Faith As Rational

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CHAPTER 3

Faith as Rational

The reader may suspect th at I am about to contra di ct all that l sa id in th e pre- vious chapter, where I spoke of a radi cal di sj unction between fa ith and reason. By that I mean: Christi an faith is in no way a produ ct of human reason or of natural human wi sdom, cann ot be coercive ly demonstrated by, or to, human reason, and even contra di cts natu ra l hum an reason. Mu st one then become an irratio nal human being in ord er to beli eve as a Chri sti an? Should we abandon the quest fo r a ra ti onal theologica l meth od, whi ch we have bee n pursuing since the beginning of thi s inquiry? I think not. Paradox ica ll y, we mu st continue to seek an understanding of fa ith that is not onl y fa ith -full , acknowledgin g th e radi ca l di sjuncti on of fa ith and reason, but that is ra ti onal as we ll. Douglas John Hall , who affirm s in hi s own theologia crucis the "cogniti ve pri ority" of revelatio n as "poi nt of departure" fo r Chri sti an theo logy, ca n set the tone fo r our discussion:

Nothin g at all can be ga ined by an auth oritarian, revelati on-based religion whi ch gloats over every humiliati on of the human mind . The point of th e cross is not that th e fai th ful should win arguments, but th at the world mi ght kn ow peace. Partl y, thi s peace depend s upon the ex pos iti on of a theo logy of reve lati on whi ch does not humiliate but ca n fulfill and exa lt th e qu est of the in te ll ect. 1

I shall argue, then, th at fa ith ca n be credibl e to the intelli gent mind, and that fa ith must account fo r itself in a reasonabl e manner. Reve lati on does not merely negate hum an reason, but in fo rm s and illuminates it.

What ls Rationality?

The word "rati onality" deri ves fro m th e Latin ratio, "reason"; rationality, broadl y spea king, is reasonabl eness. The term denotes ri ght thinking or th e ri ght fun cti oning of the human mind . However, what constitutes ra ti onality, reason-

80 Faith as Rational 81 abl eness, or ri ght thinking and how it is to be identi fied or measured are hi ghly conte nti ous questi ons that philosophers have debated endl ess ly. I shall not propose a uni versa l measurin g stick of ra ti onali ty ; all the best minds in th e hi story of philosophy have fa il ed to reach ag reement on thi s, and th ere is now a widespread opini on that none such ex ists. 2 I will offer here onl y a te ntati ve wo rkin g defi niti on and go on later to characte ri ze rationali ty more full y. My defi ni tion no doub t refl ects va ri ous contin gencies of my personal loca ti on and faith ori enta- tion, but I do not apo logize fo r thi s, sin ce no abso lute defini tion is ava il abl e. 1 propose to use th e term "rationality" to mea n a genuine effort of th e human min d to relate to rea tag">li ty in all its depth and compl ex ity. Ra ti onality occurs above all in everyday prac ti ca l li fe ; it is a matter of prax is, in whi ch prac ti ca l ac ti on and theoreti cal thought co me together. It is also an as pect of every di scipline of thought. 3 Rati onal th ought implies, first of all , an appro pri ate attent io n to the obj ect of inquiry or whatever it is th at one seeks to kn ow. Tt ca n be described, th en, as recepti vity and res ponse to whatever it is th at one encoun te rs. It is also ac ti ve, in th e se nse that it calcul ates how best to ac hi eve prac ti ca l goals. Rati o- nality, for li be rt io ni st/prax is-ori ented th ought, seeks a reasoned correlati on of th eo ry and practice. It is capable of co ntempl atin g and refl ectin g on what those goa ls of prac ti cal ac ti on should be. Wh en I say "rea li ty in all its de pth and co m- pl ex ity," 1 impl y th at ra ti onal thought is as broad and deep in scope as the wh ole vast ra nge of matters about whi ch hum an bein gs inquire and whi ch th ey wish to accomplish in th e world . A ra ti onal person is chara cteri zed by an openness not onl y to that whi ch he or she seeks to kn ow but also to th e rationali ty of oth ers, and therefore to di s- cussion and persuas ion. The rati onal perso n possesses an attitude of mind that is willing to be chall enged by relevant ev idence and is open to others' vi ewpoints or arguments, whether th ey be logica l, ex peri ential, or practi ca l. Obviously th e bas ic laws of logic, such as th e laws of noncontradiction and of logical sequence, are essenti al to rationali ty. Wi thout reason in th is sense it is imposs ibl e to kn ow or to argue anything, even th e limitati ons of reason' An extremely irra ti onal person, on th e other hand , is eas il y recogni zed by others as insane or mentall y unbal- anced, paranoid , or delud ed. A more moderately irrati onal person is usuall y seen by others as cl osed-minded, rigidl y dogmati c, unwilling to co nsider evid ence, or simpl y very subjecti vist or emotivist in an arbitrary mann er. Rationali ty ma y be hindered not onl y by dogma or emot ion but also by ideo logy or selfis h interests. Rati onal persons, however, are not necessarily di spassionate or detached in the process of knowing, or of acting. In some as pects of ex istence- fo r exampl e, sexual love, th e appreciati on of mu sic, th e love of nature, reli gious devotion , or politi cal commi tment- passion and attachment are appropriate and rati onal in the broad sense; ind eed, to relate to th ese dimensions of life di spassionately would be irrati onal. Reason and passion, th en, are not incompatible. On the contra ry, reason is appro pri ately pass ionate about ce rtain things. Th e new fa th er, perceiving how beautiful and precious hi s new child is, kn ows rationall y what he 82 1?.eflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality never knew before. The lover, besotted with erotic passion, knows his beloved more truly than he has ever known anyone. The social activist, impassioned with outrage about a brutal war, sees injustice and cruelty with incisive accuracy. Of course, one must recognize the conventional truth as well: passion, whether sexual , aesthetic, or political, can obscure rational processes, blinding us to the com- plexities of the world around us. Rational persons, however, may disagree with each other, may be believers or unbelievers; Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, or atheists; and conservatives, liberals, or radicals. This implies that rationality and truth have to be distin- guished. When I say a person is rational (say, a thoughtful Muslim, Hindu, or atheist) I do not imply that I agree with that person's ideas or beliefs. Out of the givenness of their own experience and resources, they may be functioning very rationally in coming to quite different conclusions from those I reach out of my experience and resources. On the other hand, l may consider a person to be irrational whose basic faith and viewpoints I share (e.g., some Christians or social- ists l can think of) if they refuse to be accountable in any way for their beliefs. "To claim that a belief is rational is not the same as to claim that a belief is true."4 Rationality and truth are by no means identical, yet rational persons are not at all indifferent to truth, for truth is the goal of the rational person. The rational person seeks "truth," that is, needs to be in touch with reality in order to live and to act well in the real world. It is also the case that I may consider someone essen- tially a rational person and at the same time judge some of his/her views or attitudes to be irrational. Human rationality is fallible, so that, as limited finite creatures, we are rational only to a certain degree. l reluctantly admit that some rational persons would find me to be irrational in some respects. J. Wentzel Van Huysteen proposes a helpful, broad concept of rationality that coheres with what l am suggesting here. He suggests that "rationality is all about responsibility: the responsibility to pursue clarity, intelligibility, and optimal understanding as ways to cope with ourselves and our world." It is the "intelligent pursuit of epistemic goals, of which intelligibility is the most important." Thus "optimizing our judgment about what we think, do, and value forms the crux ofrationality." 5 Rationality also has to do with accountability, that is, a will- ingness to explain oneself. Within the Christian community, such accountability will draw upon internal Christian criteria, such as Christ, scripture, tradition, and so on. But even when one converses with those outside of faith, accountability is called for. This does not imply submitting oneself to someone else's critieria of truth or making oneself responsible for universal verification of one's truth claims. It does mean an attempt to communicate reasonably by explaining why one thinks and believes as one does. The broad working concept of rationality that I am suggesting here is useful enough, l think, to proceed with the discussion of faith as rational, though the concept of rationality will have to be filled out as we proceed. I do not wish to prove or establish the content of Christian faith on the basis of some universal Faith as Rational 8 3

standard of human reason, wh ich woul d be contrary to a ll that I have said previously about fa ith as gift of the Spirit and about revelati on and th eology of the cross. Rather, revelation and human reason must be put into a kind of dialogue. As Ha ll argues, th ere is no good reason to suppose th at human reason will always be inhospitabl e to what is meant by revelati on.6 We need to give reason its due, as one of God's good gifts to humani ty. Ka rl Barth is a theologian who eschews a ll philosophi cal prolegomena for fa ith and theology. His comment on reason is in stru cti ve:

Concerning reason, I want to say thi s: J will have nothing to do wi th the di strust of reason. I have great tru st in reason. I am not a rati ona li st, but I beli eve that reason is a good girt of God and that we must make full use of it in theology. Thi s is our pra ise of God, who has given us thi s gift to di stingui sh th at two and two equals fo ur in stead of five. That is my rati onali sm! Some people want to make reason the abstract j udge of all - and that is unreasonable! 7

Some would suggest th at the whole dri ve fo r rationality in thought is ali en to bibli cal fa ith, that it is Greek and not Hebraic. But I suggest that the approach to rati ona li ty taken here is in keeping with the kind of ra ti onality we fi nd in the i Bible. For exampl e, Jesus as depicted in th e Gospels is no mere dogmati st and is 1. often in volved in argument and debate (see Mk 8: 11 ; 12:28; Mt 19: 1-1 2, 2 1, 23 - 27; 22: 15-46; etc.). The apostl es, we find , not onl y preach, teach, and bear wit- I ness; they also di scuss (Acts 6:9; 9:29), demonstrate (Acts 18:28), and reason (Acts 17:2; I 8: 19; 19:8-9). The best-known biblical text fo r the rationali ty of fa ith is I Peter 3: 15: "Always be ready to make your defense (apologia) to anyone who demands fro m you an accounting for the hope that is in you; yet do it w ith gentleness and reverence." The text does not, I th ink, ca ll for an elaborate philosophical apologetic in terms of human wisdom; it does encourage open, per- suasive, and reasonable communicati on with peopl e who do not share one's own fa ith and hope.

