University of Cincinnati

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U UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date: April 24, 2009

I, L illian Vasi , hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of:

Doctor of Philosophy in

It is entitled: Post-Partition Limbo States: Failed State Formation and Conflicts

in Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir

Student Signature: Lillian Vasi

This work and its defense approved by:

Committee Chair: Dr. Joel Wolfe Dr. Laura Jenkins Dr. Dinshaw Mistry

Approval of the electronic document:

I have reviewed the Thesis/Dissertation in its final electronic format and certify that it is an accurate copy of the document reviewed and approved by the committee.

Committee Chair signature: Dr. Joel Wolfe

Post-Partition Limbo States: Failed State Formation and Conflicts in Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of

DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.)

in the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Science

13 April 2009

Lillian Vasi

M.A., University of Cincinnati, 1998

Committee Chair: Professor Joel Wolfe Committee Member: Professor Laura Jenkins Committee Member: Professor Dinshaw Mistry

Abstract

Failed states have been described in scholarly publications as states that no longer function as bordered regions within which exist a functional government providing for the inhabitants border security, political stability, transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively. A subset of the failed state perspectives developed and defined in this research project is the limbo state model. The central concept of a limbo state is that the region or state, while displaying traits of statehood, such as having a border, an infrastructure, seeming economic development, and semblance of a functioning government, is not an independent sovereign state but is actually a minor limbo state controlled by another major sovereign state that actually controls the minor state in the military, economic, and political realms.

The limbo state model is based on four empirical explanatory concepts that define the “limbo” aspects of this model. Briefly, these four explanatory concepts are: 1) patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period of years; 2) patterns of weak leadership within the limbo state; 3) patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation with resulting partition of the land leading to incomplete or denied self-rule as well as sectarian conflicts; and 4) patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population.

Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir are model examples of limbo states

ii meeting conditions established in the four explanatory concepts. In addition to validating the limbo state model, the explanatory concepts provide explanations for three concerns regarding limbo states specifically and failed states in general. These concerns are : 1)

why these limbo states are not able to become typical modern nation-states with a defined

border wherein exists a functioning government within the state approved by the

indigenous population and providing for its inhabitants a personal, incorruptible security

network as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic

development, cultural independence, supportive and continuously updated infrastructure,

and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively; also, 2) how

state-society relations impact development of sovereign authority for the occupied state;

and 3) how state-international system relations undermine state sovereignty. The final

task offered in the last chapter of this study is speculation on current and future

usefulness of the limbo state model.

iii iv

Acknowledgments

I want to thank my husband, Rahib N. Vasi, M.D., and my son, Antar Y. Vasi, for the patience they displayed whenever I was just too busy with research and writing to be involved with daily family activities.

I want to thank members of the dissertation committee for their assistance and support and in keeping me along the path toward completion of the dissertation. Dr. Joel Wolfe, chairperson of the committee as well as chair of the department, was involved in my research and writing at the time that I started graduate coursework at U.C. Dr. Laura

Jenkins joined the dissertation committee just as I was formulating the research question and helped with concepts and editing. Dr. Denshaw Mistry joined the committee providing guidance as needed during the research and writing process. The committee members’ invaluable suggestions and help provided the guidance needed to complete the task.

Table of Contents

Chapter Topics Page

I. Introduction 1

A. Summary of Limbo State Model Perspective 1

B. Overview of Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir 4

C. Research Question and Plan of Study 9

D. Limbo State Model and Explanatory Concepts, and Organizing

Information 15

1. Limbo State Model 15

2. Explanatory Concepts of the Limbo State Model 18

3. Organizing Information 21

E. Outline of Chapter Contents 23

II. State Formation Theories, Literature Review, Relevant Theories

and Themes 27

Introduction 27

A. State Formation Theories 29

B. Literature Review of Failed States, Northern Ireland, and

Jammu-and-Kashmir 49

1. Failed States 49

2. Northern Ireland 59

3. Jammu-and-Kashmir 66

C. Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Ethnicity 71

1. Sovereignty as Theme and Theory 71

2. Nationalism and Ethnicity 79

D. Partition 80

III. Northern Ireland 86

Introduction 86

A. Political History of Northern Ireland and the Conflict 90

1. Then and Now: The Battle of Boyne and Parades 90

2. Political History of Northern Ireland 95

3. Self-Identification in Northern Ireland 106

B. Decolonization and Partition 114

C. Organizations and Northern Ireland 124

1. Political Parties 124

2. Political Parties of the United Kingdom 132

3. Paramilitary Groups 133

4. Paradoxical Role of Organizations in Northern Ireland 145

5. Chronology of Power-sharing 148

6. Decommissioning 154

7. The Belfast Agreement and Opposition 160

D. Factors Contributing to Limbo State Status in Northern Ireland 170

IV. Jammu-and-Kashmir 183

Introduction 183

vii

A. Political History of Jammu-and-Kashmir 192

1. Then and Now: Background Information on the Creation of

Jammu-and-Kashmir 192

2. Political History of Jammu-and-Kashmir 201

a. Brief Background from the Third Century BCE to the

Twentieth Century 201

b. The British in India and Jammu-and-Kashmir 209

3. Ethnic Identity and Conflict 220

B. Decolonization and Partitioning of India 223

1. Minor Partition 223

2. Major Partition 224

3. The Line of Control 231

C. Insurgency, Kashmiriyat, and the Voice of the People 234

1. Insurgency since 1989 234

2. Dissolution of then Call for Maintaining Kashmiriyat 241

3. Expressions of the Voice of the People: Results of Current

Surveys Conducted in Jammu-and-Kashmir 246

D. Factors Contributing to Limbo State Status of

Jammu-and-Kashmir 256

V. Conclusion 270

Introduction 264

A. Similarities between Northern Ireland=s and Jammu-and-Kashmir=s

viii

Limbo State Status 273

B. Differences between Northern Ireland=s and Jammu-and-Kashmir=s

Limbo State Status 283

C. Limbo State Model: Closing Comments 287

Terminology 295

References 297

General 297

Northern Ireland 301

Jammu-and-Kashmir 304

Appendix A: Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 308

Appendix B: Chronological List of Dates of Irish History 311

Appendix C: Chronology of Events since Signing of the Belfast Agreement

313

Appendix D: Decommissioning Scheme 332

Appendix E.1: Chronology of Brief History of Kashmir 335

Appendix E.2: Timeline: Conflict Over Kashmir 340

Appendix E.3: Timeline: Insurgency in Kashmir 345

Appendix E.4: Update Timeline from 2005 to 2009 349

Appendix F: Mountains and Their Passes (Kashmir) 350

Appendix G: Treaty of Amritsar 352

Appendix H: Instrument of Accession 354

Appendix I: Government of India Act 1935 355

Appendix J: Indian Independence Act, 1947 356

Appendix K: Line of Control in J&K: A Part of Simla Agreement 371

Appendix L: Article 370 of the Indian Constitution 373

Appendix M: Article 356 Provisions 374

Appendix N: Security Council Draft Resolution Document No. 667

376

Appendix O: United Jihad Council Groups (Kashmir) 381

Appendix P: Full Text of MORI Survey on Kashmir 2002 383

Appendix Q: AngloBIrish Agreement 1985 388

Appendix R: Poll Conducted by Synovate India in Kashmir 393

Appendix S: ACNielson Poll Conducted in Jammu and Kashmir 394

Appendix T: GNP per capita 395

List of Maps

Map 3.1 Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 101

Map 3.2 Northern Ireland Counties 102

Map 3.3 Northern Ireland Cities 103

Map 4.1 Jammu-and-Kashmir 196

Chapter I

Introduction

A. Summary of Limbo State Model Perspective

Please note that in this research project NI will be used to refer to Northern

Ireland unless for reasons of emphasis or clarity at which time the full name will be used.

Also, J&K will be used to refer to Jammu-and-Kashmir (connected with dashes for clarity of the name of a one nation-state region) unless for reasons of emphasis or clarity at which time the full name will be used. Kashmiri refers to the inhabitants of J&K.

The central research question is: Why, in the cases of Northern Ireland and

Jammu-and-Kashmir, did state formation during decolonization by means of partitioning land not succeed in forming sovereign nation-states where the state provides for its population personal as well as border security, political stability, transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively? In other words, why did attempts at state formation actually lead to the creation of areas of contested governance in which protracted conflicts have been in existence since the early political history of each nation- state up to the present twenty-first century.

In order to arrive at a conclusive answer to this compelling issue, the research methods I have applied to this project involve analysis of the political history of each region, official documents related to the political histories of NI and J&K, and surveys conducted at the grassroots level of each nation-state. This paper links the past centuries

1 and recent decades of the political-histories of NI and J&K with the research of scholars who delve into what makes a state function independently and effectively. These endeavors are then exposed in light of my Alimbo state model@ explanatory concepts (to be explained fully below in section D) demonstrating how both NI and J&K have become limbo states.

My limbo state model fills a gap in the literature on failed states. The limbo state model is a subset of various types of failed states perspectives, which are critiqued in chapter two (section B, part one). The central concept of limbo state is that the region or state, while displaying traits of statehood, such as having a border, an infrastructure, seeming economic development, and semblance of a functioning government, is not an independent sovereign state but is actually a minor limbo state controlled by another major sovereign state that actually controls the minor state in the military, economic, and political realms. To reiterate for purpose of clarification, a limbo state in this project refers to a region that has a border and semblance of governance but is actually under the control militarily, politically, and economically of a major state that is a bordering sovereign state exhibiting control of the minor state=s military, political, and economic sectors.

The limbo state model, fully explained below in section D, is based on four empirical explanatory concepts that define the Alimbo@ aspects of this model. Reviewed briefly here, these four explanatory concepts, that resulted from extensive political- historical, documental, and survey research are: 1) patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period of years

(revealed in each region=s political history) with limited gaps of self-rule that indicate these areas exhibit limited sovereignty, with resulting consequences such as lack of personal security, personal independence, political stability, and transparency for the inhabitants as well as poor economic development, and weakened or compromised rule of law;

2) patterns of weak leadership within the limbo state leading to failure of authority and related consequences as listed in explanatory concept one above; 3) patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation and the partition of the land leading to incomplete, limited, denied self-rule, as well as sectarian conflicts among the varied religious and ethnic groups resulting, at times, in violent consequences; and 4) patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population

(generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture) that are the aftereffect of cultural diversity in the post- partition era. More will be written about the four explanatory concepts in section D below.

Another contribution of this research project is the questioning of the use of partition as a mode of control by the occupying state. As will be revealed through my research, occupation of a region by a major state and partitioning of land contributes to different forms of responses within the occupied minor state such as demonstrations, demands to be heard by the leadership, insurgencies against the occupying state, and/or sectarian conflicts within the occupied state resulting in violent consequences.

A final note concerning the limbo state model entails future uses of this

perspective. While I write about Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir as current examples of limbo states, chapter five (section C) offers a look at other regions existing as limbo states, such as Kurdistan and Palestine. In addition, a brief review of the possibility of Iraq becoming a future limbo states is included. Thus, the limbo state model has current and future applications.

B. Overview of Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir

The political status in Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir involves protracted conflicts, which have continued into the twenty-first century. These two areas of the globe have similarities and differences that make these two minor states ideal as case studies for a comparative analysis of the political history of the processes that led NI and J&K to become areas of limbo statesBBareas without independent sovereignty, and not incontestably part of any other nation-state. Basically, NI and J&K have become areas of contested governance, impeding development of nation-states where the state maintains personal as well as border security, providing for its citizens political stability, transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a justice system based on the rule of law that maintains order effectively.1 For general purposes for this research project, an important basic definition of state as offered by John T. Rourke is, AWhether large or small, rich or poor, populous or not, states share

1. Modern state formation theories are covered in this research project in chapter 2, section A in order to help shed light on how and why NI=s and J&K=s attempt at state formation achieved limbo state status rather than full sovereign independence; however, for general definitions of state see the following: Goldstein and Pevehouse 2004, 10 B 12; Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 39 B 50; and Rourke 2001, 189 B 196. 4

all or most of six characteristics: sovereignty, territory, population, diplomatic recognition, internal organization, and domestic support.@2 This definition is helpful in the general sense of defining a state in terms of what helps a state to continue to exist.

Theories of the modern state will be developed further in chapter two in which the internal intricacies of state formation as detailed by various scholars are reviewed. This type of examination reveals not only the needs of NI and J&K in order for each to become an independent sovereign state but also what each limbo state lacks that has prevented each limbo state from becoming an independent sovereign state.

Northern Ireland=s political status involves a simple relationship of direct contact with and control by the government of Great Britain (GB). Chapter three offers an in- depth account of this politicalBhistorical relationship and how this connection resulted in

NI=s limbo state status. Chapter three also reveals how different aspects of NI=s limbo status fit in the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model.

Jammu-and-Kashmir reflects a more complex situation as will be developed fully in chapter four. The complexity is due to control of J&K by two statesBBIndia, which controls approximately two-third of south and southeastern J&K and Pakistan, which controls approximately one-third of north and northwestern J&K. In addition, India was under British control as is noted below and in chapter four. Thus, J&K was affected by

British control of India indirectly, and later by direct control through India and Pakistan, which gained independence from GB. Therefore, discussions of the political, economic,

2. Rourke 2001, 189.

military, cultural, and security status in J&K involve references to Great Britain, India,

and Pakistan.

One similarity between NI and India (as noted above, since approximately two-

thirds of Kashmir is under Indian control, and India was formerly under British control,

the comparisons in this section are between NI and India) is the fact that both were

colonized by GB. India was under British influence for over two centuries (in 1612 the

first British trading post was established in Surat, Gujarat on the western coast just north

of Bombay or Mumbai as it has now been renamed), although only officially a British

colony for less than one century. J&K remained a princely state, ruled by local

maharajas (ruling princes) with tacit approval of the British government. Northern

Ireland has been under English rule for over eight centuries if King Henry II=s entrance

into Ireland in 1171 could be considered the beginning of English control in Ireland.3

Another similarity is that NI and India have democratic forms of government although with some limits in the particular regions in question due to ongoing conflicts that, at times, are violent.

An important similarity, which will be discussed in chapters two, three, and four,

is the partition experience that both NI and India (and J&K as a result of the division of

land in India) experienced while under GB=s rule in the twentieth century. The partition

experience has affected both NI and J&K not only politically and militarily but also

economically, socially, and culturally. As is noted below, partitioning of land has been a

3. Foster 2001, 48-49. Also online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/specialreport/1998/ northern_ireland/10657.stm.

dichotomous experience. On one level, both nations became involved, either directly in the case of NI or indirectly in the case of J&K, in nation separation; yet, on a different level, and as a possible solution to be released from the current limbo state status, each nation may eventually need to experience further separation from the occupying nations in order to achieve full sovereignty. An alternative means to gaining full sovereignty without separation from the controlling sovereignty is to merge fully with the occupying nation in order to achieve the experience of full state sovereignty. Presently, neither NI nor J&K has achieved independence or fully become merged with the controlling states of GB, in the case of NI, or with India or Pakistan (or dividing J&K at the Line of

Control and then merging with Pakistan west of the LOC and with India east of the

LOC), in the case of J&K. More will be written about the partition dilemma for these two nations in chapters two, three and four.

The differences between Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir are numerous. NI is an economically and industrially more developed nation due to its association with GB and the Republic of Ireland whose GNP per capita in 2005 were

$37,632 and $40,232 respectively (see appendix T). J&K is less developed due to its association with India and Pakistan whose GNP per capita in 2005 were $724 and $689 respectively (see Appendix T). NI has a population of over one million, seven hundred thousand (UK=s population is approximately eight million), whereas Kashmir=s population is about twelve million (India=s population is over a billion). NI has an ethnicity involving primarily two diverse Christian religious groupsBBCatholics and

Protestants, while J&K=s ethnicity involves several culturally diverse groups and many 7

religious sects as well as three main religious groupsBBHindus, Muslims, and Buddhists.

Briefly these are political, historical and cultural differences inherent in the locality of each country.

Thus by examining NI and J&K in terms of the similarities and differences, this study can scrutinize the process of British partitioning activities in two very different settings. Also, research reveals that while the environmental settings may be vastly diverse culturally and socially, the desires of the indigenous population of each nation for the freedom to manifest their culture--in terms of their religion, land ownership, language, literature, the arts, celebrations, and all aspects of who they are--is so powerfully innate that certain members of the society are willing to go to extremes such as violence and even to sacrifice their lives in the struggle for an independent nation-state or allegiance to the neighboring nation with which they most identify. This study shows how the need by the diverse groups in NI and J&K to manifest their cultural sovereignty is frustrated by the British style of partition that has contributed to the conflicts in NI and

J&K (see chapter two, section E, part two for two other styles of partitioning).

The following analyses of why these two areas did not succeed in forming sovereign nation-states are organized as three types of explanations--theoretical, thematic, (since theories and themes overlap in some cases, the terminologies are referred to together to indicate complementary applicability), and the limbo state model. The first type of explanations involves established theories, which are enlarged upon in chapter two concerning state formation, sovereignty, nationalism, ethnicity, decolonization, and partition. These established theories help in understanding the bigger picture of the 8

current limbo state status of NI and J&K. The second type is a thematic organization of the political-historical events into external and internal influential events. Briefly, external influential events are those events that occurred outside of a state such as military invasions (one example), which influence the development of the state; internal influential events are those factors occurring within the state such as weak leadership

(one example), which contribute to the state=s lack of or loss of full sovereignty. As the political-historical events in both nations unfold in chapters three and four, the relative importance of how external and internal influential events and factors contributed to the non-state status of both nations will be apparent. The third perspective is the limbo state model. As explained previously in section A above, the information gleaned from the theories and themes of scholarly works are combined with documental data of past centuries and recent decades of the political-histories NI and J&K, which are analyzed in light of the explanatory concepts of the limbo state model (to be explained fully below in section D) to demonstrate how both NI and J&K have become limbo states.

C. Research Question and Plan of Study

As stated in the summary in chapter one, the research question is: Why, in the cases of Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir, did state formation during decolonization by means of partitioning land not succeed in forming sovereign nation- states where the state provides for its population personal as well as border security, political stability, transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a judicial system based on the rule of law that maintains order effectively? In other words, why did attempts at state formation actually lead to 9

the creation of areas of contested governance in which protracted conflicts among

members of the population have been in existence since the early political history of each

nation-state?

In order to seek an answer to the research question, this project will explore and

rediscover the comprehensive political history of two exemplary cases of the limbo state

modelBBNorthern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir. Included in my response to this research question will be not only a review of the political history of both NI and J&K, with a look at the major sovereign states that took control of each of these minor states, but also the roles of the leadershipBBnational, minority, and colonialBBand the desires of the peopleBBthe grassrootsBBduring attempts at state formation either through independence or through merging completely with the controlling sovereign state

(meaning unity of land with no political borders between the limited state and the occupying state as well as economic, military, social, and cultural unity). While the function of the leadership no doubt determines the political and cultural direction each minor sovereign state will eventually assume, the political aspirations and cultural needs of the indigenous peoples demand consideration as part of the future direction of the minor sovereign state. Responding to this question is important to fill a gap in the failed state literature that does not fully address the genesis of protracted conflicts that come into being during failed attempts at state formation; nor does the failed state literature establish a limbo state model (to be discussed fully in section D below) that is achieved through this research study.

Based on the case studies, I argue that external factors, including top-down 10

leadership decisions such as partitioning of land, often fail to address internal cultural,

social, economic, political, and religious needs of the groups involved. In NI and J&K,

as chapters three and four below reveal, such decisions have led to various conflicts for

the inhabitants of the involved communities. The four empirical explanatory concepts

and application of the limbo state model to both NI and J&K are contributions to the

failed state field. Thus, this study not only reexamines the process of state formation

with a focus on failed attempts at effective state formationBBfull sovereigntyBBbut also

demonstrates how escaping from the status of existing as a subordinate or minor state can

be an overwhelming task for the subordinate, limbo state.

Included in the examination of the NI and J&K cases in chapter two is a review of

scholarly research by modern state theorists, including the works of Max Weber, Michael

Mann, Graeme Gill, S. E. Finer, Roland Axtmann, and Gianfranco Poggi=s state-centric

institutionalist model. An important aspect of each of these theorists’ perspectives is the

top-down administrative apparatus. This approach underplays the importance of the fact

that different internal culturesBBethnic or religious groupsBBare attempting to manifest

their culture as well as claim ownership of and occupy the same allotment of land. This

research project acknowledges that state institutions are indeed an important part of

effective state formation; however, just as important for maintaining effective state formation is the need by involved parties to recognize and support the cultural and religious differences of each group within the state, enabling members of each group to feel not only an acceptance of but an appreciation of their cultural, social, and religious differences and contribution to the state=s overall cultural diversity. 11

Interestingly and paradoxically, partitioning of land basically has been an attempt to acknowledge the varied groups and to allow them to establish recognition of their identity on their own land. In NI and J&K, this attempt has been paradoxical in that partitioning of land has led to considerable cultural division and conflict. A relevant feature of attempts at state formation influenced by an occupying state is the role of sovereignty and how the expression of achieving full sovereignty by the indigenous population contributes to intractable sectarian conflicts.

The British use of partitioning of land, as discussed below in chapter two, was an external top-down administrative answer to the cultural, political, social, and religious differences that existed in the disputed lands. The implementation of partition, as this study reveals, appears to have exacerbated the needs and demands of members of each cultural group and contributed to the continuing conflicts. Contemporary, scholarly advocates of partition plans, such as realists Chaim Kaufmann, John Mearsheimer, and

Stephen Van Evera, discussed below in chapter two, want to impose state-like order without considering the complexity of national, cultural, and ethnic differences in their rush to link nation and state.

Decolonization, also referred to as counter-colonization, is another activity on the part of the controlling states, which contributed to NI=s and J&K=s limbo state status. In addition to being a partitioning activity, decolonization provides knowledge about the process of giving a colony its autonomy and the results for the independence-seeking nation. The terms Adecolonization@ and Acounter-colonization@ were introduced by economist Moritz Julius Bonn of the London School of Economics in the 1930s with the 12

term Adecolonization@ coming into general use in the 1950s.4 Bonn=s theory of

decolonization is Athe transfer of political, economic and cultural institutions from one

society to another and restricted . . . neither to nineteenth-century expansion nor to

expansion overseas.@5 The British government advanced the concept of decolonization by allowing the colonies to prepare Athe way for self-government and, later, by granting

dominion status.@6 Raymond F. Betts offers an accurate twentieth-century perspective of

decolonization when he writes:

Decolonization is most easily appreciated and measured as a series of political acts, occasionally peaceful, often confrontational, and frequently militant, by which territories and countries dominated by Europeans gained their independence. The expression >national liberation front= was widely used to describe the position assumed by those opposing colonial rule (Betts 1998, 98).

Other means of opposing control by occupying states include protests, demonstrations,

insurgencies, and organized militias as chapters three and four reveal.

Decolonization is significant as a process committed by a major sovereignty that

seemingly is offering autonomy and self-ruleBBfull sovereigntyBBto the state that has

been under control by the dominant sovereign state. Yet in the case of NI and J&K, full

sovereignty was not tenable in the decolonization course of action. Thus, the promises

offered by decolonization did not transpire for NI and J&K (keeping in mind that

4. Albertini 1971, 16; see also McIntyre 1998, 7.

5. Albertini 1971, 17.

6. Albertini 1971, 3.

decolonization for J&K involved the complexity of GB decolonizing India and

simultaneously the creation of East and West Pakistan). This study reveals NI=s and

J&K=s Aconfrontational and frequently militant@7 stances occurring in reaction to the failed promises of decolonization. Decolonization plays into my research under all four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model.

Thus the theoretical and practical contributions of this research project span diverse topics, such as state formation, sovereignty, nationalism, ethnicity, decolonization, and partitioning of land, through the case studies and the limbo state model. This project acknowledges the need for people of cultural and ethnic diversity to manifest their cultural differences without fear of forced assimilation or of becoming marginalized within that state. Perhaps this fear is a factor contributing to the grassroots hesitancy in the twenty-first century in NI and J&K to demand compete sovereign independence, as AThe Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey @ (NILTS; see appendix

A) and the surveys conducted in J&K (see appendices P, R, and S) reveal. Thus the theme of attempting to consolidate sovereignty is an important consideration linking state formation with the needs exhibited by the indigenous population.

The most salient contribution of this research project, the limbo state model, results from drawing comparative explanatory concepts from the case studies of NI and

J&K. Each section of each chapter draws elements from the case studies that together disclose attributes of each state that fit in the model.

7. Betts 1998, 98.

I want to note that while this study focuses on the Awhy@ of failed state formation

(experienced by NI and J&K during and after the partition plans respectively in Ireland, affecting Northern Ireland, and in India, affecting Jammu-and-Kashmir), and also the

Awhy@ of limbo state existence when the possibility of either complete independence or complete merging with the occupying state could have contributed to each state becoming a fully sovereign state, this study does not offer solutions to how each region could possibly end sectarian conflicts and violence. The topic of how the international community could contribute to and help with the alleviation of conflicts in Northern

Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir is the subject of endless scholarly research, academic discourse, and journalistic features. This is not to deny discussion of relevant topics concerning solutions to end conflicts and violence for both limbo states. An example is the topic of power sharing in the political-historical analysis of Northern Ireland as reviewed in chapter three. To reiterate, topics concerning solutions to conflicts will be discussed as part of the political-historical analysis process, but solutions per se to end conflicts and/or violence is not part of the conclusions of this research project.

D. Limbo State Model, Explanatory Concepts, and Organizing Information

1. Limbo State Model

The limbo state model is a perspective developed, advanced, and detailed in this case study of Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir based on Amultiple sources of evidence.@8 In order to develop this model extensively, I examine the current situation of

8. Yin 2003, 14.

NI and J&K through application of the theories and themes reviewed in chapter two, such as state formation, sovereignty, nationalism, ethnicity, decolonization, and partitioning of land. These theories and themes describe conditions necessary for a nation-state to become an independent functioning sovereign state. Yet, becoming a major sovereignty has transpired neither in NI nor in J&K. Both minor states have remained areas of Ain limbo@ in terms of state status, without complete sovereignty, and not becoming incontestably part of any other nation-state into the twentieth-first century. As a result of becoming areas of contested governance, personal as well as border security, political stability, transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively for members of the indigenous population have not always been provided for all of the inhabitants of NI and J&K. In fact, both areas have experienced sectarian conflicts and violence within the borders of each region into the twenty-first century, as the information provided in chapters three and four demonstrate.

This undertaking brings to light an obvious truth: successful state formation cannot take place from the top-downBBincluding the leadership of the indigenous population as well as the leadership of the occupying stateBBwithout taking into account the desires, claims, and needs of the populace at the grassroots level. This project uncovers the common patterns of decolonization, during which the leadership of the controlling state has not considered the desires, claims, and needs of the indigenous population (not only the economic, cultural-social, and security needs, but also the emotional, cultural, and psychological identity that hold together that indigenous 16

population). Partitioning of land cannot be imposed from the occupying state=s leadership but requires input not only from trusted leaders representing the indigenous population but also the populace itself.

As can been surmised from the above observation, the current situation in both NI and J&K is complex and at times confusing. For the indigenous population in both nations, the political, economic, cultural, and personal security conditions are demoralizing. For both sets of leadershipBBnational and occupiersBBin each area the circumstances of being part of the bordering state as well the occupying force is frustrating. Both conditions will become more obvious in the relevant chapters below.

One of the clearest indicators of the thoughts and feelings of the indigenous population is information accumulated from surveys conducted at the grassroots level, covering many of the concerns and needs of members of that society. The Northern

Ireland Life and Times (NILT) Survey is a comprehensive survey encompassing responses to over two hundred questions from 1998 to 2003 (see appendix A). The candid responses to the survey questions do offer challenges to the leadership in NI and

GB, relaying the attitudes toward social policy and political concerns on the part of the population. While surveys have been conducted in J&K (see Appendices P, R, and S), they are not united under one sponsorship as the NILT survey is; nor are the surveys conducted in J&K as extensive and comprehensive as the NILT survey due to safety concerns for those individuals conducting the surveys. Nevertheless, these surveys do offer insight into the attitudes, thoughts, and feelings of the population. Responses to the surveys are used throughout chapters three and four offering support for the explanatory 17

concepts of the limbo state model.

2. Explanatory Concepts of the Limbo State Model

The limbo state model, a concept developed, advanced, and detailed in this research project, attempts to answer the research question: Why, in the cases of Northern

Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir, did state formation during decolonization by means of

partitioning land not succeed in forming sovereign nation-states where the state provides

for its population personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency,

economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a judicial

system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively? In this section I offer the

central concept of limbo state to explain failed state formation that leaves a region

positioned as neither independent nor absorbed into a larger sovereign state. The region

or state, while displaying traits of statehood such having a border, an infrastructure,

seeming economic development, and semblance of a functioning government, is not an

independent sovereign state but a minor state controlled by a major sovereign state.

The limbo state model is based on four empirical explanatory concepts that help

define and explain the Alimbo@ aspect of this model. These four factors that resulted

from extensive political-historical, documental, and survey research are: 1) patterns of

invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo

state over a period of years (revealed in each region=s political history) with limited gaps

of self-rule that indicate these areas exhibit limited sovereignty, with resulting

consequences such as lack of personal security, personal independence, and political

stability and transparency for the inhabitants, as well as poor economic development, 18

and weakened or compromised rule of law; 2) patterns of weak leadership within the limbo state leading to failure of authority and related consequences as listed in explanatory concept one above; 3) patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation and the partition of the land leading to incomplete, limited, denied self-rule, as well as sectarian conflicts among the varied religious and ethnic groups, resulting, at times, in violent consequences; and

4) patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population (generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture) that are the aftereffect of cultural diversity in the post-partition era. The complex and paradoxical responses have been expressed in a number of ways such as through verbal complaints, whenever possible through political expressions such as voting choices, or through demonstrations and insurgencies that, at times, have escalated into physical violence. Recently these complex and paradoxical responses have been tallied in surveys, the results of which are included in the chapters on Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir.

The most salient contribution of this research project is the result of drawing important events from the case studies of NI and J&K in order to structure the limbo state model. Each section of each chapter draws elements from the case studies that together reveal attributes of a state that fit in the model. Chapter five reiterates these criteria of a limbo state model, reviewing the similarities and differences that NI and J&K have experienced as limbo states. 19

The limbo state model offers answers (to be reviewed in chapter five, section C) to three concerns: 1) why these limbo states are not able to become typical modern nation-states with a defined border wherein exists a functioning government within the state approved by the indigenous population and providing for its inhabitants a personal, incorruptible security network as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive and continuously updated infrastructure, and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively; also, 2) how state-society relations impact development of sovereign authority for the occupied state; and 3) how state-international system relations undermine state sovereignty. The final task offered in the last chapter of this study is speculation on current and future usefulness of the limbo state model.

Connections between the explanatory concepts and supportive topics are illustrated throughout the text. References are made as well in each section of chapters three and four revealing how Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir fit in the limbo state model. Chapter five offers a summary review of the research information provided in this study showing how NI and J&K fit in the model advanced in this research study.

3. Organizing Information

Information is organized in chapter three on NI and chapter four on J&K through a thematic design involving external and internal influential events that have historically and politically contributed to and influenced NI=s and J&K=s current non-state, non-full sovereignty, limbo position. These factors are physical evidence of the limbo state problem expounded in this research project. Use of these external and internal factors 20

help with organizing the information gained in a political-historical pattern in explanatory concepts one (domination by occupying state), two (weak leadership), three

(immigrating settlers), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population) of the limbo state model. The physical evidence of the importance of external and internal influential events will emerge as these factors are developed in chapters three and four.

External factors are any events that originated outside of NI and J&K but came to affect political, historical, social, cultural, economic, and/or military/security conditions within each state. Examples of external factors outside of the state include such influences as military invasions, military and political occupations, cultural settlements by citizens of other sovereign states, or instruments such as acts, treaties and laws established by and imposed by the occupying state.

Internal factors are any events that occurred within each state contributing to the territory=s current limbo status. Examples of internal factors within the state include such elements as weak leadership, political and cultural division among the populace such as ethnic nationalism that result in conflict, violence, insurgencies, and political and/or paramilitary organizations.

Since this research project includes grassroots involvement is NI=s and J&K=s non-sovereign state circumstances, included in different sections of this project will be an important internal factor of the previously mentioned surveys conducted in NI and J&K.

In NI a nationally conducted comprehensive survey entitled AThe Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey@ (see appendix A) was conducted into the twenty-first century to 21

2002. In Jammu-and-Kashmir many small surveys have been conducted in 2002 and

2005. The results of three surveys conducted in J&KBBthe Market and Opinion

Research

International (MORI), Synovate India, and the ACNielsen PollBBhave been included in this study (see Appendices P, R, and S). Surveys are factors that reveal the pulse of social and cultural groups within a nation-state. In addition, surveys contribute knowledge about the indigenous population=s views concerning feelings of their current

status and, interestingly, even how the grassroots may have contributed to the state=s

limbo status. The responses to the surveys contribute to illuminating explanatory concept

four (complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous

population) of the limbo state model.

It should be noted that enmeshed in the scrutiny of how NI and J&K found

themselves in Alimbo@ in terms of their statehood as offered in chapters three and four

are aspects of regional, domestic and leadership levels of analysis basically as support for

the internal and external influential events, which allow for a closer look at the causes of

each nation=s current non-sovereign state condition as chapters three and four reveal.

E. Outline of Chapter Contents

Chapter two covers theories of state formation and a review of literature covering

failed states, Northern Ireland, and Jammu-and-Kashmir. This is followed by a

discussion of theories and themes of sovereignty, nationality, ethnicity, and partition.

Section A of chapter two delineates the scholarly perspectives of state formation--how

the state came into existence and what contributes to a successfully formed state. Section 22

B reviews literature of works by noted authors in the topics covering failed states,

Northern Ireland, and Jammu-and-Kashmir. Section C covers the theoretical concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, and ethnicity, which offer a critical survey of both regions.

Section D probes into the reasoning involving partition, especially the British style of partition as imposed on NI and indirectly on J&K through the partitioning of India. It should be noted that theories and themes are scrutinized in separate sections in order to avoid a confusion of these concepts. Eventually these notions will overlap in the concluding incorporation of these theories and themes in the limbo state model.

Chapter three of this study focuses on NI, examining the criteria that contribute to the limbo state model. Chapter three begins by offering an overview of the major reasons why NI is presently neither an independent sovereign state nor part of another state but is currently in limbo state status. The first section of this chapter offers a review of the external and internal features of political history of NI and how the conflict between the

Protestants and Catholics came into existence. The next section of the chapter examines the external ingredients of the decolonization process and partition that took place under

British rule and how these processes contributed to the failed attempts at state formation, leaving NI in the current situation of Alimbo state@BBof contested governance. Other sections of this chapter discuss internal factors such as power sharing among the diverse religious and political groups, decommissioning, and the Belfast Agreement and opposition to the Belfast Agreement. Incorporated in this chapter are references to a survey conducted in NI by the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (see appendix A) that offers valuable insight into the thoughts, feelings, mood and attitude of the 23

indigenous population--considered an internal factor. This survey has been a major source of relevant data on why NI has remained in Alimbo@ as a minor sovereign state.

Chapter four begins with an introduction showing an overview of how Jammu- and-Kashmir came to be, through inherently external factors, under the control of two different bordering states--India and Pakistan. Regardless of these two states= claims,

J&K has not merged with either state politically, economically, militarily, or culturally.

The first section presents a detailed review of the creation of Jammu-and-Kashmir with an examination of the external and internal features of the political history of J&K and how this region was central to the India-Pakistani conflict in 1947-48. The second section of this chapter scrutinizes other external components such as the decolonization of India by the British leadership and the partitioning of India and the impact this division of India had on the status of J&K. The third section of the chapter reviews political organizations within J&K probing into the causes of the internal element of the insurgency of 1989 and the claim for independence by some members of the Kashmiri population. Within this section in part three is a look at the results of three major surveysBBthe MORI (Market & Opinion Research International) survey, the Synovate

India survey, and the ACNielsen surveyBBconducted in Jammu-and-Kashmir and the revelation by these surveys of what the indigenous residents are saying about their needs and concerns.

It should be noted here that the results of the NI surveys are distributed throughout chapter three while the survey results of the J&K surveys, even though at times brought into individual discussions, are reviewed entirely in section three, part 24

three of chapter four. Presentation of the survey results are done in this manner due to the comprehensive nature of the NI poll and the slightly different type of questions asked in each set of surveys. The last section of the chapter four reiterates factors contributing to the limbo state status of Jammu-and-Kashmir.

Chapter five recapitulates the pattern of how the two areas of contested governance--NI and J&K--experienced similar disappointments, activities, and grassroots challenges in the failed attempts at either independent state formation or full incorporation with the controlling state to become, in essence, a sovereign state. This section essentially examines the political and historical points of similarity that each area displayed during the process of state formation and how these similarities pointed to a path of unattainable statehood formation either through independence or through merging with another independent state. This chapter highlights the differences between NI and

J&K in their attempts at achieving an independently sovereign statehood. The examination here is to reveal how the course of each nation=s limbo state process supports the four explanatory concepts that grouped these two limited states under the limbo state model.

Chapter five reveals that this model is a useful tool in assessing procedures and factors that, if considered by not only the controlling nations= leadership but also by the international community, could possibly contribute to the success of state formation and complete sovereignty. More importantly, in the long run, each dominant state could use this model to try to avoid conflicts that lead to abuse of political, social, economic, and cultural rights of members of the indigenous populace. The conclusion also reviews how 25

the limbo state model possibly can be applied to current and future states with limited sovereignty. Although the challenges are great, the limbo state perspective does not indicate that nations which exhibit elements of the limbo state model are condemned to remain in the limbo state status.

Chapter Two

State Formation Theories, Literature Review, Relevant Theories,

and Themes

Introduction

This chapter offers a model of factors inhibiting the formation of a modern state in regions where sovereignty is contested by neighboring modern states and their domestic allies. These factors help elucidate the central focus of this study of why NI and J&K have failed at achieving state formation either through full autonomous sovereignty or through completely merging with the current occupying state during partition of each minor state. To ferret out a cogent explanation for NI=s and J&K=s current limbo state status, the tools of existing scholarly works help in eliciting an answer to the research question. In essence, the information presented in this chapter is the basis for the analyses of NI and J&K presented in chapters three and four respectively. As explained earlier in chapter one, section E, I have delineated theories, themes, and the limbo state model in separate presentations.

In section A are reviews of respected theories of modern state formation stipulating what constitutes a modern state. State formation involves how a bordered area becomes a state in terms of utility and practicality. Placing an informative section on perspectives of state formation before the literature review of concepts of sovereignty, of nationality, of ethnicity, of influential events in the political history of the region, of decolonization and of partition enriches the connection between the concepts of the modern state and the topics in the subsequent sections. 27

Section B of this chapter offers a review of relevant literature covering failed

states, Northern Ireland, and Jammu-and-Kashmir. A look at what researchers and

scholars working in the fields of failed states, NI, and J&K have offered in shedding light

on the state-forming problems of NI and J&K and the methods they have used will be

helpful in understanding the contribution of this study. By reviewing other scholars’

works on these topics, I show where my research, findings, and the limbo state model fits

in the general inquiry in these three fields of focus.

Section C reviews the explanatory theories of sovereignty, nationalism, and

ethnicity and how these perspectives contribute to an analysis of the current situation in

NI and J&K. Sovereignty involves the independence of a bordered land within which

lives a population ruled by a leadership that provides for the population (as stated in

explanatory concept one of the limbo state model) in exchange for the support needed in

order to remain the state=s leadership. The majority of the people that make up the state may exhibit specific shared features such as language, traditions, culture, and religion among others. These shared features relate to nationality and/or ethnicity, which also relate to the state=s position within the international community.

Section D details how the themes of external and internal influential events and/or

conditions contribute to the analysis of the political historical pattern that brought NI and

J&K to each state=s present limbo status.

Section E below delineates relevant established theories that provide a conceptual

frame of reference for how NI and J&K arrived at the present status of being in limbo--

neither an independent sovereign state nor fully merged with the occupying state. These 28

perspectives are decolonization and partition. Decolonization involves the process of a controlling state granting to the limited state independence. Partition is a process by which the controlling state divides portions of the limited state relegating control of those portions to specific ethnic groups in order to arrest ethnic-led violence. However, these explanatory theories, as will be revealed, do not explain fully how NI and J&K failed to become independent sovereign states.

A. State Formation Theories

State formation theories focus on what comprises functioning modern state thus facilitating comparisons between two basic types of states. One type is a state that successfully provides for its citizens= personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively.

The other type is a state in which the inhabitants experience political instability that, at times, leads to economic downfall, suppressed self-expression, ineffective justice system, and sectarian conflicts leading to violence.

Many scholars have expounded on the concept of and definition of what comprises a nation-state. A number of researchers begin their analysis of the modern nation-state with the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648 ending the Thirty Years War in

Europe. An important political change during this era was that as a result of the 1648 treaties the state has a defining boundary and is ruled by a secular leadership not beholden to a controlling religious hierarchy as in the past. This section on theories of modern state formation reviews the works of state theorists applying relevant explanatory 29

concepts to Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir, showing how these areas have

become limbo states due to the absence of components necessary for the promotion of a

successful independent state.

Preeminent in the social theorist field is Max Weber (1864-1920) considered to be

Athe foremost social theorist of the twentieth century.@1 Weber=s concepts of the modern state have been influential for many scholars in the social sciences. A significant concept that theorists of the modern state credit to Weber appears in a speech delivered at

Munich University where he states A. . . that a state . . . claims the monopoly of the

legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.@2 These two aspects, legitimate use of force and possession of territory, are the first characteristics of a state that Weber discusses in the Munich speech. It should be noted that in this speech Weber actually quotes Leon Trotsky as saying at Brest-Litovsk, AEvery state is founded on force.@3

Following this quote in the speech, Weber expounds on his understanding of Trotsky=s

statement from which came the famous line quoted above. As explained previously in

the introduction, NI and J&K do have territories with borders and thus exhibit that aspect

of statehood. However, neither NI nor J&K can claim legitimate use of force since both

1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ weber.

2. Politics as a Vocation speech delivered at Munich University, 1918, published by Duncker & Humboldt, 1919, Munich translation found in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, translators, 1946, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press: New York, 78.

3. Gerth and Mills 1946, 78. 30

are minor states under control by other major statesBBGreat Britain in the case of NI, and

India and Pakistan in the case of J&KBBthat are capable of and have engaged in the

legitimate use of force. This latter condition complies with explanatory concept one of

the limbo state model (political and administrative domination by an occupying state).

In addition to a state possessing territory and monopoly of the legitimate use of

physical force, Weber expounds on another additional characteristic attributed to the

state that is the connection between politics and power. This vital concept is presented

not only by Weber but also by other writers considered in this section such as Mann,

Gill, and Poggi. According to Weber, overt reference to a Apolitical@ question or to a

Apolitical@ official or to a Apolitically@ determined decision is in reality Ainterests in the

distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power.@4 Weber further states that an individual

Aactive in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as >power for power=s sake,= . . . in order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that

power gives.@5 In terms of power and politics, NI and J&K possession an inadequate

amount of these attributes resulting from the patterns of invasions by and political and

administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state as articulated in

explanatory concept one of the limbo state model. More will be written about power and

politics in NI and J&K in chapters three and four respectively.

4. Gerth and Mills 1946, 78.

5. Gerth and Milld 1946, 78.

Another Weberian characteristic of the state that fits in with the limbo status of NI

and J&K is Aa relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of

legitimate . . . violence . . . . [in which] the dominated must obey the authority claimed

by the power that be.@6 Weber goes within the state to the leadership level to detail further his meaning of basic Alegitimations of domination@ in terms of three

justifications.7 Briefly, the three inner justifications are: 1) traditional authority exercised

by the patriarch as a result of sanctified mores of conformation by members of the

community; 2) charismatic domination due to personal gift of grace possessed by the

leader (according to Weber, regardless of how the position was acquiredBelected or

attained by other means); and

3) legal domination based on rule of law exercised by the elected official.8 However, NI and J&K are both dominated by outside powers that are supported by Alegitimate

violence@ whose authority the limbo state must obey. This condition is consistent with

explanatory concept two of the limbo state model (weak leadership within the limbo

state) since the leaders within the limbo states are dominated by the leadership of the

controlling state.

The first two explanatory concepts of the limbo state model express the difficult

conditions faced by NI and J&K in relation to Weber=s three inner justifications for

6. Gerth and Mills 1946, 78.

7. Gerth and Mills 1946, 78.

8. Gerth and Milld 1947, 78-79.

leaders within a state: 1) patterns of invasions by and political and administrative

domination by a state occupying the limbo state, and 2) patterns of weak leadership

within the limbo state, meant that members of the NI and J&K communities were not in

the position to sanctify the leadership that was imposed on them. Also, the leaders

imposed on NI and J&K by the occupying state were neither charismatic nor displayed

gift of grace for the limbo state populace. In addition, according to the inhabitants of NI

and J&K, the leadership in their state was imposed by the occupying state and thus was

not, as noted above, Alegal domination based on rule of law.@

Another scholar who writes about the modern state, drawing on Weber=s

concepts of power, leadership, and territory and developing them further is Michael

Mann. In his definition of the modern state, Mann=s central focus is on Athe origins,

mechanisms and results of the autonomous power that the state possesses in relation to

the major power groupings of >civil society= . . . the state [being] . . . a place [Mann=s

italics] (with this place being the) . . . source of its autonomy.@9 Again, this type of statement excludes NI and J&K from being independent states and from possessing any autonomous power due to each regions= political and administrative domination

(explanatory concept one of the limbo state model) by other major states. Furthermore,

Mann discusses what he considers the two levels of analysis as the >institutional= or

state=s appearance institutionally, and the >functional= or what the state does.10 Mann

9. Mann 2003, 53

stresses in this article that his main interest Alies in those centralized institutions

generally called >states= and in the power of the personnel who staff them, at the higher

levels generally termed the >state elite.=@11 In terms of Mann=s institutional and

functional analysis, this type of definition excludes both NI and J&K from being

regarded as independent states due to the fact that each state=s institutional structures are

determined by the major controlling states (explanatory concept one of the model); also,

each state=s elite (or leadership), generally, come from the controlling state or owe their

leadership position in the limbo state to the controlling state rendering a weak indigenous

leadership within the limbo state (concept two of the limbo state model).

In this article, Mann offers four main elements that comprise a modern state that

supplements Weber=s power/force, politics/leadership, and territory/autonomy source

characteristics of state. These elements (please note that the italics listed in the four

elements are Mann=s) are:

1. A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 2. centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover 3. a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises 4. a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (Mann 1984, 53). In the cases of NI and J&K, the lack of some of these elements reveals criteria for

determining the limbo state status of NI and J&K.

10. Mann 2003, 53

11. Mann 2003, 53-54.

The manifestations of element one in NI and J&K give them a semblance of modern statehood. Each minor state does have a functioning infrastructure and institutions such as means of transportation and communication, schools, banks, hospitals, local police enforcement, local courts, local government services, and various establishments for consumer needs. The local personnel who run these institutions administratively, especially the major leadership positions, may be chosen specifically by the major state decision-makers. It will appear more evident in chapters three and four that any time chaotic activities arise, such as demonstrations or insurgencies, the major state takes over control of institutions of the minor limbo state, especially those institutions that may contribute to the chaos, such as newspapers favorable to the local insurrections as well as key leadership positions.

The concept of centrality offered in Mann=s element two, in the cases of NI and

J&K, could only apply to the major states. The occupying states, GB in the case of NI and Pakistan and India in the case of J&K, are the central controlling locations from whence radiates rules of conduct for the limbo states as well as benefits bestowed on the obeying populace.

Elements three and four, territory demarcation and physical violence, have been reviewed above in the discussion of Weber=s modern state characteristics and need not be repeated here. Mann=s elements, when applied to NI and J&K, still reveal each region=s limbo state status.

Another modern state theorist, Graeme Gill, writes about state capacity as Awhat enables the state as an institution not just to survive and carry out rudimentary functions, 35

but to make and implement policies throughout the territory over which it claims

sovereignty. . . . interven[ing] in all walks of life.@12 Gill sees Athe nature and extent of

state capacity [as] that [which] defines a state as modern.@13 Characteristics that link state capacity to the modern state are industrialization and welfare both of which, according to Gill, promoted expansion of state-society interdependence.14

Two concepts that Gill develops that support the concept of the limbo state are

Ainstitutional interdependence@ and Aorganic interdependence.@15 AInstitutional

interdependence@ involves the state embedding itself, generally, economically in policy

constituencies and in society while maintaining state autonomy; Aorganic

interdependence@ refers to the ways in which members of society find representation

within various state organs.16 The occupying major states dominating NI and J&K do so

economically within the policymaking process as chapters three and four reveal. In terms

of the inhabitants of these two regions finding representation within state agencies, again

the occupying states= leaders make the appointments.

If applied to NI and J&K, Gill=s analysis of state capacity supports the limbo

state status of these two minor states due to control of NI and J&K by major states that

12. Gill 2003, ix.

13. Gill 2003, x.

14. Gill 2003, xii and chapters four and six.

15. Gill 2003, 19.

16. Gill 2003, 19.

make and implement the policies of the minor states (political and administrative domination by the controlling state). Institutional and organic interdependence are not limited to NI and J&K solely, but actually involve the controlling states of Great Britain in NI=s case, and India and Pakistan in the case of J&K. In addition, the controlling states promote the welfare and a form of industrialization within the minor states as will be elucidated in chapters three and four below.

In his modern state analysis, Samuel Edward Finer offers five characteristics to identify the modern state noting that the first three were possessed by pre-modern states.17 These characteristics are:

1. They are territorially defined populations each recognizing a common paramount organ of government. 2. This organ is served by specialized personnel; a civil service, to carry out decisions and a military service to back these by force where necessary and to protect the association from similarly constituted associations. 3. The state so characterized is recognized by other similarly constituted states as independent in its action on its territorially definedBand hence confined population, that is, on its subjects. This recognition constitutes what we would today call it international >sovereignty=. 4. Ideally at least, but to a large extent in practice also, the population of the state forms a community of feeling--a Gemeinschaft based on self-consciousness of a common nationality. 5. Ideally at least, and again to a large extent in practice, the population forms a community in the sense that its members mutually participate in distributing and sharing duties and benefits (Finer 1997, 2-3).

These five features take on more meaning in Poggi=s analysis (see below). However, in comparing these attributes to NI=s and J&K=s current situation, the limbo state status is reinforced.

17. Finer 1997, 2-3.

As stated and defined in characteristic one and discussed previously as well, both

states are territorially demarcated, having specific borders. Also, as mentioned in

characteristic one, both NI and J&K have populations within the bordered region. In

addition to territory possession and population, Finer=s characteristic one also offers the

concept of an organ of government. Both NI and J&K do possess a semblance of an

organ of government in terms of an organized governmental system, but these are

controlled by the major states that determine which leadership will be in control and if

representatives of the people will be selected, as recounted in explanatory concept one of

the limbo state model (see chapters three and four below for full explanation of the

system of governance in NI and J&K).

Characteristics two and three do not apply to NI and J&K since decisions

concerning the civil services and military for both states are actually from the major

states controlling these two areas, as stated in concept one of the limbo state model.

Likewise, as already touched on in chapter one, section B concerning Rourke=s use of

diplomatic recognition as part of the definition of a state, NI and J&K are not recognized

as international sovereignties, Arecognized by other similarly constituted states as

independent in [their] action[s] on [their] territorially defined . . . population@18 since both regions are controlled by other sovereign states.

In order for characteristics four and five to be considered in the cases of NI and

J&K, the phrases would need to be altered to include Amultiple communities of feelings@

18. Finer 1997, 2-3; Rourke 2001, 189-196.

since both regions have more than one ethnic/ religious group vying for recognition.

According to Finer=s intact definition of the modern state, therefore, neither NI nor J&K

could be considered states except for the territorial characteristic, since both areas do

possess bordered territory. Again, the mere semblance of statehood and lack of key

characteristics of statehood place NI and J&K as states existing in limbo.

An interesting twist on the modern state is offered by Roland Axtmann, whose

model may be more applicable to the multicultural cases of NI and J&K. He discusses

the transformation of the modern state from an ideal type that, in his words, is a

territorially consolidated, homogeneous, unified, sovereign nation-state to one that

Ainstitutionalizes polycentricity, heterogeneity, and plurality.@19 Axtmann offers six characteristics of a successful modern state that he notes are drawn from the work of

Bhikhu Parekh and are:20

First, it should be territorially distinct, possess a single source of sovereignty, and enjoy legally unlimited authority within it boundary. Second, it should rest on a single set of constituted principles and exhibit a singular and unambiguous identity. . . . Third . . . [the state] represents a homogeneous legal space within which its members move about freely, carrying with them a more or less identical basket of rights and obligations. Fourth . . . all citizens are directly and identically related to the state, not differentially or through their membership of intermediate communities. Fifth, members of the state are deemed to constitute a single and united people . . . Sixth and finally, if the state is federally constituted, its component units should all enjoy the same rights and powers (Axtmann 2004, 263-64).

An analysis applying these six characteristics to the current situation of NI and J&K

19. Axtmann 2004, 259.

20. Axtmann 2004, 263-64. 39

easily reveals the limbo state status of these minor states.

The qualifications of the first characteristic take away the semblance of territorial autonomy that NI and J&K have under earlier definitions due to the phrase Aunlimited authority within its boundary.@ Occupation and control of NI and J&K by major states

(explanatory concept one) means they lack this characteristic.

The second characteristic also takes away any semblance of NI and J&K being considered independent modern states due to the phrase Aexhibit a singular and unambiguous identity@ since both states exhibit ambiguous identity due to multiple ethnic groups residing in each state with their own agenda of cultural preservation, as stated in explanatory concept three of the limbo state model. In addition, the controlling occupying major states display ethnic identity different from the ethnic groups within the minor limbo states, as chapters three and four disclose.

Likewise the remaining four characteristics call upon traits of an independent modern state that are compromised in NI and J&K due to control by major states. These compromised traits reveal that the inhabitants of NI and J&K respectively do not possess an Aidentical basket of rights and obligations,@ nor political equality regardless of

Amembership of intermediate communities,@ nor see themselves as Aconstitut[ing] a single and united people@ within their regions, nor Aall enjoy the same rights and powers@ as citizens of the occupying major state. Explanations of these compromised traits will be fully explored in chapters three and four.

Axtmann details four processes that have compromised Athe homogeneity, unity,

and sovereignty of the state.@21 The following analyses reveal how these processes contribute to the limbo state status of NI and J&K.

The first process is the Arevival of ethnic nationalism in liberal democracies and

secessionist threats by internal nationalities.@22 As will be shown in chapters three and

four, diverse religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups with their own agendas of cultural

preservation play a major role in NI=s and J&K=s limbo state status as disclosed in

explanatory concept three of the limbo state model (patterns of settlers immigrating to the

occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own

agenda of cultural preservation).

The next process considered by Axtmann is societal heterogeneity that leads to

Aincapability of the state authoritatively to impose decisions, and . . . the delegitimization

and demonopolization of experts and their expertise, and . . . the formation of radical

21. Axtmann 2004, 264.

22. Axtmann 2004, 265.

diversity among the population at large.@23 With these developments, according to

Axtmann, Anew ways will have to be found to uphold societal integration.@24 In NI and

J&K, as will be shown, societal heterogeneity has accentuated concept three (settlers immigrating resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups). In addition, maintaining societal integration has proven to be difficult with insurgencies and militia groups attempting to dominate political positions, as will be observed in chapters three and four.

The third process is the internationalization of the state and democratic governance.25 In this process, according to Axtmann, there is an internationalization of problems such as crime and environmental concerns; cross border activities such as

exchange of goods, services, people, information, and ideas; and an increase in

internationalization of decision-making from consultation to negotiated agreements to

decision-making by intergovernmental organizations. Such process leads to a

Adenationalization of the state,@ by which state powers are delegated to international

bodies, to regional levels, and to autonomous cross-national alliances; and to

Adestatization of the political system@ that accentuates the difference between the public

and private sectors, and between organizations and tasks.26 Axtmann notes that such developments have allowed Amultilateral institutions such as the United Nations,

23. Axtmann 2004, 268.

24. Axtmann 2004, 268.

25. Axtmann 2004, 269.

26. Axtmann 20004, 270.

the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization . . .

to acquire ever more authority, in some domains . . . [are] curtailing the >sovereignty= of

their nation-state members.@27 This process is not so obvious in NI and J&K because of the occupation and control by the major states, which have not allowed internationalization of the state. However, these major states that control NI and J&K have been questioned by international bodies in reference to conflicts and violent conditions within the occupied minor states.

The fourth and last process, according to Axtmann, involves geopolitical transformations. These challenges that the state faces are the result of wars and treaties that bring changes in the territorial boundaries; the result of nuclear weapons that bring changes in the military; the result of international communication that bring changes in cultural manifestations; and the result of rapid mathematical computation that bring changes in economic progress.28 The minor limbo states of NI and J&K, as chapters three and four will detail, have experienced geopolitical transformations since the earliest political-histories of both areas due to the patterns of invasions by, and political and administrative domination by, states occupying the limbo states (stated in explanatory concept one of the limbo state model).

Axtmann=s work on the modern state and its contemporary transformation

concludes that A. . . solidaristic values and attitudes must be embedded in a national

27. Axtmann 2004, 270.

28. Axtmann 2004, 273.

political culture, but for them to be sustained, and acted upon, political mobilization and

citizens= involvement at the >local= level are necessary.@29 The detailed information in chapter three and four concerning the population residing in Northern Ireland and

Jammu-and-Kashmir respectively explains how the different groups that make up the populace in both minor states have not been able to agree to unite in determining the type of Asolidaristic values and attitudes@ that should become part of the national political

culture. This has not been accomplished fully at the grassroots level due to the varied

ethnic/religious groups, each attempting to promote its own agenda (concept three as well

as concept four in which patterns of complex and paradoxical responses are expressed by

members of the indigenous population).

Gianfranco Poggi has been positioned last in this section on modern state

formation theory due to his comprehensive analysis of necessary elements that comprise

a modern state. as set forth in his article,.30 He does this skillfully by assimilating major

concepts of the works of several scholars in order to develop a discourse about modern

state formation theory beginning with the organization of three principal aspects of state

formation: the managerial perspective, the military perspective, and the economic

perspective. Poggi notes that these are Athe most significant sociological perspectives on

29. Axtmann 2004, 276.

30. Poggi 2001, Formation and Form: Theories of State Formation in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, by Kate Nash and Scott Alan, editors, Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, UK is an updated concise version of Poggi=s earlier 1990 work, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects and 1978 text, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. I have chosen to draw information from this article because of the amended comprehensive information. 44

the early and intermediate phases of what one may call statualization--a set of processes

taking place in western Europe between the twelfth and the eighteenth century.@31

Before elaborating on these perspectives, Poggi observes that during state formation the practice of rule becomes depersonalized (vested in offices rather than in individuals), formalized (norms authorize it, mandate it, and control it), integrated (takes into account other aspects of the social process), differentiated from those other aspects of the social process (addressing distinctive concerns employing special material and symbolic resources), and organized.32 This last aspect, according to Poggi, involves two phenomena, AOn the one hand, rule is exercised by and through a plurality of subjects

(individual and collective), on the other these subjects constitute together a single unit

that overrides their plurality.@33 Poggi argues that these five developing aspects of rule

should become an integral part of Astatualization@ or state formation.

At first glance, partition seems to be an attempt at state formation along these

lines--depersonalized, formalized, impersonal, and organized. However, excluding the

various representatives or leadership of the indigenous population from the process of

state formation, basically overriding local opinions, can lead to control by one group and

a reactional resentment by another group or other groups, as occurred in NI and J&K as

related in chapters three and four. These ordered practices of rule are challenged in the

31. Poggi 2001, 95.

32. Poggi 2001, 95.

33. Poggi 2001, 95.

cases of NI and J&K, upsetting an orderly statualization process and resulting in a limbo

state.

The managerial perspective, as Poggi notes (drawing from the research of Joseph

Strayer), is Athe key process . . . in the establishment of . . . effective modes of

management of larger and larger territories, put into place on behalf of rulers by growing

bodies of professional administrators.@34 An important aspect of the managerial perspective is the use of law because law Areduces contingency in the conduct of public

bodies and . . . obligations of subjects/citizens toward them.@35 More importantly, Athe

validity of existent bodies of law can be extended to new territories, facilitating their

incorporation in a given polity.@36 Interestingly, in the case of NI and J&K, the use of established bodies of law by the conquering leadershipBGreat Britain in NI, and India

(and to a lesser extent Pakistan) in J&KBdid not necessarily Afacilitate@ their

incorporation into the polity of the occupying state. More of this will be noted in the

chapters below.

Regarding the military perspective on state formation, Poggi acknowledges

Weber=s classical definition of the state as Aa human community that (successfully)

claims

the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory . . .

34. Poggi 2001, 97

35. Poggi 2001, 98.

36. Poggi 2001, 98.

the >right= to use violence.@37 Thus, Poggi writes, the use of force and violence can be internal--Alaw enforcement, the repression and suppression of threats to the public order by the police and the judicial system, or external--war and military establishment.@38

Generally rulers make use of the military before state formation to capture land either to create their state or to add more land to their existing state. Afterwards the military is needed in order to maintain and protect the territory comprising the newly formed state.

The military, therefore, becomes an Aextensive and sophisticated elaboration@ of the

state.39 Chapters three and four below narrate how this Aelaboration@ occurred in NI and

J&K through a review of the political history of each minor state.

