DOCSLIB.ORG

Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on Wrongful Interference with Goods Lrc 127 November 1992

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on Wrongful Interference with Goods Lrc 127 November 1992 LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REPORT ON WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH GOODS LRC 127 NOVEMBER 1992 The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia was established by the Law Reform Commission Act in 1969 and began functioning in 1970. The Commissioners are: ARTHUR L. CLOSE, Q.C. Chairman LYMAN R. ROBINSON, Q.C. PETER T. BURNS, Q.C. THOMAS G. ANDERSON Gregory G. Blue and Elizabeth S. Liu are Legal Research Officers to the Commission. Sharon St. Michael is Secretary to the Commission. Linda Grant provides text processing and technical copy preparation. The Commission offices are located at Suite 601, Chancery Place, 865 Hornby Street, Vancouver, B.C. V6Z 2G3. The Law Reform Commission gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Law Foundation of British Columbia in carrying out this project. Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on wrongful interference with goods (LRC, ISSN 0843-6053; 127) Includes bibliographical references: p. ISBN 0-7718-9312-4 1. Trover and conversion - British Columbia. 2. Personal property - British Columbia. I. Title. II. Series: Law Reform Commission of British Columbia. LRC; 127. KEB238.A72L38 1992 346.71103'6 C93-092009-0 KF705.L38 1992 TO THE HONOURABLE COLIN GABELMANN ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA: The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia has the honour to present the following: REPORT ON WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH GOODS Late 19th century reforms rationalized civil procedure and in so doing simplified large portions of the law. Various rights and remedies once regarded as separate and distinct matters of law were consolidated and through this process were refined, simplified and made to operate more efficiently. But some aspects of the law escaped these reforms and still bear the mark of antique notions of civil procedure. These unaltered areas of the law are more technical and complex than they need to be and lead to doubt and confusion about legal rights and methods of seeking a just resolution of disputes. The Commission touched on one part of this problem a number of years ago in Report on the Replevin Act (LRC 38, 1978). The recommendations for modernization were speedily adopted. The old remedies of conversion and detinue, essentially untouched by the 19th century reforms, are part of another area of the law seriously in need of attention. The relief to which a claimant is entitled, under these ancient remedies, can vary significantly depending on the facts in issue. Situations that are functionally similar can end up being treated quite differently. This Report recommends changes to the law that will rationalize and put on a modern footing the remedies available to parties where there has been a wrongful interference with personal property. The approach recommended is to replace the older remedies with a new statutory remedy giving the courts flexibility to tailor relief to the needs of the case before them, uninhibited by limitations that were shaped by historical considerations that for some time now have lost their relevance. TABLE OF CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION.........................................................7 A. Personal Property......................................................7 B. The Common Law Actions..............................................7 C. The Working Paper....................................................8 II THE COMMON LAW ACTIONS ...........................................9 A. Introduction..........................................................9 B. The Common Law Actions.............................................1 0 C. Some Examples......................................................1 1 D. Features of the Principal Common Law Actions.. 1 3 1. Detinue........................................................1 4 (a) Generally..................................................1 4 (b) Summary..................................................1 6 2. Trespass to Chattels. .............................................1 6 (a) Generally..................................................1 6 (b) Summary..................................................1 7 3. Conversion. ....................................................1 8 (a) Generally..................................................1 8 (b) Contrasted With Trespass to Chattels and Detinue. 1 8 (c) Who May Sue?..............................................1 9 (d) Misfeasance and Nonfeasance..................................2 0 (e) What Kinds of Property May Be Converted?. 2 0 (f) Measure of Damages.........................................2 1 (i) Date of Conversion. ...................................2 1 (ii) Proceeds.............................................2 2 (iii) Nominal Damages.....................................2 3 (iv) Summary............................................2 3 E. Categories of Distinctions Drawn By the Law. 2 5 1. Ownership and Possession.........................................2 5 2. Immediate Rights and Other Kinds of Rights: Who May Sue? ...............................................................2 6 3. Direct Interference and Indirect Interference. 2 6 4. Kinds of Available Remedies.......................................2 6 5. Third Party Rights................................................2 7 6. Summary.......................................................2 8 III LEGACIES OF THE LAW................................................2 9 A. Introduction.........................................................2 9 B. Modern Procedure....................................................3 0 C. The Former Procedural Law and the Common Law Torts. 3 1 1. Introduction.....................................................3 1 2. Divided Jurisdiction of The Courts.. 3 1 3. The Forms of Action..............................................3 2 4. Multiple Claims. ................................................3 5 5. Multiple Parties..................................................3 6 6. Pleading. ......................................................3 6 (a) Narrowing the Issues in Dispute. 