The Challenge to Rationality in a Postmodern Context

The attempt to speak of fa ith as ra ti onal find s an important challenge in much of what is call ed "postm odern " th ought. We have freq uentl y spoken of postm oderni ty and postm odernism without explaining what is meant by these terms. The terms are so widely used by such a wide variety of different thinkers, whether philosophers or theologians, scientists, arti sts, and others, that they can be very vague. Yet an awareness of th e di scourse of postmoderni ty and postmodernism is essenti al fo r understand ing important developments in contemporary theology. 84 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality ls !here a Pas I modern Con/ext! The peri odi zati on of hi story is not an un contro- versial matter. Whil e most hi stori ans of the West would agree, with hindsight, to spea k of an ancient wo rld , a medi eva l world , and a modern world , just wh en, how, and why these tra nsitions have occurred is ambiguous. Even more un clear, since so fa r we lack hindsight, is wheth er, why, or just when we have passed out of modernity into postmodernity; whether what is sometim es ca ll ed postmodernity is rea ll y just a kind of hyper-modernity; and in what postm odernity co n- sists. 8 However, there is quite wide co nsensus today th at in th e latter part of th e twenti eth century, in the Western/No rth ern world at least, a cultural and intell ectual tra nsi ti on ha s occurred, or has start ed to occur, whi ch may be ca ll ed " postmodern contex t. " Even if we do not wish to espouse postmodern is111 , we may speak of postm odernity, or a pos tm odern cultu ra l mood or atmosph ere whi ch ex presses itself in many cultural fo rm s. No doubt its ori gin s li e at least in part in the new techn ologies that we live with- the co mputer and the Intern et- and all th at th ey mea n fo r cross-c ul tura l co mmunicati on and in our awareness of li vin g in a mu ch small er world . ft is also not unconn ected to what is so metimes referred to as "post-found ati onal ism. " If th ere are no secure, demonstra bl e fo undati ons fo r hum an knowl edge upon whi ch peo pl e can agree, th en structures of auth ori ty begin to break dow n. Authori ty fi gures are questi oned in every sphere of practi - ca l life, wheth er in medi cine, reli gion, science, art, or architecture. This is not onl y because many peopl e are better educated and better abl e to read, research, and think fo r th emselves. More th an th at, peopl e have begun to be aware of the uncertain nature of so much of what has been regard ed as kn ow ledge. We kn ow, fo r exampl e, th at there is not one med icine fo r or one agreed upon way of treat- ing va ri ous ailm ents or di seases, and so now more than ever we question our phys icians and dare to disagree with them, not onl y in the detail s but in their bas ic presuppos iti ons. Postm oderni ty has something to do with thi s new awareness of compl ex ity in every fi eld of inquiry and practice. Clergy and the magis- teria of vario us fa ith co mmunities ca rry less automatic authority among peo pl e who know that there is no one set of correct answers to their reli gious questi ons. Chri stians, fo r example, are more awa re not onl y of other reli gions but also of th e grea t vari ety of di ffe ring traditions and di scourses th at have exi sted and still ex ist within the broad ra nge of Chri sti an fa ith . Teachers and professors, profes- sionals and ex perts of all kinds, find themse lves questi oned more fun da mentall y than they used to be. Postmodern ity has made its presence fe lt in the arts as we ll - in painting and architectu re , in music , fi cti on, dra ma, and mov ies. It is nothing new, of course , th at many ve ry di ffe rent styles have come and gone, ex isted and coex isted in all of these medi a. What may be qualitati ve ly new, some suggest, is an ex pl ic it celebra ti on of di versity and plu ra li sm, a deliberate choice fo r collage of styles and materi als, or bricolage, a "reconfi gurati on of va ri ous traditi onal obj ects in ord er to achi eve so me contemporary purpose or make an ironi c statement. "9 In architecture it may mean an intenti onal bringin g together of old and new and apparentl y incompati ble styles , techni ques , and materi als. In Faith as l?ational 85 fic ti on and film one may speak of the ironi c, playful j uxtaposing of the real and th e fi cti tious, emphasizin g contingency and temporality, throwing doubt on uni - versal truth. In dress, costume, and perfo rmance, "correct" and coordinated ways of doing things are de fi ed. Stanl ey Grenz comments:

The pop culture o f our day re fl ects the centerl ess plura li sm of postmodernity and gives expression to th e antirationa li sm of postmoderni sm. As evidenced in th e cloth es they wear and th e music they li sten to, postmodern s are no longer convin ced th at th eir world has a center or that human reason can perceive any logical structure in the extern al universe. They li ve in a world in whi ch the di stincti on between truth and fi ction has evaporated. Consequentl y they become coll ectors of ex peri- ences, repositori es of transitory, fl eeting images produced and fostered by the di versity o f medi a forms endemi c in postmodern society. 10

Postmodernity, then, has to do with suspi cion of all claim s to knowledge and truth, suspi cion of th e power th at is exercised in th e name of kn owledge and truth, di strust of dominant worldviews and obj ecti ve ethical values. Key words are " deconstructi on," "decenterin g," and " indeterminacy." 11 While suspi cion of authorities and truth claims was also characteri stic of earl y modernity, reason was considered th e appropri ate arbiter, replacing vested or dogmati c authoriti es. The postmodern atti tud e carri es thi s further and doubts even reason and science and their practical results. It is critical, then, not onl y of doctrines of God and reli gious moral values but also of scienti fic progress, techno logy, and aesth eti c standard s laid upon indi viduals by ex perts. It would be a mistake to think that postmodernity has entirely taken over society and culture, since in many ways and in many pl aces modernity is very much ali ve and well . One of the elements of postmodern consciousness is a suspi cion of the continuing presti ge of modern science and techno logy, of the dominati on exercised by internati onal corporations and the governments of great nati ons through technique, and of the environmental damage wrought by th e applicati on of scientific kn owledge and technology. Dominance through science has been, unquesti onabl y, one o f the major features of modernity since the days of Francis Bacon. That earl y scientific theori st spoke of"virile minds" extending the power and "empire" of the human race over the uni verse, conquering nature, " penetrating her, fo rcing her to give up her secrets."12 Ecological, especially eco- femini st, theology has done much to rai se our awareness that th ese attitudes are ali ve and well in the twenty-first century. Earl y modern technological weaponry was used by Europeans to dominate and exploit vast regions of the world, so that modernity is associated also with th e political, economi c, and re li gious imperial- ism of the ("Christian") white race. But military, political, and economic domination is, more th an ever, a dominant feature of our present reality, and re li gious imperi ali sm is certainly not dead. 86 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality

Postmodernity as cultu ral context may be severely critical of re li gion in some quarters, bu t may also open peopl e to "spirituality" in a situation that is less confident of human reason and more hospitable to fa ith and to communities of fa ith. Faith in God will not be fo unded upon forceful preth eological arguments of reason by whi ch we seek to impose correct answers on everyone. A more hum- bl e fa ith , however, whi ch kn ows it is not "sight," may be espoused with passion by postmodern peopl e, fo r we now kn ow, th rough reason's own criticism of reason, that " reason does not provide a viabl e and sati sfying altern ative to faith, as it once seemed to do." 13 Moreover, typi cal postmodern critiques of power, hegemony, and dominati on obviously have much in common w ith Christian liberati onist perspectives. Some academi c philosoph ers who have warmly embraced the ph enomenon of postmodern culture have offered philosophic th eory that attempts to account fo r and support it. lt will be useful to consider the work of some major representati ves of what is ca ll ed postmoderni st philosophy, in order to consider their significance for theological epi stemology.

A Glimpse of Postmodernist Philosophy. We have space here for only the briefest glimpse of the broad ph enomenon of postmodernist philosophy, which includes many differing and complex thinkers. The genre of postmoderni st thought (though it may be anti -postmodern to speak of genres at a ll ) is extraordinarily diverse, and thi s should not surprise us, since the celebration of diversity and difference is a central point of all postmodern ism. The term is so much in vogue, and so widespread is th e concern to di ssociate from the " modern " philosophy of the Enli ghtenment and vari ous aspects of the modern world, that the term postmodern (though not necessaril y postmodernist) is used positi vely by almost everyone from nihilisti c ath eists to conservative evangelical theologians! We have noted already in Kant's response to Hume's skepticism in the late eighteenth century the appearance of cracks in the modern philosophical confidence in human reason, and we saw growing fi ssures in thi s confidence in the post- Enli ghtenment thought of Marx, N ietzsche, and Freud. The philosophers of recent decades who have espoused postmodernism have often drawn substanti ally upon Marx but al so on such hermeneutical figures as Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, and philosophers of language such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ferdinand de Saussure, all of whom may be described as post-Enlightenment thinkers, and all of whom, in th eir va ri ous ways, hi storicized or relati vized truth claims about reality and so undermined the modern assura nce of certain knowledge. But the postmodernists have especially honoured Nietzsche as their intellectual fa ther, and postmoderni sm often takes a nihilisti c turn. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1 900) was a virulent critic of Enlightenment reason and also an avowed enemy of Christi anity. He was a radical skeptic about human knowledge in general, beli eving that we li ve in a constructed world th at derives from our own human perspecti ves. He is contemptuous of the modern "self," which is so Faith as Rational 8 7

