The Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative Studies
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RE-VISITING the FRAUD ACT 2006 – a STEP TOO FAR? Hannah Willcocks
RE-VISITING THE FRAUD ACT 2006 – A STEP TOO FAR? Hannah Willcocks Brought into force on 15th January 2007,1 the Fraud Act 2006 (‘the Act’) has now been part of the criminal law of England and Wales for over 12 years. Through the introduction of a new general offence of fraud, its aim was to improve the law by making it: a. more comprehensible to juries, especially in serious fraud trials; b. a useful tool in effective prosecutions; c. simpler and therefore fairer; and d. more flexible so able to encompass all forms of fraud 2 and “deal with developing technology”.3 Following the Act’s implementation, it has generally4 been accepted5 that the Act has managed to overcome the vast majority of the difficulties previously encountered with the old offences of deception.6 In 2012, in its Post-Legislative Assessment of the Fraud Act 2006, the Ministry of Justice (‘MoJ’) concluded that the aims and objectives of the 1 The Fraud Act 2006 (Commencement) Order 2006 (SI 2006/3200). 2 Law Commission, Fraud (Law Com No 276, Cm 5560, 2002), para 1.6. 3 Home Office, Fraud Law Reform: Consultation on Proposals for Legislation (2004) p. 5. 4 For a contrary view see Anthony Arlidge QC, Jonathan Fisher QC, Alexander Milne QC and Polly Sprenger, Arlidge and Parry on Fraud (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 44, para 3-005. 5 See e.g. Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law, Theory and Doctrine (5th edn, Hart Publishing Ltd 2013) 610; Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 405; Carol Withey ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – some early observations and comparisons with the former law’ (2007) 71(3) Journal of Criminal Law, 220 – 237, 228 – 236; Nicholas Yeo, ‘Bull’s-Eye’, 157 NLJ 212 & 418. -
Criminal Procedure in England and the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions
Fordham Law Review Volume 49 Issue 1 Article 8 1980 Criminal Procedure in England and the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions Irving R. Kaufman Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Digital Par t of the Law Commons Commons Network Recommended Citation Logo Irving R. Kaufman, Criminal Procedure in England and the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 26 (1980). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol49/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Criminal Procedure in England and the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions Cover Page Footnote Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Chief Judge (1973-1980). District Court Judge (1949-1961) and Assistant United States Attorney (1935-1940) in the Southern District of New York. Chairman of the Executive Committee and former President of the Institute of Judicial Administration. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol49/iss1/8 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: COMPARISONS IN INITIATING PROSECUTIONS IRVING R. KAUFMAN* THE legal institutions of Great Britain have long served as the well-spring of American law. In drafting the Federal Constitution, the framers embellished British conceptions of a government of sepa- rated powers,' and drew on the enactments of Parliament. -
A Rationale of Criminal Negligence Roy Mitchell Moreland University of Kentucky
Kentucky Law Journal Volume 32 | Issue 2 Article 2 1944 A Rationale of Criminal Negligence Roy Mitchell Moreland University of Kentucky Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Torts Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. Recommended Citation Moreland, Roy Mitchell (1944) "A Rationale of Criminal Negligence," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 32 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol32/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (Continued from November issue) RoY MOREL A D* 2. METHODS Op DESCRIBING THE NEGLIGENCE REQUIRED 'FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY The proposed formula for criminal negligence describes the higher degree of negligence required for criminal liability as "conduct creating such an unreasonable risk to life, safety, property, or other interest for the unintentional invasion of which the law prescribes punishment, as to be recklessly disre- gardful of such interest." This formula, like all such machinery, is, of necessity, ab- stractly stated so as to apply to a multitude of cases. As in the case of all abstractions, it is difficult to understand without explanation and illumination. What devices can be used to make it intelligible to judges and juries in individual cases q a. -
Submission to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women on Femicide Related Data and Information
Submission to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women on femicide related data and information November 2020 The Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Slovenia (National Human Rights Institution) submits the following information to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms Dubravka in response to her call for femicide related data and information.1 Administrative data (by numbers and percentage) on homicide/femicide or gender-related killings of women for the last 3 years (2018-2020). The Human Rights Ombudsman of the Republic of Slovenia acquired the following data on the number of homicides/femicides in Slovenia from the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Slovenia on 18th and 24th November 2020. 1. The total number of homicides of women and men As a homicide/femicide, we considered the following crimes under the Slovenian Criminal Code:2 manslaughter (Article 115),3 murder (Article 116),4 voluntary manslaughter (Article 117)5 and negligent homicide (Article 118).6 In 2018, the police dealt with 49 crimes of homicide. In 21 cases victims were women, in 28 victims were men. In 2019, the police dealt with 27 homicides; women were victims in 8 cases, men were victims in 19. From 1st January to 11th November 2020, the police dealt with 41 homicides, 18 committed against women, 23 against men. 1 Femicide Watch call 2020, www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/FemicideWatchCall2020.aspx 2 Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1), www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO5050. -
Principles of Criminal Liability
