PEOPLE WITHOUT A NATION:
CITIZENSHIP AND THE HILL TRIBES OF THAILAND
By
Lindsey Kingston
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in
Ethics, Peace & Global Affairs
Chair: Professor Julie Mertus
Professor Lucinda Peach
~ 7 / ( h p Y 1 I Date *
2006
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 1433564
Copyright 2006 by Kingston, Lindsey
All rights reserved.
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
® UMI
UMI Microform 1433564 Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. © COPYRIGHT
by
Lindsey Kingston
2006
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PEOPLE WITHOUT A NATION:
CITIZENSHIP AND THE HILL TRIBES OF THAILAND
BY
Lindsey Kingston
ABSTRACT
The indigenous “hill tribes” of northern Thailand, impacted by decades of
prejudicial government policies, often do not enjoy the economic and political benefits
available to the nation’s cultural majority. Denied citizenship, hill tribes exist in a
situation of statelessness that threatens the survival of both members and traditions.
While some economists are currently asking whether Thailand is the next “Asian
Tiger,” many tribes suffer from poverty, health concerns, and trafficking into the sex
industry. Without nationality, many members are unable to secure necessities such as
legal work, education, welfare opportunities, political representation, a passport and the
ability to travel, and documentation of their births, marriages and deaths.
The Thai government’s response to the hill tribes has been one of hostility, often
viewing indigenous peoples as national security risks. The international war on drugs, as
well as concerns about environmental protection in the heavily-forested uplands, further
positions the government against hill tribe members within its borders.
As Thailand seeks to modernize its image and propel itself successfully into the
global marketplace, its response to indigenous rights must be dramatically improved.
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The hill tribe situation demands a solution that draws on legal and social reforms for
uniting the nation and creating an environment of equality. As the indigenous rights
movement reaches the mountains of northern Thailand, it will take a variety of voices to
pressure for social action and inspire positive change.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...... ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... v
INTRODUCTION...... 1
Methodology...... 5
Chapter
1. HISTORY OF THE HILL TRIBES IN THAILAND
Relations Between the Government and Indigenous Peoples...... 13
2. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Application of a Human Security Model...... 34
3. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES
Differing Perspectives in the Human Rights Debate...... 52
4. THE MEANING AND IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP
The Social Implications of Thai Nationality for Hill Tribes...... 74
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 106
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABBREVIATIONS
ACHR Asian Centre for Human Rights
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BPP Border Patrol Police
CPCR Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights
DEPDC The Development and Education Programme for Daughters and Communities
DPW Department of Public Welfare
KMT Kuo Min Tang
PDA The Population and Community Development Association
PHR Physicians for Human Rights
TIP Trafficking in Persons
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Reftigees
WGIP Working Group on Indigenous Populations
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION
Mae Sai lies on the northern Thai-Burma border, a plane trip and a bus ride
away from the glitzy shopping malls of Bangkok. From this border town one can access
the mountain villages of indigenous peoples, called “hill tribes” by the Thai government,
with the help of a sturdy four-wheel drive truck. In these villages, the harsh reality of
continuing poverty and discrimination may be witnessed.
While some economists are currently asking whether Thailand is the next big
“Asian Tiger,” many hill tribe members have not been rewarded by the country’s
increasing prosperity. Tribes such as the Karen and Akha, impacted by decades of
prejudicial government policies, do not enjoy the economic and political benefits
available to the Thai majority.
It is not even correct to label these hill tribe people as “second class citizens,”
since many are not citizens at all. Denied citizenship by the government, they are often
unable to secure legal work, public education, welfare opportunities, political
representation, a passport and the ability to travel, or even legal documentation of their
births, marriages and deaths.1
The most recent wave of government intrusion in the north, begun in the 1960s,
propelled hill tribes into policy discussions revolving around national security and
1 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation o f Women in Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/aids/pdf/nostatus.pdf [21 January 2006]. 27.
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2
resources. Viewed as possible enemies of the state, particularly in relation to the
potential spread of communism within the region, the Thai government sought to bring
the hill tribes under control. The international war on drugs, as well as concerns about
environmental protection in the heavily-forested uplands, further positioned the
government against indigenous people within its borders.
Pressured to assimilate into the Thai mainstream yet often denied citizenship,
members of the hill tribes find themselves facing human security concerns as a direct
result of their statelessness. Limited educational and work opportunities leave many
unable to financially support their families, despite a new “iconography of wealth” being
transmitted to Thailand by international media. Many hill tribe youth are recruited into
prostitution, illegally migrating or being trafficked toward Bangkok and Phuket in a
country known as “Asia’s Brothel.” Others are trafficked into forced labor situations,
and many more find themselves unable to access health care for a variety of concerns,
including HIV/AIDS.
As hill tribes struggle with issues related to poverty, as well as health and
social problems related to the sex industry, many tribal people also express concern over
the erosion of their traditions. Some activists have denied the need for Thai citizenship
among the hill tribes because granting citizenship could lead to the assimilation into
mainstream Thai culture.
Further limiting equality for hill tribes is a political history in Asia of denying
indigenous rights. Most Asian states have suppressed minority nationalism, citing
indigenous peoples as either being disloyal, uncivilized, or standing in the way of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3
country’s economic development.2 Suggestions to employ multination federalism, which
grants minority groups certain decision-making power that would otherwise be held by
the central state government, meets with strong objections in Asia. Obstacles to this form
of government include skepticism that substate autonomies will be liberal-democratic,
the belief that ethnic mobilization will disappear with modernization, and the fear that
minorities will collaborate with state enemies.3
Even the identification of indigenous groups is uncertain territory, since many
Asian countries claim that the category of “indigenous peoples” does not apply to their
minorities.4 It is important to note that the Thai government refuses to categorize
northern tribes as “indigenous,” but rather will only refer to them as “hill tribes.” While
this term denies them the status of indigenous peoples, it nevertheless shows that the
government felt the need to create a distinct category for these groups.5
This situation leaves us with many questions: Is citizenship a viable solution
for dealing with problems facing hill tribes? Can indigenous people gain citizenship and
retain their native culture? What does it mean to be a full citizen, and can legal action
alone give someone this status? What social changes need to be made, both within hill
tribe culture and mainstream Thai culture, in order to attain equality?
I will argue that citizenship should be granted to hill tribe minorities, but that
legal citizenship status is not enough to secure these people with full citizenship and the
benefits that status offers. Instead, a plan is needed to create equality by going beyond
2 Will Kymlicka, “Models o f Multicultural Citizenship: Comparing Asia and the West,” inChallenging Citizenship: Group Membership and Cultural Identity in a Global ed. Age,Sor-hoon Tan (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2005): 110-136. 118. 3 Ibid 124. 4 Ibid 125. 5 Ibid 126.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4
the law to encompass the social aspects of citizenship. Full citizenship, I will argue, can
protect traditions without limiting opportunities for hill tribe peoples.
Relatively little has been written about hill tribes in Thailand from an
international relations perspective. Much of the work that does exist on the hill tribes is
anthropological in nature. Perhaps because many hill tribes cross borders and do not
exist in solely one country, international relations scholars are hesitant to tackle this
political situation. When one of those borders is Myanmar (Burma), a rogue country, an
already-difficult situation is exacerbated.
Here we do not find an easily-categorized problem. Hill tribe peoples are partly
indigenous, perhaps partly refugee as they flee dangerous circumstances in countries
such as Myanmar. Some hill tribe members speak Thai fluently and their families have
lived in Thailand for numerous generations. Others have no links to the mainstream Thai
culture. There is not one quintessential hill tribe person.
Clearly, however, the grim situation faced by hill tribe minorities is one that
should be discussed and studied within the international relations field. This is a human
rights issue, and it is also a case study in dealing with issues such as globalization,
cultural imperialism, indigenous rights and group rights. Although this thesis is region-
specific, these are topics that touch every area of the world.
The task of maintaining hill tribe culture, as well as determining to what extent
it can be maintained, is left both to the hill tribes themselves as well as the Thai
government. The establishment of equality within Thailand is also a goal that must be
acknowledged by both groups, and possibilities for success are linked to all aspects of
Thailand’s society.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5
The hill tribe situation in Thailand is a complicated issue, but it opens a
discussion that affects many cultures throughout the world. As Thailand struggles with
its identity and actions in a time of increasing modernization and economic growth, its
decisions regarding the hill tribes will shape an important aspect of its history. A
combination of activism, political and social research, and theory may contribute to an
understanding of how past decisions have impacted that history and what future actions
may create peace and human security within Thailand.
Methodology
This analysis of the hill tribes in Thailand is part of an ongoing discussion
about citizenship and identity, but it also requires recommendations for solving very real
and pressing problems. This thesis combines theory with fieldwork and activism, and it
requires a methodological approach that includes data from a variety of sources. A
combination of available data, expert interviews, field research and political theory is
necessary for fully understanding the hill tribe situation and producing possible policy
solutions.
This thesis project uses research for achieving emancipatory goals, or goals
that will hopefully “transform some aspect of society to ‘free’ or empower the
participants.”6 Emancipatory research is meant to empower individuals and change
structures of domination and oppression.7 The point of such research is not simply to
6 Gretchen B. Rossman and Sharon F. Rallis, Learning in the Field: An Introduction to Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1998), 15. 7 Ibid., 15-16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6
generate new knowledge for the academic community, but also to improve the lives of
others.8
This thesis is also the result of action research, which promotes social change
“by transforming the structures through the influence of the information collected.”9 The
finished product is a result of collective, collaborative and self-reflective inquiry. By
examining the current government response to hill tribe issues, it is hoped that existing
social problems may be solved through dialogue and action.
Available data, including historical archives and government policies, serves to
provide the background required for understanding and evaluating the situation of hill
tribe members. Sources of information specific to this case include public records,
private documents, mass media, and social science data archives.10 Government data
available through the Hill Tribes Development & Welfare Centre, as well as articles
from The Bangkok Post and anthropological ethnographies, serve as valuable resources
for providing background information. There are numerous advantages to using this type
of data, including its usefulness in analyzing social structures and studying the past.11
Research through available data may be strengthened by interviewing experts
in the field. Such experts are “those considered influential, prominent, well-informed, or
all three in an organization or community and are selected on the basis of their expertise
in areas relevant to the research.”12 Through my involvement with a 2005 American
University summer course on human security in Thailand, I was able to discuss the hill
8 Ibid., 16. 9 Ibid., 18. 10 Royce A. Singleton, Jr., and Bruce C. Straits,Approaches to Social Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 358-366. 11 Ibid., 327,367-368. 12 Gretchen B. Rossman and Sharon F. Rallis, Learning in the Field, 134.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7
tribe situation with experts from organizations such as the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Thai non-governmental organizations,
the U.S. Department of State and the Thai government.
In the case of the hill tribes, one interesting aspect of research through
available data methods and expert interviews is how information from various sources
may conflict. Some experts argued that citizenship was a major obstacle for equality and
a source of vulnerability that resulted in hill tribe members being trafficked into the sex
industry.13 Others believed that Thai citizenship would erode hill tribe culture and
values, and that providing legal citizenship was not necessarily the answer for solving
problems.14
In evaluating data and interviews, the quality of information must be assessed.
It is crucial to determine how, when, where and by whom existing data was collected
when measuring quality.15 One issue to consider is “selective survival,” which refers to
the fact that some information survives longer than others.16 Away from the main offices
of Bangkok, information in the highlands may have been improperly categorized or lost.
Of more concern, however, is “selective deposit,” which refers to systematic biases in
the content of available evidence.17 This concern is especially relevant in connection
with data provided by the Thai government, since one may argue that government
officials have reason to provide false or questionable data in relation to the treatment of
13 David Feingold, Coordinator o f Trafficking and HIV/AIDS Programs, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 7 June 2005. 14 Usa Lerdsrisunthad, Manager, Foundation for Women, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 8 June 2005. 15 Royce A. Singleton, Jr., and Bruce C. Straits,Approaches to Social Research, 372. 16 Ibid., 375. 17 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8
minorities in their country. As this thesis will later show, the hill tribes have often been
viewed as enemies of the state in relation to drug eradication, environmental concerns
and political tensions with neighboring countries and organizations.
To better understand and gauge the quality of the background information
being processed, I found the use of analytical history helpful. This form of analysis
stresses the accuracy of the description of events, and it serves to both help understand
historical outcomes as well as to comprehend the present.18 In the case of the hill tribes,
knowledge of tribal and Thai state history helps one to better understand the political
situation in question. As I will later argue, historical events such as political instabilities,
migration, anti-drug campaigns and land reform all play important roles in the current
relationship between the Thai government and hill tribe members.
Although my background information was collected by using these research
methods, further answers were provided through the use of field research. As a method
of data collection, such qualitative research allows scholars to “build a general, abstract
understanding of social phenomena.”19 In this case, fieldwork was conducted in July of
2005 in and around the northern Thai town of Mae Sai. Located in the Chiang Rai
province, this city serves as a major border between Thailand and Burma as well as a
center for hill tribe communities. The mountainous region is home to many small,
isolated hill tribe villages, and many indigenous communities are spread between
Thailand and Burma. This region is extremely poor in comparison with the richer
18 Ibid., 377. 19 Ibid., 320.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9
southern provinces of Thailand, and it has been at the center of controversies regarding
opium, the environment, and communist insurgencies.
Located just outside the center of town is the Development and Education
Programme for Daughters and Communities (DEPDC); a Thai non-profit organization
dedicated to preventing the recruitment of hill tribe children into the Asian sex industry.
Founded by current director and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Sompop Jantraka, the
DEPDC currently provides education to more than 500 children who cannot attend Thai
public schools.
As an intern with the DEPDC, I was allowed to conduct participant observation
among the staff and students, who are largely Akha hill tribe members. Access to this
community is restricted, due to privacy and safety concerns for the students, and my
internship granted me permission from the information “gatekeepers”20 to conduct
research. I was a peripheral member21 of the DEPDC, and other English-speaking
volunteers acted as my key informants.22 These volunteers shared their personal
experiences and opinions with me, and they also served as translators when I needed to
communicate with non-English native Thai speakers.
I approached my time with the DEPDC as an opportunity for unstructured
observation, in which processes are implicit and emergent.23 It was my intention to
produce grounded theory, or theory generated by collected data, and this approach
advocates loosely structured research designs that allow theory to emerge from the
20 Ibid., 337. 21 Ibid., 342. 22 Ibid., 339. 23 Ibid., 327.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10
field.241 was hopeful that my experiences at the DEPDC would lead me to learn about
hill tribe issues that I was not yet aware of, as well as to give me a better perspective of
what indigenous people thought about government policy and their place within Thai
society.
Although I had gained background information by reading literature and
speaking with experts, I wanted to observe the situation first-hand and better understand
the perspectives of hill tribe members by employing methodological empathy.25 Partly
because I had received conflicting information from experts in this field, I wanted to
learn more about how hill tribe members viewed citizenship and how the lack of
citizenship rights affected their daily lives.
Because my preliminary research had highlighted issues of poverty and
discrimination aimed at hill tribe communities, I wanted to approach my research from
an emancipatory perspective. My work took on the dimension of applied social research
that aimed at solving existing problems.26 In this case, social indicators such as health,
education and employment serve to identify trends in social problems within the hill
tribe community. Looking ahead toward policy recommendations, my thesis may
identify problems and plan policy through needs and social impact assessments.28
In order to understand how policy changes may impact the quality of life for
hill tribe members, my research focus had to become more general. Theoretical
approaches to identity issues and multiculturalism were included as part of a more
24 Ibid., 349. 25 Ibid., 322. 26 Ibid., 421. 27 Ibid., 430. 2* Ibid., 428-432.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11
specific discussion of indigenous rights in Thailand. Theory related to group rights, self-
determination, and assimilation also plays an important role in considerations of policy
aimed at hill tribes. Perspectives from cultural pluralists and liberal theorists, as well as
others, outline a broader framework for understanding what can and should be done in
Thailand.
A difficulty throughout this process was acknowledging my Western
influences, including the use of a human security model, despite my study and
discussion of an Asian-focused international issue. Although much of the theory
presented is Western in origin, it is important to note the cultural differences at play in
this discussion and to respect those differences in the creation of policy
recommendations. In field work, as well, I was aware of the ways I might be perceived
due to my status as an educated, white, Western woman while researching the situation
of indigenous peoples in Asia, I believe my awareness and acknowledgement of these
issues allowed me to deal with such obstacles and preserve the integrity and truthfulness
of my work.
The hill tribe situation in Thailand is a complicated issue, and it opens a
discussion that may include many other world cultures. As Thailand struggles with its
identity and actions in a time of increasing modernization and economic growth, its
decisions regarding the hill tribes will shape an important aspect of its history. An
action-oriented research strategy combining available data, expert interviews, field work,
and political theory may contribute to discussions of this situation.
This thesis will begin with an outline of the history of the hill tribes in
Thailand, including the relationship between indigenous people and the Thai
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12
government. Chapter two will discuss the current hill tribe situation from within a
human security framework, which will highlight the vulnerabilities that are created from
a lack of citizenship. The issues of indigenous rights and state-focused “Asian values”
will be considered in relation to Thailand in chapter three, and a theoretical approach to
the meaning and impact of citizenship there will be presented in chapter four.
Conclusions and recommendations will be found in chapter five.
As chapter one will show, the current situation of the hill tribes in Thailand
may only be understood in the context of a complex relationship between tribes and the
state government. This relationship, often marked by discrimination and hostility toward
indigenous people, has led to the formation of policies that continue to limit
opportunities in the highlands. It has also fueled stereotypes and divided Thai society
along ethnic lines, creating major obstacles for achieving national unity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1
HISTORY OF THE HILL TRIBES IN THAILAND
Relations Between the Government and Indigenous Peoples
The term “hill tribe,” or chao khao, is largely a convenient categorization that
refers to a number of very different social groups. This tribal association selects out
upland residents who are not Chinese, Shan, or Thai by birth and often has overtones of
“savage” and “crude” when compared with majority groups.! A 1964 study counted as
many as 137 separate tribes in Southeast Asia, many of them originally from China.2
Nine hill tribes have been legally recognized by Thailand: the Karen (Sgaw and
Pwo groups), Miao (also known as Hmong), Yao (also known as Mien), Lahu, Lisu,
Akha, Lawa, Htin, and Khamu.3 These indigenous groups entered Thailand from
neighboring countries, often due to political or economic tensions. For example, the
Lahu, Akha, and Lisu entered Thailand from Yunnan through the Shan States in Burma,
while the Yao and Miao arrived from a southwest course from central and southeastern
China that led through Laos.4 The Karen came from some Burma-Thailand border region
many years after leaving China.5
1 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes o f the Northern Thailand Frontier (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 2001), 50. 2 Ibid., 1. 3 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation o f Women in Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/aids/pdPnostatus.pdfl21 January 2006], 27. 4 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes o f the Northern Thailand, 53-54. 5 Ibid., 54.