prominent in modern thought from Descartes on, as a solid fo undation fo r truth about God and the world . Whi le th e pro bl emati c of the hum an subject's kn owledge of ex tern al obj ects, wheth er through rati onali sm or empiricism, had been laid out in the eighteenth century by both skepti cs and idea li sts, Imm anuel Kant had attemp ted to save hum an kn owledge with hi s transce ndental idea li sm and practica l reason, and Hegel had bro ught together "reason" and "th e rea l" in hi s grand system of absolute idea l ism. Bu t Ni etzsche was persuaded by neith er Kant nor Hegel, beli eving th at the whole of human so-ca ll ed knowledge was but a "web of illusion, " 14 constru cted by hum an bein gs out of their aesth etic gifts fo r crea ti on and self-c reation. Nietzsche him self was a writer of remark ab le arti sti c, poeti c fl air. Most espec iall y and of most interest to us here was hi s rejecti on of all mora l and reli gious claim s fo r "truth ." Both ancient Greek philosophy and Chri sti an theology beli eved th at moral truth is obj ecti ve and "given" in reality. They beli eved that moral truth is there to be di scovered thro ugh percepti on of th e eternal, either th ro ugh reason or thro ugh reve lati on. The moderns, culminating in Kant, thought that autonomous human reason (prac ti cal reason) could di scern objecti ve moral obli gations wi thin the self. Nietzsche attacked thi s view, arguing that moral va lues are actuall y ex pressions of the hum an "will to power." 15 In stincts of self-preserva ti on and self-aggrandi zement produce the illusions of moral duty and of God. In thi s res pect hi s th ought resem bl ed Marx's theory of " ideo logy" as "superstru ctural" to the economi c and technologica l base of th e social ord er, so that reli gion, philosoph y, art , morality, and law all constitute a "fa lse consc iousness" servin g th e interests of the ruling class. Nietzsche's "web of illusion" is also not unlike Freud 's view (a generation later) of re li gion as self- deceptive, illusory wish ful fi llm ent. 16 For all of these thinkers, th e relati on of God and crea ti on is reversed: It is not th at God created th e world and peopl e, but that peopl e have created God for their own purposes. Even if we do not accept their accounts of human th ought, culture, and reli gion, we need to ac knowledge the criti cal in sight of these thinkers into what is often the se lf-se rvi ng, ali enated, and alienating character of reli gious li fe. Ni etzsche, more virulentl y than any of them, attacked the concept of God, announcing th e ac tual "death of God" in Western cul ture. 17 The concept of God had been useful for human be ings for a certain peri od of time, but all truths are now increasingly seen to be li es and conve nti ons that se rve the will to power. Beli efs are not uni versa l or ra ti onal; indeed, spec ifica ll y Chri stian va lu es of humility and self-abnegati on are fo rm s of slave morality, panderin g to human weakness and engendering medi ocrity. Nietzsche was parti cul arl y contemptuous of women, whom he rega rd ed as weak and properl y mastered by men: "Man shall be educated fo r war, and woman for the recreati on of the warrior. Every- thing is fo ll y.... Thou goest to wo men? Remember th y whip! " 18 Christi an ethics, he proclaims, is " indecent, di shonest, cowardl y, effeminate ." Nietzsche beli eved that Chri sti anity was alread y essent ia ll y dead and that Chri stian ethi cs was about to peri sh: 88 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality

Thu s Chri st ianity as dogma perished by its own ethi cs, and in the sa me way Chri stianity as et hi cs mu st perish; we are stand ing on the threshold of thi s event. .. . Chri sti an truthfulness mu st now draw its strongest conclu sion, the one by which it shall do away with itse lf. 19

Nietzsche was particularly contemputous of the Chri st ian noti on of "god on the cross," whi ch he regarded as "the reve nge of the ori enta l slave on Rome." Reli- gion is essentiall y a "neurosis. "20 He did, however, assert (quite inconsistentl y) so me metaphysical truths, for exampl e, th e figure of the Superhuman (Uber- mensch), the strong, free , crea ti ve man, liberated from slave mora liti es, control- ling the hum an and nonhuman world in hi s own interests; and also, strangely, a doctrine of "etern al retu rn ," accord in g to which all th at happens will happen again and aga in an infinite number of tim es. Though hi s thought is important for any criti ca l account of reli gious li fe, it is obvious that Nietzsche's philosophy cann ot be espoused by Chri stians. He asserts a ra di ca l hi stori cism (i.e., the relativization of all notions of good an d ev il to their hi storica l contexts); the rej ection of all noti ons of the etern al and all attitudes of reverence or thanksgiving, asserting instead the primacy of will; and hi s idea l figure of the Superhum an , promot ing the domination and mastery of hum an and nonhuman nature. George Grant, a virul ent criti c of modern thought and of the modern technologica l world, comments that "there is no escape from Nietzsche if one is to understand modernity. "21 Ni etzsche, says Grant, understand s and theorizes the modern proj ect more clea rly than any other author. This raises in our minds the question of whether Nietzsche (a nd even hi s self-avowed pos t- modern ist fo ll owers) are rea ll y postmodern, or just hyper-m odern . Have they simpl y drawn th e project of modernity to its logica l conclusion? Grant points out that Nietzsche in ve nted th e concept of values, which has become universa l cur- rency in mod ern parl ance, indicating th e victory in modernity of radical hi storicism and of the technical mastery of the world. Grant wa rn s th at "one should teach Nietzsche within the understandin g that he is a teacher ofevil. "22 He is, of course, the teacher of nihilism: God is dead . Nothing is true. Nothing is good or evil. He is indeed the quintessenti al philosopher of despair. Perhaps the most fa mou s of the twenti eth-century postmoderni sts, Michel Foucault ( 1926-1 984), has been called "N ietzsche's truest disciple,"23 following him in hi s rad ical rejecti on of Enli ghtenment reason. Foucault particularly di s- mi sses the central concept of modern philoso phy, the autonomous self of both Descartes and Kant, as well as their claims to val id knowledge of the world. He objects to all alleged knowledge of universa ls, stressing difference over same- ness, heterogeneity over hom ogeneity, denying espec iall y the reality of a sin gle human nature. He echoes Nietzsche in his contenti on that all such uni versal concepts are in struments of power and domination. Claim s to kn owledge, whether of reli gion or of ph ilosophi c reason, are to be seen as hegemoni c. 24 His attitude to power is different from th at of Nietzsche, who both exposed and celebrated the Faith as Rational 89 will to power and exa lted th e Superhuman. Foucault's exposure of the hegemony of rati onal concepts ha s so methin g in common with Marxi st and liberati oni st conce rn s (though Foucault is not found valorizing justice or compassion for th e poor) in that he obviously di slik es domination. As a lover of poetry and other aest heti c pursuits, rather than rational di scourse, he wishes to draw attention to "local, discontinuous, di sq ualifi ed , illegitimate knowledges aga in st th e claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hi erarchi ze and ord er th em in the name of some true knowledge."25 The Jewish, Algerian-born, French-speakin g phil osoph er Jacqu es Derrida (b. 1930) follows Nietzsche and resembles Foucault in hi s rejection of knowledge as corresponding with rea lity. Focusing on lan guage, especiall y written language, he throws doubt on its ability to refer to objective reality beyond itself Influenced by Heid egger's herm eneuti ca l thought, Derrida thinks that, where written tex ts are concerned, there are no singular meanin gs ; th e meani ngs of texts are infini te ly fluid. We mu st aba ndon what he ca ll s " logocentrism" as search for obj ective meaning, either in an auth or's intention or in a world outside the play of language. "Deconstru cti on," then, is the important word fo r Derrida, questi onin g th e corres pondence between language and concepts and metaphysical presence or rea lity. The agenda of deconstruction is congeni al, to a degree, to liberati on theology's hermeneuti cs of suspi cion and , aga in , is opposed to the dom- in ati on that can ari se from claims to true interpretation or knowledge of what is real. These words of Derrida di sc lose both the obscurity of hi s thought and the political critique of power inh erent in hi s work:

Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual ord er, as well as the non- conceptual order with which the conceptual ord er is articulated. For exampl e, writing, as a class ica l concept, carri es with it pre di cates which have been subordinated, exclud ed, or held in reserve by forces and according to necessiti es to be anal yzed. It is these forces . .. whose force of generality, ge nerali zation, and generativity find th emse lves liberated, gra fte d onto a "new" concept of writing which also corresponds to whatever always has resisted th e former organization of forces. 26

Jea n-Francois Lyotard , a contemporary French phil osoph er, is one of the more comprehensible postmoderni sts.27 He, like the others, opposes the Enli ghtenment's optimistic proj ect of knowing, on a firm epistemological foundation, the laws and principles of the real world and what he calls the "master narratives" or myth s and worldviews th at more or less unconsciously undergird and legit- imi ze the central core of values and beli efs in human societi es. 28 Modern claims to replace ancient myth with rational postulates, wh ether th e claims of sc ience and technology or of progress, or Chri stian claims in the reli giou s and ethical field , are criticized as equ ally illusory. Since th e Second World War, not only 90 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality reli gious narrat ives bu t also the gra nd narratives of scientific progress have lost credi bil ity. No single sc ientific ente rpri se ex ists; rather, natura l scienti sts themselves are divided about th eir visions of the rea l. Va ri ous di sciplines are seen to be sets of competin g, para ll el, and in compatibl e " language ga mes ," and questions of tru th are now repl aced by qu estions about usefulness and perfo rm ativ- ity.29 Recogni tion of the encl of modern rationality, he thinks, ass ists us in coping with the radi ca l plu ra li sm fo und both in the va ri ous searches fo r know ledge and in social life. Lyotard comm ents on conte mporary ca pitali sm, whi ch he sees as a great blind system of techni ca l management, subjectl ess and va lue free. 30 But we may ask whether, accordin g to his ow n concepts , hi s perception is rea l or illusory. He has no interest in cross-cul tura l or even philosophi cal dialogue with those who di sagree with him , sin ce usuall y they are bringin g reasonabl e arguments to bea r. He seems to be opposed to totalitari ani sm and to favo ur human freedom, bu t on what ground s? And how should social goals be achi eved, according to what criteri a? The postmodern idea that peo ple create their world and themselves seems absurd , as Gregory Baum argues, in view of the hard rea l- iti es that press th emse lves upon us: " Here our speech is tested and judged when we apply it to the many dangers whi ch threaten humankind at thi s tim e: Hunger, we note, is a di scourse-transcending rea lity, so is AID S, so is torture and assas- sination by death squads. "31 Baum , as a Chri sti an theo logian who defends th e emancipatory aspects of the Enli ghtenment, objects to th e postmoderni st rejecti on of a common hum anity, of all uni ve rsal moral truth, and of th e valu e of cross-cultu ra l di alogue. Sin ce th ey stro ngly affirm difference, why do the postmoderni st philosophers not reve l in open di alogue with those who di sagree wi th them? The problem would be that di alogue has to be reasonabl e in some degree. Baum comments further:

