A Choice in Distress Artical Name : Will the "National Dialogue" Offer A

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Choice in Distress Artical Name : Will the Artical Name : A Choice in Distress Artical Subject : Will the "National Dialogue" Offer a Resolution for Tunisia¶s Political Crisis? Publish Date: 05/07/2021 Auther Name: Ahmed Nazif Subject : The political crisis in Tunisia has been spiraling over the past months with no solution in sight. The reason, in part, is that the country¶s constitution, approved in 2014, features complex intertwined interests of the governmental institutions. This situation eventually led to the current conflict between the president, on one side, and the parliament and the government, on the other. In an attempt to resolve the current gridlock, President Kais Saied, on several occasions, called for a radical change of the current political system, while the Islamist Ennahda Movement and its allies fear that they might lose the electoral privileges they have gained thanks to the power-sharing system and the current voting system. The last of Saeid¶s calls came up more detailed and within a clearer framework to be shaped by ³national dialogue.´The President¶s InitiativePrior to his arrival at the presidential palace in Carthage, Tunisian President Kais Saied demanded to radically change the political and voting systems, as he saw that the current representative democracy had reached a deadlock and became unable to fulfill the people¶s hopes and aspirations. His stand became evident in his direct criticism of the partisan system, and, in particular, the current form of parliamentary procedures, violations by members of the parliament, as well as issues of immunity. During a meeting held on June 15 with former Tunisian prime ministers, Saeid candidly announced his call for radical changes to the ³current political system and the voting system in effect´which led to what he described as ³division and paralysis of the state¶s apparatus.´This time, however, he laid a clear framework for the hoped changes and that is ³national dialogue.´Prior to his latest statement, several political forces feared that the president would resort to forced changes based on ³supra-constitutional measures´or even ³constitutional measures´that would see the president declare ³a state of imminent danger´as per Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution, which states that ³in the event of imminent danger threatening the nation¶s institutions or the security or independence of the country, and hampering the normal functioning of the state, the President of the Republic may take any measures necessitated by the exceptional circumstances.´This time, Saeid succeeded in imposing his conditions on the agenda of the national dialogue, called for months ago with support from the General Labour Union. Then, it became evident that he does not want to clone the 2013 version of the national dialogue, which succeeded in achieving temporary disengagement between Ennahda and the secular opposition but failed to address the roots of the crisis, which is nature of the political system. President Saied implied this point during his meeting with the former premiers when he said that the dialogue will be conducted for the sole purpose of seeking solutions to problems facing the Tunisians, will not be like previous dialogues and will not be a vain attempt to confer false legitimacy.A main pillar of Saied's initiative is that the root cause of the political and structural crisis Tunisia is going through is the nature of the hybrid political system, which is semi- parliamentary and semi-presidential and entails sharing of constitutional powers in a complicated way. Accordingly, this power- sharing is what blocks the executive authority from performing its functions, namely running the state and achieving development, and even divides it between a president directly elected by the people and an appointed prime minister. Additionally, the electoral system, which is based on ³proportional representation and the approval of the largest remainders.´Because this formula, widely known as the Hare Quota with Largest Remainders (HQ-LR further, further fragments the outcome of elections, the president wants the voting system to be mainly based on individuals, while also changing the constituencies into a form of direct democracy. ChallengesThere exists a near-consensus in Tunisia about the need for introducing changes to the existing political and electoral systems, but the differences fall within the limits, forms and tools of these hoped-for changes. President Saied goes far in calling for radical changes to fulfill his idea of ³direct democracy´which he has been defending since the launch of his election campaign. Yet a wide segment of partisan politicians, from both the right-wing and the left-wing, support this push for change on the condition that it amends the hybrid political system into a fully presidential or fully parliamentary system as an exit from the dilemma of the complicated power-sharing. However, the fact that some of the parties believe in the president¶s push for bringing about changes, whether they are radical or partial, to the political constitutional system, is not sufficient. The reason is that, to implement his initiative, the president needs, alongside the consultative framework represented by the national dialogue, to abide by the constitutional procedures set forth to regulate such changes, as stated in the ³Amending the Constitution'' section of the Tunisian Constitution. This section gives the proposition initiated by the president of the republic the priority of consideration, but requires approval from two-thirds of the members of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (the parliament). After such approval is given, the president may submit the amendment to be put to referendum in which case it will be adopted if it