Ph.D. Thesis A Selfless Response to an Illusory World A Comparative Study of Śāntideva and Śaṅkara Written by Warren Lee Todd PDF version - September 2012 Ph.D. in Politics, Philosophy & Religion A Selfless Response to an Illusory World A Comparative Study of Śāntideva and Śaṅkara Written by Warren Lee Todd PDF version - September 2012 Abstract This thesis compares the ethical theories of two 8th century Indian philosophers, Śāntideva and Śaṅkara. In order to construct their ethics from philosophical premises, a metaphysical approach has been taken. A comparison of these two philosophers has never been made, nor has there been any major comparative study of the ethics of their two traditions, Indian Madhyamaka Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta. In opening the way for further comparisons between these two schools, I wish to question the manner in which scholars have consistently divided them along self/non-self (ātman/anātman) lines. The key to the comparison is thus the notion of individuated self (jīva) rather than the less personal ātman. i Once the full implications of Advaita metaphysics are understood, whereby all consciousness is ultimately that of the one brahman, then, at the individuated level of consciousness, the ethical situation is strangely similar to the Buddhist with their notion of non-self (anātman). We thus have two rival schools positing a radical notion of the individual as having no unified centre of moral agency. Both schools adopt a methodology of Two Truths, the relative and the ultimate, in order to allow for both a provisional ethical framework and the potential for world transcendence. It was decided that the most convenient form of ethical comparison was a qualified form of altruism, here called “constructive altruism”. This is a form of other- regarding ethics which allows for the concept of a non-giver, i.e. a person who has realised selflessness and has seen through the “illusion” of individuation. This person then takes it upon himself to construct the other so as to gain a focus for the compassionate activity of teaching. The aim of such teaching is the liberation (mokṣa) of freedom-seeking disciples from this cyclic existence (saṃsāra) and its prevalent potential for suffering (duḥkha). ii Preface and Acknowledgements This thesis grew out of an on-going project begun by Prof. Ram-Prasad Chakravarthi (Lancaster University) and Prof. Jonardon Ganeri (University of Sussex). The project was entitled “Hindu Responses to Buddhist Critiques”. I was based in Lancaster throughout the project, with Ram-Prasad as my sole supervisor. The project was necessarily cross-curricula and it was therefore fitting that mid-way through the project the Department of Religion merged with the Departments of Philosophy and Politics. The main debates surrounded the meaning of the “self”, and how the self functioned in metaphysics, psychology and ethics. The basic methodology was to focus on the Indian texts, with occasional reference to parallel Western debates. I came into the Project as a winner of a Doctorate scholarship offered by the AHRC. This full 3-year scholarship served for all my fees and living costs. It also offered me the chance to present my thesis as a paper at the Uehiro Cross Currents Philosophy Conference at the University of Hawai’i in March 2010. I therefore acknowledge my deepest debt to the AHRC. As a Buddhist, I was concerned with the Project’s title, which seemed set up to favour the “Responses” over the “Critiques”. But as it turned out, my supervisor, Ram- Prasad, was as anxious as I to give a balanced account of the debates, which we both recognised as being a valuable exchange of cross-cutting Indian ideas. Given the time to find my own thesis within the general area of Buddhist and Hindu comparative studies and Indian Philosophy, I began by reading the Brahmanical material. iii On reading Śaṅkara, I was first interested to note how his critique of the Yogācāra was so similar to that of Śāntideva. In reading his views on self, it soon became apparent that his concept of brahman as the ultimate Self, along with his views on the provisional nature of the world, led to an evaluation of the individual most similar to that of Madhyamaka. I became particularly interested in his insistence on the continuation of the lineage, and the need for a realised teacher to pass on the knowledge to his students. It seemed that his brahman-knower, who had transcended personal identity, was willing to remain in society with the sole aim of benefiting others. This seemingly “altruistic” concept resonated with the teachings I had received from the Dalai Lama on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva. The idea of comparing Śāntideva and Śaṅkara with regard to metaphysics and ethics appealed to Ram-Prasad, and we almost instantly agreed on a working title: “A Selfless Response to an Illusory World”. This catchy title, which captures the “tension” of the Two Truths so dramatically, has remained an inspiration to me throughout the research and writing process. I thank Ram-Prasad for bringing me onto this project, for allowing me the freedom to choose my own thesis, and for his attention and fathomless expertise throughout these four years. I also wish to thank Prof. Peter Harvey, who helped me become a critical thinker. I wish to thank H.H. the Dalai Lama, who planted the seeds of the Bodhicaryāvatāra in my limited consciousness back in 2003. I prostrate to my root guru, the late Chogye Trichen Rinpoche, who one glorious day in Kathmandu, placed me on the path. I wish to thank also Dr. Irina Kuznetsova for teaching me Sanskrit. Thanks are also due to all those scholars and translators to whom I have referred. iv Abbreviations Ait.U. (Bh.) Aitareya Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) A.N. Aṅguttara Nikāya BCA Bodhicaryāvatāra B.S. (Bh.) Brahma Sūtra (Bhāṣya) Bṛ.U. (Bh.) Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) Bh.G. (Bh.) Bhagavad Gītā (Bhāṣya) Ch.U. (Bh.) Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) D.N. Dīgha Nikāya Dhp. Dhammapada EHU Enquiry concerning Human Understanding EPM Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals G.K. (Bh.) Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā (Bhāṣya) G.S. Gay Science Gau.D.S. Gautama Dharma Sūtra Īś.U. (Bh.) Īśā Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) Jā.U. Jābāla Upaniṣad Ka.U. (Bh.) Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) Ken.U. (Bh.) Kena Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) Mā.U. (Bh.) Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) Miln. Milinda Pañha MMA (Bh.) Madhyamakāvatāra (Bhāṣya) v MMK Mūla-madhyamaka kārikā M.N. Majjhima Nikāya Mu.U. (Bh.) Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) P.U. (Bh.) Praśna Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) Ś.S. Śikṣa Samuccaya S.N. Saṃyutta Nikāya T.U. (Bh.) Taittirīya Upaniṣad (Bhāṣya) U.S. Upadeśa Sāharsrī Util. Utilitarianism V.C. Viveka Cūḍāmani Vin. Vinaya Vm. Visuddhimagga Vv. Vigrahavyāvartanī vi Contents Description Page Abstract i Preface and Acknowledgements iii Abbreviations v Chapter Introduction 1 1 Introduction to the Self 8 2 Methodology 37 3 Situating Śaṅkara and Śāntideva 92 3.1 Approaching Śaṅkara 93 3.2 Approaching Śāntideva 131 4 Their Common Approach to the World 158 4.1 Their Common Denial of the Yogācāra Idealistic World-view 159 4.2 Their Common Denial of the Ultimacy of the Individuated Self 177 4.3 Their Common Response to Tradition-based Conduct 187 5 Knowledge and Liberation 232 5.1 Śaṅkara: Liberation through Knowledge of Brahman 234 5.2 Śāntideva: Liberation through Seeing into Emptiness 250 6 A Selfless Response to the World 263 6.1 Śāntideva: Wisdom and Compassion – A Complex Model 271 6.2 Śaṅkara: Living Liberation – The True Place of Action 306 7 Marginal Cases 331 7.1 Śaṅkara: The Reality and Non-reality of Class and Caste 336 7.2 Śāntideva: The Reality and Non-reality of Gender 350 Conclusion 371 Bibliography 376 vii Introduction There is no doubt that a comparative ethical study of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism and early Vedānta is long overdue. And it is quite evident that this particular metaphysical/ethical analysis of Śāntideva’s Madhyamaka and Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta is just the beginning of what will hopefully be a sustained and probing recovery and rediscovery of the Sanskritic source material. Moreover, one anticipates that it will be a practical rediscovery; one which involves ethical questions as well as metaphysical ones, one which will hopefully lead on to novel approaches which aim at accessing the workings of consciousness and thus to the potential training of the human mind. With the advent of the cognitive sciences, it may well be that Indian philosophy has come of age and is finally being taken seriously in the Western academy. In addition to keeping abreast of cognitive science, the modern writer on Buddhism and Hinduism aspires to be a combination of historian, philologist and analytic philosopher. And Chapter 1 is unapologetically aimed at the latter of these. The question of “self” has dramatically returned to the arena of analytic philosophy and may well prove to be the most telling philosophical “problem” of the current century. Without any plea from the Buddhists themselves, Western scholars of self have helped themselves to ancient Indian texts, typically in translation, and have introduced the Buddhist notion of non-self into the modern debate. It is hardly feasible any more for a Western academic to remain enclosed within their departmental walls. The Indologist feels the need to answer Descartes, Locke and Hume just as urgently as the 1 Western philosopher of self feels the urge to quote from the Pāli Canon, the Bhagavad Gītā or the Upaniṣads. Unfortunately, such inter-disciplinary flirtations have often come at a price. Blanket statements have been made on all sides and confusion abounds. When the Buddha denied the ‘self’, was he also denying the ‘person’? Are the Buddhists saying, along with the Bhagavad Gītā, that there is no fault in killing the person before you, because that is not who they really are? When Śaṅkara claims that one simply cannot deny the self, is he thus forced into standing on the ātman (self) side of the fence, with the anātman (non-self) Buddhist on the other? In allowing for the possibility of an exchange of ‘self’ or ‘consciousness’ between two ‘men’; is Locke therefore accepting Indian notions of rebirth? These are but a few of the questions that arise from the confusion of terms.