13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14
The “stresses and tensions” of warfare and economic pressures have produced
“glacierlike human flows” of migration, according to Jane and Lucien Hanks.6 In recent
history, the Lisu (1896,1900,1920) and Akha (1910,1930,1940) came to Thailand from
Burma, and members of Karen (1909,1920,1924) and Yao (1944) tribes moved within
Thailand itself. The Yao also came to the Thai uplands from Laos (1945,1946,1948).7
Life in the hills was mostly peaceful through most of the 1950s. Mostly
uninhabited in the 1800s and containing few villages until the 1930s, the uplands
contained about 100 tribal villages in 1950. These villages were “dotted amid the
endlessly forested hills, some clustered like fishing boats in featureless midocean, some
carelessly strewn across the landscape, and a few in lonely, but not fearful, isolation.”
With abundant forest and game, as well as fertile soil, times were good for the hill tribes.
The growing and use of opium was legal, but the demand was also small and opium was
often sold for silver Burmese rupees that were usually melted down to make jewelry.
There were no roads, but horse trails connected villages with a few traders and allowed
men to make annual trips to the valley markets to buy salt and iron. The Thai government
had little, if any, contact with these villages during this time.8
The fundamental unit of governancemiiang, was which has been an important
aspect of both Thai and hill tribe culture. miiangA itself is defined as “an area ruled by a
prince, an official, or a leader, major or minor.” In the modern-day kingdom of Thailand,
the citizenry is often referred to as “Miiang Thai” in reference to the rule of the king.9
Each traditional hill tribe village had its own tribal chief or council, and each was its own
6 Ibid., 2. 7 Ibid., 54. 8 Ibid., 98-99. 9 Ibid., 30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15
economically and politically autonomousmiiang .10 The head of amiiang may be
appointed by elders or by consensus, but never elected. A Confucian construct, the head
of a miiang receives its power from the Mandate of Heaven, but not from a democratic
process.11
An important aspect of the traditional understandingmiiang of governance was
that affiliation was voluntary. Except for the enslaved (usually prisoners of war), “people
were always free to sever their affiliation, move away, or transfer their loyalties without
asking permission if their interests would be better served elsewhere.”10 Although
everyone was expected to belong to onemiiang or another, this “sanction of withdrawal”
was a key factor in relations with authority.13 Furthermore, such voluntary affiliation
meant that miiang borders were fluctuating ones.14
The early days of self-rule and isolation did not last long for the hill tribes,
however, as the Thai government moved to establish a relationship with the minority
groups beginning in the late 1950s. The ultimate objective of this activity, according to
Hanks et al, was to incorporate the hill tribes into the Thai polity.15 Although the
government had taken some small steps in the 1890s to manage land and taxes, as well as
to provide mainstream Thai education and control Buddhist centers in the northern
frontier,16 this “second wave” of government imposition was much more aggressive.17
10 Ibid., 98. 11 Ibid., 30. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 31. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., 121. 16 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 71. 17 Ibid., 74.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16
Several government agencies had profound impacts in the northern region. The
Forestry Department has had the longest presence in the hills, first founded to oversee the
harvest and exportation of teak. In the 1930s, the department’s jurisdiction expanded to
include all lands above the valley floor and it sought to control erosion by forbidding hill
settlements and requiring timber licenses. According to Hanks et al., the Forestry
Department “avoided hiring uplanders, seeing them as enemies of the forest along with
fire, disease, and foliage-consuming insects because of their slash and bum agriculture.”18
The Provincial Police, the government’s constabulary arm under the Ministry of
the Interior, has been charged with the task of maintaining law and order by flushing out
“subversives” since 1948. This term has meant “communists” in the past, but it has also
meant any hostile critics of the regime or monarchy. Provincial Police forces have been
known to “supplement” pay with bribery and participation in opium trafficking, and hill
tribe members have complained of unfair treatment at the hands of its police officers.19
The Border Patrol Police (BPP) was formed in the 1950s as a response to threats
of communism, and it was charged with many of the same duties as the Provincial
Police.20 The BPP was responsible for monitoring the mountainous northern border with
Burma,21 as well as for enforcing Thai laws concerning opium.22 The policy agency
teamed with the Forestry Department to uphold the Forest Act of 1941, which forbade the
cutting of tall timber to protect the sources of water in the valleys below.23 The BPP also
18 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes of the Northern Thailand Frontier, 122. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 123. 22 Ibid., 124. 23 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17
built schools in tribal villages24 and encouraged parents in the most remote areas to send
their children to “welfare schools” to receive Thai educations.25
A Committee for National Tribal Welfare was established in 1959, with the goal
of speeding the assimilation of hill tribes. The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) was
chosen to “develop the means to benefit and guide the tribal people,” and the DPW
formed the Hill Tribes Division as a response to this assignment.26 Among the division’s
programs were land settlement centers, data collection on hill tribe culture, and
agricultural training programs.
The impact of these agencies was tightly connected to political and social
happenings of the time. A variety of national and international events led to a tighter grip
of governmental control in the north, and perhaps the strongest element of change was
the fear of communism in Asia. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker write that this
“second wave of government intrusion” in the 1960s was “driven by the perceived need
to ‘combat communism.’”28
The Asian political scene changed dramatically with the 1948 communist victory
in China. Burmese frontier towns were inundated with refugees fleeing China’s new
government, and fear spread that countries such as India, Burma and Laos would join the
communist regime. Thailand, which had allied with Japan during World War II and was
grateful to the United States for providing post-war aid, reciprocated American
24 Ibid., 125. 25 Ibid., 127. 26 Ibid., 128. 27 Ibid., 129-132. 28 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 74.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18
generosity by joining the U.S. anticommunist political stance.29 Hanks et al. writes, “A
suddenly apprehensive Bangkok sought to strengthen the defense of its border with arms
and by reassuring itself of the loyalty of its resident population.”30 These changes brought
the hill tribes to the government’s attention.
According to Kathleen Gillogly, the communist threat fulfilled fears of outsiders
living within northern borders. Supported by the United States as it attempted to contain
communism in Indochina, anti-communist actions within Thailand often affected groups
who had little or nothing to do with communism itself.31 The Thai state was “highly
militarized” and “oriented toward counterinsurgency,” and hill tribes were often
perceived to be security threats.32 A 1973 government white paper argued that the
isolation of indigenous peoples in the northern hills made them vulnerable to propaganda
and rebellion.33 Gillogly writes, “Thai authorities believed that the ‘hill tribes,’ living in
remote locations on the borders of ‘enemy’ countries and inaccessible to Thai
administration, were susceptible to communist and insurgent influences.”34
The Maio Insurrection of 1967 highlights the affect of communist fears on the hill
tribes. The event began when members of a village, which had been relocated by the
government to a new site, were burning newly cleared fields for farming. Government
officials came to remind the villagers of Forestry Department policies against cutting
trees without permission, and the officials were paid “hush money” to ignore the
29 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes of the Northern Thailand Frontier, 156-157. 30 Ibid., 157. 31 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” inCivilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, ed. Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004): 116-149. 121. 32 Ibid., 120. 33 Ibid., 121. 34 Ibid., 120.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19
activities. When provincial police arrived to profit from the same situation the next day,
the headman lost patience and the police were driven from the village. A retaliatory
group of 50 police arrived the following day to a village of women and children, and they
were ambushed by Miao men on their return path. One policeman was killed, three were
captured, and others were injured. A larger group of police successfully fought the Maio
men several days later and burned the village as revenge.35
Although the burning of rebel villages had been “standard practice” for centuries,
“here the Miao evoked more than usual fear and hostility because they were seen as
communists, or inspired by communists, in a border province.”36 Thai officials argued
that “more encompassing measures” be taken to control the insurgents. The Thai army
joined with the Royal Laotian Army to sweep the Sayaburi Province near the Thai border
and capture resident Miao. At Border Police outposts, the Miao were interrogated and
handled “according to their perceived communist bent.” Feeling overwhelmed, the Miao
reacted with violence and many Thai, Laotians and Miao were killed.37
This event escalated further as full-scale war began on the Toeng mountain.
Villages were evacuated and then bombed by the Thai Air Force, and anyone found in the
hills were considered to be communists. The uplands were a “free fire zone” where any
person or structure could be targeted by airplanes. The Miao responded by ambushing
Thai army columns in the forest and assassinating several government officials.38 The
Yao, who shared terrain with the Miao along the Thai border, were also driven from their
35 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes of the Northern Thailand Frontier, 194. 36 Ibid., 195. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20
homes.39 In the end, refugees settled into Laotian villages or even in Thailand, and the
insurrection slowly faded away without ending in victory or defeat.40 In retrospect,
according to Hanks et al., “a panicking government had elevated a routine policing matter
into a military action.”41
When members of the Miao minority protested injustice, the Thai government
labeled their actions as a “communist-inspired rebellion” and a national security threat.
Officials feared a Miao communist conspiracy against Thailand was developing in Laos.
The Thai military bombed and napalmed villages until 1973, when public opinion and
royal intervention ended military operations against uplanders.42
Another international event, the growth of worldwide drug cartels, greatly
affected the hill tribes of northern Thailand.43 While most inhabitants practiced shifting
cultivation in the forests, the possibilities of profitable international trade led some to
grow large amounts of opium beginning in the 1940s.44 This development led the Thai
government, under international pressure, to form and enforce anti-drug policies that
would have a lasting effect on the uplands.
The economy of the northern frontier is a weak one, due in part to the region’s
climate and the nature of the farming business. Many northern farmers find themselves
indebted to cash crop traders or unable to access formal sources of credit because they
39 Ibid., 197. 40 Ibid., 198-199. 41 Ibid., 196. 42 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 121. 43 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes of the Northern Thailand Frontier, 189. 44 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 175.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21
lack collateral.45 Cultivation is limited to a single season due to its dependence on
monsoon rainfall, and some cash crops (such as sugar, cassava and fruit) require labor
input over a long period. While many peasants traditionally practiced various craft and
gathering activities during the agricultural off-season, the spread of modem consumer
goods diminished the demand for local crafts and gathering was limited as forests
shrank.46 Many turned to the growing of opium as a solution to financial woes, and the
development of global drug cartels provided growers with an international market.
At first, the Thai government benefited from this arrangement and held a
monopoly on opium.47 Under pressure from the international community following the
1958 International Opium Protocol, however, the government proclaimed its Opium Act
forbidding the production, consumption, and sale of opium. By 1962, remainingKuo Min
Tang (KMT) forces from Burma and Laos moved into northern Thailand with the
knowledge of the Thai government and support of the CIA, and it was this group that
took over the opium trade and actually increased the market in the region.48
The first anti-opium program was set forth in 1963, when the DPW began a Five
Year Plan aimed at permanently settling hill tribes and abolishing opium production by
introducing other occupations. The search began for finding the perfect cash crop to
replace opium, and more than 15 replacement crops (including wheat, peaches, barley,
potatoes, strawberries, and decorative flowers) were tried over the years. The United
Nations attempted to help build markets for such crops, and bought a crop of kidney
45 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 64. 46 Ibid., 65. 47 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 123. 48 Ibid., 124.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22
beans in 1971. Without a steady market demand, however, lands devoted to such
replacement crops often reverted to opium production within a year or two.49
Narcotics control programs funded by the United Nations and USAID have
continued to assist the Thai government in their anti-opium activities since the early
1970s.50 UN views have influenced Thai governmental policy, with the international
community first arguing that unrest in the hills was due to economic insecurity. Gillogly
writes:
Previously, Thai government officials had viewed upland farmers’ continuing cultivation of opium poppy as an act of insubordination, with conscious and malicious intent; uplanders were outlaws, potential insurgents, and de facto criminals. At the very least, they were recalcitrant and lacked sufficient social structure to interact appropriately with those who had authority over them. Now there was a greater awareness of the embeddedness of the opium economy in upland societies.51
It was a Joint UN/Thai Program that began focusing on “zonally integrated
development” in the mid-1970s and increased administrative control in the uplands to
make-over village life in order to boost economic resources. This approach to
development identified land scarcity and population pressure as basic problems in the
hills, as opposed to opium and insurgency, and advocated the classification of land
according to whether areas should be farmed or reforested.52
Unfortunately, attempts to boost the northern economy while eradicating opium
production resulted in worsening conditions. Crop replacement actually created a more
insecure economy and there was a decrease in farm income. Unlike opium, which was
49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., 125. 52 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23
storable and lightweight, most new cash crops were perishable, heavy, and had to be
transported to competitive markets.53
Increasingly severe international punishments for the production of transport of
narcotics, as well as Thailand’s ability to enforce laws, substantially reduced opium
production in the 1970s and ‘80s. Today, the DPW has shifted its focus away from opium
concerns and instead focuses on environmental issues affecting the northern hills.
Although around two-thirds of Thailand was covered in forests before World War
II, the following decades saw massive destruction of the country’s woodlands.54 The
northern Thai forests had been worked for teak since the late 1800s, but the government
revoked logging licenses from colonial companies in the 1930s and issued them to local
firms.55 These firms concentrated on harvesting high-value timber scattered throughout
forests from the 1930s to the 1950s, and there was little resulting destruction. The logging
businesses expanded rapidly from the 1950s, however, and villagers began setting up
their own small-scale operations. The Thai army also began building roads into the
forests and encouraging new settlements in order to deny territory to communist
insurgents, who sometimes set up camps in remote areas. A 1968 order granted logging
companies 30-year concessions to cut forests on the condition they be replanted, but
policing was difficult and the land was often later transferred into farmland.56
The first laws to protect forests were passed in 1938, but the 1964 National Forest
Reserves Act was created to strengthen existing legislation. Unable to implement the
policies, however, the country saw massive forest destruction between 1961 and 1988,
53 Ibid., 126. 54 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 60-61. 55 Ibid., 60. 56 Ibid., 61.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24
and the total area of forested land dropped from 171 millionrai (17.1 million acres) to 90
millionrai (9 million acres).57 The Forestry Department was given the task of preserving
50 percent of forested land, and then that number was dropped to 40 percent. Areas were
designated as “forest reserves,” although that definition bore no relationship to the actual
extent of tree cover.58 In the 1980s, between one-third and one-half of cultivated land was
found within these reserves.59
The hill tribes have often received much of the blame for deforestation in the
north, although studies have shown that the greatest destruction has been caused by
illegal logging from businesses and not swiddening, otherwise known as “slash and bum”
agriculture, by indigenous peoples.60 Swiddening techniques have been criticized for
destroying watersheds, being unable to grow enough rice to feed populations, and forcing
groups to migrate frequently. However, Gillogly notes that swiddening was “an
ecologically suitable agricultural strategyin conditions o f low population” when density
the economy was partly supported by opium production.61 When anti-drug campaigns
took opium out of the picture, the “crop mix” changed and more land was cleared for the
growing of food crops such as maize, peanuts and soya beans.62 Most villagers were
clearing less than 15 rai (1.5 acres) per year, however, and that land was usually not
mature forest. This destruction was almost nothing when compared to that of logging
companies who had the incentives and resources to break Thai forestry laws.63
57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 62. 59 Ibid., 63. 60 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ of Northern Thailand,” 127. 61 Ibid., 129. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25
In 1983, the Forestry Department issued a major study of forest destruction that
prompted local and international environmentalist groups to campaign for the end of
logging in Thailand.64 Although major logging interests began moving their operations to
neighboring countries, much damage had already been done. A 1988 monsoon mudslide,
for example, killed more than 300 villagers after uncontrolled logging on the watershed
created dangerous conditions.65 The government responded by revoking all logging
concessions, which resulted in intensified competition for control of land and forest
resources in the north.66
Sixty-seven millionrai (6.7 million acres) of “degraded” forest zones became the
focus of this competition, and these zones were occupied by an estimated 7-12 million
people in the late 1980s.67 The Forestry Department wanted to make some land available
to agribusiness (eucalyptus farms and paper mills, for example), and also planned to
reforest large tracts of degraded land.68 Settlers, however, wanted to “stay put” and had
often lived in these zones before they had been labeled as “forest.”69 The result of these
clashing interests was a series of violent incidents between the Thai government and
villagers.70
The Thai military came on the scene in response to various violent protests. In
1990, the army composed a plan to move around 6 million people in 9,700 villages out of
1,253 different designated forests. This plan, called Khor Jor Kor, came into effect in
64 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 81. 65 Ibid., 82. 66 Ibid., 82. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., 82-82. 69 Ibid., 82. 70 Ibid., 83.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26
April 1991 and was met with violent resistance. Some villages were moved by force,
while others were relocated to dry and barren areas or to land that had already been
settled with existing villages. More than 4,500 peasants joined a protest march on
Bangkok in 1992, and the government finally suspended the Khor Jor Kor program in
July 1992.71
A contributing factor in this situation has been the inability of hill tribe peoples to
own their village lands. The process of officially defining “forest reserves” had important
implications for the hill tribes, since it became illegal to occupy this land and ownership
was impossible. Many settlers only received SK-1 titles on non-reserve land, which
simply recognized that land tax had been paid without giving the legal status of a land
title. The majority of settlers held occupancy certificates but no land documentation, and
by the early 1990s there were 10-12 million people (at least one-quarter of the entire
population of rural Thailand) living as “squatters” in forest reserves.72 Furthermore, many
indigenous peoples have been unaware of the Thai legal system and have not requested
land rights recognition when they qualified for it.
Moves to protect forest areas have also denied hill tribes the mobility that was
once necessary for their social and agricultural practices. A 1971 Forestry Department
mandate required villages to remain at one existing site, forcing old fields to be used
repeatedly (which reduced fertility) and denying refugees the ability to create new
villages. Most importantly, however, this forced immobility severely affected the practice
of muang that gave group members voluntary affiliation and recourse to flight if they
71 Ibid., 84. 72 Ibid., 63. 73 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 128.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27
chose to break with authority. Hanks et al. call mobility “fundamental to the way of life”
in hill tribe villages, and forestry laws that permanently settled villages changed the
dynamic of tribal customs.74
Forestry legislation wasn’t the only thing changing life among the hill tribes,
however. Thailand embarked on a course of “revolution and development” for the entire
country by I960.75 A focus on education, as well as modem developments such as
highways, electrical lines, suburbs and big city buildings, has dramatically changed the
face of today’s Thailand.76 David K. Wyatt writes that the younger generations of Thais
“carry with them not only a commitment to development, in all the varied senses of that
term, but also an ambitious vision of a modem Thailand.”77 The existence of a “large,
urban, well-educated, and prosperous middle class” is a product of a social and political
revolution that has been happening within the country.78
Wyatt writes that the consequences of such changes may take generations to
evolve, and that this revolution has meant a growing conflict between traditional powers
and modernity.79 Perhaps this situation is no more apparent than in the north, where
pressures to modernize along Western and nationalistic lines changed the uplands in
significant ways during the last several decades. As noted earlier, the Committee for
National Tribal Welfare chose the DPW and its Hill Tribes Division in the late 1950s to
74 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes o f the Northern Thailand, 210. 75 David K. Wyatt,Thailand: A Short History (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003), 297. 76 Ibid., 297-298. 77 Ibid., 297. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., 297-298.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28
help speed the assimilation of hill tribes into mainstream Thai society.80 The Hill Tribe
Research Center was an important place for the collection and dissemination of
information on the tribes, and it also served to increase the involvement of indigenous
peoples in Thai society and government.81 The DPW also enlisted Thai citizens in Hill
Tribes Relations Program “civilizing projects” from 1965 to 1976 to teach in the
mountains.82
Assimilation has been a major goal of the Thai government, and the role of the
government has taken on more importance during the last forty years. Since the 1960s,
the government has increasingly supplied public goods such as health services, seeds and
fertilizer, birth control devices, irrigation, household water supplies, and roads. More
schools were built, with the help of US funding, and indoctrination in the national
ideology became an important component of primary education. School textbooks
prompted students to “buy Thai goods; love Thailand and love to be Thai; live a Thai life,
speak Thai, and esteem Thai culture.”83
Buddhism, the influential majority religion in Thailand, has been employed to
help extend the scope and reach of the government, as well. Gillogly writes that
“concerns about controlling hill tribes gradually shifted to a policy of incorporating them
into the Thai state as minority peoples.”84 The DPW’s thammathut program was
established in 1964 to send monks into the remote north to preach Buddhism as well as to
80 Jane Richardson Hanks and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes o f the Northern Thailand, 128. 81 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 122. 82 Ibid., 123. 83 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History o f Thailand, 172. 84 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 122.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29
gc organize development projects, explain laws, and discourage communism. The
program’s stated objective was “strengthening ties with the mountain peoples and
creating loyalty to the nation by encouraging Buddhism,” but it failed after only two
years due to its cultural inappropriateness.
