CHAPTER 6 SUPPORTING THE LODGEMEN T HE primary attack phase of OVERLORD was destined to last for six T days, and it was not until 12th June, when the Omaha beach-hea d had achieved a depth of up to 20 miles and had been expanded laterally to link with the others into an unbroken lodgement, that the possibilit y of a successful enemy counterstroke on the Cherbourg peninsula faded . Throughout this period the employment of all elements of the Allie d air forces was purely tactical, their chief contribution consisting of th e protection of the army from enemy air attack, the disruption of Germa n communications and direct intervention in local actions . All these objects had been plain on 6th June so that there was merely a change in emphasis between the tasks and a shift in application once the diversionary use o f air power to achieve initial surprise could be dispensed with. Heavy and continuous air attacks against communications were ordere d by General Eisenhower to deny the enemy freedom of movement to pre- pare and launch counter-attacks and to reduce the rate of German re- inforcement to a level lower than that of the Allies . Heavy and medium bombers were directed on to road and rail centres while light bomber s and fighter-bombers attacked the bridges across the Loire and in the Paris-Orleans gap . The most important bridges over the Seine had alread y been cut and, although it was appreciated that the enemy would, as in Italy, work feverishly to keep some routes open, traffic would inevitably be canalised, and this in turn would provide profitable opportunities for the ubiquitous swarms of fighter-bombers . The problem of creating a "traffic desert" in northern France was far more difficult than that face d in Italy during the STRANGLE campaign, but the air resources to achiev e this aim were far larger and better coordinated, and it seemed likely that there would be less interference by the weather ; the Germans coul d hope for less relief from darkness during the short midsummer nights an d a larger Allied night-harassing force was ready and trained to continu e attacks round the clock . It was estimated that any German troops in immediate reserve statione d between the Seine and the Loire would be committed to battle by 7t h June, and, in general, attacks on these forces were left to the fighter - bombers, but several heavy bombing attacks were also made on the 6th- 7th to block the key rail and road centres within this area . The targets chosen were Vire, Chateaudun, Lisieux, Argentan, St Lo, Caen, Coutances , Conde-sur-Noireau and Acheres, in each case fractional forces of Bombe r Command, roughly equivalent to those which the previous night had bombed coastal batteries, being available for the task . In three of the raid s Australian squadrons and individuals played a significant part, and description of these will serve to indicate the degree of success and th e limitations of this use of air power. (R .A .A .F A Spitfire of No . 453 Squadron at Ford on D-day being prepared for take-off for close-suppor t operations with the assaulting ground forces . All Allied aircraft at this time, with th e exception of four-engined bombers, were painted with distinctive black and white stripe s for easy identification . Spitfires taking off for a patrol over the Normandy beach-head . (Imperial War Ma .reumi ) A low-level oblique of the Normandy beaches taken by a R .A .F . reconnaissance aircraft . German troops working on the beach defences run for cover when startled by the aircraft . (Imperial War Museum ) Landing-craft make their way to the shore in the D-day landings on 6th June 1944 . Othe r craft have discharged troops and vehicles which are making their way inland . (Photographic News Agencies Ltd ) (R..4 A .t .) The effect of saturation bombing by the U .S.A.A.F . and Bomber A composite aerial photograph of a "Mulberry" artificial harbour a t Command on a large constructional work in the Pas de Calai s the Normandy beach-head after the landings on 6th June 1944 . Th e area, June 1944 . use of the prefabricated port greatly simplified the problem o f supplying the Allied armies in France . ~R . .I . LI . ) On 25th June 1944 No . 453 Squadron moved from England to a landing ground in a barley field in Normandy . Ground staff setting up camp at their beach-head base . (R .A .A .G . ) Pilots of No . 453 Squadron sightseeing outside Bayeux Cathedral, July 1944 . Left to right : Sqn Ldr D . H . Smith ; F-O's K . K . Lawrence, J . F . Olver ; F-Lt V . A . Lancaster ; F-O M . West ; F-Lt P . V . McDade . 