Partnership without Membership A role theoretical and framing analysis of Sweden’s Agreement regarding Host Nation Support with NATO

Annie Wattman

Bachelor Thesis, Spring 2019 Department of Government Supervisor: Anna Michalski Word Count: 12 998 Pages: 33

Abstract

Sweden has a long-standing neutral identity, tracing back to at least the First World War. Since the end of the Cold War, the neutral identity has been redefined to military non- alignment and Sweden has deepened its cooperation with institutions like NATO. On May 25th 2016, the Swedish parliament voted to ratify an agreement regarding Host Nation Support (HNS) with NATO, which can be understood as further developing the profound cooperation. This thesis has analyzed Sweden’s decision to deepen the cooperation with NATO through a role theoretical and framing analysis, with the main objective being to describe how Sweden’s national role conceptions related to security policy were used in the policy making. A two-parted analysis was conducted. The first part distinguished three national role conceptions related to Sweden’s neutral identity and position within the international system. The second part analyzed how Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist used the discerned role conceptions as frames to motivate the policy behavior of ratifying the HNS. The thesis concluded that all three roles were used to frame the case of HNS, and that Sweden’s over-encompassing role as a neutral state framed the HNS as a positive mean for Sweden to further its political autonomy and independence.

2 Table of contents

INTRODUCTION ...... 4

PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...... 5

GENERAL BACKGROUND ...... 6 NATO ...... 6

SWEDEN AND NATO ...... 7

HOST NATION SUPPORT AND SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY DOCTRINE ...... 8

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 9

MOTIVATION OF THE CHOICE OF THEORY ...... 9

ROLE THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ...... 10

HOW DIFFERENT ROLES IMPACT POLICY BEHAVIOR ...... 12

FRAMING ...... 13

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 14

SELECTION OF CASE ...... 14

LIMITATIONS ...... 15

DISCUSSION REGARDING VALIDITY CONCERNS ...... 16

RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 16

SELECTION OF MATERIAL ...... 18

ANALYSIS ...... 19

DISTINGUISHING SWEDEN’S ROLES ...... 19 The meta-role as ‘Neutral’ ...... 19 The context-specific role as ‘National Security Protector’ ...... 21 The context-specific role as an ‘EU member’ ...... 22

DISTINGUISHED ROLE CONCEPTIONS AND FRAMES ...... 25

FRAMING ANALYSIS ...... 25 What is the problem perceived to be? ...... 25 How is the HNS framed to solve the perceived problem? ...... 27

GENERAL DISCUSSION ...... 28

CONCLUSION ...... 29

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 31

3 Introduction

Sweden’s neutrality policy can be traced back to the early 1800s, when the vulnerable geographical position in-between the two superpowers of Russia and Germany influenced a policy aiming to remain neutral. Since then, the neutrality policy has influenced all major security political stances taken by Sweden. When the First World War broke out, Sweden declared neutrality. The same was done when the Second World War commenced. During the Cold War Sweden once again found itself in a difficult position, in-between the newly founded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union, which motivated a continued neutrality policy. Sweden stuck with its policy doctrine until the Berlin Wall fell, together with the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order.

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has developed to become one of NATOs closest partners. Sweden has participated in all major NATO led operations and has become an important partner through joining NATOs Partnership for Peace. Due to its profound cooperation, Sweden has reached a “golden status” amongst NATO’s partnership countries (Petersson 2018, 74). The latest step for deepening the cooperation with NATO was taken in 2016, when an agreement regarding Host Nation Support (HNS) was ratified by the Swedish Riksdag. The agreement is a framework agreement aimed to further cooperation between Sweden and NATO, by providing a framework for future NATO led operations on Swedish territory. By incorporating the requirements of the agreement into Swedish law, it can be argued that Sweden institutionalized its cooperation with NATO.

Sweden has a long-standing neutral identity and history of pursuing a foreign policy aiming for neutrality, but manages to justify a continued profound cooperation with NATO. It can be argued that Sweden found itself in a difficult position following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, which was stated to be “the greatest challenge towards European peace and security since the end of the Cold War” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2015). Due to this, it can be assumed that Sweden had to make trade-offs between the long-standing identity of neutrality and a geopolitical context where international cooperation on security issues was deemed necessary, when deciding to ratify the agreement regarding HNS. This case indicates a trade-off between different security political stances, making it interesting to analyze how the different stances were used to motivate a deepened NATO cooperation. From a role theoretical perspective, this thesis will therefore examine what security political roles, based on both identity and Sweden’s position within the international system, the government conceptualized for itself and how these were used to frame the agreement regarding HNS.

4 The role theoretical approach has been chosen due to its ability to capture how both longstanding identity and systemic factors impact policy behavior. The approach assumes that states conceptualize roles for itself; based on expectations from the surrounding environment, its position within the international system and its self-image. A distinction between roles stemming from different sources is often made, where over-encompassing meta-roles are distinguished from context-specific roles related to specific policy issues or geographic areas. By distinguishing between Sweden’s different security political roles, it will be possible to conduct an analysis regarding what roles where most prominent in the framing of the agreement regarding HNS. The role theoretical approach assumes that roles constrain policy makers when deciding on policy behavior, but that the ultimate decision is made by the individual policy makers. This motivates the incorporation of a framing approach in order to analyze how a policy maker used the different roles to motivate Sweden’s deepened cooperation with NATO.

Purpose and research questions The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the Swedish policy behavior of deepening the cooperation with NATO, more specifically Sweden’s decision to ratify the agreement regarding HNS. The analysis is deemed interesting to conduct due to Sweden having a historical identity of pursuing a neutrality policy, but at the same time being able to motivate a profound cooperation with the single most important defence alliance in the region. It is assumed that systemic factors, such as being an EU member, forces Sweden to make trade-offs between its longstanding neutrality and contemporary security political considerations, making it interesting to examine how different security policy roles were used to motivate the case of HNS.

The analysis is deemed interesting to conduct through a role theoretical approach due to the assumption that states have several national role conceptions that impact policy behavior to different extents. What kind of role conception that has the biggest impact on policy behavior has been a contested question within role theory. Some scholars argue that more general role conceptions are more closely linked to policy behavior, whilst others argue that a more precise role conception act more constraining (Aggestam 2004; Barnett 2011). It is therefore deemed interesting to examine how different role conceptions were used by a policy maker to frame the agreement regarding HNS. Was the over-encompassing meta-role as a neutral state most prominent, or was the focus on security political considerations related to Sweden’s position within the international system?

5

To be able to conclude what role conceptions were most prominent in the Swedish discourse regarding HNS, an analysis in two parts will be necessary: the first part will define Sweden’s national role conceptions as conceptualized by the government elected in 2014. Three roles will be discerned; Sweden’s longstanding meta-role as a neutral state, Sweden’s role as a small-nation state protecting its security and Sweden’s role as an EU member. The second part will use a framing approach to analyze how the national role conceptions were used by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist to frame the case of HNS. Given these objectives, the two research questions that this thesis will seek to answer are:

How are Sweden’s meta-role as a neutral state and two context-specific roles related to Sweden’s position within the international system conceptualized by the Swedish government elected in 2014?

How did Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist use the different role conceptions to frame the case of Host Nation Support following the governments bill to ratify the agreement?

Answering these two questions will contribute with a description of Sweden’s contemporary national role conceptions and how these are actually used in policy making. It will highlight what roles were most prominent in the discourse regarding HNS, and therefore contribute with an understanding of the importance of the different roles within security policy. Describing how prominent the roles were in the case of HNS is also assumed to contribute to the contested question within role theory regarding what kind of role act more constraining on policy makers.

General background

NATO NATO was created in 1949 as a military alliance between 12 countries of the western block, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Sweden’s Northern European neighbors Denmark, Iceland and Norway were also three of the original members. The alliance was created as a collective- defence alliance, aiming to improve security and stability for its members and further democratic values (Haglund 2019). The geographical scope of the alliance was defined in the Washington Treaty as the area of North America and Europe and the heart of the alliance is a statement found in the treaty’s article five, which declare that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” (NATO 1949). During the Cold War,

6 NATO played an important role in preparing for a possible attack towards western Europe by the Warsaw Pact (Haglund 2019). When the Warsaw Pact disintegrated and the Soviet Union fell in 1991, many believed that this would constitute the end for NATO as well.