As will be shown in the chapters on NI and J&K, the military takes on a dual role

whenever there are conflicts among the varied cultural groups within the state. First the

military becomes a mechanism for maintaining calm within the state through regular

policing activities. Then, when rebellions and insurgencies transpire, the military is

called upon to put down the rebellious elements. In this situation, eventually the policing

system emerges as a source of brutal oppression as has occurred in NI and J&K in the

twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

In the economic perspective, Poggi details Athe process of production and

distribution of material wealth . . . and of the resulting conflicts, [and] political

37. See note 2 above; see also Brown and Macridis 1996, 43.

38. Poggi 2001, 99.

39. Poggi 2001, 101.

phenomena@ in the formation and development of the state.40 He notes that economic analyses of state formation should encompass Athe interests of groups constituted around

the questions of control and exclusion from economic resources.@41 These interests should be linked with political institutions, foremost being the Adevelopment of just and rational rules, . . . [allowing] the populous some voice@ in the establishment of these

rules.42 As this study reports, social groupings, their alignments, and control and

exclusion were important in the economic-political realm of both NI and J&K, in which

the economic needs of the people were not appropriately met. Subsequently, the

inappropriate distribution of economic resources contributed to frustration on the part of

the population of each minor state that led to reactions against the controlling major state

through such means as demands by the population for their economic rights,

demonstrations, and violent protests. The failure on the part of the leadership of the

controlling state to advance economic equality to the inhabitants of the minor states can

be considered a manifestation of explanatory concept one (domination by a controlling

state) and two (weak leadership) of the limbo state model.

Much of what is included in the discussion above of aspects necessary for

successful state formation, as chapters three and four demonstrate, were either denied to

NI and J&K or attempted unsuccessfully, or offered by the controlling state with

40. Poggi 2001, 102.

41. Poggi 2001, 105.

42. Poggi 2001, 106.

conditions. However, what was not included in the above discussion on state formation is inclusion of indigenous sovereignty within the formation of state sovereignty.

Indigenous sovereignty means that the differences among the cultural groups need to be considered at each level of state formationBBmanagerial, military, and economic.

The Poggi/Weberian state concept characterizes sovereignty as dominated by the state leadership, which basically determines the state structure. The political and administrative domination by an occupying major state (explanatory concept one of the limbo state model) exposes the Alimbo@ connection with the Poggi/Weberian state concept. Basically, the occupying state maintains its position as the controller of the minor state by denying managerial, military, and economic independence to the leadership and indigenous population of the minor state keeping its sovereignty in

Alimbo.@

If the differences among the diverse cultural and/or religious groups are not considered during state formation, sectarian conflict among these groups is the result, as has been witnessed in the past two centuries in NI and J&K. This research project reveals the complicated relationships between sovereignty, nationalism, and ethnicity during state formation in a region under political control by another state or, restated, occupation of a minor limbo state by a dominant sovereign state.

B. Literature Review of Failed States, Northern Ireland, and Jammu-and-

Kashmir

1. Failed States

The preceding modern states perspectives help bolster knowledge of what is 50

lacking when examining how a state fails. This section reviews the literature on Afailed states@ by scholars who offer their own angles on how a bordered region achieves the status of failed state. This section reveals the gap in failed states literature that my research fills concerning limbo state existence and status.

Most failed state literature begins with what contributes to as well as what constitutes a failed state. After stating their definitions of a failed state and consequences for the international community of the existence of a failed state, a number of authors offer examples of failed states in such regions as the African continent and/or the Middle

East and/or central Asia. Many scholars offer their assessment of policy solutions, often involving in which developed countries, to draw failed states out of their current condition.

This review begins with one author, Noam Chomsky, who approaches the failed states concept differently than other scholars who have focused on less developed states.

Chomsky concentrates on a developed country as exhibiting his definition of a failed stateBthe United States.43 He offers the view that:

primary characteristics of failed states can be identified . . . [as] their inability or unwillingness to protect their citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction. . . . [and] their tendency to regard themselves as beyond the reach of domestic or international law, and hence free to carry out aggression and violence. . . . And if they have democratic forms, they suffer from a serious Ademocratic deficit@ that deprives their formal democratic institutions of real substance (Chomsky 2006,1-2).

In the remainder of his text, Chomsky provides numerous events and accounts of how the

43. Chomsky 2006, 1-2.

United States has behaved to support his definition of Afailed states.@ The examples he offers range from escape from nuclear oblivion in the Cuban missile crisis of October

1962 to the military involvement in Vietnam and Iraq to cutting support for Athe miserably poor to finance the reconstruction of New Orleans@ and numerous other events that Chomsky considers activities on the part of the U.S. government.44

Leon Halpert observes in a review of the text where he senses Chomsky is headed by stating that this text was Aanother well-written, coherent, and systematic attack on

U.S. domestic and foreign policy.@45 Chomsky=s well-researched work does not fit in the general view of what the inhabitants of a failed state are experiencing such as lack of political transparency, lack of prevalence of rule of law justice, lack of economic security, and lack of personal freedom to practice one=s cultural manifestations in the realm of language, religion, music, the arts and the media. Chomsky=s definition of failed state involves a sovereign modern state functioning independently of society. His study does not fit into the general literature on the topic and, therefore, leaves a wide gap in failed state analysis for the limbo state model perspective.

On the other hand, this kind of research concerning developed states= behavior toward less developed states and political behavior in making decisions outside of the consent of its own civil society may be considered second generation failed state behavior on the part of the controlling state. Rather than offering a list of events to

44. Chomsky 2006, 8, 54, 234.

45. Halpert 2006, 72.

support the

limbo state model, my research involves probing into the political history, archival

documents, and grassroots surveys of the case studies. Chomsky=s research has the end

result of exposing U.S. domestic and foreign policy and, therefore, may have more

parallels to my critique of the major dominant states than to my analysis of the failed

states themselves.

In keeping with the traditional understanding within political science of what

constitutes a failed state, Robert I. Rotberg notes that, A. . . it is . . . according to the

levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods that strong states may

be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed one.@46

According to Rotberg, the Apolitical goods@ hierarchically are: human security (protect

citizens from cross-border invasion, domestic crimes, etc.), participation in the political

process, and provision of necessary infrastructural services such as healthcare, education,

transportation, communication systems, banking, etc.47

Rotberg=s contribution to the failed states literature is the distinctions among the

following terms: Aweak state,@ Afailed state,@ and Acollapsed state.@ The definitions

of these terms are:

Weak states . . . include a broad continuum of states . . . weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; . . . [and] typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic or intercommunal tensions. . . . become overtly violent. . . . [examples include] North Korea, . . .Cambodia

46. Rotberg 2004, 2.

47. Rotberg 2004, 3-4.

under Pol Pot and Iraq under Sadam Hussein . . . as do contemporary Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Libya. . . . Failed states [authorities] face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and . . . dissent directed at the state. . . . civil wars that characterize failed states usually . . . have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity. . . . [examples include] Angola, Burundi, . . . Sudan, . . . Afghanistan, Cote d=Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. . . . A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. . . . [allowing] substate actors, [to gain] control over regions and subregions within what had been a nation-state, . . . [building] up their own local security apparatuses and mechanisms, sanctioned markets and other trading arrangements, and . . . [establishing] an attenuated form of international relations. . . . [Examples include] Somalia, . . . Bosnia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, . . . Nigeria, Sierra Leone, . . . Tajikistan, . . . and Zimbabwe (Rotberg 2004, 4-10).

Even though Rotberg=s definitions do reveal features of weak states, failed states, and

collapsed states, Alex Gourevitch observes that this kind of distinction through

definition, Aobscures more than it illuminates.@48 Gourevitch further criticizes

Rotberg=s articles in the edited volumes stating that the articles:

[are] awash in indicators, dimensions and varieties of failure, from the absence of law and order, to the lack of social trust, to rapid economic decline. . . . Instead of penetrating the surface of the Third World=s seemingly random social instability to reveal what lies beneath, the articles [in the edited volumes] take chaos to be an adequate characterization of current political order. The result is superficial analysis (Gourevitch 2004, 255).

To avoid such superficial analysis of how NI and J&K came to be in the current limbo

state status, this study develops a multi-leveled, focused analysis of the political history,

official documents, and surveys of both cases. Thus, my work differs from Rothberg=s

research in that I do not offer as many factors as Rothberg does in defining Aweak,@

48. Gourevitch 2004, 255.

Afailed,@ and Acollapsed@ states, nor multiple examples, but instead offer penetrating

focus on two cases and how these two areas came to be a certain type of failed states,

namely Alimbo states.@

Shahar Hameiri=s study of failed states challenges the neoliberal institutionalists

and neo-Weberian institutionalists linking of state failure to lack of state capacity.49 The problem with linking state failure to state capacity, according to Hameiri, is the focus by the institutionalists on Ameasuring and improving the functionality of institutions.@50

This leads to Aunhelpful dichotomies such as state-society, formal-informal and traditional-modern which are drawn along institutional lines.@51 Hameiri advocates focus on a Asystem-level analysis, examining social and political conflicts and the ways in which social cleavages, pertaining to historical patterns of economic development, relate to the state and to state institutions.@52 Hameiri=s article grounds failed states

theory by highlighting potential solutions to the failed state condition. Yet, except for a

cursory look at the crisis and intervention in the Solomon Islands, Hameiri does not

present a comprehensive focused analysis of a failed state in terms of his framework. My

research differs from Hameiri=s in that I focus expansively on two case studiesBBNI and

J&KBBin my limbo state model analysis.

49. Hameiri 2007, 122-150.

50. Hameiri 2007, 144.

51. Hameiri 2007, 144.

52. Hameiri 2007, 144.

Brennan M. Kraxberger=s approach to the failed state concept is in terms of

democracy affirming that A. . . stateness is the basic prerequisite for democracy.@53 This article is one of many that illuminates how best to solve the failed state dilemma experienced by many less developed countries or countries that become failed states due to internal conflicts or external invasion and control by another state.

Kraxberger=s research reviews four possible frameworks for assessing and

responding to failed states. The frameworks that are the central concepts of his research

are: the revival and reconstruction school, the shared sovereignty/neo-trusteeships

advocates, the territorial restructuring approach (redrawing of boundaries), and persistent

stateless zones (collective governance rather than the modern state model).54 Northern

Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir do not fall under one framework, but rather exhibits a combination of territorial restructuring and persistent stateless zones. This combination of frameworks is apparent in information provided in chapters three and four.

Kraxberger concludes that the Ainternational context@ determines whether or not

state failure is Aa temporary roadblock to political liberalization.55 My research does bring in responses by the international community, which can become involved in certain areas of the relationship between the controlling major state and the limbo minor states.

Kraxberger=s four frameworks for assessing and responding to failed states basically

53. Kraxberger 2007, 1056.

54. Kraxberger 2007, 1060-1065.

55. Kraxberger 2007, 1069.

repeat the works of other failed state theorists and does not require recapitulation here.

The

author writes about failed states in general, not limbo states, which I argue is a subset of

the larger category of failed states.

Robert Jackson, writing before Kraxberger, offers the concept of international

trusteeship, Kraxberger=s second framework for assessing and responding to failed

states.56 Jackson focuses on the topic of the responsibility of the international community

toward not only the state but also its population. The author affirms the need to

safeguard Aminimal civil conditions for [the] populations [of failed states, such as]

domestic peace, law and order, and good governance@ through international

trusteeship.57 For Jackson, the solution to Anumerous civil wars and internal conflicts, of

domestic anarchy and chaotic states@ is Asome kind of international trusteeship which

might take over responsibility for pacifying and governing what clearly are failed states

until such time as domestic conditions can be restored to some minimal standards of

security and civility and those countries can be returned to a government of their own

people.@58 Interestingly, GB and Pakistan and India could be considered trustees for NI in GB=s case and J&K in Pakistan and India=s cases, yet, neither GB nor Pakistan or

India have offered to return NI and J&K to a government of their own people. In this

56. Jackson 2003, 296.

57. Jackson 2003, 296.

58. Jackson 2003, 305.

article, while Jackson offer a solution for the failed state problem, he does not offer a

penetrating analysis at how the failed state arrived at this condition, the focus of my

research.

Two researchers, Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair view how policy relates to

failed states. An example of such a statement is, AThe choice of whether or how

forcefully to intervene to prevent failure, or whether to simply accept the collapse of a

particular state, is usually a pragmatic decision made by potential intervenors on the

grounds of national interest, the potential negative consequences of state failure, and the

probability of success of the intervention.@59 Their work provides a general overview of the topic of failed states but does not focus on the many faceted aspects of how states fail.

Jeffrey Record uses the topic of failed states to develop the connection between the issue of involvement of major military powers in failed states and past military intervention experiences. According to Record, the topic of failed states is relevant because, AFailed states have become the primary source of instability in the international

political system, not just because war within the advanced industrial world has drastically

receded, but also because failed states invite intervention by stronger states.@60 The author=s central focus, however, is the related issue of how future conflicts will be

resolved militarily due to America=s casualty phobia that Ais rooted in the Vietnam

59. Ottaway and Mair 2004, 8.

60. Record 2000, 4.

War.@61

Thus, Record=s focus on failed states is a sidebar to how Washington will approach future combat that he sees as Athe air arm that offers the quickest and most viable

solutions

because of its intrinsic nature of being above the fight.@62 This article focuses on future military encounters in failed states, rather than on how a state becomes a type of failed state, as I present in my research project.

There are a number of articles on the topic of failed states that at first appear to be useful references on the topic but overall do not provide solid examples to back up the author=s

observations. Instead, the author provides examples that are not properly explained.

These types of articles appear to be observational expositions rather than methodically

researched scholarly productions. An example of such writing on the topic of failed

states is Susan L. Woodward=s AFailed States: Warlordism and >Tribal= Warfare.@ The

author identifies the reason for a state=s collapse is the fault of a major state writing,

Amajor power patrons have withdrawn the foreign financial and military support that

governments had come to depend on for domestic power and governing capacity . . .

[resulting in] regimes collaps[ing].@63 The author=s examples culminate in a final

sentence stating, AOne need only mention in this regard the former Yugoslavia, Somalia,

61. Record 2000, 8.

62. Record 2000, 21.

63. Woodward 2000, 102.

Liberia, and Zaire/Congo to make the point.@64 With only footnotes to direct the reader to materials that will explain the author=s meaning, the reader is left without the expected analysis on the part of the author.

The literature on failed states generally expounds on the concepts of Aweak

states,” Acollapsed states,@ and/or completely Afailed states.@ My research is fills a gap

by focusing on the concept of limbo state status in which the state is controlled by a

sovereign state giving it the attributes of a Aweak state.@ Since the limbo state is

controlled by a sovereign state, it does not attain the status of a sovereign state. At the

same time, if it does appear to be on the verge of becoming a Acollapsed state,@ the

controlling state steps in to bolster the position of the limbo state. Regardless of the

presence of the controlling state, conflict and violence do transpire as will be noted in

chapters three and four.

2. Northern Ireland

This section on Northern Ireland literature review explores what has been written

about NI=s status as a state under the control of Great Britain not necessarily referred to

as a failed state. As will be noted in the literature review below, no researcher offers an

analysis of Northern Ireland as a limbo state model as I have, thus opening a gap in NI

literature that I fill in this study.

A review of analysis of NI reveals the following basic topics that prevail in the

texts: a general history of the area under discussion, internal violence in NI, analysis of

64. Woodward 2000, 102.

the causes of violence, and how the violence might be mitigated the region. The review

of these texts starts with two articles on the partitioning of land beginning with a rare

article that elaborates on both topics of my case studies--Northern Ireland and Jammu-

and-Kashmir.

Radha Kumar observes that the British government used partitioning of disputed

land as Aa strategy of divide and quit,@ noting the negative effects of partition, as in the

case of the partitioning of India in 1947 by the British colonial government into India

and

Pakistan.65 The latter nation itself, Kumar reminds the reader, Awas divided into

two parts by roughly 2000 miles of Indian territory,@66 a less-than-ideal situation. A war between East Pakistan and West Pakistan resulted in the creation of Bangladesh

(formerly East Pakistan) in 1971.

Kumar does bring in a brief discussion of Kashmir showing her stand on the issue by stating that Athe conflict has continued because India retained the Muslim-majority

Kashmir Valley, which should have gone to Pakistan.@67 This statement does not

acknowledge the political situation during the partitioning of India into India and

65. Kumar 1997, 26.

66. Kumar 1997, 30. Kumar wrote 2000 miles in her article; however, online at http://www.mapcrow.info/Distance_between_Lahore_PKandDhaka_BG.html. is written that the distance between Lahore, PK and Dhaka, BG is 1119.61 miles (1801.80 kilometers).

67. Kumar 1997, 30.

Pakistan, namely, the fact that predominantly Muslim Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu monarch and that Jammu was predominately Hindu and that another section of Kashmir,

Ladakh (now known as the districts of Leh and Kargil) was Buddhist at the time of decolonization and partitioning of India.

Likewise, the author notes the negative effects of partition on NI, summarizing that Ait took four years of war to achieve the partition of Ireland . . . a movement . . . that had begun ten years earlier.@68 Kumar also briefly reviews other areas of partitioning, concluding that Athough divide and quit was a motive in Britain=s support for partition in Ireland, . . . and India, it got Britain out quickly only in India, and that was because

South Asia is distant from Britain.@69

While Kumar offers a good theoretical definition of partitioning with adequate examples of the negative outcomes of partitioning, the author does not go past the history of partition and violence in each region and thus not offer a deeper look at the complexities of the each specific situation with a political and historical perspective, as my study will do. Another missing concept from Kumar=s text is discourse on the needs of the grassroots in each minor state (already briefly discussed in chapter one, section A and further explained in section C (part one below in this chapter), which is included in my political-historical inquiry. More will be said concerning Kumar=s understanding of the negative effect of partition in section E, part two of this chapter.

68. Kumar 1997, 27.

69. Kumar 1997, 34. 62

An article offering quantitative analysis of the negative effects of land

partitioning that is war-related is authored by Nicholas Sambanis, who writes that the

results of the analysis weigh Aheavily on the side of [the] critics [of partition theory].@70

His study does not consider partition before a civil war has occurred, using his own definition of Apartition as a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and

demographic

70. Sambanis 2000, 472.

changes@71 and not Chaim Kaufmann=s more specific definition of partitions Aas

separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the

two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed

on both sides by a stronger third party.@72 Kaufmann=s definition is applicable to my

research project.

Sambanis= result is based on his study of civil wars since 1944, involving 125

totals in the data set that produced twenty-one partitions.73 Some of the countries had recurring

civil wars without any partition and some had recurring civil wars with partition. For

example, Indonesia had five civil wars with no partition. In the case of India, after six

major conflicts (1947-48 referred to as the First Indo-Pakistan War or First Kashmir War,

1965 referred to as the Second Indo-Pakistan War or Second Kashmir War, 1971 referred

to as the Third Indo-Pakistan War/Bengali War of Independence, 1984-1989 referred to

as the Punjab Insurgency, 1984-present referred to as the Siachen Operations, and 1990-

present referred to as the Kashmir Revolt) some partitions did occur. The 1947-48

conflict resulted in the partition of India into India and Pakistan. The 1971 war divided

East Pakistan (presently the independent state of Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now

71. Sambanis 2000, 445.

72. Kaufmann 1998, 125n12.

73. Sambanis 2000, 446.

named only Pakistan).

Without going into too much detail, Sambanis basically wanted Ato test whether

some of the same variables [such as religion, ideology, ethnic heterogeneity, war deaths,

government military victory or rebel victory, population size, etc.] that either cause or

terminate civil wars were also significant determinants of war-related partition.@74 He does not deal with the complex issues of state formation during the process of decolonization and partition. As do many quantitative analysts, Sambanis= study

encompasses a large number of nation-states, thus overlooking the individual nation-state

and related complexities of conflict in each country=s attempt at state formation. My

study differs from Sambanis= work in that I delve into two specific case studies that

allow for a closer look at the political-historical intricacies involving not only the

circumstances of the conflicts, but also the leadership of the major and minor states as

well as the needs of the indigenous population.

John D. Cash=s view of the conflict in Northern Ireland, drawing on the theory of

Astructuralism, post-structuralism, structuration . . . and the theory of communicative

action@ is preoccupied with politics and understanding the conflict through political

discourse.75 He discusses relativism and inclusion as current themes in the peace process themes that are concerned with dealing with the rights and identities of each community, Protestants and Catholics, rather than previous efforts that have dwelled on

74. Sambanis 2000, 446.

75. Cash 1966, 7. 65

the Amiddle ground in politics.@76 This last quotation refers to the British government=s top-down

political solutions that tend to overlook the needs of cultural groups involved in the

conflict. Cash sees the continuation of the conflict as the result of Aexclusivists@ (or

extremists) making demands on the Ainclusivist@ citizens of NI.

Use of such terms as Arelativism,@ Ainclusive negotiated settlements,@

Aexclusivists,@ and Aabsolutes@ in referring to the concern by the participants in the

peace process to orient themselves toward inclusion rather than the national question

shows Cash=s post-modernist leanings. Even though the author does not discuss failed

state formation during decolonization and the partition plan, his critique of the top-down

political solutions apply aptly to the historical period when partition was implemented.

While my study notes how the concepts of relativism and inclusion were overlooked by

the British leaders when dealing with the conflicting communities in NI and India

(specifically in J&K), I differ from Cash=s approach in that I focus on the historical-

political background of each minor state, as well as the archival documents and surveys

resulting in the limbo state model applicable to Northern Ireland (and Jammu-and-

Kashmir).

Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd have divided their comprehensive review of the

conflict in Ireland into three areas: dimensions of difference; structures of dominance,

dependence and inequality; and communal polarization. The authors wisely dispatch

76. Cash 1966, 7

monocausal theories of the conflict, realizing that any conflict has multiple complexities

the basis of the problem. The authors offer an exceptional analysis in terms of thematic

organization based on complex economic dynamics stating, AAt the symbolic and

strategic levels the economic, the cultural and the constitutional are inextricably

intertwined. Economic power is a resource for political and cultural struggle, and if

conflict in those areas continues there is every reason to believe that it will be reflected in

continued competition in the economic domain.@77 British colonization of Ireland is

viewed by the authors in terms of Ireland=s occupation Aby an emerging capitalist and

Protestant England.@78 Even though economic power can be considered a theoretical emphasis of the text, the authors do not base their text on theories relating to the conflict itself, such as state formation, decolonization, and partition of land as does my research, preferring, instead, as do many writers of the NI conflict, to offer a narrative chronology of historical events. Also the authors do not explore the political-historical genesis of the conflict in terms of state formation as does my study.

Richard Kearney writes about the national question in Ireland evaluating Athe main ideologies . . . [of] the British/Irish syndrome@ through deconstruction.79 He focuses on Irish nationalism by deconstructing the concepts of sovereignty, nationalism

77. Ruane and Todd 1996, 177.

78. Ruane and Todd 1996, 30.

79. Kearney 1996, 1. 67

and Republicanism in the Irish context. He sees a way of going past the intractable

conflict in NI by Aloosening up the nationalist-unionist logjam.@80 Kearney discusses the idealistic act of a Are-imaged@ Ireland calling for Athe postmodern preference for dissensus--

diversity without synthesis.@81 Dissensus is his term for the opposite of consensus and is basically

the author=s call for separation of cultural communities and activities. While he does not

imply or use the word Apartition,@ he hints at a non-geographic cultural separation of the

Protestants and Catholics, such as planned timing of celebrations, as a means of

overcoming the conflict. While this cultural separation appears to be a logical solution to

the problem of conflict, the foundation of the conflict is more than just cultural. The

conflict, as chapter three of my research reveals, goes deep into the regions= political

history of domination within the religious, political, economic as well as cultural realms.

Kearney=s work appears to be a weak postmodern call for an end to the conflict,

without a thorough look at the genesis of the conflict based on strong theories to

substantiate his idealism. My study is more realistic in that I review the truth of the

political-historical situations in NI, offering scrutiny of not only the responses by the

leadership involved but also an analysis of the surveys conducted at the grassroots level

80. Kearney 1996, 2.

81. Kearney 1996, 65.

and what the indigenous population is saying about conditions in their countries.

3. Jammu-and-Kashmir

Works illuminating the Kashmiri conflict are of two kinds: either they focus on

the conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu-and-Kashmir and possible ways to

end the conflict, or they focus on the Kashmiri population=s preference for joining either

India or Pakistan or for independence. This latter theme also focuses on how to solve the

conflict rather than addressing its origins. My project exposes the varied layers of the

circumstances in J&K that include not only the genesis of the conflict in the region but

also the subjects of the conflict and the violence that has resulted from internal hostility.

An analysis of grassroots= urgent needs and privations have been expressed in the

surveys presented in chapter four, revealing the reasons for the current response of the

indigenous population to J&K=s limbo state status.

A complex view of the political and historical basis of the conflict in J&K is

intimated by Sumit Ganguly in The Crisis in Kashmir. The author employs Samuel

Huntington=s theory of institutional decay and political mobilization.82 Ganguly argues,

AThe combination of institutional decay and political mobilization can contribute to political instability.@83 This perspective is combined with an observation by Kashmiri

journalist and political activist Prem Nath Bazaz that Athe educated Muslim youth . . .

realized that . . . [the Kashmiri government=s] inconsistent behavior had done immense

82. Samuel Huntington 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies.

83. Ganguly 1997, 26.

harm to the interests of the Kashmiris . . . thwarted their progress and deprived them of several political and human rights enjoyed by all the other Indians.@84 While Ganguly does focus on the Kashmiri insurgency of December 1989, he does not bring in why the state formation of 1947 initially failed. My research discloses the connection between failed state formation and the insurgency and thus offers a historical picture of J&K=s limbo state status.

The topic of the Indian-Pakistani conflict and two wars over possession of J&K

(1947-48, 1965) and the1971 war concerning Bangladesh are delineated in Sisir Gupta=s

Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations. His extensive historical work relies on specific details to bring to the fore his account of why India and Pakistan entered into the first war over J&K. He relates in detail the visions that leaders of the Indian National

Congress and the Muslim League have of themselves respectively as Aa secular, unified state@ and as a Astrategically, vital, Islamic state.@85 While an excellent detailed historical narrative on the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Jammu-and-Kashmir, Gupta=s work does not formulate theoretical considerations as the basis for his discourse. His text basically offers a detailed chronological narrative of events. My study makes use of his extensive research, drawing on his evaluation of the national leaders, the Congress and the Muslim League, and especially the role of leaders of these organizations in the implementation of the partition.

84. Ganguly 1997, 73.

85. Gupta 1966, 440.

A view of J&K=s history from ancient mythical times, when the land was known as Kashyap-mar or abode of Kashyap, to the politically troubled 1990s is found in

Victoria Schofield=s Kashmir in the Crossfire. The strongest point of this text is the fact that Schofield views Kashmir through the voices within the nation. Through her narrative, she documents the experiences of the indigenous population, showing the reaction of the Kashmiris to outside invasions of their land including the Indian-Pakistani squabble noting, AAmongst the Kashmiris watching as Pakistan and India discussed their future were those who were discontented with the status quo, but not yet in a strong enough position to do anything about it.@86 Schofield=s text deserves accolades for intensive research in J&K reflecting the nation=s stance on the issues.

However, the author does not base her work on specific theoretical bases such as state formation, decolonization, or the effects of partition even though she does offer discussions of these topics. Theory can organize the information, making sense of the historical accounts and encouraging researchers to apply the information to other similar situations of failed state formation, as my research does with the limbo state model perspective. Nonetheless, Schofield=s knowledge of the Kashmiri people=s Avoice@ will be a supplementary resource, in additional to the surveys previously mentioned and analyzed in chapter four, in my study pertaining to the needs and desires of the diverse

86. Schofield 1996, 196.

groups in J&K.

A different explanation concerning the divisive situation in J&K is found in

Suranjan Das= text Kashmir and Sindh: Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Regional Politics in South Asia. The author writes about the political issues of J&K and Sindh ( the second largest province in Pakistan with the capital of Karachi) in which he examines the problems of ethnic nations asserting their rights within states that use federal borders to divide the ethnic regions. The author argues that the central element giving rise to the political problems in J&K is the populace=s insistence on giving primary loyalty to their ethnic group rather than to the state. According to Das, the leadership of the state of

India, in nation-building attempts, is not able to Aredefine political or imagined communities if the constituent elements perceive the process to be inimical to their interests and aspirations.@87

Das sees forcing nation-building on Jammu-and-Kashmir by India and the resistance by armed groups within J&K as a problem that will be difficult to solve due to the grassroots= resistance. While this is a cogent review of the situation in J&K, the author does not delve into the complexity of the situation that should include not only the political loyalties of the ethnic groups in J&K but also economic, military, cultural, and security issues that contribute to the grassroots= concern. Bringing this latter area of research into the work would have made Das=s work more comprehensive.

This literature review section has covered some basic texts in order for the reader

87. Das 2001, 173.

to become familiar with examples of researchers= diverse thematic foci. Each work contributes knowledge that will advance the work for subsequent investigators in the politicalBhistory of NI and J&K. None of the researchers reviewed above, however, have based their research on a specific perspective in explaining how NI and J&K have become minor states under the control of major states. My project details how NI and

J&K have become minor states dominated by controlling major states utilizing the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model perspective, which helps in understanding how NI and J&K are currently limbo states controlled by other states.

C. Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Ethnicity

1. Sovereignty as Theme and Theory

The theme of struggle for national sovereignty, achieved either through independence or through merging fully with another nation, involves concerns such as national boundaries, political influence internationally as well as domestically, economic development and prosperity, military status, social facilitation, and cultural expression.

These varied concerns are woven throughout this research project as I investigate how

Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir came to be limbo states.

Various scholars within the fields of government and politics agree on the general definition of sovereignty as a state with defined borders, acknowledged internationally as having supreme political, economic, and military authority within a state=s own borders.88 A specific definition is offered by Marc A Genest who writes, AIn theory

88. See the following texts for definitions of sovereignty: Joseph Joffe, 1999, 73

states are sovereign. That is, the government is the supreme authority within the state and

does not answer to any outside power. This sovereignty is recognized by international

law and by other states through diplomatic relations and often by membership in the

United Nations.@89 The concept of sovereignty, as mentioned in chapter two, section A, came into existence in Europe after the end of the Thirty Years= War (1618-1648) at the

signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The various treaties established the creation

of what is known today as the modern nation-state. In the nation-state environment, a

secular leadership consolidated authority and control over bordered territories and a

population within the bordered region providing security, economic development, and

social and administrative infrastructure in exchange for expressions of loyalty and

support for the responding government in terms of tax remuneration and, whenever

needed, military participation, to name a few.90

Various scholars have noted that regardless of the securely bordered regions,

nations still are able to compromise autonomy, and therefore sovereignty, through

various means such as treaties, alliances, coalitions, trade, and dependence on other states

ARethinking the Nation-State,@ Foreign Affairs 78 (6) 122; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1997 Understanding International Conflicts, 76; Rourke, 2001, International Politics on the World Stage 189; Spiegel and Wehling, 1999, World Politics in a New Era 34; and Waltz, 1979, Theory of International Politics, 96 (see bibliography for complete information).

89. Genest 2004, 374.

90. Spiegel and Wehling 1999, 34.

for resources and support.91 Stephen D. Krasner offers four descriptive definitions of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal

sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty.92

Before reviewing the four types of sovereignty and, later in this section, how sovereignty is a theme in this research project, a look at Krasner=s view of the difference between authority and control is helpful. Authority is a Amutually recognized right for

an actor to engage is specific kinds of activities@93 and, therefore, authority that is

effective

does not require the use of force or compulsion. The author notes that while Aauthority

would be coterminous with control,@ control could also result from Athe use of brute

force with no mutual recognition of authority at all.@94 Krasner further interrelates the

complexity between authority and control by stating that over a period of time loss of

control could lead to loss of authority; yet, effective use of control could lead to Anew

systems of authority.@95 For Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir, this new system

of authority could be their attainment of full sovereignty. After an examination below of

Krasner=s theory of the four types of sovereignty, an explanation will follow of how

91. Joffe 1999, 122.

92. Krasner 1999.

93. Krasner 1999, 10.

94. Krasner 1999, 10.

95. Krasner 1999, 10.

sovereignty is a theme in this research project.

The first definition of sovereignty is termed domestic sovereignty and is defined

as basically Athe organization of authority within the state@96 either through one individual such as the executive office, or divided among institutions such as the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of the government. A noteworthy consideration offered by Krasner is that regardless of the type of leadership in operation

(parliamentary or presidential or monarchical or republican or authoritarian or democratic), the current

96. Krasner 1999, 11.

leader may not necessarily have control over developments within the state or territory.97

Thus a state with weakened domestic control could still have complete international legal sovereignty in terms of recognition by other states and participation and voting rights in international organizations. Even though NI and J&K have the appearance of domestic sovereigntyBBeach state appears to have bordered land and economic activityBBeach nation still is under the occupying states= political and administrative domination

(explanatory concept one of the limbo state model) as well as military control and thus cannot be considered as exhibiting domestic sovereignty.

Krasner=s second definition is termed interdependence sovereignty and at first glance appears to rival domestic sovereignty because of the state=s Ainability to regulate

flow of goods, persons, pollutants, diseases, and ideas across territorial boundaries.@98

Krasner does not see this type of loss of control as destructive to domestic sovereignty.

He observes that even if a state=s leader loses control of transborder activities, that

individual can still be recognized as the head of state and still be able to shut out external

actors. Neither NI nor J&K can be seen as having interdependence sovereignty since

each nation has a leader or head of state who is appointed by the controlling state and

whose position is generally governor of that region. Having the controlling state appoint

the leader of the minor state fits explanatory concept two of the limbo state model of

97. Krasner 1999, 12.

98. Krasner 1999, 12

having weak leadership within the limbo state. An appointed leader follows the expectations of the dominant state rather than follow policies in favor of the minor limbo state.

The third definition, termed international legal sovereignty, involves recognition of a state in the international arena and implies that a state has to earn its position within the international community. Krasner employs specifications used by international legal scholarship as the criteria for defining whether or not a state has achieved international legal sovereignty. These conditions involve the state=s international status in response to the following evaluations: AIs a state recognized by other states? Is it accepted as a juridical equal? Are its representatives entitled to diplomatic immunity? Can it be a member of international organizations? Can its representatives enter into agreements with other entities?@99

Recognition by other states invites a state to participate in lucrative exchanges in the economic, technologic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and many other realms as well as allowing secure military status. Basically Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir are recognized in the international arena as parts of the controlling power--NI is seen as part of the United Kingdom and J&K as one-third part of Pakistan and two-third part of India.

Thus international legal sovereignty does not apply to NI and J&K, which fits explanatory concept one of the limbo state model (political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state).

99. Krasner 1999, 14.

The fourth definition, termed Westphalian sovereignty, suggests that after the

Thirty Years= War, the European powers agreed to stop interfering in each other=s

domestic politics. According to Krasner, the focus point of sovereignty is

nonintervention that is violated Athrough coercion or imposition@ by one state over

another, and rarely

through voluntary invitation by a state=s ruler.100 Thus, as Krasner writes, Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty throughout the centuries have been violated consistently and Aare best understood as examples of organized hypocrisy.@101

The author concentrates on international legal and Westphalian sovereignty

revealing through historical accounts since the seventeenth century how sovereignty has

been compromised and violated Athrough conventions, contracting, coercion, and

imposition.@102 Many times coercion and imposition appear to be the dominant methods

as has occurred in NI and J&K as will be revealed in chapters three and four. Thus,

neither NI nor J&K can be classified as exhibiting Westphalian sovereignty due to having

been violated consistently by controlling states (conforming to explanatory concept one

of the limbo state model).

For the purpose of this research project, sovereignty (meaning state autonomy) is

considered to exist within recognized borders of a state in which effective use of control

100. Krasner 1999, 20.

101. Krasner 1999, 24.

102. Krasner 1999, 40.

by an occupying state has led to a new system of authority by the indigenous leadership as approved by the indigenous population. For sovereignty to have all the traits held legitimately to maintain final authority, local leadership supported by the indigenous population is necessary for state formation that is visibly manifested through political stability, economic growth, and mutually welcomed cultural diversity by all culturally- and/or religiously-varied groups. This definition distinguishes two basic types of sovereigntyBBcontrolling sovereignty and subordinate sovereignty. The controlling sovereignty is the occupying state and by authority of its position is considered the dominant or controlling sovereignty; the subordinate sovereignty is the occupied state and as a consequence of its subordinate position is considered the subordinate or limited sovereignty. The second type, even though not possessing all qualities of sovereignty as defined earlier in this section will have the term sovereignty (even though limited) applied because the state does have borders, a population, and some semblance of economic autonomy, and at times some semblance of political autonomy though still under control of an occupying state.

The major or controlling sovereign state that is occupying the subordinate or limited state can grant full sovereignty to the occupied state through any number of ways, such as through a general plebiscite of the population that could indicate that the people want complete autonomy; or through gradual withdrawal in which the occupying state assists the leadership to achieve political and economic stability, as well as security, police, and military order; or through sudden withdrawal from the land by the occupying

state. Another way that a minor sovereign state can achieve full sovereignty is through

an invasion by another state that will oust the former occupying state and itself grant

major sovereignty to the minor sovereignty (or not grant full sovereignty by simply

becoming the new occupying military force and a substitute occupying state). Another

consideration is that the subordinate sovereign state may want to merge with the

dominant sovereign state in order to become a dominant sovereignty as a result of

merging with and thus identifying with that state. Inherent in the definition of

sovereignty for this research project is the idea that sovereignty encourages cultural unity

among those members of the population including culturally diverse groups, pride in

state identity, economic and political stability, and personal security for all living within

the stateBnot only citizens but non-citizen residents as well.

Sovereignty continues to be denied by the British leadership in the case of

Northern Ireland, and the Indian and Pakistani governments in the case of Jammu-and-

Kashmir. Thus full sovereignty, attempts at achieving it and denial in attaining it (either

through full independence or through completely merging with the controlling state), is a

central concern throughout this project. The surveys conducted in both NI and J&K

reveal that after decades of control by the dominant state (or states in the case of J&K),

the concept of sovereignty, in the late 20th century, has begun to take second stage to the indigenous population=s view of what they believe to be more important needs. This recent finding has contributed to the limbo state model explanatory concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population of the limbo state) as developed in sections of this study and fully expounded in chapter five. 81

2. Nationalism and Ethnicity

Linked with sovereignty are the issues of nationalism and ethnicity within a

bordered region. For this project, nationalism and ethnicity are important issues to

consider since the case studies of NI and J&K involve manifestations of ethnic

nationalism. Depending on the author and her/his definition of nationalism and/or

ethnicity and use of the words contextually, the two terms are sometimes used

interchangeably.103

John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith offer the following observation on the

study of nationalism:

[nationalism] includes the growth of nations and the national state, as well as ethnic identity and community . . . [and] spills over into any number of cognate subjects: race and racism, fascism, language development, political religion, communalism, ethnic conflict, international law, protectionism, minorities, gender, immigration, genocide. The forms that nationalism takes [include] . . . religious, conservative, liberal, fascist, communist, cultural, political, protectionist, integrationist, separatist, irredentist, diaspora, pan, etc. (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 3)

In a sense, nationalism can take on a variety of definitional references.

John K. Cox offers a general definition of nationalism and then further clarifies the meaning of Aethnic@ nationalism. Cox=s basic definition of nationalism is Aa sense

of belonging.@104 Cox further clarifies that by Abelonging@ is meant that certain

characteristics are shared among members of the community such as Aa common

103. Varshney 2003, 85; see also Horowitz 1985, 41-54.

104. Cox 2002, 35. 82

language, a common history, and common customs or cultural traditions (sometimes including religion).@105 Thus, within a bordered state, Aethnic@ nationalism is a connection with Aancestral association . . . [and] blood line.@106 The sense of shared characteristics has a genetic link giving an affective, particularistic connection in the common culture and way of life.

Chapters three and four below discuss the ethnic nationalism prevalent in NI and J&K as internal factors, which have contributed to both states= current limbo state condition.

D. Partition

A perspective that helps shed light on NI=s and J&K=s failed attempts at state formation, in addition to the concepts discussed above, is partition. Partition theory explains why and how land is divided between or among conflicting groups of the population. Group identity ties in with partitioning of land, becoming the basis of how the land is to be divided.

As noted above in chapter one, section C, the partition experience has affected both NI and J&K not only politically and militarily but also economically, socially, and culturally. Also noted above is how partitioning of land has become a dichotomous experience for both limbo states. Dichotomous experience means that while partitioning of land basically has been an attempt to acknowledge the varied groups and to allow them to establish recognition of their identity on their own land, for NI and J&K this attempt

105. Cox 2002, 35.

106. Cox 2002, 37.

has been paradoxical in that partitioning of land has led to considerable cultural division and sectarian conflict. The partition experience, as Radha Kumar espouses in the article reviewed above,107 has created a quandary for both the occupying nations and the colonies. This dilemma was the result of the occupying nation, Great Britain, realizing that it had become enmeshed in a growing problemBBcolonies seeking independence through violent insurgency. On the other hand, the occupied nation is neither politically nor economically ripe for full independence. As commented on previously, an alternative means to gaining full sovereignty without separation from the controlling sovereignty is to merge fully with the occupying state in order to achieve the experience of full state sovereignty. However, this melding of the occupied nation with the occupying nation has not transpired in the cases of NI and J&K. The partition dilemma is a key focus of chapters three and four.

Partition theorists such as realists Donald Horowitz, Chaim Kaufmann, John

Mearsheimer, and Stephen Van Evera offer the perspective that, if necessary, conflict groups should separate into different areas. Donald Horowitz writes:

If it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in more than one homogeneous state, even if this necessitates population transfers. Separating the antagonistsBpartitionBis an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated (Horowitz 1985, 588).

Chaim Kaufmann notes that groups involved in ethnic violence need to be

107. Kumar 1997, 26-27, 34. 84

Ademographically separated@ in order for civil politics to be restored because Asolutions

[which attempt to restore] . . . multi-ethnic civil politics . . . such as power sharing, state re-building, or identity reconstruction cannot work because they do nothing to dampen

the security dilemma.@108 Security dilemma as offered by Robert Jervis, is when one

community=s attempt at increasing its own security is perceived by another community

as a threat to its own security.109 Mearsheimer and Van Evera advocate dividing a country along the communal borders of conflict to create ethnically homogeneous territories and, if necessary, transferring populations to their respectively ethnic sections.110

Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf offer a number of reasons why partition is not feasible in resolving deep communal conflicts.111 The basis of their argument is that after

World War II artificial borders established by colonial powers had ethnically heterogeneous states as a result of four centuries of population mobility. Thus attempts at redrawing state boundaries to achieve ethnic boundaries appear to be impractical on the one hand as well as raise cries of impugning on state sovereignty on the other. In addition, the authors note that economically, the international market functions more efficiently in a large-state order, and partitioning a region into smaller entities would create a costly duplication of a state system.

108. Kaufmann 1996, 137 and 139.

109. Jervis 1978, 30.

110. Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995, 16-21.

Still, as Smooha and Hanf admit, at times creation of newly independent states is

the lesser evil, at which time it should be considered by the parties involved. Such

should be the case for areas containing Aincompatible nationalisms and intense

conflicts.@112 The authors advocate that in these cases partition must be negotiated rather than Aimposed

unilaterally@113 This point is quite important in the case of NI and J&K, in which a form

of controlled partition was imposed by the occupying states on these two countries.

More will said of this controlled partition in chapters three and four. Interestingly the

authors note, AThe separation of Kashmir from India is . . . a probable and reasonable

development.@114 Such a statement, while intending to offer an example of how partition could be a solution, does not expose nor enumerate the complexities of the situation in

Jammu-and-Kashmir.

As noted by Radha Kumar above in chapter two, section B, part two, partition actually has been a means by colonizing states to Aunshoulder colonies or divide up spheres of influenceBa strategy of divide and quit.@115 Kumar observes that the fall of colonial empires gave rise to two types of partitioning justificationBBWilsonian national

111. Smooha and Hanf 1996, 326-333.

112. Smooha and Hanf 1996, 330.

113. Smooha and Hanf 1996, 330.

114. Smooha and Hanf 1996, 330.

115. Kumar 1997, 24.

self-determination that Asupported ethnic self-determination as freedom from colonial

rule@ and the British style of partitioning resulting from classification of those colonies

that were viewed as Airreconcilable nationhoods@ for which partition would be Aa lesser

evil than constant civil war.@116 A possible third style of partitioning is one in which occupying states decide on division of a state or region as a result of military venture or victory as occurred in the eastern and western areas in Germany after World War II that was divided by the victorious states of the United States, Great Britain, France, and The

Soviet

Union.117 As a result of the British style of partitioning (as opposed to the Wilsonian style

of partitioning or military style of partitioning), Kumar illustrates, India and Ireland did

not separate conflicting ethnic groups but, in fact, Afomented further violence and forced

migration@ and did lead to war.118 Kumar recognizes that the British style of partition in

India and NI Awere driven by considerations extraneous to the needs and desires of the

people [leading] . . . more often . . . to war than its culmination in peace.@119

Imposing partition unilaterally has been disastrous, especially when the national impulses of the indigenous population is ignored as has resulted in NI and J&K.

116. Kumar 1997, 25.

117. The concept of military partitioning of lands resulted in a conversation on 10/20/06 with Dr. Joel Wolfe, Ph.D., Chairperson of the Department of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati (Ohio).

118. Kumar 1997, 25.

119. Kumar 1997, 26.

Theoretically, words are easy to put on paper and such statements as Aif necessary, transfer populations@ appear to be simple logic until the theorists are confronted by the reality of members of the populace who refuse to be transferred out of their homeland because of their traditional, ancestral, and religious connections, and other myriad reasons that the people take to heart in their refusal to be Atransferred.@ The British style of partition involves the concept of division of land and/or transfer of population. Both case studies in this research project have revealed that into the twenty-first century, land division and/or transfer of population have proven to be catastrophic for the indigenous population.

While the conclusions point to problems with Asolutions@ like partition, this research study=s focus is not solutions but rather why state formation failed in NI and

J&K during and after the partition plans. Also, the focus is on why later state formation failed when the possibility of either complete independence or complete merging with the occupying state could have contributed to each state becoming sovereign.

Chapter III

Northern Ireland

Introduction

This chapter uses Amultiple sources of evidence@1 to support the limbo state model stated in chapter one, section D in relation to Northern Ireland. As the information is presented in each section of this chapter, it will be correlated with the relevant explanatory concept or criterion of the limbo state model. In order for the reader to understand the aims of this chapter, I will present an overview of the sections below, specifying the concept that the information supports. For further clarification, the connection between each section of this chapter and the link to the explanatory concept of the limbo state model is specified.

This chapter begins in section A with the political history of NI supporting explanatory concept one as stated in chapter one (section D, part two) as: patterns of invasions and

political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period

of years (revealed in the region=s political history) with limited gaps of self-rule that

indicate these areas exhibit limited sovereignty with resulting consequences, such as lack

of personal security, personal independence, political stability and transparency for the

inhabitants as well as poor economic development, and weakened or compromised rule

of law and thus acquiring limbo state status. The external factorsBBinvasion, occupation,

and settlementBBcan be viewed as the genesis of the division that took place in NI

leading to the protracted conflict among the two major groups in NI--the Protestants and

the Catholics--supporting feature four stated in chapter one (section D, part two) as

patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous

1. Yin 2003, 14. 89

population (generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own

agenda of preservation of their culture) that are the aftereffect of cultural diversity in the

post-partition era.

Section A and section D of this chapter also reveal the internal factors that

contributed to NI=s limbo state statusBBsocietal pattern of division such as establishment of various political and paramilitary groups that also support explanatory concept four.

The situation in NI in the earlier phases of the conflict reveal that generally each group supported either the Protestant=s or the Catholic=s demands and needs, thus contributing

to the schism of NI and introducing cultural fragmentation within NI=s Christian

community, supporting explanatory concepts three and four with statements of

explanatory concept three as offered in chapter one (section D, part two) as: patterns of

settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic

groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation with resulting partition of the land

leading to incomplete or limited or denied self-rule as well as sectarian violence among

the varied religious and ethnic groups resulting, at times, in violent consequences (above

repetitive statements of the explanatory concepts in this chapter are for reasons of

clarity).

The societal division prevented talks of unity between the Protestants and

Catholics that prevented a united front before the controlling British sovereignty

supporting explanatory concepts two, three, and four (concept two is: patterns of weak

leadership within the limbo state leading to failure of authority and related consequences

such as lack of personal security, personal independence, political stability, and

transparency for the inhabitants, as well as poor economic development, and weakened

or compromised rule of law). As stated in chapter two (section C, part two)

informational support of the four explanatory concepts reinforces my view that Northern

Ireland can be grouped under the limbo state model.

As noted above, processesBBthat either prevented state formation or resulted in protracted limited sovereignty and, predominately by reason of this condition, protracted conflicts among the various groups involved politically and militarily within the region of

NIBBcan be classified as either external or internal factors, supporting explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasions and outside domination), two (patterns of weak leadership), and three (patterns of immigration resulting in diverse ethnic groups). As noted above in chapter two (section D) external factors generally refers to sources outside of the state such as military invasions, military and political occupations, cultural settlements by citizens of other sovereign states, or instruments such as acts, treaties, and laws established by and imposed by the occupying state. Internal factors denotes sources within the state contributing to failed formation such as weak leadership, political and cultural division among the populace, political and para-military organizations, and insurgencies.

These external and internal factors make up some criteria for the limbo state model supporting the explanatory concepts of the limbo state model. An impressive internal factor revealing the thoughts and opinions of the population is the Northern

Ireland Life and Times Survey (see appendix A) supporting explanatory concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). This comprehensive survey has revealed interesting information concerning how the members of the population view various subjects including those relating to the current limbo state status of NI. The survey information related to the topics covered in each section of the chapter will be revealed below. A final look at what the results of the survey indicate in the general overview of the current limbo state status in NI is offered in section G of this chapter.

Section C provides a summary of external and internal factors that contributed to the failure of state formation and thus the limbo state status of NI. Briefly, an external factor was the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the subsequent partition of 1921 supporting explanatory concept one (outside domination). Other external factors were the Hillsborough Pact of 1985, the Act of Union of 1801, the >plantations= of settlers in the Ulster region of Ireland, and the Belfast Agreement of 1998, each supporting explanatory concept one (outside domination) and three (patterns of immigration); more will be said of these factors in section C below.

Also, section C (part five) offers a chronology of internal factors that actually reveals approaches that could have led to resolving the conflict within NI and maybe first steps toward a sovereign state. As will be shown, the situation resulted in failed attempts in helping NI achieve complete state sovereignty supporting explanatory concepts one

(patterns of invasion and domination), two (weak leadership), and three (patterns of immigration).

In addition, section C (parts six and seven) detail the internal factors that have contributed to failure of complete sovereignty for NIBBdecommissioning and opposition to the Belfast Agreement supporting explanatory concepts one (pattern of domination), two (weak leadership), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

The closing section of this chapter, section D, offers a reiteration of elements that have contributed to NI=s limbo state status providing a clear vision supporting the explanatory concepts of the limbo state model.

An organized viewing of the external and internal factors that have impeded NI=s ability to become an independent sovereign state focuses on the process that has led to

NI=s limbo state status. Rather than listing external and internal features in different segments of this chapter, each section follows a chronological order illustrating from epoch to epoch how NI came to be in its current status of Anon-state@ with the resultant protracted conflicts illuminating the explanatory concepts of the limbo state model. By this method of review, the reader can see the development of the process, which has led to NI=s current limbo state status.

A. Political History of Northern Ireland and the Conflict

1. Then and Now: The Battle of the Boyne and Parades

Paradoxical internal determinants supporting explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership), three (patterns of immigration resulting in diverse groups resulting in violence), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by members of the population) that have contributed to the division among the

inhabitants of NI and consequently to the current non-state position and protracted conflicts are actually ceremonial events, specifically, parades. Most parades in NI can be described as somewhat of a paradox for both the celebratory aspect as well as for the divisive contribution among the inhabitants of NI. There are as many as two thousand summer marches organized by the Protestant Orange Order; the most well-known occurs on July

12th each year commemorating an important day of glorification for the Loyalist

Protestants of NI.2 This parade is considered one of the more important because of what it celebratesBBa battle that took place over three hundred years ago. Historically and politically, the Battle of the Boyne that took place on 12 July 1690 near Dublin resulted in the victory of Protestant King William of Orange over Catholic rival, James II, for the

British throne. This conquest defined the Loyalists= place in the Ulster province of NI.3

Michael Ignatieff=s video presentation of interviews with the Loyalists and their devotion to the British Crown offers a view of NI Loyalists that only a video can capture.4 Ignatieff=s video reveals the significance of July 12th for the Loyalists and the preparation for the parties, bonfires, and processions the week before the parade, thus

2. Amoric 2004, online: http://www.libraries.uc.edu:2167/universe/documents? ThroughLexisNexis(TM) Academic.

3. Generally Protestants are also referred to as Loyalists (loyal to the British crown or current monarchy) or Unionists (stay united with Great Britain); Catholics are generally referred to as Nationalists (want union with the Republic of Ireland) or Republicans (against monarchy). Other related terminology can be found in section IV below.

4. Ignatieff 1994, Mirror, Mirror: Northern Ireland video.

presenting an image of an Ireland that cannot be fully appreciated in any written review

of the events leading to the celebrations of July 12th.

As reported on the evening news,5 the last major period of July 12th violence took place in the two major cities of Northern Ireland in 2005. According to the transmitted accounts, in the Ardoyne Catholic district in Belfast=s north side, explosives such as gas

bombs and homemade grenades were hurled at the marchers with a reported sixty officers

and a dozen civilians injured in the explosions.

In the previous year, violence broke out when the Protestant Orange Order parade

passed the same Ardoyne Catholic district. As reported by Shawn Pogatchnik,

Associated Press writer, after four hundred Protestants were allowed by the police to pass

after two hundred Orangemen paraded the main road past Ardoyne, the Catholic crowd

began throwing bottles, rocks, and other projectiles over the police lines at the Protestants

who returned the objects back at the Catholic crowd; after the Protestants marched

through the district, the Catholic crowd turned its anger against the police.6 Even though security forces attempted to separate Protestants and Catholics by a barricade of armored vehicles and steel screens along one hundred yards of the parade route, violence still occurred. Also, the Parades Commission attempted to maintain order by specifying who

5. CBS News reported online: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2005/07/12/belfast 050712. html.

6. 13 July 2004. The Associated Press. Online at http://www.uc.edu:2167/universe/ document? Through LexisNexis(TM) Academic.

and what could be paraded, yet violence still transpired.7

This violent internal occurrence attests to the division among the two major groups inhabiting NI. In the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 20028, the responses basically support each group=s apparent feelings about the parades, supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses).

In the 2000 survey, when asked if the right to march is an important freedom, the responses were the following:

% Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

Strongly Agree 9 40 25

Agree 26 41 31

Neither 25 11 20

Disagree 28 4 13

Strongly Disagree 6 1 5

(Can=t Choose and Missing categories percentages were low single digit.)

7. 13 July 2004. The Associated Press. Online at http://www.uc.edu:2167/universe/ document? Through LexisNexis(TM) Academic.

8. See appendix A for full information concerning the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2002 conducted by P. Devine of Queen=s University of Belfast and L. Dowds of the University of Ulster, International Conflict Research (INCORE). The survey is distribute by UK Data Archive, University of Essex, Colchester, November 2003. The survey is online: http://data-archive.ac.uk. The results of the questions can be accessed directly at http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/results/polatt.html (It should be noted that the 2003 results came out in late 2004 and 2005.) 96

When asked if no marches should be allowed through areas of another tradition unless the residents approve, the responses were the following:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

Strongly Agree 47 9 22

Agree 38 23 31

Neither 10 25 23

Disagree 1 26 12

Strongly Disagree 1 10 5

(ACan=t Choose@ and AMissing@ categories percentages were low single digit

The above responses offer a few interesting details. The first detail of note involves those in NI who consider themselves as having no religion supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). According to the survey in the first question about right-to-march, there were more no-religion responses (31%) than Catholic (26%) in the Agree response. Likewise, in the second question about not allowing marches through areas of another tradition, there were more no-religion responses (31%) than Protestant responses (23%) in the Agree response. The appearance that there are considerable no-religion voices on certain issues, brings new consideration to the Protestant/Catholic division that has been considered the central issue in the conflict in NI. The point here is that some NI inhabitants offered secular responses to the survey. The next detail drawn from the survey concerning marches is that

according to the responses, there were those responders who appeared to side with those

of the opposite view. For example, in the response to the question about not allowing

marches through another tradition area, the Catholic would have been expected to

reverberate overwhelming in the strongly agree/agree response; however 12% responded

either Neither or Disagree or Strongly Disagree. Likewise, a high percentage of the

Protestant reply would have been expected to have been Disagree or Strongly Disagree,

but 32% responded that they agreed or strongly agreed. These unexpected responses

reveal a curiously expressive grassroots feedback to the situation in NI. The survey

conducted in 2000 in which the above responses were given reveals a trend away from

supporting violence in general. This trend appears to be a new millennium attitude in

which a double-digit portion of the population in NI is revealing a more tolerant attitude

toward the opposition.

Interestingly, this tolerant attitude was seen in the July 12th parades from 2006 to

2008 in which orderly behavior prevailed, especially in 2008 where Afor the first time in

over 30 years the military were not deployed on the streets of Belfast on 12 July.@9 It should be noted that power sharing, which is discussed below in section C (part five), contributed as well to nonviolent parades.

2. Political History of Northern Ireland

The political history of NI before and after the Battle of the Boyne supporting

9. Reported by Northern Ireland Office online: http://www.nio.gov.uk/index/ key- issues/parades.htm.

explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasion and political and administrative

domination), two (patterns of weak leadership), three (patterns of immigration), and four

(patterns of complex and paradoxical responses by population) is an internal history of

nationalism, conflict, and violence within a region that attracts the elements that

contribute

to conflicts between two groups occupying the same land. Before reviewing the earlier

comprehensive political history of NI, it is important to realize that the NI of the twenty-

first century came into being in the 1920-22 political activities that made today=s NI a

constituent part of the United Kingdom.10 A sovereign state of Ireland, the Republic of

Ireland, located south of NI, resulted from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries political activities, which will be discussed below (see map 3.1 below) . NI=s

political history involves the Irish province of Ulster, six of whose nine counties are part

of NI (see maps 3.2 and 3.3 below). A source of early history of Irish or Celtic social and

political existence is the Táin that was compiled in the twelfth century containing

10. While much of the information found in this section on Irish and British political history can be found in any related text, information used here is taken from the following texts: Foster, R.F. 1988, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972; Foster, R.F. ed., 2001, History of Ireland; Bardon, J. 1992, A History of Ulster; and online: http://geocities.com/ CapitalHill/3222/-ulstnat.html; http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm; http:// news.bbc.uk/hi/english/static/northern-ireland/ understanding/ themes/decommissioning; http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/Id200102/ Idselect/Iddelreg/65/ 6502.htm; http://www.Infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858898.html; www.ulsternation.org; www.democraticalternative.com; and links found at these sites.

language dated to the eighth century.11 Much of what is contained in this text is considered mythic but is also an important source of the early history of Celtic society.

11. Bardon 1992, 12-13.

100

A review of the post-mythic internal history of the province of Ulster supporting

explanatory concepts one to three begins around the seventh century when documents in

Latin were written by churchmen. According to the chronicles of that era, about a

hundred clans on the island grouped themselves into the five provinces of Ulster, Midhe

(also known as Meath), Leinster, Munster, and Connaught, with Ulster dominated by the

O=Neill dynesty, who were descendants of a fifth century leader named Neill of the Nine

Hostages. Thus the act of division among the inhabitants goes back many centuries

supporting the features listed above. The O=Neills divided into northern and southern

branches and became the kings to whom other Irish kings owed allegiance. Accordingly,

until the external raids of the Norse in the late eighth century, Ireland could be

considered a sovereign state ruled by its own Celtic leadership, who were organized into

clans or tribes owing allegiance to one of the five kingdoms listed above. The external

invasion by the Norse was successful because the Celtic leadership did not develop a

strong central government (supporting explanatory concept two concerning weak

leadership) and could not fight off the intrusion by the Norse people.12 However, in 1014 the Celtic high king, Brian Boru, was able to oust the Norse invaders. Subsequently, for

150 years Ireland again became an independent sovereign land without foreign control but engaged in internal clan battles and violence that would eventually leave open an

12. Historical information online: htttp://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0858898.html.

101

invading gap13 supporting explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasions) and two

(weak leadership).

By the mid twelfth century the political conflicts became more complicated when

the external forces of multiple Norman invasions from England, South Wales, and the

Continent began to take place supporting explanatory concept one (patterns of

invasions). Historically, the first involvement by the English in Irish affairs occurred

when Richard de Clare, second earl of Pembroke, also known as Strongbow, intervened

on behalf of a claimant to the throne of Leinster in 1170.14 By 1171 English King Henry

II arrived in Ireland to establish his control and an Anglo-Irish conflict that has continued for over eight hundred years15 supporting explanatory concept one (patterns of invasions).

By 1177 John de Courci and his group advanced north of Dublin, controlling

areas of County Down and County Antrim, constructing castles, and establishing the

northeast coast as the center of Norman Ulster. Meanwhile, King John Plantagenet of

England, in maintaining the use of external sectors in the region, created an earldom of

Ulster in 1205, installing Hugh de Lacy as the earl to keep a watchful eye on the

independent Courci.

External components supporting explanatory concepts one (pattern of invasion),

13. Historical information online: http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/ A0858898.html.

14. Foster 2001, 48-49. Also online: http://news.bbc.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/ northern_ireland/10657.stm.

15. Bardon 1992, 31-33.

102

two (weak leadership), and three (patterns of immigration) that began in the twelfth century and can be said to contribute to the current conflicts in NI, continued into the late sixteenth century with an external influence in the form of Scots immigrating to Ulster.

This immigration occurred because James I was determined to fill six of the nine counties of Ulster with English and Scottish colonists, thus contributing to concepts one (patterns of invasion) and three (patterns of immigration) of the limbo state model.

Thus, Ulster=s transformation has been the result of English expansionist ambitions in Ireland from the mid sixteenth century, the defeat of the O=Neill dynasty, the controlling lords of the north in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and the activities of King James I. The immigration that began before the seventeenth century continued to bring those loyal to the English crown. As a result, Ulster province had a dominant population of Protestant English and Scottish planters with a dominant English landholding aristocracy and tenant farmers of Scottish and English immigrants also contributing to the concepts stated in concept three (patterns of immigration). The native Catholic Irish found themselves landless and displaced doing only menial labor as a means of earning wages. Basically, their financial stance was controlled by an external economy. It is not surprising that an internal event in the form of a violent uprising took place in 1641 by the subjugated Irish against the English and Scottish settlersBBthus supporting concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by the population).