Criminal Law G153 PPRINCIPLES OF CCRIMINAL LLIABILITY 22:: Mens Rea By the end of this unit, you will be able to: Explain what is meant by the term ‘mens rea’ and illustrate your explanation with cases Understand what is meant by the terms: o Direct intent, o Oblique intent, o Specific & basic intent. Explain the current legal test for recklessness, and understand how the test evolved. Explain the scope of the doctrine of transferred malice and how the courts have developed the concept of coincidence. You will also be able to evaluate: The development of the law on oblique intent and the proposals for reforming it. The limitations of the doctrines of coincidence and transferred malice. Homework During this unit, you will be set the following. In completing homework, you will be expected to do your own research and supplement your own notes. This is essential to show understanding. 1. Complete Homework Sheet (2) 2. Complete Case Cards for Actus Reus and Mens Rea. End of Unit Assessment As with AS, you will sit a DRAG test on elements, but this will be done at the end of this unit. You will also complete the following problem question (from Part B of the exam), which we will plan in lesson time, and you will then write up in timed circumstances as your termly assessment. Wayne belongs to a terrorist organisation. He telephones the police to say that he has placed a bomb in a van on Westminster Bridge and confirms that it is timed to explode in fifteen minutes. The police telephone operator mistakenly thinks that Wayne has said 'fifty minutes' and immediately communicates this information to his superior officer. -
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process Kevin C
Hastings Law Journal Volume 40 | Issue 5 Article 2 1-1989 Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process Kevin C. McMunigal Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 Hastings L.J. 957 (1989). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol40/iss5/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process by KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL* Consider the following disclosure problem. The government indicts a defendant on an armed robbery charge arising from a violent mugging. The prosecution's case is based entirely on the testimony of the victim, who identified the defendant from police photographs of persons with a record of similar violent crime. With only the victim's testimony to rely on, the prosecutor is unsure of her ability to obtain a conviction at trial. She offers the defendant a guilty plea limiting his sentencing exposure to five years, a significant concession in light of the defendant's substantial prior record and the fact that the charged offense carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years incarceration. As trial nears, the victim's confi- dence in the identification appears to wane. The robbery took place at night. He was frightened and saw his assailant for a matter of seconds. -
Liability Without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept
University at Buffalo School of Law Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1-1-1970 Liability without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept Janet S. Lindgren University at Buffalo School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Janet S. Lindgren, Liability without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 1201 (1970). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/789 Copyright 1970 by The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System; Reprinted by permission of the Wisconsin Law Review. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT: LOGIC AND POTENTIAL OF A DEVELOPING CONCEPT I. INTRODUCTION The imposition of criminal liability for an unlawful act without a required showing of mental state (often termed "strict liability" or "liability without fault") has been resorted to increasingly in the last 70 years.' In the broad context of the historical development of criminal liability, in which emphasis has been placed on moral blameworthiness, liability without fault has been viewed alter- nately as an illogical development 2 or as distinguishable in theory from the "true crimes of the classic law."' 3 This comment will dem- onstrate that, whatever may be one's emotional response to liability without fault, a rational and logical analysis of criminal liability can be made which accepts the imposition of criminal liability without a showing of fault. -
Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup John Rockwell Snowden University of Nebraska College of Law
Nebraska Law Review Volume 76 | Issue 3 Article 2 1997 Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup John Rockwell Snowden University of Nebraska College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation John Rockwell Snowden, Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup, 76 Neb. L. Rev. (1997) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol76/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. John Rockwell Snowden* Second Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska: New Juice for an Old Cup TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .......................................... 400 II. A Brief History of Murder and Malice ................. 401 A. Malice Emerges as a General Criminal Intent or Bad Attitude ...................................... 403 B. Malice Becomes Premeditation or Prior Planning... 404 C. Malice Matures as Particular States of Intention... 407 III. A History of Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraska ............................................. 410 A. The Statutes ...................................... 410 B. The Cases ......................................... 418 IV. Puzzles of Nebraska Homicide Jurisprudence .......... 423 A. The Problem of State v. Dean: What is the Mens Rea for Second Degree Murder? ... 423 B. The Problem of State v. Jones: May an Intentional Homicide Be Manslaughter? ....................... 429 C. The Problem of State v. Cave: Must the State Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Accused Did Not Act from an Adequate Provocation? . -
A Legal Response to Colin Holmes