If ... the deconstru ctionist message of the death of the subj ect were offered to the Blacks of South Afri ca or Natives in North Ameri ca, peopl e fo rcefu ll y exclud ed fro m th e scene of hi story, thi s message would be rejected as an ideo logy of th e Western empi re. Peopl e identified with th e fo rmerl y co loni zed nations argue that poor peo pl e cannot afford to be nihil is ts: nihilism is the pri vil ege of th e advantaged.32

Most readers, ensconced as we are perh aps in modern pres uppos itions, do not fin d the extreme assertions of the postm oderni st philosoph ers parti cul arl y co nvincin g. Th e pro blem with all kinds of radical hi storicism and skepticism is that the pro ponents find themselves, wi ll y-nilly, mak ing statements about th e nature of kn owledge and the nature of reality, and thus they turn out to be self- defeatin g. Their usefu lness may be th eir ability to shake loose some of our un conscious ass umpti ons about what we know and what is ac tuall y certain . However, it is improbabl e that any Chri sian beli ever could adopt the extreme nihilisti c views of these postm oderni st thinkers. The perspecti ve of fa ith ca nnot Faith as Rational 91 dispense with the "Other" reality of the holy God impinging upon our consciousness, commanding, promising, transforming. Nor does their thought per- suasively rule out or refute such experience. The objectivity of the good creation of God and of the humanity of Christ that we encounter in the experience of faith makes it impossible for C hristians to buy into the radical relativism and extreme agnosticism about reality that these authors propose. The convictions that reason is a gift of God to our good humanity, and that love and justice are intensely real, both in the will and nature of God and in human experience, mean that Christians cannot be followers of Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, or Lyotard. Christians of liberationist or feminist persuasion certainly share the suspicion of power and of the use of hegemonic di scourses and metanarratives to dominate in the world, but these theologies do not depend on the postmodernist philosophers for these insightsD Moreover, the postmodernists seldom offer concrete social or cultural analyses that would be useful for human or ecological emancipation. Jt is impossible, of course, for Christians to set aside the metanarrative of the history of creation and salvation, or to depart from the "center" of all reality revealed in the Christ. Nor have these authors persuaded us that we should' After all , persuasion by rational argument or dialogue is ruled out by them from the beginning. ln fact they appear to have further constricted, rather than opened up, the range of possible rational knowing of which human beings are capable and sometimes to have descended into a kind of self-defeating skepticism or solipsism.

The Wide Variety of "Postmodern" Th eologies. Contemporary theology and philosophical theology no doubt need to relate to what is called " postmodern context," but this is not the same as adopting the attitudes and approaches of postmodernist philosophy. A host of Christian thinkers, both philosophers and theologians, can be described as postmodern in their attitudes and approaches, and feature in their thought a suspicion of the modern Enlightenment confidence in human reason and the wish to decenter the human self. Some of them, such as Mark C. Taylor and Mark Kline Taylor, two postmodern thinkers, each very different from the other, are happy to identify themselves explicitly as postmodern and to borrow substantially from postmodernist philosophy.34 Some are perhaps more aptly described as "poststructuralist," such as Mary McClintock Fulker- son. 35 In sharp contrast, one might cautiously use the term "postmodern" of George Grant, a classically oriented Christian thinker who, in defending classical reason, would vigorously oppose any thought associated with Nietzsche, but who is at the same time a virulent critic of modernity, especially its absorption by technical reason. Douglas John Hall, a Canadian Protestant contextual theologian and appreciative inheritor of neo-orthodox theology, shares much of Grant's anti- modernity. Alasdair Macintyre is another, very different Christian philosopher who could be described as postmodern in a "premodern" way, arguing volumi- nously and with great erudition that there is not one rationality and not one jus- 92 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality ti ce. 36 One could say the sa me of Thomas Oden, co nserva ti ve Meth odi st th eologian, and Reformed ph ilosophi ca l th eo logians lik e Alvin Pl antin ga and Nich olas Wo l te r s t o rfl~ wh o are also sharply criti ca l of modern thought. 37 Then too, th e America n pos tl iberals (w ho may be ca ll ed neo-B arthi ans) such as Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, Ronald Thi emann , and Stanl ey Hauerwas, can all be described as postmodern , together with a British thin ke r congeni al with them, John Mil- bank .38 The term ca n be used, then, of theologians wh o mi ght be described as radi ca ll y liberal (a nd perh aps "hyper- modern "?) and others wh o mi ght be described as qui te conservati ve defenders of Chri stian tra di tional orth odoxy. If they have anything in comm on, it is perhaps their rejection of modern fo und a- ti onal ism or co nfidence in any uni versa ll y verifiabl e bas is fo r theology. I am both app rec iative and criti ca l of th ese va ri ous postmodern thinkers and wo uld like also to be "postm odern " in th e sense of rejecting the quest for sure reasonab le fo und ati ons fo r kn ow ledge as sought by modernity, but without buy- in g in to the anti ra ti onal rhetori c of many postmodern is t authors.

Not Foundationalism

If we are to consider fa ith as ra ti onal, must we opt fo r so me kind of modern fo und at ionalis m? That is, mu st our fa ith and theo logy be founded upon info rmati on (facts) or other we ll- fo und ed beli efs, that is, premi ses from whi ch they are logicall y in fe rred? "Foundationali sm" is the term used (pejorati ve ly) in current debate about epi stemology to refer to a typi ca ll y moderni st approach to kn owledge, whether in theo logy or human kn ow ledge in genera l. Fo undati onali sm is the search fo r an abso lu te and ind ubitabl e certai nty on the bas is of which true kn ow ledge can be constructed. For fo undati onali sm, on the bas is of first principl es, kn owledge will be di scernible and verifi abl e to all rational persons. 39 Kn ow ledge is built fro m the bottom up , then, by deductive (logical) and/or inducti ve (empirical) methods. Ancient Greek philosoph y sought fo r certain knowledge and ways to demonstra te it, but thi s was most especiall y th e preoc- cupati on of modern philosophy, es peciall y during the Age of Reason or Enli ghtenm ent, when classical noti ons of reason and knowledge were call ed into questi on. In theology, the questi on is: Do our fa ith affirma ti ons, to be rational, have to be arri ved at, or at least be defensible as, the conclusion of a logical argument?40 ls it in fac t possibl e to find a general , publicly acceptable intell ectual fo und ati on on which fai th and theology can be constructed? Certai nl y th ere is a long and respectabl e tra dition of arguing rati onall y fo r the ex istence of God reaching back fa r before modern ti mes. Great medi eval Chri sti an thinkers like Augustin e, Anselm , and Aquinas tried, fro m within fa ith , to demonstra te by reasonabl e arguments or proofs that God ex ists. Ea rl y modern rationali sts, empiri cists, and morali sts (e.g., Descartes, Locke, Kant) were th e true fo undati onalis ts, however, trying to argue to the ex istence of God from outside fai th , Faith as Rational 9 3

res pecti ve ly by vari ous deductive, empiri ca l, or moral premi ses. In addi tion , some modern (liberal) theo logians have attelllptecl to ground theo logy firml y in reli gious experi ence, whil e other modern (conservative) theologians have built on the fo und ati on of in fa lli ble scriptures. 4 1 Others try to offer hi stori cal fo undati onal premi ses and deductive argum ents fo r the spec ific content of th e gospel, such as the resurrection of Jes us, Wolfh art Pann enberg bein g perhaps the abl est and most striking exampl e of thi s kind of fo undationalism. We mi ght first consider bri efl y the apparent foundati onalism of premocl ern theo logians.

The Medievals and Their Successors. Thomas Aquinas, who li ved in the thir- teenth century, is so metim es rega rd ed as th e fo undationali st par excell ence in hi s fi ve proofs for the ex istence of Goel . Accordin g to these somewh at simil ar, over- lapping arguments, the thinker moves from something kn own- the con tingency and ord erliness of the world- to so methin g unknown- th e ex istence ofa necessary Be ing, who is first cause an d des igner oi' the world . Long before him , older medieva l theologians like Augustin e and Anselm , although they also offered argum ents fo r God's ex istence, asserted a more bas ic epi stemological principl e: credo ut intel!igam ("I beli eve in ord er that I may unde rstand"): "The beli ever does not seek to understand th at he may be li eve, but he be li eves that he may un derstand ."42 They used argum ents to corroborate, and to better und erstand , what th ey already beli eved by fa ith . An s Iem 's fa mous ontological argument for God is rea ll y an exampl e o f .fides quaerens inteLlectum ("faith seekin g under- stanclin g").43 Anselm argues: "Goel is that, than whi ch nothing greater can be conceived. That whi ch can be co nceived not to exist is not Goel ." He thu s asserts the "necessary" ex istence of God.44 It hardl y amounts to a coercive demonstration; it assumes already the reality of th e God revealed to fa ith . In fac t, Anselm presents hi s argument in the for m of a prayer: "So trul y, therefore, dost th ou ex ist, 0 Lord , my God, that thou ca nst not be conceived not to ex ist. "45 However, neither Augustine nor Anse lm th ought that Chri sti ans were required to fo und their fa ith on argumentati ve fo uncl ati ons. 46 Nor did Aquinas, despite hi s two-step epi stemology from sense ex peri ence and reason to revelati on and fa ith, think that simple beli evers were irrational if they did not fo und their fa ith on hi s proofs .47 He contended "that it is not a mark of lev ity to assent to the things that are of fa ith, although they are above reason."48 For him, the proofs were rea ll y corrob- orati on fo r fa ith . Th e great medievals, th en, th ough th ey offered onto logical or cosmological/teleological arguments fo r Go el 's ex istence, were not fo uncl ational- ists in the modern Cart esian sense. They did not in fact arri ve at fa ith on the bas is of outside premi ses and logical in fe rences. They did not think it was irrational to beli eve in God with out fo unding that fa ith upon pri or premi ses or argum ents . In fact their proofs are rea ll y a posteriori (after the fact) confirmati on of a credo they already possessed. In our time thinkers who may be regard ed as in some way the successors of Aquinas, such as Karl Rahner, Bern ard Lonergan, and Dav id Tracy, offer updated 94 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality arguments or anthropological renections in favour of a rati onal and natural human awareness of d ivine transcendence. To take Tracy as an example of this mode of th ought, the arguments of what he call s " fundamental th eology" are offered as prolegomena fo r theology as publ ic di scourse. He asserts that "the fundamental loyalty of th e th eologian qua theologian is to the morali ty of sci enti fic kn owledge whi ch he shares with hi s coll eagues, the philosophers, hi stori ans, and social scientists." 49 Thus, he is in terested in offering fu ndamental theology, or what mi ght be call ed a kind of " natura l theology" or "general revelati on" argument fo r God or tra nscendence: "Fundamental theologies will be concern ed pri- marily to provide arguments th at a ll reasonabl e persons, whether ' re li giously in volved ' or not, can recogni ze as reasonabl e."50 Tracy does not speak in terms o f proofs and does not im agin e that, as arguments, thi s mode of th ought will produce general philosophic assent. Rather, he offers " metaphysical and transcen- dental ren ecti on" 51- here he resembles Rahner and oth ers- which he hopes will evoke agreement fro m people who would otherwi se di smiss reli gious claims. He is not necessaril y, th en, a fou ndati onalist in th e modern sense (whi ch will be di s- cussed below). The evocati ve arguments o f what Tracy call s fu ndamental theology, have been both cri tic ized and defended abl y by philosophers fo r centuries. There seems to be no agreement among philosophers and logicians as to the validity or fo rce of such arguments, but it would be rare today to find a philosopher who thought they were decisive; obviously th ey are not universa ll y compelling (and therefo re not successfull y fo undationa li st). It is true and significant, th ough, that some re li g ious be lievers (some that I kn ow) have fo und th eir way to fa ith, or remain ed in fa ith, partl y wi th the help of such arguments. I am remi nded of John Updi ke 's story " Pi geon Feath ers," of the boy David Kern, who had hi s fa ith knocked out from under him by a vision of th e grave in its a ll cold certain ty and in evita bility. But coming across a dead pi geon, the pat- tern of its feathers awesomely beauti ful , David fo und that he simply could not go back on an in tuiti ve convictio n that "the God who had lavished such craft upon these worthless pi geons would not destroy Hi s whole creati on by refu sin g to let David li ve fo rever. " 52 This mode of di scourse, then, should not be di smi ssed or deplored. Yet many oth ers are quite unmoved by such arguments, fee ling th ere is enough di s- order and misery in the uni verse to counter th e so-call ed evidence or indi cati ons of God that these arguments adduce. Reasoned arguments fro m the world to God cann ot in th emselves produce fa ith in Jesus Christ, something whi ch Aquinas knew very we ll . To communicate the God of exodus, of cross and res- urrecti on, one needs to speak out of a broader rati onality about th e speci fi e content of fa ith itself.