103

Even though the colonists fled, they later returned with a reconquest of Ireland by

Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s and the Stuart monarchy restoration in the 1660s, resulting

in a continuation of external elements influencing the demography of NI in the

seventeenth century. Ulster stood out among the provinces in Ireland for having the

larger and more concentrated British and Protestant population than that of any other

Irish province, which supports explanatory concept three (patterns of immigration).16

By the late seventeenth century, two external events transpired that would have a major bearing on the religious division in NI, thus supporting explanatory concepts one

(patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership), and three (patterns of immigration). First, Roman Catholic James II was expelled from England in 1689 and made Catholic Dublin the headquarters for his followers. Meanwhile, Protestant William

III made Protestant Belfast his command center. The second event took place on 12 July

1690 when William III (or King Billy as the Loyalists refer to him) beat James II in the

Battle of the Boyne, making Ulster the part of Ireland most British, most Protestant, and most loyal to the crown, as Ignatieff reveals through interviews in his video. At the same time, however, Ulster still had a large population of non-British Catholics and was still

contiguous with a larger Catholic Ireland.

More external determinants supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period

16. As stated earlier, the political history of Northern Ireland can be found in any available source. Above information is taken primarily from Bardon 1992, 25-182.

104

of years) and three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural self preservation)

allowed continued changes for Ulster in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when that province became a refuge for Protestant Huguenots who fled from

France after

105

Map 3.1.

Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (online at www.geography.about.com/library/maps/blireland.htm-21K)

106

Map 3.2.

Northern Ireland Counties

(online at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/map3.htm)

107

Map 3.3. Northern Ireland Cities (online at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/map8.htm)

the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 168517. By the eighteenth century, internal subdivisions took place in NI when the elites of Ulster had gained the allegiance of lower- economic-class Protestants who competed with the lower-economic-class Catholics for favorable land-leases and jobs, encouraging rivalry between the two lower economic

17. Foster 1988, 212n. 108

classes and strengthening the natural fear and jealousy that existed between them.18 Thus, the external and internal groundwork supporting concepts one (invasions and domination by occupying state), two (weak leadership), three (immigrations), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population) had been set, instigating conflicts in

NI that have continued into the twenty-first century.

Part of the internal groundwork was the establishment of societal patterns and factions, supporting explanatory concept four (patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population) of the limbo state model.

In 1791, the Society of United Irishmen was founded and was based on the creation of an ecumenical nation freed of monarchical rule and religious division.19 Bitter sectarian conflicts in County Armagh in Ulster province led to a battle between Protestant and

Catholic factions in September of 1795.20 The result was the founding of the Orange

Society (later known as the Orange Order) that was devoted to maintaining British rule and Protestant control of Ulster.21 Conflicts and fighting continued, and by the summer of

1798 a number of rebellions initiated by the United Irishmen inspired the Catholic peasantry to continue fighting. As a result of the external elements of French support and

British repression, thirty-five thousand died on all sides and the Act of Union of 1800 was

18. Foster 2001, 145-154.

19. Foster 2001, 151.

20. Foster 2001, 152.

21. Bardon 1992, 226.

109

passed, thus ending Irish Parliament autonomy and transferring Irish representation to

Westminster.22 This transaction supports explanatory concepts one (patterns of political and administrative domination by occupying state), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three (patterns of immigration) of the limbo state model.

The above political-historical review of the volatility of early Irish history reveals a series of externally- and internally-influenced factors leading to conflicts between the indigenous Irish and their invading neighbors, primarily the dominant British and Scottish subjects, thus supporting all four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model. The

British leadership encouraged settlers to enter the lands of Northern Ireland and control land ownership. Thus, with the influx into NI of numerous immigrants into the six counties of Ulster, with many primarily as landowners, major conflicts between the indigenous Irish population, who generally were relegated as laborers to the British upper classes, and immigrating British and Scottish subjects began to take place, leading to the results of explanatory concepts one (domination) and three (immigration). This description of the genesis of the situation in NI that led to the non-sovereign limbo state situation shows how the inhabitants aligned their political associations with specific religious and ethnic identities, supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

3. Self-Identification in Northern Ireland

How those individuals and groups living within NI identify themselves in terms of

22. O=Day and Stevenson 1992, 6-10.

110

affiliation is linked to explanatory concept four (patterns of complex and paradoxical responses). As discussed above, in the early history of NI an individual=s and group=s religious and ethnic identities contributed to political affiliation held by either societal component. Today that concept is dichotomous in that even though it still holds true to a certain extent, that perception is being challenged. The NI Life and Times Survey (see appendix A) asked several questions about self-identification of the respondents with some expected replies and some unanticipated feedback supporting concept four. Four different questions and the varied responses are reviewed below.

In 2000, the first question asked was, AWhat is the religious mix of this area?@

The general responses were:

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

Totally Catholic 6 Mixed Catholic and Protestant 37

Mainly Catholic 14 Mainly Protestant 32

Totally Protestant 9 (Don=t know) 2

The results of the responses to the question based on the religion of the responders were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

Totally Catholic 19 0 1

Mainly Catholic 36 3 5

Mixed Catholic/Protestant 37 36 42

Mainly Protestant 7 45 42

Totally Protestant 0 14 8

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(Don=t know) 1 2 3

The responses that were not based on religious affiliation reveal that generally the population of NI sees the religious mix as equally Mixed Catholic/Protestant (37%) and

Mainly Protestant (32%). The more interesting responses were those based on the religion of the responder, in which the response of Mixed Catholic/Protestant was offered by 37% of Catholics responding, 36% of Protestants responding, and 42% of those responding who claim to be of No Religion.

If these statistics are any indication of how each religious group thinks about the situation, then about a third of the Catholic respondents and a third of the Protestant respondents see NI as being Mixed Catholic/Protestant, revealing a moderate view at least among a third of those responding. Again, in the category of those claiming No Religion, that presents a voice previously not considered in the NI conflict, 42% of the No Religion respondents see a religious mix in NI. These responses disclose a section of NI=s population who can be identified as moderate in their view of the dominate religion of NI and at the same time complex due to the fact that within the Christian community are members voicing a viewpoint not based on religious affiliation.

The next sets of questions are concerned with the respondents= ethnic affiliationBB British or IrishBBsupporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). The first of these questions asked in 2003 in the NI

Life and Times Survey was, AHow proud are you of being British, or do you not see yourself as British at all?@ The general response was:

112

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

Very proud 22 Not very proud 9

Somewhat proud 28 Don=t see self as British at all33

Not at all proud 3 Other (specify) 1

(Don=t know) 4

The results of those responding who are of different religions were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

Very proud 3 39 8

Somewhat proud 10 40 32

Not very proud 7 11 10

Not at all proud 4 2 4

Don=t see self as British at all 70 5 39

Other (specify) 1 1 4

(Don=t know) 5 3 3

The 70% Catholic responders who don=t see themselves as British and 79% Protestants who are proud (very and somewhat) of being British are not surprising results, which appears to maintain the status quo of division between Catholic and Protestants. Nor are the general responses surprising, in which 50% those responding report seeing themselves as British and 33% report not seeing themselves as British at all. The unexpected responses are the 39% of those categorized as No Religion who don=t see themselves as

113

British and the 40% categorized as No Religion who are proud (very and somewhat) to be

British. These No Religion responses reveal that a significant number within the population in NI do not have religious beliefs as a determinant in their answers. Should responses of those surveyed who claim to have no religion increase in percentage, then these No Religion faction offer a potent argument in the future for those groups who advocate a Northern Ireland independent of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland since national affiliation due to religious association will become a weak claim.

The next ethnic-related question asked in 2003 on the NI Life and Times Survey was, AHow proud are you of being Irish, or do you not see yourself as Irish at all?@ The responses were:

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

Very proud 21 Don=t see self as Irish at all 35

Somewhat proud 29 Other 2

Not very proud 7 (Don=t know) 3

No at all proud 3

The results of those responding based on the different religions were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

Very proud 45 4 19

Somewhat proud 37 24 22

Not very proud 5 8 8

Not at all proud 1 5 3

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Don=t see self as Irish at all 7 55 43

Other 1 2 3

(Don=t know) 4 3 3

In the general responses, 50% of the respondents are proud (very and somewhat) to consider themselves Irish, while 35% don=t see themselves as Irish at all. These percentages are similar to those results to the responses of those who are proud to be

British (50%) and those who don=t see themselves as British at all (33%).

In the responses based on religious difference, 55% of the Protestants who responded did not see themselves as Irish, while 70% of Catholics did not see themselves as British. Likewise, a higher percent of Catholics (82%) were proud to consider themselves Irish, while 79% of the Protestants were proud to consider themselves British.

It should be noted that 28% of the Protestants who responded were proud to consider themselves Irish, while only 13% of the Catholics surveyed were proud to consider themselves British. Again, in terms of balanced responses, the more interesting results are those in the No Religion grouping. Of those who responded as having No Religion, 41% were proud to consider themselves Irish, while a similar percentage (40%) were proud to be considered British. Within the same category, 43% did not see themselves as Irish, while 39% of those in the No Religion category did not see themselves as British. The survey offers a picture of the grassroots expressions of their thoughts and feelings. In addition, some views that may not have been expected to be articulated, such as those of the No Religion classification, have offered surprisingly complex results and support

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explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

The last polled question on identity directly asked the respondents to identify themselves. The question was, AIf you had to choose, which one best describes the way you think of yourself?@ The general responses were:

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

British 41 Scottish 1

English 1 Ulster 4

European 1 Welsh 0

Irish 27 Other 1

Northern Irish 24 (Don=t know) 1

The results for people of different religions were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

British 8 66 31

English 1 0 0

European 1 0 9

Irish 64 2 20

Northern Irish 25 22 29

Scottish 0 1 3

Ulster 0 8 2

Welsh 0 0 0

Other 1 1 6

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(Don=t know) 0 1 1

Some of the responses to the above question were expected; this included the 41% in the general response who considered themselves British and the 51% who considered themselves Irish, with the division between Irish (27%) and Northern Irish (24%). Ulster is a more recent terminology when considering oneself as Northern Irish and comprised

4% of those surveyed. In the responses under the different religions, those 66%

Protestants considering themselves British was expected, as was the 64% Catholics who considered themselves Irish.

The interesting area of this survey are the quarter percent of Catholics (25%) who described themselves Northern Irish, the slightly below quarter percent of Protestants

(22%, unless the 8% who identify themselves as Ulster is considered, then the value increases to 30%) who described themselves as Northern Irish, and the slightly above quarter percent of No Religion who described themselves as Northern Irish.

These double digit Catholics, Protestants, and No Religion responders who are viewing themselves as Northern Irish offer two possible interpretations supporting explanatory concept fourBBeither unity of identification or paradoxical in self-identity and environmental identity. These responses of those diverse groups living in NI (Catholics,

Protestants, and No Religion group) may be an indication of a future trend for these groups uniting in their identification as Northern Irish. The trend in ethnic and religious identities not aligning with an individual=s political affiliation challenges the traditional view in Northern Ireland of a person=s ethnic and religious makeup identifying him or her

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with a specific political affiliation.

The paradoxical aspect of the responses to the above question supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses) is the fact that even though the population responding to the question lives in Northern Ireland, only 24% of those in the general response category think of themselves as Northern Irish, only 25% of the

Catholics living in NI think of themselves as Northern Irish, and only 22% of the

Protestants living in NI think of themselves as Northern Irish.

It is interesting to note that the questions above on identity were asked from 2000 to 2003. A more interesting observation would be how the grassroots of NI responded before 2000 on an identity survey. From 1989 to 1994, John Darby, Chairman of Ethics

Studies at the University of Ulster, conducted an identity survey of the citizens of NI. In his text, Scorpions in a Bottle, Darby reveals statistics of the survey that showed that between 1989 and 1994 about 26% to 29% of Protestants described their identity as being either AUlster or Northern Irish@ as opposed to the conventional ABritish.@ Also, between 25% to 28% of Roman Catholics described their identity as ANorthern Irish@ rather than AIrish.@ In comparing the results of Darby=s survey with the results of the NI

Life and Times Survey, the reader sees that not much of a change has taken place. In the

NILT survey, 30% of the Protestants reported that they viewed themselves as Northern

Irish (22%) or Ulster (8%). Of the Catholic questioned by the NILT, 25% saw themselves as Northern Irish rather than Irish. The two separate surveys conducted before and after the turn of the century reveal very little in how the population of NI report their identity.

118

The only difference is that the NILT survey included a group responding as No Religion in which 31% viewed themselves as Northern Irish (29%) or Ulster (2%). The paradox of a people living in an area but only a quarter identity themselves through the area=s nomenclature supports explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses as expressed in surveys by members of the indigenous population generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture).

B. Decolonization and Partition

Decolonization and partitioning of NI are historical physical conditions that contributed to a context supporting explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasions and dominance), two (weak leadership), and three (patterns of immigration) of the limbo state model. Conflicts between the Protestant Loyalists and the Catholic Republicans continued to surface, and by the 1880s became more apparent with the internal feature known as the

AHome Rule@ movement in Ireland that was encouraged by Liberal leader, W. E.

Gladstone23 (classified under explanatory concept one as political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state). On one level, Home Rule can be considered an internal factor in NI. On another level, Home Rule paradoxically can be considered an external directive created by the leadership of the occupying sovereignty,

Great Britain. As an internal factor, Home Rule takes on a negative feature signifying minority status for the Protestant British in a larger self-ruling Catholic Ireland and encourages anti-Catholic and anti-Irish feelings manifested by the Orange Order that, at

23. Bardon 1992, 358-360. 119

the passing of the Home Rule, became more vocal. The first Home Rule Bill in 1886 was introduced in Parliament by Prime Minister Gladstone.24 Even though it was defeated in the House of Commons, the concept was supported by the Irish Catholics and caused a negative reaction by the Orange Order that was exploited by the Conservative Party that insisted on AUnionism@BBpreservation of the Union of England and Ireland. A second

Home Rule Bill was introduced by the Liberals and defeated in 1893 by Conservative rule.25 In 1912 the third and final Home Rule Bill twice passed the House of Commons but was twice defeated in the House of Lords.

Meanwhile, internal hostilities over Home Rule continued within Protestant Ulster under the leadership of barrister Edward Carson and followers who were prepared to fight incorporation into a self-governing Ireland. The Ulster=s Solemn League and Covenant in which oaths were sworn to protect Protestant Ulster was established in September

1912.26 More internal discord influenced the environment in the form of paramilitary forces that were organized and armed; a civil war between Irish Nationalists in the south and Unionists in the north seemed imminent. Amazingly when World War I broke out in

Europe in 1914, thousands of Irish Catholics and Protestants put aside their differences and joined the British fighting forces.27 This dichotomous paradoxBBhostility exhibited

24. O=Day & Stevenson 1992, 108.

25. O=Day & Stevenson 1992, 122-129.

26. O=Day & Stevenson 1992, 149.

27. Foster 2001, 194B201.

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between the two Christian groups while residing inside NI, only to unite in harmony while outside of NIBBis part of the grassroots complexities of NI and supports the concept of explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

Still two events that did not help with the volatile situation in Ireland, one external and one internal, took place during the war years. The first event, supporting explanatory concept one (political and administrative domination by occupying state), was the fact that the external instrument termed the Home Rule Bill of 1912 actually passed the British

House of Commons for the third time in 1914 that meant that, according to the Parliament

Act of 1911, ratification by the House of Lords was unnecessary.28 Because of World

War I, Parliament decided to postpone the operation of the Home Rule Act until after the war. The second was the occurrence of an internal event supporting explanatory concepts two (weak leadership) and four (complex and paradoxical responses). This event was the

Easter Rebellion of 24 April 1916, in which the provisional government of the Irish

Republic proclaimed an independent Irish Republic; the rebellion was harshly repressed by British forces.29 The southern Catholic Nationalists were determined to express their independence regardless of the northern Protestant Ulster objection.

The Government of Ireland Act of 1920, an external instrument classified under explanatory concept one (political and administrative domination by occupying state), was intended to calm the situation in Ireland in which most of Ireland rejected the Union, and

28. O=Day & Stevenson 1992, 151-160.

29. O=Day & Stevenson 1992, 160-163. 121

Ulster rejected AHome Rule.@ The Ireland Act of 1920 created two self-governing units: one comprised of six of Ulster=s nine counties and later was known as Northern Ireland; the other was comprised of the three remaining counties of Ulster together with the 23 counties of the rest of Ireland. The latter nation, in rejecting the Ireland Act of 1920 as inadequate, fought a short war with Britain, later signing the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921-

22.30 This treaty and constitutional arrangements offered sovereignty to the new Irish state and support the main concept of explanatory concept one (administrative control); the treaty also gave the six counties of Northern Ireland the right to break away from the new Irish state, which they did.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty and subsequent creation of the Irish Free State, now the

Republic of Ireland, was an act of partitioning Ireland into two separate ethnic and political nations following the stated concepts of explanatory concepts one (invasion by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state), and two

(weak leadership). The Republic of Ireland became a predominantly Catholic independent state;

30. O=Day & Stevenson 1992, 174-179.

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the six counties of Ulster became Northern Ireland, predominantly Protestant with a

Catholic population, and part of the United Kingdom.31

The above externally-created arrangement was agreeable to the one million

Protestant Unionists of the six counties but did not provide a remedy for the several hundred thousand Protestant Unionists who lived in other counties in Ireland, many of whom emigrated. In addition, the treaty did not make special arrangements for the several

hundred thousand Roman Catholic Nationalists living in the six counties of Ulster who expressed their resentment by withdrawing from political expression of their situation, contributing to the concept expressed in explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical response by inhabitants). Not surprisingly the Protestants took control of the local government and were favored in the social sectors of jobs, public housing, education, and social services.

According to Karl Bottigheimer, rather than leave Belfast and go to the south where they would be in the majority, the Catholics living in Ulster stayed in NI because of a number of internally related reasons, supporting explanatory concept four (complex responses by the inhabitants, specifically the Catholic population).32 These reasons were related to the fact that by the end of the 19th century Belfast was the largest city in Ireland with a population approaching 350,000 and jobs in textile industries and shipbuilding.33

31. Neuman 1997, 9.

32. Bottigheimer 1982, 240-242.

33. Nineteenth-century population online: http://www.uni-due.de/IERC/belfast.htm. For 123

Regardless of the fact that skilled jobs were reserved for the Protestants, Belfast=s economic growth drew lower-economic Catholics from the impoverished countryside, especially after World War I, with ship and aircraft manufacture employment.34 Also, even though the Catholics were housed in lower-standard neighborhoods and had sectarian violence imposed on them in the forms of discrimination, assault, vandalism, and riots (such as those that routinely occur during the week of July 12th), Belfast=s economic strength continued even through the Great Depression of the 1930s and the economic slumps of the 1960s and 1970s.35

Another internally-related economic reason that encouraged Catholics to remain in

Ulster rather than migrate to the south was the social welfare provisions provided in NI after the war that were more appealing than the support and protection available to individuals in the socially conservative south.36 Each of these stated reasons concerning

NI Catholics= justifications for remaining in NI contribute to concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population to the state of being occupied by a controlling state contribute to the limbo state status).

As stated earlier in this project, even though the leadership may see a resolution of sectarian violence through the implementation of land partitioning, the grassroots view

textile industries and shipbuilding see Bottigheimer 1982, 161, 210.

34. Bottigheimer 1982, 161, 210.

35. Bottigheimer 1982, 161, 210, 242.

36. Bottigheimer 1982, 240.

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moving away from their homeland tantamount to denying their ethnicity and right to remain in their ancestral homeland; these feelings support concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). While economics was no doubt a high priority for the Catholic minority in their decision to continue living in Protestant NI, homeland attachment also had to be part of the decision to stay in the land of their ancestral clan.

Staying in the north, however, did not mean that the Catholics would come to accept the inequalities prevalent in the north. While the post-World War II decades of the

1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s in NI revealed an internally stabilized NI, the calm did not last long when, in the mid-1960s, the Catholics noticed the external features of achievements of the civil rights struggle by the African-Americans in the United States and, believing their own situation to be similar, began Catholic civil rights protests in

1968. Of course the Liberal Unionists reacted to the challenge of Protestant domination legitimacy; violent sectarian confrontations took place between the two groups primarily in Belfast and Londonderry.

Naturally the Catholics felt the need to protect their own and revived the Irish

Republican Army (IRA), an internal element, in the name of Provisionals who were guerrillas who undertook the task of protecting the Catholic segment in NI from official and unofficial assault. In addition to protecting their own, the IRA=s political agenda called for the departure of the British armed forces as well as the end of Protestant domination. The Protestants, on the other hand, formed their own paramilitary

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organizations (see section C, part three below for names), thus establishing more internal components that contributed to yet more violence in NI.

When the British forces, an external influence, entered NI in the early 1970s in order to restore peace, they came to be viewed by the Catholic communities as agents of a foreign power set on suppressing their voices (explanatory concept one--domination by occupying state). In March 1972 the government of Conservative British Prime Minister

Edward Heath suspended the constitution and parliament of NI, and a cabinet official titled the Minister for Northern Ireland became responsible for the province until

December 1999 (see detailed time line in appendix B). These external details, the suspension of the constitution and parliament and appointment of a minister by the dominant state for the limbo state, added to the already volatile situation in NI. Thus, these sectarian reactions of each group support the concept found in concept four concerning the complex and paradoxical reactions of the indigenous population to occupation by an outside entityBB Great Britain.

British martial law controlled civil and judicial processes presumably to contain the rising violence, illuminating concepts one (patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period of years) and two (weak leadership within the limbo state). During this period of martial law, the worst year in terms of deaths was 1972 when 467 were killed, 321 of them civilians.37 From

37. Northern Ireland 2000, In Encyclopaedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica .com/EBchecked/ topic/41939/ Borthern-Ireland/44669/Disintegration-of-Stability.

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1976 to 1981 an average of 275 deaths per year occurred due to sectarian violence.38 In the 1980s about a hundred political murders and assassinations occurred, and by 1998 more than thirty-six hundred NI Irish citizens had been killed and over thirty thousand injured as a result of thirty years of a destructive civil war.39

By this time in NI political history, events contributed to the violence and conflicts experienced by the population of NI, supporting all four explanatory concepts. As observed above, these events included twentieth-century external factors such as the

Ireland Act of 1920, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921B22, the creation of the Republic of

Ireland, the suspension of NI=s constitution and parliament, the creation of a minister for

NI, and martial law, as well as internal features such as stable economic environment suitable to NI=s Catholics and realization of the Catholics= own civil rights struggle.

Interestingly, decolonization did take place in Ireland at the same time that partition of Ireland occurred. The British government gave the Republic of Ireland its independence while at the same time maintaining presence in the six counties of Ulster or

Northern Ireland, supporting the patterns of political and administrative domination as related in explanatory concept one of the limbo state model. This act of perpetuating control of NI also made decolonization a partition plan in which two religious groupsBBthe Catholics in the Republic of Ireland and the Protestants in NIBBostensibly were separated. But the reality is that many Catholics remained in NI and, at the same

38. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

39. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

127

time, did not want to be part of either the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland, contributing to the concept of complex and paradoxical responses of inhabitants found in concept one of the limbo state model.

David Newman, writing in the Jerusalem Post, makes a pertinent observation about Britain=s conquest of Ireland five hundred years ago and present rule of the six counties of Ulster, supporting concepts one (invasions and domination) and two (weak leadership). Newman writes, A. . . like so many other cases of colonialism it happened in a pre-democracy, pre-media era, when the rule of law was set by the mighty and powerful, not by any international organization or human rights watchdog.@40 By suspending the constitutional and legislative rights of NI, the British government was behaving like a controlling imperialistic power setting aside democratic rule of law. Concluding his article, Newman notes, AThese territories are not perceived as colonies, but rather as a territorial extension of the mainland territory of the mother country . . . [and] the idea that the indigenous residents of these territories aspire to their own national independence and sovereignty [is difficulty for the majority to accept].@41 The key words in GB=s attitude toward NI are Anational independence@ and Asovereignty.@ Section C (part seven) below reviews opposition to the Belfast Agreement by those internal sectors of the population advocating Ulster independence from both the United Kingdom and the Republic of

Ireland. As noted in chapters one and two, state formation from above, in which the

40. Newman 1997, 9.

41. Newman 1997, 9. 128

wishes of the various groups of the indigenous population is neither considered nor included in the final plans, results in rejection of the policies of the occupying state by a substantial number of members of the populace .

C. Organizations and Northern Ireland

1. Political Parties

This section is significant as evidence of the prevalent division among the inhabitants of NI through a quick review of the main political parties of NI.42 In summary, these organizations are presented as the internal seminal political mechanisms that have contributed eminently to and/or reflect the division among members of the indigenous population, reinforcing the verity offered in explanatory concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by the inhabitants of the limbo state). The main divisions of the political parties of NI are comprised of those members who consider themselves either the Unionist/Loyalist/Protestant inhabitants of NI who generally want to unite with Great Britain or the Republican/Nationalist/Catholic inhabitants of NI who either want to unite with the Republic of Ireland or express need for independence from both GB and the Republic of Ireland. In addition, the Paramilitary Organizations, United

Kingdom Parties, Irish Republic Parties, those parties advocating a middle ground, and those calling for Aa third way@ or independence from both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, all contribute to the schism among the populace of NI, supporting concept four.

Among the Unionist/Loyalist/Protestant parties are the Ulster Unionist Party

42. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. 129

(UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Both parties are opposed to the involvement of the Republic of Ireland in NI, consider sharing executive power with non-

Unionist parties, and are concerned about GB=s commitment to the union. The Ulster

Unionist Party formed the governments from 1921 to 1972 and has the support of a majority representing mainstream unionism. David Trimble was the leader of the UUP from 1995 to 2005, at which time Sir Reg Emprey took over until the present. The

Democratic Unionist Party is a more recently organized pro-union party founded in 1971 by Protestant preacher Ian Paisley, is considered more extreme in the views listed above, and is concerned with the power of the Catholic church. In addition, the party had refused to negotiate with opposition parties that they considered to be Aterrorists,@. . . [and have criticized any notion of] compromise by Trimble and the UUP.@43 March 2007 was a time of change for Paisley who agreed to a power-sharing pact with Sinn Fein leader

Gerry Adams.44 The DUP was led by Ian Paisley, who resigned in May 2008 and was succeeded by Peter Robinson, long time deputy to Paisley.

The Republican/Nationalist/Catholic parties include the Social Democratic and

Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein; the most basic doctrine of the nationalists is to unite with the Republic of Ireland. The constitutional SDLP nationalist party represents the

43. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

44. Online: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/05 /europe/EU-GEN-NIreland.

130

middle ground in nationalist beliefs and campaigns for internal reforms accepting that unity with the Republic of Ireland must await the support of the majority of NI; thus,

SDLP is committed to constitutional politics and non-violence. John Hume led the SDLP from

1979 to 2001 and was replaced by present leader Mark Durkan. Sinn Fein, led by Gerry

Adams since 1983 to the present, is considered to be the political arm of the Irish

Republican Army (see below). Sinn Fein has claimed that force is necessary to remove the British presence in NI and has refused to condemn the IRA. However, changes do happen. Sinn Fein decommissioned arms in 2005 and has been Abrought on board to negotiations@ with the Protestant DUP since March 2007.45 The result has been a power- sharing government in NI since 8 May 2007 (more is written of this in parts five and six below).

Two other parties, Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) actually represent the two main Loyalist paramilitary groupings (see below) and were developed as political parties the in mid 1990s. They became involved in the peace negotiations, bringing new perspective to unionism.

Two parties considered to be middle ground for dialogue in negotiations are the

Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) and the Northern Ireland Women=s Coalition

(NIWC). The APNI attempts to appeal to both the Unionists and the Loyalists. The

45. Online: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/05 /europe/EU-GEN-NIreland.; see also Fitzduff and O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

131

NIWC was formed in 1996 and has promoted dialogue among women and other political parties.

Concerning the feelings about political parties of those surveyed, The Northern

Ireland Life and Times Survey (http://www.ark.arkac.uk/nilt/results/polatt.html; also see appendix A) asked, AWhich Northern Ireland political party would you support?@ Below is shown a comparison of the general responses in 1998, when the survey was first conducted, and responses to the second time the survey was conducted in 2003. The difference in responses support explanatory concept four of the limbo state model

(complex and paradoxical responses by members of the indigenous population). The comparisons are separated in order not to confuse the analysis of each year=s religious groups= responses. The responses to the question in 1998 were:

POLITICAL PARTY %

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 25

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 22

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 9

Alliance Party 8

Sinn Fein 7

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 2

Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) 1

Women=s Coalition 2

Worker=s Party 0

132

UK Unionist Party 1

Green Party 1

Other Party 1

Other answer (specify) 4 4 4

(Don=t know) 4 4 3

Significant changes from the 1998 to 2003 results for people of different religions can be seen above, supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses).

First, from 1998 to 2003 the percentage of Catholics who supported the Social Democratic and Labour Party dropped from 54% to 39%. Likewise, the percentage of Protestants supporting the Ulster Unionist Party dropped from 46% in 1998 to 34% in 2003. No

136

doubt this double-digit drop in partisan support signifies a message from the grassroots that they do not support the divisive tactics of the political parties. On the other hand, some increase in support could be found in a surprising placeBBSinn Fein, which is actually considered to be the political segment of the IRA, a paramilitary organization (see section C, part three below). Percentage of support for Sinn Fein increased from 16% in

1998 to 23% in 2003, revealing an increase of support among the Catholic for a more intense means of attaining their goal of removing British government presence in NI.

The most interesting change in response to the 2003 poll concerning the question of political party support is the increase in the category of no affiliation with political parties (None) among Catholic, Protestants, and No Religion groups. In 1998, 11% of the

Catholics surveyed reported no political party affiliation. This figure increased to 24% in

2003. Likewise, among the Protestants surveyed in 1998, 10% had no party affiliation; by

2003 the figure doubled to 20%. With those surveyed who were categorized as having No

Religion, 26% in 1998 reported no party affiliation. By 2003 the figure for those not supporting any political party had increased to 39%. This reported double-digit increase among the three groups who did not support any political party again is an indication among the inhabitants of NI of refusal to participate in the discord brought on by the political parties.

2. Political Parties of the United Kingdom

Turning to the political parties in the United Kingdom, the basic official tenet espoused by the British leadership is that NI is part of the United Kingdom, supporting

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explanatory concept one of the limbo state model (patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state). However, the

Labour Party does favor Irish unity when the majority vote in NI supports it. Until 1993, the leadership supported a devolved government in NI, in which political power would be shared between nationalists and unionists. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, referred to as the Hillsborough Agreement, stated that the Irish government had the right to be consulted on NI affairs. As discussed above, this agreement created great concern among the NI Protestant Loyalists.

The political parties of the Republic of Ireland to the south of NI follow articles two and three of the Irish constitution, laying claim to the thirty-two counties of Ireland modified by the Anglo-Irish Agreement (see appendix Q), where any unity with NI required the agreement of a majority in NI. As mentioned above, the same agreement assured the Irish government a role in NI affairs, encouraging participation in government decisions and policies by NI Catholic Nationalists.

3. Paramilitary Groups

Paramilitary groups offer stark support for explanatory concepts four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) and three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation leading, at times, to violent conflicts and revealing extreme responses by members of the indigenous population to the state of being occupied). Paramilitary groups that are internally created organizations have been

138

associated with use of force and violence and are considered illegal armies.46 The activities of both Republican/Nationalist and Unionist/Loyalists paramilitaries have been violent through the use of Abombings, shootings, racketeering, and community intimidation, in order to secure political leverage for their cause.@47 According to Fitzduff and O=Hagan, at the time of heightened support there may have been as much as five hundred active Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, with possibly thousands of supporters providing shelter (safe houses), food, and necessary items needed by the paramilitaries to continue their activities.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is considered to be the descendant of the military group formed in 1921, at the time of partition, fighting for the independence of the entire island of Ireland. By the end of 1969, at which time the Catholic Irish of NI were fighting for their civil rights and meeting resistance by the unionist government, the IRA had regrouped and by the 1970s began to target British troops who were assisting the government with riot control. As stated above, Sinn Fein is the political segment of the

IRA contending that force is necessary to remove the British presence from NI. In addition to directing their violence against the British troops, the IRA had become involved with bombing civilians and public areas. By the summer of 1971 support for the

IRA had increased due to the government=s introduction of internment without trial in

46. Fitzduff and O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. Also see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/paramilitaries/69824.stm.

47. Fitzduff and O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. Also see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/paramilitaries/69824.stm. 139

hopes of reducing the now increasing violence. Internment led to the arrest and imprisonment of hundreds of Catholics who were actually innocent of any wrongdoing.48

In January 1972, support for the IRA increased as a result of British soldiers firing on a demonstration by nationalists in Derry (termed Londonderry by the

Unionists/Protestants) and killing thirteen menBBan event remembered as Bloody Sunday.

Even though official inquiry stated that the killings Abordered on the reckless,@ a new inquiry into the event took place in May 2002.49 The IRA realized that to garner more support for their cause, they would have to obtain political support as well and thus created Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA. The strategy proved to be a positive move on the part of the IRA, as its support in the polls increased from 2% in the late

1970s to 16% in 2002.50 The result is increasing use of politics in the campaign for a united Ireland.

In early 2005, the IRA came under severe criticism after the brutal murder of

Robert McCarthy (also spelled McCartney) on 30 January 2005 by members of the IRA and involvement in a Northern Bank robbery on 20 December 2004 that police in NI and

48. Fitzduff and O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. Also see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/paramilitaries/69824.stm.

49. Fitzduff and O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. Also see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/paramilitaries/69824.stm.

50. Fitzduff and O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. Also see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/paramilitaries/69824.stm.

140

GB blame on the IRA.51 The five sisters of the murder victim took their message of the

IRA=s complicity in the murder to President George W. Bush at the White House on St.

Patrick=s Day 2005. According to the sisters, about fifteen to twenty IRA members were involved in the slaying of their brother, first inside then later outside Magennis=s Bar in the Short Strand area of Belfast, in front of more than seventy witnesses who the killers threatened with death if anyone cooperated with the police. Amazingly the leaders of the

IRA told the sisters that they would kill four of those involved in the slaying if the sisters wanted.52 The sisters refused the offer, calling on justice through the rule of law. This kind of activity by the IRA indicates not only the reign of violence and threats over the community but also the revenge mentality of the leadership.

Continuity IRA is considered to be a hard-line Republican group using violence to establish their opposition to any agreement not based on a united Ireland.53 According to security forces reports, this paramilitary group was responsible for the 1996 bombing of the Killyhelvin Hotel in Enniskillen, as well as the February 1998 bombing attacks in

Moira and Portadown.

The Real IRA is a dissident Republican faction opposed to the Good Friday peace agreement. Reports place responsibility on this group for the following attacks: a five-

51. O=Regan 2005, online: www.ireland.com/newsBpaper/ireland; also see: Chrisafis 2005, online: www.guardian.co.uk.

52. 4RA=s Time Has Come Gone 2005, online:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ special_report/ 1998/northern_ireland/10657.stm.

53. Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ special_report/1998/northern_ireland/10657 .stm. 141

hundred-pound car bomb destroying the market town of Banbridge, Co Armagh in August

1998; a mortar attack on a police station in Co Fermanagh in May 1998; and an Omagh bombing killing 29 people on August 15, 1998. After the last bombing the Real IRA apologized for the civilian death and called for a ceasefire.54

The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) was formed in 1975 by dissident members of the IRA who did not agree with the ceasefire. The group planted a bomb that killed Conservative NI spokesman Airey Neave at the House of Commons in 1979. The group also murdered loyalist paramilitary Billy Wright inside the Maze Prison on

December 27, 1997; this killing set off a cycle of violence that lasted several weeks.55

Another Nationalist group calling itself Direct Action Against Drugs (DAAD) is considered by security forces a cover name for the IRA. It has carried out several murders dating back to 1995 and is considered the group that committed seven murders during the first IRA ceasefire.56

Loyalist paramilitary groups include the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the

Ulster Defense Association (UDA using the cover name of Ulster Freedom

FightersBUFF). In addition, the Unionist/Loyalist paramilitary groups formed their own political wings discussed aboveBBthe Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster

Democratic Party (UDP). As previously stated, these two groups contributed positively in

54. Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/northern_ireland/10657.stm.

55. Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/northern_ireland/10657.stm.

56. Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/northern_ireland/10657.stm.

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the discussions leading to the Belfast Agreement.

The Ulster Volunteer Force originally formed in the early 1900s in opposition to

Home Rule for Ireland. According to Gusty Spence, the modern UVF=s political theorist, the modern UVF was established in the mid sixties by right-wing members of the Unionist

Party to undermine the prime minister of NI, Terrence O=Neill.57 The concerns of the

UVF were the civil rights reforms for Catholics suggested by O=Neill. After two murders in May 1966, O=Neill banned the UVF under the Special Powers Act, and Spence and two others were convicted of the murders and imprisoned.58 Violence broke out in 1969 with almost nightly rioting between Catholics and Protestants in working-class Belfast. In order to protect their streets, both Protestants and Catholics formed vigilante groups, members who joined the paramilitaries.

The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was formed in response to direct political control from London when the British government suspended the NI parliament in March

1972.59 As mentioned earlier, the cover name for UDA, Ulster Freedom Fighters was used whenever Catholics were killed or Catholic pubs were bombed, justifying the claims that those killed were members of the IRA.

The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) is considered to be an extreme loyalist group led by Billy Wright, who was murdered in Maze Prison as stated above. In March 1998,

57. Garland 1997, online: http://www.ulsternation.org.uk/_volunteer_force.htm.

58. Garland 1997, online: http://www.ulsternation.org.uk/_volunteer_force.htm.

59. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. 143

the group threatened Protestants who were in agreement with the peace process. In May

1998, the group called for a ceasefire in order to encourage people to vote Ano@ in the referendum on the Good Friday Agreement.60

The Red Hand Defenders (RHD) is a sectarian Loyalist group that formed during the Drumcree march crisis in the summer of 1998. Their killings include a Portadown policeman and human rights lawyer Rosemary Nelson.61

The Orange Volunteers (OV), like the Red Hand Defenders (RHD), is a group of dissenters from the Loyal Volunteer Force and the Ulster Freedom Fighters. Both the OV and RHD claimed responsibility for a grenade attack in a pub in County Antrim. An OV group of hooded men appeared before a television crew claiming to attack Catholic business and threatened to kill IRA prisoners released under the Good Friday

Agreement.62

The citizens of NI were asked to express their feelings about the paramilitary groups and their activities in the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (see Appendix

A). At times the respondents offered sagacious answers to the questions; many times the responses supported explanatory concept four of the limbo state model (complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population). In 1999 a question was asked by the survey in connection with the Good Friday Agreement, also known as the Belfast

60. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

61. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

62. Fitzduff & O=Hagan 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm.

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Agreement that had concluded on 10 April 1998 (reviewed below in section C, part seven). The question is, AHow much do you agree or disagree with [the statement] . . . I am angry at the paramilitaries for blocking progress on the Good Friday Agreement.@

The general

responses were:

RESPONSES % RESPONSES %

Strongly agree 30 Disagree 12

Agree 44 Strongly disagree 1

Neither agree nor disagree 11 (don=t know) 2

The results for people of different religions were:

RESPONSES % Catholic % Protestant % No religion

Strongly agree 22 40 46

Agree 44 45 37

Neither agree nor disagree 13 9 5

Disagree 17 5 10

Strongly disagree 2 1 1

(don=t know 3 2 1

As can be seen above nearly three quarters (30% strongly agree and 44% agree) of the general responses agreed with the statement that they were angry at the paramilitaries for blocking progress on the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, 66% of the Catholics

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surveyed agree with the statement, and 85% of the Protestants surveyed agreed as well.

Eighty-three percent of the No Religion respondents agreed with the statement supporting the idea that the paramilitary groups were in the wrong when they tried to interfere with progress of the Good Friday Agreement. These figures show that a high percentage of those surveyed concerning the paramilitary organizations do not support the paramilitary attempts at blocking the Good Friday Agreement.

A year earlier the survey asked, AHave some paramilitary groups been helpful in the search for peace?@ The responses were:

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

Very helpful 10 Quite unhelpful 13

Quite helpful 41 Very unhelpful 11

Neither helpful nor unhelpful 19 Don=t know 6

The results for people of different religions were:

RESPONSES % Catholic % Protestant % No religion

Very helpful 18 5 12

Quite helpful 45 39 38

Neither helpful nor unhelpful 17 21 22

Quite unhelpful 10 16 12

Very unhelpful 6 14

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Don=t know 5 6 7

In 1998, as shown above, 51% of the general responders felt that the paramilitary groups were helpful (10% very helpful, 41% quite helpful) in the search for peace. This earlier response was different from the following year, in which 74% saw the paramilitary groups as blocking the peace processBBthe Good Friday Agreement. In terms of those responses based on religious difference, 63% of the Catholics responding in 1998 saw the paramilitary groups as helpful in the search for peace, while in 1999, 66% of the Catholics surveyed saw the paramilitary groups as interfering with the peace process. In 1998, 44% of the Protestants surveyed saw the groups as helpful, while in 1999 a near doubling of the percent surveyed, 85% saw the paramilitary groups as blocking the peace process in the

Good Friday Agreement. The changes in feelings about the behavior of paramilitary groups on the part of the indigenous population within a one-year period reveal the complex responses on the part of the populace expressing dashed hopes for a less violent

NI.

Interesting additional survey questions concerning the paramilitary groups are questions about flying paramilitary flags that are considered by the followers or the groups to be symbols representing the paramilitary organizations. While a number of questions were asked about paramilitary flags, two of these questions are intriguing primarily because of the underlying implications of the responses. Both surveys were conducted in

2003, and the first statement to be considered was, AThere should be specials laws banning the flying of all paramilitary flags throughout Northern Ireland.@ The responses

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were:

RESPONSE %

Strongly agree 33

Agree 32

Neither agree nor disagree 16

Disagree 7

Strongly disagree 3

Can=t choose 7

Missing 2

Results for people of different religions were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No religion

Strongly agree 38 28 42

Agree 35 30 28

Neither agree nor disagree 11 20 11

Disagree 5 9 6

Strongly disagree 3 4 5

Can=t choose 6 7 7

Missing 3 2 2

No doubt there is a zealous showing of those responding to having laws banning the flying of all paramilitary flags throughout NI, with 65% generally agreeing (33% strongly agree and 32% agree); 73% Catholics generally agree (38% strongly agree and 35% agree),

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58% of the Protestants generally agree (28% strongly agree and 30% agree), and 70% of those who claim No Religion generally agree (42% strongly agree and 28% agree). This unmistakable support for the banning of paramilitary flag flying reveals an underlying disregard by the grassroots for the symbols of these groups and a subtle message to the paramilitary groups that the population does not see a need for such organizations.

Responses to another question about paramilitary flags support the disdain disclosed in the survey above. The survey statement was, AThe police should remove all paramilitary flags that are being flown throughout Northern Ireland.@ The responses were:

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

Strongly agree 32 Strongly disagree 3

Agree 34 Can=t choose 6

Neither agree nor disagree 15 Missing 2

Disagree 8

Results for people of different religions were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No religion

Strongly agree 38 27 42

Agree 37 33 26

Neither agree nor disagree 11 17 19

Disagree 5 10 7

Strongly disagree 2 3 3

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Can=t choose 4 8 2

Missing 3 2 2

A decided 66% of the responders generally agree (32% strongly agree and 34% agree)

that the law should be involved in removing all paramilitary flags in NI. Even the

results among the different religions offer compelling numbers, with 75% of the Catholics, 60% of the Protestants, and 68% of those claiming No Religion all agreeing with removal of all paramilitary flags throughout NI. The double-digit percent of those who neither agree nor disagree in both the regular general respondents and the religious group respondents points to those inhabitants who fit concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). Even though the apparent show generally is against paramilitary flags, the deeper meaning appears to be an aversion to the paramilitary groups themselves.

4. Paradoxical Role of Organizations in Northern Ireland

The political parties and paramilitary units in NI have a paradoxical role in the politically- and religiously-diverse society, again supporting concepts three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own agenda of cultural preservation) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model. On the one hand these groupings can be regarded as a manifestation of democratic expression by members of the population. On the other hand these same associations can be viewed as internal factors contributing to the division among the residents of NI. The violent activities that have

materialized from a number of these organizations contribute to the latter view.

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An example of violent activities displayed by Protestant groups in the twenty-first century occurred in early September 2001 when Catholic children and their parents who were walking to Holy Cross primary school located in the predominantly protestant district on Ardoyne Road in north Belfast were accosted by the Red Hand Defenders and similar groups.63 The attackers threw bricks, bottles, pipe bombs, petrol bombs, blast bombs, nail bombs, and other devices at the children, parents, and the police who were protecting them. This violence directed at primary school children continued for most of the month of September, as reported by David Mckittrick.64

As a result of these violent encounters, another internal scheme was set in motion in January 2002BBthe extension of a two hundred fifty meter fence established in 1969 close to the Holy Cross primary school to keep the Loyalist and Nationalist crowds separated.65 This same article by Gemma Murry reports on other fences; these were more than 20 feet high and made of Agalvanised cladded steel with weld mesh screening@ located in north and west Belfast built to separate the clashing groups.66 Also mentioned are barriers built at Ainsworth Avenue/Springfield Road, Kirk Street/Workman Avenue, and Bombay Street in west Belfast. In addition, barricades were built at Madrid street in

63. Arkell 4 September 2001, 4; and 6 September 2001, 2.

64. Mckittrick 2001, 13.

65. Murry 2002, 2.

66. Murry 2002, 2.

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east Belfast and at Harding Street in Portadown. Internal violence, in this case, promotes internal local partitions that further maintain the division within NI=s society and contributes to a blurred vision of state formation and full sovereignty (where the state, as articulated not only in concept one of the limbo state model but also by the scholars reviewed in chapter two, section A on state formation theories, provides for its population personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a justice system based on rule of law for maintaining order effectively).

According to reports in The Independent (London) and The Irish Times, an international commissionBBthe Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) that has been monitoring cease-fires and the honoring by all parties of the commitments entered into under the Good Friday AgreementBBhas found high levels of violent activities by paramilitary groups, averaging about Aone murder a month and up to three victims a week from shootings and beatings.@67 Conor Lally of The Irish Times notes that the IMC reports that the Loyalist paramilitaries have carried out three times as many murders as republicans and twice as many shootings and assaults.68 According to the IMC the

Loyalist paramilitary group named the Ulster Volunteer Force has committed most of the

67. (No Author), It Is Right That Politicians Are Held To Account. . . 2004, 30.

68. Lally 2004, 6. 152

killings in Northern Ireland since the beginning of 2003.69

Internal influences in the form of parties, organizations, and paramilitary groups,

noted above, have contributed to NI=s weak vision of full sovereignty. Such groups, as many of the forceful and at times violent paramilitary groups have exhibited, have gone to the extreme in asserting their rights of existence without having to live with other diverse groups within NI=s culture and society. Their extreme brand of nationalism has given rise to violence that in turn has invited military occupation by the controlling sovereignty (GB) in an attempt to contain the bloodshed and destructiveness, at the same making full sovereignty an elusive attainment. As revealed above in the NI Life and Times Survey, the grassroots have voiced their opinions concerning the paramilitary organizations and their activities. The resulting collective opinions reveal people who express complex and, at times, paradoxical responses that support concepts three (diverse groups with cultural preservation agenda) and four (complex and paradoxical responses) of the limbo state model.

5. Chronology of Power Sharing

A chronological look at the results of attempts at power sharing as detailed by

69. (No Author), It is Right That Politicians Are Held To Account. . . 2004, 30.

153

John Darby70 is necessary in order to reveal manifestations of explanatory concepts one

(patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination by occupying dominate state) and three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own self-preservation agenda) of the limbo state model. The chronology runs from 1973 to 1993 and reveals the variety of approaches to conflict management that NI has attempted in resolving the protracted conflict. Added to this list are recent power-sharing negotiations that took place on 24

November 2006 and 8 May 2007 to reveal the pattern of on-again, off-again, on-again power-sharing diplomacy into the twenty-first century. The chronology is:

1973-74: The power-sharing Executive that lasted for three months, remains Northern

Ireland's only experience of a government shared by Catholics and Protestants. It attempted to construct a devolved system based on power sharing between Protestants and

Catholics and on a Council of Ireland to regulate affairs between the two parts of Ireland.

It was opposed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and most of the Ulster Unionist

Party (UUP), but eventually it was brought down through a Protestant workers' strike in

May 1974.

1975-76: A Constitutional Convention was convened to enable elected representatives from Northern Ireland to propose their own solution. The majority of unionist parties proposed a return to majority rule modified by a committee system with some minority rights inbuilt. It was rejected by both the British and the minority Social Democratic and

Labour Party (SDLP, which is the party of the Republican/Nationalist/Catholic

70. Darby 1995, 18-23. 154

community).

1977-78 and 1980: Two attempts to set up devolved institutions were initiated by two

Northern Ireland secretaries of state, Roy Mason and Humphrey Atkins. Neither got to first base. They were opposed, for different reasons, by the SDLP and the UUP, and both simply petered out. As a measure of the cultural gap between the two sides, two bars were set up in Stormont during the Atkins talks of 1980, one serving only non-alcoholic beverages. Students of national stereotyping may guess which bar was designed for which political parties.

1982-84: Rolling Devolution, introduced by James Prior, was perhaps the most ingenious proposal, again involving an elected assembly and a committee system. This envisaged a gradual return to power by elected representatives, but only if the proposed powers had

'Widespread acceptance,' defined as 70% agreement. In other words, the amount of power allowed to local political parties depended on their ability to agree and would roll along at the speed of progress determined by them. It was boycotted by the SDLP because it did not guarantee power sharing.

1991-92: The Brooke-Mayhew initiatives sought to introduce phased talks, involving the

Northern Irish parties first and the Dublin government at a later stage. This initiative followed the introduction of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, an agreement signed by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, but it did not involve local politicians and was bitterly opposed by unionists. A major survey in 1990 confirmed that, for Protestants, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was still perceived to be the biggest single

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obstacle to peace.

Prior to 1993 Sinn Féin was excluded from all major political talks, mainly because unionist parties refused to talk with terrorists. In 1988 and 1993, however, those regarded as the leaders of the SDLP and Sinn Féin held two series of bilateral talks. 1993: The

Downing Street Declaration, jointly announced by the Prime Minister of the United

Kingdom, John Major, and the Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, introduced for the first time the possibility of Sinn Féin becoming involved in talks. The condition was an ending of violence for at least three months. In return, the Irish government accepted that any constitutional change in the status of Northern Ireland required the support of a majority within Northern Ireland. At the time of writing, three months after the Declaration, the unionist parties were divided on the initiative and Sinn Féin was still considering it. The

Declaration offered, for the first time, the possibility of addressing the constitutional and security problems together as part of a peace package.

2006 November 24: Shortly after Protestant leader Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist

Party refused a nomination as the future head of the Northern Ireland=s power-sharing administration, stating he would accept the position only when Sinn Fein agreed to support the police force, the parliamentary meeting was dismissed abruptly due to a bomb threat by NI=s infamous Protestant militant Michael Stone (who killed three people at a

Belfast funeral in 1988). Stone tossed a bag into the entrance of the Stormont

Parliamentary Building, claiming the bag contained a bomb. Later, authorities reported

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that the bag contained Aeight viable devices@ that were defused.71

The information provided in this paragraph concerning the current situation is not part of Darby=s chronology but helps in understanding the current power-sharing situation. On 8 May 2007, Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party and Martin

McGuinness of Sinn Fein were sworn in as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively, of the Northern Ireland Assembly.72

In summary, if a broader definition of conflict management or resolution is accepted, Northern Ireland has experienced a wide variety of approaches supporting the concept of explanatory concept four (diverse religious and ethnic groups supporting self- preservation agenda):

$ Majority domination, from 1921 to 1972;

$ Integration, for a three-month period in 1974 when a power-sharing executive

was formed and failed;

$ Administrative reforms, since 1969, when legislative changes covering housing,

employment, social, and educational reforms were introduced, with varying

results;

71. Pogatchnik 24 November 2006, Paisley Refuses Post as PowerBsharing Head in Assembly Disrupted by Threat, Canadian Press, online: http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/ 061124/w112437A.html; also Taggart, Adams, 25 November 2006, Murder Bid: Con- victed Loyalist Killer Charged, CNN online: http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/ europe/11/25/nireland. parliament/.

72. Bottigheimer and Aughey, eds., 2008, Online: http:www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/419739/Northern-Ireland.

157

$ 'Holding the fort' with a standing army, since 1969;

$ Political talks, as detailed above;

$ Superordinate agreement between the two main governments, as with the

Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.

(A continuation of the chronology of events in NI since the signing of the Belfast

Agreement can be found in appendix C.)

The above information offered by John Darby paints a somewhat depressing

picture of any hope for a resolution of the continuing conflict between the Irish

Protestant/Loyalist/Unionist community and the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community or of any hope of a consideration by the occupying state for an independent NI state; this supports concepts one (invasions and political and administrative domination by controlling state), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three (diverse groups with own agenda) of the limbo state model. However, as of 8 May 2008 power sharing between the two groups promises a distant hope of peace finally taking hold in NI.

Decommissioning of arms is an important issue that helped in bringing to pass the

8 May 2008 power-sharing process, and supports explanatory concept one of the limbo state model (political and administrative domination by controlling state). This event involved handing over to the controlling state the documented disposal of weapons by paramilitary groups. The decommissioning of arms has become a part of the Belfast

Agreement (part seven below, see Appendices C and D).

It should be noted that the agonizing process of decommissioning of arms was an

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issue among the various parties involved in attempting to garner some form of peace among the conflicting groups and did stand in the way of the earlier power-sharing process. NI is currently experiencing calm due to a number of events.73 The first took place on 28 July 2005, when the IRA gave notice that it was giving up armed struggle and turning in its weapons stockpiles; in October, the Independent Monitoring Commission

(IMC) reported that this was progressing positively. The next event was that Sinn Fein supported the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), which it had refused to do in the past.74 Finally, the most important event, power sharing, occurred on 8 May 2007, when the Northern Ireland Assembly was restored with DUP=s Ian Paisley as first minister and

Sinn Fein=s Martin McGuiness as his deputy.75 A look at why decommissioning and later power sharing took so long to transpire helps in understanding the process.

6. Decommissioning

As stated above, decommissioning, an external imposition by the British leadership supporting concepts one (political and administrative domination by controlling state), three (diverse groups with own agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical

73. Northern Ireland Peace Process, online: http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/issue- briefs/domestic-policy; see also: Northern Ireland Awaits New Power-sharing as Paisley Resigns, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/europe/EU-GEN-NIreland.

74. Northern Ireland Peace Process, online: http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/issue- briefs/domestic-policy; see also: Northern Ireland Awaits New Power-sharing as Paisley Resigns, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/europe/EU-GEN-NIreland.

75. Northern Ireland Peace Process, online: http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/issue- briefs/domestic-policy; see also: Northern Ireland Awaits New Power-sharing as Paisley Resigns, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/europe/EU-GEN-NIreland. 159

responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model, is the process of turning in or verifying disposal of weapons by paramilitary groups.76 Those involved in trying to find a resolution to the conflict in NI agree that this one issue has been the Astumbling block@ to the peace process and implementation of the Belfast Agreement in keeping with explanatory concepts three and four of the model. Disagreement over decommissioning of arms by internal factions in NI led to the suspension of the NI Assembly on 11 February 2000 by the British government, an external imposition.77

The basic disagreement involves the first step that the Unionists wanted to see take place and the first step the Republicans wanted to occur. The Unionists insisted that the

Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other military groups should decommission illegally held weapons. The Unionists stated that handing over all weapons was a confidence building measure if they were to share government with Republicans. On the other hand, the Republicans stated that there would be no decommissioning before there was a political settlement of the conflict and that decommissioning should be dealt with by the

Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), which was established on 26 August 1997. According to Sinn Fein, decommissioning of weapons

76. The following information on decommissioning is taken from the document offered by John Reid, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, on 2 August 2001 (see appendix D for a copy of the document: Decommissioning Scheme); Martin Melaugh, Brief Note on Decommissioning, taken from the Cain WebService; and BBC News: http://news.bbc.uk/ hi/english/static/northern-ireland/understanding/themes/decommissioning.

77. It should be noted that NI Assembly has been suspended five times: February 2000, May 2000, in August 2001 for twenty-four hours, September 2001, and October 2002. Online: http://www.nio.gov.uk/index/faq-political.htm.

160

was not a condition of the original peace deal and, therefore, it could not promise decommissioning on behalf of the IRA. At this point, conflicting exchanges among the

Unionists and Republicans brought the question of decommissioning to the realm of more internal elements that have contributed to NI=s current limbo state status, supporting concept one concerning responses to political and administrative domination by GB, and concept four concerning complex and paradoxical reactions by the indigenous population to the state of being occupied.

The deadlock eased when George Mitchell, former U. S. Senator from Maine, was asked to report on the issue of arms decommissioning. His report of 24 January 1996 recommended that AThe parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations.@78 Sinn

Fein signed the Mitchell principles and entered multi-party talks at Stormont (NI parliament) on 9 September 1997 that led to the Belfast Agreement on 10 April 1998. The

Agreement was endorsed by the people in NI and the Republic of Ireland in referenda on

22 May 1998 with elections to a new NI Assembly held on 25 June 1998.

Unfortunately the issue of decommissioning continued to impede progress to devolution of powers (the transfer of legislative autonomy within a limited framework by the United

Kingdom to Northern Ireland and subsequent sharing of powers among institutions of government; more discussion on devolution is included in the section on independence for

NI below) from Westminster (Great Britain parliament) to Stormont. The deadline of 31

78. Melaugh 2001, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/decommissioning.htm. 161

October 1998 for the formation of the Executive (political parties represented in the power-sharing process) was missed. Implementation of the Belfast Agreement was missed during 1998 and 1999, supporting the concepts offered in explanatory concepts one (political and administrative domination by controlling state) and three (diverse groups with own agenda).

Powers were devolved to Stormont on 2 December 1999 and the institutions outlined in the Belfast Agreement were established. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) agreed to enter the Executive, stating that it would review the progress on decommissioning in February 2000 and that if the IRA had not begun the process, then

David Trimble, the then leader of the UUP, would resign as First Minister. This he did on

1 July 2001 along with the resignation of the remaining ministers on the Executive on 18

October 2001. On 23 October 2001 the IRA announced that it had begun to decommission it weapons.

On 23 January 2002, the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning (Amendment)

Bill was accepted by the House of Lords after passing the Lower House 357 to 142. This bill extends the amnesty period for decommissioning of arms to 27 February 2003 and allows orders to extend the period a year at a time until 27 February 2007 at the latest.79

Northern Ireland First Minister David Trimble of the Ulster Unionist Party has warned the government that pressure for decommissioning must be kept up in order that the

79. Online: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/Id200102/Idselect/ Iddelreg/65/6502. htm.

162

paramilitaries not relax the need to turn in or destroy arms. On 14 October 2002, the

Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive were suspended by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland until decommissioning was achieved, primarily because unionists refused to share power with Sinn Fein while the IRA still remained armed.80 As already noted above, in 2008 power sharing of the leadership in NI was restored. Nonetheless, reviewing the arduous process is a lesson in how leaders need to recognize the grassroots= cue to take the first steps toward approaching harmony for the inhabitants of a region in dispute.

How the general population in NI feels about decommissioning is revealed in the responses to the 2000 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (see appendix A) question,

AWhich of these [political issues], if any, do you think is the most important for the

Assembly to deal with?@ The issues and percentage of those responding were:

Issues %

Bringing about decommissioning 52

Securing Northern Ireland=s union with the United Kingdom 23

Bringing about a united Ireland 8

(None of these) 11

(Don=t know) 6

In terms of those responding to this survey question who are Catholic, Protestant, or No

Religion, the breakdown is:

80. McGinn 2004, Press Association News online at LexisNexis(TM) Academic.

163

Issues % Catholic %Protestant %No Religion

Bringing about decommissioning 44 54 60

Securing NI=s union with the United Kingdom 4 35 13

Bringing about a united Ireland 23 1 5

(None of these) 20 5 15

(Don=t know) 9 5 7

The responses above show that over half of those surveyed feel that bringing about decommissioning is a noteworthy issue and that among the Catholics who answered, 44% see this as more important than the 23% responding Catholics who feel that bringing about a united Ireland is an important political issue for the assembly to consider. Likewise, of the Protestants who responded, over half (54%) feel that bringing about decommissioning is more relevant than the 35% who see securing NI=s union with the United Kingdom as necessary for the assembly=s consideration. Interestingly, of those surveyed who claim to have no religion, 60% feel that bringing about decommissioning is more important for the assembly=s consideration than either NI=s union with the United Kingdom (13%) or bringing about a united Ireland (5%). The complex and paradoxical responses by the general population (explanatory concept four) concerning decommissioning of arms is that the general population still see this as a significant issue regardless of the fact that both the paramilitary groups and the leadership have been slow in acting on this issue. No doubt, the grassroots realize that if any semblance of sovereignty or at least political autonomy for Northern Ireland is to eventuate, decommissioning of arms was a necessary first step.

164

Interestingly, on 26 September 2005, John de Chastelain, the retired Canadian general appointed by Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland to oversee the voluntary disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, announced that the IRA had decommissioned all its bombs and explosives.81 It should be noted that restoring NI=s power sharing regional assembly was considered only after the January 2006 report by the

International Monitoring Commission had assessed that all of the paramilitary groups have complied fully with the cease fire commitments.82 IMC did confirm the decommissioning of arms on 26 September 2005.83 All sides hope that restoration of power sharing on 8 May 2007 and the much needed repose, which the indigenous population deserves, will continue. However, at the same, time little talk of NI=s sovereign independence has been part of the negotiations. An explanation is found in explanatory concepts two (weak leadership of limbo state) and four (complex and paradoxical response by inhabitants) of the limbo state model as the information below reveals.

7. The Belfast Agreement and Opposition

The result of The Belfast Agreement supports concepts one (political and administrative domination of limbo state by occupying state), two (weak leadership within

81. Brown 2005, 2.

82. Brown 2005, 2.

83. Northern Ireland Peace Process, online: http://politics.co.uk/reference/issues-briefs/ domestic-policy.

165

limbo state), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model. Also known as the Good Friday Agreement, this instrument was concluded on 10

April 1998 and can be considered as having both external and internal influential elements since attendance involved representatives from Great Britain and most of NI=s political parties including Sinn Fein as well as the largest NI Protestant political party, the Ulster

Unionist Party (UUP). A full-text thirty-five page copy of the Belfast Agreement can be viewed online at http//www.nio.gov.uk/agreement/pdf. (or any search tool in which the terms Belfast Agreement are entered).

