.
The respondents mention concept of “re-integration” which refers back to issue of migrant identity formation discussed in Chapter 2 under effects of migration on identity. Immigrants integrate via adopting new identity components. If they were to go back to their homeland after integrating with their host land, this would constitute a new struggle to re-integrate. This line of thought observed in the responses display that their homeland is not native to them anymore
55 which strengthens the argument that this group’s stance is unique in terms of the position they are in. Being daily associated with Turkey, yet not feeling fully native about it due to effects of new identity formation.
5.5 Perceptions on Europe
This section discusses what Turkish diaspora thinks about their home, Europe from an in- between perspective.
Turkish immigrants residing in Europe have very strong observations about Europe as well as Turkey. Their perspective is highly significant as they look at the situation from an insider position. They do not seem to be essentialising Turkey as a place for return. On the contrary, they classify Turkey and Europe in terms of their advantages and disadvantages for their safety and wellbeing. When questioned, Turkish immigrants in Europe seem relatively objective in deciding which place is more beneficial in terms of education, opportunities, human rights, freedom and values.
Generally, Turkish immigrants perceive Europe as superior to Turkey in terms of advocating for modern values. In that sense, respondents agree with the arguments mentioned in the chapter about European identity. Obviously, what they perceive living in Europe is more positive when it comes to human rights, freedom, secularism and social rights which have been mentioned as products of common European history in addition to being main concepts of the European identity constructed through EU policies.
Name 5 keywords that define Europe for you.
Answers to this question indicate that when it comes to what defines Europe and Turkey, Turkish immigrants in Europe observe opposite concepts which are typical of Europe or Turkey. 90 percent of the respondents state “freedom, democracy, human rights, education, European Union, discipline” as their common answer to the question. Interestingly, these are the concepts which they find inadequate or problematic in Turkey. So, when compared to the answers given for perceptions on Turkey, the main keywords that come to their mind when Europe is pronounced is at odds with the keywords that define typical Turkish values for them. In addition, they seem to perceive the European Union as a value that represents Europe for them which is also the case for Turks living in Turkey.
The responses hint at two concepts discussed earlier. One is the definition of Europeanness and the other is EU as the representative of European values. Regarding the first one, they define
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Europe as a land of democracy, freedom, human rights and strict legislation all of which appeared previously in this thesis as obstacles in Turkey’s Europeanisation process. So, instead of constructing a separate trend, Turkish immigrants follow the same observations as the academic literature. Or one may think they are influenced by media outlets that generally broadcast similar ideas.
As for the second finding, the respondents mention the EU as a common keyword that define Europe for them. The extent of such perception was discussed in Chapter 3. The EU can be seen as the representative of constructed European identity as well as European legislation which is what immigrants are mostly exposed to during the whole migration process governed mainly by EU policies. Therefore, their inclination to state EU as a European value is sensible. However, they seem to neglect that there is also a cultural and individual side to identity which EU alone cannot represent. Respondent seem no disregard this argument explained previously. Seeing that Turkish immigrants consider being an EU member as a criterion for Europeanness strengthens the fact that they do not see any similarities between Europe and Turkey as they have stated previously for the question about what makes Turkey similar to Europe.
What makes Europe similar to Turkey?
This one as a follow-up to the previous question tries to highlight whether they see any resemblances between Turkey and Europe. Obviously in the previous question Turkish diaspora in Europe agrees in general that what Europe is associated with does not match the situation in Turkey. 80 percent of the participants simply stated that there is “nothing” similar between the two without any further explanation. On the other hand, some think that “they share a common history; types of urbanisation are similar”. 10 percent of the respondents stated that “only southern Europeans share similar values with Turkey such as food and friendliness”.
Briefly, two trends can be identified from these responses: one being that Turkish immigrants in Europe commonly agree that there is nothing much that can be considered similar in both places. Second one is that they have a shared past and geographical closeness which results in similarities in food and behaviour.
Referring back to obstacles in the process (Chapter 4), Turkish immigrants touch upon the issue of geography which I have argued to the least important compared to cultural struggles. In line with academic arguments, respondents state that there is a geographical proximity which they consider to be a similarity. Interestingly, responses highlight urbanism as a similarity which was not highly stressed previously apart from mentioning Istanbul as a metropolitan city being
57 no different than a European city. This line of argument is later conflicted when respondents indicate that Turkey’s “lifestyle” is a reason why the EU accession has not succeeded. This might show us that Turkish immigrants make a distinction between the urban look of cities and the real urban lifestyle. Even though Turkish cities look and feel European, immigrants argue that the life residents live in them is not similar to European lifestyle.