The increasingly important role of government, as well as pressures to conform to
the expectations of mainstream Thai culture, made citizenship more important in daily
life. Many transactions came to require personal ID cards and house registration
documents, for example, and these papers were only available to citizens.87 In 1968,
some uplanders were registered as Thai citizens as part of “nationality grants” aimed at
fighting communism.88 However, the citizenship process is slow and often impossible for
hill tribe members to this day, and Gillogly notes that there are many “cultural
constraints” limiting citizenship options for tribal peoples.89 She writes, “Since uplanders
do not share the same language or history as the Thai, Thai find it particularly difficult to
think of them as fellow citizens.”90
Amendments to nationality laws in the 1950s brought “an element of discretion”
into the rule that those bom within Thai borders qualified for citizenship. While the
amendments were supposedly created to handle children of refugee communities, who
were a constant presence due to war and economic instabilities in the region, such
discretion has been used to deny full nationality to hill tribe children. Some were given
85 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History o f Thailand, 172. 86 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ of Northern Thailand,” 122. 87 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History o f Thailand, 172. 88 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 122. 89 Ibid., 122-123. 90 Ibid., 123.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30
secondary documents while others “slipped through” processes which granted
nationality.91
Although the first Thai national census failed to include hill tribes in 1956, the
consequent 1969-70 census recognized nearly 120,000 hill tribe people in 16 provinces.
As a result, the Ministry of the Interior chose to register citizenship to some hill tribe
members beginning in 1972. More than 182,000 uplands people were registered as Thai
citizens from 1975 to 1992. Highland identity cards, commonly known as “blue cards,”
have been issued to more than 800,000 people since 1988.92
Following a 1999 protest in front of Chiang Mai City Hall, the Thai government
decided in 2000 to grant citizenship or “alien status” (permanent residency) to hundreds
of thousands of minorities. It was also decided that hill tribe children bom between
December 14,1972 and February 25, 1992 would receive nationality. In 2001, hill tribe
children whose parents were registered as “alien” were granted citizenship, regardless of
when the children were bom.93
Despite this progress, many hill tribe members are still “stateless” people.
According to the Ministry’s June 2000 regulation handbook, about half of the one million
hill tribe and minority people in Thailand currently have citizenship. Of the remaining,
about 100,000 are qualified for nationality but have not yet received it; 90,000 are
entitled to permanent residency; and about 120,000 are hill tribe children who are entitled
to, but have not received, citizenship. The remaining 190,000 are allowed to stay in
91 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit,A History o f Thailand, 228. 92 Yindee Lertcharoenchok, “Searching for Identity,” United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Online. Available: http://www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/culture/Trafficking/legalstatus/Searching_for_Identity_- YL.doc [16 January 2006]. 53 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31
Thailand temporarily pending final decisions.94 The large numbers of people requesting
citizenship, whether it is granted or not, illustrates how hill tribe members value this
status and regard citizenship as an important step for attaining goals related to equality
and human rights.
The process of registering for Thai citizenship is a “lengthy and complicated
procedure, as it involves a dozen pieces of legislation and revolutionary decrees.”95
UNESCO’s Highland Citizenship Registration Project works with governmental and non
governmental offices to recruit and train staff and volunteers to register hill tribes with
citizenship or alien status. Despite these efforts, UNESCO consultant Yindee
Lertcharoenchok notes that the process is a slow one, and that there has been “little
progress” in registering hill tribes in western provinces.96
The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) reports that the process of granting
citizenship to hill tribe members is “marred by discriminatory law and procedures, apathy
and prejudices against the hill tribes, corruption by the bureaucrats,” as well as lack of
cooperation with civil society groups.97 Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) agrees that
“the citizenship process itself has been a barrier for the eligible hill tribe people to attain
QO legal status.” Despite attempts to clarify and facilitate the process in 2000, widespread
94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. See also: Chayan Vaddhanphuti, Chusak Wittayapak, Khwanchewan Buadaeng and Pinkaew Laungaramsri, “State-Making, Contested Spaces and Identifications.” Online. Available: http://www.yale.edu/seacm/groups/chiangmai_group.htm [27 March 2006]; Mirror Art Group, “Thai Citizenship Program.” Online. Available: http://www.mirrorartgroup.org/web/projects/proj-thai-citz.html [27 March 2006], 96 Ibid. 97 Asian Centre for Human Rights, “Thailand: Not So Smiling to its Indigenous Hill Tribes.” Online. Available: http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2005/81-05.htm [21 January 2006]. See also: Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 27; Mirror Art Group, “Thai Citizenship Program.” 98 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32
corruption and inefficiency within the Thai government has been cited as reasons why
many hill tribe members continue to live without citizenship. Furthermore, PHR reports:
Overall, complex regulations not always fully grasped by local district officials, arbitrary decision making and abuse of the process for personal financial gain, a lack of resources and leadership, and confusion about the identification of eligible persons have contributed to the very slow pace of citizenship grants."
Many hill tribe members have begun to enlist Western methods of activism to call
for their citizenship rights. Organized protests, including the 1999 Chiang Mai
demonstration noted above, have influenced government policy. However, tribal activism
is moving beyond mass protests to organize more effectively for governmental change.
Part of that process revolves around gaining the attention of Western media outlets, with
the hope that powerful NGOs and overseas nations will pressure the Thai government to
respect hill tribe rights. Another aspect of this activism is in directly communicating with
the government itself and working within the system to bring about positive change.
The Tribal Assembly of Thailand, created in the late 1990s to represent 7 tribes
and 170 tribal villages, continues to lobby the government for “greater transparency in
decisions affecting hill tribes, including procedures addressing citizenship, allocation and
management of natural resources, and community relocations.” Such lobbying activities
have led to the formation of a governmental joint committee to oversee the citizenship
process for hill people.100
At the grassroots level, The Akha Heritage Foundation focuses on improving the
activism strategies and resources available to the hill tribes. Founder Matthew McDaniel
notes that the causes for activism in northern Thailand are “immense,” but more work on
"ibid. 100 United States Department of State, “Thailand.” Online. Available http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/307.htm [26 March 2006].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33
the movement’s infrastructure is needed to achieve success. He argues that tribal people
need better access to activism methods, and a lack of available funding in Thailand limits
the abilities of NGOs to develop community activism and training programs.101
Citizenship issues, including the availability of identity cards for hill tribe
members, represent a central theme that tribal and Western activists alike can focus on.
McDaniel notes that citizenship is viewed within the Akha community as an important
step for equality, and the granting of citizenship rights to hill tribes is seen as a major
milestone in relations between minorities and the Thai government. “Once there are
enough hill tribe people who have ID cards, vote, and can protest, then we can expect
changes on land rights, too, very slowly,” said McDaniel. From the hill tribe perspective,
citizenship is necessary for achieving broader goals.102
Without citizenship, hill tribe minorities face major social, political and economic
consequences. Years of discriminatory action against indigenous peoples in Thailand
have resulted in extensive human security concerns in the region. Weakened socially and
economically by pressures to assimilate into mainstream Thai culture, hill tribes stand to
lose both their culture and the lives of their members. A lack of citizenship results in an
environment of extreme vulnerability in the north, and a human security approach is
necessary for understanding the situation and moving forward with positive solutions to
the existing problems.
101 Matthew McDaniel, Founder, The Akha Heritage Foundation, interview by author, e-mail correspondence, 25 March 2006. 102 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2
THE CURRENT SITUATION
Application of a Human Security Model
The current situation of the hill tribes in Thailand is a product of the laws, actions
and attitudes that have characterized a century of state relations with indigenous peoples
in Thailand. Minority groups have suffered inequalities when compared to lowland
Thais and a lack of citizenship has resulted in extreme vulnerability to human security
risks such as poverty, trafficking, and HIV/AIDS.
A human security framework is a useful tool for considering the hill tribe
situation, as it looks beyond traditional ideas about security within a state system and
focuses on the well-being of the members within society. To understand how to respect
human rights and create a sense of security at both a domestic and international level,
this multi-layered approach is needed. International law, the human rights community,
and global actors all have a role to play in addressing security issues and the status of the
hill tribes in Thailand.
It is important to understand that human security is different from other
definitions of security, especially what many know simply as “national security.” Human
security does not only mean freedom from direct violence, or an army defending its
country from the aggressions of another. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
notes that human security “encompasses human rights, good governance, access to
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35
education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and
choices to fulfill his or her potential.”1
The concept has been linked to a person’s quality of life, which United Nations
Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette links to having “enough food for the family;
adequate shelter; good health; schooling for the children; protection from violence
whether inflicted by man or by nature; and a State which does not oppress its citizens but
rules with their consent.” Inherent to this idea of human security is the ability to achieve
possible goals and the protection of human dignity, and this standpoint has prompted
nations such as Japan to identify security as an approach that may be used to cope with
threats to human beings.2
Human security is a useful concept because it protects individual rights in a way
purely state-centered security approaches fail to do. It moves beyond gauging peace and
security by counting deaths and weapons and addresses deeper security risks. For
instance, it recognizes how violence can take many forms, such as Johan Galtung’s
“cultural violence” that can be used to justify the direct violence (such as war) and
structural violence (such as apartheid) that groups may use against others. Galtung writes
that culture “preaches, teaches, admonishes, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or
repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them.. .at all.”3 He further notes that
1 Harvard School o f Public Health, “Definitions o f Human Security.” Online. Available: http;//www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/list_definitions.pdf#search=,human%security’ [ 10 May 2005]. 2 Ibid. 3 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,”Journal o f Peace Research vol. 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305. 295.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36
the study of violence is about two problems: the use of violence and the legitimation of
that use.4
Focusing on direct violence, particularly on direct violence between armies,
ignores the realities faced by civilians and by each individual. A national security
approach leaves no room for issues such as underdevelopment, natural and manmade
disasters, and environmental degradation, although a human security approach does.3
These sources of indirect violence are often causes of direct violence, and the suffering
created by indirect sources of violence may be more severe than military actions.
It is important to note that the human security approach has been met with
criticism in many Asian countries, including Thailand, due to its focus on individual
rights as opposed to state rights. This pull toward group or community rights at the
expense of personal rights has been labeled the “Asian Values” debate, and it will be
discussed in greater detail in chapter three.
Continuing now to address the hill tribe situation from a human security
perspective, many risks in northern Thailand can be directly tied to the notion of
“statelessness.” The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) identifies a stateless person as “someone who, under national laws, does not
enjoy citizenship—the legal bond between a government and an individual—with any
country.”6 Although worldwide estimates of stateless people are difficult to assess,
4 Ibid., 291. 3 Kanti Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #19:OP:l, August 2000. Online. Available: http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_19_l .PDF#search=,human%20security’ [22 January 2006]. 40. 6 Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “The World’s Stateless People: Questions and Answers.” Online. Available: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=40e2da8c4 [22 January 2006], 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37
Refugees International argues that between 2 and 2.5 million people were stateless in
Thailand as of 2004.7
Statelessness has been the subject of several international legal instruments. The
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlines that “Everyone has the right to a
nationality” and should not be arbitrarily denied a citizenship. The 1954 Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, which was originally created for
consideration as an amendment to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, requests that
signatory states provide documentation to stateless persons and consider granting them
nationality when appropriate. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
guides countries on how to avoid statelessness and protect nationality.8 Furthermore,
regional treaties such as the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 1990 African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the 1997 European Convention on
Nationality all highlight the belief that everyone should have a nationality.9
Many organizations, including Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), argue that
statelessness lies at the heart of hill tribe vulnerability. A 2004 PHR report noted that
“every stage of a hill tribe person’s life is negatively affected” by lack of citizenship,
beginning when births cannot be registered through adulthood when legal employment
cannot be attained. Non-citizens cannot receive a school diploma, do not have access to
7 Refugees International, “Lives on Hold: The Scope o f Statelessness.” Online. Available: http.7/www.refugeesintemational.org/section/publications/stateless_scope/ [22 January 2006]. 8 Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “The World’s Stateless People,” 10. 9 Ibid., 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38
government health care, and are often at risk for deportation.10 These factors contribute
to high levels of poverty among the hill tribes, and that poverty has been linked to issues
such as human trafficking and HIV/AIDS.
However, it is important to note that Thailand has also been criticized for treating
some naturalized citizens as “second class citizens.” The Asian Centre for Human Rights
(ACHR) reports that many naturalized citizens “do not enjoy all rights accorded to the
citizens by birth,” and that Section 19 of Thailand’s Nationality Act provides the power
to revoke nationality of naturalized citizens in various circumstances.11
Actions warranting the revocation of citizenship include: Concealing facts or
making false statements to receive naturalization; making use of a former nationality;
committing any act prejudicial to security or conflicting with the interests of the Thai
state, or otherwise insulting the state; committing an act contrary to public order or good
morals; residing abroad without having a domicile in Thailand for more than five years;
and retaining the nationality of a country at war with Thailand. The ACHR argues that
many of these terms, such as “prejudicial to security,” are undefined legal terms and
reversal of nationality without judicial scrutiny is a “scandalous” abuse of power.12
Despite these restrictions, however, citizenship is regarded as an important tool
for increasing human security. Without nationality, many hill tribe peoples lack
educational opportunities that will qualify them for employment later in life. Unable to
receive a primary school certificate, non-citizens are unable to continue their educations
10 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation o f Women in Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/aids/pdEnostatus.pdff21 January 2006]. 29. 11 Asian Centre for Human Rights, “Thailand: Not So Smiling to its Indigenous Hill Tribes.” Online. Available: http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2005/81-05.htm [21 January 2006]. 12 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39
and improve their chances of finding work.13 Well-educated people also tend to be less
likely to become involved in human trafficking situations, and children attending school
are less vulnerable to being recruited into the Asian sex industry.14 “Education trains you
to think and reason,” notes Matthew Friedman, Deputy Director of the USAID regional
HIV Help Office in Bangkok. “An educated person can be tricked, too.. .but it’s
harder.”15
Educational programs specific to trafficking awareness, such as UNESCO-
funded radio programs warning of the dangers of prostitution, have also been
implemented in northern Thailand.16 The trading of daughters into the sex industry is
higher when their mothers have lower educations, and many organizations have focused
specifically on educating women in order to curb prostitution. Sanphasit Koompraphant,
director of the Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights (CPCR) in Bangkok, notes,
“We need to empower women and girl children to have more education.. .so they have
more of an opportunity to choose their own futures.”17
The Development and Education Programme for Daughters and Communities
(DEPDC) in Mae Sai, a border town near Burma, is one of several Thai organizations
attempting to stem the flow of children and young adults into the sex industry by
providing education to non-citizens. The DEPDC offers schooling to hill tribe children,
often from Akha tribes, either by paying for them to attend government schools or by
13 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 29. 14 Eileen Woliner, Swedish-American Volunteer, Development and Education Programme for Daughters & Communities (DEPDC), interview by author, Mae Sae, Thailand, 18 June 2005. 15 Matthew Friedman, Deputy Director o f the HIV Regional Help Office, United States Agency for Intemationl Development (USAID), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 10 June 2005. 16 David Feingold, Coordinator o f Trafficking and HIV/AIDS Programs, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 7 June 2005. 17 Sanphasit Koompraphant, Director, Center for the Protection o f Children’s Rights (CPCR), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 6 June 2005.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40
educating them at a DEPDC center. More than 50 children live at the DEPDC, with
more than 200 attending the organization’s Patak Half Day School as an alternative to
public education.1 R
Without a diploma, many young people find that their employment opportunities
are severely limited. With an increasing focus on material wealth within Asia comes
growing pressures to make money by all means necessary. In Thailand, globalization
through the presence of American soldiers during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and
1970s, combined with tourists in the following decades, has changed the country’s
economic and political landscape. Today, the iconography of wealth is transmitted to
rural villages by the global media.19
British journalist Jeremy Seabrook warns that the lure of material gain or the
“bright lights” of the city are not primary reasons for people entering exploitative
situations, however. The story is complicated by the decreasing value of agricultural
labor, deforestation of the land, and widespread poverty and indebtedness.20 He writes
that these violations of human rights are traceable to the global marketplace, and they
represent growing human insecurity.21 Koompraphant agrees, noting: “There are many
people who would rather spend their lives in prostitution or in forced labor than to live in
their [homes] in poverty... We have to offer them options to go on living.”22
The Population and Community Development Association (PDA) leads a poverty
reduction campaign throughout Thailand aimed at reducing poverty through business
18 Eileen Woliner. *9 Jeremy Seabrook,Travels in the Skin Trade: Tourism and the Sex Industry (London: Pluto Press, 1996), 131. 2U Ibid., 133. 21 Ibid., 134. 22 Sanphasit Koompraphant.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41
rather than charity. “You can’t depend on other people’s generosity forever,” said PDA
founder and Thai senator Mechai Viravaidya.23 The PDA advocates for the privatization
of poverty reduction, viewing the poor as part of the solution. Businesses are encouraged
to contribute business skills and connections, rather than financial donations that aren’t
sustainable. The Asian Endeavor project, for example, sends business people to rural
villages to provide the training needed to support local economic activities.24
Viravaidya views access to credit as a human right. The PDA grants business
loans through a variety of programs, including “prostitution prevention funds” and loans
for children that are aimed at giving people legal opportunities for earning money and
avoiding harmful life choices. This approach, which Viravaidya called “humanity-based
lending,” gives credit to people who can not get it from traditional lending institutions.