3 6 (b) Pleading and Legal Fictions....................................3 8 D. Summary...........................................................4 0 IV THE NEED FOR REFORM...............................................4 2 A. Introduction.........................................................4 2 B. The Likelihood of a Common Law Solution. 4 2 1. Detinue, Its Death and Revival......................................4 2 2. The Common Law Actions in the 20th Century.. 4 3 3. Failure of Earlier Reforms. ........................................4 6 4. Factors that May Explain Why the Law has Stopped Developing. 4 7 C. Conclusion..........................................................4 8 V REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND DRAFT LEGISLATION.............4 9 A. Introduction.........................................................4 9 B. Models For Reform...................................................4 9 C. General Principles....................................................5 1 1. A Single Tort. ..................................................5 2 2. Available to Anyone with an Interest in the Property. 5 2 3. Compensation Limited to Actual Loss. 5 2 4. A Full Range of Remedies.........................................5 3 5. Summary.......................................................5 4 D. Specific Issues.......................................................5 4 1. Relationship with Negligence.......................................5 4 2. Third Party Interests, Defences and Representative Actions. 5 4 3. Co-owners......................................................5 6 4. Innocent Parties..................................................5 8 5. Return of Property to One Who Does Not Have an Immediate Right of Possession...............................................6 0 6. Personal Property Security Legislation.. 6 0 7. Other Issues.....................................................6 1 8. Draft Property Law Amendment Act.................................6 2 E. Acknowledgments....................................................7 0 APPENDIX C...............................................................7 1 CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE LIMITATION ACT..............7 1 A. Introduction.........................................................7 1 B. Strategy for Revising the Limitation Act...................................7 1 C. Draft Legislation. ....................................................7 2 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION A. Personal Property Two separate streams of law, developed over the centuries, protect property rights. Personal property, for many reasons, is treated differently from land. (The phrase “personal property” is usually used to mean all property other than land, or property affixed to land.)1 The legal framework of rights and remedies relating to personal property is comprehensive. Parts of the law developed by analogy to the law of real property, but much of it is unique. B. The Common Law Actions Several actions provide remedies for wrongs relating to personal property. These actions have obscure names, reflecting their antiquity. The main ones are conversion (sometimes called trover), detinue and trespass to chattels. Related actions provide remedies in special circumstances. Even a brief look finds unexpected levels of legal complexity, the necessity for which may be questioned. How well is the law working? This Report addresses these and other questions to decide whether the law needs to be changed.2
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age
    Tulsa Law Review Volume 44 Issue 4 The Scholarship of Richard A. Epstein Summer 2009 Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age Catherine M. Sharkey Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Catherine M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 677 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol44/iss4/2 This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sharkey: Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age TRESPASS TORTS AND SELF-HELP FOR AN ELECTRONIC AGE Catherine M. Sharkey* INTRODU CTION ................................................................................................................ 678 1. SELF-HELP: THE MISSING THIRD REMEDY .......................................................... 679 II. CONCEPTUALIZING SELF-HELP IN CYBERTRESPASS DOCTRINE ........................... 684 A. Self-Help in Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case ................................................... 684 1. Threshold Prerequisite to Invoke Legal Process ................................... 684 2. Liability for Evasion of Self-Help ........................................................ 687 B. Self-Help "Opt-Out" as Affirmative Defense ............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Part I Introduction
    PART I INTRODUCTION 1. WHY DOES THE PRESENT LAW NEED REFORM? 1.1 Our Sixth Programme of Law Reform1 recommended that “there should be a comprehensive review of the law on limitation periods with a view to its simplification and rationalisation.” We noted that the law is “uneven, uncertain and unnecessarily complex” as demonstrated by the following examples: (1) Adrian is injured when operating an unsafe electric mower. He seeks compensation for his injuries. If he sues the manufacturer in the tort of negligence, or the seller of the mower for breach of contract, he has three years from the date of the injury to bring his claim, subject to the courts’ discretion to extend time. If he sues the manufacturer under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (so as to avoid having to prove negligence) he has three years from the date of the injury to bring an action, subject to the court’s discretion to disapply the period; but his right of action under the 1987 Act is extinguished entirely if he does not sue within 10 years from when the mower was first bought. (2) Barbara was sexually abused by her uncle, Colin, from a young age until she was 14 years old. She is now 25 and suffers from a depressive illness and personality disorder. She has recently come to realise that her illness and disorder can be attributed to Colin’s abuse. But her action against Colin for trespass to the person will be time-barred (the limitation period being six years after she was 18).