The basic plan, as stated in the Agreement, is for an eventual devolved government in NI, the creation of Human Rights and Equality commissions, the early release of prisoners, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, and reforms of criminal justice and policing. Three strands of relationships are listed in the Agreement.

Strand One deals with relationships within Northern Ireland and the creation of the

NI Assembly, its Executive, and the consultative Civic Forum. The Assembly has 108 members (MLAs) who are elected by proportional representation and Ministers to the

Executive who are appointed according to party strength (d=Hondt mechanism).

Strand Two deals with the relationship between NI and the Republic of Ireland. A

North-South Ministerial Conference (NSMC) brings together members of the Northern

Ireland Executive and the Irish Government to oversee the operations of six cross-border implementation bodies.

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Strand Three deals with relationships between NI and the British Isles (East-West).

A British-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference was established to promote bilateral cooperation between UK and NI and to replace the Anglo-Irish Governmental Council and

Conference established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.

The Agreement also created the Equality Commission and the Human Rights

Commission. A comprehensive review of criminal justice and policing policies were created; in addition, money was allocated to help victims of violence. The brief review offered above reveals that in order for implementation to materialize, herculean cooperation was needed, yet not provided. For this reason, as noted above in section C, part six, devolution was suspended on 14 October 2002 (in addition to the previous four times, see footnote fifty-eight in part six above), supporting the concepts expounded in concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by members of the indigenous population comprised of diverse ethnic and religious groups).

As noted in the chronology in appendix C, the Belfast Agreement (21 May 1998) was approved by 71.2% of voters in Northern Ireland and 95% of voters in the Republic of Ireland. However, it did not take long after the signing of the Belfast Agreement before internal opposition to the agreement was expressed on the internet primarily by organizations such as the Democratic Alternative, ulsternation.org., Advocating A Third

Way for Ulster, Ulster Independence Movement, and the New Ulster Political Research

Group, with many websites calling for NI independence in the making. The opposition generally consists of either Protestant/Loyalist groups who feel that the Belfast Agreement

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favors the Republicans, or groups that call for an independent Northern Ireland with no ties to either Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland. The latter group is growing and may be the future element contributing to a call for an independent Northern Ireland state.

The Democratic Alternative can be found on the internet at www.democraticalternative.com and can be viewed as an example of the voice of concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) in offering an extensive analysis of the Belfast

Agreement in terms of APromise (May 1998) versus Product (Jan 2001),@ with the

AProduct@ offered as ABroken Promises.@ A structural example of this kind of analysis is: promiseBBThe Union is Strengthened (May 1998); productBBThe Integrity of the

Union is Undermined (January 2001); an extensive explanation follows and last line reads:

ResultBB Broken Promise. Part of the explanation in this section states, AThe Belfast

Agreement undermines the Union, primarily by providing the vehicle towards only one destinationBBa Sovereign United Ireland. The Sovereignty of Westminster has been compromised by placing the future of Northern Ireland in the hands of the people of the island of Ireland alone.@84 Other statements of promise/product are: No Unreformed

Terrorists in Government (May 1998)/Unreformed Terrorists are in Government (Jan

2001); Unionists Will Have a Veto (May 1998)/ Unionists Do Not Have an Effective Veto

(Jan 2001); Eire=s Territorial Claim Will Be Surrendered (May 1998)/Republic of

Ireland=s Claim to All-Ireland Government Remains Intact (Jan 2001); Mayfield Will Go

(May 1998)/Mayfield (Anglo Irish Agreement [also known as the Hillsborough

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Agreement]) is Reconstituted in the Belfast Agreement (Jan 2001); There is No License to

Terrorists (May 1998)/License to Terrorists (Jan 2001); and the RUC [NI police] Has

Been Saved (May 1998)/Destruction of RUC Under Misnomer of Police Reform (Jan

2001). The site concludes that Athe goal of peace cannot be reached through the Belfast

Agreement. . . . there must be a democratic alternative: one around which all unionists can unite, which will secure [their] . . . position within U.K., and which will deliver [their] . . . vision for all of the people of Northern Ireland.@85 The source of this site is listed as The

Long March, with no specific individual name or group of names given. The significance of the opposition to the Belfast Agreement from a predominately pro-union grassroots movement is that some members of the Unionist persuasion now see that an alternative is needed at this time in the conflict. The grassroots aspect of this movement indicates that those from the opposite end of the political spectrum see a necessity for a dialogue that will consider the needs of those who feel compromised by the results of the conflict in NI.

Ulsternation.org can be found on the internet at www.ulsternation.org.uk with various links advocating A Third Way for Ulster or complete independence for Northern

Ireland with no association with either Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland. This site allows individuals to Avoice@ their feelings about a future independent NI. David Kerr is listed as the Ulster Nation editor and webmaster and updates the site regularly. In addition, Kerr is a member of the National Executive of the Third Way and is part of the

84. Democratic Alternative, online: http://www.democraticalter-native. com.

85. Democratic Alternative, online: http:// www.democraticalternative.com.

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Ulster Independence Movement (UIM). At the Conference of Secessionist and

Independence groups hosted by the Third Way in London on 23 February 1997, Kerr gave a speech calling on Ulster independence as Athe way ahead.@ In this speech Kerr notes:

One significant feature of the past fifteen years [or early 1980s] has been a growing awareness of their [NI citizens] common distinct Ulster identity by many former unionist and a few former Irish nationalists. Ulsterfolk are learning more of their history, their links with Scotland, their rich linguistic heritage and they are forging a new UlsterBnationalistic movement. Third Way and Ulster Nation magazines have supported this welcome trend since their inception. Ulster Nation has sought to give a consistent radical Ulster- nationalist interpretation of political and historical events in Ulster over the past seven years. . . . Ulster Nation has supported the formation of a broad Ulster National Congress. This is beginning to coalesce as the Ulster Independence Movement grows in strength and influence (Kerr 1997, online: www.ulsternation.org.uk).

According to Kerr, the modern movement for an independent NI (or Ulster as Kerr prefers) began in the early 1980s. However, Donald P. Doumitt reports that a number of organizations have considered an independent NI, should Great Britain pull out. Doumitt quotes an Ulster Volunteer Force spokesman as stating, AWe belong to a population that has been here for over 400 years. Should a worst-case scenario happen and Britain did decide to withdraw, we the UVF would go for an independent state. . . . Under no circumstances ever will the Ulster Protestants accede or become party to an agreement for a 32-county Irish Republic.@86 A similar tone is expressed by Ulster Democratic Party=s

Ray Smallwoods: AOur loyalty to Britain is not unconditional. If they leave, we will form our own independent Ulster. We will not accept a false arrangement for a united

86. Doumitt 2000, 23.

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Ireland.@87 Adding to the above organizations calling for an independent NI is the New

Ulster Political Research Group, which Aadvocated an independent Ulster with social justice for all@ in 1979.88 This latter call for independence appears to be comprehensive, with the statement Asocial justice for all.@ Regardless of how it is expressed, an independent NI state has existed in the thoughts and expressed wishes of many in the indigenous population at the grassroots level, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

General population feelings about the Belfast Agreement can be drawn from the responses to the NI Life and Times Survey (see appendix A). Several different questions relating to the Agreement were asked, but only four of the questions are considered relevant in this research project. The first survey question of interest that was asked was:

How did you vote in 1998 when the referendum on the Agreement was held? The responses were:

RESPONSES % RESPONSES %

I voted yes 55 I wasn=t registered to vote 9

I voted no 13 (Don=t know/Can=t remember) 6

I didn=t vote 16 (Refused) 2

Responses based on different religions were:

RESPONSES % Catholic % Protestants % No religion

87. Doumitt 2000, 81

88. Online: 1979, http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3222/uf.html. 171

I voted yes 70 45 55

I voted no 0 23 6

I didn=t vote 14 16 23

I wasn=t registered to vote 9 8 14

(Don=t know / Can=t remember) 6 6 3

(Refused) 1 3 0

As revealed above, the overwhelming response to how those surveyed voted, generally and based on religion, was in favor of the Agreement. This strong pro-Agreement response affirms the population=s desire for not only peace among the members of the population but also political stability.

The next question asked in 2003 was: If the vote on the Good Friday Agreement was held again today, how would you vote? The responses were:

RESPONSES % RESPONSES %

Yes 47 (Not registered to vote) 2

No 25 (Don=t know) 9

I wouldn=t vote 16 (Refused) 1

Responses based on different religions were:

RESPONSES % Catholic % Protestant % No religion

Yes 74 28 50

No 4 42 14

I wouldn=t vote 13 17 23

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(Not registered to vote) 1 2 5

(Don=t know) 8 10 8

(Refused) 0 1 0

The responses to a current vote (2003) on the Agreement still elicit a positive reaction by specific members of the population, showing, generally, support of concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by the inhabitants). The strongest supporters in both surveys have been by the Catholic response to the Agreement, at about 74% in favor of the vote for the Agreement, with the No Religion next in favor of the Agreement at 50%. The

Protestant members of NI responded somewhat negatively to a possible vote, with 42% against the Agreement and only 28% of Protestants surveyed favoring the Agreement.

This latter response reveals mistrust on the part of the Protestants in 2003, who had a more positive reaction to the Agreement in the 1998 survey.

Another 2001 survey question concerning the Agreement was: If the Agreement is brought to an end, do you think that the level of violence in Northern Ireland will increase, decrease, or stay the same? The responses were:

RESPONSE %

Increase 58

Stay the same 30

Decrease 2

(Don=t Know) 10

Response for people of different religions were:

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RESPONSES % Catholic % Protestants % No religion

Increase 67 53 47

Stay the same 24 34 35

Decrease 2 2 3

(Don=t know) 8 11 15

The responses above show the complex and paradoxical responses by the populace as stated in concept four of the limbo state model. The paradoxical response appears to be along the line of: We support peace but will be violent if the Belfast Agreement does not go through. Over half of the Catholics and Protestants surveyed believe that should the

Agreement come to an end violence would increase, while just below half of the No

Religion believe that violence would increase should the Agreement end (67% Catholics,

53% Protestants, and 47% No Religion).

The final survey question reviewed in this project concerning the Belfast

Agreement was asked in 2003 and was: Please read these four statements and tell me which one is closest to your own opinion. The general responses were:

RESPONSE %

The agreement is basically right and just needs to be implemented in full 23

The agreement is basically right but the specifics need to be renegotiated 35

The agreement is basically wrong and should be renegotiated 15

The agreement is basically wrong and should be abandoned 10

(Don=t know) 17

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Results for people of different religions were:

RESPONSE % Catholic % Protestant % No Religion

The agreement is basically right and just needs to be implemented in full 41 10 26

The agreement is basically right but the specifics need to be renegotiated 36 33 39

The agreement is basically wrong and should be renegotiated 4 24 11

The agreement is basically wrong and should be abandoned 2 16 8

(Don=t know) 17 16 17

In the general responses, the results reveal that over half of those surveyed (58%) feel that the Belfast Agreement is basically right. In the responses based on religion, over three- quarters of the Catholics surveyed feel that the Agreement is basically right (77%), while less than half of the Protestants (43%) surveyed feel the same. Of those surveyed claiming No Religion, close to two-thirds of those surveyed (65%) favored the

Agreement. The citizens of NI, regardless of differing beliefs, do favor the Agreement and the hopeful results expected from implementation of the Agreement. It cannot be said with any certainty that implementation of this Agreement would eventually lead to a sovereign Northern Ireland, either through complete sovereignty, meaning independence from Great Britain, or through merging with either Great Britain or through merging with

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the Republic of Ireland and thus through sovereignty by unity with either state. Such a possibility is left for the future of Northern Ireland. Amazingly, the grassroots responses in the survey to the Agreement were positive, but the reality of reactions to the Agreement have not been as positive as expected, supporting concept four concerning complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population to the state of being occupied contributing to the limbo state status.

D. Factors Contributing to Limbo State Status in Northern Ireland

The current spurts of violence alternating with promises of a stable political backdrop in NI appear to be part of a pattern of external and internal events contributing to missed opportunities, which supports explanatory concepts one (political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state), two (weak leadership of limbo state), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). This pattern presently includes the grassroots and the weak show of support for a strong state politically, economically, culturally, and socially with secure borders either through independence or through merging with the controlling state.

There were two missed opportunities that could have resulted in an independent sovereign state of Northern Ireland. The first appeared to have occurred at the time of the

Government of Ireland Act of 1920. The second missed opportunity for an independent

NI appeared to have occurred at the subsequent partition in 1921 when the Republic of

Ireland was established as an independent state.

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If the internal conflict between the Protestant Loyalists and Catholic Republicans of Northern Ireland had been addressed resulting in some form of compromise between the two groups, then there could have been several possible outcomes: an independent state of Northern Ireland could have been established; Protestants and Catholics of NI could have agreed on a decision to join either the Republic of Ireland or the United

Kingdom; or a division of NI to accommodate joining each country based on a partition could have been established. Actually, during the violent activities of 1972, the then

Prime Minister of Great Britain, Heath, and other ministers of the British government considered the externally offered option of Aa repartition which would divide Northern

Ireland into Protestant and Catholic districts, with the latter being allowed to join the

Republic.@89 None of these possible solutions to the problem of the limbo state of NI transpired, supporting the notions offered in concepts one (political and administrative domination of limbo state by occupying state), two (weak leadership within limbo state), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own self-preservation agenda), and four

(complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population).

Had the British officials taken such external possibilities further, offering the opportunity of a sovereign state either through independence or in joining another state, perhaps further violence and conflicts could have been ameliorated. This movement on the part of the leadership did not transpire, supporting the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state modelBBdomination, weak leadership, diverse immigrant groups, and

89. McKittrich and McVea 2000, 77. 177

paradoxical responses by indigenous population.

Those individuals who are calling internally for an independent NI/Ulster nation see the externally established Hillsborough Pact of 18 November 1985 as the document that gave the Republic of Ireland a >right= to interfere in NI=s internal affairs.90 Thus, according to Kerr and those calling for an Ulster nation, the Hillsborough Pact contributed to the breakdown of the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and helped contribute to a possible future union between the Republic of Ireland and Northern

Ireland. In a way, this Pact did not allow the indigenous population the freedom to decide if the nation actually wanted to join with the Republic of Ireland or wanted to become independent from union with either Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland, adding further support to the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model.

What appeared to be an earlier external contribution to a missed opportunity for an independent state occurred in 1801 with the Act of Union abolishing the Irish Parliament and binding Ireland and Britain as parts of the United Kingdom supporting concept one

(political and administrative domination by major state occupying the limbo state). Had the internal Irish Parliament been allowed to continue in existence and be guided by the

British government toward autonomy, with conflicts resolved between the Protestants and

Catholics, again an independent state of Northern Ireland could have been established.

90. Kerr 1985, online: http://geocities.com/CapitalHill/3222/-ulstnat.html.

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One could even go back further and point out that external British >plantations= of settlers from Scotland and England into the Ulster region of Ireland from the twelfth century onward, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, helped create the conflict, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination by state occupying the limbo state), and three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation). Large tracts of Irish land were confiscated and given to

British citizenBBsoldiers who fought in Ireland or groups relocating to Ireland to improve their lot financially. This act of distributing indigenous land to settlers contributed to the establishment of external Protestant planters who were part of the Reformation that broke from the Roman Catholic church and who were placed on the island of Ireland among those Christians who remained loyal to the Catholic church.91 Again, this activity supports the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model.

More conflicts between the two groups occurred 1968 as a result of the struggle taking place in the United Stated in a call for civil rights for African-Americans.

Influenced by this call for civil rights, the Catholics of Northern Ireland began an internal campaign for their civil rights; the results have been Protestant reactions to Catholic assertions and the continued internal conflict between the Protestant Loyalists/Unionists and Catholic/Nationalists/Republicans, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population).

91. Fitzduff and O=Hagan, 2002, online: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/incorepaper.htm. 179

The most recent attempt to quell the fighting between the two groups was the internally created 1998 Belfast Agreement, also referred to as the Good Friday

Agreement, which resulted after two years of political talks.92 The Agreement originally resulted in a stalemate, supporting concepts one (political and administrative domination) and four

(paradoxical responses by inhabitants). The Belfast Agreement was approved by Northern

Ireland=s main nationalist political parties (primarily Catholics who wanted NI to join the

Republic of Ireland) and most of the unionist parties (who wanted NI to remain within the

United Kingdom). This Agreement also resulted in the Republic of Ireland=s ending its external territorial claim to NI, which came about after both the United Kingdom and the

Republic of Ireland signed an international agreement titled AAgreement Between the

Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the

92. Belfast Agreement, online: http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.htm.

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Government of Ireland.@93 In the Belfast Agreement, Article three states that the Belfast

Agreement will replace the Hillsborough Pact. More importantly, this agreement established an internally created Northern Ireland assembly based on power sharing that was set up in December 1999. The legislative assembly was made up of both unionist and nationalist politicians with Ministers and committee members drawn from both the

Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists.

Before the ink dried on the Agreement, objections to different requirements put forth by the agreement surfaced by different groups particularly Unionists and those calling for an independent Ulster nation, supporting concept four (responses by inhabitants). Even among the latter group of individuals exists debate on whether the independent state should be named Northern Ireland or Ulster. The objection to the

Belfast Agreement is strongest among the Unionists who claim that the Agreement has reneged on specific promises and will eventually force a union with the Republic of

Ireland.

On 14 October 2002, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland suspended the

Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive and assumed control of the Northern Ireland

Departments assisted by Northern Ireland Office Ministers, further supporting the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model. In December 2004, an attempt by Great

Britain to get Northern Ireland back on track with the Belfast Agreement did not come to fruition, supporting the notions in all four explanatory concepts.

93. Online: http://www.ireland.com/special/peace/theprocess/agreement/agreement.htm. 181

However, in 2005 Sinn Fein decided to cooperate and decommission its stockpile of arms. It took power sharing five times to fail before it currently succeeded on 8 May

2007.94 The hope of a lasting peace for the inhabitants of NI appears to be in the making.

Still NI remains in the limbo state status.

The importance of an all-inclusive legislative assembly was a major step toward autonomy and for the grassroots exposure to possible results of cooperation. An important concept for the citizens of NI is that cultural and religious differences can actually coexist and that these differences should not be the basis for failure to create a state providing an economically thriving, culturally and socially diverse, and stable environment that allows its citizens personal security, political equality, economic prosperity, and a justice system based on rule of law.

The response by the indigenous population to the Northern Ireland Life and Times

Survey (see appendix A) has revealed much about the grassroots concerns about diverse topics concerning various situations in NI. The responses to the survey questions also reveal a population that, at times, changes it focus, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). This lack of consistency can be seen in the survey information provided in chapter three (section C, part three), in which the respondents gave diverse answers to the same question asked a year apart. In 1998 and 1999 the question asked was, AHas the paramilitary been helpful in the search for peace?@

In 1998, 51% of the general responses felt that the paramilitary groups were

94. See section C, part six, footnote 77 in this chapter.

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helpful (10% very helpful, 41% quite helpful) in the search for peace. This earlier response was different from the following year (1999) in which 74% saw the paramilitary groups as blocking the peace processBBthe Good Friday Agreement. In terms of those responses based on religious difference, the Catholic response followed the general response pattern, with 63% of the Catholics responding in 1998 seeing the paramilitary groups as helpful in the search for peace, while in 1999, 66% of the Catholic surveyed saw the paramilitary groups as interfering with the peace process.

Again, a change in response among the Protestants surveyed followed the general response pattern. In 1998, 44% of the Protestants surveyed saw the groups as helpful, while a near doubling of the percent surveyed, 85%, in 1999 saw the paramilitary groups as blocking the peace process in the Good Friday Agreement. As stated earlier, the change in opinion about the peace process and paramilitary groups could be due to a number of reasons such as the flare up of violence, frustration with weak economic growth, or lack of evidence of any good coming from a peace process requiring compromise on the part of different groups. Regardless of the reason for the change in opinions, the one-year change does support the concepts espoused in concept four concerning complex and paradoxical responses by members of the indigenous population.

Chapter three (section C, part one) details how support for different political parties has shown a change on the part of the population, again supporting concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population). A survey of preferences

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for political parties was conducted in 1998 and 2003. The first change is the drop in percentage of Catholics who supported the Social Democratic and Labour Party, from

54% in 1998 to 39% in 2003. Likewise, the percentage of Protestants supporting the

Ulster Unionist Party dropped from 46% in 1998 to 34% in 2003. This double-digit drop in partisan support may be a show by the citizens of NI that they do not support the divisive tactics of the political parties. On the other hand, some increase in support could be found in a surprising placeBBSinn Fein, which is actually considered to be the political segment of the IRA, a paramilitary organization associated with violent activities as discussed above in section C, part three. Percentage of support for Sinn Fein increased from 16% in 1998 to 23% in 2003, revealing an increase of support among the Catholic for a more intense means of attaining their goal of removing British presence in NI.

The survey on self identity revealed in chapter three (section A, part three) is an area showing a divide among the members of the population. When asked how would they choose to describe themselves, 41% responded as being British, 27% as being Irish, and 24% as being Northern Irish. In terms of religion, 64% Catholics described themselves as Irish and 24% of Catholics as Northern Irish; 66% of Protestants described themselves as British and 22% of Protestants as Northern Irish. In the category of No

Religion, 31% described themselves as British, 20% as Irish, and 20% as Northern Irish.

The division exists and contributes to the lack of unity among the indigenous population, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

However, the citizens of NI have maintained consistency in their view of

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decommissioning arms and support for the Belfast Agreement of May 1998. When asked in a survey, AWhich political issue is the most important for the Assembly to deal with,@

52% responded Abringing about decommissioning;@ responses in terms of religion shows

44% of the Catholics, 54% of the Protestants, and a significant 60% of those of No

Religion saw decommissioning as an important issue. In the vote on supporting the

Belfast Agreement in the 1998 and 2003 surveys, 55% and 47% respectively voted yes, with Catholics showing stronger support (70% and 74%) and Protestants weaker (45% and 28%).

As this chapter has revealed, Northern Ireland has experienced conflict among the various groups since the original sixteenth century external settlers from Scotland and

England were brought to the land by the leadership to assure the population=s loyalty to the crown. By the twenty-first century, among the calls for a violent-free NI, are internal grassroots movements that call for an independent NI free from association with or control by Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland.95

John Darby lists what he refers to as elements of Aa tangle of interrelated

problems@ experienced by NI in which no easy solution Alies around the corner.@96 The list consists of the following:

$ There is a central constitutional problem: What should be the political context for the people of Northern Ireland? Integration with Britain? A united Ireland;

95. Kerr 1997, speech online: http://www.ulsternation.org.uk/ulster_independence.htm. Also see: http://www.democraticalternative.com.

96. John Darby 1995, 21.

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independence? $ There is a continuing problem of social and economic inequalities, especially in the field of employment; $ There is a problem of cultural identity, relating to education to the Irish language and to a wide range of cultural differences; $ There is clearly a problem of security; $ There is a problem of religious difference; $ There is certainly a problem of the day-to-day relationships between the people who live in Northern Ireland (Darby 1995, 21).

After reviewing the above list of obvious problems in NI supporting concepts one

(political and administrative domination by state occupying limbo state), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population), the reader can only surmise that in order for the people of NI to begin to seek solutions to some of the problems listed above, they would need to overcome concepts three and four. In order to do this, it would be incumbent upon the population of NI to work indeterminately at overcoming their political, social, ethnic/cultural, and economic problems without interference but still with help from a third party. Currently, as a result of power sharing of 8 May 2007, NI appears determined to make this government and peace succeed while in the limbo state status.

Two revealing surveys conducted by NILT place doubts about whether the indigenous population really wants full sovereignty, supporting concept four of the limbo state model (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). The first question asked in 2000 was, AWhich political issues do you think are the most important for the

Assembly to deal with?@ As stated above in section C (part six), 52% of the general 186

responses were ABringing about decommissioning.@ However, a lesser percentage, 23%, responded with ASecuring Northern Ireland=s union with the United Kingdom,@ and only

8% responded with ABringing about a united Ireland.@ When the results were based on different religions, 44% of Catholics, 54% of Protestants, and 60% of No Religion responded with ABringing about decommissioning,@ while 35% of Protestants and an expected 4% of Catholics responded with ASecuring Northern Ireland=s union with the

United Kingdom@ and 23% of Catholics and an expected 1% of Protestants responded with ABringing about a united Ireland.@ Of the No Religion responders 13% wanted

ASecuring Northern Ireland=s union with the United Kingdom@ and 5% wanted

ABringing about a united Ireland.@ The fact that the survey shows that respondents in the

50% range considered ABringing about decommissioning@ more important that either uniting with the United Kingdom or Republic of Ireland reveals that members of the population do not appear to demand or even expect some form of full sovereignty by merging with another sovereign state, supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses).

The second question asked in 2003 was, ADo you think the long-term policy for

Northern Ireland should be for it . . .@

RESPONSE % RESPONSE %

. . . to remain part of the United Kingdom 55 Other 2

Or, to reunify with the rest of Ireland? 24 (Don=t know) 12 187

(Independent state) 7

The results of the above question for people of different religions were:

RESPONSE %Catholic %Protestant %No Religion

. . . to remain part of the United Kingdom 21 82 45

Or, to reunify with the rest of Ireland 49 5 27

(Independent state) 10 5 10

Other 1 2 4

(Don=t know) 19 7 15

The general response (55%) to this question was Ato remain part of the United Kingdom,@ meaning to continue as part of Great Britain but not merge with GB. In the response based on religion, 82% of Protestants wanted Ato remain part of the United Kingdom@ and thus continue with the status quo. Of those who responded to this question in general, only 7% opted for an independent state. In terms of responses based on religion, 10% of

Catholics, 5% of Protestants, and 10% of No Religion wanted an independent state. These kinds of responses, showing that the general grassroots do not see a need for either being fully independent or merging fully with either Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland, reveal a general reason for NI=s limbo state status, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population).

The research question stated in chapter one, section C, and tailored for NI is: Why, in the case of Northern Ireland, did state formation during decolonization by means of partitioning land not succeed in forming a sovereign nation-state where the state provides

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for its population personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a justice system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively? In other words, why did attempts at state formation actually lead to the creation of contested governance in which protracted conflicts have been in existence since the early history of Northern Ireland?

The response is a combination of answers based on the researched information in the sections above. Without a detailed review of the already closely examined material, the explanation can be seen as the result of a number of events, which are manifested in the following areas supporting explanatory concepts one (political and administrative domination by state occupying the limbo state), two (weak leadership of limbo state), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with own self-preservation agenda), and four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants): political-historical external and internal events listed above that set a pattern of domination by British invasion and occupation; a series of external instruments, treaties, acts, and proclamations that further give control of northern Irish land to outside forces; non-Irish settlers brought to NI and given land in order to assure continued British presence in NI and contributing to resentment by indigenous Catholic residents; internal conflict propagated by such internal activities as parades, bonfires, festivals, parties, and celebrations glorifying occasions such as battles that transpired centuries ago; leadership of Great Britain that did not take into consideration the needs and wants of the indigenous population even when rebellion by the Catholics in 1641 and again 1968 burst forth; and the fact that the citizenry is hesitant

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in wanting to either expect full sovereign independence or compete immergence with either Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland as the survey results reviewed above have shown. Thus, as of the current date of this report, Northern Ireland continues to remain in limbo state status.

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Chapter IV

Jammu-and-Kashmir

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is how Jammu-and-Kashmir (J&K) exemplifies the limbo state model. This analysis is in response to the research question: Why in the case of

Jammu-and-Kashmir did state formation during decolonization by means of partitioning land not succeed in forming a sovereign nation-state where the state provides for its population personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a justice system based on the rule of law that maintains order effectively? In other words, why did attempts at state formation actually lead to the creation of an area of contested governance in which protracted conflicts among members of the population have been in existence since the early history of Jammu-and-Kashmir?

In order to demonstrate how J&K fits the limbo state model, this case study explores and rediscovers the political history of J&K, including official documents and survey responses, in light of the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model advanced in chapter one: 1) patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period of years (revealed in the region=s political history) with limited gaps of self-rule that indicate the area exhibits limited sovereignty with resulting consequences such as lack of personal security,

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personal independence, and political stability and transparency for the inhabitants, as well as poor economic development and weakened or compromised rule of law, thus acquiring limbo state status; 2) patterns of weak leadership within the limbo state leading to failure of authority and related consequences as listed in explanatory concept one above; 3) patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation and the partition of the land leading to incomplete, limited, or denied self-rule, as well as sectarian conflicts among the varied religious and ethnic groups, resulting, at times, in violent consequences; and 4) patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population (generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture) that are the aftereffect of cultural diversity in the post-partition era. The complex and paradoxical responses have been expressed in a number of ways such as through verbal complaints, through political expressions such as voting choices whenever possible, or through demonstrations and insurgencies that, at times, have escalated into physical violence. Recently these complex and paradoxical responses have been tallied in surveys the results of which are included in this chapter on Jammu-and-Kashmir.

Situations that could have led to J&K becoming a fully sovereign independent state involve one of five possibilities: 1) J&K could achieve full independence from India and Pakistan and thus become a fully independent sovereign state; 2) J&K could merge with India and through this union be considered fully sovereign as a part of India; 3) J&K

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could merge with Pakistan and through this union be considered fully sovereign as part of

Pakistan; 4) J&K could be divided at the Line of Control with each section joining the state of controlBBIndia southeast of the LOC and Pakistan northwest of the LOC and thus become two sovereign independent states as a result of merging with India in that section of the land southeast of the Line of Control (LOC) and merging with Pakistan in that section of the land northwest of the Line of Control; or 5) J&K could divide at the LOC and the land east of the LOC become independent and the land west of LOC become independent with decisions later on the name of each independent land. The fact that none of the above possibilities have transpired and that other conditions reviewed below in light of explanatory concepts one, two, three, and four of the limbo state model make J&K a revealing case of limbo statehood.

The full picture of why none of the five alternatives to independence materialized will be offered below in sections A to C, followed by a concluding section D. As was noted in chapter one, processes that either prevented state formation or resulted in protracted limited sovereignty and conflicts in J&K can be classified as external or internal influential events or factors. The extensive definitions of external and internal influential events have been offered already in chapter one (section D, part three); however, briefly, external influential events are those events that occurred outside of a state such as military invasions (one example) that influence the development of the state; internal influential events are those factors occurring within the state such as weak leadership (one example) that contribute to the state=s lack of or loss of full sovereignty.

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As the political-historical events in Jammu-and-Kashmir unfold in this chapter, the relative importance of how external and internal influential events and factors contributed to the non-state status of Jammu-and-Kashmir will be evident. This introduction to J&K will identify those internal and external events and factors in J&K=s political history that have inevitably contributed to that region=s current limbo state status.

As the research on J&K in this chapter reveals, many of the internal and external elements that contribute to the richness and diversity of that land are instrumental as well in the failure of J&K to become an independent sovereign state. These elements also have been instrumental in the conflicts among the diverse communities inhabiting J&K.

An important factor that has contributed to the failure of the formation of an independent sovereign state of J&K is nationalism, an internal factor supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population). Nationalism in this case us not only a source of cohesion but also a source of conflict.

Arthur Waldron observed that nationalism can be Aa powerful force@ that can bind

Athe new society that is constructed from the raw material of the old.@1 In addition, as

Waldron notes, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants): Afar from being a source of cohesion, nationalism [can become] . . . an important source of intrasocietal conflict.@2 This same theme is echoed by Elie Kedourie

1. Waldron 1985, 425.

2. Waldron 1985, 433.

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who writes about nationalism as a powerful, destructive force.3 Due to the internal factor of nationalism, J&K, as the brief political and cultural history in section A below reveals, did experience periods of unity and cohesion, yet also found itself divided, supporting explanatory concept four of the limbo state model (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

Internal ethnic loyalties had become so compelling as to lead to the establishment of nationalistic groups within the boundaries of J&K (supporting concept four). The creation of these mini-nations, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups) and four

(complex and paradoxical responses) can be viewed as being among the many factors that have contributed to the failure of the formation of an independent sovereign state of all of

Jammu-and-Kashmir, resulting in the current limbo state status.

As section A below reveals, the internal establishment of varied ethnic groups created a Jammu-and-Kashmir of diversity and many identities. Even though this cultural diversity may be viewed as giving J&K cultural richness and diverse economic durability due to the varied trade and manufacturing contributions by each group, the intense internal ethnic identity did become extreme during certain historical periods, leading to sectarian violence. This kind of ethnic and religious strife prevented unity among the varied groups and led to uncompromising political divisions within the region preventing formation of a unified sovereign state thus supporting concepts one (pattern of invasions and

3. Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 49B55. 195

domination), two (weak leadership), three (diversely ethnic immigrants) and four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model.

Section A reveals, moreover, that the political-historical dispute is more complex than the question of which countryBBeither India or PakistanBBhas sovereign rights over

J&K (supporting concepts one, two, and three). This chapter exposes the political- historical genesis of the Jammu-and-Kashmir question following concept one in terms of the country=s attempt at and failure to attain some form of independent statehood, through any of the five methods outlined above (either through complete sovereign independence, or through merging with India, or through merging with Pakistan, or dividing at the Line of Control and merging with the bordered state, or through dividing at the LOC and each land section attaining independence).

Section A also reveals how geographic location of Jammu-and-Kashmir was, and can be considered currently, at the same time a blessing and a problem. The blessing involves those segments surrounded by mountains that actually can provide protection for parts of J&K; as a problem, the location places J&K in a centrally located spot attracting invading forces supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination) and two (weak leadership).

Section B, as well as parts of section A, details the power struggle that transpired internally among the potential leaders upon the death of whomever was the current ruler, supporting concept two (weak leadership) allowing more invasions and political and administrative domination by an outside force further supporting concept one. A pattern

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appeared that included: leadership, then the downfall or death of the leader, then conflict, then a new leadership, then downfall or death, then conflict. This pattern appears to be a dominant motif in the political history of J&K. A brief example of this motif can be seen with the conflict between the Muslim sects, Sunni and Shia, with the death of Yaqub Chak that allowed the external forces of India Mughal ruler Akbar to take control of Kashmir.

With the downfall of the Mughal empire, another external group, the Afghans, invaded

J&K. Yet another external conqueror, the British, were able to take a firmer control of

India and eventually Jammu-and-Kashmir contributing to the conflict internally between the Sikhs and the British.

Section B as well reports on how the partitioning of India by the British leadership also affected how J&K became a partitioned land supporting concepts one (pattern of invasions and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state) and two (weak leadership within the limbo state). This section also reveals how the

British style of partitioning played a role in Jammu-and-Kashmir=s current limbo state status supporting concept one.

Section C offers a look at the insurgency since 1989 and the effects it has had on the current population, with attention to concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). According to Richard H. Curtiss, executive editor of the Washington

Report on Middle East Affairs, as of 2002 over 50,000 people have been killed in J&K as a result of internal and external elements contributing to the dispute not only between

India and Pakistan in J&K but also between the inhabitants of J&K and India, and

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between J&K and Pakistan.4 Unfortunately, according to Curtis, many more will die if the violent dispute over the future of J&K continues supporting explanatory concepts one

(patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination), two (weak leadership), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population).

Part three of section C provides the results of surveys conducted in J&K (see appendices P, R, and S for details of three surveys). When appropriate and if needed in specific areas of this research project, results of the surveys will be included showing the relativity of concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population).

Uses of surveys, as stated in chapter one (section D, part one), contribute to knowledge about the indigenous population=s views and feelings on various topics

Section D sums up the information and analysis of why Jammu-and-Kashmir has to this day remained in the limbo state status. As will be shown, the results of consequences of several factors prevent a nation from becoming a sovereign independent state.

A. Political History of Jammu-and-Kashmir

1. Then and Now: Background Information on the Creation of

Jammu-and-Kashmir

As of the twenty-first century, as the map below reveals, approximately 100,569 square kilometers (38,830 square miles) of Jammu-and-Kashmir are under the external control of India, including Jammu province, Kashmir province, and Ladakh;

4. Curtiss 2002, 34-36.

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approximately 78,932 square kilometers (30,476 square miles) are under the external control of Pakistan, including Gilgit, Baltistan, Muzaffarabad and Poonch valley; also, a small portion of about 42,735 square kilometers (16,500 square miles) in the northeast are under the external control of China, including Aksai-chin and Demchok in Ladakh and Shaksgam.5

Thus external as well as internal factors contribute to J&K=s lack of full sovereignty and independent statehood.

How J&K came into existence is a mixture of internal and external mythology and reality supporting concepts one, two, three, and four of the limbo state model. The following story of the creation of J&K appears in the earliest text on J&K entitled the

Nilamatpurana (also written Nilamat Purana).6 However, a compilation of the early history of Kashmir is attributed to the twelfth century chronicler Kalhana who is often quoted by researchers and scholars on the topic of Jammu-and-Kashmir and who authored the text Rajatarangine (River of Kings) in which the tale of the creation of Kashmir is related quoting from Nilamatpurana.7 The compelling legend can be viewed as the

Kashmiri subconscious beginnings.

Briefly, the legend relates that the Kashmir valley was once an extremely large

5. Kashmir 2009, Encyclopaedia Online: http:// www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 312908/kashmir.

6. Bamzai 1973, 30-36.

7. The information on the legend of the creation of Kashmir can be found in any text on the history of Jammu-and-Kashmir. Information related here is taken from Bamzai 1973, 3-10; Kaul 1969, 13-18; and Kahol 2003, 365.

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lake called Sati Saras (Lake of Sati) in which lived Jalodbhava (also known as Jaludhar) who was protected as long as he lived in the water. He began to create chaos for the Nagas

(snake worshipers) who lived in the area of the lake guarding it. When a sage named

Kashyap learned of Jalodbhava=s destructive behavior, he asked for help from external sources in the form of the gods Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. Vishnu called upon his brother (Balabhadra) to create an enormous internal gap or break in the surrounding mountains at Baramula draining the lake of Sati in order to expose the internal evilness in the form of Jalodbhava, who was then beheaded. The land was settled by Kashyap

(whether he was native to the land or arrived from the outside is never really stated in the literature) and was named after him as Kashyap-mar (>the bode of Kashyap=) also known as Kasmira, Kasmir or Cashmere. It was Kashyap, in a transition from legend to history, who was credited with bringing the first external settlers, Brahmin penitents and philosophers to the valley.8

The reality part of the story is that geologists confirm that indeed a gap formed in the ring of mountains at Baramula most probably, they reason, by an earthquake; paleontologists have reported finding coral and various marine fossils within this valley attesting to the existence at one time of water possibly in the form of a lake.9 This story of the creation of Kashmir through violence and settlers attests to the internal enigma of this

8. Bamzai 1973, 53.

9. Bamzai 1973, 53-55.

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most baffling land that will become more evident as the political history of this land unfolds supporting all four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model.

As noted in the map below, Jammu-and-Kashmir is surrounded by four countries--

India to the south, Pakistan to the west, Afghanistan to the north, and China to the northeast and east. This location in south central Asia has contributed to J&K=s political history of external elements in the form of invasions and occupation by the military force of a foreign state and/or leadership from a diverse group of cultures.10

Included in these groups, from ancient times to the twenty-first century, are Hindus,

Buddhists, Kushans, Brahmins, Shaivists, Huns, Mongols, Turks, Mughals, Afghans,

Sikhs, British, and presently Indians and Pakistanis providing a strong support for concepts one and four of the limbo state model (see appendix E, part one for a brief chronology of

Kashmiri history).

External invasions by many varied groups into a land situated in a crossroad location such as J&K should not be considered unusual especially in the earlier centuries.

In the case of J&K, continued episodes of conquest and rule by such a diverse group as experienced by this nation is somewhat unexpected because of the security provided by

10. While much of the information found in this section on the political history of J&K can be found in any related text, information used here is taken from the following texts: Bamzai 1973, A History of Kashmir; Deora and Grover, eds., 1991, Documents on Kashmir Problems; Ganguly 1997, The Crisis in Kashmir; Kaul 1969, A Six Millennium Review of Kashmir; Schofield 1996, Kashmir in the Crossfire; and Online at any of the links to kashmir.org; kashmirwatch.org; geocities.com; soundvision.com/news/kashmir; amnestykashmir.org; and 1upindia.com/states/jammu-kashmir/index.html.

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the

Map 4.1. Jammu-and-Kashmir Map courtesy of the University of Texas at Austin online at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/ maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_rel_2003.jgp

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surrounding mountains that contribute to the protection of the centrally located Valley of

Kashmir and especially the capital of Srinagar. Strategically, the external invaders really had only a handful of internal mountain passes by which to enter J&K. These passes actually have a very important role in J&K=s political history and have become part of the stories of invasion by external distant armies. Appendix F lists some of the more prominent passes and a brief reference to historical events that have either contributed to the nomenclature of the pass or given rise to famous events at a specific pass.

A well guarded pass in previous centuries of hand-to-hand combat could have repelled an invading army. However, time and again J&K=s internal borders and passes were transgressed by external forces resulting in the indigenous population finding itself controlled by yet another invader supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination) and two (weak leadership). According to Dr. Radha Krishan Parmu:

Under strong and magnificent kings, the Himalayan mountain ranges secured the valley from foreign intrusions. Under weak kingsBand there were a lot of themBowing to their complacency and laxity of control over the passes, Kashmir fell an easy prey to adventurers, missionaries and conquerors (qtd in Schofield 1996, 2).

A quick review of internal features of J&K such as location, physical environment and natural resources, offered below, will help in understanding why this nation has attracted so much uninvited external attention and invasions. These patterns of invasions and domination by states occupying J&K (concept one), contributed, unfortunately for the indigenous population, to failure in forming an immutable independent sovereign state.

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Jammu-and-Kashmir has an area of approximately 223,000 square kilometers

(eighty-six thousand square miles) and is located in the Himalaya Mountains where

Pakistan, India, and China meet.11 J&K has been described as rising in tiers starting from the south of J&K in India in a narrow plain called the Punjab plain beyond which is a hilly area known as the Outer Himalayas where elevations range from six hundred to twelve hundred meters (two thousand to four thousand feet). Farther north is a higher range known as the Lesser Himalayas and still farther north are the Great Himalayas where some peaks are over seventy-six hundred meters (twenty-five thousand feet) high.

The Vale of Kashmir lies in a broad valley between the Lesser and Great

Himalayas, at an elevation of about sixteen hundred meters (fifty-two hundred feet). In northern J&K are great plateaus and the towering, snowcapped peaks of the Karakoram

Range where the famous K2 (Mount Godwin Austen) peak is found, the world's second highest mountain after Mount Everest rising to a height of 8,611 meters (28,250 feet) near the Chinese border.12 A number of the great rivers of India and Pakistan have their origins in J&K or pass through the region. The most important of these are the Indus, Jhelum,

Ravi, and Chenab rivers.

Asharani Mathur describes J&K=s seemingly unlimited source of natural and

11. Srivastava 1998, online: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/colkash.htm.

12. This information can be found online at any website referenced Vale of Kashmir or K2. This information was taken from a website online at: http://www.monterosa-nepal .com/8000m/K2.htm.

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produced wealth:13

What makes Kashmir so special? Many things: its landscape, a lush green valley and rolling wooded uplands ringed by snowcapped mountains, crisscrossed by rivers and studded with lakes; its rich profusion of trees and flowers and fruits, the Himalayan cedar, the chinar, the ramrod-straight poplar, the pale pink foam of almond blossoms in spring, lotuses budding in the late summer heat, jewel- like cherries glowing in wooden boxes, and, in autumn, saffron- yielding crocuses in Pampore stretching purpose as far as the eye can see. And the lovely liquid sound of the Kashmiri language; the wealth of handicrafts, evoking different and subtle tactile sensationsB the soft, butter feel of the famed tush shaws, the waxy smoothness of planed walnut wood, paper macheBslick to the touch and a marvel to the eye, the rough texture of the mumdah and the thick, luxurious pile of a close-knotted carpet; its food-curried stalk of lotus, tangy greens and karam sag, crisp-fried chops, mutton cooked in spices and yogurt, meatballs made of finely pounded meat and simmered in a creamy-rich sauce of cardamom, thickened milk and broth, washed down with cups of kahwa, tea flavored with cinnamon, cardamom and saffron; people-medley of races and religionsBAryan, Scythian and Mongolians; Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists, faces and images closer to Central Asia than to the plains of India; a wealth of historical remainsB the somber magnificence of the Sun Temple at Martand, the formal elegance of the Mughal Gardens. These are the sights that make Kashmir. Other places in India have some of these, but only Kashmir has them all, and from these threads are woven the . . . experience that is uniquely Kashmir (Kashmir and Ladakh Online: http://www.angelfire.com/nd/ gulmarg/kashinfo .html).

Thus, patterns of invasions and domination in J&K result from the tourist- attracting beauty of the region and all of the natural and produced resources, in addition to the national defense considerations of the states seeking to possess J&K; yet political opportunity, for which J&K is besieged by India and Pakistan, is the most compelling reason for control of Jammu-and-Kashmir as will be discussed in sections B and C below.

13. Kashmir and Ladakh Online: http://www.angelfire.com/nd/gulmarg/kashinfo.html.

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Sumit Ganguly observes that India and Pakistan individually have a need to control J&K based on each state=s secular and ideological identity.14 For India, according to Ganguly,

AIt is . . . crucial for a secular India to include a Muslim majority state.@15 For Pakistan, as Ganguly notes, Agiving up Kashmir means denying the ideological basis of partition@ since the Alogic of partition . . . [was] to form Pakistan in 1947.@16 J&K, as a predominantly Muslim nation, was considered by the Pakistani founders to be part of

Muslim Pakistan. For India, adding Jammu-and-Kashmir with its Muslim majority to

India=s vast land of Hindus would provide a show that indeed India is a secular, multiethnic state. Thus one reason, among many as the sections below will reveal, why

J&K exists in a limbo state status is due to a conflict between two major states in a show of identity.

The result of varied external groups coming to J&K has created a present-day diversity of peoples, languages, religions and cultural manifestations that contribute to the concepts found in explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), three

(patterns of settlers immigrating with own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). According to the 2008 census, the population of Indian-controlled Kashmir is 11, 700,000 and the population of Pakistani-controlled

14. Ganguly 2003, 35

15. Ganguly 2003, 35.

16. Ganguly 2003, 35.

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Kashmir is 5,000,000.17 The religious and language divide show that the people of the

Valley of Kashmir and the Pakistani areas are predominantly Muslims and speak Urdu and Kashmiri. The inhabitants of the western part of Jammu are majority Muslim and the inhabitants of the eastern part of Jammu are predominately Hindu and people in both regions speak Hindi, Punjabi, and Dogri. In terms of language difference, it should be noted that spoken Urdu and Hindi have much in common, while written Urdu and Hindi are different. The inhabitants of the Ladakh region to the east bordering China are the

Tibetan peoples who are Buddhists and speak Balti and Ladakhi. As stated previously, while this diversity contributed to the richness of the region in terms of language, customs, legends, costumes, celebrations of events, merchandise for trade, and the arts, the differences among the ethnic groups also contributed to the perceived need for self- preservation, supporting concepts three (patterns of settlers immigrating with own self- preservation agenda) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population).

2. Political History of Jammu-and-Kashmir

a. Brief Background from Third Century BCE to the Twentieth Century

As has been offered above, as a result of the geographic location of Jammu-and-

17. Freedom in the World 2008. The information on the population census of India- controlled Kashmir is online at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/487ca21996.html. The information on the population census of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir is online at: http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/docid/487ca21a2a.html.

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Kashmir, a pattern of waves of invaders has been a part of the political history of J&K, which reinforces concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination) and three (patterns of settlers immigrating) of the limbo state model. According to Kalhana, earlier sources indicate that Kashmir was actually an independent valley from its earliest existence up to the third century BCE ruled by fifty-two kings of Kashmir=s earliest internal dynasties.18

In the third century BCE, Ashoka from India ruled J&K beginning a long political history of rule by outside invasions.19 Interestingly, when Alexander III of Macedon (356-323

BCE) led his forces into India, he by-passed J&K going from Afghanistan to northern

India to defeat the forces of King Porus. Historical documents, according to Kaul, note that, AIn 326 BC the king of Kashmir sent his brother to announce submission to

Alexander@ whose army had advanced to the northern part of India between the Jhelum

River and the Indus River defeating the army of King Porus of India then following the

Indus River south to the Arabian Ocean proceeding back to the Middle East along the coastline.20 This move on the part of the Kashmiri leadership helped prevent an additional invasion and control by an outside force. Yet, nonetheless, changes did take place as noted below supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three (patterns of settlers immigrating). An interesting historical side note illuminating concepts one (invasions and domination) and

18. Kalhana 1900, 16.

19. Bamzai 1973, 80-86.

20. Kaul 1969, 21.

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four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) concerning Alexander=s presence in India is connected with the Greek soldiers who stayed in northern India after

Alexander=s victory in 327 BCE (rather than joining Alexander=s march back to the

Middle East) remaining in that area of India intermarrying among the indigenous population enriching the diversity of the region=s population.21 On the other hand, many of the Greeks were ousted by then India=s ruler, Chandragupta, from central India. 22

The pattern of leadership supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination) and three (patterns of settlers immigrating with own self-preservation agenda) continued when Ashoka, Chandragupta=s younger brother, became the next leader of

J&K. Ashoka established the external Mauryan empire, which extended from

Afghanistan to present day Bangladesh and including Jammu-and-Kashmir. Ashoka was born a Hindu but converted to Buddhism and sent Buddhist missionaries to Kashmir.

When Ashoka died, interestingly, Kashmir regained its independence internally under the leadership of Jaluka who also converted to Buddhism and who was praised for a leadership of integrity and for establishing administrative departments to rule J&K. In keeping with concept one, Kashmiri independence did not last long.23

By the first century CE, Jammu-and-Kashmir lost its independence to the external invading Kushans from northwest China who ruled until 178 CE spreading Buddhism to

21. Schofield 1996, 7.

22. Schofield 1996, 7.

23. Schofield 1996, 7. See also Kalhana 1900, 108.

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central Asia and China. After the downfall of the Kushan rule, Shaivism became the newly established religion and was basically a merging of Brahminist scriptures and

Buddhist humanist teachings. Later external rulers and/or invaders were of the above mentioned religions until Richan, a Ladakhi Buddhist prince dethroned the Hindu ruler

Sahdev in 1319 and converted to Islam taking the name of Sadar-ud-Din. This is considered the beginning of Islamic rule in Kashmir.24 After Sadruddin died, Hindu rule was briefly restored.

Then in 1339 Shah Mir, a Muslim court minister under the former king, Sadaruddin, became ruler, took the name Shams-ud-Din and established an Islamic dynasty that lasted for two hundred years contributing to the dichotomy of rich ethnicity and divisive diversity within the region.

Islam became the dominant religion by the late fourteenth century when three hundred external religious preachers in 1393 were brought into J&K to convert the people to Islam contributing to concepts three (patterns of settlers immigrating with own self- preservation agenda) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population). In addition, Islam became more dominant in J&K under the rule of Sikandar

(1394-1416) who attempted to raise money to pay a large tribute to Timur, Genghis

Khan=s successor, who threatened an invasion. Sikandar levied high taxes, destroyed

Hindu temples, ashrams, and scriptures, and demanded conversion to Islam or exile and even death. During this time, all but eleven Kashmiri Brahmin families, called Pandits,

24. Bazaz 1954, 45.

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emigrated from Kashmir to Jammu.25 Traditionally, Pandits were highly educated Hindu

Brahmins who administered the government in Kashmir. The Kashmiri Muslims citizenry were against Sikandar=s policy of eliminating the Hindus and many gave refuge to escaping Hindus. Fortunately for the population of Kashmir, Zain-ul Abidin, Sikandar=s son, became

25. Bazaz 1954, 53-55; see also Schofield 1996, 16.

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ruler from 1420 to 1470 and was the opposite in policies to his father.26 Zain-ul Abidin oversaw the rebuilding of temples his predecessor had destroyed and invited Pandits, scholars, and intellectuals to return to Kashmir supporting concept three (patterns of settlers immigrating) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

After Zain-ul Abidin=s death, years of internal instability occurred due to wars and external invasions until 1555 at which time Ghazi Chak became king of Kashmir ending the two hundred-year-old dynasty of the Shah Mirs.27 The Chak rule created an independent Kashmir again but only for a short time as indicated in concept one

(invasions and domination with limited gaps of self-rule). During reign of the last of the seven Chak Kings, Yaqub Chak, members of the Muslim sects--Sunnis and Shias--fought against each other allowing the external Mughal emperor of India, Akbar, to take advantage of the power struggle among the internal groups by invading and taking control of Kashmir in 1586 in keeping with concept one of the limbo state model.28

Under Mughal leadership, the typical pattern of government was for the seat of the government, in this case Delhi, to send a governor to rule over J&K and collect taxes.

However, regardless of the fact that J&K was under the control of a foreign dynasty, the

Mughal empire brought stability and prosperity to the region and an era referred to as the

26. Bazaz 1954, 56-57.

27. Bazaz 1954, 68.

28. Bazaz 1954, 70.

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golden age.29 Unfortunately the golden age did not last after the reign of Aurangzeb, the last Mughal king who ruled from 1658 to 1707. Disasters, created by both humans and nature appeared to spread over Jammu-and-Kashmir. During Aurangzeb=s reign, persecution of Hindus and Shia Muslims took place and after his death the war of succession among his three sons contributed to instability and disorder with widespread arrests, rebellion, assassinations, and murders. Major Hindu-Shia-Sunni conflicts occurred in 1720 supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). By the early eighteenth century, Hindus continued to leave the Kashmir

Valley. The year 1746 brought on floods and famine in which was reported three-quarters of the people of Kashmir are said to have perished.30

With the weakened Mughal rule in India, the governors of J&K became more tyrannical toward their subjects forcing Kashmiri nobles to seek external help from

Afghan leaders, the Pathans, supporting concepts four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) and one (patterns of invasions and domination) of the limbo state model. The nobles= request received a response in 1753 when the Afghans finally did invade J&K and annex it to the Afghan kingdom creating more problems than peace for the Kashmiris.31 The fifty-year rule by Afghan governors proved to be as cruel and demanding in tax collection as were the last of the Mughal governors leading to more

29. Schofield 1996, 21. See also Bamzai 1973, 375-395.

30. Schofield 1996, 23. See also Bamzai 1973, 400-417.

31. Bamzai 1973, 418-430.

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rebellion on the part of the inhabitants, which led to more suppression supporting explanatory concepts one (invasions and domination of >limbo state@ by occupying state), four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants), and two (weak leadership within the limbo state).

An example of weak Pathan leadership is the decline of the shawl industry under

Afghan rule. Under Mughal rule an estimated forty thousand shawl looms were active; this number dropped to sixteen thousand in the late eighteenth century under the Pathan leadership. However, later under the new Sikh leadership the number of looms increased to about twenty-four thousand in the beginning of the nineteenth century.32 The external

Sikh invasion and subsequent rule resulted from a combination of court intrigue and encouragement of an invasion by Ranjit Singh of Lahore that allowed J&K to fall to the

Sikhs in July 1819 in keeping with concept one (patterns of invasions and domination).

By the time the Sikhs began their twenty-eight year rule in J&K, another external influence, the British, had already made their presence felt through trading activities of the

East India Company (EIC) that began in the early 17th century (more about British in J&K below) further supporting concept one.33 The East India Company had a military branch to protect their interests in India and by the 1857 mutiny, the British government army also joined in the need to protect ABritish interests@ in India as noted in concepts one

(patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and

32. Schofield 1996, 29.

33. Wild 2000, 10-11.

214

three (patterns of settlers immigrating). During the Sikh rule, the treaty of AAmity and

Concord@ between the Sikhs and the British East India Company was completed on 25

April 1809 in which the Sikhs acknowledged British EIC control in Sind province and the

British EIC agreed to end their territorial control at the Sutlej River. Making treaties with local rulers became a part of the British slow entrance into India and later Jammu-and

Kashmir, contributing to support of concepts two (weak leadership within the limbo state) and one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination). Under Sikh rule a feudatory of Ranjit Singh, Gulab Singh (not related), became the ruler of Jammu.

Gulab

Singh and his relationship with the British through the East India Company will play a vital role in the political future of J&K supporting concepts one (political and administrative domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three

(patterns of settlers immigrating with own self-preservation agenda).

Gulab Singh was a descendant of the external Dogra Rajputs who were former vassals of the external Mughals and who continued to rise politically after the death of Aurangzeb, the last Mughal ruler.34 The name Dogra comes from Dogirath meaning >two lakes= referring to lakes Mansar and Siroinsar around which the Dogra Rajputs settled.35 After displaying his loyalty to Ranjit Singh and obtaining control of Jammu, Gulab Singh expanded his lands to include Ladakh and Baltistan in the 1830s in the name of the Sikh

34. Das Gupta 1968, 14.

35. Sshofield 1996, 39.

215

kingdom supporting concepts one (patterns of domination) and two (weak leadership within the limbo state). After Ranjit Singh=s death, typical court intrigue for the legitimate successor occurred with Gulab Singh on the winning side. Gulab Singh and his followers carried away from the fort where the battle took place carts of rupees and silver coins, and bags of gold seals, jewelry, and other valuable articles.36

The brief review of J&K=s political history above reveals a land experiencing wave after wave of military invasions followed by cultural invasions supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), three (patterns of settlers immigrating), and two (weak leadership within the limbo state). Also contributing to the varied influences on J&K=s political history is the region=s close connection with India and the political and military activities experienced by India. This pattern of varied external control sprinkled by occasional internal rule has had an effect on J&K=s inability to form a stable, long lasting fully independent sovereign state. Jammu-and-Kashmir is a limbo state, a concept developed and defined in this study, through this historical support of explanatory concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination by a state occupying the limbo state), two (patterns of weak leadership within the limbo state), three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state), and four (patterns of complex and paradoxical responses by indigenous population).

b. The British in India and Jammu-and-Kashmir

Before viewing how the external British activities conducted in Jammu-and-

36 Schofield 1996, 43. See also Singh 1974, 51.

216

Kashmir contributed to the inability of J&K to attain complete statehood (supporting concepts one and two), this section reviews briefly how the British entered India and later

J&K and the result of British political activities--especially the partition of India. Linked closely with how the British government began to colonize India is the entrance into India by the external establishment named the East India Company (also known as the English or British East India Company to distinguish it from the other East India Companies such as the Dutch, Spanish, French and Portugese among others).37

Anthony Wild sums up the presence of the East India Company, which offered support of concept one (patterns of invasions and domination):

It ruled India, raised its own army and navy, minted its own currency, and traded with every corner of the globe. Colorful figures such as the inimitable Clive, Captain James Skinner, and John Nicholson made their names through their association with AThe Honourable Company@ and Britain discovered a new world of tea, silks, porcelain, cashmere, and spices (Wild 2000, Front Flap of Hardcover Edition).

The East India Company had established trading stations at Machlipattanam in

1611, Surat in 1612, Madras in 1641 and Calcutta in 1699. In 1688 the company acquired

37. While much of the information found in this section on the history of the East India Company can be found in any related text, information used here is taken from the following texts: Bamzai 1973, A History of Kashmir; Bowen 2000, 400 Years of the East India Comapny; Keay 1991, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company; Wild 2000, The East India Company: Trade and Conquest from 1600; Schofield 1996, Kashmir in the Crossfire; 2002, History of India: The British East India Company and Colonization online: http://members.tripod.com/~india_resource/ eastindia. html; Wheeler 1899, India and the Frontier States of Afghanistan, Nipal and Burma; http://www.kamat.com as well as links to the East India Company at www.eastindiacompany.com.

217

its first territory and thus land holding in Bombay Island from Charles II for ten pounds per year (Bombay Island was part of the dowry of Charles= Portuguese wife Catherine of

Braganza).38 With the acquisition of Bombay Island, the British can be considered, in substance, foreign settlers in a new land categorizing Great Britain as part of the pattern discussed in concepts one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination) and three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state).

The Battle of Plassey historically is the point in which the power of the East India company took hold of India.39 On 23 June 1757 the East India Company forces under

Robert Clive defeated the army of Siraj-ud-Daulah, the Nawab (Mughal governor) of

Bengal. After the Battle of Plassey, East India Company was allowed by the Mughal rulers to collect land revenue from the conquered provinces in return for an annual tribute to the Mughals and a promise to maintain order and peace. This action on the part of the native leadership allowed the external East India Company to begin its authority in India through acquisition of land, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership), and three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state).

Through the East India Company, the external forces of the British government inched their way into India with a major leap into the country after the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

The company=s method of cruel management led to the Indian Mutiny of 1857,

38. Gardner 1971, 42.

39. Gardner 1971, 88.

218

referred to by the British as the Sepoy Riots, and referred to in Indian writings as India=s

First War of Independence. The mutiny was considered an attempt by Indian soldiers

(sepoys) in the military service of the company to unite India against the British controllers and to restore power to the Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah.40 Since Indians made up 96% of the three hundred thousand East India Company army troops, the violence against the British spread quickly. The British government sent in their own troops to quell the rebellion. After much violence, killings, massacres, and recapturing of towns the mutineers had occupied, the mutiny was put down in April 1859 after the capture and execution of Maratha General Tatya Tope, the last of the mutiny leaders.41

The mutiny had failed for the following reasons relating to concepts one (invasions and domination), two (weak leadership with the limbo state), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants): native Indian states did not join the rebels; Sikh soldiers of the Punjab who had joined the East India Company army and later the British army remained loyal to the British; the aging last Mughal leader, Bahadur Shah, was not a dynamic brave general nor charismatic leader of the people.42 Unfortunately for the future of Kashmir, the first two explanations--native states did not join the rebels and Sikh soldiers remained loyal to the British--would also contribute somewhat to its present non-

40. Remembering 1857-58 War of Indian Independence 2003, Online: http://www.kamat. com/kalranga/itihas/1857.htm.

41. Remembering 1857-58 War of Indian Independence 2003, Online: http://www.kamat. com/kalranga/itihas/1857.htm.

42. Remembering 1857-58 War of Indian Independence 2003, Online: http://www.kamat. com/kalranga/itihas/1857.htm. 219

sovereign limbo state status. The British government entered the rebellion because of criticism and concern about East India Company=s abilities in India and, of course, to protect and maintain British presence--politically and economically--in India verifying concept one (invasions and domination by state occupying limbo state). In August 1858 the externally established Act for the Better Government of India entrusted political authority to the secretary of state. In addition the British crown assumed control of India from the East India Company and in 1877 Queen Victoria was crowned empress of India.