Instead of putting up property as collateral, the poor may use their labor as collateral and
not be limited by their initial lack of material goods.25 This form of lending allows the
poor to go into business for themselves, escaping their dependence on charity and
making their communities self-sustaining.
This approach is a new way of doing business in Thailand, where existing capital
and connections have made some people rich as others continue to struggle in poverty.
The tourism industry has helped to highlight the ever-widening gap between rich and
poor, and it has significantly contributed to human security concerns associated with
forced labor. Today, the $4 billion per year tourist industry has come to be known as the
23 Mechai Viravaidya, Director, Population and Community Development Association (PDA), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 2 June 2005. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42
“Thai Economic Miracle.”26 Central to tourism is the sex trade, with sex tour operators
promoting the country as a center for sexual fantasy.
To supply this industry, sex workers are often trafficked to Bangkok from poor
northern villages, as well as from surrounding countries such as Burma and Cambodia,27
and there are continuing demands for women and children workers despite increasing
risks of HIV infection.28 Without travel documents, and sometimes without Thai
language skills, literacy and support networks, many hill tribe women and girls rely on
paid smugglers to secure them transportation and employment opportunities 29 Although
many workers enter the industry voluntarily, many others are sold into bondage by their
poor families or forced into sex work through coercion or deception.30 Many workers are
subjected to rape, physical and mental abuse, inadequate health care, forced abortion,
and various other human rights violations within brothels.
However, it is important to stress that the sex industry is not the only market for
victims of trafficking. With the growing Thai economy, particularly the high economic
growth from 1986 through 1996, there is a greater demand for labor.31 People are often
trafficked to do “objectionable” jobs that are often dangerous and unappealing.32 “No
one wants to work in an acid factory,” explains Friedman. Trafficking victims are often
put to work as domestic servants, construction workers, fishermen, street beggars, and
26 Ryan Bishop and Lillian S. Robinson,Night Market: Sexual Cultures and the Thai Economic Miracle (New York: Routledge, 1998), vi. 27 Sietske Altink, Stolen Lives: Trading Women in Sex and Slavery (London: Scarlet Press, 1995), 56. 28 Francis T. Miko, “Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International Response,” in Trafficking in Women and Children: Current Issues and Developments, ed. Anna M. Troubnikoff (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003): 1-25.4. 29 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 2. 30 Jeremy Seabrook,Travels in the Skin Trade, 137. 31 Simon Baker, Researcher, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 3 June 2005. 32 Matthew Friedman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43
factory workers. Men can be trafficked, often for physically-demanding work such as
fishing and construction. However, men are often left out of dialogue about human
trafficking and currently Thai law does not acknowledge men as potential trafficking
victims.33
Without citizenship, hill tribe members and other undocumented migrants often
assume major risks in order to find and keep jobs. PHR outlines many of these risks,
including: Dangerous working conditions without safety precautions; low or no pay;
employer confiscation of documentation when it is secured; long hours of labor without
rest periods; inadequate sanitary and living conditions; and physical and sexual abuse by
employers and their agents. Sex workers from hill tribe communities are also subject to
“extortion, sexual exploitation, and/or sexual assault by police and immigration
authorities.”34
Thai law enforcement and welfare systems directed at combating trafficking have
often been reluctant, or ill-equipped, to deal with many of the situations facing hill tribe
trafficking victims. Although many women and girls may be afforded long-term shelter
following government intervention in a trafficking situation, PHR argues that “denial of
citizenship limits their opportunities for education, work, or independent living, and they
end up in a kind of limbo in state custody.”35 Furthermore, more human rights violations
may occur while in state custody, and PHR reports that Thailand has “not evolved and
33 Phil Robertson, Project Manager, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (UNIAP), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 20 June 2005. 34 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 3. 35 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44
consistently implemented comprehensive policies on the identification, safe removal,
witness protection, family reunification, and reintegration of trafficked persons.”36
However, negative media attention from the West has prompted the Thai
government to make efforts to fight prostitution and trafficking within its borders.
Relevant laws include the 1996 Prostitution Suppression and Prevention Act, which
reduces the penalty for prostitution while criminalizing sex with children under the age
of 18. The 1997 The Measures in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women
and Children Act extends legal coverage to both sexes under 18, criminalizes conspiracy
to commit a trafficking offense, outlines penalties, and gives victims temporary shelter
and necessities such as vocational training. The 1997 Penal Code Amendment Act
(Number 17) outlines sexual offenses to include those who “procure, lure or traffic”
people for sexual gratification of themselves or others, and also protects children under
18 and allows the state to punish traffickers. Finally, the 1999 Criminal Procedure
Amendment Act (No. 20) creates better conditions for the investigation, inquiry and trial
of those suspected of participating in child prostitution.37
Despite the above laws, critics of the Thai government argue that the government
has endorsed the sex industry as an economic asset for the country. Although the out-
and-out acceptance of prostitution is avoided by the government, politicians and police
forces have quietly allowed the practices to continue.38 In 1980, which was proclaimed
“Year of the Tourist,” then-Deputy Prime Minister Boonchu Rojanasathian encouraged
36 Ibid. 37 Embassy of Thailand in the United States, “Thailand’s Actions for the Prevention o f Trafficking in Women and Children.” Online. Available: http://www.thaiembdc.org/socials/actionwc.html [22 January 2006]. 38 Leslie Ann Jeffrey,Sex and Borders: Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand (Toronto: UBC Press, 2002), 98.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45
governors to promote “certain entertainment activities which some of you may find
o n t disgusting and embarrassing because they are related to sexual pleasure.” Corruption
within the police and military forces are often linked to the sex industry, with these
government employees often accepting bribes of money and sex in exchange for turning
a blind eye to illegal activities.40 The Thai Royal Army has been accused of providing
customers for the sex trade, using brothels in soldier recruitment while also promoting
red light districts to tourists.41
Negative media attention has also prompted other countries to take notice of the
situation in Thailand. The United States government has taken some legislative action,
although many argue that results have been weak. The Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000 was “enacted to combat trafficking, to ensure the just and effective
punishment of traffickers and to protect victims 42 The Act added new crimes and
strengthened existing penalties, while also creating certain benefits for trafficking
victims such as a special “T” nonimmigrant status in the U.S.43 President George W.
Bush signed an Executive Order forming the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and
Combat Trafficking in Persons in early 2002,44 and the recent Sex Tourism Prohibition
Improvement Act (HR4477) aims to curb sex tourism by Americans in foreign
countries.45 With the exception of HR4477, however, these measures seek to regulate
39 Catherine Hill, “Planning for Prostitution: An Analysis o f Thailand’s Sex Industry,”Women’s in Lives and Public Policy: The International Experience, ed. Meredeth Turshen and Briavel Holcomb (London: Greenwood Press, 1993): 133-144.137. 40 Leslie Ann Jeffrey,Sex and Borders, 93. 41 RitaNakashima Brock and Susan Brooks Thistlewaite,Casting Stones: Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the United States (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 74. 42 Francis T. Miko, “Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International Response,” 53. 43 Ibid., 53-54, 150. 44 Ibid., 13. 45 Ibid., 22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46
trafficking to the United States without addressing the issue of trafficking and
prostitution abroad. Furthermore, HR4477 is extremely difficult to enforce and there is
little to no chance of foreign authorities cooperating with investigations of alleged sex
tourists.
Thailand is currently ranked as a “tier two” country in the US State Department’s
2005 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, which ranks countries on a three-tier system
(the first tier being the best) based on what each nation is doing to alleviate their
trafficking situation.46 Improved mechanisms for dealing with trafficked Cambodian
street beggars recently brought Thailand off of the tier two “watch list,” although
Timothy Scherer from the U.S. Embassy in Thailand warns “there’s still a long way to
go.” The TIP Report is aimed at “naming and shaming,” although economic sanctions
can be taken against tier three countries if they do not make significant changes within
90 days of the report being issued. Only North Korea and Burma have been sanctioned
through the TIP Report. Scherer notes, “Naming and shaming would be much more
significant in Thailand than economic sanctions” due to the dependence on tourism and
the need for a positive international image.47
However, it is important to note that the TIP Report has been criticized for
reflecting a political agenda beyond trafficking issues. Country biases, ineffectiveness,
and an inability to rank or criticize the U.S. government when it comes to trafficking
within American borders are all concerns regarding the accuracy of the TIP Report.
Although these political dimensions certainly exist, the social impact of the report may
46 United States State Department, 2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, “Country Narratives: Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.state.gOv/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/46616.htm#thailand [26 March 2006]. 47 Timothy Scherer, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Thailand, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 7 June 2005.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47
prompt governments to act in an effort to “save face” within the international
community.
Despite efforts to improve its image and “clean up” its sex industry, flaws still
exist in Thailand’s approach to this problem. A major weakness in current discussions
and actions related to human trafficking and the sex industry is that the focus is primarily
on criminalizing prostitution, rather than creating more opportunities to give people
options for economic survival. Laws against prostitution treat sex workers as criminals,
AQ t # but do not recognize the elements of victimization involved in the industry. Punishing
clients and traffickers threatens the economic support base for sex workers without
offering alternatives. Punishing sex workers does nothing to end poverty and other root
causes of the sex industry, but rather further hurts the potential of people who have
already fallen on hard times.
Ping Pong, coordinator for Empower-Chiang Mai, argues that many women
choose sex work as a profession in order to support themselves and their families.
Because prostitution is viewed as a crime rather than a job, however, many sex workers
cannot speak out against human rights violations they encounter from clients and bosses.
Rather than helping sex workers, laws that criminalize prostitution serve to further limit
opportunities for people already working within the industry. Sex workers may learn
more about labor rights and personal security at various Empower offices throughout
Thailand, as well as receive business and language training to assist them in their
business dealings.49
48 Francis T. Miko, “Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International Response,” 5. 49 Ping Pong, Coordinator, Empower-Chiang Mai, interview by author, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 14 June 2005.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48
The social position occupied by sex workers has also hurt attempts to fight
threats to human security that are linked to the sex industry. According to Jo Bindman of
Anti-Slavery International, prostitutes are regarded “as women who do not adhere to
sexual and other behavioral norms; pitied or despised, they are excluded from
mainstream society, their lowly and marginal position analogous to that of a low caste or
minority ethnic group.”50 This outcast status leaves sex workers vulnerable to
exploitation and denies them protection from abuse.
Trafficking and the Asian sex industry are tied to yet another human security
concern: HIV/AIDS. The numbers of infected sex workers, clients and members of the
general population continue to rise in Thailand since the disease first appeared in
Thailand in 1984,51 and researchers warn that the cost of AIDS is estimated to soon
outweigh the income generated by sex tourism.52 Women and girls are said to be
particularly at risk for HIV and AIDS,53 and sex workers for the impoverished north face
greater risks of contracting the disease.54
Access to health care among the hill tribes is “critically limited” due to “threat of
arrest and deportation, forced confinement, confiscated legal documents, discrimination,
lack of financial information, lack of information, and/or language barriers.”55 Barriers
to accessing reproductive health services, including health education and condoms,
50 Jo Bindman, “Redefining Prostitution as Sex Work on the International Agenda,” Network o f Sex Projects. Online. Available http;//www.nswp.org/mobility/redefining.html [22 January 2006], 51 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 18. 52 Jeremy Seabrook,Travels in the Skin Trade, 78. 53 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 13. 54 Ibid., 19. 55 Ibid., 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49
increases the risk of HIV infection, particularly among girls and women.56 PHR reports
that, should hill tribe women become infected with HIV, “discriminatory denial of care
and treatment virtually condemns them to living with (and quickly dying of) AIDS.”
Without citizenship, hill tribe members are unable to access universal health care
coverage under a 30 baht (75 cents) medical co-payment plan. The program, introduced
in April 2001, involves a complicated registration process that requires citizen
identification and/or housing registration, and children under 15 need birth certificates.
These requirements “often end up excluding the poorest segments of society,” writes
PHR, including the hill tribes. Even those able to access the health care system may find
the co-payment unaffordable, and many earn less than the average daily wage of 134
baht in rural provinces.58
Some action has been taken to combat HIV/AIDS threats in Thailand. Family
planning networks, increased awareness, and an aggressive free press have been linked
to declining infection rates. The Thai Ministry of Health also implemented a 100%
condom use program that monitors sexually-transmitted diseases and punishes brothel
owners who do not require condom use among their employees and customers.59
The 100% condom use program, however, does not work well with changing
dimensions of the Thai sex industry. “The situation has changed,” explains
Koompraphant. “People don’t go to brothels; they go to specialty places like karaoke
bars and night clubs.” This shift to “indirect” sex venues means sex workers are harder
to identify and the industry is more difficult to regulate. Many people work as part-time
56 Ibid., 3-4. 57 Ibid., 4. 58 Ibid., 45. 59 David Feingold.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50
sex workers, supplementing their legal income in massage parlors and other businesses
with illegal activity.60 Also, the 100% condom use program has been criticized for
failing to recognize that “condom use is not an effective tool for women if they do not
have adequate control over their bodies or power within sexual relationships.”61 These
issues render the government’s 100% condom use program obsolete, and a different
approach is needed.
The PDA offers an approach that has been met with success in Thailand. Led by
Viravaidya, known to many as “Mr. Condom,” the organization advocates condom use
to prevent disease and alleviate poverty caused by overpopulation. PDA’s community-
based family planning education programs, often promoted by shocking and entertaining
campaigns such as the “Vasectomy Mobile,” helped drop Thailand’s birth rate from
3.2% to 1.1%. Other programs include a “Positive Partnership” that gives loans to
people infected with HIV/AIDS, teaming infected businesspeople with HIV/AIDS-
negative partners to promote economic activity and combat discrimination.62
Two omissions in recent responses to HIV/AIDS, however, increase disease
exposure among uplanders. Injection drug users and foreign migrant workers have
contributed to the spread of HIV in northern Thailand. HIV rates among injecting drug
users is 35 to 50 percent and rising in some areas, yet prevention strategies among this
group (such as needle exchanges) have not been priorities. Burmese migrants, many of
whom are Shan, face severe obstacles in receiving HIV/AIDS services. A Johns Hopkins
University study showed that those with Shan ethnicity are particularly at risk, with HIV
60 Sanphasit Koompraphant. 61 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 12. 62 Mechai Viravaidya.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51
prevalence among Shan women at 3 percent and among Shan men at 9 percent—among
the highest reported for any Asian ethnic group. A study in the Chiang Mai area revealed
an average prevalence of 4.9 percent, almost double the rate for local• Thai populations. • 63
The threat of HIV/AIDS is not the only health concern facing the hill tribes,
however. Situations of trafficking, unsafe migration and exploitative labor result in
health consequences for hill tribe members that include “physical injury, sexually
transmitted diseases.. .pregnancy/abortion complications, malnutrition, and mental
health impacts.”64
The linkages between lack of citizenship and vulnerability should be addressed
by the Thai government and the international community. Incidences of poverty, human
trafficking and health concerns among the hill tribes may be linked to an environment of
discrimination and inequality that denies indigenous peoples access to citizenship and
the benefits associated with nationality. From a human security framework, citizenship is
necessary for ensuring that human rights are protected and equality is respected.
In Thailand, however, these statements and recommendations are not so simple.
Discussions about the hill tribe situation are tom between the individual-based, Western
language of indigenous rights and the communitarian “Asian Values” stance. To
understand the attitudes influencing existing policy, as well as to have any hope of
changing such policy in the future, one must consider these very different viewpoints.
63 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status,” 13. 64 Ibid., 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND ASIAN VALUES
Differing Perspectives in the Human Rights Debate
Central to discussions of indigenous rights are the assumptions that such group
rights are necessary, and that individual human rights alone cannot safeguard the
security of minorities. These assumptions are questioned in Asia, however, and the
possibility of implementing group-differentiated rights in Thailand cannot be considered
without understanding how such rights are perceived by policymakers. The indigenous
rights movement, as part of a modem “ethnic revival,” often clashes with government
actions that deny group rights for a variety of practical and ideological reasons.
These two competing viewpoints play important roles in the history and future of
the hill tribes. As activists call for group rights that protect hill tribes, the government
has a long history of protecting national security over the interests of its indigenous
populations. This focus on state “community” rights over the rights of individuals and
minorities has been termed “Asian values” in political discussions. In the future,
policymakers will have to determine whether national security and the protection of
rights can and should be integrated.
The Bangkok Declaration, which was approved as the founding document of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on August 8,1967, seems to outline
the straggle between and possible convergence of so-called “Asian values” and Western
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53
influences. Signed by representatives from Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand, this document clearly protects “Asian values” by stating a demand for non
interference in the region. The Declaration notes that ASEAN countries “are determined
to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals
and aspirations of their peoples.”1 This sentence is a rejection of Western influences, and
can be read as a rejection of demands for individualistic rights that clash with
communitarian values.
However, the Bangkok Declaration also promises adherence to the principles of
the United Nations Charter and seems, in many ways, to be inspired by Western
institutions and actions. In fact, its aims of respect for justice, social progress, cultural
development, equality, and the improvement of living standards2 all correspond with
aims of human rights discourse. Despite its rejection of the Western language of
individualism, the Bangkok Declaration shares many of that discourse’s ideals. The
problem, it seems, lies not in the goals but in the approach to achieving them.
This obstacle is perhaps no more apparent than in northern Thailand, where calls
for indigenous rights for the hill tribe minorities have been met with hostility and
rejection by the Thai government. As part of a modern-day “ethnic revival,” demands for
group rights have borrowed the language of rights from Western human rights discourse.
Invoking “Asian values” that include a communitarian perspective, the Thai government
1 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “Bangkok Declaration.” Online. Available: http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm [5 February 2006]. 2 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54
has rejected indigenous rights and instead attempted to assimilate the hill tribes to
protect security and resources, as well as to “modernize” the north.