Th e Modern Quest for Certain Knowledge. The dawn of what is call ed " moderni ty'' fo ll owing on th e Renaissance and Reformati on meant th at th e medi eval certainties about fa ith and kn owledge were severely shaken. T he Renaissance Faith as Rational 9 5 rev ived much of the wisdom of the ancient cl assica l phil osoph y and to so me ex tent fostered a se mi secul ar spirit. The Reform ation too stimul ated many people to question the traditi onal faith they had been taught, chall engin g peopl e to doubt and question authoritative doctrine by checking it with scripture. 51 The old question How do you kn ow? took on new urgency. In some ways this resembl ed what we today ca ll " postmodern context," a tra nsiti onary time of doub t and radical questioning. However, th e Enli ghtenm ent of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ca n be described as a positive, opti mi sti c effort to find secure, unques- tionable fo undations for human knowledge, and so to be liberated fr om both doubt and the tyranny of dogma. Even al its hei gh t, though, Enli ghtenment reaso n was never unanim ous about what th e foundations of assured knowl edge should be. The French philosoph er Rene Descartes ( 1596-1 650), a brilli ant contributor to mathematics and empirical science in the early seventee nth century, often described as the first majo r figure of modern philosophy, set out to doubt every- thing until he reached a rock-bottom ce rtainty that could not be doubted: "I per- ceived th at ... I had to undertak e seri ously once in my li fe to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted up to th en and to begin afresh fr om th e foundations, if I wished to establish so methin g firm an d constant. "54 Descartes found that he was capabl e of doubting the ex istence of extern al objects and genera ll y the evidence of hi s senses, since these so metimes deceived him . Wh at he could not doubt was hi s own "self," hi s own existence as a doubting, thinking subject. Jn this way Descart es arrived at hi s famous Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). He could only be sure of hi s ow n ex istence, however, as long as he was actu all y thinking. By a circuitous route beginning from hi s cogito, he reached, through a kind of ontologica l argument like that of Anselm, the conclu sion th at a perfect God must ex ist (for he wo uld be imperfect if he did not ex ist) who is the guara ntor of hi s innate, clear, and di stinct ideas. It was, therefore, on the indubitable basis of hi s own personal ex istence that he constructed a rational edifice by way of a process of logica l dedu ction. The human subj ect or se lf, th en, is the center of all knowledge, and God ca n be seen to ex ist only in as much as the human self needs him as gua ra ntor of human knowledge. Descartes' dream of building all knowledge upon abso lutely secure foundations and rational deductive processes did not last long, th ough hi s basic intenti on- to secure a rational fo undati on fo r all knowledge- became a major agenda for modern philosophy. Descartes also thought that the human mind or self was a "thinking substance" di stinct from the world of matter or "extension," including the human body. This duali sm of mind and body iso lated th e se lf from other persons and from the world around. Thinking became an abstracted intell ectual ded uctive process cut off not only from any essenti al relati onship to other persons but from practical activity in the real world. 55 Empiricist philoso phers who followed knew that it was not enough to think deductive ly (though Descartes also kn ew that to know the real wo rld one has to 96 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality observe it by mea ns of th e ph ys ica l senses). The Engli shm an John Locke, fo r exampl e ( 1632 -1 704), qu es ti oned Descartes' innate ideas, bu t optimisti ca ll y sought hi s rock-bottom certainty in th e mind 's percepti on of sensibl e obj ects, th e mind bein g und erstood as a tabula rasa, something li ke "white paper, vo id of all characters, with out any ideas."5<• Thi s was Locke's way of findin g a secure, unques ti onabl e startin g point on whi ch to build tru e kn ow ledge. Locke deve l- oped a cosmologica l argum ent fo r God on an emp iri cist basis and even tri ed to argue, wi th a comb inati on of empiri ca l and deductive procedures, fo r th e revelati on of God in Chri st. Christi ani ty needed, however, to rid itself of mysteri es and dogmatic baggage, without whic h it co uld be an entirely reasonable reli gion. The devout French be li ever and math emati cian Bl aise Pasca l ( 1623 -1 662) was already ve ry skepti ca l about such uses of reason and held a very low assess- ment of reason's powers, whi ch, accordin g to him , were purely ca lcul ative. 57 Pasca l's skepti cism about reason, whether deducti ve or empiri cal, preceded th e hi ghl y developed philosophi ca l skepti cism of the Scotti sh philosoph er Dav id 1-1 ume ( 17 11-1 776), however, who threw a good dea l of cold water on the cogency of the argum ents of both ra ti onali sts and empiricists, putting in doubt the va lidity of both reli gious and sc ientific kn ow ledge of the rea l wo rld as we ll as the substanti al rea li ty of the self. At about the same tim e th e idea li st philosopher George Berk eley argued that th e onl y things we rea ll y kn ow are the " ideas" th at we directly perceive in our minds, with no grounds fo r thinking th at such id eas correspond to extern al obj ects. Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1 804), fo ll ow ing upon a century or so of phil osophi cal controversy among ra ti onali sts, empiri cists, and idea li sts, ca ll ed into question all real knowlege of th e "th ing-in -itself' (the real world as it actuall y is), postul ating in hi s Critique of Pure Reason the impos ition of the principl es and catego ri es of human understanding upon all percepti on. In other wo rds, the human mind is emphati ca ll y not a tabula rnsa, as Locke thought, but contributes its own perce p- ti on of the real. Yet Kant proposed hi s own kind of rock-bottom start ing point fo r what he called "prac ti ca l reason" in the se lf's own inner consc iousness of moral obligati on. Hav ing in hi s first Critique demolished, he beli eved, the traditional cosmological and teleo logical argum ents fo r God, Kant deve loped in hi s Critique of Practical Reason a moral argument fo r a God wh o must ex ist as the lawgiver of what he thought was surely beyond doubt- our sense of mora l duty. This concept of God- and modern phil osophi c concepts of God generall y- tended, then, to be fu ncti onali st, in the sense th at "God" came to be manipulated fo r human purposes, designed to fit our specifica ti ons, or, as William Placher has argued, modern theology tended to domesti cate God.58 God became a postul ate of the human self, whi ch remained the epistemologica l center and arbiter of kn owledge. Out of great confidence in the capac ity of the human reasonabl e self to kn ow the truth, and the necessity of thi s truth to be use ful to our modern projects, modern theology deemph as ized th e doctrine of the Trini ty, pl ayed down the th eo logy of grace, and generall y di sparaged the recogniti on of God's transcendence and mys tery. Faith as Rational 97

A passionate rejecti on of thi s whole philosophi c endeavour to prove the ex istence of Goel ca me from Denmark in the outpourin gs of S0ren Kierkegaard. Hi s brilliant attacks upon philosophical theology (especially the system of Hege l) asserted the radical givenness of faith and used reason to di scred it reaso n's pres umptions to prove or es ta bl ish the existence of Go el. He also protested the abstractness of so much Chri sti an philosophy, as in thi s ra ther typical snippet of hi s writing:

For the rights of understanding to be valid one mu st ve nture out into Ii fe , out on the sea and Ii ft up one's voice, even though Goel hea rs it not, and not stand on the shore and watch others fighting and stru gglin g- only then does understand in g acquire its official sanction, for to stand on one leg and prove God's ex istence is a very different thing from go in g on one's kn ees and thanking him. 59

The point to note here, with a little help from Ki erk egaard , is that the modern philosophers and their va ri ous rationalist, empiri cist, idealist, or mora li st successors down to our time have not succeeded in finding uni versa ll y acceptable fo und ations for certain kn ow ledge- not of the phys ica l wo rld and certainl y not of God. Succeeding generations of phil osoph ers have made us even more aware of the complexity of the question of kn ow ledge. As we noted in chapter J, the "masters of suspi cion "- Marx , Nietzsche, and Freud60- and later such figures as Wittgenstein have thrown doubt on th e va lidity of mu ch of our rat ional thought and its correspondence to rea lity, not on ly in theology but in other disciplines as we ll , and also on the all eged secure fou ndations of human knowledge.