receives an absolute majority of votes cast.Although the president¶s popularity, according to a majority of polls, is relatively broad enough to garner a guaranteed outcome of a referendum on amending the system, he certainly cannot guarantee the approval of two thirds of the parliament, in which Ennahda and its allies hold a majority of seats. Additionally, representatives who are not part of the majority coalition in the parliament have reservations on the president¶s stands, in general, as well as his plans to change the existing political system. The Free Destourian Party, led by Abir Moussi, defends the need for changing the current political system, but believes that the solution lies in a return to adopting the fully presidential system and not pushing towards a new type of democracy that the president wants to establish. Another challenge facing the president¶s initiative to change the political and electoral system 10/1/2021 6:18:16 AM 1 / 2 is the vagueness of his efforts. That is to say, he has not set forth any proposals or clearly defined outline or borderlines for the desired change. Hence several political forces continue to abstain from showing their positions on the initiative. Furthermore, it seems President Saied wants the national dialogue to be the framework for discussing these proposals. He stated, in his meeting with the former prime ministers: ³Let us enter into a credible dialogue... to a new political system and a real constitution, because this constitution is based on putting locks everywhere and institutions cannot proceed with locks or deals.´Saied¶s statement suggests that he is willing to make concessions in order to reach agreement on the issue of changing the political system. Ennahda¶s PositionOn the other side, Ennahda Movement is the sole defender of the current political system because it is the major contributor to assuming the majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, or National Constituent Assembly (2011-2014), allowing it to be the largest beneficiary of this system. Historical factors too play a significant role in this position. The Islamist party was involved in a bitter conflict with the state under the totalitarian presidential system over four decades, and still fears the establishment of a new presidential system that can very well put an end to its existence, especially in light of its strained relationship with President Saied.Yet, the deep political and economic crisis hitting the country pushed Ennahda, which is the major supporter of Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, to spare no effort to engage in any new rounds of the national dialogue to save itself from a potential predicament of being blamed for any failure of the government, as was the case back in 2013, in the wake of a wave of political assassinations which targeted secular opposition leaders. For this reason, it quickly backed the initiative proposed by the General Labour Union early this year. It, however, had to face the conditions set by President Saied about the content and goals of the dialogue. While its media and political networks continued their violent attack on the president for his policies, Ennahda continued to search for some form of compromise with him without any success so far. The aim was to try to revive the process of coming up with new compromises as was the case with ex-president Beji Caid Essebsi. But the dilemma that Ennahda is facing is that it is now encountering a new figure who came to power from outside the frameworks of the traditional Tunisian political class and who does not believe in bargaining. Future TrajectoriesThe outlook in Tunisia seems to be foggy due to high polarization and tensions between the president and Ennahda, backed by the parliament and the government. This would reduce the ability to analyze the future trajectories of the current crisis, as well as the outcome of calls to the national dialogue and the president¶s push towards changing the political and voting systems. Based on this, a number of potential future scenarios can be proposed (outlined): - All Parties agree to sit at the negotiating table to reach agreement and continue to work towards making partial changes to the political system and changing the electoral system.
Recommended publications
  • 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia Final Report
    ELECTION REPORT ✩ 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia Final Report ELECTION REPORT ✩ 2019 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Tunisia Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org Contents Map of Tunisia................................. 4 The Independent High Authority Executive Summary ............................ 5 for Audiovisual Communications .............. 40 Background ................................. 6 Conclusion ................................ 41 Legal Framework ............................ 7 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns ........... 42 Election Management ........................ 7 Campaigning in the First Round Voter Registration ........................... 8 of the Presidential Election .................. 42 Voter Education ............................. 8 Conclusion ................................ 44 Citizen Observation .......................... 8 Campaigning in the Parliamentary Election .... 44 Candidate Registration ....................... 8 Campaigning in the Second Round of the Campaign .................................. 9 Presidential Election ........................ 46 Voting and Counting ........................ 11 Campaign Finance ............................ 47 Tabulation ................................. 12 Social Media Monitoring ...................... 49 Electoral Dispute Resolution ................. 12 Legal Framework ........................... 49 Results .................................... 13 Methodology .............................