5.6 Perspectives on the EU membership
Having in mind that the Turkish immigrants in Europe consider European Union as an indicator of Europeanness as well as a European value, last part of the questionnaire focuses on analysing the perspectives towards Turkey’s Europeanisation process through its EU membership process.
Why do you think Turkey has not been granted EU membership?
The common answers to this question include the following: it has not been and cannot be an EU member due to “its religion, political system, lack of democracy and human rights, its lifestyle”. These are the most common points stated in the answers. However, respondents who also think more positive about Turkey’s current situation seem to state that it is due to the fact that “Turkey would change the balance of power in the EU and it is a Christian club”. One participant who is a postgraduate student in Italy argues that “Turkey barely carries anything common with Europe in any aspect: economically, culturally, geographically”.
Once again, Turkish immigrants display quite an objective stance towards Turkey’s EU membership in line with general academic discussions surrounding the issue. They commonly highlight lack of values that are typical of Europe in addition to religion being a major issue from both perspectives.
Interestingly, stereotypical arguments regarding Turkey’s failure in the process as well as issue of lacking common values reappear. As previously discussed in the thesis, the most problematic areas are about democracy, rights and religion. However, this is the question under which almost all respondents mention religion as a reason of failure. Issue of religion is one of the most stressed by the European citizens as a source of fear for losing their native culture. However, despite mentioning it here and there, Turkish immigrants mention religion most strongly in the answers about EU membership. This might hint back at the argument about the EU being a “Christian Club” which is a term often used by Turkish media as an excuse for failing at Europeanisation. Such a response could demonstrate that Turkish diaspora follow
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Turkish media and get influenced rather than following arguments of European media. They seem to be associating Europe with being Christian in a similar way that Europeans associate Turkey with Islam as mentioned previously in the section about Eurobarometer surveys.
Should Turkey become an EU member? Explain why.
Having been born in a non-EU country and living in an EU country, this time the questionnaire aims to find out respondents’ subjective opinion. Turkish immigrants in Europe seem to have different opinions regarding this question. 60 percent of the people state that “it should not be as it has much to sort out; its economy and democracy are not mature enough; Europeans would not want any more migration from Turkey; it cannot be an EU member because it is a Christian club; they should only collaborate economically but not culturally”. Two of the respondents go on to say that “Turkey should seek a membership at a Middle Eastern or Arabic union” instead of striving for Europeanisation in vain. While the rest state that Turkey should become an EU member but all of these respondents tie it up to certain conditions such as “Turkey should comply with EU criteria; work on its democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, eradication of corruption”. The group who are in favour of Turkey’s EU membership also expect many positive contributions from such a membership such as “Turkey would improve its democracy and economy, Turkish people deserve living in a free country; membership would bring the totalitarian regime in Turkey to an end; it would provide religious and ethnic minorities with more rights”.
All of these ideas demonstrate that Turkish immigrants in Europe also see the EU membership as a positive contribution for Turkey just like many living in Turkey however they are still aware of the conditions that need be realised. Moreover, the ones who do not agree with Turkey’s EU membership stress the importance of values that Turkey lacks which have been discussed throughout this study. Obviously there is a perceived misfit in values and culture among Turkish immigrants.
It is also interesting that the remarks of the respondents regarding Turkey’s EU membership reflect many of the issues brought up by the Turkish media such as the contributions it would provide. Therefore it can be argued that the Turkish media partly forms the “habitats of meaning”157 of the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Similar to the ideas mentioned in the previous
157 This notion belongs to Ulf Hannerz. Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. London: Routledge, 1996. It is understood in relation to the existence of local and global together at once. Media outlets generally have a significant impact on the formation of habitats of meaning. 59 analysis about EU being a Christian Club, media also provides a lens through which the whole process is viewed and Turkish immigrants sometimes take up that lens to interpret the situation.
What should Turkey do to integrate with Europe?
Answers to this question mainly highlight the conditions mentioned in the previous section. One respondent generally summarises the general perspective in her own words: “Censorship, secularism, freedom of speech, and human rights should be reconsidered and Turkey has to regulate itself to be a social state in order to provide equal standards for its people. This would change the main political problems that directly have impact on individuals' lives. Then other cultural differences between Europe and Turkey could just stay as cultural diversity that should be appreciated.” All of the participants agree with the aspects that Turkey should work on in order to integrate itself with European standards. However, this respondent nicely argues that such efforts would only correct political problems and as argued in this thesis cultural differences which are argued to be the main hindrance in the process would prevail.