J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/jme.17.2.86 on 1 June 1991. Downloaded from Journal ofmedical ethics, 1991, 17, 86-88 Psychopathic disorder: a category mistake? A legal response to Colin Holmes Irene Mackay University ofManchester Author's abstract diminished responsibility upon which I propose to comment. Holmes is concerned with a conflict between law and The absence of any established medical or medicine about the problem ofpsychopathy, in particular psychiatric definition of 'moral insanity' or as it relates to homicide. 'psychopathy' is noteworthy in this article by Colin He looksfor a consistent set oflegal principles based on Holmes. It is not clear whether either can be referred to a variety ofmedical concepts and in doing so criticises the correctly as an illness or whether the two could be courtfor its commonsense approach, its disregardfor synonymous. Moral insanity is referred to as 'absence medical evidence andfor employing lay notions of of conscience', 'no capacity for true moral feelings', responsibility and illness. 'depravity', and 'absence of moral scruple'. This commentary explores how Holmes's notionsfit into Psychopathy appears to mean 'total lack ofcopyright. existing legal rules and explains how the court seeks the compunction or consequent moral emotion', 'absence assistance ofmedical evidence when looking at the evidence of conscience', 'inability to experience guilt' and 'lack as a whole to enable it to decide upon issues ofdefence, of respect for the moral claims of others'. which involve legal and not medical concepts. Holmes is concerned with the conflict between law There is a difficulty inherent in this paper, as it seeks to and medicine about what he refers to as the problem of psychopathy. -
Serial Murder: a Four-Book Review by J
The Journal of PsychiatP/& Law/ÿpdng 1989 Serial murder: a four-book review by J. Reid Meloy, Ph.D. Serial Murder, by Ronald Holmes and James De Burger (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1988), 155 pp., $27.50. The Lust to Kill: A Feminist Investigation of Sexual Murder, by Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 177 pp., $35.00. Compulsive Killers: Tile Story of Modern Multiple Murder, by Elliott Leyton (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 298 pp., $24.95. Mass Murder: America's Growing Menace, by Jack Levin and James Fox (New York: Plenmn Press, 1985), 233 pp., $16.95. For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak With most miraculous organ. Hamlet The act of murder--the willful killing of one human being by another--is a major public health problem in the United States. One person in 10,000 will be murdered this year, and the probability of being murdered dramatically increases if one is young, black, male, poor, uneducated, and living in an urban area in the West or South.' A peculiar and frightening new form of murder, however, is becoming apparent: the purposeful killing of strangers, usually one at a time, over an extended period of time. This phenomenon, called serial murder to describe its distinctive AUTIIOR'S NOTE: Please address correspondence to 964 Fifth A re., Suite 435, San Diego, CA 92101. Telephone: (619) 544-1435. © 1990 by Federal Legal Publicatiolts, htc. 86 BOOK SECTION temporal sequence, was rarely chronicled from post-World War I until 1960, with each decade producing one or two cases. -
1 the Corporate Agent in Criminal
1 THE CORPORATE AGENT IN CRIMINAL LAW – AN ARGUMENT FOR COMPREHENSIVE IDENTIFICATION MARK DSOUZA* The doctrine of identification is often used to explain how corporations can commit criminal offences in their own right. Courts identify the natural persons who can be said to personify the corporation, and attribute their conduct and mental states to the corporation. However, current versions of the doctrine of identification suffer from several well-documented shortcomings. This paper sets out, and gives serious consideration to, a reformulated version of the identification doctrine that has the potential to addresses many of these shortcomings. In Section I, I explain how the doctrine of identification promotes the sociological legitimacy of corporate criminal law by allowing it to piggyback on the sociological legitimacy of the criminal law as it applies to natural persons. Next, in Section II, I describe the existing versions of the doctrine of identification, and the problems with them. In Section III, I argue that because the various alternatives to the identification doctrine might tend to undermine the sociological legitimacy of corporate criminal law, a suitably reformulated rule of identification would be preferable to abandoning identification altogether. Section IV describes such a reformulation, viz. comprehensive identification (CI). CI would attribute to corporations both the actions, and the mental states, of each of its employees acting in the course of their employment, that is to say, within the scope of their real or ostensible authority. While it would vastly expand the scope of corporate criminal liability, I demonstrate that it would also correct or ameliorate many of the problems that existing versions of the identification doctrine generate. -
The Origins of the Homicide Act 1957
Journal ofmedical ethics, 1986, 12, 8-12 J Med Ethics: first published as 10.1136/jme.12.1.8 on 1 March 1986. Downloaded from Forensic psychiatry symposium The origins of the Homicide Act 1957 J Higgins Regional Forensic Psychiatry Service, Liverpool Editor's note were certain serious wrongs, amongst them murder, which were 'botless', that is they could not be expiated Thispaper traces the history ofthe concepts ofinsanity and by compensation but had to be punished by death and diminished responsibility in English law. Insanity as a forfeiture ofproperty. Nevertheless for both groups of defence in Law has two components, and these two offences, botless and non-botless, there was no components developed quite separately. The idea that an assessment of culpability or responsibility - a sort of insane person may not know what he or she is doing when strict liability operated. It appears that the mentally he or she commits an offence, and isfor this reason not abnormal offender's family would have to pay guilty, goes back to the thirteenth century. The other compensation for any act done by him, including component, which developed in the seventeenth century, homicide, and thereafter take care of him - 'an insane was known as the 'right-wrong test'. According to this a person should be guarded and treated leniently by his person who commits an offence may be not guilty on the parents'. copyright. grounds that he does not know that what he is doing is wrong. The conceptofdiminished responsibility originated in the middle ofthe nineteenth century and was developed The twelfth to the eighteenth centuries in Scottish law.