But, when the Berlin Wall fell and the threat of the Soviet Union disappeared, NATO remained. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded and found new roles for itself. The alliance developed its range of missions to include peace operations outside of its borders and added cooperative security as one of the alliance’s main tasks (Cottey 2018, 45). Cooperative security meant promoting discussion and further cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact members as well as promoting peace in peripheral Europe (Haglund 2019). As a result of this new focus, NATO welcomed new members and developed a handful of partnerships; such as Russia-NATO relations through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with partners like Egypt and Algeria, as well as NATO’s global partners like Japan and Australia. NATO’s biggest partnership program is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) which is open for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic Area and currently have 21 partners. The PfP can be understood as a mean to consolidate democracy throughout Europe and to re-integrate former Soviet countries and eastern European countries with the West (Cottey 2018, 62). The integration of countries from outside of NATO’s borders have become an important task following the 9/11 attack, where NATO and the United States identified their main threat as stemming from outside of NATO’s boundaries.

Sweden and NATO When NATO was created, Sweden had just emerged from the Second World War as a strong military and economic power in Northern Europe. The neutrality policy was deemed successful, since Sweden had managed to stay away from conflict during both World Wars. With this fresh in mind, a membership in the newly founded NATO was not on the agenda (Petersson 2018, 75). Due to Sweden’s vulnerable geographic position, in-between the West and the Soviet Union, and post-war strength, both Sweden and the Western countries perceived cooperation to be fruitful. Since the 1950s, Sweden and NATO members have cooperated through sharing information regarding Russian military and integrating Swedish air force with the Norwegian and Danish. Due to Sweden’s neutrality policy, the cooperation during the 1960s and 1970s was kept secret and was bilateral with NATO members rather than multilateral with NATO as an alliance (Petersson 2018, 77-78).

Sweden and NATOs formal cooperation can be traced back to the end of the Cold War when Sweden joined the PfP in 1994. Joining the partnership meant that Sweden developed multilateral and bilateral

7 cooperation with NATO and its members without having to join the alliance. The partnership includes military exercises, consultation and furthering interoperability between NATO and national forces. When the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created in 1997 Sweden joined that forum to. EAPC can be understood as the political framework of the PfP and works as a political forum for developing the cooperation between NATO members and PfP-partners. Since joining the PfP and EAPC, Sweden has participated in all major NATO-led operations, for example in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and joined the Strategic Airlift Capability together with Finland and ten NATO members. As a result of Sweden’s extensive cooperation with NATO, Sweden was rewarded the Enhanced Opportunity Partner status in 2014 together with Finland, Australia, Georgia and Jordan. The status is sometimes understood as a “golden card”, awarded to partners who have contributed significantly to NATO operations and who the alliance wants to continue pursue a deep cooperation with (Petersson 2018, 74).

Host Nation Support and Swedish security policy doctrine The Memorandum of Understanding regarding HNS was signed by the former Swedish center-right government on September 4th, 2014. The changes in basic law necessary for ratifying the agreement were passed by the Swedish Riksdag on May 25th, 2016, following a bill introduced by the contemporary government constituted of the Green and Social Democratic party on March 17th 2016.

The memorandum of understanding regarding HNS can be understood as a practical framework for NATO led operations on Swedish territories. It regulates both financial and judicial aspects for receiving military and civil support (Ds 2015:39, 24). The purpose is to be able to provide efficient military and civil support for NATO and their members when operating in Sweden, through civil military assistance. The agreement covers, but is not restricted to, operations like military exercises and crisis management (Prop. 2015/16:152, 14). The agreement works as a framework for future operations, which means that it will be necessary to further define each operation prior to it being carried out. An invitation from the Swedish government prior to all forms of operations will also be necessary, meaning that the agreement is based on mutual consent like the rest of Sweden’s cooperation with NATO.

Since 1993, Sweden has been pursuing a security policy doctrine of military non-alignment. The policy states that Sweden may not undertake mutual defence obligations, meaning that approving NATOs Article 5 is politically impossible since it entails an individual and collective responsibility to assist an allied in case of a military attack. The agreement regarding HNS is not perceived to interfere with the

8 non-alignment policy, since it does not entail that Sweden is obliged to let NATO pursue operations on Swedish territories, due to mutual agreement being necessary prior to any such operation.

Although the HNS does not breach Sweden’s security policy doctrine of military non-alignment, it can be difficult to draw a line between partnership and membership. Although Sweden is not a NATO member, its contributions to NATO operations and objectives have earned the country a “golden card” within the alliance and given it the nickname of “the Allied partner” (Petersson 2018, 14). Sweden does not breach its non-alignment policy and remain unattached to military obligations, but might already be perceived as entrenched in the military structure of NATO due to its profound cooperation and development of interoperability with the alliance. Due to Sweden declaring solidarity with all members of the European Union in case of conflict, Sweden is already entrenched in a possible conflict in the Baltic region, which undermine the goal of not getting involved in a military conflict (SOU 2016:57, 42). Due to the declaration of solidarity and the profound integration in NATOs military structure, Sweden’s declaration of remaining outside of NATO might be perceived by some as an empty statement.

Theoretical framework

This chapter aims to provide a basic outline of the two theoretical approaches used in the analysis; role theory and framing. It will provide a short presentation of both and untangle some vital concepts for conducting the following analysis. The chapter will begin with providing a motivation for the selection of theoretical approaches.

Motivation of the choice of theory Since one objective of this thesis is to distinguish Sweden’s longstanding national identity as a neutral state, it is necessary to use a theoretical framework that can capture the profoundness of this identity. When Holsti defined role conceptions using a sociological approach, he stressed that role conceptions emerge from a nation’s history, culture and societal characteristics (1970). Besides being a theoretical approach that capture how political culture and identity are institutionalized into profound roles, the distinction between different types of roles is also deemed useful for conducting this analysis. The distinction emphasizes how some roles stem from systemic factors, such as being a member of an international institution, whilst some roles stem from a state’s self-image. Role theory therefore manages to capture the relation between agent and structure within international relations, making it a useful theory when wanting to capture how both identity and structural factors impact policy behavior. Since a distinction between Sweden’s longstanding neutral role and roles stemming from

9 systemic factors is made, it is deemed important to use a theoretical framework that highlights these differences.

In its second part, the analysis will focus on how Peter Hultqvist as a policy maker used roles to frame the issue of HNS, which is why a method of framing is added to the role theoretical approach. Since the process connecting role conceptions to policy behavior has been contested within role theory, it might be useful to include a method from another theoretical approach to get a more comprehensive understanding of how roles are used in real-life politics. Using framing as a method can therefore be seen as emphasizing the importance of the policy maker’s agency in the process connecting role conceptions to policy behavior, which is already stressed as a central component by many role theorists (Aggestam 2004, Brummer & Thies 2015, Elgström & Smith 2006, Breuning 2011, etc).

Role theory in international relations Holsti introduced the sociological understanding of national role conceptions to the field of international relations when publishing his article National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy in 1970. Holsti noted how scholars had been classifying nations according to the contemporary international system during the cold war, characterized by the balance of power theory, and assuming that their foreign policy behavior would be consistent with the prescribed role (Holsti 1970, 233-234). Rather than seeing roles as stemming only from systemic factors, Holsti incorporated a sociological understanding of the role concept. He defined a national role conception as “the policy makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems” (ibid, 245-246). How role conceptions affect foreign policy behavior can be conceptualized as a theatrical analogy, where foreign policy makers resemble stage actors that are inclined to follow their script (role conception) but ultimately interpret and decide in what way (Bradbury et al 1972, 43). The policy maker can therefore be understood as a situated actor, whose decisions are a result of reason as well as the constraining role conceptions (Aggestam 2006, 14).

The role theoretical approach includes several aspects in need of clarification. A role expectation can be understood as the expectations that other actors have of the state and its actions. It can be conceptualized as both normative expectations regarding behavior and expectations inherent in occupying a specific position within the international system (Aggestam 2004, 64-65). Besides the surrounding international environment exerting expectations on the state, domestic actors may also have expectations regarding aspects such as what role a state should take or what a specific role

10 implies (Harnisch et al 2011, 8). Role expectations can therefore be understood as the role prescriptions that the surrounding environment, both the domestic and the international, impose on the state.