    [Show full text]
  • Representing Yourself and Your Business in Magistrate Court
    REPRESENTING YOURSELF AND YOUR BUSINESS IN MAGISTRATE COURT I. INTRODUCTION Business is rife with conflict. To succeed, a business owner must be adept at resolving these disputes quickly and efficiently. Sometimes, more that a simple phone call, refund or apology is needed. Some disputes must be resolved in court. The American civil judicial system is designed to resolve disputes. Although the process works well, it is expensive and time consuming, sometimes taking several years and costing tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. For many smaller disputes, the time and cost associated with a traditional lawsuit makes litigation in these forums impractical. Mediation or arbitration are sometimes good options, but only if your adversary is of a similar mindset. There is an alternative. Georgia’s Magistrate Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, hearing civil claims involving disputes of $15,000 and less. It is often described as “Small Claims Court.” With the right judge, it might be more aptly called a “Court of Common Sense.” The rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed. There is no jury. In the State and Superior Courts of Georgia, a corporation must by law be represented by an attorney. This is not true for Magistrate Court, where a business may be represented by an employee or owner. In short, Magistrate Court provides a forum in which it is often possible to secure justice quickly and inexpensively for smaller disputes. The purpose of this article is to provide a basic roadmap for representing yourself and your business successfully in Magistrate Court. II. PROS AND CONS There are advantages and disadvantages to trying your case in Magistrate Court as opposed to the slower and more expensive State and Superior Courts of Georgia.
    [Show full text]
  • IN the CIRCUIT COURT for Baltimore City
    ',E~: 1 ~ ~. a,~~ Baltimore City IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR------------------------------ CIVIL - NnN-DnMESTIC CASE INFnRM T DIRECTIONS t~ ~ ~~ ~4~ Plaintiff: This Information Report must be completed and attached to the complaintfiled with the Clerk of Court unless your case is exempted from the requirement.by t~i~'+~~a~~~u~ the~Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 2-111(a). Defendant: You must file an Information Report as required by Rule 2,323(h).: THIS INFORMATION REPpRT CANNOT~BE ACCEPTED AS A PLEADING BY:~7PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT CASE NUMBER FORM FILED •--- --- ------'-- - - -f~rkto nser~------------------ Brenda Bennett, et al. University of Marylan~ ~Viec~icat System CASE vs. ----------------- NAME:------------------------- amti - ------------------~~TSe en ant PARTY'S NAME: PHONE: PARTY'S ADDRESS:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ------ - --- -- --- PARTY'S E-MAIL:----------- --- -------------------------------------_._____--------------------------•-------------- ~f r~~zr~sented__by an_ attorn.ey; --Ben'amin L:Davis, III - - --410 244 7005- PARTY'S ATTORNEY'S NAME:---------~_- --- _---- _ ~,_~___ PHONE:.------_--___- _--_----- -------__ ADDRESS:~6 South Charles ~freet,Baltimore, Maryland 21201 PARTY'S ATTORNEY'S bdavTs~"nicholtlaw.com"""""- PARTY'S ATTORNEY'S E-MAIL: JURY DEMAND? Yes O No RELATED CASE PENDING? L7Yes f~No If yes, Case #~s), if known:__________~_________~_~M________. ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF TRIAL?: ____._hours _____.__da s PLEADING TYPE New Case: Original
    [Show full text]
  • COURT of CLAIMS of THE
    REPORTS OF Cases Argued and Determined IN THE COURT of CLAIMS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS VOLUME 39 Containing cases in which opinions were filed and orders of dismissal entered, without opinion for: Fiscal Year 1987 - July 1, 1986-June 30, 1987 SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 1988 (Printed by authority of the State of Illinois) (65655--300-7/88) PREFACE The opinions of the Court of Claims reported herein are published by authority of the provisions of Section 18 of the Court of Claims Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 439.1 et seq. The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters: (a) all claims against the State of Illinois founded upon any law of the State, or upon an regulation thereunder by an executive or administrative ofgcer or agency, other than claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, or claims for certain expenses in civil litigation, (b) all claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State, (c) all claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned shall receive a pardon from the Governor stating that such pardon is issued on the grounds of innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned, (d) all claims against the State in cases sounding in tort, (e) all claims for recoupment made by the State against any Claimant, (f) certain claims to compel replacement of a lost or destroyed State warrant, (g) certain claims based on torts by escaped inmates of State institutions, (h) certain representation and indemnification cases, (i) all claims pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act, (j) all claims pursuant to the Illinois National Guardsman’s and Naval Militiaman’s Compensation Act, and (k) all claims pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act.