6-7 June VIRE AND ARGENTAN 13 1 Vire was not only an important junction on the railways linking bot h Caen and St Lo with the lateral Paris-Granville main line ; through it ran the principal highway along which enemy reinforcements could be rushe d up from Brittany. The aiming points chosen were two railway bridges but it was expected that the spread of bombing would block roads throug h the town. There had been some discussion of the political advisability of attacking built-up areas for the purpose of making road-blocks, but urgency overcame doubt, as any delay, however slight, imposed on th e Germans in the first two days of OVERLORD was expected to be important . Accordingly, a few minutes after midnight on 6th-7th June, 107 Lan - casters, including 24 from No . 460, attacked Vire from a height of 4,000 to 5,000 feet. The Australians saw the target indicators burning close t o both bridges, and 414 tons of bombs were rained on the town . Enemy ground defences were slight, but some night fighters appeared and tw o crews of No. 460 reported inconclusive combats while a third failed t o return to base. Similarly accurate bombing was achieved two hours later by 104 Halifaxes of No . 4 Group at Chateaudun, a rail centre west of Orleans which was also an enemy armoured-unit training centre . No. 466 Squadron dispatched 14 aircraft for this raid and 16 other Halifaxe s were piloted by Australians, many of whom actually saw bombs falling in the railway yards or brought back night photographs which clearl y showed the aiming point and target indicators . Argentan, 35 miles south of Caen, and astride most of the importan t roads and railways leading to the British assault area, was attacked on th e 6th-7th by Lancasters of No . 5 Group, and, next day, by large formation s of American bombers . Nineteen crews from No . 463 and 17 from No . 467 joined in this raid and all returned safely, although some complaine d bitterly that they had been fired on by Allied naval vessels .l All the Australians were enthusiastic about the results of their attack and photo - graphs taken after the second raid showed considerable damage to railway facilities and warehouses and other buildings adjacent to the marshallin g yards. After these initial raids close to the assault area Bomber Comman d targets were chosen along a wider arc with the object of drawing a tactical line beyond which it was hoped that reinforcements either fro m 1 This was a recurrent difficulty in complex operations . Theoretically all major flights were mad e known to the naval forces, but with nearly 5,000 ships of varying types in the OVERLORD are a the task of passing information to all concerning the exact time of passage of each bombe r stream was tremendous . Each ship in the danger area was free to fire under independent control ; and some were not well trained to distinguish friend from foe at night . The problem increased when individual army commanders ashore began to declare restricte d flying zones in which anti-aircraft guns would have unrestricted right to fire at any time . This hampered the planning of air operations in support of these very commanders, and Leigh- Mallory pressed, although unsuccessfully, for the appointment of a single air defence commande r for the entire assault area and rigid central control of gunfire . In view of the comparativel y low level of German air attack the air force wished army and navy authorities to accept th e risk of sneak raids during the comparatively short overhead passage of Allied bomber forces . Aircrews were themselves responsible for some of the incidents, because of bad navigatio n or poor timing . Weather and the need to mount operations at short notice also played a part in this consistently intractable problem of satisfying the opposing safety requirements of th e three Services. Mistakes were almost inevitable, just as sometimes bad coordination or sudde n changes in the battle area entailed Allied air attacks on friendly troops when the blameles s pilots were bombing the precise targets given to them . These were unfortunate but almost ineradicable hazards of this type of warfare . 132 SUPPORTING THE LODGEMENT 7-9 June the Fifteenth German Army in the Pas de Calais, or from farther east , would not be able to move by rail. The French and Belgian railways had already suffered heavy attack during the preparatory phase of OVERLORD , and the cumulative effects of damage to tracks, rolling stock, repair shop s and communication gear were slowing down the whole system until it wa s capable of satisfying only minimum enemy requirements . It was hoped that further heavy raids coupled with enormously increased German needs would cause major blockages far from the actual battle area .