Nonfoundationalist Science. What may be called the nonfoundationalist character of ph ys ical science also ca me to the fo re in the latter half of the twentieth century. That sc ience is not simpl y a matter of demonstrable facts was evident, for exampl e, to the theoretical phys icist C. F. von Weizsacker, a pro minent figure in the development of quantum theory, who could speak of scienti fi e knowing as a kind of meditation, pointing to "th e process by which consciousness takes pos- session of a truth in such a way that not onl y the content but also the structure of consciousness is changed. "61 Similarly, the philosopher of sc ience Michael Polanyi, in hi s famous epi stemological work Personal Knowledge, di scussed the similarity of new scienti fie discovery to reli gious conversion:

We can now see the great difficulty that may arise in the attempt to per- suade others to accept a new idea in sc ience. We have seen that to the extent to which it represents a new way of reasonin g, we ca nnot con- vince others by formal argument, for so lon g as we argue within their framework we can never induce them to abandon it. Demonstration must be suppl emented, therefore, by forms of persuasion which can 98 /{efleclions on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality

induce a con version. Th e refu sa l to enter on th e opponent's way of arguing mu st be justifi ed by makin g it appea r altogether un reasonabl e. 62

The epi stemologica l foundati ons of ph ys ical science have been shaken especiall y since th e work of Thomas Kuhn on scientific revoluti ons. 63 A helpfu l commenta- tor on Kuhn on the signifi ca nce of phil osophy of science fo r ra ti onali ty in theo l- ogy is Yan 1-1 uys teen in hi s boo k The Shaping of Rationality. He points out that the moderni st vi ew of sc ience was very pos itivi sti c in th at scientific kn owl edge was thought to be objecti ve, fa ctual. subj ect to stri ct ve ri ficati on or fa lsifi cati on, beyond the need for interpretati on, and fixed in meaning64 Kuhn ex pl ored th e transiti on in bas ic scientifi c paradigms, fo r exampl e, from Newtoni an to Ein- steini an, showin g th at th e shift fr om one vi sion of the physica l world to anoth er was not stri ctl y based in unambiguous facts that were immediately prova ble to all scienti sts. Many sc ien ti fi e researchers engaged in "norm al science" continued fo r a long time to work within the ass umptions of the old paradi gm. The eventual widespread shitl of paradi gm has to be seen as a revo luti on that occurred gradu- all y and resembl ed fo r many sc ienti sts a kind of co nve rsion.65 Yet it was not merely an indi vidu ali sti c shift but a communal one within the scientific community th at was seeking the greater holi sti c intelligibility of certain rea liti es of th e phys ica l uni verse, whi ch now, th ro ugh relati vity and quantum th eory, was seen to be fa r more mys teri ous than had been previously thought. Kuhn and hi s successors in philosophy of sc ience began to speak of "the undetermination of theory by ev idence or data, and th e theory-l adenness of observ ati on. "66 This implies a brea kd own in th e sharp di stincti on that modern thought usuall y drew between properl y sc ientific rati onality and the ra tio nality of the humaniti es and social sc i- ences, and even of theo logy. Rati onal sc ience is no longer seen to require uni ve r- sal demonstrability. Co ncepts such as "intuition," "creativity," and "lea p," usuall y associated with "softer" di sc iplines, come to be part of scientifi c di scourse. More- over, the concept of prax is in relati on to truth is important here, since practi cal interests are hi ghl y determinative in th e development of sci entific theory: " Post- Kuhni an philosophy of science has ex plicitly taught us that when sc ientists obse rve, th ey do so selecti ve ly, and th ese se lecti ons are always determined by both th eoreti cal and practica l in te rests."67 Since Kuhn , scienti sts and philosophers of sc ience have argued th at the natu ra l sc iences have not achieved a uni versa l bas is fo r mediating di sagreements, that the rul es regul ating sci enti fi e deci sion are not universa ll y recogni zed. While Kuhn had argued for growing consensus among sci enti sts at the th eoreti cal level, making way for widespread revoluti onary agreement about a new paradigm, post-Kuhnian postmodern phil osophers of sc ience go even furth er than he did, suggestin g th at rational sc ientifi c thought does not necessaril y require consensus, but onl y th e openness of sc ientific researchers and the- orists to the evaluati on ur th e relev ant sc ienti fi e community, since there now exist side by side competin g paradigm theo ri es and research tra diti ons. Yan Huysteen cites a number of phil osophers of science who have argued that Faith as Rational 99

[i]n ord er to even begi n to und erstand what rati onali ty in di ffe rent modes of inquiry is about, it is necessary to see th at even in natu ra l sci - ence, as arguably our best exampl e of th e cognitive dimension of rati o- nality at work, the arguments and valu e judgments empl oyed by scienti sts are grounded in hi stori ca l contexts and social practices, and th at there is an essential openn ess even in th e very cri te ri a and norms th at guide sc ienti fi c inquiry6 8

All of thi s does not impl y surrender to an extreme postmoderni st, antirational subj ectivism. Rather, it impli es th at "we never escape the in te rsubj ecti ve and cross-di sciplinary obli gation to support our rati onal judgments wi th th e best ava il abl e reasons and th e best possible arguments."69 We see, then, that it is not onl y th at scholars of the humani ties and social sciences, the philosophers of reli gion and th eologians, whose ra ti onality is compl ex and less th an unanim ous; th e scientists and philosoph ers of science, cl assica ll y seen as the exemplars of trul y ra ti onal ve ri fia bl e di scourse, also lack absolu te fo undati ons and genera ll y accepted meth ods and th eo ri es. What we have is a general brea kdown of fo unda ti onali sm in epi stemology, if by fo undationali sm we mea n a un iversa ll y acceptab le standard or starting point of ra ti onali ty th at can be used as a bas is fo r furth er knowledge. Will ia m Pl acher, as a nonfo und ational- ist th eologian, states th e matter cogentl y:

all thi s impli es a dead end fo r Desca rtes' proj ect, and with it of the Enli ghtenment dream. We cann ot fi nd a startin g point fi rml y established on its own, on whic h we could constru ct the rest of our system of know ledge . . . . If theologians try to defend their claims by starting with basic, fo und ati onal truths that any rat ional person woul d have to beli eve or observa ti ons ind ependent of theory and assumption, they are trying to do someth ing that our best philosophers tell us is impossibl e- not merely fo r reli gious beli efs but fo r any beli efs whateve r. 70

Hav in g said all thi s, a cauti onary note is call ed fo r. To reject fo und ati onalism is not necessaril y to reject totall y the rati onality of the Enli ghte nment. Humanity passed thro ugh some very impor1ant learn ing ex peri ences between th e seventeenth and nineteenth centuri es, and we cannot merely return to what was, all too often, the authoritarian dogmati sm and superstiti on of pre modern times. Nor is it appropriate to revel in the humili at ion of the in te ll ect so th at peopl e will have to return to a mindless " fa ith " and submit themse lves to eccles ias ti cal authori ties I However, the human intell ect may be in fac t more ca pabl e of ce rtain kin ds of kn owl edge th an moderni sts ha ve usuall y granted, since, whil e modern philosophy and th eology were very confi dent of ce rtain kind s of dedu cti ve or empirica l ways of know in g, th ey also te nded to constri ct th e range of acceptabl e 100 Refl ections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality reasonin g. Perhaps postmodern thought can be both more hum ble and more positive about fait h as a rational way of know in g.

Not Fideism

In spea king in the last chapter of the ra di ca l di sj uncti on of fa ith and reason, rul ed out any kind of rationalistic approach to fa ith on the grounds that it is inappro pri ate to the rad ica l givenness of fa ith deri ved from revelation. Our di s- cussion of th e fa ilure of fo undationalis m confirms that even secul ar th ought about human kn ow ledge discounts the possibil ity of a secure ra ti onal ground on whi ch all knowledge ca n be constru cted. How, then, should we construe the nature of kn ow ledge and , in parti cul ar, theological kn ow ledge of God? I wish to argue th at the alte rn ative to thi s need not be an irrat ional or an ti- intell ectu al/ideism (fa ith-i sm) whi ch renoun ces or di sparages the responsible use of the rational mind. Beyond fo und ati onal ism there remain important and better ways to be rati onal, in human kn ow ing generally and spec ifica ll y in theology. To be fa ir, the fi deist at hi s or her best is so overta ken by th e wonder of what has been revealed, that s/he thinks that the criti cal intell ect, or use of hum an reason, has li ttle or no ro le in und erstandin g or defending th e revelati on. Fideists may actu all y be hi ghl y intelli gent indi vidu als who use th eir rational minds to dispar- age rationality. At hi s or her worst, however, th e fi deist is simply mindless and in tell ectuall y lazy and makes of thi s a sp iritual virtue. Bu t the controversy is not by any means limited to academ ics. A comm on sort of conversatio n along th ese lin es mi ght go somethin g li ke thi s at a church stu dy group of adul ts, sitting com- fo rtably in someone's li vin g room .

Conversation

T ED: Well, 1guess 1 should say right of/the bat that 1 have a lot of trouble believing in God at all. 1 don't know if I 'm an ath eist or not; well, I guess maybe 1 am. Th e fact is, 1 just can 't imagine a loving God standing behind all the pain and suffering in the world Especially since Becky died But it s not just that. I know we 're not th e first parents to lose a daugh t e 1~ but .. . 1 'd like to believe in a good and loving Fat her in heaven but 1 just can 1 get my head around it. 1 actually f eel like a bit of a hypocrite going to church, singing the hymns and all that, when actually most of it doesn 't make much sense to me. But J'd like to be talked into it. 1 mean, I 'd love to be a believe1; if I could do it with intellectual integrity.