A modem “ethnic revival” has minorities moving away from isolationist and
accommodationist strategies and moving toward communalism, autonomism and
separatism.3 Much of this new revival is a direct result of nationalism, which enshrines
principles of self-determination, popular sovereignty and cultural diversity, and lends
ethnic movements self-confidence and legitimacy.4 As Western concepts of nationalism
spread, the idea of citizenship rights and ethnicity within the political sphere extends the
scope and intensity of this ethnic revival.5 Anthony Smith writes, “Nationalism has
endowed ethnicity with a wholly new self-consciousness and legitimacy, as well as a
fighting spirit and political direction. It is these qualities that have turned ethnicity into
such a politically volatile issue in the modem world.. .”6
An “ethnic group” is a type of community with a “specific sense of solidarity and
honour, and a set of shared symbols and values.”7 Features of an ethnic group include a
sense of unique group origins, knowledge of group history and belief in its destiny, one
or more dimensions of collective cultural individuality, and a sense of unique collective
solidarity.8 A history may be rediscovered or even invented, but a historical foundation
(even a mythical one) is necessary for the existence of an ethnic community.9 Smith
writes, “Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over
3 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 17. 4 Ibid., 18. 5 Ibid., 19. 6 Ibid., 20. 7 Ibid., 65. 8 Ibid., 66. 9 Ibid., 67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55
generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given
cultural unity of the population.”10
In the current international system, a major problem is “striking the right balance
between the obvious modernity of nationalism and the often premodem historical
dimensions of ethnicity.”11 In its quest for autonomy, unity and identity, the modem
ethnic revival sharpens global rivalries and competition for political standing.12 The task
of implementing a program of ethnic nationalism is a formidable one, but the difficulty
in achieving such a goal has not abated current movements.13
The modem ethnic revival is often discussed in the language of rights. Moving
beyond traditional concepts of universal human rights, many stress the importance of
group-differentiated rights that empower minorities. Will Kymlicka writes that
traditional human rights standards cannot resolve some of the problems related to
cultural minorities, and that further rights must be granted in order to create equality.14
He argues that it is both natural and desirable for cultures to change as a result of
members’ choices,15 and group rights help rectify disadvantages by “alleviating the
vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions.”16 The aim is to ensure that all
groups have the opportunity, if they so choose, to maintain themselves as a distinct
culture.17 Group-differentiated rights such as territorial autonomy, veto powers,
10 Anthony D. Smith,National Identity (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 25. 11 Smith, The Ethnic Reviva,, 51. 12 Ibid., 188. 13 Ibid., 196. 14 Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 4. 15 Ibid., 104. 16 Ibid., 109. 17 Ibid., 113.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56
guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, and language rights are all
cited as possible ways to empower minorities and create social equality.18
As an international legal concept, the term “indigenous” has been adopted as a
call for rights and a way of identifying issues.19 The United Nations has been specifically
addressing indigenous rights issues since the creation of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982. The International Decade of the World’s
Indigenous People was celebrated between 1995 and 2004, and a Special Rapporteur on
the rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples was appointed in 2001.
Currently, a draft declaration on indigenous rights is working its way through the United
Nations system on its way to the General Assembly.
The hill tribes fall under the category of “indigenous” people from the
perspective of the United Nations. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (UNHCHR) asserts people whose “social, cultural and economic
traditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community” may be
considered “indigenous,” as well as those whose status if regulated “wholly or partially
by their own customs or traditions or by special laws and regulations.”21 As discussed in
chapter one, tribal culture varies dramatically from Thai culture. Language, religion,
agricultural techniques, andmiXang governance systems are a few of the ways in which
hill tribe traditions are distinct from those found within the Thai majority.
18 Ibid., 109. 19 Andrew Gray, “The Indigenous Movement in Asia,” Indigenousin Peoples o f Asia, ed. R.H. Barnes, Andrew Gray and Benedict Kingsbury (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The Association for Asian Studies, University o f Michigan, 1995): 35-58. 57. 20 Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), “Indigenous Peoples.” Online. Available: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/index.htm [5 February 2006]. 21 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), “Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.” Online. Available: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm [26 March 2006].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57
Hill tribes may also trace their descent from populations that inhabited the region
before the Thai majority took an interest in the northern highlands, and therefore fall into
the “indigenous” category. The spread of Thai citizens into the uplands can be viewed as
a type of colonization or conquest, and the UNHCHR argues that the establishment of
present state boundaries cannot divide indigenous people from their ancestral00 claims.
Many hill tribes have existed between Thailand and the neighboring countries of Burma
and Laos, with no thought to political boundaries between those nations. Judging the
mountains as one land, rather than divided into state sections, many hill tribe members
have legitimate claims to the northern hills of Thailand even if residency fluctuated
across borders.
The UNHCHR also views self-identification as “indigenous” to be a fundamental
criterion for determining which groups fit into this category.23 For many activists and
scholars, self-determination is viewed as the “clinching concept” for defining
“indigenous.”24 Hill tribes have indeed determined themselves to be indigenous people,
and they have organized themselves accordingly in protests, lobbying efforts, and
grassroots activities outlined at the end of chapter one.
The Thai government seems to partially agree with this assessment, classifying
tribal people who settled in the country before 1991 as “indigenous” while classifying
those settling after that deadline as “migrants.”25 Links to the other aspects of
22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Andrew Gray, “The Indigenous Movement in Asia,” 40. 25 United States Department o f State, “Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/307.htm [26 March 2006].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58
indigenousness discussed above, however, support many of these so-called “migrants”
being reclassified as “indigenous.”
Self-determination may have a role to play in such reclassifications. This
concept, which may be understood as “the right of people to organize their lives on their
territories with as little outside interference as they wish,” is a way of controlling a
group’s political, cultural and economic lives.26 It may be understood as the freedom for
peoples to live according to their own values and beliefs, and to be respected by their
non-indigenous neighbors. Erica-Irene Daes writes that self-determination is a
process,28 and the true test of self-determination “is whether indigenous peoples
themselves actually feel that they have choices about their way of life.”29 In northern
Thailand, the principle of self-determination stands in opposition to government policies
that determine how the hill tribe members will govern themselves, manage land, educate
their children, and financially support themselves.
The appropriate groups for self-determination “must be those whom such
autonomy can have a discernible effect on their well-being.”30 The clearest case of this is
that of peoples who stand to lose if they are absorbed into larger populations or
countries. Like Kymlicka, Omar Dahbour does not believe that the concepts of human
rights or democratic self-government addresses the problems he terms “internal
26 Andrew Gray, “The Indigenous Movement in Asia,” 37. 27 Erica-Irene A. Daes, “Striving for Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples,” inIn Pursuit o f the Right to Self-Determination: Collected Papers & Proceedings o f the First International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United Nations (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2001): 50-62. 58. 28 Ibid., 57. 29 Ibid., 58. 30 Omar Dahbour, “The Ethics o f Self-Determination: Democratic, National, Regional,” inCultural Identity and the Nation-State, ed. Carol C. Gould and Pasquale Pasquino (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001): 1-17.9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59
colonialism” or “regional exploitation.”31 To adequately resolve these issues, he
advocates the following regional principle of self-determination:
If a group of persons living within a well-defined region of a country and pursuing a distinctive way of life is systematically disadvantaged by an entrenched and continuing pattern of discrimination in the allocation of goods and resources that prejudicially affects their ability to pursue their own way of life, that group has a right to redress through assertion of a principle of self- determination in the allocation and management of its own goods and resources.32
Indigenous mistreatment is a situation that warrants the use of such regional self-
determination. This principle, which is drawn from Allen Buchanan’s “discriminatory
redistribution” concept, “is a way of giving reasons for such a claim not in terms of
cultural identities but in terms of the preservation of different regional ways of life.”34
From this perspective, respect for the group rights of indigenous peoples is more than
protection for diversity and culture—it is way of safeguarding the practical, everyday
needs of a community.
Retaining the term “indigenous” is crucial for a group to ensure their basic rights,
and that academic debates over the term itself have practical consequences.35
Indigenousness is “actually a self-reflective notion, which means that people have
looked at themselves from the outside, identified the problems that face them, and
understand why an assertion of their identity is a prerequisite for their survival.”36 The
term “indigenous” is an open concept that brings together different peoples through their
31 Ibid., 10. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 11. 35 Andrew Gray, “The Indigenous Movement in Asia,” 42. 36 Ibid., 40.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60
structural positions within the nation-state,37 and the hill tribe activists of Thailand see
“that the demands of the indigenous peoples of the world should apply to them.”38
The underlying goal of self-determination is not gaining institutional power, but
rather achieving the freedom to live well—and to determine what it means to live well in
the first place. Because indigenous peoples do not seek and will not acquire much
physical or economic power, new forms of international cooperation are required to •5Q ensure indigenous rights. Daes writes, “If we are genuinely committed to conserving
the world’s cultural diversity, we must accept responsibility for establishing an
international regime in which small nations and peaceable peoples can survive.”40 If the
goal of self-determination is to be achieved, social changes toward cooperation and
mutual respect are necessary.
In Thailand, as well as throughout the world, the recognition of indigenous rights
often requires states to dramatically change their activities. Kymlicka outlines three
classifications of group-differentiated rights that require permanent changes in how
governments operate. First, there are “self-government rights” that allow minorities to
make some decisions for themselves without the risk of being outvoted by the
majority 41 In Quebec, for example, members of the Canadian French-speaking minority
are given self-government rights for certain aspects of regional decision-making.
Second, “polyethnic rights” aim at protecting cultural diversity and avoiding
practices of assimilation. These rights challenge the model that forces people to abandon
37 Ibid., 56. 38 Ibid., 55. 39 Erica-Irene A. Daes, “Striving for Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples,” 58. 40 Ibid., 58-59. 41 Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, 28.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61
their ethnic heritage, and such rights may be protected through the adoption of anti
racism policies and the teaching of minority history in schools.42 Public funding for
cultural practices may be granted, or perhaps religious groups may be exempted from
laws that disadvantage them due to their practices.43
Third, “special representation rights” may reduce barriers by getting more
minorities involved in politics or reserving a certain number of positions for them.44 This
classification of rights may be understood as a democratic version of self-determination
rights, in which people have the right to participate in the governing of their lives.45
Self-determination may be interpreted from a cultural perspective, as well, and
this interpretation requires national members to preserve their “distinct existence” and to
manage their “communal life” in accordance with their “particular” way of life.46
Demands for indigenous rights lend support for such a cultural interpretation of self-
determination, and that these demands call for justice for past wrongs as well as for the
wish to express cultural identity in the future. Minority members are entitled to special
rights because they “have an interest in preserving their unique cultural essence.” In fact,
the very term “minorities” should be understood in terms of a group’s proportional size
as well to the extent to which its culture is reflected in the public space.47
This cultural interpretation of self-determination directly challenges pressures for
minorities to assimilate into the majority culture. A narrow definition of assimilation
means “a surrendering of the past, the abandoning of a native ethnicity” and has a
42 Ibid., 30-31. 43 Ibid., 31. 44 Ibid., 32. 45 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 69. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 76.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62
negative meaning for many. Forced assimilation throughout history has been a
consequence of conquest, and refusals to accept the dominant culture have often been
associated with severe consequences.48
In modem times, however, the process of assimilation has sometimes appeared as
a process of cultural fusion. By accepting the values, institutions and cultures of other
groups, modem civilization has often been shaped by a variety of ethnic perspectives 49
Felix Gross writes that “the relative toleration and respect for difference created
conditions for a cultural fusion and contributed to an emergence of a broader
civilization.. .”50 From the perspective of a state, nurturing rather than subordinating
cultural identities may result in a more unified, although diverse, national group.51
Ethnicity should be allowed to endure if a larger sense of community is to be
constructed. “If you insist that ethnics drop their identity,” Jeff Spinner writes, “you
immediately divide the political community, defeating the very purpose of the attempt to
force people to shed their ethnicity.” Economic deprivation and oppression will lead to
cultural pluralism, and that minorities will retain their differences or construct alternative
ones if they are prevented access to society’s dominant institutions.
During the 1920s, Horace Kallen argued that attempts at assimilation would fail
because people are simply not that malleable. He wrote that ethnic identity was part of
48 Felix Gross, The Civic and the Tribal State: The State, Ethnicity, and the Multiethnic State(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), 158. 49 Ibid., 161. 50 Ibid., 163. 51 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 189. 52 Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 59. 53 Ibid., 63.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63
each individual, and that it could not be forgotten or ignored.54 This approach differs
leaves little room for cultural fusion, however, and does not account for cultural
change.55 Instead, boundaries between cultural groups are quite fluid and Kallen did not
recognize the possibility of transforming ethnicity or the creation of new identities.56
The point of indigenous rights is not to freeze cultures in time, but to empower
minorities so they may choose how to live within their culture. It is not possible to
eliminate social pressures to assimilate through legal reform, since social pressures to
conform will always be set by the dominant social group. “This pressure need not
always be overt and obvious,” Spinner notes. “Power and pressure are manifested not
only through the blunt instrument of law but also in subtle ways.”58
Despite this, ethnicity and identity should be a public matter as long as ethnic
groups feel pressure to drop their cultural differences. Rather than endorse some ethnic
practices as “good,” public institutions should work to make ethnic practices that accord
with liberal principles acceptable to all people within a society. Spinner writes, “Once
particular ethnics and their practices are accepted, then their ethnicity need not be a
public concern. Until this happens, however, the social pressures on ethnics to conform
must be fought.”59
In Asia, many governments have rejected such arguments for group rights and
instead have endorsed assimilationist policies. Thailand’s approach to hill tribe issues in
the north has pushed for conformity with majority social practices and has often
54 Ibid., 60. 53 Ibid., 62. 56 Ibid., 64. 37 Ibid., 80. 38 Ibid., 78. 39 Ibid., 80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64
contributed to inequality and increased group tensions. Kymlicka writes that suppressed
minority nationalisms, including that of the hill tribes, is usually justified by
governments in three ways: national minorities are likely to be disloyal; minorities are
“backward” and “uncivilized” and need to be brought into the modem world; and the
minority’s territory contains land and resources required for the state’s economic
development.60
Many states object to the idea of empowering minorities and choose to suppress,
rather than accommodate, calls for group rights due to security concerns.61 Kymlicka
writes that a history of “imperialism, collaboration, and regional instability” has
encouraged the viewpoint that support for minority self-determination will put state
security at risk. An assumed disloyalty of minorities goes beyond the belief that certain
groups lack loyalty to the state, and there is a sense that such groups have collaborated or
will collaborate with current or potential enemies.62
In border areas such as northern Thailand, the government may worry that hill
tribe members will be used as pawns by neighboring states such as Burma or by armed
movements.63 From this perspective, a strong and stable state requires disempowered
minorities. Kymlicka writes that ethnic relations are considered a “zero-sum game” in
which “anything that benefits the minority is seen as a threat to the majority.”64 In the
past, the threat of communism has been used to justify efforts to control indigenous
60 Will Kymlicka, “Models o f Multicultural Citizenship: Comparing Asia and the West,” inChallenging Citizenship: Group Membership and Cultural Identity in a Global ed. Age,Sor-hoon Tan (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2005): 110-136.118. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., 124. 63 Ibid., 127. 64 Ibid., 124.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65
minorities and Asian governments have viewed control of “fringe” areas as necessary.65
Therefore, “the treatment of minorities is above all a question of national security.”66
Kymlicka stresses that “the long-term prospects for minority rights depends on
changing people’s attitudes,” both in relation to the “securitization” of ethnic politics as
described above, as well as in relation to the expectation that indigenous mobilization
will “fade away” with modernization.67 There is a belief that economic development,
education and greater intercultural contact will help assimilate minorities into the
majority culture and minority claims will simply “go away.”68 This is closely tied to the
assumption that indigenous peoples can be assimilated and would benefit from such a
process.69
Most development agendas rely on the underlying beliefs that modernization is a
good thing and that the mythical untouched “primitive” exists. Indigenous minorities
often receive special emphasis in socioeconomic development projects, and “these
programs exemplify the great faith that Southeast Asian governments have in the ability
of twentieth century science and technology to enable policymakers to lead their
populations into modernity.”70 From this perspective, government bureaucrats view
themselves as the “pinnacle of social development, or at least as close to it as any of
65 Christopher R. Duncan, “Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized,” in Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development o f Minorities, ed. Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004): 1-23. 7. 66 Will Kymlicka, “Models of Multicultural Citizenship,” 124. 67 Ibid., 130. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid., 127. 70 Christoper R. Duncan, “Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized,” 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66
their countrymen has reached,” and indigenous peoples are subjected to programs that
will help or force them to reach a similar point.71
There has been a gradual policy shift to incorporate hill tribes into the majority
Thai culture.72 Due to differences in language, religion, social organization, and
agricultural practices, the lowland Thais have often viewed hill tribe members as being
“anarchic, irrational, and uncivilized.”73 Unable to think of hill tribe members as fellow
citizens, the Thai majority has undertaken paternalistic projects that perceive minorities
as a target of charity.74 Hill tribes have often been perceived as uneducated,
superstitious, and childlike by their “older sibling” countrymen.75 “Civilizing projects”
have sought to assimilate hill tribe members and create a more unified, similar Thai
society.76
Kathleen Gillogly writes, “Modernization once meantexcluding upland ethnic
minorities. Now, it meansincorporating them into the Thai cultural mainstream.
Minority people have been made subject to the control of the state.”77 Such
modernization processes have been those of increasing control, and the Thai government
has viewed the establishment of administrative control and the security of the nation’s
borders as main themes of this practice.78
71 Ibid., 4. 72 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” inCivilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development o f Minorities, ed. Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004): 116-149. 122. 73 Ibid., 123. 74 Ibid., 119. 75 Ibid., 136. 76 Ibid., 123. 77 Ibid., 117. 78 Ibid., 120.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67
Resistance to indigenous rights in Asia has also been linked to the belief that
such rights impede economic development, which is an urgent priority for developing
nations.79 In some cases, including that of northern Thailand, indigenous peoples have
been blamed for environmental degradation that threatens natural resources. Swidden
agriculture has often been cited as a destructive and unsustainable practice employed by
indigenous farmers.80 The establishment of land use zones and the development of a
more environmental and preservationist consciousness have been main objectives of the 01 t Thai government in hill tribe areas. Deforestation has been ultimately viewed as a hill
tribe problem, and forest policies resulted in escalating disputes between the local people
and the government.82 Gillogly argues that development and forestry projects constitute
another powerful way by which the lives of hill tribe members were “minutely
controlled” and “brought under the discipline of the state.” In this action, the Thai
government was not unlike those of colonial empires toward their subjects.83
The state-led fight against opium has also affected perceptions and treatment of
minorities in the north. Anti-opium programs and international aid for drug eradication
have deeply affected government policy in hill tribe areas,84 and the war against opium
has had many negative consequences for uplanders. Interventions such as the eradication
of opium are significant because they inserted hill tribes into a “regime of thought and
practice” that served the process of Thai nation-building.85
79 Will Kymlicka, “Models o f Multicultural Citizenship,” 127. 80 Christopher R. Duncan, “Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized,” 13. 81 Kathleen Gillogly, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ o f Northern Thailand,” 131. 82 Ibid., 129. 83 Ibid., 138. 84 Ibid., 124. 85 Ibid., 140.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68
Resistance to indigenous rights is Asia has been attributed to a variety of sources,
ranging from security concerns and “civilizing” motives to the control of land and
natural resources. In Thailand, all of these issues have been significantly impacted by the
power of data collection. Technical assistance was provided as a way of establishing a
government presence in the north, and this required the gathering of information by
o/ means such as aerial reconnaissance by the Border Patrol Police and censuses.
Information has been collected at centers such as the Hill Tribe Research Center near
Mae Sai,87 and data collection has become a key form of governmental control in the
O O north. Furthermore, Gillogly writes that data “gave officials a means by which to
translate their experience of the ‘exotic’ uplanders into a language understood by the
center.”89
Computer-generated data has been an important political tool because both
policymakers and the general public viewed it as more credible and objective than other
forms of information. Those who command this information are given more power to
use it according to their own objectives.90 Problems have often been defined in terms of
finding the right technology and means of control, and the collection and control of data
has been a central part of this process.91
Furthermore, data collection has been central for labeling in northern Thailand.