Overall responses to this question lights up the remark of Casanova quoted158 in in Chapter 4 where Casanova argues that cultural identity is what divides Europe and the whole debate about Turkey’s admission to the EU opens up the question about limits of European identity as well as European tolerance and inclusiveness. So as the respondents state, Turkey has to work on its political reforms to integrate with Europe. Yet, the extent of the problem is beyond political reforms and enters the realm of cultural integration. At that point, not only Turkey’s ability to culturally modify and adapt itself but also limits of Europe’s cultural acceptance come on stage and play a vital role.
Only when the cultural gap can be appreciated as a part of European cultural policy of diversity then Turkey can fully be accepted within Europe. Otherwise, political efforts would not be enough to turn Turkey’s Europeanisation failure into a success story.
158 “The public debates in Europe over Turkey’s admission have shown that Europe is actually the torn country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer the question whether European identity, and therefore its external and internal boundaries, should be defined by the common heritage of Christianity and Western civilization or by its modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, political democracy and tolerant and inclusive multiculturalism.” Quoted in Casanova, Jose. "Long, Difficult and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization." Constellations 13, no. 2 (2006): 246. 60
How do you perceive current Turkish government’s attitude towards EU accession? Has it improved or decreased?
Turkey’s EU accession has been an unsteady process over the years under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) rule. The process which started out as an exciting project that led to formation of a new ministry159 and creation of various government policies in efforts to Europeanise Turkey instead of following the same path as countries with high Muslim population in the Middle East. However, less than a decade Turkish government’s current attitude toward Europe seems to be unenthusiastic. Erdogan and his government often disagree with EU regulations and values which they utterly criticise. During such disputes, Turkish authorities call out to Turkish diaspora in Europe to protest their host countries to support Turkish government which was the case in the recent Dutch-Turkish crisis160 where a Turkish minister wanted to give an election speech in Rotterdam without the permission of the Dutch government. So, it can be argued that Turkish diaspora is often manipulated by the Turkish government in Turkey-Europe relations. Therefore, their opinion is significant in understanding the government’s attitude.
95 percent of the respondents say that “Turkish government’s efforts have decreased due to their intentional policies”. In addition to worsening, one of the respondents from Germany argue that “Turkish government uses the anti-Europe discourse as a way to gain more votes”. Rest of the respondents state that “it does not matter how much they try, in the end Turkey will never be a part of the EU”. Once again, Turkish immigrant portray a generally objective view of the current situation where the Turkish government does not care about EU accession as much as it used to.
In conclusion, attitudes of the Turkish immigrants in Europe can be divided into two groups: one that finds Turkey faulty in terms of the values it promotes and the other seeing Europe as the exclusivist club that brings them welfare. The percentage of the first group dramatically outweighs the second one. The group who sees Turkey responsible for the failing process is much bigger than the group who argues that Europe is an exclusive Christian club and no matter what Turkey does they will never let it in. General findings of the questionnaire can be explained as follows:
159 Republic of Turkey, Minstry for EU Affairs was founded on 29 June 2011. See http://www.ab.gov.tr/ 160 See the news for more information https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/turkey-summons- dutch-envoy-over-riot-police-tactics-in-rotterdam. 61
The general trend among the target group is that they see Turkey’s policies to be faulty and European values as something that Turkey should strive for and improve. However, the same group also finds Turkish government’s efforts and enthusiasm to do so as declining which implies that they do not see any possibility for Turkey to become an EU member any time soon.
Another interesting finding would be that the target group’s ideas stated in the form of keywords coincide with the general academic discussion. For instance, the values they associate Turkey and Europe with are very much in line with the points discussed previously in this thesis. They see Europe as representative of democracy, human rights, rule of law, respect, equality, freedom and so on. Whereas they associate Turkey with hospitality, Islam, strong family relations, collectivism and censorship.
The Turkish immigrant diaspora in Europe also generally agree that Turkey and Europe do not share much in common therefore Turkey is not a European country. Their opinion in this topic is significant as they have experienced life in both places and had a better chance to observe both.
Another trend concluded from the responses would be that they see Europe as a land full of opportunities for them. Almost all of the respondents state that they would never consider moving back to Turkey and they see EU membership as a saviour for the Turkish population living in Turkey in terms of improving their standards.
Overall, the stance of the Turkish diaspora in Europe seems quite in line with what has been discussed previously in the thesis. Turkey’s Europeanisation process is currently halted due to declining efforts to align with EU legislation, the shift from positive to negative in Turkish foreign policy towards European countries and the general public and academic opinion which demonstrates that Turkey is far from being European due to the values it represents. As long as the vital improvements in democracy, human rights and preserving secular culture do not take place, Turkey will find itself faced with the bleak and chaotic destiny of its neighbouring Middle Eastern countries.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This thesis has tried to shed light onto Turkey’s Europeanisation process through analysing attitudes of Turkish immigrants living in Europe. Following a thorough overview of related literature and carrying out a questionnaire, the thesis has reached some conclusions which might contribute to the discussion regarding Turkey’s troubled Europeanisation process.