A role conception can be understood as stemming from the role beholders perceptions regarding its self-image and the role expectations imposed by the surrounding environment (Elgström & Smith 2006, 6). Aggestam defines role conceptions as “a cognitive construct which evolves more or less in correspondence with concepts of self in foreign policy” (2004, 66). Role conceptions act as guide lines for the actor’s foreign policy behavior by providing an understanding of the structure the actor is situated in and what behavior that is expected because of it (Aggestam 2006, 20). This relates back to the role theoretical approach of conceptualizing both policy makers and states as situated actors, where the policy maker “interprets and defines for himself the rights, duties, privileges and appropriate forms of behavior associated with his positions and relationships in society” (Holsti 1970, 329). Besides being influenced by its position within a structure, the sociological understanding of a role conception emphasizes the influence that a state’s identity, history and culture have on a role conception. The more socialized and institutionalized a role conception is witin a state, the more permanent it is assumed to be (Holsti 1970).

A role performance is the result of the national role conception on a specific matter within foreign policy (Aggestam 2004, 65). The role performance can be understood as the resulting behavior stemming from a national role conception (Harnisch 2011, 9). Elgström and Smith stress that the process between role conception and role performance is not mechanical, since the agency of the actor does allow for freedom of choosing amongst feasible options stemming from the role conceptions (2006, 7). Role conceptions act as guide lines for what policy behavior is perceived as feasible, but what stance is ultimately decided upon is a decision made by the individual policy maker. The correlation between national role conceptions and role performance is further complicated by the fact that states usually have several different national role conceptions, making it difficult to predict what role will be performed in which situation (Aggestam 2004, 65).

Since a state can have several national role conceptions, it is useful to distinguish between different types of roles. Bengtsson and Elgström distinguish between meta-roles and context-specific roles (2011). A meta-role is defined as a general role based on material or immaterial power resources which remain more or less constant over time and over different policy issues, which is why a meta-role is generally perceived as very stable (ibid, 114). Aggestam suggest that a role is more stable if it is closely related to a state’s identity, due to institutions protecting the role conception being created

11 simultaneously with the role conception (2004, 69). It can therefore be assumed that a more over- encompassing role, socialized into a state’s identity, should have a more constraining effect on policy makers than a context-specific role. A context-specific role can be understood as roles related to specific issue areas or to a geographical region (Bengtsson & Elgström 2011, 114). These can be understood as more precise due to them being conceptualized for specific issues or regions.

Even though role theory manages to conceptualize the interrelation between agent and structure within foreign policymaking, it has been critiqued for suppressing domestic contestation regarding role conceptions. Cantir and Kaarbo critiques role theorists for “black-boxing” national role conceptions by assuming national consensus regarding the nation’s different roles (2012). The result is that domestic processes, such as discrepancy between the elite and the masses and contestation amongst the elites, have been left undertheorized. A distinction between vertically-contested and horizontally-contested roles is made, where vertically-contested roles reveals a discrepancy between the elite and the masses whilst a horizontally-contested role reveals disagreement amongst the political elite (ibid, 6-8). Understanding domestic contestation regarding role conceptions would further the understanding of inconsistency between role conceptions and role performance (ibid, 17), as well as a more comprehensive understanding of how roles emerge. Aggestam notes how role contestation often result in foreign policy change. By elaborating on the domestic processes of role contestation, one may therefore be able to further understand the inconsistent nature of foreign policy behavior (2004, 68).

How different roles impact policy behavior When deciding on a foreign policy behavior, the policy makers are assumed to be constrained by national role conceptions. The different role conceptions are believed to map out the feasible options in each matter, leaving it to individual policy makers to decide what option to choose. How policy makers choose between different roles in different cases can be understood as an undertheorized and contested area within role theory. Some argue that roles related to material power resources and positions within an international system have a greater impact on foreign policy behavior and shape behavior during a long period of time (Barnett 1993; Bengtsson & Elgström 2011). Others argue that a role is more stable as it becomes more socialized and institutionalized into a state’s identity and political culture (Aggestam 2004, 65; Holsti 1970). Whilst some seem to perceive general perceptions as more constraining, other seem to emphasize that more precise roles have a greater impact. What is clear is that the process connecting role conceptions to foreign policy behavior is not a mechanical process, but rather dependent on the individual policy makers and their interpretations of the different role conceptions.

12 Framing Framing is an analytical approach that can be found within many of the social sciences. Within sociology and political science, frames and framing processes have been used to analyze subjects like policy making and social movements. Framing can be understood as an “approach that focuses on how messages are created” (Hallahan 1999, 206) but it also captures the psychological processes necessary for shaping messages, such as how people examine information and perceive the world around them (ibid, 306ff).

Framing can be understood as dynamic processes of reality construction. In accordance with this, Hallahan conceptualizes framing as processes of including, excluding and emphasizing information when creating a message, meaning that framing can be understood by analyzing how information is portrayed in, for example, an argument (1999). Benford and Snow captures the dynamic aspect of framing by stating that collective action frames contain two features: the different tasks of framing and the dynamic processes which create the frames (2000, 615).

Benford and Snow state that framing within the field of social movements have three main tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing (ibid). Diagnostic framing can be understood as defining what the problem is, which may be done in several ways. One example from the research on social movements is creating injustice frames and distinguishing “who the victims are”, whilst another is defining what the source of the problem is. Prognostic framing aims to articulate a solution to the perceived problem and motivational framing aims to engage people in collective action, for example by creating vocabularies of motive (Benford & Snow 2000, 616ff).

Frames are created in different ways, for example through strategic, contested or discursive mechanisms. Strategic mechanisms conceptualize frames as distinguished through deliberative and goal directed processes. One of these processes is frame amplification, which is when existent beliefs are amplified through being idealized or clarified by a frame (Benford & Snow 2000, 624-625). Entman conceptualizes frames as elevating aspects of information, for example by repeating information (1993, 52). Frame amplification, together with the other processes, are means through which movement leaders relates their specific goals to the norms and culture of the public (Haines 1999, 19).

13 Methodology and research design

This chapter will explain the research design used to conduct the analysis. It will include a discussion regarding the choice of analyzing Sweden’s agreement regarding HNS with NATO, choice of material, how the analysis is limited to match the scope of this thesis and a methodological discussion regarding validity.

Selection of case This thesis will seek to analyze Sweden’s agreement regarding Host Nation Support with NATO. HNS can be understood as “an operational tool to outline conditions under which a Host Nation is receiving the sending nations’ military troops” (Otzulis & Ozoliņa 2017, 79). Signing and ratifying the agreement regarding HNS requires a change in Swedish basic law in order for Sweden to be able to provide HNS according to NATO’s requirements. Implementing the agreement can therefore be understood as institutionalizing the cooperation with NATO and making it a part of Swedish law. What this entails is that future NATO operations on Swedish territories will be much easier to conduct, due to a framework already being in place.

Magnus Petersson argues in his chapter of The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-alignment, partnership, membership? That Sweden has become one of NATOs most important partners, referred to as NATOs “allied partner” or “partner number one” in Brussels (2018). The HNS can be understood as a mean to further develop the profound partnership by incorporating the cooperation into Swedish law. This is deemed an interesting development, due to Sweden’s longstanding identity as a neutral state. Still today, the security policy doctrine of remaining militarily non-aligned is inherent in Swedish security policy. Analyzing the ratification of the HNS is therefore argued to be a critical case, that sheds light on how policy makers make trade-offs between a longstanding identity and security political considerations. Besides being an interesting case to analyze, the selection was also based on theoretical considerations. The profoundness of Sweden’s neutral identity was deemed interesting to analyze in contrast to roles stemming from systemic factors, since it provides a clear distinction between different role conceptions. To analyze how Peter Hultqvist used the different role conceptions to frame the case of HNS is deemed interesting due to it emphasizing how different roles were actually used to motivate policy making. The agency of policy makers in choosing between different role conceptions is a central element within role theory, making it interesting to use a framing approach to describe how this agency was rhetorically performed by Hultqvist in the case of HNS.