MIMI: [Smiling sweetl y] Oh Ted, why wony so much about it ? if you want to believe, just believe. Take it on faith like 1 do. !Jind a lot of comfort in my religion because 1 j ust don 't let those kinds of questions bother me. Fa ith as Rational I OI

TED: J 'm glad you do. hut I can 'tj ust shut my eyes and believe. J need to hear a good m:gwnent be/ore I believe someth ing. Why not believe the moon is purple, or the Red Sox are going to vvin the pennant? ft has to be reasonable or J can 't believe it. Look, I 'm in business. I don /just believe any cockeyed story anybody tells me. Il l did J 'd be bankrupt overnight. And the same with politics. You can 't j ust believe every thing every politician tells you. They 'II take y ou for a fool every tirne. As.far as 1 'm concerned, it '.;· exactly the same with religion. How can l base my !1/e on something that seern s so irrationa// (/you expect me to believe it, sell me on it.

R EV. B Rl/\N : Well. I 'm with you, Ted. !/ you were going to throw out y our rational faculties ever)1 time you talked about religion, you 'd be wide open to every kind of' religious charlatan who came your way. Min d you, it depends· what you mean by "reasonable. "

JANE : Yes, that '.s· the key thing, isn't it:? Wh at do we mean by "reasonable "? l don't believe eve1y thing in the Bible, 01·just any thing the minister says. It has to make sense somehow. But religion can 't be reasonable the same way as businss or politics is, or science, say. Aren 't there different ways of being reasonable about different things /

Rr::v. BRIAN: Absolutely, Jane, you 're onto something there.

JANE : For one thing, I know J can't believe literally in both creation stories in the book a/Genesis. Th ey actually contradict each other But ! feel that those old stories have something really important to say to us.

Trn: Keeping in mind that those old stories have been refi1ted for a long time by evolutionary science'

REV. B RIAN: Th at'.\' why it '.;· reasonable to read them as poetry rather than as science or history. Then you read them for wisdom rather than historical or scientific facts. We 'II have to go .fiirther into that Later: And then too, there'.\' a whole different kind o/ reasoning, say, for interpreting poetry, or study ing history, or economics, or f or p ersonal relationsh1j;s. Ted, as f or the suf/ering of the world, you make a very good point. Lots ofpeople don 1 believe in Cod p reciselY./or that reason, and 1 .sympathize with them. I know what you went through when Becky died. But maybe we have to rethink our whole concept of Cod so that what we believe is credible and makes some kind of sense to a th inking person.

MIM I: Well, 1 guess I'm j ust not a thinking person then, and don't care to be eithe1: As .far as 1 'm concerned, 1 was brought up to believe in the Bible and I'm very comfortable with th at. if the Bible seems to contradict itself' 1 'm sure Cod has some good reason and we'll understand it all some day. But if we're going to come here and pull apart the Bible maybe l should stay home. I'll just believe what I like, thank you ve1y much. 102 Reflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality

This kind of conversation occurs often among Christians and their friends. Ted's position leans toward rationalism, Mimi's is fideism of the less admirable sort. Jane's or Rev. Brian 's attitude, insofar as we 've observed it, is approxi- mately what I would call "rational faith. " Rationalism (or rationalistic theology) imagines that Christian faith can be a secure intellectual system built upon prior premises and foolproof intellectual foundations. Some rationalists think that it 's possible to argue people into fully traditional Christian belief with compelling logical force . Others of rationalist inclination are inclined to reduce or dilute the content of faith to the point where it is palatable to reason. Fideism, on the other hand , tends to abandon rational processes and simply assert the right to believe anything at all: "I'll believe whatever I like. " The queen in Alice in Wonderland could believe in "as many as six impossible things before breakfast." Or fideism of a more sophisticated kind may tend to keep to itself and evade the critical questions of skeptics. In arguing for the disjunction of faith and reason I have clearly rejected rationalism, but have not defended fideism.

Mindless Fideism. Fideists can be extreme and mindless, becoming exasperated with the Teds of this world. But some highly intelligent, sophisticated thinkers can tend toward fideism. The great church father Tertullian, a brilliant mind and generally a rational person, is famous for his fideistic statements: "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?" That is , What has reason to do with faith? Or, "The Son of God died: absurd, and therefore utterly credible. He was buried and rose again: impossible, and therefore a fact. "71 The wisdom of God in the cross of Christ may appear foolish to human understanding, but it is not mere non sense. What J am calling mindless fideisrn refuses to be accountable for its path to knowledge. The attitude of extreme fideism could justify believing in alchemy or astrology or that the world is flat. It could mean that the two accounts of creation in Genesis I and 2 are both literally true or ruling out a priori the theory of evolution or any other empirically based information or theory because it seems to contradict the Bible. It could mean insisting that the four Gospel accounts of the resurrection events are all fac- tually accurate (though they contradict each other) or, in the face offeminist criticism, denying the patriarchal character of much biblical literature. It could mean refusing to consider the findings ofform or redaction criticism, or refusing to listen at all to the criticisms of religion that have arisen from thinkers like Marx and Freud, a refusal to listen and be challenged, a mere closed-minded repression of doubt, rooted in fear and usually ending in fanaticism. The Russian theologian Shestov reportedly held that "one can attain religious truth only by rejecting the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 and accepting instead 2 + 2 = 5. "72 Such attitudes as these are emphatically not defended here. Human reason, even if it cannot itself discover the truth of God, is nevertheless (according to faith) the gift of God and must be given its due. Faith as Rational 103

Luther. We have to be grateful for the penetrating in sight of Martin Luther's theology of the cross, which we co nsidered in the last chapte r. He in sisted on not rationalizin g and domesticating the "fooli shness of God" in the cross of Chri st. A brilliant and courageous man , Luther was also a belli cose, large r-than-life character who lived in a time of religious turmoil with constant clan ger to hi s life. So it is perhaps not surprisin g th at hi s language could at times become magnifi- centl y excessive. Hi s in te nse distaste fo r Aristotle and sc holas ti c theology was part of hi s insistence that sa lva ti on does not come by works, and certai nly not works of the intell ect. The a post !es of Jes us, he insisted , were not doctors of philosophy but humble fishermen and tax co ll ectors. That is why "the wise" of th is world condemn faith: "When God spea ks, reaso n judges hi s word as heresy and the word of th e devil, fo r it seems so absurcl."n This bein g the case, Luther dec lares,

Fai th slaughters reason .. . . So all th e god ly who enter with Abraham into the darkness of fa ith , kill reason and say: "Reason, thou art foolis h, yo u do not und ersta nd the things whi ch belong to Goel : therefore speak not aga in st me but be quiet; judge not, but hea r the word of Goel and believe it .. .. The evenin g sacrifi ce is to kill reason; the morning sacri- fice is to glorify Gocl ."74

We should not be mi sled by such dramat ic overstatement to the view that Luther was a mindless, irrati onal ficleist. He constantl y demonstrated an ability for orderl y, logicall y coherent th ought. The most fa mous example was hi s earl y debate with John Eck at Worms, when he argued th at popes and councils sometimes contradict each other (thereby proving th at they cannot both be absol utely right) and pushed fo r the auth ori ty of scripture in the church- but scripture interpreted in a reasonable fashion: "U nl ess I am convinced by scripture and plain reason, I will not . .. recant. "75 If taken at face va lue, all "antireason" is self- defeating, vanqui shin g its ow n arguments, and Luther's antireason diatribes can be dangerous if th ey make theo logy an enemy of all the rational sciences and give honest human beings th e impress ion th at to be Chri sti an they mu st lose their intellectual integrity.76

Th e Post liberals. This is a contemporary movement of sc holars and theologians whose thought in some respects tends to move toward a subtle form of fide ism. The late Han s Frei of Yale, being concerned not to dilute or revise the content of Chri sti an faith by correlating it to uni versal, cultural/reli gious quests fo r meaning, speaks of Chri st ian theo logy as "Chri sti an self-description," that is, an internal di scipline of th e believing communityn This is va lid enough in itse lf. Thi s is the same Anselmian/Barthian tradition that I have bee n utili zin g here in making the point that refl ection on th eo logical method proceeds a posteriori; that is , it 104 T?eflcctions on Revelation, Faith , and Rationality lays out th e ways in whi ch conve rsa ti on and debate ty pi ca ll y occur among Chri s- ti ans and ex pl ores the intern al logic and inte rconnectedn ess of fa ith statements. Thi s is a form of rati onal di scourse. In th eology, according to Frei, we spell out and arti cul ate th e content of ac tu al Chri sti an faith and we do so descriptively, not all ow in g thi s to be di storted by apologeti c concern s or submitting to ali en rati o- nal criti cism from oth er di sc iplines or from outside the fa ith co mmunity. As an interpreter of the Bibl e, Frei proposes th at biblical sto ri es have to be read as "rea li sti c narrative," ra ther lik e a novel (a nd here he does use li terary studies to analyze the character of bib li ca l narrat ive) .78 The stories, especiall y in the Gospels, "render an agent," id entifyin g Jes us Chri st as th e ri se n Saviour and Lord , in vitin g and enabling fa ith . Thi s herm eneuti c is, I think, very illuminatin g, a helpful way of characteri zin g and interpretin g bibli ca l narra tive, and Frei is surely ri ght th at fa ith as response to revelation is res ponse to a story. Frei is concern ed to point out th at the mea nings of th e biblical narratives do not depend on th eir hi stori ca l accuracy or reference, certainl y not the hi sto ri ca l fac tu ality of all th e detail s, and he is surely ri ght in thi s. In thi s way he avo ids th e mindless fid eism of litera li sm or fundamentali sm. But Frei's utteran ces are so metim es rather ambiguous on th e questi on of reference and truth claim s, as though he is retreatin g from any need to espouse or defend them at all. While at tim es it seems clear that, as a Chri sti an th eologian, he is claiming certain things to be so , for exampl e, that Chri st is ri se n,79 at other tim es, he argues th at bibli cal narratives do not "mean " by referrin g eith er to hi s- tori ca l fa cts or to ontological rea liti es.80 William Pl ac her, a fri endly critic, comments on Frei th at he "sometim es leaves what he wants to say about their truth a bit un clea r. " Trevor Hart, too, while appreciating Frei's contributions, in sists th at, "rea li sti c narra ti ve" or not, questions of truth "will not go away."8 1 Frei's approach ca n be seen as a postmodern nonfoundati onali st move- a local , internal, or co mmunal hermeneuti c. Hi s concern about the internal integrity of Chri s- ti an fa ith leads him to refuse to become in volved in open-minded di scussion as to truth cl aim s. Fo r exampl e, hi s insistence that it is "imposs ibl e not to beli eve" the res urrection of Jesus82 would not be helpful to ordinary thought ful Chri sti ans who kn ow themsel ves more th an ca pabl e of doubt. In addition, hi s refu sal to dis- cuss questi ons concerning th e hi stori ca l Jes us (questions about hi storical reference) give us a whiff of fi de ism, but of a subtl e kind: truth cl aims of faith are the intern al lan guage of the fa ith community and cann ot be questi oned or evaluated from outside. One must read sc ripture and do th eology "intratex tu all y"; that is, the text is not to be correlated with the context of th e world but ra ther "absorbs the world." The world is in te rpreted in li ght of th e tex t; the tex t is not interpreted in li ght of the world. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Frei is simply retreatin g from th e ch all enges of hi stori cal scholarship, that thi s is a protective stra tegy designed to make fa ith immune to rational chall enge from any quarter. George Lindbeck, also of Yale, is cl osely associated with Fre i in hi s empha- sis on doctrine as "Chri sti an self-description." Lindbeck becomes more explicit Fnith as Rational 105 in hi s dee mphas is on, if not deni al of, the signifi ca nce of ontologica l truth cl aim s (an approach th at owes mu ch to the philosoph y of Wittgenstein ). Lindbeck too is moti va ted to uph old the intern al in tegrity o f' Chri sti an fa ith , to res ist an y diluti on of the content of fa ith by meth ods of correlati on with contex t or co ntemporary questi ons. He wi shes to resist any comp ro mi se or negoti ati on with rival truth claim s in other reli gions, and to oppose th e idea of a com mon core among the wo rld reli gions. In The Nature of Doctrine, he argues th at the va rio us reli gions, in cluding Chri sti ani ty, mu st be understood as di stin ct " language games," wi th their own "communally auth oritati ve rul es of discourse, attitude, and acti on."83 The stud y of doctrine is the study of regul ative th eory within a fa ith commun ity. Thu s,