    [Show full text]
  • Russell V. Hill (N.C. 1899) Misunderstood Lessons John V
    NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 73 | Number 6 Article 3 9-1-1995 Russell v. Hill (N.C. 1899) Misunderstood Lessons John V. Orth Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation John V. Orth, Russell v. Hill (N.C. 1899) Misunderstood Lessons, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 2031 (1995). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol73/iss6/3 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RUSSELL V HILL (N.C. 1899) MISUNDERSTOOD LESSONS JOHN V. ORTH* In this essay, Professor Orth examines the North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Russell v. Hill, which has long been unfavorably compared with the contemporaneousMinnesota case of Anderson v. Gouldberg. Both cases concerned claims to property by two parties,neither of whom was the true owner, and both cases relied on the venerable common law case of Armory v. Delamirie. Professor Orth explains that the North Carolina court's decision resultedfrom strict insistence upon the elements of the common law forms of action. In contrast, the Minnesota court, broadly construingprecedent, made a policy choice which it believed would best protectproperty. Professor Orth concludes, however, that the North Carolinacourt's decision has proved to be no less protective Russell v. Hill' is, in its way, one of the most famous cases ever decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court, but it has an unenviable fame because most right-thinking lawyers today think it was wrongly decided.2 A staple of first-year property courses,3 the case involved a claim by Russell for the value of logs that the partnership of Hill and Nelson had taken from his possession without authority.4 Plaintiff honestly but mistakenly believed that the logs * William Rand Kenan, Jr.
    [Show full text]
  • Defamation and the Right of Privacy
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 15 Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1962 Article 4 10-1962 Defamation and the Right of Privacy John W. Wade, Dean Vanderbilt Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation John W. Wade, Dean, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vanderbilt Law Review 1093 (1962) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Defamation and the Right of Privacy JOHN W. WADE* In this article Dean Wade discusses the scope of the tort of un- warranted invasion of the right of privacy, comparing and contrasting it with the tort of defamation. He observes that the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to supplant the action for defamation and that this development should be welcomed by the courts and writers. Finally, he concludes that the whole law of privacy may someday be- come a part of the larger, more comprehensive tort of intentional in- fliction of mental suffering. I. INTRODUOTMON The history of the two torts of defamation and unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy has been greatly different. Defamation developed over a period of many centuries, with the twin torts of libel and slander having completely separate origins and historical growth.
    [Show full text]
  • Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law Catholic University Law Review Volume 19 Issue 3 Article 1 1970 Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough Vernon X. Miller Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Vernon X. Miller, Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough, 19 Cath. U. L. Rev. 283 (1970). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough VERNON X. MILLER* This article is an essay on death statutes and torts. It is not a text because there is little profit nowadays in laying down the law.' People everywhere in 1970 are reappraising the social structure, and lawmen cannot escape. Lawyers can be creative, or they can be stubborn. They can respond with imagination, or they can wait for pressures. But legislating and judging are constant processes, and the law does catch up with the community. There will be much reappraising in the personal injury business during the nine- teen-seventies. Death cases are part of that business. Death can be related to a tort, or it can happen after the accident from other causes while a claim for damages is pending.
    [Show full text]
  • Tort Responsibility for Destruction of Goodwill Floyd A
    Cornell Law Review Volume 14 Article 4 Issue 3 April 1929 Tort Responsibility for Destruction of Goodwill Floyd A. Wright Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Floyd A. Wright, Tort Responsibility for Destruction of Goodwill, 14 Cornell L. Rev. 298 (1929) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol14/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TORT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESTRUCTION OF GOODWILL FLoYD A. WRiGHT* A discussion of the development of the various definitions of good- will is not within the scope of this article, but it is necessary first to mention briefly the origin and general nature of goodwill.' From an early date the common law courts had strongly opposed any agreements between parties which tended in the least towards restraint of trade. Because of this strict rule, the goodwill concept was very slow in its development; for goodwill in its very nature connotes some form of restraint. In 1415, Judge Hall, in Dyer's Case,2 emphatically denounced contracts in restraint of trade. This policy continued unmodified until 1620, when the case of Broad v. Jollyfe3 came before the courts. -In that case the court allowed the vendor of a stock of goods to recover against the purchaser for breach of an agreement not to compete.