14 Due to these considerations, this thesis takes the form of a critical single case study. The objective of describing national role conceptions and their manifestation in real-life politics makes it a descriptive study. It could be argued that a comparative case study could be conducted to reach the same objectives, since Sweden is not the only neutral, European country who pursue a deep cooperation with NATO without being a member in the alliance. Alongside Sweden, Finland pursue a deep cooperation with NATO and it has been argued that both countries contribute more to NATO operations and objectives than some of the NATO members do (Petersson 2018, 86). The decision to conduct a single case study was made due to it allowing to make a more profound description of different role conceptions and their manifestation in real-life politics than a comparative case study would do. The decision to analyze Sweden instead of Finland in a single case study was made due to Sweden’s neutrality being grounded in history and a longstanding identity, whilst Finland’s neutrality is better understood as a consequence of systemic factors. Finland’s neutrality is based in the FCMA treaty, where Finland reassured the Soviet Union that possible aggressors would not be allowed to pass over Finnish territories. The policy was neutral in the sense that Finland fostered profitable relations with both the East and the West, rather than becoming a part of the Soviet bloc (Forsberg 2018, 100-102). It is therefore argued that Sweden’s longstanding neutrality is more interesting to examine as a meta-role than Finland’s, since it is assumed to be much more institutionalized into Swedish political culture than Finland’s neutrality.

Limitations A common method used for discerning national role conceptions is looking at policy makers and government representative’s own understanding and conceptualization of the roles of their state. Due to this method being used in the first part of the analysis, the material used for distinguishing the national role conceptions will be limited to statements and bills regarding security policy presented by the contemporary government. Due to the government being elected in 2014, this limits the material to the years of 2014 to 2016. An important element of a meta-role is how it is an institutionalized part of a state’s history and identity, which is why a historical approach will be necessary to conceptualize the meta-role. To avoid summarizing Sweden’s entire security policy history, academic research will be used to capture the historical component of the meta-role.

A state has several national role conceptions, which is why a limitation regarding the number of analyzed roles had to be made. This analysis will focus on three roles, Sweden’s meta-role and two context-specific roles. The context-specific roles have been chosen since they are believed to act as contrasts to the meta-role stemming from Sweden’s neutral identity. Both context-specific roles are

15 based on systemic factors, more specifically Sweden’s position on the international arena. They are context-specific in the sense that they only relate to security issues, whilst the meta-role can be understood as more over-encompassing. The first context-specific role will refer to Sweden’s position as a small-state affected by its surrounding environment, placing great emphasis on how regional instability affect role conceptions, whilst the second refers to Sweden’s role as an EU member.

The second part of the analysis will be limited to focus on statements and speeches made by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist, due to him being the main government representative in the question regarding HNS. The analysis will focus on statements and speeches made between the bill being introduced in early 2016 and July 2016, when Hultqvist held speeches at the NATO summit in Warsaw. Including the speeches held after the bill passed legislation is not deemed problematic, due to the assumption that policy behavior is a dynamic, constant process rather than ending with a specific policy decision. Due to Hultqvist and the government introducing the bill, it can further be argued that they did not change their position regarding the HNS after it passed legislation.

Discussion regarding validity concerns Validity within the field of social science can be conceptualized as measuring what is intended to be measured. When conducting research within the social sciences, ensuring validity can be conceptualized as having formulated analytical tools that correctly connect the empirical findings to the theoretical framework. To ensure validity in this thesis, it is therefore deemed important to use clearly defined concepts and being transparent with the research design. To ensure transparency and intersubjectivity, the empirical identification of the different concepts from role theory and framing theory is therefore presented in the chapter regarding research design. The empirical material on which conclusions are based will be highly present throughout the analysis, to further ensure transparency.

Research design To capture Sweden’s different national role conceptions and analyze how Hultqvist used these in the discourse regarding HNS, an analysis in two parts will be necessary. The first part of the analysis will distinguish the different roles using a role theoretical approach whilst the following part will use a framing approach to analyze the agency of policy makers, by analyzing how the distinguished roles were used as frames in the discourse regarding HNS.

16 The first part of the analysis requires distinguishing Sweden’s national role conception, where a distinction is made between the meta-role as a neutral actor, Sweden’s role as a small-nation state and Sweden’s role as an EU member. Discerning role conceptions is often done through an inductive method by analyzing central domestic actors and how these perceive and define roles (Aggestam 2004, 77). It is argued that this method is the best way to capture how role conceptions contain “interests, world views and triggers expectations” (Aggestam 2004, 66) of policy makers, which highlight the sociological understanding of role conceptions as cognitive constructions. By analyzing how the Swedish government expressed itself regarding the “commitments, duties, functions and responsibilities” (ibid, 78) of Sweden’s behavior related to security policy, it will be possible to outline the perceived role conceptions. Finding statements about the state’s duties or responsibilities requires identifying expressions such as “I wish” or “I think” which can be used to discern the role conceptions (Thumerelle & Le Prestre 1997, 143). To discern Sweden’s meta-role as a neutral state, it will be necessary to analyze material that capture foreign policy behavior and identity over a longer period of time. This is due to the assumption that meta-roles are more consistent over time (Bengtsson & Elgström 2011, 114) and that Sweden’s neutral role is deeply embedded in history and identity. To capture the long-standing meta-role, secondary sources in the form of academic research will be used to discern general patterns of behavior related to Sweden’s meta-role as a neutral state, like Bengtsson and Elgström did when distinguishing the EU’s meta-role as a normative power (Bengtsson & Elgsrtröm 2011, 115). They state that EU’s role as normative power can be conceptualized as a meta-role due to it being readily adopted by academic research and used not only by EU representatives, but also by ‘alters’ (ibid, 114ff). Discerning general patterns of behavior through academic research will therefore be added to the main framework of analyzing governmental statements to capture both the general nature of the meta-role and how contemporary policy makers perceive it.

To connect the first part of the analysis to the framing analysis of the second part, it is necessary to conceptualize how the different roles can be used as frames by individual policy makers. Within the framing approach, a distinction is often made between diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing (Benford & Snow 2000, 615). The focus of this analysis will be on diagnostic and prognostic framing, which can be understood as distinguishing what the problem is and how it can be solved. After having distinguished the different roles according to the framework above, it is therefore necessary to hypothesize how the different roles would diagnose the problem that the HNS is to solve and how the HNS is believed to solve that problem. To clarify how the different frames can be identified in the second part of the analysis, some key words related to each role conception will be discerned. These inductively constructed frames based on the different role conceptions will then be used in the following framing analysis.

17 The second part of the analysis will be using a framing approach to capture how Hultqvist used the different role conceptions to frame the agreement regarding HNS. As noted in the theory chapter, framing can be conceptualized as reality construction. By highlighting and emphasizing parts of information, policy makers can make some information appear highly salient whilst understating something else. The agency-centered approach therefore goes well with the inherent assumption in role theory that policy makers ultimately decide upon what role to choose in a specific situation. The second part of the analysis will therefore consist of distinguishing which of the frames that Hultqvist used in the discourse regarding the HNS. The diagnostic frames are discerned by identifying how he defined the problem, for example who he perceived to be the source of the problem or who the main victims were. The prognostic frames are distinguished by identifying expressions about why the HNS is perceived to be necessary or how it is to solve the perceived problem. Prognostic framing can also include refuting other solutions, which is called “counterframing” (Benford & Snow 2000, 627). In the case of the HNS, a counterframe could for example be to oppose a NATO membership.

Selection of material The first part of the analysis will use academic literature and official statements to discern Sweden’s role conceptions, meaning that both first hand sources and secondary sources will be used. Official statements, such as different Statements of Government Policy regarding Foreign Affairs and bills regarding the direction of Swedish security policy will be used to inductively capture the role conceptions and expectations that the contemporary government ascribe themselves and Sweden as an international actor. Important to note is that joint statements by the government will be used, rather than by individual policy makers. This entails that expressions regarding role conceptions are officially agreed upon by the entire government, rather than by Hultqvist himself. Due to this being Sweden’s official position, it is deemed more interesting since it was believed to capture the general Swedish meta-role better than statements by an individual policy maker would. The academic research is, as stated above, used to capture how longstanding and profound Sweden’s meta-role is. To avoid possible bias, it is deemed important to use different secondary sources confirming the same information when discerning Sweden’s meta role.