The immediate result of the rebellion was that politically the mutiny allowed the

British government to bring in its own external army to help Aprotect@ British interests in

India supporting the domination status of concept one of the limbo state model. The result of the defeat of the sepoys was an end to internal Mughal rule (supporting concept two, weak leadership within the limbo state) and the beginning of external British rule as

India became a British colony for a hundred years, supporting concept one (patterns of invasion and domination).43

The relationship between the British leadership in India and the Sikhs began to deteriorate before the first Anglo-Sikh war between the British (East India Company) and

Sikhs that took place on 10 February 1846.44 Gulab Singh had connected with the British before the war began and still kept the Sikhs thinking that he would support them in their fight against the British. In playing with both sides of the conflict, Gulab Singh presumed

43. Wheeler 1899, Online: www.kamat.com

44. Schofield 1996, 52-53.

220

he would be guaranteed acquisition of land he had already obtained as a Sikh feudatory.

As a result of court intrigue and support from Sikh leadership, Gulab was appointed to the position of wazir, at which time he contacted the British about land he would possess after the war should he support the British with his twelve thousand-men army. On February

10th, Gulab did not enter the battle of Sobraon, a village on the banks of the Sutlej.45

Without Gulab Singh=s support, the Sikh=s army lost miserably.

The British leadership praised Gulab Singh=s decision to stay out of the war; the

Sikh leadership, on the other hand, regarded Singh as a traitor to their side and, in order to punish him by reducing his land power, dismissed him as wazir. In addition, in what would be considered an unusual maneuver, the Sikh leadership offered to the British the lands of Jammu-and-Kashmir as war debt. By doing this the Sikhs believed that they had stripped all the acquired lands from the feudatory Gulab Singh. In reality, Gulab Singh would become the Maharaja of the land he had coveted even while under the feudatory of

Ranjit Singh.

For the people of Jammu-and-Kashmir, the British had managed to gain a foothold within their land through a simple act on the part of the Sikh leadership. Thus the land of

Jammu-and-Kashmir was passed from one external authority to another external influence by means of war retribution due to a war in which the general Kashmiri population had not

45. Schofield 1996, 53.

221

participated.46 The consequences of the British-Sikh war that the population had not anticipated resulted in occupation of J&K affirming concepts one (invasions and domination), two (weak leadership), three (settlers immigrating to limbo state), and four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants of the limbo state) of the limbo state model that eventually led to J&K=s limbo state status.

The British under the leadership of Sir Henry Hardinge were concerned with controlling the military power of the Sikhs and, at the same time, rewarding Gulab Singh

46. Schofield 1996, 54, 62. See also Bazaz 1954, 123.

222

for siding with the British.47 Of course his former overlords, the Sikhs, saw Singh=s deed as secretly betraying them during their war against the British. The British reasoned that since Gulab Singh had control of Jammu-and-Kashmir for twenty-five years, it would be politically wise to allow him to become an independent leader (maharaja) of that area rather than try to control an area themselves. At the time of the sale, J&K was three hundred miles from the British dominion, which ended at the river Sutlej. Because of the distance and the mountainous terrain the British leadership felt that to possess J&K would be dangerous because military support was too far away should an immediate need of help arise. Another convincing reason to reward Gulab Singh with that region was that he offered to pay the British for the region.48

The sale of Jammu-and-Kashmir to Gulab Singh by the British in the Treaty of

Amritsar (see appendix G) on 16 March 1846 was for 7.5 million rupees, which at the time was equivalent to eighty thousand kilos of silver.49 There were many expressions of regret

over the event by English military leaders.50 Sir Charles Napier, commander-in-chief, was against selling J&K to Singh basically because he wanted to finish the war with the

Sikhs and annex Punjab to British control of India. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Torrens

47. Schofield 1996, 57.

48. Schofield 1996, 57.

49. Bazaz 1954, 122-123. Chowdhury 2002, Online: http://wwww.hisduismtoday.com/ 2002/1-3/26-27_kashmir_history.html.

50. Schofield 1996, 59-62. 223

wrote in

1861 that the British should have kept the Jammu-and- Kashmir region to maintain the area as a buffer on the northern frontier of the British Empire.51 Interestingly, the same political concern was expressed earlier in 1821 by William Moorcroft, a veterinary surgeon with the East India Company looking among the local horses for a good breed of horses for the military. When the Sikhs annexed Kashmir, he saw Ladakh as a possible

British sphere of influence against Russia.

By the mid-nineteenth century the British leadership began to realize that because of its strategic location, the region of Jammu-and-Kashmir was indeed a buffer against potential invasions by Russia, Afghanistan, and China.52 In the twentieth-century Sir

Francis Younghusband also noted that J&K would have been a buffer between Russia and the Indian sub-continent. A hundred years later in 1946 during the Quit Kashmir

Movement, Sheikh Abdullah, a colorful figure in Kashmiri politics, angrily wrote to Sir

Stafford Cripps, AWe challenge the political and moral status of this sale deed, this instrument of subjugation, handed by the East India Company to a bunch of Dogras. A sale deed does not have the status of a treaty.@53 His anger at the loss of J&K through exchange from one external influence to another external control would be felt by many more Kashmiris.

51. Schofield 1996, 59-62.

52. Schofield 1996, 62.

53. Schofield 1996, 62.

224

It should be noted that even though the Treaty of Amritsar handed the land to

Gulab Singh, the British still maintained a level of control over Singh in keeping with stipulations in the treaty. In addition, the British were aware of some of his cruel activities such as punishing those Muslims who slaughtered cows, and were aware that they had appointed a Hindu ruler over a Muslim majority population. Commander-in- chief of the Indian army, Sir Charles Napier referred to Singh as a Amodern Tiberius for horrible cruelty and villainy.@54 When Singh maintained neutrality during the second

Anglo-Sikh war, the British demanded his military support. Lord Dalhousie, who became governor-general after Hardinge=s departure, wrote of the sale of Kashmir to Singh, AIn

1846 we unwittingly handed over [Jammu-and-Kashmir] to a chief who had proved himself a veritable tyrant and who already appears the founder of a race of tyrants.@55

When Gulab Singh died on 7 August 1857, his third son Ranbir Singh became

Maharaja of Jammu-and-Kashmir. Just before Singh=s death, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 began on 10 May. Gulab Singh and his son Ranbir decided to support the British with money and troops.56 Even after the death of the father, the son continued supporting the

British during the mutiny. As stated above, one of the factors that contributed to British victory over the rebels was Sikh support to which the Singh leadership contributed.

After Ranbir, his eldest son Pratap Singh became the Maharaja, continuing with

54. Schofield 1996, 67.

55. Schofield 1996, 68.

56. Schofield 1996, 68.

225

concept one (domination of limbo state). Pratap developed roads and rails in order to connect J&K to India, established a hydroelectric plant at Mehura, and promoted tourism by establishing vacation spots in the Valley area.57 Hari Singh, Pratap=s nephew and the more well-known of J&K=s maharajas, ruled Kashmir from 1918 up to the time of independence and became aligned with the British partition plan of 1947. More is written about the partition of 1947 in section B, parts one and two below.

It should be noted that political unrest had been occurring in Jammu-and-Kashmir years earlier, especially by university students against the Maharaja=s government that many found oppressive due to the bureaucratic and feudalistic regime, attesting to concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). A sign that something very wrong was happening in J&K occurred on 13 July 1931 in which twenty-one protesters were killed by the police. Their protest was related to the arrest of Abdul Qadir who earlier made a speech considered seditious by the government. He was arrested and tried.

During his trial the Muslim demonstrators took to the street; the police lost control and shot at them killing the twenty-one people. More demonstrations took place and three

Hindus were killed. Analysts of the historical event record it as an event in modern J&K in which an open violent demonstration against the despotic rule of Hari Singh took place.58

Later in March 1933, the Muslim Conference promoted a Civil Disobedience

57. Bamzai 1973, 678-80.

58. Bamzai 1973, 715.

226

Movement demanding a constitutional government and the government responded by suppressing the people=s demands. By March 1946 the National Conference launched a

AQuit Kashmir@ movement demanding more political power for the people of J&K. The leaders were arrested and hundreds of workers who attempted to protest were arrested.59

Thus protests against government policies (or lack of policies for the people), and killings and arrests by the police occurred years before the 1947 uprisings and would occur again in the 1989 insurgency, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by the inhabitants).

According to Bamzai, AThe policy of suppressing public opinion had been . . . followed by . . . [Hari Singh=s] predecessors and . . . supported by the British Indian

Government.@60 Thus in keeping with their determination to maintain control of the frontier borders by keeping out of isolated, Abackwards@ Jammu-and-Kashmir any

Aseditious@ ideas from the more educated parts of India, the British government basically prevented formation of political and even social or religious associations as well as discouraged publication of any major newspaper that would give the masses ideas of self- rule, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants of the limbo state).61

59. Bamzai 1973, 715.

60. Bamzai 1973, 707.

61. Bamzai 1973, 707-709.

227

With the passing of time and with the younger generation becoming more educated and more aware of self-rule and democracy, political suppression and rigged elections in 1987 became intolerable resulting in an insurgency in 1989 as related below in section C and affirming explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

3. Ethnic Identity and Conflict

Theoretical explanations of why division and conflict among the Muslim and

Hindu Kashmiris presently has occurred involve ethnic identity as a major factor, confirming concept four of the limbo state model (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants of the limbo state). Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, in her essay on Kashmiri identity, turns to two researchers, Stanley Hoffman and Don Ronan, in her explanation of the conflict with Jammu-and-Kashmir.62 The first approach is that of Stanley Hoffman, specifically his concept of national consciousness as arising from the perception of having enemies, invaders or intruders. The second approach employs Don Ronan=s vision that

Aethnic groups are born and arise because of the perception of oppression; if there were no perception of oppression, real or imagined, there would be no ethnic self- determination.@63 Earlier in Jammu-and-Kashmir=s history, the Pandit Hindu Kashmiris were favored in land allotment and government jobs.64 The Muslim population felt that they were ethnically discriminated against by the Dogra leadership. During the

62. Tremblay 1996-97, 471-475.

63. Tremblay 1996-97, 475.

64. Tremblay 1996-97, 475.

228

insurgency in 1990, the Muslim militants gained the upper hand and the Pandits were fearful of being killed and migrated to Jammu, demanding a partitioned part of the land for themselves or to remain as part of India. This division between the Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus, according to Tremblay, supports the concept that Apolitics of ethnonationalism is based on a linkage between political movement and ethnic identity.@65

The experiences felt by the Muslim and Hindus of Kashmir, in a sense, has become a form of Michael Levin=s Aethnodrama@ or history of victimization, denial and genocide that leads to claim for nationhood.66

The concept of KashmiriyatBBa form of syncretic, secular, ethnic identity indigenous to the Valley uniting Hindus and MuslimsBBis an historical identity concept of unity among the inhabitants of Jammu-and-Kashmir (see section C, part two below). This concept is believed to originate under the fourteenth-century Muslim Kashmiri rule of

Sultan Qutb Udin (1374-1389) who was advised by the Sufi Saiyid Ali Hamdani that in addition to promoting appropriate Muslim rule, the leader of the state should Apromote brotherhood and unity among the people and look after the welfare of all his subjects, both

65. Tremblay 1996-97, 475.

66. Tremblay 1996-97, 475.

229

believers and non-believers.@67 This concept of acknowledging the presence of an indigenous ethnic identity of another community was accepted by both groups as long as neither group was favored by the leadership in terms of economic or political advancement or as long as neither group was singled out negatively by the military or security forces. In stressful times, if the information above is to be understood correctly, whenever either group felt itself to be at a disadvantage economically, politically, culturally, or in terms of personal security, then the call for ethnic self-determination prevailed. More is written about Kashmiriyat in section C (part two) below concerning the dissolution of then call for maintaining this form of unity among the Hindus and

Muslims in J&K.

Also, as revealed in the results of surveys, by 2001 the inhabitants of Jammu-and-

Kashmir have become Atired of continuing violence@ needing a break from a life of violence and fear, and therefore have been calling on a return to the Kashmiriyat identity.68 This reversion back to the Kashmiriyat identity reinforces concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) and actually contributes to J&K=s current limbo state status as will be explained further in the survey results analyses in section C, part three below. As a result of the peoples= need to live a life of normalcy, the respondents to the survey about Kashmiriyat felt a need to maintain that unique Kashmiri

67. R. K. Parmu 1969, A History of Muslim Rule in Kashmir, 1320-1819, qtd in

Tremblay 1996-97, 475.

68. Oberoi 2001, 197.

230

identity and unity among the varied ethnic groups within Jammu-and-Kashmir. This identity, as noted above, supports concept four (complex and paradoxical responses) and also J&K=s current limbo state status as will be further elucidate below in section C (parts two and three).

B. Decolonization and Partitioning of India

1. Minor Partition

Before reviewing the major partitioning of India in 1947 that affected the statehood status of J&K, a review of the externally imposed Government of India Act of

1935 (see appendix I) will be helpful in understanding that under the British rule India was, in what could be termed a minor partition, partitioned before 1947, affirming concept one (invasions and domination by a state occupying limbo state). Under this act India was divided into two distinct and separate entitiesBBBritish Provinces and Princely States, also referred to respectively as British India and Princely India.69 By the 1930s there were ten

British Provinces, administered by Indian politicians with direct rule exercised through the

British Parliament, Secretary of State for India, Governor General in Council or Provincial

Governors. On the other hand, the Princely States of various sizes basically were remains of regional kingdoms conquered by the British in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of which there were over 600 by the 1930s substantiating concepts one (invasions and domination), two (weak leadership), and three (settlers immigrating to limbo state).

These Princely States experienced a form of dual control. Basically these Princely States

69. Bhatt 2001, Online: http://www.kashmir-information.com/Miscellaneous/ Bhatt1 231

included any territory not a part of the British IndiaBBseemingly independent; yet, they were still under Crown rule, which meant that authority was indirectly exercised by some form of documentation such as treaties.70 As a result of their status, these Princely States were feudal and were associated directly with the Crown through the Aprinciple of paramountcy@ that, according to Vernon Hewitt, was Aa vague concept under which the

British granted the princes considerable autonomy of action in exchange for their loyalty and the surrendering of foreign policy and defense to the supremacy of British imperial interests.@71 Thus, when a major concern for London in 1947 became the political situation of demand for national self-rule in India, the British leaders realized that it could no longer control India. The leaders believed that the only path to peacefully attaining freedom for the subcontinent would be by partitioning of the area into two regions--a secular (predominantly Hindu) India and a Muslim Pakistan.

2. Major Partition

The decision by the British government to partition India into two separate states of India and Pakistan is considered in this research project the major partition of India that would eventually affect the non-state status of Jammu-and-Kashmir. As noted in chapter two, section B, part two, Radha Kumar explained that partition actually has been a means by colonizing states to Aunshoulder colonies or divide up spheres of influenceBBa strategy

.html.

70. Bhatt 2001, Online: http://www.kashmirinformation.com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt1.html.

71. Hewitt 1997, 2. 232

of divide and quit.@72 Kumar also observes that the fall of colonial empires gave rise to two types of partitioning justification--Wilsonian national self-determination that Asupported ethnic self-determination as freedom from colonial rule@ and the British style of partitioning resulting from classification of those colonies that were viewed as

Airreconcilable nationhoods@ for which partition would be Aa lesser evil than constant civil war.@73 This type of policy on the part of GB contributed to support of concept one

(invasions and domination by a state occupying the limbo state).

The British government began the process of partitioning of India by sending an external Parliamentary delegation, known as the Cabinet Mission and consisting of Lord

Pethic Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps, and Mr. L.V. Alexander, to visit India to meet with the national leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League in 1946. The Cabinet

Mission reported in the State Paper of 16 May 1946 that a federal union of India should be formed that would include British India and the Indian Princely States.74 During this period, this solution by the delegation basically rejected the Muslim League=s call for creation of

Pakistan. The main concept here would be that the provinces and Princely States would become autonomous except for national foreign affairs, defense, and communications.

72. Kumar 1997, 24.

73. Kumar 1997, 25.

74. Hewitt 1977, 2.

233

These latter areas would be controlled by the newly formed state of the Federal Union of

India. Even though the Muslim League joined the Interim Government, the members refused to join the Constitutional Assembly, still demanding the creation of Pakistan. The

British government realized that the situation called for a more dynamic leader and appointed Lord Viscount Mountbatten as Governor-General of India replacing Lord

Wavell.

Lord Mountbatten met with the leaders of the various Indian political parties and announced on 3 June 1947 that, AWhile paramountcy will lapse, according to His

Majesty=s Government=s declaration of May 12, and May 16, 1946, His Majesty=s

Government will not enter into military or any other agreement with the Indian state.@75

Many of the leaders of the princely states appeared to misunderstand the meaning of

Alapse of paramountcy@ believing that this meant that they could either join the

Constitution Assembly (India) or remain independent.76 The then Prime Minister of India,

Jawaharlal Nehru, attempted to correct this misunderstanding on 15 June 1947 by announcing that India will not recognize the independence of the princely states in India and that other foreign powers also should not recognize any independent princely state.77

Needlessly to say, Pakistan=s Muslim Leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, encouraged independence and, if possible, relationship with such states. In order for the Princely

75. Bhatt 2001, Online:http://www.kashmirinformation.com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt1.html.

76. Bhatt 2001, Online: http://www.kashmirinformation.com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt1.html.

77. Bhatt 2001, Online: http://www.kashmirinformation.com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt1.html.

234

States to follow an accepted transition from British rule to rule by the Federal Union of

India, the Negotiating Committee of Chamber of Princes prepared two documents requiring signatures by the princes, the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill

Agreement. These two instruments were basically more formal requirements on the part of the British government, which eventually led to the limbo state status of J&K supporting concept one (political and administrative domination of the limbo state).

The Instrument of Accession (see appendix H) required that the Princely State join either the Federal Union of India or Pakistan giving control of external affairs, finance, and defense to the state of accession. An important detail for the leader of the Princely

State to consider in joining either India or Pakistan is that religion would not determine with which nation the Princely State would join, unlike the Radcliffe Boundary

Commission, as is explained below. Rather, location of the Princely State was to determine with which dominion to join. Jammu-and-Kashmir was one of the few Princely

State that was located between India and Pakistan and, therefore, could select to join the state of choice.

The Standstill Agreement was basically a temporary agreement allowing continuation of transport, trade, and communication between the Princely State and either or both India and Pakistan. Hari Singh had signed the Standstill Agreement with both countries but not the Instrument of Accession in the belief that J&K could become an independent state. When other Princely State rulers agreed to the Standstill Agreement but not Instrument of Accession, India informed them that it would execute the Standstill

Agreement only with the Princely State that had already signed the Instrument of 235

Accession.

On 17 June 1947, the Indian Independence Act (see appendix J) was passed stating that the British would relinquish their authority in India on 15 August 1947 making the

Federal Union of India an independent country; and that a part of the territories that contained a Muslim majority was to become Pakistan, which also would be recognized as an independent and sovereign state. The Union of India was considered the legal succes-

sor to the British Crown; hence, the United Nations recognized the Union of India as the successor to the pre-independent government of India thus continuing the original UN membership. Pakistan, on the other hand, had to apply as a new member state. This partitioning of India was to be based on religion--India for the secular and Hindu population and Pakistan for the Muslim population.

In July 1947 Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed chairman of the Boundary

Commission in order to create Pakistan out of the Bengal province in northeastern India and the Punjab province in northwestern India. After five weeks of drawing boundaries,

Radcliffe presented his Boundary Awards to Mountbatten and returned to England leaving behind not only a partitioned India but what is considered historically Aone of the largest migrations in history, in which 10-12 million people fled from one side of the new borders to the other,@ and an estimated million were killed along the border areas where communal massacres occurred.78

At the time of the external undertaking by the British of partitioning India into the

78. Chester 2000, 42-43.

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independent state of India and the independent state of East and West Pakistan (currently

Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively), 562 princely states (the figure has also been quoted as 565)79, with special attention to the border provinces, had to choose between joining either Pakistan or India before the deadline of India=s and Pakistan=s independence on 15 August 1947. Hari Singh put off making a decision hoping to allow an independent state of Jammu-and-Kashmir to come into existence.80

The future consequence of Singh=s indecisiveness in joining either India or

Pakistan and of his hope for independence for J&K was a concern for Lord Mountbatten.

He was appointed by the British government to close out British rule in India and visited

Singh on 19 June 1947 for four days advising him to Ajoin whichever Dominion . . . [the] people wish to join by August 14."81 According to Mountbatten, if Singh had acceded to

Pakistan before 14 August 1947, the future government of India assured Mountbatten that no objection would have been raised by them; had Singh acceded to India, by 14 August,

Pakistan did not exist then and therefore could not have raised an objection nor interfere with the decision.82 As Mountbatten put it, the only trouble that could have been raised was by non-accession to either side and that was exactly what happened. Even two months after Independence Day had passed, Singh still attempted to remain independent,

79. Schofield 1996, 120.

80. Schofield 1996, 120; Chowdhury 2002, Online: http://wwww.hisduismtoday.com/ 2002/1-3/26-27_kashmir_history.html; Bamzai 1973, 731-733.

81. Bamzai 1973, 734.

82. Bamzai 1973, 734. 237

not acceding to either India or Pakistan. Unfortunately for the state of Jammu-and-

Kashmir and the inhabitants, violent events occurred that forced the maharaja to take a stand, which resulted in substantiating concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three (patterns of settlers immigrating to the limbo state) of the limbo state model.

On 20 October 1947 approximately five thousand Pathan tribesmen from the

North-West Frontier region of Pakistan had crossed the Jhelum river heading towards the

Baramula Pass with the goal of a takeover of Srinagar. Hari Singh sent a desperate message to the government of India for military help on 24 October. V.P. Menon of the

Indian Defence Committee flew to Srinagar; upon realizing on 25 October that the tribesmen had attacked and captured Muzaffarabad and Domel and were rapidly approaching Srinagar, which was 35 miles within their reach. Menon advised Singh to leave immediately for Jammu, which he did.83 By 26 October 1947, Hari Singh signed the

Instrument of Accession (see appendix H) acceding to the Indian Union, after which India sent two companies of Indian troops to Srinagar, supporting concept one (patterns of invasion and domination) of the limbo state model.

Warfare between India and Pakistan over Kashmir continued throughout 1948 and abated with a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire that took effect in January 1949. In

July 1949, India and Pakistan agreed on what was to be a temporary cease-fire line-of- control (LOC) that divided the administration of the territory of J&K. That line-of-control

83. Kaul 1969,133.

238

still exists into the twenty-first century with control by India east and south of the line and control by Pakistan west and north of the line (see map above in chapter four, section A, part one).

In chapter two, section B, part two above, the unfortunate consequences of British style partition are reviewed by Radha Kumar who states that Apartition has more often been a backdrop to war than its culmination in peace.@84 His observation is backed by the information that Athe 1947 partition agreement between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League was intended partly to prevent the spread of communal riots from

Bengal in eastern India to northwestern India . . . But the riots that followed in 1947-48 left more than a million people dead in six months and displaced upwards of 15 million.@85 The exodus and riots support concepts three (patterns of settlers immigrating with own self-preservation agenda) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

When the first Indo-Pakistani war broke out in 1948, both nations sent troops into

Jammu-and-Kashmir. Troops have remained in J&K into the twentieth-first century separated by the UN-sponsored Line of Control (LOC) established after the 1964 war in the Tashkent Peace Pact (see map above in chapter 4, section A) contributing to J&K=s present limbo state status.

3. The Line of Control (LOC)

84. Kumar 1997, 26.

85. Kumar 1997, 26.

239

The origins of the line of control (LOC), which contributed to Jammu-and-

Kashmir=s limbo state status, supporting concept one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination by the state occupying the limbo state), of the limbo state model began in 1947 after the invasion by the Pathan tribesmen from the North-West

Frontier region of Pakistan into J&K occupying what is now part of the northwestern one- third of J&K. After the invasion, the then ruler of J&K, Hari Singh, signed the Instrument of Accession with India, which then allowed Indian troops into Srinagar to repel any advances by the Pathan invaders. The fighting continued for about fourteen months until the United Nations intervened on 1 January 1949. India and Pakistan signed the cease-fire agreement on 27 July 1949 that became known as the Ceasefire Pact defining the border between the two forces as the Ceasefire Line (CFL, original term).

War between the two countries broke out again in 1965 in which each country occupied territories of the opposing country. The Tashkent Peace Accord (also referred to in some documents as the Tashkent Agreement) returned the positions of each force to the previously drawn Ceasefire Line. This Ceasefire Line, now referred to as the Line of

Control, became the official boundary separating the two sets of troops with the signing of the Simla Agreement on 2 July 1972 (see map above in chapter 4 section A and appendix

K). In the Simla Agreement both parties agreed to respect the LOC until the issue of which country, if either, should have full sovereignty in Jammu-and-Kashmir.

Many analysts writing about the LOC talk of the difficulties in discerning the line in the hilly and mountainous regions. In answering the critics, Lt. Gen M. L. Chibber,

240

Pakistan=s Director of Military Operations after 1971 writes in his article about the exactness of the lines drawn (see appendix K) showing how the drawing of the lines were exact and do help resolve various hostilities at the LOC.

Since the designation of the LOC in 1972, hostilities and skirmishes across the borderline have continually occurred between India and Pakistan into the twenty-first century. The two forces also have exchanged hostilities in the Siachen Glacier, when

Indian troops took over the glacier in 1984. The glacier is located in the northeastern part of the LOC and is considered Athe world=s highest and most difficult battlefield [with]

some glaciers as high as twenty-four thousand feet@ with no human population except the troops from Pakistan and India.86

These hostilities across all parts of the LOC including the Siachen Glacier were alleviated in November 2003 with a ceasefire truce between India and Pakistan.

Representatives of the two countries met in Islamabad on 26-27 May 2005 in an attempt to reach an agreement to withdraw troops from the Siachen Glacier; as of February 2009, the talks have failed and have not resumed since then.87

However, the fact that representative of both states are attempting to meet and iron out differences between them in relation to the J&K situation is a hopeful sign for the indigenous population. Despite these efforts to stabilize the situation in J&K, for the

Kashmiri residents the LOC and the presence of the troops from Pakistan and India at the

86. Irshad 1999, Online: http://www.defencejournal.com/sept99/loc.htm.

87. Inderfurth 23 May 2005, 9; and Bokhari, 28 May 2005, section 9.

241

borderline is a visible sign that their land is disputed between two nuclear-power nations documenting concepts one (invasions and political and administrative domination by [in the case of J&K] two occupying states) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

C. Insurgency, Kashmiriyat, and the Voice of the People

1. Insurgency since 1989

The leadership focus in sections A and B above has been how the external leadershipBBfrom the earliest historical times to when the British made their presence feltBB contributed to J&K=s limbo state status through concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three

(patterns of settlers immigrating). The central focus of this section is the contemporary reaction of the indigenous population to the historical-political events within their land supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

In contemporary Jammu-and-Kashmiri political history, the insurgency (see timeline in appendix E.3.) with key events from 1987 to 1989, which will be reviewed below, has to be the most telling indicator of what many members of the civil society of

J&K want for the future of their country. The Aofficial@ violent launching of the campaign for independence took place on 31 July 1988 when the Jammu and Kashmir

Liberation Front (JKLF) exploded two powerful bombs in Srinagar leading to more attacks and general deterioration of security for all in the valley. Part of the violence

242

associated with the secessionist movement involved the kidnaping in December 1989 of

Dr. Rubiya Sayeed, daughter of Indian Minister of Home Affairs, as she left the government hospital in Srinagar. Only after negotiations between the kidnapers, who wanted the release of incarcerated members of their groups from Indian jails, and the government in New Delhi was she released. In the months that followed, innumerable organized insurgency groups (see appendix O for list of various groups) have killed government officials, members of the Indian security forces, and Kashmiri civilians supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by members of the indigenous population generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture).88

In addition many deaths have resulted from the armed exchanges between the

Indian troops, sent to bring a halt to the insurgency during the counterinsurgency phase of the insurgency, and those participating in the insurgency.89 According to R. C. Tremblay,

AThe year 1989 was marked by a plethora of bandh/hartals [work stoppage/ strikes], . . .

88. While much of the information found in this section on the insurgency of 1989 can be found in any related text, information used here is taken from the following texts: Banerjee 2001, State Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh; Beinart 2002, Free State; Beinart 2002, Understate; (No Author) 2000, Breakthrough in Kashmir; Curtis 2002, India and Pakistan: the World=s Most Dangerous Place; Ganguly 1996, Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay; Kumar 2002, Untying the Kashmir Knot; Oberoi 1997, Kashmir is Bleeding; Tremblay 1995, Kashmir: The Valley=s Political Dynamics; Tremblay 1996, Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir; and (No Author) 1999, The Valley of the Shadow; also there are several online links to information on the insurgency at http:// www.kashmir-information .com.

89. Oberoi 1997, Online: http://www.britannica.com/bcom/magazine/article/. 243

processions, bomb blasts, acts of arson, selected killings of political workers and intelligence officers, attacks on the security forces [Indian] and the latters= violent response of cordoned-off searches that led to arrests and indiscriminate firing.@90

Analysts have offered various reasons in an attempt to explain the why of the violent insurgency. A very telling point about the insurgency is that it has continued into the twentieth-first century and has contributed to the deaths of over fifty thousand insurgents, civilians, paramilitary personnel, and police91 (see timeline of chronology of history of

J&K from 3000 BCE, conflict, insurgency, and table of violence up to 2009 at Appendix

E, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4). Among the explanations of the violent insurgency lending strength to concept four (complex and paradoxical responses) are the irregularity of the

1987 elections in which the Indian Congress Party and Kashmir National Conference were opposed by the Muslim United Front (MUF). According to Ganguly, Avoters were intimidated, ballot boxes tampered with and candidates threatened.92 According to

Beinart about 80% of the people actually turned out to vote in elections for nationalist parties that might have accepted autonomy rather than full independence.93 India erred in stuffing the ballot boxes for pro-government parties. Such fraudulent activities on the part of New Delhi were observed by insurgent leaders such as Shabir Shah, Yasin Malik, and

90. Tremblay 1995, 79.

91. Curtiss 2002, 34-36.

92. Ganguly 1996, 76.

93. Beinart 2002, 6.

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Javed Mir. This educated younger generation of Kashmiris became outraged with New

Delhi=s disregard for their democratic rights and resorted to the only means of expressing their frustrationBarmed violence.94 This type of reaction by the indigenous population supports the concept expounded in concept four of the limbo state model (complex and paradoxical responses).

Additional explanations of the insurgency supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses) include the frustration of the growing middle class with the loss of the pre-1953 autonomy as offered in Article 370 of the Indian constitution (see appendix

L). The aim of some Indian political parties in abrogating Article 370 has been to integrate J&K into India through various articles added to the Indian Constitution.

Articles 356 and 357 respectively, allowing the central government to impose president=s rule and allowing parliament to confer the power of the state legislature on the president were applied to J&K (see appendix M). In addition the following articles of the Indian

Constitution were extended to Kashmir so that India may legislate matters of state jurisdiction, supporting concepts one (invasions and political and administrative domination), two (weak leadership), and four (complex and paradoxical responses):

Articles 248, giving the central government tremendous power to interfere in state matters to defend Indian sovereignty; Article 249, allowing parliament to pass a resolution asking the central government to legislate on any ConstitutionallyBrelated matter; and Article

250, allowing parliament to legislate on any matter not initially listed in the Union List

94. Beinart 2002, 6.

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(see appendix M). In this loss of J&K=s broad autonomy over its domestic affairs to direct rule by the Indian government, the Kashmiris resented the tight control by New

Delhi and the denial of J&K=s distinctness.95

An extended version of the Afrustrated middle class@ internal explanation is that as members of this group became more educated, employment opportunities have not kept pace with this growing, more educated middle class in J&K. This lack of economic opportunity for the middle class resulted in an expression through rebellion96 giving strength to concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination by state occupying the limbo state), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by the inhabitants of the limbo state) of the limbo state model.

According to Ganguly, Athe Kashmiri insurgency arose out of a process of political mobilization that was juxtaposed with steady institutional decay.@97 In his analysis, Ganguly presents how internal political mobilization in J&K came about as a result of increased literacy, access to higher education, growth of political knowledge, and media exposure. He further explains that institutional decay began to take place when

Sheikh Abdullah dominated Kashmiri politics with the creation of the National

Conference in 1947 until India dismissed him from office in 1953. The National

Conference and Kashmiri leadership did not allow the development and growth of

95. Beinart 2002, 6; Tremblay 1995, 471-497.

96. Prem Shankar Jha qtd in Ganguly, 1996, Online: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/ intrel/sumit.htm.

97. Ganguly 1996, Online: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sumit.htm. 246

political opposition. Ganguly notes that Athe national political leadership, from

Jawaharlal Nehru onward, adopted a unified stand on the internal politics of Jammu-and-

Kashmir: as long as the local political bosses avoided raising the secessionist bogey, the government in New Delhi overlooked the locals= political practices, corrupt or otherwise.@98 Basically many political elections were marked by corruption and deceit; and any opposition to the National Conference were Adriven out of the [political] institutional arena.@99 Ganguly presents a solid argument about the historical origins of the insurgency as well as the reason for why the insurgency occurred in 1989 and not earlier in 1947 or 1965.

Tremblay observes that in addition to the repression of legitimate democratic opposition, the insurgency is also the result of Athe pursuance of a patronage politics@ that she observes went hand-in-hand.100 Tremblay relates how Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, leader of Jammu-and-Kashmir from 1947 to 1953 then again from 1975 to 1977, after

1974 suppressed democratic opposition maintaining Aan extensive system of political patronage.@101 While patronage politics may have helped J&K=s leadership for four decades in association with India after India=s independence, by the 1980s the economic growth had not exceeded the population growth. In addition, the growing more educated

98. Ganguly 1996, Online: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sumit.htm.

99. Ganguly 1996, Online: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sumit.htm.

100. Tremblay 1996-97, 471-97.

101. Tremblay 1996-97, 471-97.

247

middle class experienced the lack of development (as related above) and questioned the political relationship with India that led to the secessionist movement in J&K giving support to concept four (complex and paradoxical responses).

Tremblay offers examples of how the internal patronage system exceeded economic growth in the state-sponsored educational and social sectors.102 One example relates how education is free from elementary to the university and professional institutions level and has been used extensively by the middle and upper economic classes who found employment in the bureaucracy, hospitals, schools and state institutions.

Another example details how the middle and upper economical classes also took advantage of lower costs of electricity, free health services, and government-subsidized ration of rice, wheat, and sugar. Eventually the government could not keep up with the growing educated middle class that became frustrated by the lack of economic growth and development and expressed their discontent through political demands. Tremblay adds that additional factors that contributed to the tensions in J&K include the absence of an indigenous capitalist class, winter months isolation of the Valley, exposure by the general population to India and Pakistani media (television came early to J&K), and the concept of political autonomy.103

While the insurgency may be considered a grassroots expression of some members of Kashmiri society, current surveys conducted in Kashmir and related below in part three

102. Tremblay 1996-97, 471-97.

103. Tremblay 1996-97, 471-97.

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offer insight into the feelings of the grassroots (including less violent persons about many topics, including their thoughts about sovereignty through either complete independence or through merging with either India or Pakistan supporting the view in concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses). Before reviewing the results of the surveys below in part three, the topic of Kashmiriyat below deserves consideration, providing a basis for concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model.

2. Dissolution of then Call for Maintaining Kashmiriyat

An important factor that many of the analysts writing about the insurgency of 1989 bring into their discussion is the disintegration of the cultural concept of KashmiriyatBBa form of syncretic secular ethnic identity indigenous to the Valley uniting Hindus and

Muslims (briefly discussed in section A, part three above, which also contributes to

“complex and paradoxical responses@ of the limbo state model).104 This concept is believed to have originated under the fourteenth-century Muslim Kashmiri rule of Sultan

Qutb Udin (1374B1389) who was advised by the Sufi Saiyid Ali Hamdani that in addition to promoting appropriate Muslim rule, the leader of the state should Apromote brotherhood and unity among the people and look after the welfare of all his subjects, both believers and non-believers.@105 This concept of an indigenous ethnic identity was also promoted by Lalishari, a female Hindu sage, and Sheikh Nur ud-Din also known as Nanda

104. See note 47 above.

105. See note 33 above.

249

Rishi, founder of the Rishi order in Kashmir, both of whom used mystic poetry to preach the brotherhood of human kind and the unity of God. This sharing of cultural identity by

Hindus and Muslims in Kashmir is demonstrated by such activities as both religious groups visiting the shrine of Nanda Rishi; Hindu pilgrims visiting the spring originally dedicated to the goddess Kali located near the Shah-i-Hamdan mosque; and the mosque of

Akhum Mullah Shah co-existing with the Hindu temple of Chakreshwari Mata and the

Sikh temple of Chhati Patshahi Gurdwara.

Sheikh Abdullah promoted Kashmiriyat during his leadership when he opened his party to people of all communities making it secular in orientation promoting the

Kashmiri national freedom movement. One of the more prominent secessionist groups, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) has attempted to promote the

Kashmiriyat identity claiming that the movement is secular and Adirected at the Indian occupation of Kashmir and not against the Hindu minority community.@106 This concept of Kashmiriyat, among others, has been cited by Indian political leaders, historians, and intellectuals to justify

Jammu-and-Kashmir=s continued association with India107 supporting concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses).

The Kashmiriyat identity slowly disintegrated during the insurgency due first to the view held in the 1990s by foreign militants who encouraged the Valley Muslims to

106. Tremblay 1995, 79.

107. Tremblay 1996-97, 487.

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establish a more Islamic identity-based independence movement, and second the Jammu

Hindus= concern of being absorbed into the predominantly Muslim state, both reactions affirming concept four. Hindus have looked at the Muslim population and leadership with an apprehensive view since the exodus of all Hindus except eleven families from the

Valley under the rule of Sultan Sikandar (1394B1416) when he ordered that only Muslims would be allowed to live in the Valley (see this chapter, section A, part two, subsection a above). By 1982, just before his death, Sheikh Abdullah had pushed the passage of the

Resettlement Bill that alarmed Hindus of Jammu. This bill allowed the refugees from

Jammu-and- Kashmir who had settled in Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled J&K to return freely to either Kashmir or Jammu causing a wave of protests by Hindus living in

Jammu.108 As a result of killings of a dozen Kashmiri Hindu Pandits in 1990 by Muslim insurgents, another historical mass exodus of about one hundred forty thousand Hindus from the Valley to either Jammu or other parts of India has taken place.109

It should be noted that when the struggle for freedom from India began to exhibit significant expression by 1988, involvement by local Muslim militants was small in number and really could not achieve anything of significance.110 This separatist group was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) that considered itself non-religious demanding independence for all J&KBBthe two-thirds held by India and the one-third

108. Tremblay 1995, 79-92.

109. Oberoi 1997, Online: http://www.britannica.com/bcom/magazine/article/.

110. Oberoi 2001, 195-200.

251

held by Pakistan. By 1990-91 the movement began to grow tremendously with thousands of Kashmiris demonstrating in the streets. Among the new militant groups emerging were those calling for J&K to merge with Pakistan. These groups had more support in the rural and poor areas than in the urban and more economically developed areas and were more well trained showing a willingness to fight to the finish.

Foreign pan-Islamic militants called mujahadin (see appendix O) began arriving in the mid 1990s (1994-95 onward) calling for the creation of an Islamic state. The most famous of these mujahadin groups is Harkat-ul-Ansar with headquarters in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-held Kashmir. This organization claims membership of nationals from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Syria among possibly others.111 Oberoi reports that support for the militants by the locals had begun fading by the late 1990s and fades more each year with the masses Atired of continuing violence@ needing a break from a life of violence and fear.112 The current situation is that of the majority of Kashmiris seeking a life of normalcy and return to Kashmiriyat, as the survey results below (and part three) reveal affirming concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

In a survey conducted in 2002, the indigenous population in Jammu-and-Kashmir have articulated the need to maintain Kashmiriyat as part of their cultural identity. This opinion was communicated by a poll conducted by the Market and Opinion Research

111. Tremblay 1996-97, 472.

112. Oberoi 2001, 197.

252

International (MORI, see appendix P), from 20-28 April 2002 in J&K. According to the results of the survey, APeople in all regions are in general agreement that >the unique cultural identity of Jammu-and-KashmirBBKashmiriyatBBshould be preserved in any long-term solution.=@ Overall, 81% agree with this statement, including 76% in Srinagar and 81% in Jammu@ (see appendix P). Also reported in the MORI survey is that 92% of the respondents opposed the state of Jammu-and-Kashmir being divided on the basis of religion or ethnicity (see appendix P). In addition, according to the MORI poll, 80% of those interviewed stated Athat allowing displaced Kashmiri Pandits to return to their homes in safety will help to bring about peace@ (see appendix P). This call for the return of the Pandits is indicative of the want for religious tolerance and desire to maintain the

Kashmiriyat identity.

Another poll conducted by ACNielsen for Asian Age (see appendix S) asked the inhabitants of four citiesBBSrinagar, Anantnag, Jammu, and UdhamputBBabout their opinions of the proposal to trifurcate the state. The trifurcation recommendation basically suggests dividing the state into separate entities of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. An overwhelming 87% across the state rejected the proposal to trifurcate the state. This kind of feedback from the grassroots reveals the call for cultural unity among the inhabitants of

Jammu-and-Kashmir regardless of the diversity of religious and ethnic manifestations, which also supports concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). This is significant in that the attempts by leaders of the mujahadin to create an Islamic state was rejected even by the Muslim population.

253

Regardless of viewpoints of the origins of the insurgency, the more cogent consideration is that the uprising actually took place beginning in 1987 and has continued to be a violent force within J&K into the twenty-first century as is evidenced by the massacre of twenty-four Kashmiri Pandits including eleven women and two children on

24 March 2003 at Nadimarg, Shopian, Pulwama district as well as the assassination of the

Kashmiriyat supporter and Hizbul leader Abdul Majid Dar on 23 March 2003, and the earlier murders of senior Hurriyat leader and moderate A.G. Lone, and Kashmiri journalist

Pervez Sultan among other faction-fighting deaths113 (see timeline of chronology of history of J&K revealing conflict, insurgency, and table of violence up to 2009 at

Appendix E, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4). The secessionist movement is a strong message that members of civil society are dissatisfied with the current political situation under the control of India and Pakistan and want a change. Part three below reveals some interesting survey results in which a call for independence by the indigenous population from both India and Pakistan have been expressed but not in overwhelming numbers.

3. Expressions of the Voice of the Grassroots: Results of Current Surveys

Conducted in Jammu-and-Kashmir

As stated earlier in this project, internal surveys reveal the pulse of social and cultural groups within a populace contributing to knowledge about the indigenous population=s views concerning thoughts of their current status. Appendices P, R, and S offer specific information about the three surveys conducted in Jammu-and-Kashmir that

113. news online: http://www.ipcs.org/kashmir.php.

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provide the bulk of the information in this section and substantiate concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by members of the indigenous population, which generally include diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture). Occasionally references will be made to minor surveys primarily for purposes of comparison.

The results of the responses to one survey concerning the Kashmiriyat identity, trifurcation of J&K, and return of the displaced Kashmiri Pandits back to Kashmir have already been offered in section C, part two of this chapter. The remainder of this section will review the internal thoughts on various topics by the indigenous population and the importance these responses have in answering the research question of why Jammu-and-

Kashmir has remained in a limbo state status and can be grouped under the failed state subset of the limbo state model, which is developed and defined in this study.

The controversial survey response that received considerable attention in the

Indian, Kashmiri, and Pakistani press was summarized in a headline (based on the survey),

A61% Kashmiris Prefer to be Indian Citizens@ (see appendix P on the full text of the

Market & Opinion Research International survey, MORI,).114 These 61% Afelt they would be better off politically and economically as an Indian citizen@ (see appendix P) with 6% reported wanting to be Pakistani citizens and 33% responding that they did not know. It should be noted that in an interview conducted by a Times of India reporter with

Prakash Nijhara, managing director of Facts Worldwide, (an affiliate of MORI in India

114. Balakrishnan, S. 8 June 2002, The Times of India online: http://www.jammu- 255

that conducted the survey in Kashmir), it was revealed that the survey sample did not include people in Pakistan-occupied section of Jammu-and-Kashmir.115 While no one disputes the authenticity of the survey, the knowledge that people in Pakistan-occupied portion of J&K were not included raised some concerns. Prakash Nijhara did not answer directly why interviews were not conducted in Pakistan-occupied area but responded,

ABecause of the tension [due to the insurgency], we had to complete the survey as expeditiously as possible.@116 The implication is that the survey could only be conducted expeditiously in non-Pakistani controlled land.

One article of interest, noteworthy in that the author offers an analysis of the results revealing why this poll is misleading, in response to the A61% Kashmiris Prefer to be Indian Citizens@ headline was written by Akhila Raman and entitled ATruth Behind the

MORI Poll on Kashmir.@117 In this article Raman notes, A. . . the conclusion [of why

61% Kashmiris prefer to be Indian citizens] that the people of Kashmir are happy with

India rule and that militancy is the only problem . . . is far from true.@118 According to

Raman, AA region-wise analysis of the same MORI poll by BBC News (released on

kashmir.com/archives/ archives2002/kashmir20020605b.html.

115. Balakrishnan, S. 8 June 2002, The Times of India online: http://www.jammu- kashmir.com/archives/ archives2002/kashmir20020605b.html.

116. Balakrishnan, S. 8 June 2002, The Times of India online: http://www.jammu- kashmir.com/archives/ archives2002/kashmir20020605b.html.

117. Raman 2002, Online: http://home.comcast.net/~raman_akhila/

118. Raman 2002, Online: http://home.comcast.net/~raman_akhila/

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31May 2002) shows that only 9% of the people in the Kashmir Valley, where discontent and insurgency is concentrated, want to be with India while 13% want to join Pakistan.

The remaining 78% showed no enthusiasm for being part of either country. Perhaps they would have preferred a third choice that was not being offered, namely independence.@119

He goes on to explain that the 61% reported by MORI came from the responses in the

Jammu and Ladakh regions where the people had a preference for Indian citizenship.

Earlier in the article Raman provided the information writing, AAccording to the 1981 census, Kashmir Valley has 96% Muslims, while Jammu has 66% Hindus and Ladakh has a 51% Buddhist majority.@120 He further states that authors writing about the situation in

Kashmir such as Balraj Puri (in the text Kashmir: Towards Insurgency) have observed that Amost inhabitants of Jammu and Ladakh have been happy with Indian rule, which explains the pro-India results.@121

Raman further brings in a few additional facts to support his concern about the

MORI survey. He notes:

Of the 850 people interviewed (out of an estimated population of 7.5 million), only 360 (42.35%) were from the Valley. However, according to the 1981 census, Valley constitutes 52% of the total population of Kashmir. If an addition 170 people in the Valley were included in the poll to reflect the Valley=s 52% representation, this would bring down the percentage of pro-India results for the whole of J&K from 61% to 52%. Further, the areas polled in Jammu and Ladakh were in and around the Jammu City and Leh; Muslim majority regions of Jammu such as Poonch, Rajouri,

119. Raman 2002, Online: http://home.comcast.net/~raman_akhila/

120. Raman 200, Online: http://home.comcast.net/~raman_akhila/

121. Raman 200, Online: http://home.comcast.net/~raman_akhila/

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Doda and the Muslim majority region of Ladakh such as Kargil were not included (Raman 2002, Truth Behind MORI Poll on Kashmir, Online: http://home.comcast.net/~raman_akhila/).

In a poll conducted at a later date (than the MORI survey) between 12 and 16

September 2002 by ACNielsen (see appendix S for complete information on the

ACNielsen Poll) for Asian Age in which 547 people were interviewed, 49% across the state responded that the Kashmir Valley should remain in India, bringing the percentage of pro-India results from 61% (MORI survey) to 49% (not the 52% calculated by Raman).

Of course the change in number of citizens interviewed should be considered in the

ACNielsen survey. The ACNielsen Poll also states that in Srinagar 21% of those polled said the Valley should remain with India, in Anantnag 5%, in Jammu 79%, and in

Udhampur 81% (see appendix S). The difference in percentage between the respondents in Srinagar and Anantnag on the one hand and in Jammu and Udhampur on the other is significant enough to take into consideration Raman=s analysis of the Market and Opinion

Research International (MORI) results.

As stated earlier by Raman, an aspect of the poll not included in this specific survey either is the possible third solution to the situation in Kashmir, i.e. not becoming part of India nor becoming part of Pakistan, but achieving complete independence (or azadi, the Kashmiri word for independence), not an option in either poll. The poll conducted by ACNielsen (appendix S) reveals that 48% in Srinagar and 59% in Anantnag say that independence is the solution to the Kashmir problem. Twenty-five percent in

Srinagar and 27% in Anantnag responded that Kashmir should stay with India but with

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greater autonomy for the state. Autonomy was also a topic in the MORI survey in which

55% of the inhabitants felt that India and Pakistan should grant Aas much autonomy as they can to both sides of Kashmir to govern their own affairs. However, while the majority in Srinagar and Leh support this, the majority in Jammu oppose this policy@ (see appendix P). This opposition by inhabitants of Jammu is explained by Raman above in which he states that Jammu has supported union with India.

A poll conducted in 1995 found that 72% of the Valley=s inhabitants wanted independence rather than be united with Pakistan.122 In a survey conducted in Srinagar and Rajouri by Synovate India for the Times of India and published on 17 April 2005 (see appendix R for full information on the survey) in which the respondents were asked to choose between staying with India or going to Pakistan or attaining independence, reportedly 53.9% of those responding in Srinagar and Rajouri chose independence. For comparison purposes with the MORI survey information above, in the Synovate survey,

36.2% or over one-third wanted to join with India, and a single digit 3.3% wanted to join with Pakistan.

Even though the information above appears to confirm the residents= call for azadi or independence, actually responses to another survey question corroborate the impression that independence is important until other factors are considered, thus revealing the people=s contradictory feelings about independence and information supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). The Kashmiris were asked by Synovate India

122. (No Author) The Valley of the Shadow 1999, The Economist 351: 10.

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to rank the following options in order of priority: development, education, health, tourism, and azadi or independence (see appendix R). The poll found that many respondents listed several of these options as number one. Therefore, education was ranked number one either singly or jointly by 90.1% of the respondents; development was ranked number one by 82.9%; tourism by 80.3%; health by 73.7%; and lastly azadi was ranked number one by 55.3% of the respondents (see appendix R).

These statistics indicate that when asked if they would like to unit with India, or with Pakistan, or with neither and be independent, 53.9% picked independence (36.2% with India and 3.3% with Pakistan); yet when asked for priority ranking of five issues,

90% to 73.7% of the people ranked development, education, tourism, and health care as number one, and only 55.3% ranked independence as number one on their list of priorities. This ambivalence about wanting independence may be considered a factor in considering why J&K has remained in Alimbo,@ supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). While expressing the need for independence, the indigenous population also expresses the need for first confronting what they consider more important issues such as education, development, tourism, and health needs.

Regardless of the inhabitants= priority ranking, simply noting the percentage of the indigenous population=s call for independence rather than association with India or

Pakistan communicates that identity is based on location of the land, kinship, and culture primarily, then followed by religious association. In addition, the responses to the surveys on independence reveal the grassroots= desire for formation of an independent sovereign

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state of Jammu-and-Kashmir after other concerns such as development, education, tourism, and health care are advanced first, then followed by sovereign independence.

How the population feels about the militants operating within their midst is also revealed in the three surveys. In the MORI survey 65% felt that the presence of foreign militants in J&K have been damaging to the Kashmiri cause while the remainder view militant presence as neither damaging nor helpful (see appendix P). In the same survey, when asked about what proposals could help bring about peace in the region, 86% felt that an end to militant violence in the region would help bring about peace and 88% observed that stopping the infiltration of militants across the Line of Control also would help contribute to peace in the region (see appendix P). When asked about human rights violations by militant groups in J&K in the same survey, results were different. Ninety- six percent of the respondents in Jammu believe such violations are widespread. On the other hand, 2% responding in Srinagar believe such violations are widespread, while 33% believe human rights violations are >occasional= (see appendix P). The diverse responses to militants and violence also support concept four concerning complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population.

On the same topic of militants in the ACNielsen survey, 91% across the state observe that the use of violence by militants has not helped in solving the Kashmir problem (see appendix S). On this same topic in the recent poll conducted by Synovate

India (see appendix R) in April 2005, 73.7% maintained that the militants were not fighting for issues like better schools, hospitals, and jobs for the people (see appendix R).

Yet when asked by Synovate India if militants are holding up the development of the state, 261

65.8% who responded felts that militants couldn=t be blamed for lack of development and only 25% said the militants were holding up development (see appendix R). This positive response in terms of activities of the militants actually showed up in the ACNielsen survey in which 16% in Srinagar and 22% in Anantag felt that the use of violence by militants would help in solving the Kashmiri problems (recall above in which 91% across the state felt that the use of violence by militants does not help in solving the Kashmir problem (see appendix S).

Thus it should be noted that in general the populace of all of Jammu-and-Kashmir feels that the militants are not a positive influence in that region (see appendix S). At the same time, the fact that some responded in the double digits that violence by militants would help in solving the Kashmiri problems reveal statistical support of concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model.

The inhabitants expressed their feelings about another armed influence within their

regionBIndian security forces. In the MORI poll the role and impact of the Indian security forces drew mixed responses from the inhabitants offering further support of concept four. According to the poll, 90% of those interviewed in Srinagar and Leh believed that security forces reducing operations in J&K would help in bringing peace; in

Jammu, according to the survey, responses were reversed in which 90% of those polled believed that security forces should not reduce operations in J&K (see appendix P). In terms of behavior of the Indian security forces, according to the survey, no one interviewed in Leh or Jammu believed that human rights violations by the Indian security

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forces in J&K are widespread; in Srinagar 64% of the people interviewed felt that the human rights violations were widespread (see appendix P).

No doubt perceptions concerning the militants and Indian security forces are based on activities by both groups within each city or region with responses based on activities conducted by each group affecting the inhabitants of each city or region. Again, the diverse responses to the survey reveal support of the paradoxical responses of explanatory concept four of the limbo state model.

The surveys also asked the respondents about how to achieve peace and undertakings, which would help in promoting peace in the region. Ninety-three percent

(93%) of those interviewed in the MORI poll pointed out that economic development of the region in order to provide more job opportunities and to reduce the current level of poverty experienced would help in the pursuit of peace (see appendix P). Eighty-six percent (86%) in the same poll saw holding free and fair elections to elect the people=s representatives would help in bringing about peace. Eighty-seven percent (87%) in the same poll advocated direct consultation between the Indian government and the people of

J&K as an important undertaking in promoting peace in the region. In the connection between peace and militants, earlier in this section, it was noted that 86% felt that an end to militant violence would promote peace; and 88% saw stopping the infiltration of militants across the Line of Control would contribute to peace in the state (see appendix

P).

In section C, part two above detailing the call by the citizens of Jammu-and-

Kashmir to maintain the cultural concept of Kashmiriyat, the respondents had indicated 263

that religious tolerance was important to keep peace among the inhabitants of J&K.

Respect for those of the Hindi religion by Kashmiri Muslims was expressed by 80% of those surveyed who felt that allowing Kashmiri Pandits to return to their homes safely would help in bringing about peace (see appendix P and section C, part two above).

When the ACNielsen poll asked the respondents about peace, 79% across the state believed Pakistan does not want peace with India; in Srinagar, however, 33% felt Pakistan did want peace (see appendix S). In Jammu and Udhampur, more than 90% viewed

Pakistan with skepticism in the country=s desire for peace (see appendix S). Because achievement of peace was foremost in the minds of the respondents, according to

Synovate India, even though Aa majority opt for >azadi= over staying as part of India or joining Pakistan . . ., an equal number also supported the idea of turning the LOC (Line of

Control) into the international border@ indicating that even though independence would be a possible final consideration, the majority of Kashmiris Aseem quite comfortable with the idea of freezing the status quo legally if it means an easing of tensions and creation of a soft border@ (see appendix R) supporting concept four (paradoxical responses) of the limbo state model.

Thus while seeking complete sovereignty in state formation independent of either India or

Pakistan, many Kashmiri people are willing to wait if peace is a strong possibility. The final point in considering what the inhabitants want appears to be: independence may be a future goal, but peace is the immediate goal. These responses show the grassroots as not rushing to attain full sovereignty supporting explanatory concept four (paradoxical

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responses) contributing to the limbo state status.

D. Factors Contributing to Limbo State Status in Jammu-and-Kashmir

The political history of Jammu-and-Kashmir exposes the perspective that J&K can be grouped under the limbo state model, substantiating concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), three (patterns of settlers immigrating with own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). These four concepts of the limbo state model also are revealed by the internal and external elements that have contributed to a complex chronology from which has emerged an intricate pattern showing gaps of independence, then control by an invading force, then another gap of autonomy, then control again affirming concept one

(invasion and domination).

This elaborate pattern, in which settlers from outside the region have contributed to the diverse ethnic mixture as well as breach of security necessary for state formation, is, by means of an indirect contribution, one of many factors that have contributed to failure of sovereign state formation, supporting classifying J&K under the limbo state model. As revealed in the above sections, these internal and external factors range from weak rulers allowing invaders to enter their land (concept one), to continuous invasions by neighboring states (concept one), to nationalism and distrust of other internal ethnic groups (concept three), to control from leaders of foreign lands to the present day control by two regional powers (concept one), to complex and paradoxical responses to surveys

(concept four), and the seemingly eternal Line of Control separating the two areas of J&K under control by two states (concept one). 265

Various surveys as reported above in section C (parts two and three) have revealed concerns by the populace on such issues as economic development, education, tourism, and health care as coming before the need for complete independence (concept four, complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). Only by becoming aware of what has touched Jammu-and-Kashmir, not only in recent times but in the past political history of the nation, does an explanation of why this region=s current limbo state status begin to emerge coherently.

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the potential course of actions through which J&K can achieve complete sovereign statehood involve one of five possible ways:

1) by obtaining complete independence from both India and Pakistan at the same time; 2) by merging all of Jammu-and-Kashmir with India and thus obtaining full sovereignty as part of India; 3) by merging all of Jammu-and-Kashmir with Pakistan and thus obtaining full sovereignty as part of Pakistan; 4) by having each section of land on either side of the

Line of Control join the state of controlBBIndia southeast of the LOC and Pakistan northwest of the LOC; or 5) by dividing Jammu-and-Kashmir at the LOC so that the land east of the LOC becomes independent and the land west of LOC becomes independent, with later decisions concerning the naming of each independent land. The introduction to this chapter points out that after the political history of the region has been reviewed, a pattern emerges that reveals how Kashmir has found itself in the current non-state status

(concept one).

In addition, the introduction touches on diversity of ethnicity as an enigma

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contributing paradoxically to cohesion and to conflict in Kashmir (concept four). The introduction also offers a brief look at the concept of Kashmiriyat that began to fade at the beginning of the insurgency in 1989, but was reconsidered by the inhabitants of the region as expressed in surveys conducted in 2002 (see section C, part two above and appendices

P, R and S). A closer look at each concept noted above and developed in sections A, B, and C brings to light how Jammu-and-Kashmir came to be, in essence, a limbo state occupied and controlled by the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan.

Section A details the background information on the myth and reality of the creation of J&K noting legends that reveal internal and external patterns of violence and settlements, affirming concept one (patterns of invasions). Also within section A is a quote by Ashrani Mathur that reveals all that J&K has to offer as an exotic, exciting land of beauty with many natural and created resources. Yet sections B and C above reveal that the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is not related to possession of the region for the natural and created resources, its location as a buffer zone for India and

Pakistan as defense against each other, defense for each state against other surrounding states, nor even for tourism as a form of economic development. A valid reason for the scramble by the states of India and Pakistan for possession of Jammu-and-Kashmir

(concept one), according to Sumit Ganguly, is that India and Pakistan individually have a need to control J&K based on each state=s secular and ideological identity.123 According to Ganguly, Pakistan was considered to be an Indian subcontinent state for Muslims.

123. Ganguly 2003, 35.

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J&K, as a predominantly Muslim nation, was considered by the Pakistani founders to be part of Muslim Pakistan. For India, adding Jammu-and-Kashmir with its Muslim majority to India=s vast land of Hindus would provide a show that indeed India is a secular, multiethnic state. Thus, one reason why J&K exists in a limbo state status is due to a conflict between two occupying states in a of show of self-identity, supporting concept one (patterns of invasions and political and administrative domination).

Still another reason for J&K=s existence in a limbo state status can be surmised in

Section A, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership within the limbo state), and three (patterns of immigrating settlers with own self-preservation agenda). The beginning of this section shows that J&K was actually an independent nation until the third century BCE, at which time Ashoka of India took over control and established the Mauryan empire. After Ashoka=s death, J&K achieved independence under the leadership of Jaluka. By the first century CE, China=s Kushans had invaded and ruled until 178 CE; this was followed by Hindu and Muslim rule until

1555, at which time J&K gained its long awaited independence under Ghazi Chak. This was not to last long, with the invasion of Akbar of India in 1586, followed by the Afghan invasion in 1753, then Sikh invasion in 1819.