This process, in which Arturo Escobar writes that “the whole reality of a person’s life is
reduced to a single feature or trait,” has played an important role in state perceptions of
86 Ibid., 120. 87 Ibid., 122. 88 Ibid., 117. 89 Ibid., 139. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., 140.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69
hill tribes.92 These labels have given the government a chance to portray majority
members as the “kind and wise older brother” and the hill tribe members as “backward.”
Gillogly writes, “The labels are invented and maintainedinstitutions, by as part of an
essentially political process. They are the justifications for the process of Thai nation-
building.”93 Data collection and labeling gave the Thai government the power to define
problems and solutions, and that power has often resulted in the rejection of indigenous
rights.
There is yet another obstacle to group-differentiated rights in Asia, however, and
it questions whether Western concepts such as human rights can and should be
implemented in the East. Some Asian leaders have argued that “Asian values” are
incompatible with the core values of liberal democracy, such as civil and political
liberties and minority rights.94 This approach often considers the use of liberal
democracy as a form of Western cultural imperialism95 and gives economic and social
rights top priority over other rights.96
Critics of Western individualism argue that human rights practices reflect a
“corrosive, hedonistic individualism that gives inadequate attention to social duties and
is incompatible not only with traditional values but with any plausible conception of
human dignity and decency.”97 The well-being of the nation-state is ranked higher in
92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., 141. 94 Inoue Tatsuo, “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism,” Thein East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 27-59. 28. 95 Ibid., 37. 96 Ibid., 34. 97 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense o f ‘Western’ Universalism,”The in East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 60-87. 76.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70
importance than individual rights, and this perspective is said to embrace communitarian
values over individuality.98
Inoue Tatsuo disagrees with this “Asian values” approach and writes that this is a
strategy “based on economic modernization without political modernization.”99 He
argues that “Asian values” doesn’t represent genuine Asian initiatives or fully convey
Asian perspectives, and that there are points of contact between Asian voices and liberal
democracy.100 He points out that although “Asian values” discourse criticizes the
Western concept of rights, it accepts the Western concept of sovereignty without
hesitation.101
Rather than having a destabilizing effect, liberal democracy may deal with the
conflicts and tensions created by internal diversity in many Asian states. Oppressive
systems that do not respect rights suppress minority discontent, and pent-up anger
increases the instability of the system from a long-term point of view.102 Tatsuo writes,
“The core of liberal tolerance is fairness, not ‘orderliness’ based on compelled silence,
and fairness, not compelled silence, will truly stabilize the political system in the long
run.”103
Traditional human rights discourse leaves “considerable space” for the Asian
implementation of rights.104 Jack Donnelly writes that a human rights approach
“assumes that people probably are best suited, and in any case are entitled, to choose the
Inoue Tatsuo, “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism,” 52. 99 Ibid., 28. 100 Ibid., 29. 101 Ibid., 30. 102 Ibid., 44. 103 Ibid., 44-45. 104 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian Values,” 83.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71
good life for themselves. If Asians truly do value family over self, they will exercise
their personal rights with the consequences for their family in mind.”105 Although
Western societies may interpret human rights from an individualistic perspective, there
is no reason why Eastern societies couldn’t respect human rights while taking a more
communitarian approach.
However, human rights also “empower people to modify or reject parts of their
traditional culture,” and the people, not the rules, must decide what is valued.106 It is the
will of people—not the nature of human rights itself—that may cause cultures to change.
Donnelly writes:
Cultural traditions are socially created legacies. Some are good. Others are bad. Still others are simply irrelevant. And what is considered to be the content of a tradition changes with time. Tradition legitimately governs and limits fundamental life choices covered by human rights guarantees only to the extent that individuals and groups choose to follow, and thus reproduce, that tradition.107
In order to avoid the East-West debate surrounding human rights, there is a need
for an intercivilizational approach to human rights.108 This perspective “enables us to
evaluate human rights in the long history of humanity, to judge its proper range and
applicability, and to compare it with other mechanisms pursuing spiritual and material
well-being of humanity.”109 Although human rights discourse was “bom and raised” in
the West, this approach requires rights to be viewed from other civilizational
105 Ibid., 86. 106 Ibid., 87. 107 Ibid. 108 Qnuma Yasuaki, “Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights,” Thein East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A, Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 103-123. 118-119. 109 Ibid., 118.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72
perspectives, as well.110 The intercivilizational approach characterizes human rights as
tools for assisting humanity, and such tools can no longer be characterized as products of
the West.111 Instead, they are “the products of long discussions, controversies, and
negotiations among various nations with diverse civilizational backgrounds.”112
Such an intercivilizational approach will require two important facets of
convergences: the meeting of minds, who are “worlds apart” in their premises but able to
unite for immediate practical conclusions; and closing extreme distance to better
understand differences and acknowledge good things in all traditions. In order to meet
these goals, the West will need to better see how their culture is one among many.113
Westerners will also have to “recapture a more adequate view of our own history” to
understand the spiritual ideas that have been part of development, and then better
understand the spiritual paths of other traditions.114 Charles Taylor writes: “Contrary to
what many people think, world convergence will not come through a loss or denial of
traditions all around, but rather by creative reimmersions of different groups, each in
their own spiritual heritage, traveling different routes to the same goal.”115
In Thailand, the governmental rejection of rights, as well as “civilizing” projects
among indigenous peoples, often leads to violence, resistance, avoidance and possibly
integration.116 Programs may have the unintended side effect of empowering indigenous
groups, and development policies often create a heightened sense of ethnic identity
110 Ibid., 119. 111 Ibid., 122-123. 112 Ibid., 122. 113 Charles Taylor, “Conditions for an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” inThe East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 124-144. 143. 114 Ibid., 143-144. 115 Ibid., 144. 116 Christopher R. Duncan, “Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized,” 16-18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73
among target populations.117 Duncan writes, “Although these civilizing projects are
imposed from above, local populations still maintain considerable say in what happens
to them.”118
The resilience of hill tribes in preserving their cultural traditions not only disrupts
government-sponsored plans to “modernize” the north, but it also calls into question the
very assumptions officials hold about what is best for northern Thailand. Can
policymakers do what is best for the country without destroying indigenous cultures, and
is there a way to foster respect for differences without fragmenting Thai society?
These questions can and must be addressed in a discussion of citizenship and
multicultural societies. If citizenship is to be advanced as a possible solution to the
vulnerabilities faced by the hill tribes, the full range of legal and social impacts of
citizenship itself must be addressed. Although citizenship may provide indigenous
people with useful tools such as education and employment opportunities, it may also
help to unify society and fight the negative elements of racism and government
paternalism found within Thailand.
117 Ibid., 17. 118 Ibid., 16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4
THE MEANING AND IMPACT OF CITIZENSHIP
The Social Implications of Thai Nationality for Hill Tribes
The international community tends to regard citizenship as a positive institution,
which is a “good” desired by people throughout the world. It is associated not only with
a sense of group belonging and social representation, but also with the protection of
human rights and dignity. More than just a passport or a birth certificate, nationality
represents state protection and identity within the global system.
Herman R. Van Gunsteren, for example, writes that “citizenship is an
institutional status from within which a person can address governments and other
citizens and make claims about human rights.”1 Yael Tamir argues that citizenship itself
should be viewed as a primary good that all individuals deserve. Tamir writes:
“Citizenship is indispensable for the well-being of modem individuals. Stateless persons
are deprived of protection, lack of civic and welfare rights, have no passports, and
officially belong nowhere.’”
This last statement particularly rings true for the hill tribes of Thailand, and yet
there is more to citizenship than the benefits outlined thus far. There remains underlying
1 Herman R. Van Gunsteren, “Admission to Citizenship,” inEthics 98, no. 4 (July 1988): 731-741. 731. : Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 125. 3 Ibid., 124.
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75
issues regarding how citizenship (and the lack thereof) can affect both individuals and
groups. To understand these issues, one must consider what it means to be a citizen and
how identification with a nation impacts a cultural group.
Many scholars emphasize the politics of identity that relate to citizenship.
Anthony D. Smith asserts that “national” identity involves some sense of political
community,4 and that this identity serves as a legitimation for social order and solidarity
by outlining rights and duties of citizens.5 Ideally, a nation serves as a center for
fraternity and exerts a stronger influence than other collective cultural identities.6
Smith outlines the fundamental features of national identity, which include: a
homeland, common myths and historical memories, a common public culture, common
legal rights and duties for all members, and a common economy with territorial mobility
for all.7 He writes that the collective identity that results from nationalism is due to a
“sense of continuity” that stems from shared memories and notions of a collective
destiny.8
However, many scholars argue that such a conception of national identity is too
limited. Jeff Spinner notes that the world is not divided as nationalists envision,9 and that
nationalism itself is often an “exclusionary doctrine” that creates inequality for
minorities.10 He writes that the nation-state is “mostly a myth,” and that “most states, if
4 Anthony D. Smith,National Identity (Las Vegas: University o f Nevada Press, 1991), 9. ' Ibid., 14. 6 Ibid., 175. 7 Ibid., 14. 8 Ibid., 25. 9 Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries o f Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 144. 10 Ibid., 142.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76
not all, are made up of a variety of peoples.”11 A collective identity based on
nationalism, according to Spinner, is simply not enough.
To define the Thai national identity along Smith’s strict lines would be to
exclude the hill tribes from any possibility of becoming equal and contributing members
of society. The tribes have different historical memories and cultures than the majority,
and yet they are linked to the land of the same nation-state. Although their histories
differ, it is not impossible to imagine a future in which the hill tribes and the Thai
majority may share a collective destiny that stems from the “sense of continuity” that
Smith requires within a national identity.
Felix Gross notes that territorial solidarity, institutionalized as common
citizenship, has changed the social bonds that tie together members of the same state.
Citizenship, as a consequence of these bonds, forms a “second higher identity”
associated with the politics of the state.12 The first identity, the ethnic identity, remains
related to associations based on common descent, including kinship and religion.1T Gross
writes, “citizenship creates a legal and philosophical form that defines a concept of two
or even more identities, which are not necessarily conflicting, but complementary.”14
The civic bond arises from common interests and mutual responsibilities, and eventually
a “common tradition, culture, loyalty and identity” is established.15
11 Ibid., 144. *2 Felix Gross, The Civic and the Tribal State: The State, Ethnicity, and the Multiethnic State (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), 2. 13 Ibid., 5. 14 Ibid., 122. 15 Ibid., 123.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77
This view corresponds with that of Will Kymlicka, who argues that the idea of a
shared identity is necessary for national survival.16 While cultural groups within states
cannot derive this shared identity from a common history, language or religion, they can
relate with shared pride in particular achievements. In the United States, for example, a
shared pride in the founding of the American Republic and other historical achievements
translates into a shared pride that builds the American political identity.17
As Thailand works to strengthen its economy and modernize its society, the ways
in which its government deals with issues of globalization and social pressures will
shape the future identity of the nation. The Thai government has taken a keen interest in
protecting the environment, Westernizing its economy and promoting the image of a fair
and democratic state. Without the support of its hill tribe minorities, however, these
goals may not be fully met. It will take cooperation between the majority and the
minorities to maintain peace and prosperity, and in these shared goals there may be room
for a shared identity.
This discussion is taken yet another step further by Tamir, who draws on the
issue of morality when discussing shared identity. Working within a framework of
liberal nationalism, Tamir writes that a state of mind characterized by tolerance and
respect for diversity can lead to a shared set of moral values.18 He argues that important
obligations flow from identity and relatedness,19 and that group membership “will be
meaningless unless individuals learn to see it as tied up with their own identity, and
16 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Right. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 188. 17 Ibid., 188-189. 18 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 90, 95. 19 Ibid., 99.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78
perceive fellow members as partners in a shared way of life, as cooperators they can rely
on.”20
Despite their cultural differences, Thais and hill tribe members may strengthen
their chances for peace and equality by embracing an environment of tolerance and
mutual respect. In order to accomplish this, stereotypes concerning the “backwardness”
of indigenous people will have to be fought. Hill tribe members, too, will have to take
steps toward cooperation by initiating dialogue and joint projects with majority Thais on
issues of mutual concern, such as the environment.
Iris Marion Young and other cultural pluralists, however, argue that the ideal that
citizenship will create a common will, and that the activities of citizenship transcend
group differences, has acted to exclude groups and enforce homogeneity among citizens.
Furthermore, where there exists differences between groups but some of these groups are
privileged, “strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate
oppression or disadvantage.”21 Because differences exist and may create disadvantages
between groups, “fairness seems to call for acknowledging rather than being blind to
them.”22
Young writes that groups are integrated into the common culture with foil
participation only if a “differentiated citizenship” is adopted.23 She writes that
mechanisms for “effective representation and recognition of the distinct voices” of
20 Ibid., 115. 21 Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique o f the Ideal o f Universal Citizenship,” in Ethics 99, vol. 2 (January 1989): 250-274. 251. 22 Ibid., 268. 23 Ibid., 251.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79
oppressed groups must be provided.24 Such mechanisms must support: self-organization
of group members so they may be empowered and understand their collective
experiences and interests in the context of society; the group’s voicing of how proposals
affect them and in generating policy themselves; and having veto power regarding
policies that directly affect the group.25 This principle applies only to oppressed and
disadvantaged groups, since privileged groups already have representation.26
Cultural pluralism, illustrated by Young’s argument, may be directly linked to
the concept of what Kymlicka refers to as a “multination state”. The term “multination”
refers to a country which contains more than one historical community, or “nation,” with
the smaller cultures forming national minorities.27 The very term “multination” requires
us to identify the varying groups found within the boundaries of a state, and to recognize
the particular differences between cultures. The question inherent to discussions of
multination states, however, is to what extent particular cultures should take priority
over universality and the state as a whole. In Thailand, this view questions whether the
rights of hill tribes should interfere in any way with the well-being of the nation-state.
John Rex outlines the essentials of a multinational society, although he prefers
the term “multicultural”. Ideally, this society would distinguish between the public
domain where there is a single culture (based on the notion of equality) and the private
domain, which permits diversity between groups. The public domain includes law,
politics and economics, while the private domain includes moral education, primary
socialization and religious beliefs. Important to the understanding of multinational
24 Ibid., 261. 25 Ibid., 261-262. 26 Ibid., 262. 27 Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80
societies is that minority communities may conflict and challenge existing orders, and
that the social order of such a society is an “emergent” one resulting from dialogue and
conflict between cultures.28
Kymlicka notes that citizenship is not just a status defined by rights and
responsibilities, but that it is also an identity and an expression of one’s community
membership.29 He writes that such multination states cannot survive unless their various
groups share an allegiance to the larger political community.3 A While citizens may
identify with cultural groups, they must also incorporate their national citizenship into
their personal identities. This would require hill tribe members to see identify themselves
along tribal lines, but also along national lines as members of the Thai state. Although
this situation may create tensions, the possibilities for collective identities and mutual
respect discussed above lend hope for the peaceful existence of multination states.
In order to balance cultural and civic identities in multinations, Kymlicka argues
that the acknowledgment of “group-differentiated rights” may alleviate disadvantages
and vulnerabilities of minorities so they may have the same opportunities to live and
work as the majority members. These rights may include territorial autonomy, veto
powers, guaranteed representation in central institutions, land claims, and language
rights.31 These rights are meant to ensure equality between cultural groups, providing
balance for minorities who would be marginalized by state-sponsored universality. The
need for such group rights is particularly apparent in relation to land use in northern
28 John Rex,Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), 29. 29 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return o f the Citizen: A Survey o f Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” inEthics 104, no. 2 (January 1994): 352-381. 369. 30 Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, 13. 31 Ibid., 109.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81
Thailand, as Thai laws threaten hill tribe agriculture and economic survival. Much of the
poverty created by environmental regulations, which were created without input from
tribal communities, have resulted in the human security issues presented in chapter two.
Kymlicka notes that some multination federations formed by these group-
differentiated rights have failed in the past partly due to the very nature of a society built
on what Rex outlines as “dialogue and conflict”. He writes that “the lived experience of
inter-group relations is hardly a model of robust intercultural exchange.” Rather, most
citizens are ignorant or indifferent to the internal life of minority groups. At worst,
inter-group relations are “tinged with feelings of resentment” and both sides are
“sensitive to perceived slights”.33 In cases where laws have been implemented for
creating equality between cultural groups, contact between groups is often extremely
limited and the result is “parallel societies” within one nation-state.34 Kymlicka writes,
“The state has made itself accessible to all citizens, and affirms the important
contribution that each group makes to the larger society; but from the perspective of
individuals, the presence of other groups is rarely experienced as enriching.”35
Laws, therefore, are not enough for creating equal citizenship. Spinner argues
that culture and identity cannot be relegated to the private sphere, but instead equality
must create a change in public opinion.36 John Murray Cuddihy calls this the “religion of
civility,” contending that liberal citizens will be nice to each other simply so they may
32 Will Kymlicka, “Models o f Multicultural Citizenship: Comparing Asia and the West,” inChallenging Citizenship: Group Membership and Cultural Identity in a Global ed. Age, Sor-hoon Tan (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2005): 110-136. 115. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 115-116. 36 Jeff Spinner, The Boundaries o f Citizenship, 49.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82
get along.37 Spinner notes that ethnicity must be allowed to endure to avoid divisions,
since people will rebel against attempts to weaken or destroy their cultural identities.
Instead, ethnic identities will be transformed gradually, with some practices surviving
and others disappearing, if society tolerates differences.38 Spinner advocates what
historian John Higham calls “pluralistic integration,” and argues that common
I Q • citizenship can bind groups together without obliterating all ethnic ties. The key is that
citizenship is not just about equal rights and treatment within the courtroom, but that
citizenship is also about standing and respect that all citizens deserve.40
In Thailand, social standing and respect has been intimately linked with
government policy. In Asia generally, there has been opposition to granting substate
autonomy to cultural groups. This has sometimes been linked to practical reasons such
as ethnic groups being less territorially concentrated than in the West, or that poorer
Asian countries simply can’t afford the extra costs. However, Kymlicka writes that
multinational states are not necessarily more costly to administer because some minority
groups are concentrated.41
Instead, he offers two possible explanations for resistance: First, the political
culture in Asia is more “communitarian” than in the West. Kymlicka notes, however,
that even Asian liberals are more likely to oppose multinational federalism than their
Western counterparts because they often worry that substate autonomies will become
“petty tyrannies” that “flout the rule of law, deny human rights and oppress internal
37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 59. 39 Ibid., 73. 40 Ibid., 39. 41 Will Kymlicka, “Models o f Multicultural Citizenship,” 120.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83
minorities.”42 Second, many communitarians in Asia “cling to the hope that minority
nationalism will fade away.”43 This view has been relinquished in the West, yet the idea
that the problem will resolve itself if states “have the strength to hold out against
minority demagogues and ethnic entrepreneurs” persists in the East.44 Kymlicka writes:
“In Asia, many intellectuals and politicians are deeply pessimistic about the prospect that
substate national groups can exercise territorial autonomy in accordance with liberal-
democratic norms, yet are surprisingly optimistic about the possibility that substate
nationalism will simply disappear.”45
Resistance to multinationalism isn’t entirely an Eastern concern, however, since
some Western scholars have outlined problems with multicultural accommodation
policies. Ayelet Schachar writes that legal steps to accommodate multiculturalism may
result in reinforcing power hierarchies, and some at-risk group members may be asked to
shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs.46
Schachar argues that multiculturalism often has an overly narrow focus on
“identity” as a singular concept that fails to “capture the multiplicity of group members’
affiliations and experiences.”47 This focus may be blind to vulnerabilities within
traditionally subordinated categories, such as women, and people within these categories
may find themselves in worse situations as a result of accommodationist policies.48 State
action affects power relations within the cultural group and may legitimize certain
42 Ibid., 121. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 122. 46 Ayelet Shachar, “On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability,” Politicalin Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 64-89. 65. 47 Ibid., 69. 48 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84
interpretations of that group’s culture.49 Therefore, policies meant to improve a group’s
status may unintentionally sanction the mistreatment of certain group members.