The second part of the analysis will focus on verbal statements made by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist, such as speeches and debates, where the HNS is mentioned. The decision to focus on verbal statements was made due to Benford and Snow’s conceptualization of framing as highly centered around rhetorical construction of reality and the power of language (2000). Other scholars within the

18 framing paradigm have analyzed framing in text as well, but due to the scope of this thesis it is deemed necessary to limit the number of objects to analyze.

Analysis

The analysis of this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the analysis will distinguish three of Sweden’s national role conceptions. It will also distinguish diagnostic and prognostic frames related to the three role conceptions. The second part of the analysis will identify and describe how government representative Peter Hultqvist used the different frames in the discourse regarding HNS. The analysis will then be concluded with a general discussion.

Distinguishing Sweden’s roles

The meta-role as ‘Neutral’ The Swedish meta-role as a neutral state has a longstanding history that can be traced back to, at least, the First World War. The role can be understood as originally stemming from systemic factors, such as Sweden being a small nation with a vulnerable geographical position, but has become more socialized into Swedish identity and political culture during the following decades. During the 1960s, the neutrality policy became part of a wider foreign policy doctrine where pursuing a neutral foreign policy was understood as inherently good (Dalsjö 2010b, 203). In the Statements of Government Policy regarding Foreign Affairs for 1950, the foreign policy aiming for neutrality was stated to be useful not only in the event of war, but also as a mean to further Swedish interests during peace time (ibid, 213). Both parts of the doctrine can be connected to the same goal of securing Swedish independence (Bjereld & Möller 2015, 6). Independence can be understood as a state being able to “maintain and develop its society according to its own values” (ibid, 6) during peacetime and not being violated by a military assault in case of conflict. The Swedish behavior of criticizing the two superpowers during the Cold War and voting in accordance with third world countries in the UN can be understood as a policy behavior stemming from the meta-role, where Sweden demonstrated its highly valued independence by distancing itself from the two blocks. Besides being one of the most important goals with the neutrality policy, staying independent and openly criticizing both the West and the Soviet Union was also a way of bolstering the credibility of the neutrality policy (Bjereld & Möller 2015, 6; Dalsjö 2010b, 222).

A distinction is often made between the neutral foreign policy doctrine until the Cold War and the foreign policy pursued after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The systemic factors shaping the international

19 arena rapidly changed due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order. Sweden was no longer caught in between the two blocks, and the likelihood that Sweden would be drawn into a conflict was deemed small. A change in foreign policy was further motivated by Sweden deciding to join the European Union’s predecessor in 1995, since neutrality was incompatible with a membership.

Since being introduced in 1993, the military non-alignment has become an institutionalized part of the Swedish security policy doctrine. In contrast to a declaration of neutrality, military non-alignment entail that Sweden will not undertake mutual defence obligations, which can be understood as being able to independently decide when to partake in military action. During the 1990s, this was conceptualized as “no one else defends Sweden, and we only defend Sweden” (Prop. 91/92:102, 8). This perception of Sweden as a lone-standing state has evolved during the following years. Instead of basing the non-alignment on a perception of Sweden as a lone-standing state and expecting isolationist behavior as a consequence, the contemporary objective is stated to be to secure Sweden’s political autonomy and sovereignty by ruling out policy options that might constrain foreign policy behavior in future situations. This is expressed as: ”Sweden’s security policy’s main objective is to ensure the country’s independence and autonomy” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 7). The objective of not restricting security policy has been an ambition of the neutrality policy since the 1950s, and can thus be understood as an institutionalized part of Sweden’s meta-role (Andrén 2002, 97). During the 1990s, the objective was used to motivate opting out of a NATO membership: “by such membership, Sweden would lose its freedom of action in foreign and security policy issues” (Bjereld & Möller 2015, 10). A contemporary expectation regarding policy behavior stemming from the commitment to secure independency is that the defence should be able to prevent and handle conflicts and war, to “guarantee Sweden’s political autonomy and independence, and the country’s territorial integrity” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 52). The government contemporary with the case of HNS state that “our non- participation in military alliances serves us well” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016), indicating that the military non-alignment is still conceptualized as a positive mean within Swedish security policy and that policy behavior is expected to be in line with it.

Diagnostic frame The meta-role is assumed to perceive the problem that the HNS is to solve as Sweden being restricted to act politically autonomous. This could be understood as being situated in a context that constrain future policy option. Being threatened by a military assault could be understood as restricting policy options, since a military assault can be understood as the ultimate violation of a country’s independence. The source of the perceived problem is any state, institution or international actor that restricts Sweden’s political autonomy, making Swedish independence the main perceived victim.

20 Prognostic frame The HNS would be motivated as a solution if it is deemed to ameliorate Swedish independence and political autonomy by not being put in a situation where Sweden by itself can’t decide on military action. Due to a NATO membership being non-compatible with the meta-role, counterframing could be used where the feasible HNS is used to oppose a NATO membership. The agreement regarding HNS would probably be framed as a solution where Sweden would maintain its policy options open whilst also gaining military capacity or intelligence to avert a possible military assault.

The context-specific role as ‘National Security Protector’ This role conception stems from Sweden’s position in the international system as a nation state, which is affected by its geographical position. Due to the decreasing stability in the region as a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian acts of aggression, this role is assumed to put Swedish national security in the foreground when stating expressions regarding Sweden’s role as a regional actor. Thus, this role becomes apparent in expectations for Sweden to act in accordance with perceived security based interests.

“The Russian aggression towards Ukraine constitutes the biggest challenge towards European peace and security since the end of the Cold War”, Wallström expressed in the Statement of Government Policy regarding Foreign Affairs 2015. The Russian annexation of Crimea is thus perceived by the Swedish government as threatening the sustainable peace in Europe and Sweden’s proximity. “It is not possible to distinguish military conflicts in the immediate area that would only affect one country” (ibid) expresses a perception regarding Sweden’s security as deeply integrated with its approximate region. Even though the expressed concerns relate to the security in the region, the policy commitments stemming from the perceived insecurity are mostly centered around ameliorating Sweden’s own security. It is argued that the decreased security motivates a change in Swedish security doctrine, focused on the national security dimension (Prop. 2014/15:109, 9). This can be conceptualized in statements such as “the worsened security policy situation entails changed requirements on the Swedish defence capability” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 1). The government thus expresses commitments regarding strengthening the defence, for example by reinforcing the air force, developing a new civil defence and increasing the presence around the island of Gotland and the Baltic Sea region (Prop. 2014/15:109, 8). Having credible national defence capabilities is perceived as a mean to contribute to security in Northern Europe as well (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016). It is important to note that Sweden does not choose to pursue a policy of isolation, but rather sees cooperation with states and other regional actors as a means to ameliorate the stability in the region

21 as well as Sweden’s own security (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016). In the bill regarding Sweden’s security policy for 2016 to 2020, it is stated that “the Swedish defence capability’s main objective is the security of Sweden’s own territory, but should also be regarded as part of a bigger security and stability community in Northern Europe” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 1). The statement highlights Sweden’s perception of its own security as its main responsibility, but also how interrelated the security of the entire region is. An expectation regarding policy behavior stemming from this perception regarding Sweden’ security is that “the government deem that Sweden’s bi- and multilateral defence- and security political collaborations should be deepened” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 1) as a mean to secure the region and ameliorate Swedish defence capabilities.

Diagnostic frame The role as ‘National Security Protector’ can be understood as a pragmatic role with ensuring Swedish security as its main objective. Due to the perception of Sweden as deeply integrated in its approximate area, a security threat towards either would be perceived as a problem. Due to the contemporary situation of Russian aggression, the most plausible problem formulation would be of Russia as the source of a decreasing regional and Swedish security. Due to the regional security situation, Russia can be understood as the main aggressor or source of the problem, making Swedish security the main victim.

Prognostic frame The ‘National Security Protector’ would motivate the HNS as an effective solution to the perceived security problem. This could be done by arguing that the HNS would strengthen Swedish military defence or act as an assurance that NATO would step in to support Sweden in case of armed conflict. It could also be argued that it would not only ameliorate Sweden’s own security, but also the stability throughout the region, which in turn reflects back on Swedish security.