Overall, the thesis has tried to tackle several crucial questions which have helped construct a stable background in order to understand the outcomes of the questionnaire more profoundly. These questions include the following: Europeanisation, EU-Turkey relations, identity in relation to migration, Turkey’s Europeanness, the extent of EU’s representativeness, possible prospects of Turkey’s membership and common obstacles that hinder the process. On the basis of these discussions, the last part has dealt with the responses given to the questionnaire.
In this thesis, Europeanisation was considered not only from an EU-isation perspective but specifically from a cultural perspective implying that European values of democracy, freedom, human rights, equality and secularism should be more important than simply adopting EU legislation in Turkey’s case. I have argued that Turkey needs to do more than just adopting EU legislation. The actual struggle is to construct a bridge over the cultural and identity gap between Europe and Turkey.
The study also argues that Turkey’s identity struggle has broader European and historical frames. Sharing a history together that dates back to Roman and Ottoman Empires is not enough to defend the idea that Europe and Turkey today share common identity traits. Current circumstances and government policies shape the identity components of Turkey which seem to be facing eastwards rather than the West. However, the disputed nature of Turkish identity would not mean that there is by comparison a definitive common European identity which is manufactured by the efforts of the EU institutions.161 Therefore, the thesis also argues that although Europeans share a common past and now a union that shapes most of the public and political sphere, individuals are more attached to their national identities and may identify with different components of European or national identities.
In efforts to assess how European Turkey is, the thesis considers various factors such as geography, culture, history and opinions of other European states. I suggested that Turkey has
161 Delanty, Gerard. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.
63 a dualistic culture which is inspired by both the Middle Eastern and European elements. It shares Islam as a common cultural and religious trait with the Middle Eastern countries while the lifestyle in its metropolitan cities looks as modern as any European city. It is confirmed in the thesis that Turkey definitely shares historical and geographical ties with Europe but being labelled as European requires far more than these two factors. As long as Turkish cultural and social spheres miss out on essential European values, European citizens would never identify Turkey as a member of their union.
These points that affect the extent of how European Turkey can be considered are the same points that construct an obstacle in Turkey’s Europeanisation. The thesis formulates this discussion around issues of geography, demographics, economy, human rights and democracy, religion and public opinion all of which are the main topics of argument in Turkey’s troubled and failing process of Europeanisation.
This discussion has been studied from various perspectives such as Turks living in Turkey, European citizens, government officials and academic experts in the field. However, as a populous group stuck in between both cultures, Turkish immigrants’ opinions are often neglected. Due to their specific position, living in Europe and constantly being in touch with Turkey allows them to possibly open up new lines of thought. Therefore, questions related to the academic discussion surrounding Turkey’s failing Europeanisation process were asked to them with hopes to understand how they perceive the whole process. The questionnaire revealed certain trends of thought among the target group. Parallel to academic arguments, deficiencies in democracy, human rights and secularism are seen as the main obstructions in the process. In addition, the feedback confirms that immigration can rebuild one’s identity as the respondents identify more with European way of life rather than their home country.
Overall, the attitude towards Turkey’s Europeanisation process among Turkish immigrants in Europe does not seem to be optimistic. They generally agree that the hopes for Turkey’s possibility to Europeanise itself are long gone whether it be culturally or politically as a result of the recent decline in Turkey’s enthusiasm as well as the rising negativity in the European continent towards aggressive religious movements rooted in the Middle East. However, it is good to note that the Turkish diaspora in Europe is exemplary in the sense that they know what Europeanisation entails on a personal level, their stance derived from this thesis can be seen as a starting point for future academic research to analyse the possible outcomes of Turkey’s overall Europeanisation.
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So, although Turkey’s EU membership or discussion of Turkey’s Europeanness is no longer a political or academic priority, it will always be in Turkey’s benefit to keep its foot in Europe’s door. Otherwise, if Turkey moves away from reaching for high standards of European values, the future seems as dark as the obscurantism that has captured many Middle Eastern countries. As the attitudes of Turkish immigrants in Europe suggest, the possibility of success for Turkey’s Europeanisation seems far away. Yet, as the founder of modern Turkey from the ashes of Ottoman monarchy and caliphate, Atatürk suggested Turkey should continue to attempt to raise its national culture above the level of contemporary civilization for a brighter and more democratic future.
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