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia's New Political Order Likely to Test Ennahda's Governing Mettle
    UK £2 Issue 231, Year 5 EU €2.50 November 17, 2019 www.thearabweekly.com Interview Iran-backed Shedding light on crackdown on Qatar's influence Iraqi protests networks Page 9 Pages 3,7 Tunisia’s new political order likely to test Ennahda’s governing mettle Lamine Ghanmi that is likely to have trouble acting tle will be facing the country’s on legislation. daunting economic problems. With Ennahda ensured the election GDP growth at slightly more than Tunis of Ghannouchi as speaker of par- 1%, the economy is ill-equipped to liament because of an about-face create enough jobs to address the ith the election of En- by the Qalb Tounes party, a former more than 15% unemployment rate. nahda President Ra- arch-political foe. An impatient population dealing ched Ghannouchi as However, it is not clear whether with high prices and a deteriorat- W parliament speaker and Qalb Tounes, led by media magnate ing standard of living will offer any the nomination of Habib Jemli, a Nabil Karoui, will participate in the government limited margin to ma- former junior agriculture minis- formation of the new government noeuvre. ter, as prime minister, Tunisians or whether it will give it its approval It is unknown what kind of rela- now know the shape of the politi- to Jemli’s proposed cabinet, which tionship the Ennahda-dominated cal landscape that has been greatly must be put to a parliamentary vote institutions will strike with Presi- altered by recent presidential and in less than two months. dent Kais Saied. The new head of legislative elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Is Rached Ghannouchi Ennahda's President for Life?
    IS RACHED GHANNOUCHI ENNAHDA’S PRESIDENT FOR LIFE? Leadership Struggles Pose Challenge to Tunisia’s Largest Party ANNE WOLF July 2021 IS RACHED GHANNOUCHI ENNAHDA’S PRESIDENT FOR LIFE? Leadership Struggles Pose Challenge to Tunisia’s Largest Party Anne Wolf JULY 2021 ABOUT THE AUTHOR ANNE WOLF is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy, as well as a fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford, and an associate editor at the Journal of North African Studies. She has published numerous articles on North African affairs, particularly on Tunisia, and is the author of Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda (Oxford University Press, 2017), which won the CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title. Dr. Wolf’s previous writings for POMED include “Ennahda’s Past, Present and Future: Anne Wolf Discusses Her Book Political Islam in Tunisia” (June 2019); “Beji Caid Essebsi: The Old Guard Member Who Helped Build Tunisia’s Democracy” (July 2019); and “The Counterrevolution Gains Momentum in Tunisia: The Rise of Abir Moussi” (November 2020). Her current research focuses on the Ben Ali regime and authoritarian resilience in Tunisia after the 2010–11 uprisings. @AnneMWolf ABOUT THE PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY (POMED) THE PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization based in Washington, DC, that is dedicated to examining how genuine democracies can develop in the Middle East and how the United States can best support that process. Through dialogue, research, and advocacy, POMED works to strengthen the constituency for U.S. policies that peacefully support democratic reform in the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Avoiding a Populist Surge in Tunisia
    Avoiding a Populist Surge in Tunisia Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°73 Tunis/Brussels, 4 March 2020. Translation from French What’s new? The legislative and presidential elections in late 2019 have reshaped Tunisia’s political landscape. A new political class supporting the cause of national sovereignty has emerged in the country’s parliament and presidency. Four months passed before the Assembly approved a new government on 27 February 2020. Why does it matter? Tunisia has lost valuable time. The focus on national sover- eignty among the new political forces threatens to stir up increasing populism, polit- ical tensions and social polarisation. This will make it harder for the country to tack- le its economic and security problems. What should be done? To avert this populist surge, the new political class should help set up inclusive dialogue mechanisms using consensus to establish a long-term national strategic orientation, particularly regarding ways of increasing the country’s economic sovereignty. I. Overview Tunisians went to the polls in September and October 2019, and the results have shaken up the country’s political scene. The new political figures and parties that emerged in recent years as a result of certain popular expectations are now playing a leading role in Tunisian politics. This new political class has sustained a populist surge that has fuelled political tensions, polarised society and reduced the country’s ability to meet economic and security challenges. To contain this surge, politicians should support the creation of dialogue mechanisms that bring together the main political, trade union, administrative and associative actors.