The context-specific role as an ‘EU member’ The role as an ‘EU member’ relates to Sweden’s position within the EU. Being an EU member is assumed to restrict Sweden’s policy behavior, due to systemic as well as normative factors. Traditionally Sweden has been conceptualized as a reluctant European, which is argued to have changed when Sweden decided to join the EUs predecessor in 1995. It has been argued that joining the EUs predecessor in 1995 started a Europeanization process, where both the definition of security problems as well as how these problems where to be solved were affected (Brommesson 2015; Möller & Bjereld 2010). A process of Europeanization entails that national values and policies have been

22 affected, and in some matters replaced, by the values inherent in the European integration. This can be conceptualized by the statement that “the European security order must be safeguarded” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016), which in its context can be understood as an expression of safeguarding the EU’s “common values and principles” (Margot Wallström in Foreign Policy Declaration 2016) as well the European security. The Swedish solidarity declaration have also changed Swedish security prioritizations. The declaration state that “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected.” (Foreign policy declaration 2016). A concrete policy consequence stemming from the solidarity declaration can be found in the bill where it was first introduced, where the former government state that Sweden has to be able to militarily support an EU member or a Nordic country, which entails higher operational requirements on the Swedish National Defence (Prop. 2008/09:140, 6). In the bill regarding Swedish security policy from 2016 to 2020, this is expressed as “the solidarity declaration imposes requirements on Swedish prerequisites of receiving and contributing with assistance, which might be military” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 8). Besides expressing a responsibility of ameliorating Swedish interoperability, Sweden also expresses expectations regarding the EU’s security policies. For example, when expressing concerns about the regional security, Sweden emphasizes “the importance of a strong European cooperation with the EU as its core” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 35). An expectation regarding policy behavior following from this perception is that “the government deem that EU as a security political actor should be strengthened” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 35). The role also entails a commitment of conceptualizing the EU as a political unit, rather than Sweden as an independent actor, which is expressed as: “Effective cooperation within the European Union is a prerequisite for peace and prosperity. […] Internal divisions must be counteracted.” (Foreign policy declaration 2016).

The EU and NATO are closely linked to each other. When it comes to security policy, EU is mostly involved in military and civilian education whilst NATOs main objective is the collective military defence of Europe. They will continue to be important partners, due to the EU abandoning its earlier ambition of retaking this responsibility from NATO (SOU 2016:57, 15-17). The government expressed that “the expansion of NATO has fostered security in Europe” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 36). The role as ‘EU member’ therefore entails a duty to be able to cooperate with NATO in order to be able to fulfill the solidarity declaration. An expression regarding this commitment is that “it is continuously prioritized to participate in activities that aim to improve the interoperability between allies and partners” (Prop. 2014/15:109, 39).

23 Diagnostic frame A possible problem could be a perceived threat against, not only Sweden, but rather the European union as a unit. Due to the solidarity declaration, a security threat towards any EU member would also be perceived as a problem that could justify deepening Sweden’s cooperation with NATO. As expressed in the Foreign Policy Declaration 2016, an effective and unified cooperation is deemed necessary for the European Union to be able to function as it is supposed. A possible fraction within the union could therefore also be perceived as a problem. A poor interoperability between NATO and the EU could also be seen as a problem that could justify Sweden deepening its cooperation with NATO, due to NATO being the main part responsible for the collective defence of Europe. If the ‘National Security Protector’ perceives Sweden’s security as the main victim, then the role as ‘EU member’ understands the EUs common security to be the main problem. Russia or any other state or institution that threaten the sustainable peace and stability throughout the European Union are perceived as sources of the perceived problem.

Prognostic frame The agreement regarding HNS could be understood as a mean to be able to fulfill Sweden’s solidarity declaration, by ameliorating Sweden’s possibilities of receiving and providing military and civil support. It could also be argued that it is positive that EU members are connected within the same military structure, due to NATO having the main responsibility of protecting Europe in case of armed conflict.

24 Distinguished role conceptions and frames

Role conception Diagnostic frame Prognostic frame Keywords ‘Neutral meta- Main objective is to Main problem perceived as HNS perceived as Autonomy, role’ remain politically Sweden not being able to ameliorating Swedish independence, autonomous. pursue an autonomous defence capabilities, options, “future Incompatible with mutual foreign policy. Main source which in turn lets situations”. defence obligations that of the problem is any Sweden be politically might restrict future state, institution or autonomous.

foreign policy behavior. structure that restricts Counterframing in the Values neutrality and non- policy behavior. form of undermining alignment as a “merit a future NATO good”. membership.

‘National Main objective is to Russia’s open aggression, Recognizing Sweden Security, Security ensure Swedish national either towards Sweden as interconnected defence Protector’ security. Deemed specifically or towards an with other countries capability, important to have a approximate country. Main and therefore stability, capable defence. source of problem is an perceives HNS as defence- and Important to be aggressive state, due to increasing Swedish security incorporated with other the regional situation security, by cooperation, organizations and Russia is assumed to be simplifying receiving Northern structures, due to the the most plausible and giving military Europe, Russia unlikeliness of an isolated aggressor. Swedish and civil support. and the Baltic attack on Sweden. security the main victim. Ameliorating Swedish Sea region. defence, reaching the objective of having credible defence capabilities.

‘EU member’ Situates Sweden within Decreased security, to the Ameliorating EU, the context of the EU, EU as a whole rather than Sweden’s possibility interoperability, conceptualizes the union to Sweden as an of pursuing the European as the central unit. independent state. Poor solidarity policy. norms and Solidarity policy stemming interoperability between Improving values such as from the Europeanization EU/EU members and interoperability “the European of Swedish security policy. NATO. Divided EU, between Sweden and security order”, affecting EUs effectiveness NATO. effective negatively. European cooperation security, inflicting on and terms Swedish security due to related to the the solidarity declaration, solidarity perceived as the main declaration. victim.

Framing analysis

What is the problem perceived to be? One reoccurring diagnostic frame relates to the security issues in the region as a result of Russian acts of aggression, framing Russia as the main source of regional and national security issues. Hultqvist mentions the Russian annexation of Crimea in every speech and debate analyzed, stating it to

25 challenge the European security order, the security in the Baltic region as well as breaching international law (Sveriges Riksdag 2016, Hultqvist 2016d). The risk of incidents in the Baltic Sea region is stated to have increased due to Russian aggression in the region (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). The reoccurring perception expressed by Hultqvist is that the annexation is a demonstration that Russia is not afraid of using military operations in order to reach their political goals. Hultqvist stated that “in the long term, threats of military attack can’t be excluded” (Sveriges Riksdag 2016) which can be understood as perceiving a Russian threat towards Swedish national security, making the frame stemming from the role as ‘National Security Protector’ prominent. When speaking at the Lennart Meri conference in Estonia, a forum for discussing foreign and security policy from the perspective of Northern and Eastern Europe, Hultqvist mostly used the frame stemming from the ‘EU member’ role by stating that “the annexation and the Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine is the greatest challenge to the European security order since the Second World War” (Hultqvist 2016c). This shows how interrelated European and Swedish national security is perceived to be, making a distinction between the two diagnostic frames difficult to discern. It is simply not possible to distinguish whether the Russian aggression in Ukraine is seen as a threat towards the EU as an entity or towards Sweden as a nation embedded in the international system. A reoccurring pattern is that Hultqvist does not refer to statements made in the Foreign Policy Declarations such as the unlikeliness that only one state is to be attacked. He highlights the vulnerability of solitary states, both Sweden and in the Baltic Region, rather than the EU as an entity. One statement expressing the frame stemming from the ‘National Security Protector’ is that “we see an increased Russian interest not only in the Baltic States, but also in Sweden and Finland” (Hultqvist 2016b). For this reason, the frames stemming from the role as ‘National Security Protector’ seem most prominent, although the solidarity declaration and European values such as “European security order” inherent in the role as ‘EU member’ is mentioned as threatened as well.

Besides mentioning Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine as a perceived security threat, Hultqvist also mentions aggressive Russian actions directly related to Sweden and the Baltic Region. Acts mentioned are Russian air planes flying in densely trafficked airspace without using transponders and disrupting civilian work (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). These statements can be understood as highlighting the perceived threat against the Baltic Region, and are therefore understood as diagnostic framing stemming from the role as ‘National Security Protector’. This frame is highlighted by expressions such as: “A regional crisis in the Baltic Sea area would be a common concern for all countries in the region, including Sweden” (Hultqvist 2016a). Hultqvist does not explicitly mention the Swedish independence or political autonomy as a “victim” of the Russian aggression, making the frame stemming from the meta-role inexistent in the diagnostic framing of the problem.