An issue of concern within northern Thailand is the division between traditional
hill tribe culture and the increasingly “modem,” often Westernized Thai mainstream.
Although activists have called for policies protecting tribal ways of life, such policies
run the risk of forcing hill tribe members to live in a way they perhaps wish to escape.
An Akha or a Lisu may want to remain in their village and live as their parents did, but
then again they may want to move to Bangkok and learn about computer technology.
Some multicultural policies may run a fine line between protecting rights and limiting
them.
Thomas Janoski also finds fault with conceptions of group rights, as elaborated
by Kymlicka. Janoski writes that the difficulty in dealing with group rights “concerns the
loss of universality” when rights are accorded to different ethnic groups. “The problem
is that social resources will be guaranteed to promote a culture in which everyone cannot
participate.”50 John R. Danely offers a similar view, noting that Kymlicka’s position
seeks to defend some inequalities that benefit minorities.51 From this perspective, the
protection of minorities should not create costs for the majorities.
Janoski outlines three major problems with group rights: Group rights are
particularistic and may become discriminatory; they require representation of the group,
and group leaders become invested with the rights (rather than the citizens themselves);
49 Ibid., 73. 50 Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights & Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 48. 51 John R. Danley, “Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights, and Cultural Minorities,” inPhilosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 168-185. 171.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85
and some groups may seek self-determination and liberation through secession.52 Janoski
further asserts that group rights will “lead to segregated ethnic communities that are sub
states and societies in and of themselves,” and that these sub-societies will develop
tensions and increase ethnic conflict.53
Jonathan Mercer also points out the drawbacks to group identification. He differs
with the realist worldview that attributes conflict to struggle for survival in an anarchic
world, and instead relates conflict to issues of identity. He argues that the more people
identify with a particular group, the more they differentiate with others.54 Mercer writes:
“Competition need not be triggered by economic or security concerns and is not
necessarily a function of selfishness or limited resources; instead, competition results
from categorization, comparison, and a need for a positive social identity.”55 Donald
Rothchild also discusses the potential costs of group membership, and advocates the use
of confidence-building measures such as inclusive coalitions and the offering of regional
autonomy in order to engender minority trust.56 In Thailand, a second “national”
identity, as well as cooperation between minority groups and the majority, is necessary
for internal peace.
Despite these negative aspects of group membership, Mercer’s constructivist
approach lends hope for future cooperation. Like fellow constructivist scholar Alexander
Wendt, Mercer argues that groups and individuals may come to identify with each
52 Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society, 48-49. 53 Ibid., 49. 54 Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,”International in Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 229- 252.245,251. 55 Ibid., 246. 36 Donald Rothchild, “Ethnic Fears and Security Dilemmas: Managing Uncertainty in Africa,” Beingin Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory, ed. Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University o f Michigan Press, 2000): 237-266. 248, 251.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86
other.57 Because identities and definitions of self-interest are changeable, an emphasis on
identity may provide theorists with solutions for understanding and alleviating ethnic
conflict.58 As Wendt notes, people act on the basis of meanings,59 and those meanings
arise out of interaction.60 If those meanings can be changed and identity-based alliances
can be formed, cooperation may be possible.
The concept of mutual respect has been advanced as a possible solution for
creating equality while avoiding the pitfalls of group-differentiated rights. Charles
Taylor endorses a liberal model that distinguishes between fundamental rights and a
“broad range of immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment,” arguing that
uniformity must be weighed against the importance of cultural survival on a case-by-
case basis.61 He does not assert that culture must be preserved at all costs, but rather that
the value of different cultures must be recognized and acknowledged for their worth. He
notes that there is a new demand for recognition that has become explicit in the
international system.62 Taylor writes:
The awkwardness arises from the fact that there are substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles.63
Kymlicka argues that different cultures can exist within a state, and that access to
one’s culture should be treated “as something people can be expected to want, whatever
57 Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” 236. 58 Ibid., 252. 59 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make o f It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics,” in International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon, 1999): 434-459.437. 60 Ibid., 440. 61 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 61. 62 Ibid., 64. 63 Ibid., 63.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87
their more particular conception of the good.”64 One’s culture, therefore, is something to
which they are “reasonably entitled.”65 Attempts to subordinate separate cultural
identities, according to Kymlicka, will be perceived by minorities as threats to their
existence and will result in national instability.66
From this perspective, the Thai government should cease to view hill tribe
cultures as pitted against mainstream Thai culture and instead expand the definition of
what it is to be Thai in the first place. Despite the state’s current focus on modernization,
it will be its history that binds its citizens together. In the north, that history is strongly
linked to the hill tribes and to the more slow-paced way of life many members choose to
embrace. If the northern provinces are to remain part of Thailand, then these different
cultural differences must be incorporated into the Thai identity.
In order to hold together a multination state, Kymlicka suggests that ethnic
groups and cultures must be genuinely valued.67 This, in turn, builds on a shared national
identity that is required for the survival of a multination state. Kymlicka rejects the strict
“common citizenship” strategy that requires members to hold a singular, politically-
based identity, and instead advocates diversity as a method for creating unity. He writes:
What is clear, I think, is that if there is a viable way to promote a sense of solidarity and common purpose in a multination state, it will involve accommodating, rather than subordinating, national identities. People from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated.
64 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 86. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., 185. 67 Ibid., 191. 68 Ibid., 189.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88
Kymlicka views culture as something that provides “meaningful ways of life,”69
and deciding how to lead one’s life is “a matter of exploring the possibilities made
available by our culture.”70 Cultural identity is an “anchor for self-identification and
secure belonging,” and that means a people’s self-respect is bound up “with the esteem
in which their national group is held.”71 Kymlicka argues, “If a culture is not generally
respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened.”79
Taylor writes that identity is socially-derived and dependent on society,73 and he
agrees with Kymlicka’s assessment that cultural identity is tied to dignity. Taylor argues
that identity is partly shaped “by recognition or its absence, often by the mwrecognition
of others” and a person or group can suffer real damage “if the people or society around
them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of
themselves.”74
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can result in oppression, “imprisoning
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”75 Indigenous peoples, for
example, have often been misrecognized as being “uncivilized.” Taylor writes, “Within
these perspectives, misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a
grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not
just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.”76
69 Ibid., 76. 10 Ibid., 126. 71 Ibid., 89. 72 Ibid. 73 Charles Taylor,Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition, 34. 74 Ibid., 25. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89
Misrecognition is a major problem among the hill tribes, as false Thai
perceptions of indigenous people are perpetuated by the tourism industry. Almost two
million tourists visit the northern towns of Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai each year,
snapping pictures of women in ceremonial dress and visiting tourist-oriented tribal
villages with the help of guided tour operators. The Tourism Authority of Thailand has
endorsed these activities as being beneficial for the Thai economy, and yet such tourism
relies on misrepresentations of hill tribe members that often does not reflect the harsh
realities faced in the north.77 This sort of tourism not only perpetuates racist and
unrealistic views of hill tribes, but it also exports such ideas overseas through foreign
tourists.
While Tamir agrees that cultures should be respected, but he differs with fellow
scholars as to the nature of culture itself. He disagrees with arguments centered on the
idea of cultural membership as innate and inevitable. Although he agrees that people
have reasons to protect their cultural choices, such choices should not be isolated from
<70 “the market of preferences.” The right to culture, according to Tamir, is not only the
right to follow one’s culture, but also the right to re-create it. He argues, “The ultimate
result of a series of moral and communal choices is a proliferation of ways of life,
interpretations of culture, and the emergence of new national groups.”79 Because of this,
there is no central point from which to evaluate the authenticity of cultures.80 Tamir
writes:
77 Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Hill Tribes Viewed as Commodities?” Inter Press Service News Agency. Online. Available: http://www.ipsnews.net/mekong/stories/hilltribes.html [25 March 2006], 78 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, 38. 79 Ibid., 49. 80 Ibid., 52.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90
The claim that, if given the choice, identity features cannot be constitutive, seems unreasonable. We readily accept that life-plans, religious beliefs, and social roles are objects of reflections and choice, yet constitutive to our identity. Cultural and national affiliations fall under the same category, of being both chosen and constitutive.• 81
The concept of nation-building serves as an example of how cultural membership
may be chosen. Tamir writes that nation-builders search for “ancestral origins” and
O'} oo historical continuity to create solidarity. Nations are imagined through culture, filled
with invented traditions,84 and serve as an example of how cultures can be created.
Nations may be understood as a “cluster concept,” in which a group must share a
Of sufficient number of certain characteristics and members share a “family resemblance”.
Furthermore, this “resemblance” points to increasing discussion among theorists
that citizenship comes with specific responsibilities towards one’s “family,” or political
community. In addition to institutional checks and balances, “some level of civic virtue
or and public-spintedness is required.” There has been increasing support throughout the
international community for the promotion of “responsible citizenship” as an aim of
public policy.87 Civil society theorists, for example, emphasize the need for civility and
self-restraint through participations in voluntary organizations of civil society. The
approval or disapproval found within these organizations act as incentive for acting as
responsible citizens, and it is here that we internalize concept of mutual obligation.88
However, Kymlicka and Wayne Norman warn that joining associations may be “more a
81 Ibid., 33. 82 Ibid., 64. 83 Ibid., 68. 84 Ibid., 64. 85 Ibid., 65. 86 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 360. 87 Ibid., 368. 88 Ibid., 363.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91
matter of withdrawing from the mainstream of society than of learning how to
participate• • •m it.
Civic virtue theory also outlines some of the requirements for responsible
citizenship. Liberal theorist William Galston divides the virtues required for responsible
citizenship into four categories: general virtues (courage, law-abidingness, loyalty);
social virtues (independence, open-mindedness); economic virtues (work ethic, capacity
to delay self-gratification, adaptability to change); and political virtues (capacity to
discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for,
ability to evaluate the performance of elected officials, willingness to engage in public
discourse).90 Stephen Macedo outlines the virtue of “public reasonableness,” which
requires that citizens justify their political demands in a way that other citizens can
understand and accept. This virtue requires the separation of matters of private faith with
those capable of public defense, “and to see how issues look from the point of view of
those with differing religious commitments and cultural backgrounds.”91
The obligations of citizenship, however, require legal citizenship to begin with.
In today’s Thailand, it seems that any mention of responsibility has excluded these
northern tribes, and instead has focused on the mainstream majorities. To reach a point
where mutual obligations may be considered, one must first determine whether the hill
tribes can become members of the political community and what that process would look
like.
89 Ibid., 364. 90 Ibid., 365. 91 Ibid., 366.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92
Citizenship is about more than passports and welfare rights: It is about standing,
self-respect, community membership and personal identity. In order to achieve Ml
citizenship, the hill tribes must secure official recognition by the Thai government as
well as respect by Thai society. In order to achieve these goals, responsibility must lie
with the government and majority of society, as well as with the hill tribe members
themselves. The debate in Thailand continues to question whether citizenship is a
solution for the hill tribes’ problems, and how a situation for positive change can be
created.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The hill tribes face a situation created by both political and social causes. In order
to elevate the status of indigenous people within Thailand and create an environment of
tolerance and equality, steps should be taken to impact the government and its policies as
well as society itself. The responsibility to advocate for and implement such changes lies
not only in the hands of the government, but also within the powers of the hill tribes and
the international community.
To begin a truly positive, state-sponsored response to the hill tribe situation, the
Thai government should act immediately to provide citizenship to all tribal people bom
within its boundaries and work to ensure that all national rights are protected. To do this,
the government must understand the shortcomings in current policies that may result in
discrimination against the hill tribes. For example, many government forms should be
made available in tribal languages to assist indigenous people who do not speak or read
Thai. If that is not possible, translators should be made available free of charge. Also,
nationalized citizens should be accorded the same rights as other citizens, without risk of
revoked nationality or limited freedoms.
In addition to offering citizenship to hill tribe members, the government should
also acknowledge the complicated nature of the citizenship process and make it more
accessible to indigenous peoples. Government offices should be placed near tribal
93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94
villages, and mobile offices should visit remote mountain locations. Free workshops on
the citizenship process should be offered, possibly in cooperation with nongovernmental
organizations, and legal assistance should be made available to those undergoing the
naturalization process. Such accessibility should also be extended for those seeking to
document births, marriages, and deaths.
The Thai government should also address situations of inequality and
exploitation and seek to reduce vulnerabilities among the hill tribes. Law enforcement
agencies must investigate and punish those responsible for crimes against indigenous
peoples, including human trafficking and exploitative labor practices. Serious efforts
must be made to end corruption within government agencies that currently allow such
crimes to continue, and all ranks of law enforcement officials must be held equally
accountable for their actions. Labor protections must also be enforced, with trained
officials given the access to inspect places of work to ensure equal enforcement of labor
laws.
The government should take a firm stand against the sex industry by enforcing
existing anti-trafficking laws and sexual abuse laws, including the 1997 The Measures in
Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children Act and the 1997
Penal Code Amendment Act. Government officials, including members of the Thai
Royal Army, must be held accountable for violating such laws. The decriminalization of
sex work is necessary to make these changes, and it is necessary that all law enforcement
strategies accord trafficked individuals their human rights.
Health services should also be provided to hill tribe members, both to ensure
individual well-being as well as to halt the spread of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Hill
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95
tribes must be given access to prevention, testing and counseling services, as well as to
necessary medication and contraceptives. In addition to providing health services under
the national 30 baht co-payment plan, welfare services must be put into place for those
who cannot afford such a fee. Women and girls should have access to family planning,
reproductive health services and prenatal care. Health information must also be made
available in ethnic languages, with health centers stationed near indigenous villages.
Remote villages should also have access to public education, either through
traditional school facilities or via satellite classroom. Hill tribe students should be
provided with the same level of quality education afforded to lowland Thais. Although
knowledge of the Thai language is necessary component of Thai education, access to
tribal language and traditions can and should be an aspect of uplands education.
Additionally, all graduates should receive a diploma and have access to their educational
records so they may have increased chances of employment success later in life.
These potential government actions represent significant changes from previous
policy toward indigenous peoples, and a period of political self-reflection will be
required to turn these proposals into realities. The effects of globalization have altered
Thailand dramatically over the last several decades. Without making a conscious effort
to fight the negative effects of “modernization,” Thailand will continue to operate with
what Richard Falk calls “global inhumane governance.”1 This form of governance is
1 Richard Falk, “The Religious Foundations o f Humane Global Governance,” inToward a Global Civilization? The Contribution o f Religions, ed. Patricia M. Mische and Melissa Merkling (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2001): 41-59. 45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96
characterized by severe gaps in cultural groups and classes, as well as the neglect of
human suffering and a decline in the public good.2
The economic pressures and promises of globalization heavily contribute to
inhumane governance. As a possibly emerging “tiger” within the Asian economy,
Thailand will continue to have ethical choices to make based on what is best for its
markets and its people. A focus on large returns on investments may lead to small wages
and a lack of labor unions, for example. Labor abuse, as well as environmental and
social harms, has already characterized Thai businesses. Richard Falk notes that
globalization is also often characterized by a steady downward pressure on public goods,
such as welfare services and public education, which negatively affects the quality of life
for “regular people” while political support often remains focused on big business/
Globalization may have positive effects, as well, and international pressures may
help to guide the government of Thailand toward more humane policies. The
international human rights community has a responsibility to monitor the hill tribe
situation and ensure that the Thai government works toward equality in the uplands.
Thailand’s emergence in the international marketplace makes it susceptible to
international economic pressures, and governments such as the United States may use
their power to increase human rights protections in Asia. International actors should
view statelessness as a human rights violation and respond with according concern,
which may necessitate state and/or corporate sanctions and other forms of pressure that
threaten the nation’s economic vitality.
2 Ibid., 50. 3 Ibid., 48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97
The Thai government must be held to international law. According to the United
Nations, hill tribe people and all other individuals possess the rights to “security of
person,” recognition, and nationality, as well as to the rights within their country of
movement, employment, education, and political representation.4 Statelessness in
Thailand is also addressed by the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Much of the power
of international law comes from global pressures to respect those laws, and Thailand has
already responded to negative attention regarding the sex industry and human
trafficking, as noted in chapter two. Pressure must now focus on the hill tribe situation,
as foreign governments and corporations demand that international law be respected.
The U.S. must also enforce laws related to human trafficking and seek to
strengthen the existing Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. The U.S. State
Department should keep Thailand on a Tier II status in its Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Report until more significant measures are taken to eliminate trafficking and government
corruption. Unless significant steps are immediately taken, the U.S. should consider
placing Thailand on an elevated Tier II “watch list.” However, it must also be noted that
the TIP Report has been criticized for country biases, ineffectiveness, and an inability to
rank or criticize the U.S. government when it comes to trafficking within American
borders.
The U.S. and the human rights community may also assist hill tribes by funding
nongovernmental organizations that specifically deal with statelessness and
4 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Online. Available: http://www.xmhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm [26 March 2006].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98
vulnerabilities arising from a lack of citizenship. I agree with a recommendation by
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to “increase funding for prevention, monitoring,
and assistance by grassroots groups working to detect trafficking and remedy
exploitation, including community watches, groups working with sex workers, and
ethnic networks.”5
The United States government, through USAID, should pressure Thailand to
implement funded programs in HIV prevention and health care for indigenous
populations. USAID should also “ensure the coordination, coverage, sustainability, and
quality of these services, including through direct involvement by its regional mission
and by increasing funding to NGOs serving these populations.”6 Furthermore, the U.S.
should not include provisions in free trade agreements that affect Thailand’s ability to
produce or import generic drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS.7 International donors,
including UNAIDS, should also pressure the Thai government to move forward in
o implementing health programs.