    [Show full text]
  • THE DARK SIDE of CONSENSUS in TUNISIA: Lessons from 2015-2019
    t THE DARK SIDE OF CONSENSUS IN TUNISIA: Lessons from 2015-2019 SHARAN GREWAL SHADI HAMID GOVERNANCE | JANUARY 2020 THE DARK SIDE OF CONSENSUS IN TUNISIA: Lessons from 2015-2019 SHARAN GREWAL SHADI HAMID EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since the 2011 revolution, Tunisia has been considered a model for its pursuit of consensus between secular and Islamist forces. While other Arab Spring countries descended into civil war or military dictatorship, Tunisia instead chose dialogue and cooperation, forming a secular-Islamist coalition government in 2011 and approving a constitution by near unanimity in 2014. Even after the constitution was approved, Tunisia from 2015 to 2019 was governed by a grand coalition that included both the major secular and Islamist parties. However, Tunisia’s experience has also raised the concern of whether there is such a thing as too much consensus. In this paper, we argue that the extended pursuit of consensus in Tunisia has also had a dark side, constraining its democratic transition. In the name of consensus, the national unity government of 2015-2019 abandoned controversial but necessary issues like transitional justice and security sector reform and could not take bold action on the economy or on the formation of the Constitutional Court. That the largest parties were in government together also meant that there was no effective opposition, which in turn contributed to public disillusionment with political parties and democracy. The failure of the unity government was illustrated in the 2019 elections, when the establishment was largely defeated in favor of political outsiders. Moreover, the consensus government merely postponed rather than resolved the underlying secular-Islamist tensions.
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia's 2019 Parliamentary Elections
    A Guide to TUNISIA’S 2019 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS October 2019 A Guide to TUNISIA’S 2019 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OCTOBER 2019 ABOUT THE PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY (POMED) The Project on Middle East Democracy is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to examining how genuine democracies can develop in the Middle East and how the United States can best support that process. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, we aim to strengthen the constituency for U.S. policies that peacefully support democratic reform in the Middle East. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Seth Binder, Amy Hawthorne, Louisa Keeler, Stephen McInerney, and Andrew Miller participated in the drafting of this report. Essia Imjed, Ons Mhmidi, Sacha Gilles, McKenna Hering, Abbie Wilt, and Alex Bumpers conducted research and fact-checking; and April Brady designed and produced the report. POMED expresses its appreciation to Sharan Grewal, Mohamed-Dhia Hammami, and Anne Wolf for sharing their insights and expertise, although any errors are the responsibility of POMED. © 2019 Project on Middle East Democracy. All rights reserved. The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, Washington, D.C. based 501(c)(3) organization. The views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of POMED, its staff, or its Board members. For electronic copies of this report, visit: https://pomed.org/2019-tunisia-parliamentary-election-guide/ Limited print copies are also available. Project on Middle East Democracy 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 617 Washington, D.C. 20036 www.pomed.org CONTENTS Introduction . 2 The Electoral Framework. 4 Constituencies . .4 Electoral System . .4 Election Administration . 6 Voters . .6 Electoral Law .
    [Show full text]
  • Gender Equality in Tunisia: Current Trends
    Journal of Social Sciences: Transformations & Transitions ISSN 2792-3843 JOSSTT 2021, 1(01):04 ARTICLE GENDER EQUALITY IN TUNISIA: CURRENT TRENDS Kashina, Anna *a a. Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Moscow, Russia * Corresponding author ([email protected] ) PUBLISHED: 19/07/2021 COPYRIGHT NOTICE: © 2021 by the author. Licensee ERUDITUS. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). CITE THIS PAPER: Kashina, Anna 2021. "Gender equality in Tunisia: current trends" JOSSTT 1(01):04. DOI: https://doi.org/10.52459/josstt1140721 ABSTRACT Tunisia has come a long way towards achieving gender equality and remains a prominent example to other Arab countries in this experience. Meanwhile, Tunisia still takes only modest positions in international rankings on various indexes measuring gender gap. This work examines, with the help of a comparative- historical method, the formation of the women's movement in Tunisia and the development of legislation on gender equality. Then, through statistical data the author outlines the extent of women's economic, social, and political participation, and, finally, referring to the "concept of representation" by Hanna F. Pitkin (1967), the author looks at the pre-election programs of political parties that won the 2019 parliamentary elections, in order to assess the perception of the problem of women's emancipation in Tunisian society on the whole. As a result of the research, the author comes to the conclusion that, despite progressive legislative framework guaranteeing women's rights, the mass consciousness of Tunisians maintains a set of ideas and norms on gender inequality generated by Islamic tradition and fostering the discrepancy, first in the existing legislation and the objective reality, and secondly, between the rules of family law containing elements of Sharia, and the provisions of the Constitution, as well as the accepted international obligations.