26 How is the HNS framed to solve the perceived problem? The prognostic frame stemming from the meta-role is assumed to perceive the HNS as a mean to sustain Swedish political autonomy. Sustaining political autonomy can be understood as acting in a way that creates, rather than constrains, opportunities for future behavior. Since a NATO membership is framed as constraining Swedish security behavior by binding Sweden to a mutual defence obligation, the HNS can be understood as a counterframe to this position. Rather than binding Sweden to any such obligation, the HNS is stated to create policy options since “we do not promise each other anything in beforehand, but we create the opportunity” (Sveriges Riksdag 2016). A NATO membership is also expressed to change Sweden’s basic stance within security policy (military non-alignment), creating a problematic situation in the region. The HNS on the other hand is framed as creating opportunities in case of conflict, crisis or a catastrophe within the region (ibid). The HNS is believed to create opportunities and ameliorating Swedish political autonomy by providing an administrative framework that will simplify future military exercises. From the meta-role, this is framed as promoting political autonomy due to it “creating freedom of action to act in a nascent crisis situation or crisis” as well as signaling capabilities that could be used if deemed necessary (ibid).

Using the role as ‘National Security Protector’, Hultqvist frames Sweden’s main security political objective during the following years to be “increasing the operational capability and the collective capability of the total national defence” (ibid) This is to be done through a bigger financial investment in the defence and by deepening Sweden’s cooperation with other organizations and countries, where the HNS is understood as an important part. It is stated that military exercises work as signals, where Sweden in collaboration with other actors indicate a resource that could be used if needed, and also ameliorate Swedish defence by “increasing the operational capability for our national defence” (Hultqvist 2016a). Another example of framing the HNS and military exercises as a mean to ameliorate national security is expressed as “Sweden increases exercises and training, both in terms of quantity and quality focusing on increasing our warfighting capabilities” (Hultqvist 2016b). The exercises that the HNS is assumed to simplify the conduction of are therefore framed as means that will help Sweden tackle an attack towards Sweden itself or the region. Hultqvist stresses that “security in the Baltic Sea region is of particular importance in our dialogue with NATO” (2016b), highlighting how the HNS is to contribute to Swedish and regional security.

The role as ‘EU member’ is framed through statements that highlight how the HNS contributes to European cooperation and ameliorating interoperability amongst the EU members. Hultqvist expresses in the parliamentary debate that Sweden’s solidarity declaration, which was undertaken in 2009 through the Treaty of Lisbon, requires that Sweden may receive and give civilian and military

27 support. He states that: ”the Memorandum of Understanding regarding HNS with NATO that the Parliament is to take a stand on is an important part in creating the legal prerequisites and strengthening Sweden’s capability to live up to that commitment” (Sveriges Riksdag 2016), using the prognostic frame as ‘EU member’ to show how the HNS increases Sweden’s opportunities of being a loyal EU member. But rather than framing a deepened NATO cooperation as a mean to ameliorate the EUs unified security, Hultqvist reoccur to frame NATO presence as important for “our part of Europe” or “our region” rather than for the EU, showing that the frame stemming from the ‘National Security Protector’ is more widely used than the frame stemming from the ‘EU member’ (Hultqvist 2016d).

General discussion When discerning the three role conceptions as conceptualized by the government, it became quite clear that all three to some extent were affected by the increasing regional instability. All three perceived the Russian acts of aggression and the decreasing stability in the region as problematic, and it can thus be argued that Sweden’s national security is a goal inherent in all three roles. The ‘National Security Protector’s ambition of increasing Swedish security can be understood as an objective of the meta-role to, since a military assault can be understood as the ultimate violation of a nation’s independence. The biggest difference between the two is therefore the meta-role’s emphasis on securing Swedish political autonomy and independence in times of peace, whilst the ‘National Security Protector’ rather focus on national security in case of a conflict, crisis or assault. Since terms related to the meta-role were not used by Hultqvist in the diagnostic framing of the problem, it can be concluded that the meta-role was not used as a frame to diagnose the problem. The role as ‘EU- member’ was less explicitly mentioned in relation to the perceived security threats, but due to the solidarity declaration and Sweden’s pledge to assist a fellow EU member in case of emergency, it is inherent in expressions regarding European or regional security. Another feature inherent in Hultqvist’s framing was a perception of Sweden as part of the international community, rather than as an isolated nation state. This is expressed in statements such as “A regional crisis in the Baltic Sea area would be a common concern for all countries in the region, including Sweden” (Hultqvist 2016c). All three roles therefore emphasize international cooperation in their prognostic framing of the HNS. The only restriction regarding international cooperation on security issues were expressed by the meta- role, for whom cooperation that might restrict future security policy behavior is not feasible. The different roles do perceive the objectives of international cooperation differently. Whilst the ‘National Security Protector’ perceives it as a way to improve Sweden’s defence capabilities, the role as ‘EU member’ emphasized how it increased the interoperability between the European members and NATO.

28 Russia was mainly framed by Hultqvist as a threat towards a bigger region, often referred to as the Baltic Sea region or Northern Europe, but also emphasized how, in the long run, a military threat towards Sweden could not be ruled out. This makes the role as ‘National security protector’ most prominent in the diagnostic framing, due to the threat being framed as mainly military and related to national security rather than values such as independence and autonomy. As mentioned before, the role as ‘EU member’ was not very prominent in the framing of the problem, but is inherent in a perception of a regional threat due to the solidarity declaration.

It is interesting that all three role conceptions did frame the HNS as a solution to their own perceived problem. When debating in the Swedish Riksdag, Hultqvist emphasized how the HNS would improve Swedish political autonomy, by providing Sweden with future policy options. The frames stemming from the meta-role was not used in any other statement or speech other than when Hultqvist debated the HNS in the Swedish Riksdag. In other situations, the HNS was framed as a way to improve Sweden’s defence capabilities and interoperability, which can be understood as frames stemming from all three roles depending on the context in which it is mentioned. Due to Hultqvist often using terms such as “our region”, “our part of Europe” or the Baltic Sea region, the ‘National Security Protector’ can be understood as the most prominent role. Once again, the role as ‘EU member’ was not very prominent, since Hultqvist does not seem to emphasize the importance of conceptualizing the EU as an entity.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to further the understanding of HNS within Swedish security policy and how the different national role conceptions motivated such policy behavior. This was done by conducting a two-parted analysis, where the first part focused on discerning security policy roles as conceptualized by the government and the second part focused on how these roles were used to frame the case of HNS. It can be concluded that all three roles were used to frame the case of HNS by Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist. The most prominent frame used by Hultqvist was the ‘National Security Protector’. It framed Russia as the main threat towards Swedish security, and saw the HNS as a way to improve Sweden’s defence capabilities and capabilities for both receiving and giving assistance in case of conflict. Sweden’s meta-role as a neutral state was difficult to identify as a diagnostic frame, probably because Hultqvist did not perceive Russia as a direct threat towards Swedish independence. What was interesting was that the meta-role was used as a prognostic frame, identifying it as a prominent feature in contemporary security policy. That the meta-role was used to motivate the HNS, and in turn a deepened cooperation with NATO, is deemed the most interesting result of this study.

29 The combination of a framing and role theory was deemed interesting. It did highlight how Hultqvist rhetorically used the different role conceptions to motivate the case of HNS in Sweden, and therefore emphasized the agency of policy makers in choosing between different role conceptions. It became clear what policy options that were non-compatible with each role, such as the meta-role constraining Hultqvist from motivating a NATO membership although the other roles would probably not see this as a problem.

When discerning the different role conceptions, it became clear that the meta-role has undergone a change since the end of the Cold War. From being centered around pursuing a policy that would keep Sweden out of a military conflict, the contemporary meta-role has Swedish political autonomy as its main goal. A close cooperation with NATO is framed as way to improve Swedish political autonomy, by improving Swedish military capacity and improving Sweden’s interoperability with other countries. It would therefore be interesting to examine how opting out of a NATO membership is motivated by the three roles. If close cooperation is deemed necessary by all roles to improve features such as independence, military capacity and interoperability - what stops Sweden from taking the step to become a NATO member?

