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Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz With contributions from Hope LeBeau, Cynthia Lobosky, Ya’ara Barnoon, Susan Sypko, David Tohn, Jessica Reitz, Tamara Klajn, Sarah Miller and JP Schnapper-Casteras. The Intelligence and Policy Project Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Fax: (617)495-8963 Email: [email protected] Website: http://belfercenter.org Copyright 2009 President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America Design: Tim Duffy The co-sponsors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly state: Reproduced from Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community (Cambridge, Mass: The Belfer Center, Harvard University, June 2009). With contributions from Hope LeBeau, Cynthia Lobosky, Ya’ara Barnoon, Susan Sypko, David Tohn, Jessica Reitz, Tamara Klajn, Sarah Miller and JP Schnapper-Casteras. Satellite image by GeoEye. Dear Friend, Your work as a lawmaker is one of the toughest and most rewarding jobs in the country. During the course of your service on Capitol Hill, you will undoubtedly need to consider legislation and issues relevant to national security and the Intelligence Community. Your responsibility to oversee the Intelligence Community will not be easy, but I am confident that you will find extraordinary opportunities to protect and pursue America’s interests around the globe. My friends at the Harvard Kennedy School and I strongly believe that an understanding of the inner architecture of the Intelligence Community will allow you to serve the country more effectively. The Community’s size and complexity, however, often confuse and stymie lawmakers attempting to understand intelligence issues. As the 9/11 Commission Report noted, “Few members of Congress have the broad knowledge of intelligence activities or the know-how about technologies employed.” This briefing book attempts to provide you with the foundation to improve your knowledge of intelligence issues. The memos in this book give you important basic information about the Intelligence Community and outline the central issues you will likely encounter during your time in Congress. Although new and unforeseen challenges will certainly arise during your tenure, the ideas presented in this book will provide you with a general framework on many of the issues you will encounter. I thank you for your service. Sincerely, Bob Graham The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | The Harvard Kennedy School Table of Contents Background Memos Intelligence Basics 10 Organization of the Intelligence Community 14 Congressional Oversight of the Intelligence Community 18 The Congressional Authorization and Appropriation Processes 24 Informing Congress of Intelligence Activities 28 Covert Action 32 National Intelligence Estimates 36 Defense Intelligence 40 Domestic Intelligence 44 Intelligence and International Cooperation 50 Issue Memos Intelligence Reform 56 Interrogations and Intelligence 62 Electronic Surveillance and FISA 68 Cyber Security and the Intelligence Community 74 Overhead Surveillance 78 The National Interest, Energy Security and the Intelligence Community 82 Terrorist Safehavens and the Intelligence Community 86 The Role of Private Corporations in the Intelligence Community 88 The USA-PATRIOT Act 92 State and Local Fusion Centers 96 Sources 100 Acknowledgments 114 About the Authors 115 Background Memos Intelligence Basics 10 Organization of the Intelligence Community 14 Congressional Oversight of the Intelligence Community 1 The Congressional Authorization and Appropriation Processes 24 Informing Congress of Intelligence Activities 2 Covert Action 32 National Intelligence Estimates 36 Defense Intelligence 40 Domestic Intelligence 44 Intelligence and International Cooperation 50 Intelligence Basics Intelligence is a critical tool lawmakers often use to assess issues essential to U.S. national policy. Understanding the complexities, mechanics, benefits and limitations of intelligence and the Intelligence Community (IC) will greatly enhance the ability of lawmakers to arrive at well-grounded decisions vital to our nation’s foreign and domestic security. This memo provides an overview of U.S. intelligence and its primary functions, including intelligence collection and analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence activities. What is Intelligence? Intelligence is information that agencies collect, analyze and distribute in response to government leaders’ questions and requirements. Intelligence is a broad term that entails: • Collection, analysis, and production of sensitive information to support national security leaders, including policymakers, military commanders and Members of Congress. • Safeguarding these processes and this information through counterintelligence activities. • Execution of covert operations approved by the President. The IC strives to provide valuable insight on important issues by gathering raw intelligence, analyzing that data in context, and producing timely and relevant products for customers at all levels of national security—from the war-fighter on the ground to the President in Washington. Levels of intelligence include: • Strategic: intelligence needed by policymakers to make policy and military decisions at the national and international level. • Operational: intelligence used by military leaders to plan and accomplish strategic objectives within the operational area. • Tactical: intelligence provided to military leaders in the field to accomplish immediate tactical objectives. Intelligence Cycle The intelligence cycle is the process in which intelligence officers convert collected information into valuable intelligence for national security consumers. The cycle begins with establishing priorities and requirements, often with input from policymakers. The cycle then involves collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information for intelligence customers. Some of the most well-known published intelligence products include: 10 Confrontation or Collaboration? | Congress and the Intelligence Community Intelligence Basics Intelligence Cycle Planning Planning PlanningPlanningThe Intelligence and Cycle Direction begins with estab- lTheishin Intg prioritieselligence and requirements, often PlanningPlanning CycleC beginsycle begins with estawithb esta- The IntPolicymakerswithlishinelligence inputg priorities fr om establish policymak and requirements, requirementsers b- Thelishin IntThewithgelligence priorities Int inputelligence fr and C requirements,ycle begins with of teestano fbte- n for the IC Conomycle various policymak begins topics. with esta Theseb- lishinwithlg ishininput prioritiesg frprioritiesom andpolicymak requirements,and requirements,ers ers often with input from policymakers often with inputguidelines from policymak are used ertos determine the IC’s collection strategies and the types DisseminationDissemination of necessary intelligence products. Providing the results Collection Providing the resultsoof oof pr processing to Disseminationnational security con ocessing to CollectionIntelligencce analysts use six primarry disciplines of intelli- DisseminationDisseminationnational security connsumers.nsumers. The The quality quality Proandviding rele thevance results of the oof processing to IntelligencCollectionCollectiongenceCollectionce colle analystsection useto draf six tprimar finishedry disciplines inntelligence of reporintellit-s Providingand the rele resultsvance of thee disseminate disseminated reports maPrDisseminationyo vidinglead the resultsoofnsumers. processing oof pr ocessing The to qualityed repor to CollectionIntelligenc elligence reports nationalmay securityleadto tore-spec re-specconcificationcification of ofint intelligencets genceIntelligenc colleectioncece analysts analysts to draf uset usefinished six six primar primar innt ry disciplines of intelli- nationalcollectionnational security securityrequirem connsumers. connsumers. The qualityed The reporelligence qualityts gence colle ry disciplines of in and collectionrelevancerequirem requiremof thee disseminatments, thereby complet- IntelligencgenceceRaw analystscolleection ectiondata useisto to gathered drafsix primart finished from overtinntelligence reports and releandvance Therelevance offinished the ofments, the eanalysis disseminat thereb is givened reporto thets draft finishedry disciplines in of intelli- telli- maingy leadthe cytoc re-spece cificationdisseminat ofed int reporelligencey complets t- gence colleection ntelligence repor may leading the cyle.cle. and covertto draf sourcest finished in orderinntelligence to reports ts collectionmaytopolicymaker. lead re-specrequirem to re-speccificationments,cification thereb of intelligence ofy comple intelligencet- collection requirem ing collectionthe cyrequiremcle. requiremments,ments, thereb thereby compley complet- t- produce finished intelligence. ing theing cy cthle.e cycle. Processing ProcessingConverting colleollected information into a form suitableble for analysis or the produc- AnalysisAnalysis ConProcessingverting colleollected information into a ProcessingConvetionrting of colleintelligence. formCon
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