    [Show full text]
  • Limitations of Actions in Conversion and Detinue
    Manitoba Law Reform Commission 432-405 Broadway, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3C 3L6 T 204 945-2896 F 204 948-2184 Email: [email protected] http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/mlrc LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN CONVERSION AND DETINUE Report #125 November 2011 Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Manitoba. Law Reform Commission Limitations of actions in conversion and detinue. (Report ; 125) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-7711-1557-8 — 1. Limitation of actions 2. Trover and conversion Manitoba 3. Time (Law)--Manitoba I. Title. II. Series: Report (Manitoba. Law Reform Commission) ; 125 KEM 484 .L54 .M35 2011 346.7127052 222 20119620014 ’s Copies of the Commission Reports may be ordered from Statutory Publications, 20 - 200 ’s Reports are also available Vaughan Street, Winnipeg, MB R3C 1T5. The Commission electronically at www.jus.gov.mb/mlrc. The Manitoba Law Reform Commission was established by The Law Reform Commission Act in 1970 and began functioning in 1971. Commissioners: Cameron Harvey, Q.C., President John C. Irvine Hon. Mr. Gerald O. Jewers Hon. Mr. Justice Perry Schulman Legal Counsel: Catherine Skinner Administrator: Debra Floyd The Commission offices are located at 432-405 Broadway, Winnipeg, MB R3C 3L6 Tel: (204) 945-2896 Fax: (204) 948-2184 Email: [email protected] Website: http://gov.mb.ca/justice/mlrc The Manitoba Law Reform Commission is funded by grants from: The Government of Manitoba and The Manitoba Law Foundation TABLE OF CONTENTS Page # – CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 – CHAPTER 2 CHARACTERISTICS OF CONVERSION AND DETINUE 3 A. CONVERSION 3 1. Reform of Conversion 6 B.
    [Show full text]
  • The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States
    VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 39 APRIL 1986 NUMBER 3 "Alas! Poor Yorick," I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States Nicolas P. Terry* I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 420 II. EXPERIMENTATION, DISPOSAL, AND THE ABORTION DE- BATE .............................................. 422 III. FETUSES AND FETAL MATERIALS: DISPOSAL ......... 426 A. Disposal-Specific Legislation .............. 427 B. Disposal-IndirectRegulation .............. 430 C. Fetus Disposal and Tort Law ............... 431 IV. FETUSES AND FETAL MATERIALS: POSSESSORY RIGHTS 432 A. Common Law Possessory Interests .......... 432 B. Possessory Interests in Nonburial Situations. 433 C. Fetal Possession-Specific Legislation ....... 437 V. FETAL EXPERIMENTATION ........................... 440 A. Definitional Problems ...................... 441 *Associate Professor of Law, St. Louis University. Formerly, Lecturer in Law, Univer- sity of Exeter, England. B.A. (Law) Kingston Polytechnic; LL.M. Cambridge. I owe a debt of gratitude to Kate Whitby, my research assistant, for her painstaking work. I would like to thank my colleagues, Isaak Dore, Stanislaw Frankowski, Sandra Johnson, and Carolyn Jones for their support and encouragement. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:419 B. Guidelines for Research in England ......... 442 C. Federally Funded Fetal Research ........... 444 D. State Regulation of Fetal Research ......... 446 E. Fetal Experimentation Regulation and Pri- vacy Guarantees..........................
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 6 – Civil Case Procedures
    GENERAL DISTRICT COURT MANUAL CIVIL CASE PROCEDURES Page 6-1 Chapter 6 – Civil Case Procedures Introduction Civil cases are brought to enforce, redress, or protect the private rights of an individual, organization or government entity. The remedies available in a civil action include the recovery of money damages and the issuance of a court order requiring a party to the suit to complete an agreement or to refrain from some activity. The party who initiates the suit is the “plaintiff,” and the party against whom the suit is brought is the “defendant.” In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove his case by “a preponderance of the evidence.” Any person who is a plaintiff in a civil action in a court of the Commonwealth and a resident of the Commonwealth or a defendant in a civil action in a court of the Commonwealth, and who is on account of his poverty unable to pay fees or costs, may be allowed by the court to sue or defendant a suit therein without paying fees and costs. The person may file the DC-409, PETITION FOR PROCEEDING IN CIVIL CASE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEES OR COSTS . In determining a person’s ability to pay fees or costs on account of his/her poverty, the court shall consider whether such person is current recipient of a state and federally funded public assistance program for the indigent or is represented by legal aid society, including an attorney appearing as counsel, pro bono or assigned or referred by legal aid society. If so, such person shall be presumed unable to pay such fees and costs.
    [Show full text]