Another interesting question stemming from the result of this thesis relates to the role theoretical concepts of vertically-contested and horizontally-contested roles mentioned in the chapter Theoretical Framework. The analysis reveal that the meta-role is only used as a prognostic frame when Hultqvist speaks at the debate in the Swedish Riksdag. It would be interesting to examine whether this result stems from a possible contestation regarding the meta-role. One hypothesis is that the meta-role is deemed more important by the domestic public than by international actors or the political elite, which is why it is most prominent in domestic situations. To analyze how the meta-role becomes manifest when talking to different publics would therefore be an interesting question to analyze in a future study.

30 Bibliography Aggestam, L. (2004) A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, France and Germany. Diss. Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet

Aggestam, L. (2006) Role theory and European foreign policy: a framework of analysis in in Elgström, O., Smith, M. (ed) (2006). The European Union’s Roles in International Politics Concepts and analysis. New York: Routledge

Andrén, N. (2002) Säkerhetspolitik: Analyser och tillämpningar. 2. Uppl. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.

Barnett, M. (1993) Institutions, Roles and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System, International Studies Quarterly 37(3) 271-296

Benford, R., Snow, D. (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, Annual Review of Sociology 26 611-639

Bengtsson R., Elgström O. (2011) Reconsidering the European Union´s roles in international relations: self-conceptions, expectations and performance in Harnisch, S. Frank, C., Maull, H. W. (red.) (2011). Role theory in international relations: approaches and analyses. New York: Routledge

Bjereld, U., Möller, U. (2015) Swedish Foreign Policy: The Policy of Neutrality and Beyond in Pierre, J. (ed.) (2018) The oxford handbook of Swedish politics. New York: Oxford University Press

Bradbury, M., Heading, B., Hollis, M. (1972) The Man and the Mask: A Discussion of Role-Theory in Jackson, J. A. (ed) (1972) Role. Cambridge: Cambride University Press

Breuning, M. (2011). Role Theory research in international relations in Harnisch, S., Frank, C., Maull, H.W. (red.) (2011). Role theory in international relations: approaches and analyses. New York: Routledge

Brommesson D. (2015) The Europeanization of Swedish Foreign Policy and Beyond: On Multiple Roles in Swedish Post-Cold-War Foreign Policy in Pierre, J. (ed.) (2018) The Oxford Handbook of Swedish politics. New York: Oxford University Press

Brummer, T. (2015) The Contested Selection of National Role Conception, Foreign Policy Analysis 11:273–293

Cantir C., Kaarbo J., (2012) Contested roles and domestic politics: reflections on role theory in foreign policy analysis and IR theory, Foreign Policy Analysis 8(1): 5–24.

Cottey, A. (2018) Introduction: The European Neutral states, Europan Neutrality in Historical Perspective & NATO’s Partnership in Cottey, A. (ed.) (2018) The European Neutrals and NATO: Non- alignment, Partnership, Membership? 1. Ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Dalsjö, R. (2010) Från neutralitet till solidaritet: Omgestaltningen av Sveriges säkerhetspolitik efter det kalla kriget in Engelbrekt, K., Ångström, J. (red.) (2010) Svensk säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen. 1. Uppl. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik

Dalsjö, R. (2010) Från stormaktsspel till neutralitetspolitik: Några huvudlinjer i svensk säkerhetspolitik från 1700-tal till Sovjetväldets fall in Engelbrekt, K., Ångström, J. (red.) (2010) Svensk säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen. 1. Uppl. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik

31

Ds 2015:39. Samförståndsavtal med Nato om värdlandsstöd. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet [online] https://www.regeringen.se/49ffb6/contentassets/c4f93c1e3479439c86f732a4b75b7a2b/samforstan dsavtal-med-nato-om-vardlandsstod-ds-2015_39.pdf [Accessed 10 May 2019]

Elgström, O., Smith, M. (2006) Introduction in Elgström, O., Smith, M. (ed) (2006). The European Union’s Roles in International Politics Concepts and analysis. New York: Routledge

Entman, R. (1993) Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, Journal of Communication 43(4) 51-58

Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M., Oscarsson, H., Wängnerud, L. (red.) (2012). Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 4. Uppl. Stockholm: Norstedts juridik

Foreign Policy Declaration (2015) Regeringskansliet. Utrikespolitiska deklarationen 2015 [online] 2015. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/49b753/contentassets/87d0416f08e24cd3bb91a631a8461c08/utrikesdek larationen-2015 [Accessed 10 May 2019]

Foreign Policy Declaration (2016) Regeringskansliet. Utrikespolitiska deklarationen 2016 [online] 2016. Available at: https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/02/utrikesdeklarationen-2016/ [Accessed 10 May 2019]

Forsberg, T. (2018) Finland and NATO: Strategic Choices and Identity Conceptions in Cottey, A. (ed.) (2018) The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-alignment, Partnership, Membership? 1. Ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Haglund, D. (2019) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Haines, H. (1999) Against Capital Punishment: The Anti-Death Penalty Movement in America, 1972- 1994. New York: Oxford University Press, Incorporated.

Hallahan, K. (1999) Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public Relations, Journal of Public Relations Research, 11(3), 205-242

Harnisch S. (2011) Role Theory: operationalization of key concepts in Harnisch, S., Frank, C., Maull, H.W. (red.) (2011). Role theory in international relations: approaches and analyses. New York: Routledge

Harnisch, S., Frank, C., Maull, H. W. (2011) Conclusion: role theory, role change, and the international social order in Harnisch, S., Frank, C., Maull, H.W. (red.) (2011). Role theory in international relations: approaches and analyses. New York: Routledge

Holsti, K. (1970) National Role Conceptions in the study of foreign policy, International Studies Quarterly, 14(3): 233-309

Hultqvist, P. (2016a) Interoperability Platform, Sveriges Regering [online] https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/07/interoperability-platform/ [Accessed 12 May 2019]

32 Hultqvist, P. (2016b) Preserving Peace: NATOs Role, Sveriges Regering. [online] https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/07/preserving-peace--natos-role/ [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Hultqvist, P. (2016c) Tal av försvarsminister Peter Hultqvist: NATO in Warsaw - Steeling the Alliance? [online] https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/05/tal-av-forsvarsminister-peter-hultqvist-nato-in- warsaw-steeling-the-alliance/ [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Hultqvist, P. (2016d) Tal av Peter Hultqvist: Warsaw Nato Summit – How to face new challenges in Europe and the Baltic sea region? Sveriges Regering. [online] https://www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/05/tal-av-peter-hultqvist-vid-folk-och-forsvar/ [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Möller, U., Bjereld, U. (2010) From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation, Cooperation and Conflict, 45(4) 363–386

Norh Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) The North Atlantic Treaty [online] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Otzulis, V., Ozolina, Z. (2017) Shaping Baltic States Defence Strategy: Host Nation Support, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 15 77-98

Petersson, M. (2018) ’The Allied Partner’: Sweden and NATO through the Realist-Idealist Lens in Cottey, A. (ed.) (2018) The European Neutrals and NATO: Non-alignment, Partnership, Membership? 1. Ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Regeringens proposition 1991/92:102. Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/97 samt anslag för budgetåret 1992/93

Regeringens proposition 2014/15:109. Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020. [online] https://www.regeringen.se/49c857/contentassets/266e64ec3a254a6087ebe9e413806819/propositi on-201415109-forsvarspolitisk-inriktning--sveriges-forsvar-2016-2020 [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Regeringens proposition 2015/16:152. Samförståndsavtal om värdlandsstöd. [online] https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/proposition/samforstandsavtal-om- vardlandsstod_H303152 [Accessed 12 May 2019]

SOU 2016:57. Säkerhet i ny tid: Betänkande av Utredningen om Sveriges försvars- och säkerhetspolitiska samarbeten. [online] https://www.regeringen.se/4a58e0/contentassets/dc054ef38cde47dabf5aadf63dcab469/sou- 2016_57.pdf [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Sveriges Riksdag (2016) Riksdagens protokoll 2016-05-25. Debatt om förslag: Samförståndsavtal om Värdlandsstöd. [online] https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/debatt-om- forslag/samforstandsavtal-om-vardlandsstod_H301UF%C3%B6U4 [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Thumerelle, C. & Le Prestre, P. G. (1997) France: The Straightjacket of New Freedom in Le Prestre, P. G. (ed) (1997). Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

33