Even though the British Empire entered India through the East India Company in the early 1600s, it came to J&K through the first Anglo-Sikh war and Gulab Singh in

1846, at which time the British government won J&K as a part of the spoils of victory and sold the entire nation to Gulab Singh in the same year. By 1947, J&K=s Hindu Maharaja

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Hari Singh had flirted with independence for J&K after the British pulled out of India but acceded to India with the threat of an invasion by the Pathan tribesmen from the northwest frontier region of Pakistan. After much armed activities along the Pakistani-

Kashmiri border, Pakistan gained one third of J&K, which it still has today, and India gained the remaining two-thirds of J&K (see section A, parts one and two above). This section reveals J&K as existing in a type of holding pattern of control by invading and occupying states, denying this region full sovereignty (concept one). This political- historical pattern offers for Jammu-and-Kashmir the truth of the adage paraphrased: Those leaders who do not take heed of their country=s history are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Section A also relates a mutiny by Indian soldiers and rebels against British rule in

India in 1857, offering various reasons for the rebellion and supporting concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). Among the reasons offered for the failure are that other Indian states did not join in the mutiny (the rebellion began in the north-western part of Uttar Pradesh in the city of Meerut); also important was that the

Sikh soldiers in the East India Company army remained loyal to the British; in addition, the last mughal leader was not a brave, dynamic, charismatic leader, substantiating concept two (weak leadership within the limbo state). Thus, disunity among Indians and a weak leader allowed the British government to enter India in 1877 to Aprotect British interest@ by colonizing India (as stated in section A, part two) and eventually moving into, occupying, and deciding on the fate of Jammu-and-Kashmir.

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Sections B and C reveal more reasons why J&K currently is experiencing non- state status through occupation by two regional states. As stated above, the British had conflicts with the Sikh rulers and in defeating them in 1846 gained J&K as part of the conquest of the Sikh leadership. In turn, the British government sold J&K to Gulab Singh for his support against the Sikh, thus placing a Hindu Maharaja in control of a Muslim majority population. When the time came for release of British control of India, partitioning it into a secular and predominantly Hindu India and predominantly Muslim

Pakistan and Bangladesh, Maharaja Hari Singh (descendant of Gulab Singh) was indecisive in whether to join either India or Pakistan as part of the partitioning deal offered by the British to various Indian states. As stated above, an invasion took place that resulted in the division of J&K, placing it under partial control by Pakistan and partial control by India, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), and two

(weak leadership).

The current limbo state of Jammu-and-Kashmir, in reiteration, is due to external control by a state attaining possession of the region as a result of a war in which J&K did not participate. In addition, J&K came under the leadership of a Maharaja through a sale of the region with no consideration of where the inhabitants of the land stood on the issue of who should Apossess@ the region, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination) and two (weak leadership within the limbo state). Invasion, occupation, and control by so-called contemporary superpowers relegated Jammu-and-Kashmir into a state of subjugation that has continued to exist into the twenty-first century, sustaining concept one (invasions and domination) of the limbo state model. 270

Section C (part one) details the insurgency that actually began before 1989 through various activities including bombings but went into full force in 1989. In this section was noted that the two-third area of Kashmiri land controlled by India was granted a form of autonomy in 1948 with the passing of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Slowly, with the passing of other articles that negated Article 370, J&K lost that limited autonomy, and today that portion of J&K is experiencing an insurgency with Indian troops enforcing

Indian rule. This section affirms that violence on the part of some of the occupied inhabitants does get attention by the occupiers; yet, at the same time, violence on the part of the occupiers transpires as well. This section communicates that another contribution to J&K=s current limbo state status is the result of conflict and violence between the occupiers and the occupied, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants).

Part two of section C advances the concept of Kashmiriyat, a type of internal unifying, multiethnic, interrelationship among members of the populace that demonstrated that attempts to maintain harmony among the various ethnic groups can lead to a peaceful civil society. This unifying approach began to disintegrate in the beginning of the insurgency as was detailed in this section, leading to more internal violence. As is disclosed above, violence from within Jammu-and-Kashmir among the ethnic groups contributed to the lack of formation of a secure sovereign state, affirming concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses). (It should be noted that only recently talk has begun among the grassroots to promote and maintain Kashmiriyat, as the MORI survey revealed in section C, part two, and the violence has subsided somewhat among the 271

indigenous population within J&K.)

Section A (part three) reviews the effect of the existence of multiple ethnic groups with a look at ethnic identity and conflict that contributes to the end result of limbo state status, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses). When the unifying concept of Kashmiriyat weakened within Jammu-and-Kashmir, external invaders were able to take advantage of the internal discord and weakened security measures. The effects on non-state formation of having external states and foreign leadership within J&K have already been reviewed in sections A and B of this chapter.

Section C (part three) scrutinizes grassroots responses to survey questions, offering a look at the thoughts and feelings of the indigenous population on topics that concern them supporting, concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by members of the indigenous population generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture). While the questions and responses will not be repeated here, an interesting overview of the responses by the grassroots uncovers a paradoxical trait exhibited by the people of Jammu-and-Kashmir. This peculiar trait is the ambivalence through contradiction that recurs with feedback to follow-up interview questions. An example is found in the Synovate India poll (see Appendix R) that reports that Athough a majority opt for >azadi= [freedom or independence] over staying as part of

India or joining Pakistan . . . , an equal number also supported the idea of turning the LOC into the international border@ (see Appendix R). The contradiction in accepting both choices is that while the majority of the inhabitants of Jammu-and-Kashmir would prefer

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the independence of becoming one united sovereign state, the respondents to the survey also were willing to have the Line of Control that separates the two occupied areas become the border dividing the two separate areas. Thus, the LOC would become a border separating the two areas of J&K, if this type of division would help to bring harmony between the currently divided areas of their homeland.

Another example of the contradiction is found in the responses by the grassroots to the Synovate India survey concerning the militants. The respondents= replies when asked if the militants were fighting for issues for the community like better schools, hospitals and jobs for the people was an emphatic >No.= Barely 13.8% of the respondents felt the militants were, while 73.7% maintained they weren=t (see Appendix R). Yet when asked about militants preventing economic development of the state, 25% said that they were and 65% rejoined that militants were not to be blamed for lack of development in Jammu- and-Kashmir (see Appendix R). Those responding, on the one hand, appeared to look at militants with disdain; yet, on the other hand, some respondents were not willing to criticize the militants too harshly.

The more interesting incongruity in the feedback by those participating in the

Synovate India poll is that the statistics show 53.9% wanted to be independent (36.2 wanted to join with India and 3.3% wanted to join with Pakistan); yet when asked which issues would the respondents rank in order of priority, only 55.3% ranked independence at number one as opposed to 90.1% ranking education as number one, 82.9% ranking development as number one, 80.3% ranking tourism as number one, and 73.7% ranking

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health care as number one. (The respondents considered several issues as number one, thus the unusually high percentages for each issue; see section C, part three above, and

Appendix R). This type of ambivalence appears to say that independence is important, but other issues are more pressing. Borrowing from an earlier statement at the end of section

C (part three): While independence could be considered a future goal, education, development, tourism, health care issues, and manifestation of peace are immediate goals.

Today this division of land between two nuclear powers presents a challenge for

Jammu-and-Kashmir in its attempt at survival as a land of diverse cultures with complex and paradoxical responses to the challenge (explanatory concepts one and four). Each controlling power offers to speak with the other power to end a conflict that possibly could lead to a devastating nuclear war in that region.124

Still, neither state has considered offering independence to Jammu-and-Kashmir.

Pakistan has always felt that since the majority of Kashmiri populationBBsixty percentBBis Muslim, it should be part of Pakistan and that if J&K had been allowed a plebiscite in 1947, it would have voted to join Pakistan. India feels that the Instrument of

Accession signed by Hari Singh in 1947, which bound Kashmir to India, was legal and binding and that no plebiscite was, nor is today, necessary. Furthermore, it is important for Indian leadership to show how, as a secular country, India can have a thriving Muslim-

124. The most recent resumption of talks has taken place on 16 November 2006 and concern the stand-off over the Siachen Glacier, where Pakistani and Indian troops are the only inhabitants, as reported by Reuters AlertNet online: www.alertnet.org.

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populated state.125 An additional concern for India is that if J&K breaks away from the

Indian Union, factious groups in other parts of India would be aroused to seek their independence from India.126 Bienart refers to the event of J&K=s breakaway from India as Aadvocat[ing] the dismemberment of the Indian State.@127 Ganguly observes, AThe question of control of Kashmir goes to the very basis of the state-building enterprise@ for both India and Pakistan.128 This need for a state-building enterprise for both countries, at the same time, has attested that for Jammu-and-Kashmir attaining sovereign-state status will be a major political, economic, and cultural struggle.

Sacrificing Jammu-and-Kashmir=s attainment of statehood for India=s and

Pakistan=s state-building enterprises fits in with Walker Connor=s observation that states

Aresist, if need be with force, any attempt to dismember the state in the name of self- determination@ by nationalist groups within the state=s heterogeneous population.129

When the state that invaded and controlled J&K was not militarily powerful in holding on to J&K, as noted above in section A, then Jammu-and-Kashmir did assert its claim to independence. The two powers that currently have grasps on J&K are militarily more powerful and politically more determined to hold onto their control. The Line of Control

125. Ganguly 1996, 2.

126. Ganguly 1996, 2

127. Bienart 2002, 2.

128. Ganguly 1996, 2.

129. Connor 1994, 12.

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separating Pakistani-controlled J&K from India-controlled J&K is a landmark confirming the reality of Jammu-and-Kashmir=s current status of a land controlled by other governments not willing, even in a devastating insurgency, to let go and allow the creation of an independent sovereign state.

A brief reiteration of the reasons of failure to attain an independent sovereign

Jammu-and-Kashmir, based on the detailed information offered in sections A to C, involves various internal and external elements, supporting concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination), two (weak leadership with the limbo state), three (patterns of immigrating settlers with own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model. These explanations include the consequences of a geographic location that gave rise to an historical pattern of control by various invading states; nationalism that, paradoxically, is divisive as well as cohesive; strength due to the then weakening of (and now slow restoration of) the concept of Kashmiriyat; ethnicity that encourages extreme loyalty to one=s own cultural group; power struggle among potential leaders; disunity among the people of India during the rebellion of 1857 allowing GB to colonize India and thus have control over J&K=s destiny; mismatched ethnic/religion-oriented leaders over ethnic/religious population; striving for independence by a leader who does not prepare the nation militarily for the consequences of independence; insurgency and violence on the part of members of the population and violence on the part of the occupiers in an attempt at counterinsurgency; and finally display of an ambivalent attitude among the inhabitants as revealed by the

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surveys conducted in Jammu-and-Kashmir as to whether independence should be the leading concern in that region.

Achieving independence is not simply a matter of declaration as Hari Singh realized. Nor can a sovereign state be formed in a violent struggle as the insurgency has exposed. Likewise independence cannot be achieved by attempts by one ethnic community to force submission of another ethnic group through conflicts among the varied factions. As offered in sections A through C above, the result of consequences of several factors prevent a nation from becoming a sovereign independent state. For the current residents of Jammu-and-Kashmir, this struggle for an independent sovereign state has lasted several decades but appears endless, as the people of Jammu-and-Kashmir can attest through their collective experience.

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Chapter V

CONCLUSION

Introduction

As stated in the introduction to chapter one, Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-

Kashmir have many political, historical, physical, cultural, and statistical similarities and differences. The similarities and differences, which will be discussed in this chapter in section A, involve a final analysis of what factors have contributed to NI=s and J&K=s current non-state, non-sovereign limbo state status in response to the research question:

Why, in the cases of Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir, did state formation during decolonization by means of partitioning land not succeed in forming sovereign nation-states where the state provides for its population personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a justice system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively? In other words, why did attempts at state formation actually lead to the creation of areas of contested governance in which protracted conflicts have been in existence since the early political history of each nation-state up to the present?

The response to the question involves classifying both minor states under the limbo state model, a concept developed and defined in this study. As stated in chapter one, (section D, part two), explanatory concepts that need to be addressed in order to

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classify NI and J&K under the limbo state model include the following: 1) patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period of years (revealed in each region=s political history) with limited gaps of self-rule that indicate these areas exhibit limited sovereignty with resulting consequences such as lack of personal security, personal independence, and political stability and transparency for the inhabitants, as well as poor economic development and weakened or compromised rule of law, thus acquiring limbo state status; 2) patterns of weak leadership within the limbo state leading to failure of authority and related consequences as listed in explanatory concept one above; 3) patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state, resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation and the partition of the land leading to incomplete, limited, or denied self-rule, as well as sectarian conflicts among the varied religious and ethnic groups, resulting, at times, in violent consequences; and 4) patterns of complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population

(generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of preservation of their culture) that are the aftereffect of cultural diversity in the post- partition era.

For clarity and because of the near-state characteristics of both NI and J&K (see the definition of state in chapter two, section A), the terminology referring to NI and J&K as delineated in chapter one, (section A, and again in chapter two, section C, part one) is limited state (or the interchangeable expressions of subordinate or dependent state) as

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opposed to the terminology referring to the states occupying NI and J&K, which are dominant, independent, or controlling states (again interchangeable terminologies).

Needless to say, the use of these terms also defines the position of the occupying states.

Use of words that modify the concept of sovereignty of NI=s and J&K=s current statehood statuses allows use of the expressions in referring to NI and J&K with an understanding of each minor state=s limited standing among other states internationally.

In order to respond in an enlightened approach to the research question, this chapter is structured with a section devoted to review of the similarities and a section devoted to the review of differences in NI=s and J&K=s limbo state statuses based on the information gathered above in chapters two, three, and four. Part of the disclosure revealed in chapters three and four involves the explanatory theories and themes, as well as the theme of internal and external factors that have influenced NI=s and J&K=s current limbo state status. The full definition of internal and external influential factors or events is offered in chapter two (section D) and need not be repeated here. It is only significant that this chapter offers these factors as part of the examination of why NI and J&K have found themselves in the current limbo state status. An analytical summation of the internal and external factors observed and noted that have contributed to the two nations= current limited limbo state conditions provides support for explanatory concepts one, two, three, and four of the limbo state model as restated above.

Another important contribution to the information in chapters three and four that has provided a lead into the two nations= current limbo state statures involves the results

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of polls and surveys conducted among the indigenous inhabitants in each nation. As stated before, these surveys have offered an insight into the pulse of social and cultural groups within each limited state.

The last segment of this chapter, section C, offers an analytical summation of how

NI and J&K have found themselves in their current limbo state status and responds to three concerns advanced at the end of chapter one (section D, part two): 1) why these limbo states are not able to become typical modern nation-states with a defined border wherein exists a functioning government within the state approved by the indigenous population and providing for its inhabitants a personal, incorruptible security network as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive and continuously updated infrastructure, and a judicial system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively; also, 2) how state-society relations impact development of sovereign authority for the occupied state; and 3) how state-international system relations undermine state sovereignty. Section C also offers an insight into how the limbo state model can be applied to current states that may be fulfilling the explanatory concepts and thus fit into the model, as well as implications for future solutions in which the international community could help other regions avoid becoming limbo states. A final positive note is offered stating how a limbo state does not have to remain in that condition.

A. Similarities between Northern Ireland=s and Jammu-and-Kashmir=s Limbo

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State Status

The similarities between Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir in their limbo state statuses is best reviewed initially in terms of the explanatory concepts under the limbo state model as revealed in detail in chapter one (section D). Each section below will be devoted to a reviewed explanatory concept and will show similarities that NI and

J&K share under that specific concept. The shared explanatory concepts are drawn from chapters three and four on Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir, respectively. As the comparison progresses, the overlapping of the explanatory concepts will become apparent as a natural process. The fact that both NI and J&K fulfill the comprehensive assumption of each explanatory concept of the limbo state model assigns NI and J&K as limbo states.

The first explanatory concept of the limbo state model that reveals similarities between NI and J&K is stated as: patterns of invasions by and political and administrative domination by a state occupying the limbo state over a period of years (revealed in each region=s political history), with limited gaps of self-rule that indicate these areas exhibit limited sovereignty with resulting consequences, such as lack of personal security, personal independence, and political stability and transparency for the inhabitants as well as poor economic development and weakened or compromised rule of law, thus acquiring limbo state status. As has been discerned, explanatory concept one is connected closely to explanatory concept two (weak leadership within the limbo state). A review of the beginning sections of chapters three and four reveals how both limbo states experienced a

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pervasive pattern of alternating external and internal dominance and control in the military-political leadership realm. This political-historical pattern begins with an internal control by indigenous leadership, then external control through invasions and occupations as a result of weak leadership internally, then a period back to indigenous control, and finally external control through more invasions and occupations as a consequence of weak leadership internally. This pattern of primary dominance by external occupiers, coupled with weak leadership internally, appears to be the structural basis for Northern Ireland=s and Jammu-and-Kashmir=s failures in attaining full sovereign selfBrule.

An obvious similarity between NI and J&K is the fact of Great Britain=s involvement politically, historically, economically, and militarily in both nations. This involvement is either direct as in Northern Ireland=s case as detailed in chapter three, or indirect then direct as in the case of Jammu-and-Kashmir as detailed in chapter four.

GB=s involvement in J&K=s situation is first through India and then through direct involvement with J&K during the partition phase of India=s, and subsequently J&K=s, political history, supporting explanatory concepts one (invasions and domination) and two

(weak leadership within limbo state). GB=s original involvement in NI (directly through invasion and settlements as described in chapter three) and J&K (first through India, then directly through J&K=s leader=s reluctance to join either Pakistan or India during partition of India as depicted in chapter four) reveals a dominant state colonizing and occupying Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir.

In addition, both NI and J&K have found themselves in a tug between two other

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fully sovereign states, supporting explanatory concept one (invasions and domination). NI is predominantly controlled by GB, but the Republic of Ireland has been involved in the condition of dominance in NI. J&K is physically divided by the Line of Control between

Pakistan northwest of the LOC and India southeast of the LOC.

Another similarity involves the occupying state at one time granting the occupied state limited autonomy that was then rescinded, supporting concept one (invasions and domination). In the case of NI, as was explained in chapter three (section C, part five), there were instances of power sharing in which the assembly was cancelled five times (see also Appendix C). As of 8 May 2007, power sharing has been restored to Northern

Ireland with Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party and Martin McGuinness of Sinn

Fein sworn in as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively, of the Northern

Ireland Assembly (in May 2008 Ian Paisley resigned and was succeeded by Peter

Robinson, long time deputy to Paisley).

In the case of J&K, as detailed in chapter four (section C, part one), in 1948 autonomy was granted to the Indian-controlled side of the LOC in the form of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. However, slowly with the passing of other articles, article 370 was negated and Jammu-and-Kashmir lost that limited autonomy.

Another similarity involves explanatory concept three, in which immigrating settlers with their own self-preservation agenda establishing their own homeland in the limbo states in question, thus also lending support to concepts one (patterns of invasions and domination) and two (weak leadership). Great Britain=s influence brought the introduction and expansionist ambition of the English in NI, or Ulster as it was known in 284

the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, through outside settlements. As detailed in chapter three (section A, part two), the immigrants to NI were Scots from Scotland and

English from England. Protestant influence through settlements was furthered in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when Protestant Huguenots fleeing from

France entered Ulster as refugees. These settlers helped maintain GB=s occupation of NI through their loyalty to the crown into the twenty-first century.

Jammu-and-Kashmir=s settlers arrived at different times in the history of the region and from different areas, as detailed in chapter four (sections A and B), supporting not only concept three (patterns of settlers immigrating with own self-preservation agenda) but also explanatory concepts one (invasions and domination) and two (weak leadership within limbo state). As observed in chapter four (section A), Kashmir is surrounded by four countriesBBIndia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and ChinaBBand because of this location has had from ancient time to the present numerous invaders, political and military occupiers, and settlers including Hindus, Buddhists, Kushans, Brahmins,

Shaivists, Huns, Mongols, Turks, Mughals, Afghans, Sikhs, British, and, currently,

Indians and Pakistanis. Settlers from these varied ethnic groups who remained in different areas of J&K brought with them a diversified culture. As was stated in chapter four, the diversity brought richness of culture to the region but during national stressful periods, also brought tensions, conflicts, and violence.

Another form of similarity between NI=s and J&K=s limbo state status in each country=s political history is related to its ethnic variance, which resulted from the

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immigrating settlers, again supporting concept three (immigrating settlers with own self- preservation agenda). As previously noted, the varied groups of settlers have brought to

NI and J&K rich diversity in culture, traditions, religions, and language. At the same time, during stressful political times, the richness of the differences among the ethnic groups can be viewed as sources of the numerous occurrences of tension and conflict in

NI and J&K during attempts by rebels or insurgents to manifest their ethnic nationalism, which also supports explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). These conflicts between or among the ethnic groups in each country have been detailed in chapters three and four.

The next similarity between NI and J&KBBpartition of landBBcame with the passage of time, supporting concepts one (invasions and political and administrative domination) and four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). Partitioning can also be said to occur because of weak leadership within the limbo state, supporting concept two (patterns of weak leadership). GB began behaving like a withdrawing state when it had realized that its presence was creating unanticipated violence and offered a rapid solution of land partitioning. As noted in chapter three (section B), even though the leadership may see a resolution of sectarian violence through the implementation of land partitioning, the grassroots view moving away from their homeland as tantamount to denying their ethnicity and right to remain in their ancestral homeland. As stated in chapter three, partitioning of land for the six counties of NI resulted in a part of Ireland that is neither a sovereign independent state nor fully merged with the Republic of Ireland nor with GB. For J&K, as offered in chapter four, the partitioning resulted in neither a 286

sovereign independent state, nor a merging with India, or Pakistan. likewise, J&K neither divides at the Line of Control with each section joining the controlling state and attaining sovereignty with the state association, nor does it divide at the LOC with each area attaining independence. Thus, both NI and J&K have found themselves Ain limbo.@

Another similarity this research project uncovered was the voice of the indigenous inhabitants in NI and J&K in the forms of surveys and polls, supporting concept four

(complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). Much was exposed in terms of how the indigenous populace felt about the current status of their limited statehood.

One side of the NI question reveals a circumspect populace responding to a NILT

(see Appendix A) 2000 survey question asks which political issue is the most important for the Assembly to deal with (see chapter three, section C, part six). According to the survey, 52% responded that bringing about decommissioning was important, 23% responded that securing NI=s union with the United Kingdom was important, and 8% responded that bringing about a united Ireland was important. An independent NI was not considered in this survey.

In a 2003 survey, the question was, if the respondent had to choose, which identity choice best describes the way the respondent thinks of her/himself. Interestingly, 24% of the respondents answered Northern Irish and 4% responded Ulster (see chapter three, section A, part three, titled Self Identification in NI). The fact that even though the population responding to the question lives in Northern Ireland, only 24% of those in the general response category think of themselves as Northern Irish, with an additional 4% as

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Ulster, substantiating explanatory concept four of the limbo state model (complex and paradoxical responses by the inhabitants).

As was stated in chapter three (section D), the populace is hesitant in wanting full sovereignty or in wanting complete immergence with either GB or the Republic of

Ireland. This collective reluctance on the part of the grassroots to demand and expect full sovereignty reveals an apprehension on the part of the indigenous population of what might occur should the two groupsBBthe Catholic Republicans and the Protestant

UnionistsBB suddenly find themselves face-to-face in order to solve their problems without interference by GB. As was stated in chapter one (section C) in the discussion on partition imposed on the grassroots, the need for the people of cultural and ethnic diversity to manifest their cultural differences without fear of forced assimilation or of becoming marginalized within that state may also have contributed to their hesitancy in demanding compete sovereignty.

In the case of Jammu-and-Kashmir, the responses to the surveys by the indigenous population, as revealed in chapter four (section C, part three), disclose an ambivalence through contradiction that recurs with feedback to follow-up interview questions, supporting explanatory concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants) of the limbo state model. This contradiction is communicated in the Synovate India poll

(see Appendix R), which reports that even though a majority opt for independence over staying as part of India or joining Pakistan, a double-digit number also supported the idea of turning the Line of Control into the international border separating the two parts of

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J&K. The Synovate Indian Poll shows that 53.9% of the participants wanted to be independent, 36.2% wanted to join with India, and 3.3% wanted to join with Pakistan

(6.6% Can=t Say responses, see Appendix R). However, another poll conducted by

ACNielsen for Asian Age (see appendix S) concerns trifurcation recommendation

(dividing the state into three separate entities of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh) and reveals the inhabitants expression of remaining in the current situation. An overwhelming

87% across the state rejected the proposal to trifurcate the state. The complex and paradoxical responses (concept four) are revealed in the two different survey questions concerning dividing and joining either India or Pakistan (39.5% total) or dividing the state into separate independent regions (87% against the division and wanting to remain the same) or wanting independence (53.9 for).

On the other hand, when asked which issues would the respondents rank in order of priority, the list reveals the following: 90.1% ranked education as number one, 82.9% ranked development as number one, 80.3% ranked tourism as number one, 73.7% ranked health care as number one, and 55.3% ranked independence as number one (the respondents considered several issues as number one, hence the unusually high percentage for each issue; see chapter four, section C, part three, and Appendix R). Here again, as in

NI, the indigenous population appears reluctant to demand complete independence possibly because of the concern of finding themselves on their own to solve their problems, primarily in education, development, tourism, and health care. The issue of forced assimilation and/or of becoming marginalized within the state, as stated above

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concerning the grassroots of NI=s hesitancy in demanding full sovereignty, could also be a consideration in the case of Jammu-and-Kashmir.

The last similarity between NI and J&K in their limbo state status is that each region has various paramilitary or rebel groups, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses by inhabitants). Chapter three (section C, part three) lists the various paramilitary groups of NI. Chapter four (section D, parts one and two, and

Appendix O) offers information on the various jihadi/rebel groups in J&K. The original perception of these paramilitary/rebel groups was to win for the indigenous population, especially within specific areas of each occupied state, freedom from oppression of the troops of the occupying state. As noted in each section of NI and J&K on the paramilitary groups and/or rebels, eventually many of these groups take on different roles, contributing to the oppression of the residents.

As this section reveals, NI and J&K have many similarities as limbo states. The prevailing characteristics are: pervasive pattern of alternating external and internal dominance and control in the military-political leadership; Great Britain=s involvement politically, historically, economically, and militarily in both nations; both limbo states finding themselves in a tug between two other fully sovereign states; the occupying state at one time granting the occupied state limited autonomy that was then rescinded; immigrating settlers with their own self-preservation agenda establishing their own homeland in the limbo states; ethnic variance as a result of the immigrating settlers, bringing with them rich diversity in culture, traditions, religions, and language, as well as

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tension and conflict during stressful political times; partitioning of land experienced by each limbo state; voice of the indigenous inhabitants in the forms of surveys and polls; and the formation of various paramilitary and/or rebel groups, which resulted from internal conflicts in each limbo state. These similarities support the four explanatory concepts establishing NI and J&K as limbo states.

B. Differences between Northern Ireland=s and Jammu-and-Kashmir=s Limbo

State Status

The first obvious differences between NI and J&K is the differences in ethnicity, encompassing the cultural and religious manifestations of each region. As stated previously in chapter one, NI is predominantly western European and Christian

(Protestant and Catholic), while J&K is Central Asian with many sects, the dominant division of which are Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam.

The beliefs held by each group in J&K are distinct and dissimilar in several ways.

Because of the divergent beliefs exhibited by each ethnic group, the culture of each religious classification is somewhat different in that the celebrations and religious observations influence how each group celebrates their characteristic holidays, especially if an ethnic group populates a specific area of a city or province.

In addition to the two Christian groups in NI, a different groupBBNo

ReligionBBhas emerged during the NI comprehensive poll (conducted by the Northern

Ireland Life and Time Survey begun in 2000 and released in 2003). The fact that some citizens of NI do not follow a specific religion is significant in that the situation in NI can

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be viewed through a new dimension not based on religious beliefs but on concerns of self- identity by citizens of NI (see chapter three, section A, part three).

Until this survey categorized the No Religion respondents, many citizens of NI who were not in agreement with joining either GB or the Republic of Ireland, had called for NI independence. Many who did not agree with the basis of the conflict, had referred to themselves by various organizational designations (see chapter three, section A, part three and section C, part seven).

The different group concept found in J&K involves the Kashmiriyat notion explained in chapter four (section C, part two). As noted in chapter four, this cultural concept is considered a form of syncretic, secular ethnic identity indigenous to the Valley uniting Hindus and Muslims. This form of sharing of cultural identity actually originated in the fourteenth century under the Muslim Kashmiri rule of Sultan Qutb Udin (see chapter four, section C, part two). The Kashmiriyat identity slowly disintegrated since the

1989 insurgency due to views held by foreign militants who encouraged the Valley

Muslims to establish a more Islamic identity-based independence movement and the

Jammu Hindu concern of being absorbed into the predominantly Muslim state. However, the MORI survey (see Appendix P) conducted in 2002 revealed that the indigenous population in Jammu-and-Kashmir has articulated the need to maintain Kashmiriyat as part of their identity (see chapter four, section C, part two). Paradoxically, the group differences of a No Religion survey-responding group in Northern Ireland and a

Kashmiriyat identity- sharing group in Jammu-and-Kashmir reveals the uniqueness of NI and J&K in their limbo state statuses. 292

The next obvious difference is the geographical location of each nation. As a result of the location of NI in Europe within miles of GB, letting go of NI in the realm of political, military, economic, and cultural dominion has proven to be an unattainable task at of the beginning of the twenty-first century, supporting explanatory concept one

(patterns of invasions and domination). As stated in chapter four, because of Jammu-and-

Kashmir=s distance from GB and location in the Central Asian continent, Great Britain=s ability to release dominance of India, and thus J&K has proven to be easier than releasing

NI. Alternatively, letting go of J&K on the part of both India and Pakistan has proven to be a difficult task for each state, supporting concept one (patterns of invasions political and administrative domination).

Another differenceBBeconomical developmentBBis connected with the geographical location. Northern Ireland, due to its close proximity to the economically developed states, has a higher GNP per capita due to its association with GB and the

Republic of Ireland, whose GNPs per capita in 2005 were $37,632 and $40,232, respectively (see Appendix T). Jammu-and-Kashmir is less developed due to its association with India and Pakistan, whose GNPs per capita in 2005 were $724 and $689, respectively (see Appendix T). Economic development is indirectly related to the concept of political and administrative dominance, as stated in explanatory concept one, since control of NI and J&K by a major state can have effects on the limbo state=s economic progress.

An interesting difference between NI and J&K is related to the paramilitary/rebel

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groups that were discussed in chapters three and four, and above in section A. Though both NI and J&K have paramilitary/rebel groups, supporting concept four (complex and paradoxical responses), the difference is in the success of negotiations between the paramilitary and the occupying state. In Northern Ireland the decommissioning of arms by the IRA took place on 26 September 2005. As a result of the decommissioning of arms, as of 8 May 2007 power sharing has been restored to Northern Ireland with Ian

Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein sworn in as first minister and deputy first minister, respectively, of the Northern Ireland Assembly ( in May 2008 Ian Paisley resigned and was succeeded by Peter Robinson, long time deputy to Paisley).

Presently in J&K, neither negotiations nor announcements by any of the jihadi/ rebel groups concerning the elimination of weaponry of any kind has been announced. In the matter of less violence on the part of military/rebel groups, NI appears to go forth in the search for political power sharing and movement toward attempts at achieving peace.

J&K appears to have a long way to go in quelling violence on the part of the jihadi/rebel groups. An important difference in each state=s situation has to do with the occupying state=s nuclear capability, indirectly connected with concept one (invasions and political and administrative domination). While GB does have nuclear capability, the

Republic of Ireland does not, and a scenario in which nuclear threat would be used in solving the NI situation is not expected to occur because nuclear confrontation has never transpired in GB, NI, and/or the Republic of Ireland.

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The nuclear situation between Pakistan and India has painted a different concern for the international community and for the inhabitants of J&K. Both less developed nation-states have claimed nuclear capability and have brought concern to the international community during the conflict over J&K and moments of violent exchanges, especially in the first Indo-Pakistan War of 1948-49 (also referred to as the First Kashmir

War) and the second Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 (also know as the Second Kashmir War).

The use of nuclear threat has not been claimed by either state, but the fact that both have nuclear capabilities and have had wars over Jammu-and-Kashmir is cause for concern for

J&K and the international community.

Even though differences between NI=s and J&K=s limbo state status exist, these distinctions are paradoxically similar. The paradoxes involve existing ethnicities that are inherently dissimilar due to the nature of each region; connection with GB, even though locations are miles apart; economies that are affected by the controlling state(s); existence of paramilitary/rebel groups that have responded differently to negotiations; and the role of nuclear capability of the controlling state(s). As a result of these paradoxically similar differences, NI and J&K still meet the limbo state criteria stated in the four explanatory concepts.

C. Limbo State Model: Closing Comments

The researched information offered in this project exposes, through the political history of each region, documents of each region, and surveys conducted in each region, elements that substantiate, through the four explanatory concepts of the limbo state model, the perspective that Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir can be grouped under the 295

limbo state model, a concept developed and defined in this study. As reviewed above in section B, even the differences between the elements that have led to NI=s and J&K=s limbo state status still affirm the four explanatory concepts.

Briefly, Northern Ireland and Jammu-and-Kashmir are case studies in how two regions came into existence with limited state sovereignty due to patterns of invasions, patterns of political and administrative domination, and occupation by other fully sovereign states, as well as long term occupation by GB in NI=s case, and India and

Pakistan in J&K=s case. Also, weak leadership within each limbo state creates an environment for occupation, as well as complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population to the occupation. Converting their limited sovereignty to full sovereignty could have been accomplished by a number of ways as offered in the above text; brief examples include: either limited- sovereignty state could have been granted full independence by their occupying states, or each limited state could have fully merged with the occupying state or states. Since none of the above possibilities have occurred, both NI and J&K have found themselves in a non-sovereign limbo state status.

A model of limbo state is evident when states reveal a pattern of manifested internal/external factors exposing the state=s inability to self-govern combined with a political-historical motif of invasions, occupation by an invading state, short-term independence, then invasions and occupations again. This process continues when mixed with ethnically diverse settlers who become part of a cultural environment that displays a seemingly intractable conflict among members of the indigenous population, many of

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whom become members in organized paramilitary/rebel groups hostile toward the current occupying state and its policies. The beginnings of this model of limbo state status are seen in the pattern of self-rule broken by invasion and occupation by an outside force that brings in settlers to reinforce their iron rule over the residents of the occupied state.

At times there are indications that the occupying state plans to loosen ties by passing laws allowing autonomous rule, as did India with J&K in Article 370 of the India

Constitution and Great Britain with NI in passing the Home Rule Bill of 1914. But eventually subsequent rules and laws rescind the self-rule interval, as occurred in India, or crush the hope for self-rule as occurred in Northern Ireland in 1914, thus supporting the domination aspect of explanatory concept one (invasion and domination).

The most telling indication that the limited sovereign state will appear to remain floating in the limbo state status is the hesitancy on the part of the grassroots in attaining full sovereignty collectively as a community. Collectively as a community is the reaction on the part of the indigenous population when asked outright if independence is what they really want. The responses on the part of the grassroots, as was revealed above in chapters three and four at first indicate enthusiasm for independence in which bravado of language on the part of representatives of organizational groups is displayed. Yet when the grassroots are asked about independence in polls and surveys, the revelation of their hesitancy appears in their paradoxical responses, as revealed in the text above, supporting the complex and paradoxical responses in explanatory concept four.

This study also offers an answer to the concerns articulated at the end of chapter one (section D, part two): 1) why these limbo states are not able to become a typical 297

modern nation-states with a defined border within which exists not only a continuously updated infrastructure, educational system, healthcare services, and an incorruptible security network, but also a functioning government approved by the indigenous population; 2) how state-society relations impact development of sovereign authority for the occupied state; and 3) how state-international system relations undermine state sovereignty.

The response to the first question (why these limbo states are not able to become typical modern nation-states) emerges from the research, substantiating explanatory concepts one, two, three, and four of the limbo state model. These states have not been able to become typical modern states due to: 1) political-historical pattern of occupation and control of these limbo states by major states over a period of years with limited gaps of self-rule that indicate these areas exhibit limited sovereignty with resulting consequences such as lack of personal security, personal independence, political stability and transparency for the inhabitants, as well as poor economic development, and weakened or compromised rule of law; 2) weak leadership within the limbo state leading to failure of authority and allowing take-over by other states and other leadership with consequences as stated above in concept one; 3) patterns of settlers immigrating to the occupied limbo state, resulting in diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own agenda of cultural preservation with resulting partition of the land leading to incomplete or limited or denied self-rule, as well as sectarian violence among the varied religious and ethnic groups; and lastly 4) the complex and paradoxical responses expressed by members of the indigenous population (generally comprised of diverse religious and ethnic groups 298

with their own agenda of preservation of their culture) to the condition of being occupied by a controlling state.

The response to the second concern (how state-society relations impact development of sovereign authority for the occupied state) is more complex due to the occupied society=s relationship with two statesBBthe external occupying state and the internal limited state in which the society lives. Thus, the answer involves concepts one

(political and administrative domination by the occupying state), two (weak leadership within the occupied limbo state), three (diverse religious and ethnic groups with their own self-preservation agenda), and four (complex and paradoxical responses by the indigenous population of the limbo state) in terms of the response on the part of the indigenous population to the dichotomy of an occupying state where the seat of political and economic control is located and to their own limited state=s existence where their social and cultural manifestations exist. Because of this separation of political and economic control, and social and cultural manifestations, the relationship between the existing two states and the one society within the occupied state negatively impacts development of sovereign authority. This lack of development of sovereign authority for the occupied state is due to: 1) the political-historical pattern of occupation by outside entities, creating an unstable environment of failed state formation; 2) weak leadership within the occupied state and the inability to overcome political, military, economic control by the outside occupying state; 3) the diverse ethnic and religious groups struggling to preserve their own culture and in this attempt not acceding to a unified society but contributing to a

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divided society within the internal limited state; and 4) complex and paradoxical responses on the part of the grassroots to being in a continuous state of occupation and realizing that other concerns such as education, health, and economic development do take priority over being an independent state.

The response to the third concern (how state-international system relations undermine state sovereignty) lies in explanatory concept one of the limbo state model.

John T Rourke and Stephen D. Krasner contribute to the answer of the third concern. In chapter one (section B), a basic definition of state is offered by John T. Rourke, who states that one of six characteristics is diplomatic recognition. This diplomatic-recognition characteristic gives the state international recognition, promoting communication and interrelation among the states. In chapter two (section C, part one), Krasner offers four descriptive definitions of sovereignty. The third definition, international legal sovereignty, involves recognition of a state in the international arena based on evaluations such as: Is a state recognized by other states? Can it be a member of international organizations? Or, can its representatives enter into agreements with other entities? A significant indication of Rourke’s diplomatic recognition and Krasner’s international legal sovereignty is membership in a functional international organization such as the United

Nations. Neither Northern Ireland nor Jammu-and-Kashmir is a member of the UN. Not being part of the international system has undermined each limited state=s sovereign authority. The reason can be found in concept one: NI and J&K exhibit patterns of occupation and control by outside entities leading to NI=s and J&K=s limbo state status;

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NI and J&K have been occupied by major states over a period of years leading to NI=s and J&K=s current limbo state status. Thus, the controlling states not only have contributed to NI=s and J&K=s lack of international recognition but also to the two limbo states lack of attainable sovereign independence and authority.

The limbo state model is helpful in two ways: for current and future classifications of minor states and for alerting the international community that a region is on the verge of attaining limbo state status due to major state=s incursion into the region. Two current regions that could be classified under the limbo state model are Kurdistan and Palestine.

The Kurdistan region is divided among Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and

Azerbaijan.1 The two Palestinian regions of Gaza and the West Bank are militarily and thus economically under the control of Israel. A current area that may become a future limbo state is Iraq, which is currently predominantly currently under the control of the

United States. The international community could help these limited state regions pull out of the limbo state status, first by recognizing that they are limbo states and second by coordinating with the controlling state how to nurture full state status by leading these regions forward through political and economic provisions that will effectuate a state, and provide for its population personal as well as border security, political stability and transparency, economic development, cultural independence, supportive infrastructure, and a justice system based on rule of law maintaining order effectively. In the twenty-first century, a limbo state is able to achieve sovereign independence through participation by

1. Dahlman 2002, 271.

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member states within the international community.

The limbo state model does not indicate that the state that meets the criteria of the model is doomed to an existence of remaining in Alimbo@ permanently in terms of the limited state=s sovereign status. Changes may and at times do occur. An example of change is Northern Ireland=s recent announcement on 26 September 2005 concerning the decommissioning of all arms by the IRA, which helped bring relative peace and harmony to the region, as well as power sharing on 8 May 2008. However, as the indigenous population has indicated numerous times in both NI and J&K, to be under occupation is not the ideal political, economic, cultural, or military/security condition. But, as the surveys reveal, the grassroots show that more important internal problems, such as education, development, and health care among others, need to be solved in their region before serious deliberations take place concerning resolution of the limbo state status in order for the minor state to no longer be grouped under the limbo state model.

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Terminology

Below is a list of commonly used terminology and a brief definition of each. In the main text a more extensive definition is given as needed.

Continuing Conflict, Protracted Conflict, and Intractable Conflict will be used interchangeable in this paper to refer to large-scale conflicts that are resistant to settlement. According to Louis Kriesberg, these types of conflicts Apersist despite efforts to resolve them, and do end or become transformed at some time@ (Kriesberg 2000, 333-

4).

Culture refers to Athe widely shared customs, beliefs, values, norms, institutions, and other products of a community that are transmitted socially across generations@ (Weiten

1998, 24).

Cultural Pluralism refers to Atwo or more cultures that exist within a nation-state and attempt to pressure the government for policies responsive to that particular group=s interest and needs@ (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 46).

Decolonization also referred to as counter-colonization were terms adopted by Moritz

Julius Bonn in the 1930s and originally took on the meaning of Ato grant independence to a colony@ or Ato withdraw from a colony leaving it independent@ (McIntyre 1998, 7).

Later the terminology began to take on more connotative definitions such as Athe continuation of imperialism by other means@ (Robinson and Gallagher 1962, 72).

Ethnicity refers to Aa collectivity [population] within a larger society having real or

303

putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood@ (Schmerhorn

1978, 12).

Nation refers to Aa group of people that views itself as having a common heritage, destiny, and sense of mutual identification based on language, history, and culture@

(Spiegel 1995, 13).

Nation-State refers to Aa state structure in which a nation resides and that exists to protect and promote the interests of that nation@ (Spiegel 1995, 13).

Nationalism refers to Athe doctrine of popular freedom and sovereignty@ (Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 4).

Partition is Aseparations jointly decided upon by . . . responsible parties: either agreed between the two sides . . ., or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party@ (Kaufmann

1998, 125).

State refers to Aan independent political entity with institutions and an authority in a specific territory@ (Spiegel 1995, 13). According to John T. Rourke, A. . . states share all or most of six characteristics: sovereignty, territory, population, diplomatic recognition, internal organization, and domestic support@ (Rourke 2001, 189).

Stormont refers to the Northern Ireland Parliament Buildings and thus to any legislative activity (hppt://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/martin_sloan/stormont.htm,

6/03/02).

All other terminologies will follow the generally accepted use (politically and historically)

304

unless otherwise stated in the text.

305

References

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Appendix A Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2002 UKDA study number:4767

Principal Investigators Devine, P.Queen's University of Belfast. Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social ResearchDowds, L.University of Ulster. International Conflict Research (INCORE)

316

Data Collector Research and Evaluation Services Original Data Producers Sponsors Economic and Social Research CouncilOffice of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland)University of Ulster Distributed by UK Data Archive, University of Essex, Colchester. November 2003 Bibliographic Citation All works which use or refer to these materials should acknowledge these sources by means of bibliographic citation. To ensure that such source attributions are captured for bibliographic indexes, citations must appear in footnotes or in the reference section of publications. The bibliographic citation for this data collection is: Devine, P. and Dowds, L., Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2002 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 2003. SN: 4767. Acknowledgement Any publication, whether printed, electronic or broadcast, based wholly or in part on these materials, should acknowledge the original data creators, depositors or copyright holders, the funders of the Data Collections (if different) and the UK Data Archive, and to acknowledge Crown Copyright where appropriate. Copyright: ARK Disclaimer Although all efforts are made to ensure the quality of the materials, neither the original data creators, depositors or copyright holders, the funders of the Data Collections, nor the UK Data Archive bear any responsibility for the accuracy or comprehensiveness of these materials. All rights reserved. No part of these materials may be reproduced, stored in, or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the UK Data Archive.UK Data ArchiveUniversity of EssexWivenhoe ParkColchesterEssex C04 3SQUnited Kingdomwww.data-archive.ac.uk

317

4767 . Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2002 Depositor: Devine, P. , Queen's University of Belfast. Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research Principal Investigators: Devine, P. , Queen's University of Belfast. Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research Dowds, L. , University of Ulster. International Conflict Research (INCORE) Data Collector: Research and Evaluation Services Sponsors: Economic and Social Research CouncilOffice of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland)University of UlsterGrant Number: ESRC Awards R000223989 and RES-000-22-0017 Other Acknowledgements: Gillian Robinson and Ann Marie Gray, Co-Directors, Life and Times Survey. Abstract: The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT) series began in 1998, and was the successor to the previous Northern Ireland Social Attitudes series, (held at UKDA under GN:33235), which was discontinued in 1996. The aims of the NILT series are:to monitor public attitudes towards social policy and political issues in Northern Ireland;to provide a time-series on attitudes to key social policy areas;to facilitate academic social policy analysis;to provide a freely available resource on public attitudes for the wider community of users in Northern Ireland.NILT also participates in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).NILT has a companion series which also began in 1998, the Young Life and Times Survey (YLT), which surveys young people aged 12-17 living in the households of adults interviewed for NILT. Users should note that the YLT was not conducted in 2001 alongside the main NILT survey, as the survey was undergoing evaluation at the time.Further information about the survey may be found on the NILT pages on the Ark (Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive) web site. Main Topics: The dataset records the responses of 1800 adults to the 2002 NILT survey.Questions are

318

grouped into modules and this dataset includes modules on:$ Political attitudes$ Women in politcs$ Community relations$ Rights of the child$ Europe$ Family and gender roles (asked as part of the ISSP)$ Background information on the respondentStandard MeasuresInternational Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) codesRegistrar General's Social Class Coverage: Dates of Fieldwork: October 2002- January 2003 Country: Northern Ireland Spatial Units: Countries Observation Units: Individuals Kind of Data: Numeric data; Individual (micro) level Universe Sampled: Location of Units of Observation: National Population: Adults aged 18 and over in Northern Ireland during 2002. Methodology: Time Dimensions: Repeated cross-sectional study Sampling Procedures: One-stage stratified or systematic random sample. Number of Units: 2893 (target) 1800 (obtained) Weighted sample size = 1800 Method of Data Collection: Face-to-face interview; Self- completion; Used CAPI (Main stage interview). Weighting: Weighting factors used = WTFACTOR Language(s) of Written Materials: Study Description: EnglishStudy Documentation: English Access: Access Conditions: Depositor has specified :- Registration required and standard access conditions apply. Depositor may be informed about usage. Availability: ESDS Government, UK Data Archive Contact: Help desk: [email protected] Date of First Release: 21 November 2003 Copyright: ARK

APPENDIX B

319

Chronological list of dates of Irish History c.3000BC Megalithic tombs first constructed. c.700BC Celts arrive from parts of Gaul and Britain. Ireland divided into provinces. (This according to a contributor is reconstructed folk history and not based on the archaeology.) c.AD350 Christianity reaches Ireland 432 Traditional date for the arrival of St. Patrick in Ireland 700-800 Irish monasticism reaches its zenith. 795 Full-scale Viking invasion. 1014 Brian Boru/ defeats Vikings at Clontarf, but is murdered. 1169 Dermot MacMurrough, exiled king of Leinster, invites help from 'Strongbow'. 1172 Pope decrees that Hery II of England is feudal lord of Ireland. 1366 Statues of Kilkenny belatedly forbid intermarriage of English and Irish. Gaelic culture unsuccessfully suppressed. 1534-40 Failed insurrection by Lord Offaly. 1541 Henry VIII proclaimed king (rather than feudal lord) of Ireland 1558-1603 Reign of Elizabeth I. Policy of Plantation begins. System of counties adopted. 1595-1603 Failed uprising of Hugh O'Neil. 1607 Flight of the Earls; leading Ulster families go into exile. 1641 Charles I's policies cause insurrection in Ulster and Civil War in England. 1649 Cromwell invades Ireland. 1653 Under the Act of Settlement Cromwell's opponents stripped of land. 1689-90 Deposed James II flees to Ireland; defeated at the Battle of the Boyne. 1704 Penal Code enacted; Catholics barred from voting, education and the military. 1775 American War of Independence forments Irish unrest. 1782 Grattan's Parliament persuades British to declare Irish independence, but in name only. 1795 Foundation of the Orange Order. 1798 Wolfe Tone's uprising crushed. 1801 Ireland becomes part of Britain under the Act of Union. 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act passed after Daniel O'Connell elected 320

as MP. 1845-48 The Great Famine. 1879-82 The Land War; Parnell encourages boycott of repressive landlords. 1914 Implementation of Home Rule postponed because of outbreak of World War I. 1916 Easter Rising. After the leaders are executed public opinion backs independence. 1920-21 War between Britain and Ireland; Irish Free State and Northern Ireland created. 1922 Civil war breaks out. 1932 De Valera elected. 1969 Rioting between Catholics and Protestants. British troops called in. 1971 Provisional IRA begins campaign to oust British troops from Ireland. 1972 UK and Republic of Ireland join European Community. 'Bloody Sunday' in Derry. 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement signed. 1990 Peace Declaration and IRA ceasefire. 1998 The Belfast Agreement was concluded on 10 April 1998, Good Friday, and was approved On 22 May 1998 by the electorate of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 2002 On October 14, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive. The Secretary of State and Northern Ireland Office Ministers have assumed responsibility for the direction and control of the Northern Ireland Departments

Appendix C

The full text of the Belfast Agreement (also known as The Good Friday Agreement) which was concluded on 10 April 1998 can be viewed online at http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf.

Chronology of events since the signing of the Belfast Agreement () 321

1998

April 1998: The 65-page agreement is drawn up, proposing devolution of some central government power to a Northern Ireland assembly. It is welcomed by the Ulster Unionists, the SDLP and Sinn Fein. DUP leader Ian Paisley denounces it as "treacherous."

21 May 1998: The first all-Ireland poll since the general election of 1918 sees the agreement approved br 71.2% of voters in Northern Ireland and 95% of the Republic of Ireland electorate.

29 June 1998: David Trimble is elected First Minister designate of the assembly with the SDLP's Seamus Mallon Deputy First Minister.

15 August 1998: Dissident republicans using the name AReal IRA@ detonate a 500lb bomb in the centre of Omagh on a busy Saturday afternoon. The bomb kills 28 people outright and injures 200Bthe worst single atrocity of the Troubles. A 29th victim dies later.

September 1998: Assembly is elected, with Ulster Unionists winning the largest share of the vote and 28 seats. The SDLP takes 24, with Sinn Fein winning 18.

1999 16 February 1999: The assembly votes to accept a report on the devolution of powers from Westminster and a deadline of 10 March is set to establish the executive. This is later postponed to 2 April - Good Friday.

1 April 1999: All-party talks at Hillsborough Castle end with call for establishment of an executive within three weeks. But Sinn Fein says it cannot deliver IRA decommissioning before the executive sits, as the UUP insists.

20 May 1999: UK Prime Minister Tony Blair sets an "absolute deadline" of 30 June for agreement on the formation of an executive, or the assembly will be suspended.

30 June 1999: The deadline passes without agreement. Tony Blair agrees to an extension. 322

15 July 1999: A meeting of the assembly to nominate ministers for the executive collapses as the UUP refuses to attend over Sinn Fein's stance on decommissioning. Seamus Mallon resigns as deputy first minister. Talks at Stormont to resolve the dispute also fail.

17 July 1999: London and Dublin ask former US senator George Mitchell, who helped set up the original agreement, to re-enter the peace process.

6 September 1999: George Mitchell's review of the peace process begins.

23 October 1999: The expected cut-off point for Senator Mitchell's review is extended.

17 November 1999: The IRA releases a statement confirming that it will contact the decommissioning body as part of a comprehensive political deal.

18 November 1999: George Mitchell reveals details of the plan to rescue the peace process and allowing the setting up of a power-sharing government. It includes the IRA contacting the decommissioning body as soon as the executive is set up.

27 November 1999: The Ulster Unionist Council backs the Mitchell deal by 480 votes to 349 - paving the way for devolution within days.

29 November 1999: The Northern Assembly meets and Seamus Mallon is reinstated as deputy first minister. D'Hondt mechanism is triggered and 10 ministers are nominated to the Northern Ireland Executive. 30 November 1999: The laws to enable devolution to take place are rushed through both houses of parliament.

1 December 1999: Power is passed from Westminster to Belfast at midnight.

2 December 1999: The Irish government removes its territorial claim to Northern Ireland from its constitution and the Anglo-Irish agreement is revoked. The new Northern Ireland Executive meets for the first time. The IRA announces that it has appointed a representative to the international body on decommissioning.

323

2000

19 January 2000: As the Assembly members and ministers settle into governing Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, tells the House of Commons that he endorses the Patten Commission proposals on policing reform.

31 January 2000: Amid growing tension over arms decommissioning, General John de Chastelain delivers his report on the prospects for decommissioning to the British and Irish governments after meeting the IRA's representative earlier that day.

3 February 2000: Secretary of State Peter Mandelson tells the House of Commons that he will suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly if there is no IRA decommissioning. The order is designed to stop the resignation of First Minister David Trimble, a move that would collapse the institutions.

5 February 2000: The IRA releases a statement insisting that it has entered into no agreements to decommission arms.

7 February 2000: The Continuity IRA, splinter group, admits responsibility for a bomb attack at a hotel in County Fermanagh the previous day.

11 February: Despite furious last-minute negotiations, no deal is struck on decommissioning and Secretary of State Peter Mandelson signs the order to suspend the assembly just before 6pm.

15 February 2000: The IRA announces that it will no longer co-operate with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning because of the suspension of the assembly.

15 March 2000: Secretary of State Peter Mandelson tells MPs that weapons decommissioning is unlikely to have happened by the 22 May deadline set out in the Good Friday Agreement.

17 March 2000: David Trimble, attending St Patrick's Day celebrations in Washington, says that he is prepared to return to an assembly without prior decommissioning, 324

providing the issue is dealt with.

23 March 2000: Reverend Martin Smyth challenges David Trimble for the UUP leadership. Two days later he is defeated 56.8% to 43.2%.

25 March 2000: Mr Smyth is defeated at the Ulster Unionist Council but the delegates link a return to devolved institutions with a pledge from the government that the name and symbols of the Royal Ulster Constabulary will be retained.

6 April 2000: Sinn Fein chief negotiator Martin McGuinness dismisses as "a pathetic fabrication" allegations in a secret document, publicised at the Bloody Sunday inquiry, that he fired a single shot that led to the shooting dead of 14 civilians by British soldiers in 1972.

12 April 2000: The Queen awards the George Cross to the RUC at a ceremony at Hillsborough Castle. Troop levels reach their lowest in 30 years - 14,000.

27 April 2000: UUP MP for South Antrim Clifford Forsythe, dies aged 70.

2 May 2000: Seven hours of talks between party leaders and the two governments result in no new progress.

6 May 2000: The IRA releases a statement saying that it is ready to begin a process that would "completely and verifiably" put its arms beyond use. The statement follows a proposal to restore the assembly, linked to a firm commitment to decommissioning. Details suggest that two international figures will inspect IRA arms dumps and confirm that the weapons are not being used.

7 May 2000: UUP leader David Trimble expresses cautious optimism about the statement.

8 May 2000: Secretary of State Peter Mandelson announces that he will bring forward an order to restore the Northern Ireland Assembly.

15 May 2000: The two independent weapons inspectors, former ANC official Cyril 325

Ramaphosa and former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari hold meetings with Northern Ireland's political leaders.

16 May 2000: The Police (Northern Ireland) Bill to reform the RUC is published.

21 May 2000: Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams says that he cannot fully support the Police Bill, saying it waters down the Patten Commission's recommendations.

26 May 2000: Amid intense lobbying by both anti and pro-agreement unionists, the UUP's Jeffrey Donaldson MP publishes what he says is an alternative plan for devolution. He recommends that the party's ruling council supports his move to insist on a prior start to decommissioning.

If it does not take place, he argues that the assembly can operate in a shadow mode, advising and making recommendations to Northern Ireland Officer ministers.

Party leader David Trimble dismisses it as a "Unionist wishlist".

27 May 2000: David Trimble secures the backing of his party to re-enter the power-sharing assembly at Stormont despite no decommissioning of IRA arms.

29 May 2000: At midnight power is restored to the Stormont executive.

26 June 2000: A month after the Ulster Unionists agree to re-enter powersharing government with Sinn Fein, the two international arms inspectors, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and ex-ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa, report that they have been secretly taken to IRA arms dumps, inspected them and concluded that the arms cannot be used without their detection.

9 July 2000: The Orange march at Drumcree takes place, but was stopped by the Parades Commission from marching down the mainly nationalist Garvaghy Road.

19 July 2000: The police explode a bomb found on a railway line in west London. Dissident republican groups are believed to be responsible. 326

21 September 2000: The UUP loses its second safest Westminster seat to the DUP, as the Reverend William McCrea wins the South Antrim by-election forced by the death of UUP MP Clifford Forsythe.

On the same day, a rocket attack on MI6 headquarters in London is believed to be the work of dissident Irish republicans.

13 October 2000: The date of 28 October is set for a fresh meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council, where leader David Trimble will face pressure from his party to withdraw from the executive.

25 October 2000: The IRA releases a statement saying it will allow some of its arms dumps to be re-inspected.

26 October 2000: It is announced that the second inspection by international observers of some of the IRA's arms dumps has taken place. On the same day the General John de Chastelain of the Decommissioning Commission says no progress has been made on actual paramilitary disarmament.

28 October 2000: David Trimble wins the backing of the UUC, beating off a challenge from Jeffrey Donaldson by 445 votes to 374.

Mr Trimble's plans put before the council include seeking a more pro-active stance on disarmament from the decommissioning body and barring Sinn Fein from North-South ministerial meetings.

16 November 2000: Sinn Fein begin a legal challenge against First Minister David Trimble's ban on them taking part in North-South ministerial councils.

22 November 2000: Legislation to reform th Royal Ulster Constabulary passes into law at Westminster. But the crucial question of what the force will be called remains unanswered as Secretary of State Peter Mandelson retains the power to decide this at a later date.

5 December 2000: In an apparent response to the passing of the Police Bill, the IRA 327

releases a statement reiterated the position it set out on 6 May 2000. It accuses the British government of failing to keep to its side of the bargain by implementing in full the Patten Report on policing reform. It stresses that it has not broken "contact" with the decommissioning body - but that decommissioning "cannot and will not happen on terms dictated by the British government or the unionists".

12 December 2000: In a farewell visit, outgoing US President Bill Clinton pays his third and final official visit to the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Speaking to a crowd of thousands in the border town of Dundalk in the republic, Mr Clinton appeals to people north and south "to protect this progress, to cherish it and build on it."

2001

17 January 2001: RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan says that the loyalist paramilitary UDA had become a loose organisation "lacking central direction and control" and some its members were responsible for a number of killings and for an increase in sectarian attacks against Catholic homes in Northern Ireland.

24 January 2001: Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson resigns from government amid allegations of fresh scandal. John Reid, formerly Scottish Secretary, arrives in Belfast as his successor and the first Catholic holder of the post.

30 January 2001: The Belfast High Court rules that David Trimble's ban on Sinn Fein ministers attending North-South ministerial councils is illegal because it was designed to put pressure on the IRA to decommission weapons. But Mr. Justice Kerr adds that Mr Trimble did not have to nominate the Sinn Fein ministers and could use his discretion in who he chose. Mr Trimble announces that an appeal to the decision but insists the ban will remain in place.

4 March 2001: Dissident republicans detonate a car bomb outside the London headquarters of the BBC after warnings are given. There is one minor injury but substantial damage to the corporation's News Centre.

8 March 2001: With Sinn Fein still banned by David Trimble from attending North-South Ministerial meetings, talks in Belfast fail to find a solution to the impasse. But the IRA releases a fresh statement saying that it is entering "further discussions" with the 328

decommissioning body and that the British government "must deliver on its obligations".

22 March 2001: General John de Chastelain confirms that the IRA are in contact with his body and adds that events of the previous weeks led him to believe that "progress can be made".

31 March 2001: Michael McKevitt, the brother-in-law of IRA hunger striker Bobby Sands, is charged in the Irish Republic with directing terrorism. Mr McKevitt, a member of the 32 Country Sovereignty Movement which has been linked to the dissident Real IRA, is under legislation passed in the wake of the 1998 Omagh bomb.

2 May 2001: Northern Ireland Education Minister Martin McGuinness, one of the principle figures in the modern republican movement, confirms that he was a leading member of the IRA in Derry in the 1970s. Mr. McGuinness makes the announcement ahead of his expected appearance at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.

4 May 2001: The European Court of Human Rights finds that 10 IRA men shot dead by security forces had their human rights violatedBnot because of the deaths but because of the failure of the authorities to properly investigate the operations in question.

8 May 2001: UK Prime Minister Tony Blair calls a general election for 7 June. Launching his own campaign and attempting to head off a substantial challenge from the Democratic Unionists, David Trimble tells the UUP that he will resign as First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly on 1 July if there has been no progress from the IRA on decommissioning.

16 May 2001: The US government declares the dissident republican organisation the "Real IRA" a foreign terrorist organisation. It moves to freeze the assets of any individual or group linked to the paramilitaries in the US.

30 May 2001: Amid growing political pressure for movement and jostling for position in the general election campaign, the independent international arms inspectors, Cyril Ramaphosa and Maarti Ahtisaari, say that they have carried out a third inspection of some IRA arms dumps - and conclude that the weapons remain out of use.

31 May 2001: In a statement coming a week before the general election, the IRA said that 329

it had held four meetings with the arms decommissioning body.

It says that it has honoured every statement it has made - but that the British government continues to renege on two - policing and demilitarisation.

7 June 2001: The general election leads to major gains for the hardline Democratic Unionists and Sinn Fein. The UUP remains the largest party but is only one seat ahead of the DUP. The moderate SDLP are pushed into fourth place as Sinn Fein snatch two more seats as they consolidate political control in the west.

The UUP suffers similar damage in the local council elections which see Sinn Fein become the largest single party on Belfast City Council.

14 June 2001: The Court of Appeal in Belfast reserves judgement in David Trimble's appeal against the overturning of his ban on Sinn Fein ministers attending North South meetings. The Lord Chief Justice, Sir Robert Carswell, said that there were "difficult and delicate issues to consider'' and the court would give a ruling as soon as it could.