Perhaps most important for inspiring change, however, are the hill tribes
themselves. By working within the human rights regime, and perhaps beyond it, the hill
tribes may have the power to affect change through group action. Clarence Dias writes
that a “people-centered” approach to human rights is arising from Asian grassroots
organizations and making people in struggle, rather than state governments, the
5 Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation o f Women in Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/aids/pdf/nostatus.pdf [21 January 2006]. 61. 6 Ibid., 5. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99
“determinative players in human rights standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement.”9
Collective actions by marginalized groups are “fueled by mounting frustration over
government inertia” regarding the protection of human rights, and mass movements
among indigenous peoples and other groups have often achieved their rights-oriented
goals.10
Not only does this people-centered approach challenge the tendency to view
human rights as guaranteed by the state, but it also reveals shortcomings in the dominant
Western human rights regime. Dias notes that such shortcomings include: a focus on
individuals as the bearers of a limited set of civil and political rights; excessive legalism;
an adversarial nature; failure to include non-Westem bases for rights; a disregard for
concepts of duty and collective rights; and the relegation of economic, social and culture
rights to a secondary status.11
Nongovernmental human rights organizations often have a role to play in people-
centered movements by playing the role of intermediary between communities,
government agencies, and professional groups. In addition to the goal of protecting
human rights, people-centered efforts may call for popular participation in rights
monitoring and investigation. NGOs throughout Asia have helped organize “Peoples’
Tribunals” to deal with controversial human rights issues and pressure the courts to
enforce rights through social action litigation.12
9 Clarence Dias, “A People-Centered Approach to Human Rights,”Innovative Human Rights Strategies in East Asia (Carnegie Council o f Ethics and International Affairs, 1997). Online. Available: http://www.camegiecouncil.Org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/560 [4 February 2006]. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100
An important aspect of this people-centered approach is the understanding that
human rights cannot be protected by law alone. In Thailand, the hill tribes face a
situation created by the cultural violence of prejudice and a conflict between “self’ and
“other.” Such cultural rifts have led to structural violence in the form of discriminatory
laws and policies, as well as direct violence in the form of forced relocation and the
killing of tribal peoples. In order to create an environment of equality, cultural causes of
discrimination must be addressed.
Johan Galtung writes that cultural violence is an “invariant,” “a permanence,”13
that “makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right—or at least not
wrong.”14 To understand and alleviate suffering in the uplands, we must employ
Galtung’s approach of studying both the use of violence as well as the legitimation of
that use. Without removing the cultural base for violence, human rights standards and
state legislation cannot ensure equality for the hill tribes. This involves the difficult
process of changing something as deeply-entrenched as culture.
Religion has been advanced by many peace researchers as a possible method for
eliminating cultural violence. Patricia Mische writes that religion plays an important role
in forming ideas, perceptions and responses related to social justice and injustice.15 The
very concept of justice is a cultural construct, and it is deeply tied to the self-presentation
and self-image of a social group.16 Negotiations for change often involve social
13 Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,”Journal of Peace Research vol. 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305.294. 14 Ibid., 291. 15 Patricia Mische, “The Significance o f Social Justice and Religion in Developing a Culture o f Peace,” International Seminar on the Contribution by Religions in Creating a Culture of(Barcelona: Peace April 13-18, 1993). 3. 16 Ibid., 13,16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101
pressures, and religious leaders and communities are often well-positioned for these
responsibilities.
Although Buddhism has been used among the hill tribes for the negative
purposes of assimilating and controlling indigenous peoples, one could argue that these
actions were a corruption of the spiritual tradition. In fact, the focus on compassion
within Buddhism and the prevalence of the faith throughout mainstream Thailand may
position monks and spiritual activists to achieve positive cultural change. According to a
2000 census, 94.6 percent of the Thai population is Buddhist.17 Although most hill tribe
members are animists, Buddhist influences within Thailand could positively impact
policies and attitudes aimed at indigenous people.
The ultimate concern of Buddhism is the elimination of suffering, which is
caused by individualizing experiences such as greed. Compassion is advocated to serve
both the individual and the community,18 and group security can only exist when each
member enjoys internal harmony.19 Sulak Sivaraksa writes that Buddhism may help to
address the “deficiency of values” that allows for an indifference to human rights
violations and the suffering of others.20 An inability to show compassion for such
suffering shows a failure to recognize the interdependence of all beings, and this
inability is an obstacle to personal liberation within the Buddhist tradition.21
17 United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Thailand. Online. Available: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/th.html (4 February 2006]. 18 Sulak Sivaraksa, “Religion and World Order from a Buddhist Perspective,” Towardin a Global Civilization? The Contribution o f Religions, ed. Patricia M. Mische and Melissa Merkling (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2001): 128-139. 129. 19 Ibid., 130. 20 Ibid., 131. 21 Ibid., 132.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102
His Holiness the Dalai Lama often cites Buddhist concepts such as
interconnectedness andshen dug ngal wa la mi “theso pa, inability to bear the sight of
another’s suffering” as Buddhist support for human rights.22 He compares the universe to
a living organism where each cell works in cooperation with every other cell to sustain
the whole, arguing that all living creatures are interconnected.23
InEthics for the New Millennium, His Holiness the Dalai Lama writes, “Due to
the fundamental interconnectedness which lies at the heart of reality, your interest is also
my interest...It is in everybody’s interest to do what leads to happiness and avoid that
which leads to suffering.”24 Because interests are linked, “we are compelled to accept
ethics as the indispensable interface between my desire to be happy and yours.”25 The
justification for human rights is found within the interrelatedness of beings.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama argues that people “will have to develop a greater
sense of universal responsibility” as a key to human survival and world peace.26 He
notes that “events such as those which occurred at Auschwitz are violent reminders of
what can happen when individuals—and by extension, whole societies—lose touch with
basic human feeling.”27 Even more important than legislation, according to the Dalai
Lama, is “our regard for one another’s feelings at a simple human level.”28
Human rights education may complement the Buddhist focus on
interconnectedness and compassion. Srirak Plipat, director of Amnesty International
22 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Ethics for the New Millennium (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999). 64. 23 Ibid., 41. 24 Ibid., 47. 25 Ibid. 26 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Human Rights and Universal Responsibility,” Buddhismin and Human Rights, ed. Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish and Wayne R. Husted (Surrey: Curzon, 1998): xvii-xxi. xx. 27 His Holiness the Dalai Lama,Ethics for the New Millennium, 64. 28 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103
Thailand, asserts that human rights can be integrated into Buddhism despite the
perception that rights are Western constructions. In Thailand, Plipat and others are trying
to get Thais more involved with human rights advocacy by developing a rights
curriculum for school teachers and expanding their organizational membership base to
include more of the middle class.
UNESCO is a major advocate for human rights education, noting that it is about
acquiring new information and skills as well as developing the values and attitudes
necessary for upholding rights. The organization asserts that human rights education
should be viewed as a component to quality learning, and that such studies should be
viewed in the framework of one’s right to education. UNESCO defines human rights
education as:
education, training and information aiming at building a universal culture of human rights through the sharing of knowledge, imparting of skills and moulding of attitudes directed to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity; the promotion of understanding, tolerance, gender equality and friendship among all nations, indigenous peoples and racial, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups; the enabling of all persons to participate effectively in a free and democratic society governed by the rule of law; the building and maintenance of peace; and the promotion of people-centered sustainable development and social justice.J
UNESCO asserts that human rights education is necessary for the
implementation of rights at all levels of society. Education is said to significantly
contribute to “promoting equality and the rule of law, enhancing participation and
29 Srirak Plipat, Director, Amnesty International Thailand, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 June 2005. 30 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Human Rights Education.” Online. Available: http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php- URL ID=3516&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201 .html [5 February 2006].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104
democratic processes and preventing conflict and human rights violations.”J1 Such
education moves beyond government policy and international human rights standards to
create awareness among everyday people, fostering an environment of human dignity
and respect that can affect government action.
The plight of the hill tribes is a complicated issue that requires action on a variety
of levels. The government of Thailand has a responsibility to enact and uphold laws
guaranteeing equality among its people, and such action requires that hill tribe members
are granted citizenship. Such a step also requires the understanding that hill tribes have
been subjected to discriminatory treatment, and that measures to eliminate specific
vulnerabilities must be taken.
As discussed above, the government must ensure that hill tribe members have
access to government offices and services, are not limited in their freedoms by the threat
of revoked citizenship, do not suffer inequality due to government corruption or ignored
laws against exploitative labor and human trafficking, have access to health services and
information, and receive public education and all of the benefits associated with it.
The international community may help hill tribe members to gain equality by
pressuring the Thai government to protect human rights standards and grant indigenous
people legal citizenship. Nongovernmental organizations may assist grassroots
movements in the uplands by monitoring and preventing exploitation, creating
partnerships with international actors such as the United States to pressure policymakers
into creating positive change.
31 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105
The hill tribes must continue to organize for their human rights, and a people-
centered movement against statelessness must target both government policy and
cultural viewpoints. An appeal to the spiritual traditions of Buddhism that already exist
within mainstream Thai society may build public support for the elimination of human
suffering in the uplands. Human rights education may also raise awareness of rights
issues and battle discrimination against indigenous peoples.
Globalization highlights an interconnectedness of people and nations that is
fundamental to Buddhism and reflected in the human rights regime. As Thailand takes
its place in the global economy, its government must reflect on its past and make ethical
decisions for its future. Changes in current policy and attitudes may reduce the
vulnerabilities faced by hill tribe members, such as limited education and employment
opportunities, that fuel trafficking operations and threaten human security in the region.
Such changes may also create a sense of national identity that includes the hill tribes,
allowing for cultural differences while maintaining a common purpose and history
through the Thai state. By embracing diversity and equality, Thailand may shed the
negative aspects of its history and move forward as a progressive supporter of human
rights in Asia.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. WORKS CITED
Altink, Sietske, Stolen Lives: Trading Women in Sex and Slavery(London: Scarlet Press, 1995).
Asian Centre for Human Rights, “Thailand: Not So Smiling to its Indigenous Hill Tribes.” Online. Available: http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2005/81-05.htm [21 January 2006].
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “Bangkok Declaration,” Online. Available: http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm [5 February 2006].
Bajpai, Kanti, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #19:OP:l, August 2000. Online. Available: http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_l 91 .PDF#search=’human%20securit y' [22 January 2006].
Baker, Chris and Pasuk Phongpaichit,A History o f Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Baker, Simon, Researcher, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 3 June 2005.
Bindman, Jo, “Redefining Prostitution as Sex Work on the International Agenda,” Network of Sex Projects. Online. Available http://www.nswp.org/mobility/redefining.html [22 January 2006].
Bishop, Ryan and Lillian S. Robinson,Night Market: Sexual Cultures and the Thai Economic Miracle (New York: Routledge, 1998).
Brock, Rita Nakashima and Susan Brooks Thistlewaite,Casting Stones: Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the United (Minneapolis: States Fortress Press, 1996).
Daes, Erica-Irene A., “Striving for Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples,”In in Pursuit o f the Right to Self-Determination: Collected Papers & Proceedings o f the First International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United Nations (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2001): 50-62.
106
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107
Dahbour, Omar, “The Ethics of Self-Determination: Democratic, National, Regional,” in Cultural Identity and the Nation-State, ed. Carol C. Gould and Pasquale Pasquino (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001): 1- 17.
Danley, John R., “Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights, and Cultural Minorities,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 168-185.
Dias, Clarence, “A People-Centered Approach to Human Rights,”Innovative Human Rights Strategies in East Asia (Carnegie Council of Ethics and International Affairs, 1997). Online. Available: http://www.camegiecouncil.Org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/560 [4 February 2006].
Donnelly, Jack, “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense o f‘Western’ Universalism,” inThe East Asian Challenge for Human ed.Rights, Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 60- 87.
Duncan, Christopher R., “Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized,”Civilizing in the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, ed. Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004): 1-23.
Embassy of Thailand in the United States, “Thailand’s Actions for the Prevention of Trafficking in Women and Children.” Online. Available: http://www.thaiembdc.org/socials/actionwc.html [22 January 2006],
Falk, Richard, “The Religious Foundations of Humane Global Governance,”Toward in a Global Civilization? The Contribution of ed. Religions, Patricia M. Mische and Melissa Merkling (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2001): 41-59.
Feingold, David, Coordinator of Trafficking and HIV/AIDS Programs, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 7 June 2005.
Friedman, Matthew, Deputy Director of the Regional HIV Help Office, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 10 June 2005.
Galtung, Johan, “Cultural Violence,”Journal o f Peace Research vol. 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108
Gillogly, Kathleen, “Developing the ‘Hill Tribes’ of Northern Thailand,”Civilizing in the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, ed. Christopher R. Duncan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004): 116-149.
Gray, Andrew, “The Indigenous Movement in Asia,”Indigenous in Peoples of ed. Asia, R.H. Barnes, Andrew Gray and Benedict Kingsbury (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The Association for Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1995): 35-58.
Gross, Felix, The Civic and the Tribal State: The State, Ethnicity, and the Multiethnic State (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998).
Hanks, Jane Richardson and Lucien Mason Hanks,Tribes o f the Northern Thailand Frontier (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 2001).
Harvard School of Public Health, “Definitions of Human Security.” Online. Available: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/list_definitions.pdlWsearch =’human%security’ [10 May 2005].
Hill, Catherine, “Planning for Prostitution: An Analysis of Thailand’s Sex Industry,” in Women’s Lives and Public Policy: The International Experience, ed. Meredeth Turshen and Briavel Holcomb (London: Greenwood Press, 1993): 133-144.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Ethics for the New Millennium (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999).
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Human Rights and Universal Responsibility,” in Buddhism and Human Rights,ed. Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish and Wayne R. Husted (Surrey: Curzon, 1998): xvii-xxi.
Janoski, Thomas, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework o f Rights & Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic (Cambridge: Regimes Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Jeffrey, Leslie Ann,Sex and Borders: Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand (Toronto: UBC Press, 2002).
Koompraphant, Sanphasit, Director, Center for the Protection of Children’s Rights (CPCR), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 6 June 2005.
Kymlicka, Will, “Models of Multicultural Citizenship: Comparing Asia and the West,” in Challenging Citizenship: Group Membership and Cultural Identity in a Global Age,ed. Sor-hoon Tan (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2005): 110-136.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109
Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority (Oxford: Rights Oxford University Press, 1999).
Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” inEthics 104, no. 2 (January 1994): 352-381.
Lerdsrisunthad, Usa, Manager, Foundation for Women, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 8 June 2005.
Lertcharoenchok, Yindee, “Searching for Identity,” United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Online. Available: http://www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/culture/Trafficking/legalstatus/ Searching_for_Identity_-_YL.doc [16 January 2006].
Macan-Markar, Marwaan, “Hill Tribes Viewed as Commodities?” Inter Press Service News Agency. Online. Available: http://www.ipsnews.net/mekong/stories/hilltribes.html [25 March 2006].
McDaniel, Matthew, Founder, The Akha Heritage Foundation, interview by author, e-mail correspondence, 25 March 2006.
Mercer, Jonathan, “Anarchy and Identity,”International in Organization 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 229-252.
Miko, Francis T., “Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International Response,” inTrafficking in Women and Children: Current Issues and Developments, ed. Anna M, Troubnikoff (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003): 1-25.
Mirror Art Group, “Thai Citizenship Program.” Online. Available: http://www.mirrorartgroup.org/web/projects/proj-thai-citz.html [27 March 2006].
Mische, Patricia, “The Significance of Social Justice and Religion in Developing a Culture of Peace,”International Seminar on the Contribution by Religions in Creating a Culture of Peace (Barcelona: April 13-18, 1993).
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), “Indigenous Peoples.” Online. Available: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/index.htm [5 February 2006].
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Universal Declaration o f Human Rights. Online. Available: http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm [26 March 2006].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “The World’s Stateless People: Questions and Answers.” Online. Available: http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=40e2da8c4 [22 January 2006].
Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Chris Baker,Thailand: Economy and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Physicians for Human Rights, “No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation of Women in Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/aids/pdEnostatus.pdff21 January 2006].
Plipat, Srirak, Director, Amnesty International Thailand, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 9 June 2005.
Pong, Ping, Coordinator, Empower-Chiang Mai, interview by author, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 14 June 2005.
Refugees International, “Lives on Hold: The Scope of Statelessness.” Online. Available: http://www.refugeesintemational.org/section/publications/stateless_scope/ [22 January 2006].
Rex, John, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996).
Robertson, Phil, Project Manager, United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (UNIAP), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 20 June 2005.
Rossman, Gretchen B. and Sharon F. Rallis,Learning in the Field: An Introduction to Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1998).
Rothchild, Donald, “Ethnic Fears and Security Dilemmas: Managing Uncertainty in Africa,” in Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory, ed. Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2000): 237-266.
Shachar, Ayelet, “On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability,”Political in Theory 28, no. 1 (February 2000): 64-89.
Scherer, Timothy, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Thailand, interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 7 June 2005.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 111
Seabrook, Jeremy, Travels in the Skin Trade: Tourism and the Sex Industry (London: Pluto Press. 1996).
Singleton, Royce A., Jr., and Bruce C. Straits,Approaches to Social Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999).
Sivaraksa, Sulak, “Religion and World Order from a Buddhist Perspective,”Toward in a Global Civilization? The Contribution o f Religions,ed. Patricia M. Mische and Melissa Merkling (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2001): 128-139.
Smith, Anthony D., The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Smith, Anthony D.,National Identity (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1991).
Spinner, Jeff,The Boundaries o f Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
Tamir. Yael. Liberal Nationalism (Princeton. New Jersev: Princeton Universitv Press. 1993.
Tatsuo, Inoue, “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism,”The in East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 27-59.
Taylor, Charles, “Conditions for an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,”The in East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 124-144.
Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics o f Recognition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Human Rights Education.” Online. Available: http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php- URL_ID=3 516&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201 .html [5 February 20061.
United States Central Intelligence Agency,The World Factbook: Thailand. Online. Available: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/th.html [4 February 20061.
United States Department of State.2005 Trafficking in Persons Report, “Country Narratives: Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.state.gOv/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/46616.htm#thailand [26 March 2006).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112
United States Department of State, “Thailand.” Online. Available: http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/307.htm [26 March 2006|,
Vaddhanphuti, Chayan, Chusak Wittayapak, Khwanchewan Buadaeng and Pinkaew Laungaramsri, “State-Making, Contested Spaces and Identifications.” Online. Available: http://www.yale.edu/seacm/groups/chiangmai_group.htm [27 March 2006],
Van Gunsteren, Herman R.. “Admission to Citizenship,”Ethics in 98, no. 4 (July 1988): 731-741.
Viravaidya, Mechai, Director, Population and Community Development Association (PDA), interview by author, Bangkok, Thailand, 2 June 2005.
Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” inInternational Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, ed. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (Needham Heights, Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon, 1999): 434-459.
Woliner, Eileen, Swedish-American Volunteer, Development and Education Programme for Daughters & Communities (DEPDC), interview by author, Mae Sae, Thailand, 18 June 2005.
Wyatt, David K.,Thailand: A Short History (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003).
Yasuaki, Onuma, “Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights,”The in East Asian Challenge for Human Rights,ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 103-123.
Young, Iris Marion, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” inEthics 99, vol. 2 (January 1989): 250-274.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.