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia Presidential Elections 2019
    INFO PACK Tunisia Presidential Elections 2019 Yasmina Allouche INFO PACK Tunisia Presidential Elections 2019 Yasmina Allouche Tunisia Presidential Elections 2019 © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE September 2019 WRITTEN BY YASMINA ALLOUCHE PHOTO CREDIT ANADOLU AGENCY TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON 200 GRAYS INN ROAD, WC1X 8XZ LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE, 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC / UNITED STATES www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this report represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Introduction n July 25th 2019, the death faces the challenge of fixing the state’s budget of Tunisia’s first democrati- deficit, a stagnant economy with high inflation cally elected President, Beji and an increasing unemployment rate of 15.2 per Caïd Essebsi, following the cent, up 3 per cent from before the revolution. uprising of 2011, was an- nounced. Unlike many of Despite its problems, Tunisia has managed to OTunisia’s counterparts which took part in the so- remain strong in the last nine years, and its ex- called Arab Spring, Tunisia has often been hailed periments with political plurality have both been as one of the success stories for its transition to positive and negative for the country. One of Tu- democracy following 22 years of authoritarianism nisia’s main political parties in the current power under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Are the Candidates in Tunisia's 2019 Presidential Elections?
    Bawader, 5th September 2019 Who are the Candidates in Tunisia’s 2019 Presidential Elections? → Souha Drissi With the death of President Beji Caid Essebsi on 25 July, Tunisia’s presidential elections were moved up and will be held on 15 September 2019. By the end of the eight-day process of accepting nominations – from 2 to 9 August – the Independent High Authority for Elections (IHAE) had received 97[1] requests for nomination which include 75 independents and 11 female candidates. On 31 August, the IHAE released the final list of candidates for the presidential race, accepting 26 nominees, including two women, and rejecting 71 applications for failing to meet candidacy requirements. The IHAE is considered one of the achievements of the 2011 Revolution. It is a nine- member permanent body based in Tunis which enjoys administrative and financial independence. Its mission is to “ensure democratic, pluralistic, fair and transparent elections and referendums”[2] and supervise and oversee all related processes. The election campaigns started on 2 September and will continue until 13 September, with 17 September as the deadline for the announcement of the preliminary election results and 21 October for the announcement of the final results. In case of no absolute majority vote, a second round will be held after two weeks.[3] What is at stake in these elections? Presidential elections are vital to the democracy-building process that began with the fall of the Ben Ali regime, not only because they are a cumulative step towards greater consolidation of democracy in Tunisia, but also as a significant test of the quality of Tunisian democracy itself.
    [Show full text]
  • A Guide to Tunisia's 2019 Presidential Election
    A Guide to TUNISIA’S 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION September 2019 A Guide to TUNISIA’S 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SEPTEMBER 2019 ABOUT THE PROJECT ON MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY (POMED) The Project on Middle East Democracy is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to examining how genuine democracies can develop in the Middle East and how the United States can best support that process. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, we aim to strengthen the constituency for U.S. policies that peacefully support democratic reform in the Middle East. Stephen McInerney, Amy Hawthorne, Andrew Miller, Louisa Keeler, and Seth Binder participated in the drafting of this report; Essia Imjed conducted research and fact-checking; and April Brady designed and produced the report. POMED expresses its appreciation to Sharan Grewal and Anne Wolf for sharing their expertise and insights. © 2019 Project on Middle East Democracy. All rights reserved. The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, Washington, D.C. based 501(c)(3) organization. The views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of POMED, its staff, or its Board members. For electronic copies of this report, visit: https://pomed.org/2019-tunisia-presidential-election-guide/ Limited print copies are also available. Project on Middle East Democracy 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 617 Washington, D.C. 20036 www.pomed.org CONTENTS Introduction . 2 Electoral Process . .4 Powers of the President . .4 Electoral System. 4 Voters. 4 Electoral Timetable. 5 Candidates . 6 Mohamed Abbou. 7 Youssef Chahed . 8 Hamma Hammami . 8 Hamadi Jebali . 9 Mehdi Jomaa . .9 Nabil Karoui. 10 Mohsen Marzouk.
    [Show full text]