19 June 2001: Riot police are called in to protect Catholic children going to school in north Belfast after clashes between rival gangs. Violent clashes in the Ardoyne area of Belfast continues into the following week with loyalists and republicans blaming each other.

23 June 2001: David Trimble emerges from the Ulster Unionist Council's annual meeting as the unopposed leader as party opponents choose not to challenge him ahead of his scheduled resignation at the end of the month.

27 June 2001: The RUC fire a plastic bullet amid disturbances in Portadown, scene of the upcoming banned Drumcree parade.

28 June 2001: Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern begin intensive talks aimed at preventing David Trimble resigning as First Minister.

1 July 2001: First Minister David Trimble resigns - but nominates fellow UUP minister Reg Empey as caretaker, triggering a six-week period in which to resolve the impasse over arms. 330

2 July 2001: The Northern Ireland Parades Commission bans the Orange Order's Drumcree March at Portadown for the third successive year. The mediator between the Orange Order and the residents appeals to loyalist paramilitaries to stay away.

8 July 2001: The annual Drumcree parade near Portadown passes off peacefully after the Orange Order tells its members to disperse from the site. But the organisation's leaders pledge to challenge the Parades Commission under human rights legislation.

9-11 July 2001: Political talks at Weston Park, Staffordshire, fail to find a breakthrough with the parties remaining at loggerheads. The UVF (loyalist-paramilitary) aligned Progressive Unionist Party withdraws from these talks, saying that until republicans set out their terms for decommissioning, its impossible to negotiate with them.

In a separate development, the other main loyalist paramilitaries, the UFF, withdraws support for the Good Friday Agreement, but insists that its ceasefire remains intact.

12 July 2001: Night-long rioting between nationalist protesters and security forces in North Belfast come at the end of the height of the Protestant marching season. Both plastic bullets and water cannon are used and more than 100 police are injured.

13-14 July 2001: Political talks reconvene at Weston Park. Despite rumours that a deal is taking shape, the talks break up with no agreement found.

22-27 July 2001: The British and Irish governments spend the week putting together an intricate package as a "make or break" deal to be presented to the pro-agreement parties. Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern insist that it will be the only document on offer and will not be open to negotiation.

30 July 2001: A weekend of sectarian violence ends with the shooting dead of an 18-year-old Protestant man in Glengormley, north of Belfast, as he stood at a roadside with friends. The RUC reports that it has no doubt that the attack was carried out by loyalist gunmen who had assumed that they were attacking a group of Catholic men.

1 August 2001: The British and Irish governments unveil a package of proposals aimed at breaking the deadlock, with the focus on policing reform, demilitarisation, stability of the 331

institutions and a reiteration of the importance of decommissioning. They give the parties less than a week to respond.

6 August 2001: The international arms decommissioning body headed by General John de Chastelain says the IRA has put forward a plan to put its weapons "beyond use". Gen de Chastelain publishes neither a timescale nor details of the plan, but stresses that his commission believes the IRA's proposals "initiates a process that will put IRA arms completely and verifiably beyond use."

None of the major parties meets the deadline of responding in full to the two governments' proposals.

9 August 2001: With three days to go before the deadline for a political deal or a potential collapse of the institutions, the IRA releases a statement confirming the details of what the decommissioning body set out earlier in the week. The organisation reveals that it has had eight meetings with Gen de Chastelain since 8 March to discuss its arms.

The Ulster Unionists stand by their line that they cannot return to power-sharing government with republicans without actual decommissioning from the IRA.

10 August 2001: With no sign that the IRA is about to decommission and no sign that the unionists will accept anything but, Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid suspends the devolved institutions for 24 hours starting from Saturday 11th.

12 August 2001: Devolution is restored, resetting the clock for a deal by six weeks. Sinn Fein accuses the British government of having caved in to unionist pressure. 14 August 2001: The IRA releases a statement withdrawing its offer to put in place a mechanism to put arms beyond use, describing the unionists' actions as "totally unacceptable".

14 August 2001: Three suspected members of the IRA are arrested in Colombia after being allegedly in contact with the Farc rebels who control part of the country.

16 August 2001: Sinn Fein rejects the government's proposed revised plan to carry out police reforms before its formal publication, saying that it fails to put in place a police force that republicans can support. 332

17 August 2001: The British government publishes revised plans to change the shape of policing in Northern Ireland. The new plan includes substantial changes to the policing board and powers of investigation of police operations.

18 August 2001: Thousands of loyalists join a UDA-organised march along the predominantly Protestant Shankill Road in Belfast to commemorate a senior paramilitary killed during the loyalist feud of 2000.

20 August 2001: The Catholic Church in Ireland officially backs the revised policing plan. The bishops say that they still have some reservations but there is now "real hope for a new beginning in policing".

20 August 2001: The SDLP endorses the policing plan and announces that it will nominate members to join the new policing board. It calls on people from all of Northern Ireland's communities to do the same.

3 September 2001: An earlier dispute over access to the Catholic Holy Cross primary school in Ardoyne erupts into violence. Loyalist demonstrators attempt to stop children reaching the school, saying that republicans are using the journey as a screen to attack their community. The stand-off continues for the rest of the month with no sign of resolution.

6 September 2001: Sean Neeson resigns as leader of the cross-community Alliance Party saying that the party needed a "fresh face" following its drop in support.

17 September 2001: John Hume announces that he is to step down as leader of the SDLP, citing health reasons for his decision. The party's deputy leader Seamus Mallon later announces that he too will step down and not run for the leadership.

18 September 2001: The High Court in Belfast reserves judgement on the UUP's challenge against Sinn Fein's victory in the Fermanagh and South Tyrone constituency at the General Election. Michelle Gildernew won the seat by 53 votes but the UUP has alleged voting irregularities.

19 September: Two days before the deadline for solving the political crisis, the IRA 333

releases a statement saying that it is "intensifying" its engagement with the decommissioning body. The organisation says that it wants to accelerate moves towards a "comprehensive resolution" but that depended on others playing their part.

20 September 2001: The annual BBC survey of public attitudes finds that 41% of those polled want fresh elections to break the political deadlock.

21 September 2001: Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid announces the second technical suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly after a failure to break the deadlock and reinstate a first minister. He insists that it will be the last time that he carries out the technical order.

21 September 2001: The UUP and DUP announce that they will nominate members to the Policing Board.

23 September 2001: David Trimble plans to table to motion to exclude Sinn Fein from the executive of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

27 September 2001: Nightly rioting in north Belfast escalates with gun fire directed towards the security forces. RUC Chief Constable Sir Ronnie Flanagan blames the UDA and warns that there is no "security solution" to the violence other than to get community leaders to act.

28 September 2001: Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid announces that he had prepared the order to declare the UDA ceasefire over but was delaying it because the paramilitary group's leaders had communicated that they accepted the damage that the violence was causing to the peace process.

28 September 2001: Sunday World journalist Martin O'Hagan is shot dead in his home town of Lurgan, the first journalist to be killed by paramilitaries in the history of the Troubles. The Red Hand Defenders, a cover name used in the past by both the Ulster Defence Association and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), claims responsibility for the killing in a call to a Belfast newsroom.

28 September 2001: Mark Durkan becomes the leader-designate of the SDLP after none of his party colleagues challenge him for the leadership. 334

29 September 2001: The Northern Ireland Office announces the formation of the Policing Board, the new body to oversee the reformed force. The move goes ahead despite Sinn Fein's refusal to endorse the reforms and nominate members to the body.

30 September 2001: Martin McGuinness tells the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (conference) that more progress can be made in the peace process. Party president Gerry Adams says that terrorism is "ethically indefensible" but recent "huge developments" pointed to a future "free of IRA weapons". 6 October 2001: David Ford is named new leader of the cross-community Alliance party following the resignation of Sean Neeson in September.

8 October 2001: Unionist attempts to exclude Sinn Fein from the executive fail after the SDLP refuses to support the motion. David Trimble announces that he is withdrawing his ministers from the body and they would eventually resign.

18 October 2001: The Ulster Unionists' three ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive resign - putting a seven day deadline on solving the crisis.

22 October 2001: Gerry Adams announces that he and Martin McGuinness have urged the IRA to make a "groundbreaking move" to save the peace process. The statement appears to lay the ground for the IRA to begin decommissioning weapons.

23 October 2001: The IRA announces that it has begun a process of putting arms beyond use in line with an agreement with the Independent International Decommissioning Commission. Hours later the IICD confirms it has witnessed the disposal of arms and describes it as "significant".

24 October 2001: David Trimble renominates UUP ministers to the NI Executive, thereby preventing its collapse. Secretary of State John Reid announces the scaling down of military forces in south Armagh by the removal of two watchtowers and part of a base.

2 November 2001: David Trimble fails to become First Minister after two rebel members of his own party vote against him.

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3 November 2001: Pro-agreement parties strike a deal to re-elect David Trimble by redesignating three Alliance Party members as unionists.

4 November 20001: The Royal Ulster Constabulary is renamed The Police Service of Northern Ireland as the first new recruits begin their training.

6 November 2001: David Trimble is elected First Minister and Mark Durkan as Deputy First Minister after a DUP legal challenge fails. Scuffles break out among some MLAs at Stormont following the vote.

11 November 2001: Mark Durkan becomes leader of the SDLP.

12 November 2001: A teenager dies in Belfast after a home-made bomb explodes in his hand amid clashes between several hundred people.

28 November 2001: The Ulster Democratic Party, linked to the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Defence Association is dissolved.

1 December 2001: David Trimble wins a crucial vote at the Ulster Unionist Council allowing him to set policy over the party's position on IRA decommissioning.

6 December 2001: The leaking of a draft report by the NI police ombudsman reveals that the RUC had information about a planned attack in Omagh 11 days before the 1998 bombing which left 29 dead.

14 October 2002: Devolution was suspended in Northern Ireland with Unionists refusing to share power with Sinn Fein while the IRA remains armed and active. Britain=s NI secretary, John Reid, suspended the power-sharing government making this the fourth time this had occurred since NI Assembly came into being in December 1999.

Disarmament of the Irish Republican Army: A timelineSabrina Saccoccio, CBC News Online | Updated November 26, 2003 1998April 10: The governments of Britain and Ireland, along with eight political parties in Northern Ireland conjointly sign the Good Friday Agreement in Belfast. It is a landmark

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accord in the search for peace in Northern Ireland because of the clause that calls for "the decommissioning of illegally-held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups." These groups equate disarmament with surrender C an official policy of most armies. April 30: The IRA issues a statement saying the Good Friday Agreement falls short of what will provide a lasting peace process and it has no plans to decommission its weapons. May 22: The Good Friday Agreement is put to a vote. The people of Northern Ireland and Ireland vote overwhelmingly in favour of the deal in two separate referendums. August 15: A car bomb blast in the small Northern Ireland town of Omagh kills 29 and injures hundreds. The Real IRA, a splinter group of the faction, claims responsibility for this attack referred to as the worst in 30 years. Dec. 11: Ulster Unionist Party First Minister David Trimble and Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Leader John Hume win the Nobel Peace Prize for working to implement the Good Friday Agreement. 1999Jan. 27: Eamon Collins, who defected from the IRA and wrote a book about the murders he and others committed, is stabbed and bludgeoned to death. Feb. 16: The Northern Ireland Assembly votes in favour of an all-party cabinet. March 10: The deadline for the Good Friday Agreement clause stating Northern Ireland should set up a democratically-elected assembly is ignored. May 15: Weeks of disarmament talks between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the IRA end without agreement. Blair sets June 30 as an "absolute deadline" for resolution. June 30: Blair's deadline for resolution of the disarmament talks passes. July 12: The Orange Order cuts back on its annual marches commemorating the Protestant victory in the Battle of the Boyne (July 1690) in light of boosted British security. August 14 The IRA rejects a disarmament proposal set out by the Ulster Unionists. Nov. 16: The IRA agrees to join panel discussions for the disarmament of paramilitary groups. Dec. 2: The British government transfers power back to Northern Ireland that had been held by London since 1972, in the form of a power-sharing cabinet in Belfast. 2000Jan. 31: According to a committee report, the IRA has not begun decommissioning its weapons.

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Feb. 11: The British government suspends Northern Ireland's power-sharing cabinet in Belfast because of IRA disarmament refusals. May 6: The IRA says it will begin to "put its weapons beyond use" after the Irish and British governments push for a move. The IRA says it will put the arms in storage as long as the agreement is officially implemented. May 30: The British government lifts its suspension of Northern Ireland's power-sharing cabinet. 2001March 4: The Real IRA is accused in a bomb blast near the headquarters of the British Broadcasting Corporation. June 30: David Trimble resigns as first minister of the power-sharing executive. He had set the day as his deadline to quit unless the IRA begins disarming. July 12: The IRA denies its involvement in clashes during Orange Order marches where more than 100 police officers were injured. August 14: The IRA rejects a disarmament proposal set out by the Ulster Unionists. Sept. 5: Protestant militants are arrested on suspicion of throwing a bomb the day before that injured police guarding Catholic schoolgirls. Protestants had repeatedly harassed the girls on their way to school. Oct. 18: Five Ulster Unionist ministers resign over the IRA's failure to disarm. Unless the ministers return, the Catholic-Protestant power-sharing executive will collapse at midnight on Oct. 24. Oct. 21: Gerry Adams, leader the IRA's political wing Sinn Fein, holds meetings with the IRA increasing speculation of disarmament. Oct. 22: In an attempt to save Northern Ireland's peace process, Gerry Adams tells the group to disarm. Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid also shows his support for IRA disarmament, stating the move would not receive "an ungenerous response" from his government.

Oct. 23: The IRA announces it has begun to disarm and will put some of its weapons "completely and verifiably beyond use." This measure is the first step in preventing Northern Ireland's peace process from crumbling entirely. Nov. 03: Adams launches the Canadian chapter of Friends of Sinn Fein, a non-profit group that will raise funds in support of the Irish peace process. "Canadians and the Canadian government, as well as

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Irish people here, have had a part in the international contribution to building peace and justice in my country," he told reporters in Toronto. Similar groups have been set up in the United States and Australia. Sinn Fein believes Northern Ireland will need worldwide support to stop sectarian violence within its borders. Nov. 6: Trimble is re-elected first minister of Northern Ireland's power-sharing government. Roman Catholic Mark Durkan is elected deputy first minister. The elections will allow the executive to resume the power-sharing arrangement set up under the 1998 Good Friday accord.2002 Jan. 11: Catholic schoolchildren return to a Belfast school after a night of nearby violent clashes injures at least 30 people. Police standing in front of grey Land Rovers clear a route for the parents to accompany their children to the Catholic Holy Cross Primary School in the Protestant area of Ardoyne. The route is littered with burnt-out cars and debris left from the overnight violence. The school had been shut down the day before following previous confrontations between Protestants and Catholics. Jan. 14: Reid condemns the violence, describing the recent attacks and death threats issued against staff and teachers at a Catholic school and against Catholic postal workers as cowardly. The threats and violence have spread to other schools in the area and, earlier in the day, hundreds of police and soldiers flooded into north Belfast to shield them. Jan. 21: Four Sinn Fein MPs arrive at Westminster but won't take their seats in the House of Commons and refuse to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen. Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, Pat Doherty and Michele Gildernew are able to move into three offices and draw on MP expense accounts after a controversial vote the previous month lifted a ban on the party. Blair says recognizing the Sinn Fein politicians will encourage Irish republicans to engage with the parliament and become more involved in Britain's democratic processes. This has rankled Conservatives and Unionists who say the move tampers with the rules of parliament by creating special status for one group. Jan. 22: The Special Criminal Court in the Irish Republic convicts a man of being involved in the planning of the 1998 Omagh bombing, the single bloodiest act of terrorism of the 30-year-old Northern Ireland conflict. Colm Murphy is the only person charged so far in connection with the bombing. A panel of three judges finds him guilty of conspiring to cause an explosion and sentences him to 14 years in prison. Police have said they know the Real IRA guerrilla group is responsible, and have interrogated suspects. But they have yet to find enough forensic or witness evidence for a conviction. March 9: Trimble calls for a referendum the next year on whether the region should remain part of the United Kingdom. It would be up to Britain whether to schedule a vote in 2003. People in Northern Ireland last cast ballots on the issue in 1973. Almost 99 per cent voted to remain part of the United Kingdom, but the results were skewed because Catholic leaders had urged their followers to boycott the 339

referendum. April 9: The IRA surrenders another chunk of its arsenal in a sign of support for the peace accord. A substantial number of guns, as well as ammunition and explosives, are handed over to disarmament officials. July 16: The IRA apologizes for killing civilians during more than three decades of violence in Northern Ireland. "We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to their families," the IRA says in the unprecedented statement faxed to British news organizations. "While it was not our intention to injure or kill noncombatants, the reality is that on this and on a number of other occasions, that was the consequence of our actions. It is therefore appropriate on the anniversary of this tragic event that we address all of the deaths and injuries of noncombatants caused by us." July 22: A series of gun attacks in northern Belfast leave a Catholic teenager dead. It's the first death related to the conflict in the region in three months. The victim was walking just after midnight near Whitewell Road, a contested boundary between rival neighbourhoods on either side of the sectarian divide. Catholics say the series of shootings started the previous Saturday night after Protestant militants on motorcycles were seen trying to shoot Catholics. Protestants argued the first shooting injured a Protestant man. A man was in hospital after the attack in the Protestant part of Ardoyne, but the IRA denied being involved in the attack. July 24: In the final parliamentary session before the summer, Blair warns that the violence has to stop and vows to crack down on paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. Blair says both sides must prove they are "not engaged in any preparations for terrorism." He says extra police and soldiers would be sent to flashpoint areas. Aug. 1: A Protestant construction worker dies when he opens a lunch box containing a bomb. Police and politicians suspect the IRA. It's the first fatal attack linked to the IRA in four years. Sept. 21: Ulster Unionists issue an ultimatum to the IRA - squash the violence within four months or the Protestant party will leave the coalition. Trimble says the IRA would have until Jan. 18 to finish "a transition from violence to exclusively peaceful means" as pledged when the Good Friday peace accord was reached. "If we don't see that the transition is complete, yes, we will be out of office," he said. Oct. 6: Police in Northern Ireland charge Sinn Fein's senior legislative aide with possessing stolen British government documents. The week before, police had raided homes in Catholic parts of Belfast and Sinn Fein's office and confiscated documents they said were "likely to be of use to terrorists." Denis Donaldson, 52, pleads not guilty to five charges related to documents allegedly found at his home. He was arrested at the party's offices along with three others, including a former British civil servant suspected of passing documents to Donaldson before quitting his job in September 2001. Oct. 8: Trimble says Sinn Fein must be kicked out of the government after charges that the IRA stole British documents. If they aren't, "that will leave us with no alternative but to remove ourselves 340

from the administration," Trimble said. William Mackessy is accused of supplying the IRA with documents - including lists of potential IRA assassination targets - taken from Britain's Northern Ireland Office where he had worked the previous year. Expelling Sinn Fein would require support from the major Catholic parties in government. Most of these parties had resisted previous efforts to dump the party. Oct. 15: Britain suspends Northern Ireland's power-sharing administration, saying it would resume administrative responsibility in an effort to preserve peace. Reid blames a lack of trust on both sides, and voices concerns about some of the parties' commitment to democracy and non-violence. However, both sides denounce Britain's move. Protestant leader Sir Reg Empey says Britain had failed to deal with people who were not committed to peaceful solutions. Sinn Fein's Adams says he has no confidence that Reid would implement the 1998 Good Friday peace accord, which set up the coalition. This will be the fourth time Britain has suspended the coalition in less than three years. Oct. 30: The IRA announces that it's breaking off contact with the international body overseeing the disarmament of guerrillas, crippling the future of the Northern Ireland peace process. The IRA blames the British government and Blair for the move, saying it's up to the British government to create confidence in the peace process by honouring its obligations. Nov. 29: British newspapers report that the IRA is nearing a decision to give up military operations and decommission all of its weapons. 2003 Feb. 22: Protestants institute a 12-month moratorium on attacks against Catholics. The Ulster Defence Association also announces it wants to resume talks with retired Canadian general John de Chastelain. He's been leading disarmament talks in the region since 1997. April 7: U.S. president George W. Bush travels to Northern Ireland for a war-and-peace summit with Blair. The purpose is to hash out details of rebuilding Iraq, and to revive the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement by pressuring Catholics and Protestants to make concessions.

Appendix D

DECOMMISSIONING SCHEME ()

1. This is a decommissioning scheme within the meaning of section 1 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 ("the 1997 Act") made by the Secretary of State to facilitate the decommissioning of firearms, ammunition and explosives ("arms") in 341

Northern Ireland. It supplements the scheme made by the Secretary of State on 29 June 1998 and it comes into force on 3 August 2001. 2. The scheme makes provision for the decommissioning of arms in accordance with section 3 of the 1997 Act by making them permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable. 3. The period during which arms may be dealt with in accordance with the scheme ends with 26 February 2002. 4. Unless the contrary intention appears, expressions used in the scheme have the same meaning as in the 1997 Act, and: Χ A The Commission" means the independent International Commission established by agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland made on 27 August 1997 and includes any person authorised by Commission to perform functions on its behalf; Χ AProscribed organisation@ means an organisation specified in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000; Χ "Contact person" means a person who has given notice to the Commission on behalf of a proscribed organisation of a proposal to make arms permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable. Provision of information by the Commission 5. The Commission may provide to a person who seeks it such information in relation to the making of arms permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable in accordance with this scheme as it considers appropriate. Notice of intention to decommission arms 6. (1) Notice of a proposal to make arms permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable must be given to the Commission by a contact person in accordance with arrangements determined by the Commission before any other act leading to decommissioning is undertaken. (2) Decommissioning under this scheme may only begin if the Commission is satisfied that the notice: Is given on behalf of a proscribed organisation, and Contains sufficient information to indicate a clear intention to make specified arms permanently inaccessible and permanently unusable. Information provided to the Commission 7. (1) A contact person must provide the Commission with such information as it may require in relation to a proposal to make arms permanently inaccessible and permanently unusable. (2) A person who provides information to the Commission under paragraph (1) must not: 342

Intentionally disclose any of it, without the Commission's consent, to a person who is not acting with him; Subject to paragraph (3), do anything which affects its accuracy. (3) The Commission must be informed as soon as possible of any matter which may affect the accuracy of information provided under paragraph (1). (4) The Commission must keep a record of information provided under paragraph (1). Arrangements for decommissioning 8. (1) The Commission may make such arrangements with a contact person or a person acting with him as it considers appropriate to facilitate the making of arms permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable. (2) The arrangements referred to in paragraph (1) may include conditions considered necessary on grounds of public safety. (3) A person acting to make arms permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable in accordance with this scheme must comply with the arrangements and conditions referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2). Locations at which decommissioning of arms may take place 9. The locations at which the making of arms permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable may take place are to be determined in accordance with arrangements made by the Commission with the contact person or a person acting with him. Movement of arms 10. (1) Where arms are moved for the purpose of making them permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable to a location determined by a person other than the Commission, such movement must be in accordance with arrangements made by the Commission and subject to any conditions considered necessary on grounds of public safety. (2) The conditions referred to in paragraph (1) may include conditions about: The location to which arms may be moved, The quantity of arms which may be moved at a time, The method of transportation, The condition in which arms may be moved, including conditions that arms must be unloaded, explosives must be unprimed and that public transport must not be used. (3) Where arms are moved in accordance with arrangements made under paragraph (1), the Commission may give to any person moving them a document showing that they are moved for the purpose of making them permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable in accordance with this scheme. (4) The Commission must keep a record of any arrangements made under paragraph (1), any conditions imposed on grounds of public safety and any document issued under paragraph (3). (5) The Commission must be 343

informed of the arrival of any arms moved under paragraph (1). Records of decommissioned arms 11. (1) Where arms are made permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable in accordance with this scheme, the Commission must: Χ Make a record of the arms containing such information as it considers necessary, or Arrange for the contact person or a person acting with him to provide it with such a record. (2) The Commission must take such steps as are necessary to verify the information contained in a record provided under paragraph 1(b).

Method of making permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable 12. The method by which arms are to be made permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable, so that they are completely beyond use, is to be determined by the Commission after consultation with the contact person or a person acting with him.

John Reid Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 2 August 2001

Appendix E

1. Chronology of Brief History of Kashmir ()

App. 3000 B.C.: Kashmir clan is named in Mahabharata.

2629-2564 B.C.: Rule by King Sandiman. 2082-2041 B.C.: Rule by King Sunder Sen rules Kashmir. 1048-1008 B.C.: King Nara rules Kashmir. 250 B.C.: Shrinagari (today's Srinagar is located about three miles from Shrinagari) near the ancient capital Pandhrenatha is founded by 344

Ashoka the Great. 7th century: King Lalitaditya builds the famous Sun temple and formed the city of Pharihaspura. 813-850: Pampore was founded by Padma, during the rule of King Ajatapida 855-883: King Avantivarman builds the town of Avantipur and the famous Sun temple. 883-902: King Shankaravarman builds Shankarapura-pattan (now known as Pattan). 1128-1149: Reign of King Jayasim. mid-12th: Muslim invasion of Kashmir. 1322 Turks, under ferocious Zulkadur Khan, first invade Kashmir. 1394-1416: Central Asian ruler, Sikander invades Kashmir and brings about mass conversion to Islam. After the tyranny of Sikander was over, only eleven Kashmiri Hindu families survive. 1540: Mirz Haidar, a relative of Humayun (of the Moghul invader dynasty) conquers Kashmir. Kashmir gradually absorbed into Moghul Empire. 1810-1820: Maharajah Ranjit Singh, one of the greatest rulers of India, regains Jammu and appointed his Dogra feudatory Gulab Singh to rule the State. Mar 16, 1846: The present State is created by a treaty between the British East India Company acting on behalf of the British Government and Maharajah Gulab Singh in Amritsar. 1931: One of the worst communal riots led by Sheikh Abdullah and his Muslim Conference. 1939: Muslim Conference becomes the National Conference. Aug 15, 1947: India gains independence. The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh yet to make up his mind regarding accession. Oct 22, 1947: Pakistan violates the Standstill Agreement by preventing essential supplies to the State, then hoards of armed Pakistani

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tribesman entered Kashmir. Oct 26, 1947: Hari Singh signs the instrument of accession, it is no different than the one signed by over 500 other rulers. The accession of Kashmir was accepted by the Governor General of India Lord Mountbatten. Oct 27, 1947: The first Indian forces arrived in Kashmir to defend against Pakistani troops. Dec 31, 1947: A highly unconstitutional offer of plebiscite was made by Prime Minister Nehru in the U.N. Jan 1, 1948: India under Nehru declares a unilateral cease-fire and under Article 35 of the U.N. Charter, India files a complaint with the U.N. Security Council. Pakistan still controls 2/5 of the State. Jan 20, 1948: The U.N. Security Council in its resolution of establishes the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Jul 1948: Mohd. Zafrulla Khan, then the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and principal Delegate of Pakistan in the U.N. admits to the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan that the Pakistani Army had been in Kashmir. UNCIP adopts a resolution on Kashmir accepted by both India Aug 13, 1948: and Pakistan. Pakistan is blamed for the invasion of Kashmir and is instructed to withdraw its forces from Kashmir. Jan 1, 1949: Amidst great tension, one minute before midnight, India and Pakistan concluded a formal cease fire agreement. Jan 5, 1949: Almost a year after Nehru's offer of plebiscite, the UNCIP passes a resolution that states that, "The question of accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite". However, Pakistan has yet to comply with the earlier resolution and withdraw from the State. Also, Pakistan is now busy changing the demographic composition of the State. 1949: Not withstanding the opposition by several authors of the Indian Constitution, including Dr. Ambedkar, its chief architect, Article 370 was inserted in the constitution of India. This article is meant 346

as a temporary measure, to be in effect until the formal constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is drafted. Jun 1948: Sheikh Abdullah declares, "We the people of Jammu and Kashmir, have thrown our lot with Indian people not in the heat of passion or a moment of despair, but by a deliberate choice. The union of our people has been fused by the community of ideals and common sufferings in the cause of freedom". 1949: Following the cabinet decision taken by the Abdullah Government, Hari Singh steps down. Hari Singh's son, Karan Singh is named his successor. Apr 1950 UN Security Council appoints Sir Owen Dixon as the UN representative in place of UNCIP to find expeditious and enduring solution to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Oct 1950: General Council of the National Conference demands elections to create a Constituent Assembly. Sep 1951: Elections for the Constituent Assembly are held The National Conference wins all 45 seats unopposed. Oct 1951: Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is inaugurated. Nov 5, 1951: The Constituent Assembly is given four tasks by Sheikh Abdullah which including the accession to India. Nov-Dec 1951: Karan Singh steps down as the ruler, and is elected by the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State as Sardar- i-Riyasat (Governor). 1952: Jana Sangh begins campaign called "Ek Vidhan Ek Pradhan" (One Constitution, one leader) and demands that the State of Jammu and Kashmir be totally integrated into India and that the people from the other States be able to visit Jammu and Kashmir without a passport. 1952: Jana Sang leader Shyamaprasad Mukherjee dies in a Kashmiri Jail under mysterious circumstances. Aug 9, 1953: Sheikh Abdullah is arrested. He had turned corrupt and autocrat. He tried to hold India for ransom by giving increasingly anti- 347

India speeches and preserve his power. Feb 1954: Under the leadership of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ratified the State's accession to India. May 14, 1954: The President of India promulgates the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order placing on a final footing the applicability of the other provisions of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir. 1956: Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956, the category of Part B State was aboilished and Jammu and Kashmir was included as one of the States of India under Article I. However, Article 370 of the Indian constitution is still retained. Jan 26, 1957: After the formal inauguration of its constitution, the Constituent Assembly dissolves itself. 1958: All-India services extended to J and K through an amendment in Article 312. 1964: Sheikh Abdullah released from the prison. 1965: Pakistan attacks India, in operation code named, Gibraltar. The defeat of Pakistan results in the Tashkent Agreement between the two countries. Mar 30, 1965: Article 249 of Indian Constitution extended to Jammu and Kashmir whereby the center could legislate on any matter enumerated in state list (just like in any other State in the Union). Designations like Prime Minister and President of the State are replace by Chief Minister and Governor. 1971: Pakistani attack on India results in the third war between the two countries. Pakistan is completely defeated, over 90,000 of its men surrendered. 1972: India and Pakistan sign the Shimla Pact. Two agree to respect the line of control until the issue is finally resolved. Feb 24-25, 1975: Following an accord signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah on February 24, 1975, Jammu and Kashmir is 348

made a "Constituent Unit" of India on February 25, 1975. Through this accord Indian Parliament reaffirms its right to legislate on any matter concerning the territory of the State. 1977: National Conference wins the first post-Emergency elctions. 1982: Sheikh Abdullah nominates his son, Farooq Abdullah as his successor setting up a political rivalry between Farooq Abdullah and his brother-in-law G. M. Shah. 1986: In one of the most shameful acts of religious massacre, several ancient historical Hindu temples are destroyed and scores of Hindus were killed in the city of Anantnag. Chief Minister G. M. Shah looses power to his brother-in-law Farooq Abdullah. 1990-1991: In a spate of terrorist violence, 2400 people have died so far, and 300,000 people have been driven out of their homes. Pakistan's involvement in this carnage of violence is beyond doubt. Reproduced from: Converted Kashmir - Memorial of Mistakes A Bitter Saga of Religious Conversion Author: Narender Sehgal Utpal Publications, 1994 Kashmir Information Network

UPDATE in TIMELINE: CONFLICT OVER KASHMIR

2. TIMELINE: CONFLICT OVER KASHMIR

From 1947 to 2002 August 15, 1947 - India and Pakistan gain independence from Britain. October 27, 1947 - Kashmir becomes part of India. January 1948 - India and Pakistan go to war over Kashmir and finally agree to withdraw all troops behind a mutually agreed ceasefire line, later known as the Line of Control. August 5, 1965 - India and Pakistan at war again over Kashmir. 349

The war ends when both countries decide to adopt a UN-sponsored resolution to stick to the Line of Control. May 7, 1999 - The Indian Army patrols detect intruders on Kargil ridges in Kashmir. India fights to regain lost territory. March 19, 2000 - Then U.S. President Bill Clinton arrives in India, beginning his six-day visit to South Asia, partly in an attempt to ease relations between Pakistan and India over the disputed region of Kashmir. July 25, 2000 - Hizbul Mujahedeen, a pro-Pakistan Kashmiri militant group, declares a unilateral ceasefire for three months in Jammu and Kashmir. August 3, 2000 - India begins peace talks with Hizbul Mujahedeen, in Srinagar. August 8, 2000 - Hizbul Mujahedeen calls off its 2-week-old ceasefire and orders its forces to resume fighting against Indian troops. November 19, 2000 - Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announces that security forces will suspend combat operations against militants in Jammu and Kashmir state during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. 27 November 2000 - India puts a ceasefire into effect in Kashmir. December 23, 2000 - Pakistan-based guerrilla group, Lashkar-e- Taiba, claims responsibility for a deadly attack on New Delhi's historic Red Fort.February 22, 2000 - Prime Minister Vajpayee extends the unilateral ceasefire by three months. April 27, 2001 - An executive from Kashmir's separatist All Parties Huriyat Conference (APHC), which claims to be the premier political representative of the Kashmiri people, rejects an Indian offer for a dialogue. May 23, 2001 - India ends a six-month military ceasefire against Islamic guerillas in Kashmir while also inviting Pakistani military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, to peace talks aimed at ending five decades of hostilities between the two countries.

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May 28, 2001 - India's peace negotiator for Kashmir, Krishan Chander Pant, visits the territory to meet a cross-section of people from Pakistan and Kashmir. India refuses to yield any ground in talks and insists that the territory is an integral part of India and rejects Pakistan's calls for a referendum on the future of Kashmir. May 28, 2001 - Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, formally accepts an Indian invitation for summit talks focused firmly on the Kashmir dispute. June 18, 2001- Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, announces a visit to India from July 14 to 16 for the first summit talks between the neighboring states in two years. June 20, 2001 - Musharraf dismisses President Rafiq Tarar as the nation's ceremonial head of state, dissolves the national and provisional assemblies and declares himself as new Pakistani president. July 4, 2001 - India says it is releasing more than 400 Pakistani prisoners from its jails as a goodwill gesture 10 days ahead of the India-Pakistan summit meeting in New Delhi. July 4, 2001 - President Musharraf issues an executive order, giving the president boundless powers through a newly devised National Security Council. July 14-16, 2001 - President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee meet in Agra, India for a three-day summit. The talks fail to produce a joint statement on Kashmir. July 24, 2001 - Abdul Hamid Tantray, chief spokesman of the Hizbul Mujahadeen, one of Kashmir's largest militant groups, dies in what Indian authorities call an "encounter" with police in the village of Paloo. August 8, 2001 - India imposes an indefinite curfew in Jammu as tension runs high in the city after the massacre of 11 people at a railway station. October 1, 2001 - Militants attack the Kashmiri assembly in

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Srinagar, leaving 38 people dead. Kashmir chief minister Farooq Abdullah urges the Indian government to launch a crackdown on militant training camps across the border in Pakistan. October 18, 2001 -- The United States says its campaign against terrorism will pursue Kashmiri militants. December 13, 2001 - Unidentified men attack the Indian parliament in New Delhi. Fourteen people are killed, including the five assailants. December 20, 2001 - The Indian army deploys troops on its border with Pakistan in the northern states of Kashmir and Punjab in response to a Pakistani troop build-up across the frontier. December 25, 2001 - Pakistan detains the leader of an Islamic organization blamed by India for the suicide attack on the Indian parliament. December 27, 2001 - Indian police verify reports that a group of al Qaeda members led by a close associate of Osama bin Laden entered Kashmir. January 2, 2002 - India stops long-distance calls from all public telephone offices in Kashmir to prevent militants from communicating with each other. New Delhi tells Pakistan to wipe out Pakistan-based Kashmir separatist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Row triggers military build-up, diplomatic sanctions, and closure of transport links. January 7, 2002 - After weeks of heated rhetoric, accusations and military posturing, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee says at the South Asian Regional Cooperation meeting in Kathmandu, Nepal, that his nation is ready for "dialogue" with its fellow nuclear power. January 9, 2002 - A siege between Indian troops and two militants holed up in a mosque in Kashmir ends after one of the gunmen was killed and the other surrendered. January 11, 2002 - India's army chief says the nation is ready for

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war with Pakistan and would use its nuclear weapons if its neighbor were to launch a nuclear strike first. January 13, 2002 - Welcoming Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's pledge to crack down on religious extremists, India says it will judge its neighbor's actions before it begins a military de-escalation or resumes dialogue. January 13, 2002 -- Two suspected militants were shot dead after they allegedly tried to attack a paramilitary camp in Srinigar. January 16, 2002 - U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Islamabad on the first stage of a South Asian tour designed to kickstart a dialogue between India and Pakistan. January 21, 2002 - Unidentified gunmen kill eight members of a family including several women and children in a small village in Kashmir. February 4, 2002 - The radical Kashmiri group Jaish-e- Mohammed suspend operations in the rest of India in order to focus on Kashmir. February 17, 2002 - Militants kill eight Hindus in Kashmir. February 25, 2002 - India's parliament resumes for the first time since a suicide attack in December with a new strategy from the government on Kashmir designed to stamp out terrorism. March 25, 2002 - A Kashmiri separatist leader was arrested under an anti-terrorism law in connection with the seizure of large sums of cash India says was smuggled into the region from Nepal by two activists. May 14, 2002 - Suspected Islamic militants open fire on an army camp in Indian Kashmir, killing at least 30 people and wounding 40, marring a new effort to ease the tension between India and Pakistan. May 17, 2002 - A blast rips through the capital of Kashmir as India's parliament debates how to respond to an earlier deadly attack in the disputed region. May 19, 2002 - Fourteen people, including eight security

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personnel, were killed and 17 injured in fresh rebel attacks Kashmir. May 20, 2002 - Three Pakistani villagers were killed after Pakistani and Indian troops traded fire across their tense border in Kashmir, a Pakistani official said. May 21, 2002 - Gunmen open fire on a meeting of Indian Kashmir's main separatist Hurriyat alliance, killing separatist leader Abdul Gani Lone. May 22, 2002 - A Pakistani girl was killed and three people wounded as Indian and Pakistani forces face off in Kashmir trade fire. India Prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee heads for India's front lines.

January 16, 2004 - India and Pakistan begin preliminary meetings to discuss resuming dialogue of all bilateral issues including Kashmir. Above timeline at

3. TIMELINE: INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR

1987 - The Muslim parties contest the election as the Muslim United Front (MUF) against Farooq's Conference-Congress alliance. Record numbers participate. The MUF expects 10 seats of 44 but wins 4. Charges of rigging are widespread. The insurgency in the valley increases in momentum from this point on. Farooq blames unemployment, especially educated unemployment, with numbers of 40-50 000 unemployed graduates. Others blame the theft of the election as the closure of political space making a resort to armed struggle inevitable. India responds with repression. 1990 - 400,000 Kashmiris march to the UN Military Observer Group to demand implementation of the plebescite. Soon after, at a march of 1 million, 40 are killed by 354

police. 140,000 Hindus leave the Kashmir valley for refugee camps in Jammu. 1989 - present: Amnesty International figures are that 700,000 security forces are in Kashmir (the population is about 14 million). 34,000 have been killed over the past 11 years. 1998 - India and Pakistan perform nuclear tests. 1999 - Indian and Pakistani militaries clash in Kargil. 2001 - 3000 conflict-related deaths occurred in 2001. 1000 were civilians. (Amnesty International figures) Human rights violations are widespread and endemic by the Indian authorities and some of the insurgent groups. December - the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (POTB) is passed in the Indian parliament. Like its counterparts elsewhere in the world, it is a repressive piece of legislation that could be used to justify considerable human rights abuses by the government of India, especially in Kashmir, where India is fighting a counterinsurgency war. December 13 - An attack on the Indian parliament by militants leads to India escalating its war in Kashmir and threatening war with Pakistan. India seeks to attack states that sponsor terrorism, using the US 'war on terror logic'; this leads them to Pakistan. Pakistan arrests some militants. India demands more. 2002 - India and Pakistan are at the brink of war. Self-preservation suggests war is not a good idea. May 2002: Tension dramatically increases, prompting an intense international diplomatic effort to avert war between the two nuclear-armed rivals.

October 2002: Four rounds of polls to choose a new state administration conclude in Indian- controlled Kashmir. About 500 people are killed during the blood-soaked election campaign.January 2003: India=s defense minister says that India could easily absorb a nuclear hit, whereas Pakistan would Acease to exist.@ Pakistan=s information minister retorts that India would learn a >historic and unforgettable lesson= in such scenario.

February 2003: India says it has shot down an unmanned Pakistani spy plane that has intruded into Indian airspace in Kashmir, as a top Indian official says he is ready and willing to hold talks with Pakistan over Kashmir.

May 2003: India announces the resumption of a bus service between Delhi and Lahore.

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Pakistan calls the plan a Apositive gesture.@ Both sides name high commissioners as diplomatic links are resumed. Delhi says it will release Pakistani prisoners after a similar move by Islamabad.

August 2003: For the first time in history, Indians and Pakistanis hold joint independence day celebrations in a further sign of the thaw in relations.

October 2003: India unveils a series of measures aimed at improving relations with Pakistan and forging progress in the Kashmir dispute.

November 2003: A ceasefire comes into effect along the informal border dividing IndiaB and PakistanBadministered Kashmir. The two countries earlier order troops to halt firing along the de factor border, or Line of Control (LoC).

December 2003: India and Pakistan agree to resume direct air links from 1 January after a twoByear ban.

January 2004: India and Pakistan hail progress made at historic talks at a regional summit in Islamabad. President Musharraf spends an hour with Mr. VajpayeeBtheir first meeting in nearly three years. Later in the month, the Indian government and moderates in the main Kashmiri separatist alliance hold a historic first meeting and agree that violence must end in the troubled region.

February 2004: India and Pakistan begin their first formal talks in nearly three years, with Kashmir high on the agenda. Three days of landmark discussions in the Pakistani capital are designed to pave the way for full peace talks.

March 2004: Around 30,000 cricket fans watch India beat Pakistan in the historic first contest of their tour of Pakistan since 1989.

May 2004: Pakistan welcomes a pledge made by incoming Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to seek friendly relations after Mr. Vajpayee=s party loses the general election.

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ANo problem is intractable if there is a will to work towards just and durable solutions,@ Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan says. June 2004: India and Pakistan renew a ban on nuclear weapons tests and set up a hotline to alert each other to potential nuclear risks.

September 2004: The two countries= foreign ministers meet in Delhi B the first official meeting at such a high level for three years. Both sides say they have made some progress but there are few results to show for it. Agreement on Kashmir seems as far away as ever.

President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh meet for talks in New York on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly.

For the first time in the history of the Kashmir dispute, the two leaders discuss various Aoptions@ to solve the dispute.

The two leaders apparently discuss pulling back troops from Siachen, a glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops face each other in freezing temperature. Both leaders welcome the talks.

October 2004: President Musharraf unveils some radical proposals to bring an end to the dispute over Kashmir.

One of his suggestions is that the territory, which is claimed by both countries, be demilitarized and jointly governed by the two nuclearBcapable nations.

President Musharraf also suggests that Pakistan could withdraw its demand that a plebiscite be held in the disputed region.

India is cool to the proposals and asks Pakistan to discuss Kashmir through official channels.

November 2004: India begins to withdraw some of its troops from IndiaBadministered Kashmir as premier Manmohan Singh starts his first visit there since taking offfice. A first unit of about 1,000 soldiers withdraws from the southern town of Anantnag. It remains unclear how many soldiers India plan to pull out.

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February 2005: Delhi and Islamabad agree to launch a landmark bus service across the ceasefire line dividing Kashmir. The link will reunite families divided since buses last ran on the route before India and Pakistan fought their first war over Kashmir in 1947. The agreement gives a boost to yearBold peace moves, which critics said had produced little substantial progress.

Above timeline at:

Also timeline at:

4. Update Timeline from 2005 to 2009 January 8, 2005: 11 killed in sectarian violence in Gilgit in Pakistan administered Kashmir[1]

April 30, 2006: 2006 Doda massare of Hindus

July, 2006 : Second round of Indo-Pakistani peace talks.

Feb, 2007 : Samjhauta Express firebombed, 67 killed

June 2008: Amarnath land transfer controversy. Huge anti-India protests were held against the transfer of land to SASB (shrine board), which was an outside state organization, as it was a direct violation of article 370 of the Indian constitution.

August 25, 2008: All anti Indian ,separatist and Islamist organisation leaders arrested due to their uncontrolled anti-Indian activities , to restore the law and order in the Indian-administered Kashmir.

October 5, 2008: Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari says India has never been a threat to Pakistan, and that militants in Indian-administered Kashmir are terrorists [2].

December 24, 2008: 2008 Kashmir Elections: Assembly elections held in Jammu and

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Kashmir. The elections, are a vote for democracy with a record turnout of 62 per cent - the highest in 20 years [3] [4].

December 30, 2008: Omar Abdullah of National Conference chosen the new Chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir [5], takes oath on January 5, 2009, becoming the 11th and the youngest Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

References

1. 11 killed in Gilgit violence, Dawn(newspaper), 2005-01-09 2. India 'not a threat to Pakistan' BBC News. 3. J&K polls: After a record turnout, it's verdict time now NDTV 4. Reduced militancy led to higher voter turnout: Chief Election Commissioner The Hindu. 5. Kashmiri parties agree coalition, BBC BBC.

Above timeline at:

Appendix F

Mountains and Their Passes Mountains have a special geographical importance to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir valley is enclosed by high mountain-chains on all sides except for certain passes and a narrow gorge at Baramulla. There are Siwalik hills towards the south and very lofty mountains in the north, the peaks of which always remain covered with snow. There are volcanic mountains too in the State. They have caused havoc in Kashmir in the past. Some of the famous mountains and their passes are: 1. Karakoram (8615.17 M) and Kyunlun Ranges: Both these mountains lie to the north and north-east of the State and separate it from Russian Turkistan and Tibet. In the north west, Hindukush range continues towards Karakoram range, where K2 peak, the second highest peak of the world, is situated. Two lofty peaks of Gashorbram (8570 metres) and Masharbram (7827 metres) also lie there. People of Ladakh pass through Karakoram pass (5352 metres) and Nubra pass (5800 metres) while going to Chinese Turkistan and Khattan. One can reach Tibet from Ladakh via Kharudangala pass (5557 metres) and Changla pass

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(5609 metres). 2. Zanskar Range: It is about 600 metres above sea level and separates Indus Valley from the valley of Kashmir; it prevents south-west cold winds from reaching Kashmir. Ladakh region terminates at Zojila pass (3529 metres) from where begins the valley of Kashmir. Poat pass (5716 metres) of this range is also a famous pass in this range. 3. Nun Kun Range: It lies between Ladakh and kashmir border. It is 7055.1 metres above sea level. To its south-east is situated Kulu and to its north-west is situated Kargil tehsil of Ladakh . One has to pass through Bawalocha pass (4891 metres) to reach Leh (Ladakh) from Kulu. In 1947, when Kargil was attacked by Pakistan, Indian forces, arms and ammunition were sent to Ladakh by the Indian Union through this pass. 4. Nanga Parbat Range: This range spreads in Gilgit. Its height is 8107.68 metres above sea level and is utterly devoid of vegetation. It was conquered by the Italian mountaineers in 1954. This is now under the unlawful possession of Pakistan. 5. Harmukh Mountain: This is a range of the Himalayas and is situated at a height of 5141.3 metres above sea level towards Bandipore between the rivers Jhelum and Kishan Ganga valley. 6. Burzil Mountain: It bifurcates Kashmir and Ladakh on which Burzil pass is situated at a height of 3200 metres above sea level. 7. Amarnath Mountain: This is famous for its holy Amarnath Cave, at a height of 5372 metresabove sea level, which thousands of pilgrims visit every year on Rakshabandan. They have to pass Mahagunas pass (1475 metres) on their way to Shri Amarnathji. Gwasharan (5450 metres) is situated in the Lidar valley towards Pahalgam; on it lies the famous glacier Kolahi. Sheeshnag Mountain also spreads in this valley. It is called Sheshnag as its peaks resemble the heads of seven big snakes. 8. Toshmaidan: Toshmaindan (4270 metres) and Kajinag (3700 metres) mountains lie in the Inner Himalayas. They remain clad with snow throughout the year, but during summer when the snow melts, the water flows down into the Jhelum river. 9. Afarwat: This mountain spreads through the Gulmarg valley. The famous spring Alpathar lies on its peak, from which Nullah Nagal comes out and flows down into the Wullar lake. 10. Pirpanjal Range: It separates Kashmir valley from the outer Himalayas and is about 2621 Kms. in length and 50 Kms. in breadth. Famous Banihal pass (2832 metres) lies in the shape of a tunnel on its peak; it remains covered with snow during winter making it impassable. Now at a height of 2200 metres above sea level a new tunnel 'Jawahar Tunnel' has been constructed. The tunnel is 2825 metres long and it was opened for traffic on 22nd

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Dec. 1956. On the other end of this range lie Baramula pass (1582 metres) and Hajipir pass(2750 metres). Hajipir joins Poonch and Uri. During 1965 Indo-Pak war, the Indian army had occupied this pass. Later on it was handed over to Pakistan. 11. Siwalik Range: These hills extend from the north of the outer plains to middle mountains of the State reaching heights varying from 600 metres to 1500 metres above sea level. 12. Volcanic mountains: One volcanic peak, 'Soyamji' (1860 metres) is situated in North Machhipura (Handwara) and the other 'Kharewa' peak lies in Tehsil Pehalgam, which is dead so far; the former, however, continued eruption of lava for about l3 months during 1934. There is a temple on this peak and many sulphur springs are found at the foot of the hill.These volcanic mountains are the cause of earthquakes in Kashamir. So far twelve devastating earthquakes have occured in Kashmir. Of these the earthquake of 1885 was the most devastating. Hundreds of houses collapsed, thousands of people died and there were cracks in the earth as a result of this earthquake.

APPENDIX G

Treaty of AmritsarThe Treaty between the British Government and Maharaja Gulab SinghConcluded at Amritsar, on 16th March 1846 Treaty between the British Government on the one part, and Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu on the other, concluded on the part of the British Government by Frederick Currie, Esq; and Brevet-Major henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the orders of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., one of her Brittanic Majesty==s most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-general, appointed by the Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in East Indies, and by Maharaja Gulab Singh in person. Article 1. The British Government transfers and makes over for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravi, including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State, according to the provisions of Article 4 of the treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March 1846. Article 2. The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharaja Gulab Singh shall be laid down by commissioners appointed by the British government and 361

Maharaja Gulab Singh respectively for the purpose, and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey. Article 3. In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing articles, Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy five lacs of rupees (Nanak Shahi) fifty lacs to be paid on the ratification of this treaty and twenty five lacs on or before the 1st of October of the current year A. D. 1846. Article 4. The limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be, at any time, changed without the concurrence of the British Government. Article 5. Maharaja Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or any other neighboring State, and will abide by the decision of British Government. Article 6. Maharaja Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join, with the whole of his military force, the British troops, when employed within the hills or in the territories adjoining his possessions. Article 7. Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to take or retain, in his service any British Subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government. Article 8. Maharaja Gulab Singh engages to respect, in regard to the territory transferred to him, the provisions of article 5, 6, and 7 of the separate engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar dated 11th March 1846. Article 9. The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies. Article 10. Maharaja Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government and will, in token of such supremacy, present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male and female) and three pairs of Kashmir shawls. This treaty consisting of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, Esq; and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under the directions of the Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B., Governor-General, on the part of the British Government, and by Maharaja Gulab Singh in person and the said treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G. C. B. Governor General.

Done at Amritsar, this 16th day of March in the year of our lord 1846 corresponding with 17thday of Rabi-ul-awal 1262 Hijri

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APPENDIX H

Instrument of Accession Legal Document No. 13

Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up an independent Dominion known as INDIA, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall, with such omission, additions, adaptations and modifications as the Governor-General may by order specify, be applicable to the Dominion of India, And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted, by the Governor General provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof : Now, therefore, I Shriman Inder Mahander Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji Jammu and Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi Deshadhipathi, Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State, in the exercise of my Sovereignty in and over my said State do hereby execute this my Instrument of Accession; and 1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor- General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter refrred to as "this State") such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th Day of August 1947, (which Act as so in force is hereafter refrred to as "the Act"). 2. I hereby assume the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given to provisions of the Act within this State so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession. 3. I accept the matters specified in the scheduled hereto as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State. 4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance that if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler of this State whereby any functions in relation to the administration in this State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be 363

deemed to form part of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly. 5. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any amendment of the Act or the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless such amendment is accepted by me by Instrument supplementary to this Instrument. 6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any law for this State authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the purpose of a Dominion law which applies in this State deem it necessary to acquire any land, I will at their request acquire the land at their expense, or, if the land belongs to me transfer it to them on such terms as may be agreed or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief justice of India. 7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into arrangement with the Government of India under any such future constitution. 8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my Sovereignty in and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights now enjoyed by me as Ruler of this State or the validity of any law at present in force in this State. 9. I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors. Given under my hand this 26th day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven.

Hari Singh,Maharajadhiraj of Jammu and Kashmir State. Acceptance of Accession by the Governor-General of India I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession. Dated this twenty-seventh day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven.

Mountbatten of Burma,Governor-General of India.

APPENDIX I

The deliberations of the round table conference resulted in the Government of India Act 1935. The main features of the Act were: 1. A Federation of India was promised for, comprising both provinces and states. The

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provisions of the Act establishing the federal central government were not to go into operation until a specified number of rulers of states had signed Instruments of Accession. Since, this did not happen, the central government continued to function in accordance with the 1919 Act and only the part of the 1935 Act dealing with the provincial governments went into operation. 2. The provinces were given autonomy with respect to subjects delegated to them. 3. Dyarchy came to an end, and the provincial governments now had full responsibility. 4. Sind was made a separate province. 5. Separate electorates were continued. 6. One third Muslim representation in the Central Legislature was guaranteed. 7. Autonomous provincial governments in eleven provinces under ministries responsible to legislatures would be setup. The Act came into force on April 1, 1937.

APPENDIX J

INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT, 1947

An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominion, to substitute order provision for certain provisions of the Government of India Act. 1935, which apply outside those Dominions, and to provide for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions.

Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-

1. (1) As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan.

(2) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as "the new Dominions" and the said fifteenth day of August is hereafter in this Act referred to as "the appointed day".

2. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) (4) of this section, the territories of India shall be the territories under the sovereignty of His Majesty which, immediately before the appointed day, were included in British India except the territories which, under subsection (2) of this section, are to be the territories of Pakistan.

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(2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the territories of Pakistan shall be -

(a) the territories which, on the appointed day, are included in the provinces of East Bengal and West Punjab, as constituted under the two following section:

(b) the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in the Province of Sind and the Chief Commissioner's Province of the British Baluchistan; and of the new Province of East Bengal, then, as from that day, a part of Assam shall, in accordance with the Provisions of the subsection (3) of this section, form part of the new Province of East Bengal.

3. The boundaries of the new Provinces aforesaid and, in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the boundaries after the appointed day of the Province of Assam, shall be such as may be the determined, whether before or after the appointed day, by the award of a boundary commissions appointed or to be appointed by the Governor-General in that behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined -

(a) the Bengal Districts specified in the First Schedule to this Act, together with, in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the Assam District of Sylhet, shall be treated as the Territories which are to be comprised in the new Province of West Bengal;

(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the passing of this Act in the Province of Bengal shall be treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the new Province of West Bengal; and

(c) in the even mentioned in subsection (2) of this section the District of Sylhet shall be excluded from the Province of Assam.

(4) In this section, the expression "award" means, in relation to a boundary commission the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in his report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the commission's proceedings

4. (1) As from the appointed day -

(a) the Province of the Punjab, as constituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

(b) their shall be constituted two new Provinces, to be known respectively as East Punjab and West Punjab. (2) The boundaries of the said new Provinces shall be such as may be determined, whether

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before or after the appointed day, by the award of a boundary commission appointed or to be appointed by the Governor-General in that behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined :- (a) the Districts specified in the Second Schedule to this Act shall be treated as the territories to be comprised in the New Province of West Punjab; and (b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the passing of this Act in the Province of the Punjab shall be treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the New Province of East Punjab.

(3) In this section, the expression "award" means, in relation to a boundary commission, the decisions of the chairman of that commission contained in his report to the Governor-General at the conclusion of the Commission's proceedings.

5. For each of the new Dominions, there shall be Governor-General who shall be appointed by His Majesty and shall represent His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the Communion:

Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may be Governor-General of both the new Dominion:

6. (1) The legislature of each of the New Dominions shall have full power to make laws for that Dominion, including laws having extra-territorial operation.

(2) No law and no provision of any law made by the Legislature of either of the new Dominions shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of this or any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of each Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the Dominion.

(3) The Governor-General of each of the new Dominions shall have full power to assent in His Majesty's name to any law of the Legislature of that Dominion and so much of any Act as relates to the disallowance of laws by His Majesty or the reservation of laws for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon or the suspension of the operation of laws until signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon shall not apply to laws of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions.

(4) No Act Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either or the new Dominions as part of the law of that dominion unless it is extended thereto by a law of the Legislature of the Dominion. 367

(5) No Order in Council made on or after the appointed day under any Act passed before the appointed day, and no order, rule or other instrument made on or after the appointed day under any such Act by any United Kingdom Minister or other authority, shall extend, or to deemed to extended, to either of the new Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion.

(6) The power referred to in subsection (i) of this section extends to the marking of laws limiting for the future the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion.

7. (1) As from the appointed day :-

(a) His Majesty's Government in the United kingdom have no responsibility as respects the government of any of the territories which, immediately before that day, were included in British India.

(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date with towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise; and

(c) there also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise:

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of this subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement as is therein referred to which relate to customs transit and communications, posts and telegraph, or other like matters, until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part there of concerned on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements.

(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is hereby given to the omission from the Royal Style and Titles of the words "Indian Imperator" and the words "Emperor of India" and to the issue by His Majesty for that purpose of His Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.

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8. (1) In the case of the new Dominions, the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion shall, for the purpose of making provision as to the constitution of the Dominion, be exercisable in the first instance by the Constituent Assembly of that Dominion, and references in this Act to the Legislature of the Dominion shall be construed accordingly.

(2) Except in so far as other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion under subsection (1) of this section, each of the new Dominions and all Provinces and other parts thereof shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935; and the provisions of that Act, and of the orders in Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder, shall, so far as applicable and subject to any express provisions of this Act, and with such omissions, additions, adaptations and modifications as may be specified in orders of the Governor-General under the next succeeding section, have effect accordingly:

Provided that -

(a) the said provisions shall apply separately in relation to the new Dominions and nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing on or after the appointed day any Central Government or Legislature common to both the new Dominions;

(b) nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in force on or after the appointed day any form of control by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom over the affairs of the new Dominions or of any Province or other part thereof;

(c) so much of the said provisions a requires the Governor-General or any Governor to act in his discretion or exercise his individual judgment as respects any matter shall cease to have effect as from the appointed day;

(d) as from the appointed day, no Provincial Bill shall be reserved under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure, and no Provincial Act shall be disallowed by His Majesty there under; and

(e) the powers of the Federal Legislature or Indian Legislature under that Act, as in force in relation to each Dominion, shall in the first instance, be exercisable by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion in addition to the powers exercisable by that Assembly under subsection(1) of this section.

(3) Any provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, which, as applied to either of the new Dominions by subsection (2) of this section and the orders therein referred to, operates to limit the power of the legislature of that Dominion shall, unless and until other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion in accordance 369

with the provisions of subsection, (1) of this section, have the like effect as a law of the Legislature of the Dominion limiting for the future the powers of the Legislature.

9. (1) The Governor-General shall by order make such provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient :-

(a) for being the provisions of this Act into effective operation;

(b) for dividing between the New Dominions, and between the new Provinces to be constituted under this Act, the powers, rights, property, duties and liabilities of the Governor-General of Council or, as the case may be, of the relevant Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to exist,

(c) for making omissions from, additions to, and adaptations and modifications, of, the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Orders in Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder, in their application to the separate new Dominions:

(d) For removing difficulties arising in connection with the transition to the provisions of this Act,

(e) for authorising the carrying on of the business of the Governor-General in Council between the passing of this Act and the appoint day otherwise than in accordance with the provision in that behalf of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1953;

(f) for enabling agreements to be entered into, and other acts done, on behalf of either of the new Dominions before the appointed day;

(g) for authorising the continued carrying on for the time being on behalf of the new Dominions, or on behalf of any two or more of said new provinces, of services and activities previously carried on behalf of British India as a whole or on behalf of the former Provinces which choose new Provinces represent;

(h) for regulating the monetary system and any matters pertaining to the Reserve Bank of India; and

(i) so far as it appears necessary or expedient in connection with any of the matters aforesaid, for varying the constitution, powers or jurisdiction of any legislature, court or other authority in the new Dominions and creating new legislatures, courts or other authorities therein.

(2) The powers conferred by this section on the Governor-General shall, in relation to their

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respective provinces, be exercisable also by the Governors of the Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to exist; and those powers shall, for the purposes of the Government of India Act, 1935, be deemed to be matters as respects which the Governors, are, under that Act, to exercise their individual judgement.

(3) This section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the third day of June, nineteen hundred and forty seven, and any order of the Governor-General or any Governor made on or after that date as to any matter shall have effect accordingly, and any order made under this section may be made so as to be retrospective to any date not earlier than the said third day of June:

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence by reason of so much of any such order as makes any provision there of retrospective to any date before the making there of.

(4) Any others made under this section, whether before or after the appointed day, shall have effect -

(a) up to the appointed day, in British India;

(b) on and after the appointed day, in the new dominion or dominions concerned; and

(c) outside British India, or, as the case may be, outside the new dominion or dominions concerned, to such extent whether before, on or after the appointed day, as a law of the legislature of the dominion or dominions concerned would have on or after the appointed day, but shall, in the case of each of the Dominions, be subject to the some powers of repeal and amendment as laws the legislature of that dominion.

(5) No order shall be made under this section, by the Governor of any Province, after the appointed day, or by the Governor-General, after the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and forty-eight, or such earlier date as may be determined, in the case of either Dominion, by any law of the Legislature of the Dominion.

(6) If it appears that a part of the Province of Assam is, on the appointed day, to become part of the new Province of East Bengal, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, under this Act, the province of Assam was to case to exist on the appointed day and be reconstituted on that day as a new province.

10. (1) The provision of this Act keeping in force provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue in force the provisions of that Act relating to appointments to the civil services of, and civil posts under, the Crown in India by the secretary of State, or the provisions of that Act relating to the reservation of posts. 371

(2) Every person who-

(a) having been appointed by the Secretary of State, or Secretary of State in Council, to a civil service of the Crown in India continues on the after the appointed day to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any Province or Part thereof; or

(b) having been appointed by His Majesty before the appointed day to be a judge of the Federal Court or of any court which is a High Court within the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935, continues on and after the appointed day to serve as a judge in either of the new dominions, shall be entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominions and Province or Parts which he is from time to time serving or, as the case may be, which are served by the courts in which is from time to time judge, the same continues of conditions of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be, as respects the tenure of his office, or rights as similar there to as changed circumstances may permit, as that person was entitled to immediately before the appointed day.

(3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enabling the rights and liabilities of any person with respect to the family person funds vested in Commissioner's under section two hundred and seventy-three of the Government of India Act, 1935, to be governed otherwise then by Orders in Council made (whether before or after the passing of this Act or the appointed day) by His Majesty in Council and the rules made (whether before or after the Passing of this Act or the appointed day) by His Majesty in Council and rules made (whether before or after the passing of this Act or the appointed day) by a Secretary of State of such other Minister of the Crown as may be designated in that behalf by Order in Council under the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946.

11. (1) The orders to be made by the Governor-General under the preceding provision of this Act shall make provision for the divisions of the Indian armed forces of He Majesty between the new dominions, and for the command and governance of those forces until the division is completed.

(2) as from the appointed day, while any number of His Majesty's forces, other then His Majesty's Indian forces, is attached to or serving with any of His Majesty Indian forces-

(a) He shall, subject to any provision to the country made by a law of the Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions concerned or by any other of the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of this Act, have, in relation to the Indian forces in question, the powers of command punishment appropriate to his rank and functions; but 372

(b) nothing in any enactment in forces at the date of the passing of this Act shall render his subject in any way to the law governing the Indian forces in questions.

12. (1) Nothing in this Act affects the jurisdiction or authority of His Majesty's Government United Kingdom, or of the Admiralty, the Army Council, or the Air Council or the any other United Kingdom authority, in relation to any of His Majesty's forces which may, on or after the appointed day, be in either of the new Dominions or else where in the territories which, before appointed day, were included in India, not being Indian forces.

(2) in its application in relation to His Majesty's forces, the Army Act shall have effect on or after the appointed day-

(a) as if His Majesty's Indian forces were not included in the expressions "the forces" His Majesty's" and "the regular forces" and

(b) subject to the further modifications specified in parts I and II of the third Schedule to this Act.

(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, and to any provision any law of the Legislature of the Dominion, concerned, all civil authorities in the new Dominion, and, subject as aforesaid and subject also to the provisions of the last preceding section, all service authorities in the new Dominions, shall, in those Dominion and in the other territories which were included in India before the appointed day, perform in relation to His Majesty's Military forces, not being Indian forces, the same functions as were, before the appointed day, performed by them or by the authorities corresponding to them, whether by virtue of the Army Act or otherwise, and the matters for which provision in to be made by order of the Governor- General under the preceding provision of this Act included facilitating of the withdrawal from the new Dominion and other territories aforesaid of His Majesty's military forces not being Indian forces.

(4) The provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall apply in relation to the air forces of His Majesty, not being Indian forces, as they apply in relation to His Majesty's military forces, subject, however, to the necessary adaptation, and in particular, as if-

(a) for the references to the Army Act there were substituted references to the Air Force Act; and

(b) for the references to Part II of the Third Schedule to this Act there were substituted a reference to Part III of that Schedule.

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13. (1) In the application of the Naval Discipline Act to His Majesty's naval forces, other than Indian naval forces, references to His Majesty's navy and His Majesty's ships shall not as from the appointed day, include, references to His Majesty's Indian navy and the ships thereof.

(2) In the application of the Naval Discipline Act by virtue of any law made in India before the appointed day to India naval forces, refers to His Majesty's navy and His Majesty's ships shall, as from the appointed day, be deemed to be, and to be only, references to His Majesty's Indian navy and the ships thereof.

(3) In section ninety B of the naval Discipline Act (which, in certain cases, subjects officers and men of the Royal Marines to the law and customs of the ships and naval forces to other parts of His Majesty's dominions) the words "or of India" shall be repealed as from the appointed day, wherever those words occur.

14. (1) A Secretary of State, or such other Minister of the Crown as may be designated in that behalf by order in Council under the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946, is hereby authorised to continue for the time being the performance, on behalf of whatever government or governments may be concerned, of functions as to the making of payments and other matters similar to the functions which, up to the appointed day, the Secretary of State was performing on behalf of Governments constituted or continued under the Government of India Act, 1935.

(2) The functions referred to in subsection (1) of this section include functions as respects the management of, and the making of payments on respect of, government debt, and any the enactments relating to such debt shall have effect accordingly.

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in force so much of any enactment as empowers the Secretary of State to contract sterling loans on behalf of any such Government as the aforesaid or as applying to the Government of either of the new Dominions the prohibition imposed on the Governor-General in Council by section three hundred and fifteen of the Government of India Act, 1935, and respects the contracting of sterling loans.

(3) As from the appointed day, there shall not be any such advisors of the Secretary of State as are provided for the section two hundred and seventy-eight of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that section, and any provisions of that Act of his advisers are hereby repealed as from that day.

(4) The Auditor of Indian Home Accounts is hereby authorised to continue for the time being to exercise his functions as respects the accounts of the Secretary of State or any such other Minister of the Crown as in mentioned in subsection (1) of this section, both in respect of

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activities before, and in respect of activities after, the appointed day, in the same manner, as nearly as may be as he would have done if this act had not passed.

15. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, and, in particular, notwithstanding any of the provisions of the last preceding section, any provision of any enactment which, but for the passing of this Act, would authorise legal proceedings to be taken, in India or elsewhere, by or against the Secretary of State in respect of any right or liability of India or any part of India shall cease to have effect on the appointed day, and any legal proceedings pending by virtue of any such provision on the appointed day shall, by virtue of this act, abate on the appointed day, so far as the Secretary of State is concerned.

(2) Subject to the provision of this subsection any legal proceedings which, but for the passing of this Act, could have been brought by or against the Secretary of State in respect of any right or liability of India, or any part of India, shall instead by brought:-

(a) in the case of proceedings in the United kingdom, by or against the High commissioner;

(b) in the case of other proceedings, by or against such person as may be designated by order of the Governor-General under the preceding provisions of this Act or otherwise by the law of the new Dominion concerned, and any legal proceedings by or against the Secretary of State in respect of any such right or liability as aforesaid which are pending immediately before the appointing day shall be continued by or against the High Commissioner or, as the case may be, the person designated as aforesaid:

Provided that, at any time after the appointed day, the right conferred by this subsection to bring or continue proceedings may, whether the proceedings are by, or are against, the High commissioner or person designated as aforesaid, be with drawn by a law of the legislature of either of the new Dominions so far as that Dominion is concerned, and any such law operated as respects proceedings pending at the date of the passing of the law.

(3) In this section, the expression "the High Commissioner means, in relation to each of the new Dominions, any such officer as may for the time being be authorised to perform in the United kingdom, in relation to that Dominion, functions similar to those performed before the appointed day, in relation to the Governor-General in Council, by the High Commissioner referred to in section three hundred and two of the Government of India Act, 1935; and any legal proceedings of an immediately before the appointed day are the subject of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, or of a petition for the special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, shall be treated for the purposes of this sections as legal proceedings pending in the United Kingdom.

16. (1) Subsections (2) to (4) of section two hundred and eighty-eight of the Government of

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India Act, 1935 which confer on His Majesty were to make Order in Council provision for the government of Aden shall cease to have effect and the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945, (which authorise His Majesty to make laws and establish institutions for British Settlements as defined in those Acts) shall apply in relation to Aden as if it were a British Settlement as so defined.

(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the said subsections (2) to (4) Orders in Council in force there under at the date of the passing of this Act shall continue in force, but the said Orders in Council, and other orders in Council made under the Government of India Act 1935, in so far as they apply to Aden, and any enactments applied to Aden or amended in relation to Aden, and any enactments applied to Aden or amended in relation of Aden by any such Orders in Council as aforesaid, may be repealed, revoked or amended under the powers of the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945.

(3) Unless and until provision to the contrary is made as respects Aden under the powers of the British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945, or, as respects the new Dominion in question by a law of the Legislature of that Dominion, the provisions of the said Orders in Council and enactments relating to appeals from any courts in Aden to any courts which will, after the appointed day, be in either of the new Dominions, shall continue in force in their application both to Aden and to the Dominion in question, and the last mentioned courts shall exercise their jurisdiction accordingly.

17. (1) No court in either of the new Dominions shall, by virtue of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Acts, 1926 and 1940, have jurisdiction in or in relation to any proceedings for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage, unless those proceedings were instituted before the appointed day but, save as aforesaid and subject to any provision to the contrary which may hereafter be made by any Act of the parliament of the United Kingdom or by any law of the Legislature of the new Dominion concerned, all courts in the new Dominions shall have the same jurisdiction under the said Acts as they would have had if this Act had not been passed.

(2) Any rules made on or after the appointed day under subsection (4) of section one of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, for a court in either of the new Dominions shall, instead of being made by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, be made by such authority as may be determined by the law of the Dominion concerned, and so much of the said subsection and of any rules in force thereunder immediately before the appointed day as require the approval of the Lord Chancellor to the nomination for any purpose of any judges of any such court shall cease to have effect,

(3) The reference in subsection (1) of this section to Proceeding for a decree for the dissolution of a marriage include references to proceedings for such a decree of presumption of death and dissolution of a marriage as is authorised by section eight of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937.

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(4) Nothing in this section affects any court outside the new Dominions, and the power conferred by section two of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, to apply certain provisions of that Act to other parts of His Majesty's dominions as they apply to India shall be deemed to power to apply those provisions as they would have applied to India if this Act had not passed.

18. (1) In so far as any Act of Parliament, Order in Council, order, rule, regulation or other instrument passed or made before the appointed day operates otherwise than as part of the law of British India or the new Dominions, references therein to India or British India, however worded and whether by name or not, shall, in so far as the context permits and except so far as Parliament may hereafter otherwise provide, be construed as, or as including, references to the new Dominions, according as the circumstances and subject matter may require:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing in operation any provision in so far as the continuance thereof as adapted by this subsection is inconsistent with any of the provision of this Act other than this section.

(2) Subject to the provision of subsection (1) of this section and to any other express provision of this Act, the order in Council made under subsection (5) of section three hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935, for adapting and modifying Act of Parliament shall, except so far as Parliament may thereafter otherwise provide, continue in force in relation to all Acts in so far as they operate otherwise than as part of the law of British India or the new Dominions.

(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the law of British India and of the several parts thereof existing immediately before the appointed day shall, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, continue as the law of each of the new Dominion and the several parts thereof until other provision is made by laws of the Legislature of the Dominion in question or by any other Legislature or other authority having power in that behalf.

(4) It is hereby declared that the Instruments if Instructions issued before the passing of this Act by His Majesty to the Governor-General and the Governors of Provinces lapse as from the appointed day, and nothing in this Act shall be construed as continuing in force any provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to such Instruments of Instructions.

(5) As from the appointed day, so much of any enactment as requires the approval of His Majesty in Council to any rules of Court shall not apply to any court in either of the new Dominions.

19. (1) Reference in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in relation to any order to be made or other act done on or after the appointed day, be construed:-

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(a) where the order of other act concerns one only of the now Dominions, as references to the Governor-General of that Dominion.

(b) where the order or other act concerns both of the new Dominions and the same person is the Governor-General of both those Dominions, as references to that person; and

(2) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in relation to any order to be made or other act done before the appointed day, be construed as references to the Governor-General of India within the meaning of the Governor-General of India within the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935, and so much of that or any other Act as requires references to the Governor-General to be construed as references to the Governor-General in Council shall not apply to references to the Governor-General in this Act.

(3) References in this Act to the Constituent Assembly, of a Dominion shall be construed as references (a) in relation to India, to the Constituent Assembly, the first sitting whereof was held on the ninth day of December, nineteenth hundred and forty-six, modified;-

(i) by the exclusion of the members representing Bengal, the Punjab, Sing and British Baluchistan; and

(ii) should it appear that the north-West Frontier Province will form Part of Pakistan, by the exclusion of the members representing that province; and

(iii) by the inclusion of members representing West Bengal and East Punjab; and

(iv) should it appear that, on the appointed day a part of the Province of Assam is to form part of the new Province of East Bengal, by the exclusion of the members therefore representing the Province of Assam and the inclusion of members chosen to represent remainder of that Province ;

(b) in relation to Pakistan, to the Assembly set up or about to be set up at the date of the passing of this Act under the authority of the Governor-General as the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan;

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the extent to which

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representatives of the Indian States take part in either of the said Assemblies, or as preventing the filling of casual vacancies in the said assemblies, or as preventing the participation in either of the said Assemblies, in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in that behalf, of representatives of the tribal areas on the borders of the Dominion for which that Assembly sits, and the powers of the said Assemblies shall extend and be deemed always to have extended to the making of provision for the matters specified in this proviso.

(4) In this act, except so far as the context otherwise requires :-

Reference to the Government of India Act, 1935, include references to any enactments amending or supplementing that Act, and, in particular, references to the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946;

"India", where the reference is to a state of affairs existing before the appointed day or which would have existed but for the passing of this Act, has the meaning assigned to it by section three hundred and eleven of the Government of India Act, 1935.

"Indian forces" includes all His Majesty's Indian forces existing before the appointed day and also any forces of either of the new Dominions :

"pension" means, in relation to any person, a pension whether contributory of not, of any kind whatsoever payable to or in respect of that person, and includes retired pay so payable, a gratuity so payable and any sum or sums so payable by way of the return, with or without interest thereon or other additions thereto, of subscriptions to a provident fund;

"Province" means a Governor's Province,

"remuneration" includes leave pay, allowances and the cost of any privileges or facilities provided in kind.

(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make any order includes power to revoke or very any order previously made in the exercise of that power.

20. This Act may be cited as the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

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APPENDIX K

Line of Control in Jammu-and-Kashmir: A Part of Simla Agreement

It is a bit surprising to read in newspapers that some people in Pakistan have expressed a doubt that theLine of Control in Kashmir is vague. These statements indicate complete innocence about the meticulous care and thoroughness with which this Line was discussed, surveyed where necessary, identified on ground and delineated on maps giving detailed grid references and description of land marks. These were checked and re-checked before representatives of the two countries signed the documents pertaining to this Line and which were thereafter approved both Governments of India and Pakistan. It is necessary to describe the whole process for those who are not aware of how this crucial matter was handled. The Simla Agreement stipulated that in Jammu & Kashmir, the Line of Control separating the two Armies on the day of cease-fire will be delineated. India and Pakistan very carefully selected senior military commanders to shoulder this historic responsibility. On the Indian side the team captain was the well known, highly respected, gallant soldier scholar, Lt Gen PS Bhagat, PVSM, Victoria Cross and on Pakistan side the highly respected veteran and a man of sterling character Lt Gen Hameed Khan, S Pk, SQA. It was a fortunate coincidence that Bhagat and Hameed knew each other since their days in the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Consequently they worked on the difficult, time consuming and laborious mission with trust, utter frankness and mutual regard and respect. General Bhagat's team included the then Director Military Operations, Maj Gen IS Gill, PVSM, MC. known in the Indian Army as a man of 24-carat-gold for his sterling qualities. Similarly, on the Pakistani side was the then Director Military Operations, Brig SM Abbasi, scion of the princely family of Bahawalpur. Included in the teams were also Deputy Directors of Survey of India and Pakistan with adequate number of trained survey personnel and survey equipment. The senior military commanders of the two sides were assisted by three sector commanders along the entire length of 740 Km of Line of Control which was divided in three segments namely the Southern Sector, the Central Sector and the Northern Sector. In turn, sector commanders were assisted by sub sector commanders to do the ground work on the entire Line of Control. For Example, in the Northern Sector were included the four Sub Sector Commanders of Partapur Sub Sector, Kargil Sub Sector (including Batalik), Shingo (Kaksar) Sub Sector and Drass Sub Sector which are the areas of current conflict. Sector and Sub Sector commanders of the two countries worked in close co-operation. A total of nine meetings were held between the senior military commanders of the two countries and their teams between 10 Aug 72 and 11 Dec 72, alternatively at Suchetgarh near Jammu, and Wagah near Amritsar. At each meeting the inputs of sub sectors were discussed, the sticky points resolved and where necessary, a joint survey was ordered to ensure that nothing was left vague or uncertain. It is pertinent to add that there were some 380

issues which had to be resolved by the Army Chiefs of India and Pakistan and for these both the meetings were held at Lahore in Nov and Dec 72 between Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw and General Tikka Khan. All issues were amicably resolved. In the whole exercise two sets of maps each comprising of 27 maps were prepared. These marked maps were joined and 19 mosaics were prepared, thus clearly delineating the entire stretch of Line of Control running through 740 Km starting from Sangam and ending at Pt NJ-9842. Besides the maps, there were 19 Annexures consisting of 40 pages, giving the details of every feature, landmark and coordinates of the Line of Control. The delineated Line of Control was jointly prepared and signed by two senior military commanders, Lt Gen PS Bhagat and Lt Gen Hameed Khan. These documents were jointly signed and exchanged by the two senior military commanders on 11 Dec 72 at Suchetgarh. Immediately after signing of the delineation maps and documents at the final meeting of senior military commanders on 11 Dec 72, the DMO flew to New Delhi and reported to the COAS alongwith copies of the signed delineation proceedings and one copy of the signed maps at 1500 hours 11 Dec 72. The COAS presented these at a meeting of the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet at 16 hours the same day. At 1620 hours a message was received from Mr Aziz Ahmed, Special Assistant to the President of Pakistan for Mr PN Haksar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, informing him that the Government of Pakistan had accorded its approval to the Joint Recommendations submitted by the senior military commanders of Pakistan and India on that day in regard to delineation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. This message was passed to the COAS at Parliament House and at 1747 hours the DMO informed the DMO Pakistan Army on the telephone that the Government of India had accorded its approval to the Joint Recommendations in regard to the delineation proceedings. At 0700 hours on 17 Dec 72 the mutually agreed statement was released in New Delhi and Islamabad. At 2100 hours on 20 Dec 72, a joint statement by the Indian and Pakistan Governments was released to the media regarding withdrawal of troops to the International Border and delineation in conformity with the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. In view of the facts explained above, there should be absolutely no reason for any reservation in anyone's mind in India or Pakistan that there is anything vague or uncertain about the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. It is pertinent to add that for a period of over 27 years, the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir has stood the test of time. There have been frequent clashes as well as exchange of fire which were invariably discussed and resolved in flag meetings of the two sides. The authenticity of the Line of Control was never questioned. It is worthwhile adding that each flag meeting invariably developed into a competition in hospitality! It is also appropriate to take a close look on the wording of Paragraph dealing with the sanctity of the Line of Control of the Simla Agreement which reads as under:- "In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace. Both the Governments agree that: In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from cease fire on 17th December, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, 381

irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides undertake to refrain from threat of use of force in violation of this Line." [The Writer Lt Gen (Dr) ML Chibber, was Deputy Director of Military Operations after 1971 War and later C-in-C Northern Command when Pakistan was prevented from occupying Soltero Ridge and Siachen Glacier] online at

APPENDIX L

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution (1) Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- (a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to-- (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii)such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify. Explanation.- For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948; (c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State; (d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify : Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State : Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub- clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3) Not withstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be 382

operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify : Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification. Source: Constitution of India

APPENDIX M

Article 356 Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States(1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation -(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State;(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament;(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State:Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts.(2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation.(3) Every Proclamation under this article shall be laid beforeeach House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament:Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the People is dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the period of two months referred to in this clause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People.(4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of issue of the Proclamation:Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance

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in force of such a Proclamation is passed by both Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a further period of six months from the date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to operate, but no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force for more than three years:Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during any such period of six months and a resolution approving the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the continuance in force of the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People:Provided also that in the case of the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 11th day of May, 1987 with respect to the State of Punjab the reference in the first provisio to this clause to "three years" shall be construed as a reference to Five years.(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (4), a resolution with respect to the continuance in force of a Proclamation approved under clause (3) for any period beyond the expiration of one year from the date of issue of such Proclamation shall not be passed by either House of Parliament unless -(a) a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as the case may be, in the whole or any part of the State, at the time of the passing of such resolution, and(b) the Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the Proclamation approved under clause (3) during the period specified in such resolution is necessary on account of difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned:Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 11th day of May, 1987 with respect to the State of Punjab. Article 357 Exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation issued under article 356(1) Where by a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356, it has been declared that the powers of the Legislature ofthe State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, it shall be competent -(a) for Parliament to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the State to make laws, and to authorise the President to delegate, subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, the power so conferred to any other authority to be specified by him in that behalf;(b) for Parliament, or for the President or other authority in whom such power to make laws is vested under sub-clause (a), to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities thereof;(c) for the President to authorise when the House of the People is not in session expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State pending the sanction of such expenditure by Parliament.(2) Any law made in exercise of the power to the Legislature of the State by Parliament or the President or other authority referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) which Parliament or the President or such other authority would not, but for the issue of a Proclamation under article 356, have been competent to make shall, after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other authority. 384

Article 248 Residuary powers of legislation(1) Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.(2) Such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. Article 249 Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter in the State List in the National interest(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two- thirds of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest that Parliament should make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the State List specified in the resolution, it shall be lawful for Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to that matter while the resolution remains in force.(2) A resolution passed under clause (1) shall remain in forcefor such period not exceeding one year as may be specified therein:Provided that, if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of any such resolution is passed in the manner provided in clause (1), such resolution shall continue in force for a further period of one year from the date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to be in force.(3) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the passing of a resolution under clause (1) have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the resolution has ceased to be in force, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period. Article 250 Power of Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the State List if a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament shall, while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List.(2) A law made by Parliament which Parliament would not but for the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency have been competent to make shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period.

APPENDIX N DRAFT RESOLUTION PRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT (CANADA) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE RAPPORTEUR (BELGIUM) ON 6 FEBRUARY, 1948 (DOCUMENT NO. 667, DATED THE 10TH FEBRUARY, 1948) THE SECURITY COUNCIL Having considered the claims and allegations of India and Pakistan expresses the conviction

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that a peaceful settlement of the dispute about the accession of Jammu and Kashmir will best promote the interests of the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir of India, and of Pakistan. Considers that it is urgent and important to stop acts of violence and hostility in Jammu and Kashmir and to decide the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan or to India by the democratic method of a plebiscite to be held, as recognized by the parties, under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure complete impartiality. Believes that the joint action of the Governments of India and Pakistan is required to carry out the purposes set forth below: Alternative A Takes note with satisfaction that both Governments, in seeking a solution by negotiation under the auspices of the Council, have agreed to cooperate with each other and with the Council in developing specific proposals, and, to this end, to apply the following, principles which, in the opinion of the Council, should, among others, constitute the basis of a just settlement; Alternative B Appeals, therefore, to both parties, in seeking a solution by negotiation under the auspices of the Council, to cooperate with each other and with the Council in developing specific proposals and, to this end, to apply the following principles which, in the opinion of the Council, should, among others, constitute the basis of a just settlement; Acts of violence and hostility must end. The withdrawal and continued exclusion of all irregular forces and armed individuals who have entered Jammu and Kashmir from outside must be brought about, each party using to that end all the influence at its disposal. Regular armed forces in aid of the establishment and maintenance of order must be made available. In this connection the Governments should seek to ensure cooperation between their military forces to establish order and security until the question of accession shall have been determined by the plebiscite. Regular armed forces must be withdrawn as soon as reestablishment of law and order permits. After acts of violence and hostility have ceased, all citizens of the Jammu and Kashmir State, who had left on account of the recent disturbances, shall be invited and be free to return to their homes and to exercise all their rights without any restrictions on legitimate political activity. There shall be no victimization. All political prisoners should be released. The conditions necessary for a free and fair plebiscite on the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan, including an interim administration which will command confidence and respect of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir must be established. Such conditions include that the plebiscite must be organized, held and supervised under the authority of the Security Council at the earliest possible date. This draft resolution was considered by the Security Council on 10th and 11th February, 1948, but was not put to vote. Subsequently, a Joint Draft Resolution was introduced by the

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Representatives of Belgium, Canada, China, Columbia, United Kingdom and the United States of America and its amended version (Doc. No S/726) was adopted by the Security Council on 21-4-1948, vide Resolution No 47 (I948).RESOLUTION 47 (1948) ON THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION SUBMITTED JOINTLY BY THE REPRESENTATIVES FOR BELGIUM, CANADA, CHINA, COLUMBIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 286TH MEETING HELD ON 21 APRIL, 1948. (DOCUMENT NO. S/726, DATED THE 21ST APRIL, 1948). THE SECURITY COUNCIL Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter complaints of the representative of Pakistan, Being strongly of opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir in essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about cessation of all fighting, Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security, reaffirms its resolution 38 (1948) of 17 January 1948; Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by its resolution 39 (1948) of 20 January 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition to the membership mentioned in that Resolution, representatives of ....and ..., and that if the membership of the commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this resolution the President of the Council may designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five; Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian sub-continent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in co- operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution; and, to this end, recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council and appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan. A - RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavors: To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State; 387

To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order. The Government of India should: When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's Resolution 39 (1948) that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order; Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage; When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles: That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State; That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas; That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and policy provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2(a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for the reestablishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in paragraph 7. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification. B - PLEBISCITE The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question 388

of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police. The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administration, make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions. The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the Plebiscite Administrator. The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate the assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the Plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite. The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates. The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly, with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the Plebiscite. The Government of India should undertake to prevent and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of India should themselves and through the government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavor to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals 389

other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or since l5th August 1947 have entered it for a lawful purpose. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State releases all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that: all citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited and are free to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens; there is no victimization; minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial. C- GENERAL PROVISIONS The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein. *** The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 20-1-1948 with the following result:- In favor: Argentina, Canada. China, France, Syria, U. K, and U. S. A Against: None Abstaining: Belgium, Columbia, Ukrainian S. S. R. . and U. S. S. R.

APPENDIX O

United Jihad Council GroupsGroup Includes: Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HuM); Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM); Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT); Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM); Al Badr. In the past, Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) acted as an umbrella organisation, although after the formation of JeM an estimated three quarters of HUA members defected to the new group. Alias/front organisations Numerous; small groups attached to HUA and HuM include Convoy of Mercy, Al Hadid, Muslim Brotherhood, Al Faran, Al Jihad. Aims/objectives The groups fight for the "liberation" of Jammu and Kashmir. There is some difference of opinion, although many of these groups also seek the unification of Kashmir with Pakistan. Political/religious affiliation Mostly Sunni (Wahhabi) radicals. Date of founding Most radical groups began operations in Kashmir, where there was a long-standing insurgency, in the early 1990s. HUA and HuM were founded in 1993, while JeM was founded in early 2000, following the release of Maulana Masood Azhar from an Indian prison in late 1999 during a hijacking crisis. Al Badr was founded in 1999. Status Active. Insurgent alliances

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There are links between the groups, although there are inevitability some rivalries. There are also alliances with the Taliban, al-Qaida, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other international Islamist organisations. There are also some links with Sikh organisations, which Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has brokered in the past. Rival insurgent groups These radical groups are critical of the more moderate Kashmiri guerrilla organisations, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). They also fight Hindu self-defence groups and Village Defence Forces (VDF). Method of funding India accuses Pakistan of heavily subsidising UJC groups, and also of providing the groups with training and equipment. However, the dependency of each group on Islambad varies. HuM and HM receive much of their income from religious charities, for instance, while JeM is almost wholly dependent upon Pakistan. Other funds for militants arrive from al- Qaida, sympathetic individual Pakistanis, Kashmiris who live overseas, drug trafficking, and religious foundations based in countries around the world. Membership and support The number of militant Kashmiri and Pakistani fighters in Kashmir varies according to intensity of operations and climate. Usually there are between 2,500 and 5,000 guerrillas, many of whom rotate between operational tours in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, as well as training and periods of rest in Pakistan. The Al Badr group was established with the express purpose of serving as an organisation for foreign volunteers fighting in Kashmir. Area of operation The UJC groups operate in Jammu and Kashmir State, and in cells in some of the larger cities in India. Training occurs mainly in Azad Kashmir in Pakistan, and in Afghanistan. Foreign bases/supply lines There are foreign bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, other operations in Central Asia, Myanmar, and suspected involvement in the Balkans. Weaponry/arsenal The UJC groups have machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, mines, and rockets. They also field some sophisticated military equipment, supplied by the Pakistani military, including night-vision equipment. Sources of weapons UJC weapons come from Pakistan, although the government of Pakistan has denied this charge. Tactics/methodology There have been incidents of large-scale guerrilla infiltration of Kashmir from Pakistan, as well as tactics designed to pin down Indian regular forces. Command structure The command structures varies between the individual groups. Pakistani officers lead some groups. Most guerrillas receive a high level of training in Azad Kashmir or Afghanistan. Leadership HuM - Fazlur Rahman. HM - Syed Salahuddin, with military command in the Kashmir valley under Abdul Majid Dar. Al Badr - Bakht Zamin. Political Wing The militant, pro-Pakistani groups act under the United Jihad Council (UJC). The LeT is the armed wing of Markaz Da'wa wa'I-Irshad, based near Lahore. HM is the armed wing of Jamaat-i-Islami, although the group tries to distance itself from the violence in Kashmir.

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APPENDIX P

Full Text of MORI (Market & Opinion Research International) Survey on Kashmir 2002 Kashmiris Reject War In Favour Of Democratic Means 31 May 2002 MORI publishes results of major new survey The vast majority of Kashmiris oppose India and Pakistan going to war to find a permanent solution to the situation in Kashmir and believe the correct way to bring peace to the region is through democratic elections, ending violence, and economic development. They also believe the unique cultural identity of the region should be preserved in any long- term solution, and there is virtually no support for the state of Jammu and Kashmir being divided on the basis of religion or ethnic group. These are the main findings to emerge from a poll conducted by the independent market research company, MORI International, at the end of April (20-28 April 2002), just before the start of the recent escalation of conflict in the region. Interviews were conducted in the Jammu and the surrounding rural areas, Srinagar and its surrounding rural areas and in Leh. Interviewers were set quotas for sex and religion (assessed by the interviewer) to match the population of each region. Although the vast majority in Jammu and Leh believe the correct way to bring about peace is though democratic elections, opinions are more evenly divided in and around Srinagar, with a bare majority (52%) agreeing with this view. Nevertheless, the vast majority - 76% - of those in the Srinagar region believe India and Pakistan should not go to war to bring about a permanent solution. There is a general consensus across the regions that it is not possible to hold democratic elections while violence continues - 65% agree while 34% disagree. A very clear majority of the population - 65% - believes the presence of foreign militants in Jammu and Kashmir is damaging to the Kashmir cause, and most of the rest take the view that it is neither damaging nor helpful. Overall, two thirds of people in Jammu and Kashmir take the view that Pakistan's involvement in the region for the last ten years has been bad. Only 15% believe it has been good for the region, while 18% say it has made no real difference. On the issue of citizenship, overall, 61% said they felt they would be better off politically and economically as an Indian citizen and only 6% as a Pakistani citizen, but 33% said they did not know. A suggestion that most people do not feel that the current political parties have the solution to the problems in Kashmir is reflected in the fact that around half, or more, of the 392

population in each region agree with the view that 'a new political party is needed to bring about a permanent solution in Kashmir'. People in all regions are in general agreement that 'the unique cultural identity of Jammu and Kashmir - Kashmiryat - should be preserved in any long-term solution'. Overall, 81% agree, including 76% in Srinagar and 81% in Jammu. There is also widespread consensus on the types of proposals which will help to bring about peace in Jammu and Kashmir. More than 85% of the population, including at least 70% in each region, think the following will help to bring about peace: onomic development of the region to provide more job opportunities and reduction of poverty - 93% e holding of free and fair elections to elect the people's representatives - 86% ect consultation between the Indian government and the people of Kashmir - 87% end to militant violence in the region - 86% pping the infiltration of militants across the Line of Control - 88% The critical role people see for economic development in helping to solve the problems is further underlined by the 74% who think that 'people from outside of Kashmir being encourage to invest in the area to help rebuild Kashmir's economy and tourist industry' will help to bring peace to the state. There is also a widespread view, held by 80%, that allowing displaced Kashmiri Pandits to return to their homes in safety will help to bring about peace.Views are mixed on the likely impact of 'People in Jammu and Kashmir having the freedom to travel in both directions across the Line of Control'. Those in and around Srinagar and Leh generally feel this would help to bring peace while those in Jammu take the opposite view. An overwhelming 92% oppose the state of Kashmir being divided on the basis of religion or ethnicity. There is also overwhelming support - 91% - for a forum in which Kashmiris from both sides of the Line of Control can discuss common interests. A clear majority - 70% - also support the borders between Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and Indian Kashmir being opened for much more trade and cultural exchange. However, while the views in Srinagar and Leh were very decisive - over 90% support - those in Jammu were much more balanced - 47% support, 53% oppose. Views are also split on the issue of granting more autonomy to Kashmir. Overall 55% support 'India and Pakistan granting as much autonomy as they can to both sides of Kashmir to govern their own affairs. However, while the majority in Srinagar and Leh support this, the majority in Jammu oppose this policy. There are also mixed views about the role and impact of the Indian security forces. In Srinagar and Leh, at least nine out of ten believe that security forces scaling down their operations in Jammu and Kashmir would help to bring peace, whereas in Jammu opinions are reversed. There are clearly different perceptions of the behaviour of the Indian security forces. 393

Nobody interviewed in Leh or Jammu believes that human rights violations by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir are widespread, whereas in Srinagar 64% of the population think they are widespread. Perceptions are different with respect to human rights violations by militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir. 96% of those in Jammu believe such violations are widespread whereas only 2% of those in Srinagar believe they are widespread (although 33% believe they are 'occasional'). Technical details Fieldwork was carried out by FACTS Worldwide, MORI's affiliate company in India, between 20 - 28 April 2002. In total, 850 interviews were completed, face-to-face, with adults aged 16+ across 55 localities within Jammu and Kashmir. This comprised 22 localities in Jammu City, 20 in Srinagar City and 6 in Leh (urban areas), as well as in 3 villages around Jammu and 4 villages around Srinagar (rural areas). Quotas were set by gender, religion (assessed by observation) and locality, according to the known population profile of the region. A random selection procedure was used to select individual respondents.Sample Profile The following table details the profile of respondents by locality and religion: Locality Total i'views Breakdown by religion (observed) Muslim Hindu Sikh Buddhist Christian Srinagar 300 292 8 - - - 97% 3% - - -

Villages nr Srinagar 60 58 2 - - - 97% 3% - - -

Jammu 344 103 229 7 1 4 30% 67% 2% *% 1%

Villages nr Jammu 71 21 50 - - - 30% 70% - - -

Leh 75 35 4 - 36 - 47% 5% - 48% -

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Total 850 509 293 7 37 4 60% 34% 1% 4% *% Quotas were based on 1981 Census data (population in 1,000s): Total pop. Muslim Hindu Sikh Buddhist Christian Kashmir Valley(Srinigar & surrounding areas) 3,102 2,977 125 - 0.2 - 96% 4% - *% -

Jammu region 2,717 805 1,803 100 1 8 30% 66% 4% *% *%

Ladakh(incl. Leh) 134 62 4 - 68 - 46% 3% - 51% - ______Total 65% 32% 2% 1% *% Statistical Reliability The sampling tolerances that apply to the %age results in this report are given below. This table shows the possible variation that might be anticipated because a sample, rather than the entire population, was interviewed. As indicated, sampling tolerances vary with the size of the sample and the size of %age results. The confidence intervals take no account of design effects and, of course, there were certain areas in each region we did not conduct interviews. Approximate sampling tolerances applicable to %ages at or near these levels (at the 95% confidence level): 10% or 90% 30% or 70% 50% 850 (total) 2 3 3 415 (Jammu region) 3 4 5 360 (Srinagar region) 3 5 5 75 (Leh) 7 10 11 Source: MORI For example, for a question where 50% of the people in a sample of 850 respond with a particular answer, the chances are 95 in 100 that this result would not vary more than 3 %age points, plus or minus, from the result that would have been obtained from a census of the entire population using the same procedures. Tolerances are also involved in the comparison of results between different elements of the sample. A difference, in other words, must be of at least a certain size to be statistically significant. The following table is 395

a guide to the sampling tolerances applicable to comparisons. Differences required for significance at the 95% confidence level at or near these %ages: 10% or 90% 30% or 70% 50% 432 (Men) and 418 (Women) 4 6 7 415 (Jammu region) and 360 (Srinagar region) 4 7 7 415 (Jammu region) and 75 (Leh) 7 11 12 360 (Srinagar region) and 75 (Leh) 8 12 13 Source: MORI

The vast majority of Kashmiris, 63%, oppose India and Pakistan going to war to find a permanent solution to the situation in Kashmir and believe the correct way to bring peace to the region is through democratic elections (71%). They also believe the unique cultural identity of the region should be preserved in any long-term solution (81%), and there is virtually no support for the state of Jammu and Kashmir being divided on the basis of religion or ethnic group (8%). There is also widespread consensus on the types of proposals, which will help to bring about peace in Jammu and Kashmir. Among the things that more than 85% of the population believe will help bring peace to the region are: economic development, free and fair elections, direct consultation between the Indian government and the people of Kashmir, an end to militant violence, and the stopping of infiltration of militants across the Line of Control. An overwhelming 92% opposed the state of Kashmir being divided on the basis of religion or ethnicity. There was also overwhelming support - 91% - for a forum in which Kashmiris from both sides of the Line of Control can discuss common interests. Views were split on the issue of granting more autonomy to Kashmir. Overall 55% supported 'India and Pakistan granting as much autonomy as they can to both sides of Kashmir to govern their own affairs. However, while the majority in Srinagar and Leh supported this, the majority in Jammu opposed this policy. There are clearly different perceptions of the behaviour of the security forces. Nobody who was interviewed in Leh or Jammu believed human rights violations by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir are widespread, whereas in Srinagar 64% of the population believe they are widespread. Perceptions are different with respect to human rights violations by militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir. 96% of those in Jammu believe such violations are widespread whereas only 2% of those in Srinagar believe they are widespread (although 33% believe they are 'occasional'). A very clear majority of the population - 65% - believes the presence of foreign militants in Jammu and Kashmir is damaging to the Kashmir cause, and most of the rest take the view that it is neither damaging nor helpful. Perceptions of the role of Pakistan are also mixed. Those in Jammu and Leh mostly take the view that Pakistan's involvement in the region over the past ten years has been bad, while those in Srinagar have much more mixed views. More think it has made no real difference (41%) than that it has

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been either good (35%) or bad (23%). On the issue of citizenship, overall, 61% said they felt they would be better off politically and economically as an Indian citizen and only 6% as a Pakistani citizen, but 33% said they did not know. However, all the 'don't knows' were concentrated in Srinagar. Whereas 99% of respondents in Jammu and 100% in Leh felt they would be better off as Indian citizens, 78% of those in Srinagar said they did not know while 9% felt they would be better off as Indian citizens and 13% as Pakistani citizens. Details:http://www.mori.com/polls/2002/kashmir.shtmlTechnical details: Fieldwork was carried out by FACTS Worldwide, MORI's affiliate company in India, between 20 - 28 April 2002. In total, 850 interviews were completed, face-to-face, with adults aged 16+ across 55 localities within Jammu and Kashmir. This comprised 22 localities in Jammu City, 20 in Srinagar City and 6 in Leh (urban areas), as well as in 3 villages around Jammu and 4 villages around Srinagar (rural areas). Quotas were set by gender, religion (assessed by observation) and locality, according to the known population profile of the region. A random selection procedure was used to select individual respondents.Mori=s international offices: MORI House, 79-81 Borough Road, London SE1 1FY. Tel: 020-7347 3000, Fax: 020-7347 3800 India Affiliate Prakash Nijhara (Mobile 09821034703), Facts Worldwide India pvt Ltd, 11 Unique Industrial Estate, twin towers Lane, Off Veer Savarkar Marg, Prabhadevi Mumbai 400025, 022 4602097, 4366822Mori=s profile: MORI (Market & Opinion Research International) claims it is the largest independently owned market research company in the United Kingdom. Founded in 1969 MORI has seen a fast growth. Following a management buy-out in March 2000, MORI's UK staff and directors hold over half the company's equity - the remainder being held by 3i, Europe's leading venture capital company. MORI says it provides a full range of quantitative and qualitative research services Aand we aim to earn a superior reputation for creative research in our areas of expertise. We specialise in both private and public sector research and are particularly strong in the areas of corporate communications, business to business, consumer, e-MORI, employee opinion and social research.@ Its chairman is Professor Robert M Worcester, Chief Executive Brian Gosschalk and Managing Director is Mike Everett.

APPENDIX Q AngloBIrish Agreement 1985 between The Government of Ireland and The Government of the United Kingdom

The Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom:Wishing further to develop the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Community; Recognising the major interest of both their countries and, above all, of' the people of Northern Ireland in diminishing the divisions there and achieving lasting peace and stability; Recognising the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who wish for no change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other hand by 397

those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement; Reaffirming their total rejection of any attempt to promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence and their determination to work together to ensure that those who adopt or support such methods do not succeed; Recognising that a condition of genuine reconciliation and dialogue between unionists and nationalists is mutual recognition and acceptance of each other's rights; Recognising and respecting the identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland, and the right of each to pursue its aspirations by peaceful and constitutional means; Reaffirming their commitment to a society in Northern Ireland in which all may live in peace, free from discrimination and intolerance, and with the opportunity for both communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of government; Have accordingly agreed as follows: A. STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELANDARTICLE 1 The two Governments(a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of' the people of' Northern Ireland; (b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of' the people of' Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of Northern Ireland; (c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of' Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.

B. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCEARTICLE 2(a) There is hereby established, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council set up after the meeting between the two Heads of Government on 6 November 1981, an Intergovernmental Conference (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference"), concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of' the island of Ireland, to deal, as set out in this Agreement, on a regular basis with (i) political matters; (ii) security and related matters; (iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice; (iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation. (b) The United Kingdom Government accept that the Irish Government will put forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of the Conference in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In the interest of promoting peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to resolve any differences. The Conference will be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland; but some of' the matters under consideration will involve cooperative action in both parts of the island of' Ireland, and possibly also in Great Britain. Some of the proposals considered in respect of' Northern Ireland may also be found to have application by the Irish Government. There is no derogation from the sovereignty of either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government, and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction.ARTICLE 3The Conference shall meet at Ministerial or official level, as required. The business of the Conference will thus receive attention at the highest level. Regular and frequent Ministerial meetings shall be held; and in particular special meetings shall be convened at the request of' either side. Officials may meet in subordinate groups. Membership of the Conference and of sub-groups shall be

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small and flexible. When the Conference meets at Ministerial level an Irish Minister designated as the Permanent Irish Ministerial Representative and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland shall be joint Chairmen. Within the framework of the Conference other Irish and British Ministers may hold or attend meetings as appropriate: when legal matters are under consideration the Attorneys General may attend. Ministers may be accompanied by their officials and their professional advisers: for example, when questions of' security policy or security co-operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by the Commissioner of the Garda Siochána and the Chief Constable of' the Royal Ulster Constabulary; or when questions of economic or social policy, or co- operation are being discussed, they may be accompanied by officials of' the relevant Departments. A Secretariat shall be established by the two Governments to service the Conference on a continuing basis in the discharge of its functions as set out in this Agreement. ARTICLE 4 (a) In relation to matters coming within its field of activity, the Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government and the United Kingdom Government work together (i) for the accommodation of the rights and identities of the two traditions which exist in Northern Ireland; and (ii) for peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation. (b) It is the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government that responsibility in respect of certain matters within the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be devolved within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. The Irish Government support that policy. (c) Both Governments recognise that devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there. The Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, in so far as they relate to the interests of the minority community.

C. POLITICAL MATTERSARTICLE 5 (a) The Conference shall concern itself' with measures to recognise and accommodate the rights and identities of' the two traditions in Northern Ireland, to protect human rights and to prevent discrimination. Matters to be considered in this area include measures to foster the cultural heritage of both traditions, changes in electoral arrangements, the use of flags and emblems, the avoidance of economic and social discrimination and the advantages and disadvantages of a Bill of Rights in some form in Northern Ireland. (b) The discussion of these matters shall be mainly concerned with Northern Ireland, but the possible application of any measures pursuant to this Article by the lrish Government in their jurisdiction shall not be excluded. (c) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may, where the interests of' the minority community are significantly or especially affected, put forward views on proposals for major legislation and on major policy issues, which are within the purview of' the Northern lreland Departments and which remain the responsibility of the Secretary of' State for Northern Ireland. ARTICLE 6 The conference shall be a framework within which the Irish Government may put forward 399

views and proposals on the role and composition of bodies appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or by Department subject to his direction and control including the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights; the Fair Employment Agency; the Equal Opportunities Commission; the Police Authority for Northern Ireland; the Police Complaints Board. D. SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS

ARTICLE 7

a) The Conference shall consider(i) security policy;(ii) relations between the security forces and the community;(iii) prisons policy.(b) The Conference shall consider the security situation at its regular meetings and thus provide an opportunity to address policy issues, serious incidents and forthcoming events. (c) The two Governments agree that there is a need for a programme of special measures in Northern Ireland to improve relations between the security forces and the community, with the object in particular of making the security forces more readily accepted by the nationalist community. Such a programme shall be developed, for the Conference's consideration, and may include the establishment of local consultative machinery, training in community relations, crime prevention schemes involving the community, improvements in arrangements for handling complaints, and action to increase the proportion of members of the minority in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Elements of' the programme may be considered by the Irish Government suitable for application within their jurisdiction. (d) The Conference may consider policy issues relating to prisons. Individual cases may be raised as appropriate, so that information can be provided or inquiries instituted.

E. LEGAL MATTERS, INCLUDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE The Conference shall deal with issues of concern to both countries relating to the enforcement of the criminal law. In particular it shall consider whether there are areas of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might with benefit be harmonised. The two Governments agree on the importance of public confidence in the administration of justice. The Conference shall seek, with the help of advice from experts as appropriate, measures which would give substantial expression to this aim, considering inter alia the possibility of mixed courts in both jurisdictions for the trial of certain offences. The Conference shall also be concerned with policy aspects of extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction as between North and South.

F. CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION ON SECURITY, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MATTERS ARTICLE 9 (a) With a view to enhancing cross-border co-operation on security matters, the Conference shall set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Commissioner of the Garda Siochána and the Chief Constable of the 400

Royal Ulster Constabulary and, where appropriate, groups of officials, in such areas as threat assessments, exchange of information, liaison structures, technical co-operation, training of personnel, and operational resources. (b) The Conference shall have no operational responsibilities; responsibility for police operations shall remain with the heads of the respective police forces, the Commissioner of the Garda Siochána maintaining his links with the Minister for Justice and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary his links with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. ARTICLE 10 (a) The two Governments shall co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the possibility of securing international support for this work.(b) If it should prove impossible to achieve and sustain devolution on a basis which secures widespread acceptance in Northern Ireland, the Conference shall be a framework for the promotion of co-operation between the two parts of Ireland concerning cross border aspects of economic, social and cultural matters in relation to which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland continues to exercise authority.(c) If responsibility is devolved in respect of certain matters in the economic, social or cultural areas currently within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, machinery will need to be established by the responsible authorities in the North and South for practical co- operation in respect of cross-border aspects of these issues. G. ARRANGEMENTS FOR REVIEW ARTICLE 11 At the end of three years from signature of this Agreement, or earlier if requested by either Government, the working of the Conference shall be reviewed by the two Governments to see whether any changes in the scope and nature of its activities are desirable.

H. INTERPARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS ARTICLE 12 It will be for Parliamentary decision in Dublin and in Westminster whether to establish and Anglo-Irish Parliamentary body of the kind adumbrated in the Anglo-Irish Studies Report of November 1981. The two Governments agree that they would give support as appropriate to such a body, if it were to be established.

I. FINAL CLAUSESARTICLE 13This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the two Governments exchange notifications of their acceptance of this Agreement. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. Done in two originals at Hillsborough on the 15th day of November 1985 For the Government of Ireland ...... Gearoid Mac GearailtFor the Government Of the United Kingdom ...... Margaret Thatcher

Appendix R: Poll Conducted by Synovate India in Kashmir for The Times of 401

India

1. April 18, 2005 LENGTH: 689 wordsHEADLINE: ONLY 3% KASHMIRIS WANT TO BE WITH PAKBYLINE: Shankar RaghuramanBODY:

Kashmiris want to be . . . 53.9 % Independent 36.2 % With India 3.3 % With Pakistan Read those figures above? They might suggest that New Delhi's efforts at wooing the Kashmiris to its side aren't paying off, that most Kashmiris still want azadi, but the truth is much more complex.On the eve of Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf's visit to India, The Times of India decided to get a feel of the pulse in Kashmir. Synovate India conducted the poll in Srinagar and Rajouri and the findings give reason for hope rather than despair.Indeed, if there is one thing that comes across clearly from the survey, it is that more than 15 years of violence and bloodshed have been unable to rob Kashmiris of hope and they retain a positive outlook. That in itself is remarkable under the circumstances. This is not to suggest that the responses to the questions asked in the survey are unambiguous. On the contrary, there is a great deal of ambivalence. For instance, though a majority opt for "azadi" over staying as part of India or joining Pakistan (a surprisingly meagre 3.3% want the latter), an equal number also supported the idea of turning the LoC into the international border.The two responses suggest that independence may be a distant aspiration but at a more realistic level, the Kashmiris seem quite comfortable with the idea of freezing the status quo legally if it means an easing of tensions and creation of a soft border.Azadi is not the only issue where...(##include msid=43376741,type=11 ##)... this ambivalence is manifested. The response to a question on whether the militants are fighting for issues like better schools, hospitals and jobs for the people was an emphatic 'No'. Barely 13.8% of the respondents felt they were, while 73.7% maintained they weren't.But don't jump to the conclusion that Kashmiris see the militants as troublemakers. Such simplistic assumptions are shot down by the response to another question: Are militants holding up the development of the state? Only 25% said they were, while 65.8% felt militants couldn't be blamed for lack of development.Again, while the Hurriyat is seen as much less representative of Kashmiris (page 1) than the state government, this is not necessarily a vote of confidence in the democratic process. Only 45.4% felt the Hurriyat should fight elections and that the militants too should come overground and contest. Despite the obviously free and fair nature of the last assembly elections and the success of the recent polls to local government bodies, decades of bitter experience have made Kashmiris wary of betting too heavily on the ballot.What do Kashmiris perceive as the real issues? The survey gave them 402

five options - development, education, health, tourism and azadi - and asked them to rank these in order of priority. Interestingly, most respondents insisted that several of these were equally important and hence ranked more than one of them No. 1. There is, therefore, no sharp distinction in the relative rankings given to these issues, with one exception. Only 55.3% ranked azadi at No. 1 (singly or jointly), against 90.1% for education, 82.9% for development, 80.3% for tourism and 73.7% for health. This confirms the earlier indication that gaining independence is not really top-of-the-mind for Kashmiris.In a state that has so...... consistently been let down by governments and politicians, you would expect them to have rather low credibility. Yet, an amazing 78.9% named Manmohan Singh or Sonia Gandhi as the Indian they most admire. Among Pakistanis, Pervez Musharraf was a comfortable winner with 47.4% to Inzamam-ul-Haq's 29.6%. Clearly, these ratings reflect the approval for the recent peace initiatives and the perceptions about who's driving them.There is a surprisingly high rating for the state government too. As many as 60.5% were of the view that the Mufti government is sincere about development. The fact that 83.6% say the quality of education today is better than in 1989 (when militancy began) should also come as a shot in the arm for the government.Note: Figures in the graphic may not add up to 100% because of 'Can't Say' responses.JOURNAL-CODE: WTINLOAD- DATE: April 18, 2005

APPENDIX S No one in Kashmir wants the Valley to go to Pak: ACNielsen Poll 2002-09-27 Press Trust Of India Virtually nobody in Kashmir, even in Srinagar or Anantnag, wants the Valley to go to Pakistan, says an opinion poll conducted in Jammu and Kashmir last week. The poll conducted by ACNielsen also suggests that the National Conference has a lead over other parties in the current Assembly elections. In Srinagar, Anantnag and Udhampur zero per cent said they wanted the Valley to go to Pakistan and interestingly only in Jammu did one per cent favoured it. A total of 574 people were interviewed between September 12 and 16 in four towns in the state C Srinagar, Anantnag, Jammu and Udhampur. Rural areas were not covered in this survey. Significantly, 49 per cent across the state said the Kashmir valley should remain with India. In Srinagar, it was 21 per cent, in Anantnag five, Jammu 79 and Udhampur 81. Forty eight per cent in Srinagar and 59 per cent in Anantnag say that independence is the solution to the Kashmir problem. 26 per cent in Srinagar and 27 per cent in Anantnag say that Kashmir should stay with India but with greater autonomy for the state. The poll, conducted for Asian Age, found that a very clear majority C 91 per cent across the state C feel that the use of violence by militants would not help in solving the Kashmir problem. In Srinagar 16 per cent and in Anantag 22 per cent feel otherwise. Other highlights of the poll: Likely to vote: Sixty per cent across the state said they intended to vote. The figure was much lower in Srinagar (32 per cent) and Anantnag (17 per cent). In both Jammu and Udhampur, 90 per cent said they would vote. Hurriyat factor: If the Hurriyat Conference and Shabir Shah's PDF had contested 28 per cent in Srinagar would 403

have backed the Hurriyat and 14 per cent the PDF. Faith in Vajpayee's free and fair poll promise: Sixty two per cent across the state said they had faith in the Prime Minister's assurance that the elections would be free and fair. In Srinagar, though, this was only 50 per cent. Trifurcation: The proposal to trifurcate the state C into Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh C was rejected by 87 per cent across the state. Does Pakistan want peace?: Seventy nine per cent across the state said they believed Pakistan does not want genuine peace with India. In Srinagar, however, this rate was less and just 33 per cent felt Pakistan did want peace. In Jammu and Udhampur, more than 90 per cent had no faith in Pakistan's desire for peace.( Indian Express, September 27, 2002) Posted on 2002-09-27

Appendix T

Countries of the World Gross National Product (GNP) per capita - 2005 (Wealth levels around the world)

In order from left to right: Country Rank GNP per capita (dollars)

Luxembourg 1 65 602 $ Norway 2 59 768 $ Switzerland 3 54 925 $ Denmark 4 47 363 $ Iceland 5 46 655 $ United States 6 43 743 $ Bermuda 7 41 875 $ Sweden 8 41 042 $ Ireland 9 40 232 $ Liechtenstein 10 39 412 $ Japan 11 38 984 $ Great Britain 12 37 632 $ Finland 13 37 471 $ Austria 14 36 912 $ Netherlands 15 36 600 $ France 16 35 854 $ Belgium 17 35 712 $ Germany 18 34 577 $ Canada 19 32 546 $ Australia 20 32 170 $ Isle of Man 21 31 200 $ Monaco 22 30 606 $ 404

Italy 23 29 999 $ Singapore 24 27 842 $ New Zealand 25 25 942 $ Spain 26 25 358 $ United Arab Emirates 27 24 213 $ Kuwait 28 23 423 $ Brunei 29 21 675 $ Greenland 30 20 702 $ Cayman Islands 31 20 667 $ Jersey & Guernsey 32 20 000 $ Aruba 33 19 800 $ Greece 34 19 687 $ Israel 35 18 624 $ U.S. Virgin Islands 36 18 609 $ French Polynesia 37 18 521 $ Qatar 38 18 212 $ Gibraltar 39 17 500 $ Andorra 40 17 468 $ Slovenia 41 17 352 $ Cyprus 42 17 081 $ Taiwan 43 16 764 $ Portugal 44 16 164 $ Macau 45 15 413 $ Bahamas 46 15 232 $ Martinique 47 15 063 $ San Marino 48 15 000 $ Bahrain 49 14 187 $ New Caledonia 50 13 889 $ Malta 51 13 589 $ Netherlands Antilles 52 13 552 $ Falkland Islands 53 13 333 $ British Virgin Islands 54 13 043 $ Puerto Rico 55 12 221 $ Nauru 56 12 143 $ Faroe Islands 57 12 083 $ Saudi Arabia 58 11 764 $ Korea (N + S) 59 10 975 $ Antigua and Barbuda 60 10 854 $ Czech Rep. 61 10 674 $ Trinidad and Tobago 62 10 444 $ Guam 63 10 118 $ Hungary 64 10 034 $ Niue 65 10 000 $ Tokelau 65 10 000 $ 405

Barbados 67 9 741 $ Guadeloupe 68 9 183 $ Estonia 69 9 107 $ Oman 70 8 999 $ French Guiana 71 8 836 $ Saint Kitts & Nevis 72 8 298 $ Seychelles 73 8 235 $ American Samoa 74 8 103 $ Croatia 75 8 064 $ Slovakia 76 7 955 $ Reunion 77 7 752 $ Anguilla 78 7 692 $ Palau 79 7 500 $ Mexico 80 7 154 $ Turks and Caicos Islands 81 7 143 $ Saint Pierre and Miquelon 81 7 143 $ Poland 83 7 112 $ Lithuania 84 7 041 $ Latvia 85 6 757 $ Montserrat 86 6 667 $ Lebanon 87 6 186 $ Chile 88 5 865 $ Libya 89 5 527 $ Mauritius 90 5 265 $ Botswana 91 5 178 $ Gabon 92 5 007 $ Cook Islands 93 5 000 $ Saint Helena 93 5 000 $ Malaysia 95 4 963 $ South Africa 96 4 959 $ Venezuela 97 4 807 $ Saint Lucia 98 4 731 $ Turkey 99 4 704 $ Panama 100 4 626 $ Costa Rica 101 4 589 $ Russia 102 4 466 $ Argentina 103 4 466 $ Uruguay 104 4 359 $ Wallis and Futuna 105 4 000 $ Grenada 106 3 925 $ Romania 107 3 834 $ Dominica 108 3 750 $ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 109 3 613 $ Belize 110 3 493 $ 406

Bulgaria 111 3 473 $ Brazil 112 3 455 $ Jamaica 113 3 396 $ Yugoslavia 114 3 291 $ Fiji 115 3 278 $ Thailand 116 3 065 $ Marshall Islands 117 3 016 $ Namibia 118 2 986 $ Kazakhstan 119 2 942 $ Tunisia 120 2 889 $ Macedonia 121 2 826 $ Mayotte 122 2 809 $ Iran 123 2 771 $ Belarus 124 2 760 $ Algeria 125 2 727 $ Ecuador 126 2 628 $ Peru 127 2 612 $ Albania 128 2 578 $ Suriname 129 2 539 $ Tuvalu 130 2 500 $ Bosnia 131 2 446 $ El Salvador 132 2 445 $ Jordan 133 2 426 $ Guatemala 134 2 403 $ Maldives 135 2 401 $ Dominican Rep. 136 2 370 $ Colombia 137 2 292 $ Northern Mariana Islands 138 2 289 $ Micronesia 139 2 252 $ Tonga 140 2 157 $ Western Samoa 141 2 108 $ Myanmar 142 2 039 $ Swaziland 143 1 934 $ Cape Verde 144 1 874 $ China 145 1 736 $ Morocco 146 1 694 $ Vanuatu 147 1 611 $ Ukraine 148 1 516 $ Armenia 149 1 473 $ Kiribati 150 1 414 $ Syria 151 1 384 $ Turkmenistan 152 1 371 $ Georgia 153 1 346 $ Philippines 154 1 304 $ 407

Indonesia 155 1 279 $ Paraguay 156 1 275 $ Egypt 157 1 255 $ Azerbaijan 158 1 241 $ Honduras 159 1 192 $ Sri Lanka 160 1 162 $ Angola 161 1 078 $ Equatorial Guinea 162 1 052 $ Djibouti 163 1 020 $ Guyana 164 1 011 $ Bolivia 165 1 009 $ Cameroon 166 1 009 $ Cuba 167 996 $ Lesotho 168 958 $ Congo 169 948 $ Nicaragua 170 906 $ Bhutan 171 871 $ Ivory Coast 172 843 $ Moldova 173 754 $ East Timor 174 749 $ India 175 724 $ Senegal 176 708 $ Mongolia 177 690 $ Pakistan 178 689 $ Papua New Guinea 179 657 $ Comoros 180 650 $ Sudan 181 643 $ Viet Nam 182 623 $ Yemen 183 604 $ Iraq 184 599 $ Nigeria 185 564 $ Mauritania 186 560 $ Kenya 187 527 $ Benin 188 514 $ Uzbekistan 189 508 $ Solomon 190 507 $ Zambia 191 486 $ Bangladesh 192 467 $ Haiti 193 455 $ Ghana 194 452 $ Kyrgyzstan 195 445 $ Laos 196 442 $ Chad 197 396 $ Burkina Faso 198 396 $ 408

Sao Tome and Principe 199 385 $ Cambodia 200 380 $ Mali 201 379 $ Guinea 202 373 $ Togo 203 352 $ Tanzania 204 350 $ Central African Rep. 205 347 $ Zimbabwe 206 343 $ Tajikistan 207 335 $ Mozambique 208 310 $ Gambia 209 290 $ Madagascar 210 289 $ Uganda 211 276 $ Nepal 212 268 $ Niger 213 240 $ Rwanda 214 230 $ Afghanistan 215 222 $ Sierra Leone 216 218 $ Eritrea 217 193 $ Guinea-Bissau 218 177 $ Malawi 219 161 $ Ethiopia 220 156 $ Somalia 221 136 $ Liberia 222 135 $ Dem. Rep. of Congo 223 120 $ Burundi 224 96 $

------Students of the World => Countries of the World => GNP per capita

Above information courtesy of: http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/rank/PNBH2.html

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