a reli gion ca n be viewed as a kind of cultu ra l and/o r lingui stic framework or medium th at shapes th e entirely of li fe and th ought. It fun cti ons so mewhat lik e a Kantian a pr io ri , although in thi s case the a pri ori is a set of acquired skill s th at could be di fferent. It is not prim aril y an array of be liefs about the tru e and th e good (though it may in vo lve these). 84

Doctrine, then, regul ates fa ith statements within th e fa ith communi ty and resembl es rul es like " Dri ve on the left" and "Dri ve on the ri ght. "85 Later wr it ings by Lindbeck seem not to have departed fro m thi s genera l app roach. He spea ks of the Chri stian "idiosyncra ti c journ ey," of th e ex clusivity of the elect community and its " incommensurable, untra nslatabl e fra meworks."86 Thi s, aga in , can be identified as a fo rm of postmodern nonfo undati onali sm, but one imm edi ately suspects a fid eisti c retrea t. Lind beck appears to have co ll apsed fa ith commitment into a postmodern theory of many ra ti onaliti es, conceptual structures that fun cti on onl y in terms of th eir own intern al logic. Van Huysteen, commenting on another postlibera l author, sees thi s move as a kind of "di sciplinary cl os ure and intell ectu al autonomy. "87 Yet Lindbeck 's own stance about rat ionali ty is ambi guous. Toward the end of hi s book we find a fe w paragraph s in which he opens out to a broad and non - fi deist noti on of rati onal discourse that appears very helpful. Defending hi s nonfo undati onali st, intratex tual approach, he points out that standards of rati onality va ry from fie ld to fie ld and fro m age to age, making th e di scovery of uni versal fo undations fo r knowledge, either within or across di sciplines, unlikely. Ci tin g Wi ttgenstein and Thomas Kuhn, Lindbeck argues that "the norms of reasonabl e- ness are too rich and sub tle to be adequ ately specifi ed in any general theory of reason or kn ow ledge." Neverth eless, a kind of "reasonabl eness" is app ro pri ate:

Thus reason ableness in reli gion and theol ogy, as in other domai ns, has so mething of that aesth eti c chara cter, th at quality of un fo rmali za bl e skill , whi ch we usuall y associate with the arti st or the linguisti ca ll y competent. If so, bas ic religious and theological positi ons, Iik e Kuhn 's 106 Refl ections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality

sc ientific paradi gms, are in vuln erable to defini tive refutati on (as we ll as confirmati on) but ca n nevertheless be tested and argued about in va rious ways , and these tests and argum ents in the long run make a difference. Reason places co nstraints on reli gious, as we ll as on scientific opti ons, even th ough th ese co nstrai nts are too fl ex ibl e and in fo rm al to be spell ed out in either fo undati onal theo logy or a genera l th eory of sc i- ence . ... Thus, alth ough a reli gion is not subj ect to dec isive di sproof, it is subj ect . . . to ra ti onal testin g procedures not wholl y unlike th ose that appl y to genera l sc ientific theori es or paradi gms. 88

These thoughts approach cl osely to th e kind of rati onal fa ith and ra ti onal theological di scourse that l am defending here. However, th ey remain margin al to Lindbeck 's main thrust. In defen ce of hi s cultural-lingui sti c th eory of doctrine, he argues at length aga in st wh at he id entifi es as a comm on altern ati ve approach in modern liberal th eo logy, the "experi ential/ex press ivist app roach," in whi ch doctrinal statements are reinterpreted as "nonin fo rm ati ve and nondi scursive sy mbols of inn er fee lings, attitudes, or ex istenti al ori entati ons. "89 Here one suspects th at he has described ce rtain auth ors un fa irl y in a rather pejorati ve way. In Wittgensteini an fas hi on, he argues that, sin ce it is language th at perm its and shapes ex peri ence, and not vice-versa , th e in te rn al language of a reli giou s tra diti on determines the kind of reli gious ex peri ence peo pl e will have within that traditi on. This too is interestin g, but continues to beg th e qu esti on of truth claims about rea lity. Of particul ar interest here is Lindbeck 's oppositi on to what he call s the "cogniti ve/propositi onal" app roach, whi ch understand s doc trinal statements as " in fo rmative propos iti ons or truth claims about obj ective rea liti es."90 Lind- beck tends to di smi ss th is approach rather swiftly as so methin g naive and passe, cha racteri zing it simpli sti ca ll y, as though theol ogians of thi s stripe have thought they were "describing obj ecti ve rea li ties" in some perm anentl y valid , un change- abl e way. But of co urse so-ca ll ed cogniti ve/propositi onal th eologians have always kn own that th eir th eo logica l for mul ati ons are analogica l and inadequate to describe the di vine mys tery. Great th eol ogical minds, like Au gustine, An se lm , Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Barth , knowin g th e inadequacy and tentativeness of their theo logica l language, neverth eless beli eved that th eir th eo logica l statements corresponded, imperfectl y yet trul y, to the di vine reality, and thi s precise ly because of God's se lf-revelati on. Further, contex tu al theologians today al so know very well th at th ey are not offering th eofogia eterna, 91 th at perspectives, emphases, and even truth claim s wi ll shi ft in theology. Yet thi s does not impl y the withd rawal of propositi ons about the true and the good. But then Lindbeck, in rather con fus in g mann er, does not rule out truth claim s as part of th e cultu ra l/lingui sti c approach,92 and ca n say later in th e book: "modifi ed or hi storicized propositional theori es seem no less capabl e of admitting hi storical change and di versity than is a rul e th eory."93 Another dimension of the thought of Lindbeck and oth er postliberal theo lo- Faith as aationa/ 107 gians is th eir fai lure to grappl e with contex t. Wi shin g to do theology intratex tuall y, they emphasize the intern al logic and coherence of scripture and tradition, in sistin g that theology mu st not be absorbed by situations or contexts but rath er should "absorb the universe into the biblical world."94 Here they exhibit a char- acteristic of postmodern thought genera ll y, in that they emphas ize th e parti cular- ity of Chri sti an co mmunal rul es of discourse, but theirs is (as Mark Klin e Taylor suggests) a "postmodern ism of reactio n,"95 in that they di sda in to be in seri ous dialogue with th e plu ra liti es around them and fa il to struggle with the concern s ra ised within their own Ameri ca n co ntex t by black or feminist theo logies% Other representati ves of thi s movemen t- Stanley Hauerwas, Kathryn Tanner, David Kelsey, and John Milbank (not to suggest that this is a monolithi c group)- also make important contributions, emphasizing the internal fa ith of the co mmunity and scripture as canon , constitutive for the life of th e church. The work of thi s group is helpful in maintainin g Chri sti an identity and the integrity of fa ith. Yet there remains a suspi cion that the dee mphasis on truth claims that one detects in some of their work amounts to a retreat into relativism or ontologica l agnosticism. In their neglect of a positive approach to the rational , postlibera l theology leans toward a hi ghl y intell ectual fo rm of fid eism.97 Lindbeck especia ll y seems to imply that we should not be in dialogue with non-Chri stians about truth claims; rather we shoul d simply continue to believe, worship, and be th e church. The credibility of the church, he argues, wi 11 derive from the authenticity of its practical life and not from any rational defence of its truth claims.98 In fact it is uncl ear whether he thinks Chri sti ans should make any truth claims at all. In turning as ide from the abso lute, demonstrable certainty of modern foundational ism, he seems to opt for the opposi te error- a kind of relativism or agnosti cism.99 This approach may have a certain charm in academi c ci rcles but would be scandalous to most ordinary faithful Chri stians; fo r their fa ith it is crucial and indi spensa bl e th at the claims of the gospel about God, Jesus Chri st, sa lvati on, and so on, are true. We may ask, with Kathryn Tann er, "What would be th e point of doing theology if one were not rea ll y talking about God?" 100 Does God actually hear our prayers? Is God actually there, and does God truly love us, as the Christ revelati on tell s us? If not, why pray, however correct our intern al language game may be? Is God 's Spirit actuall y at work among us, hea lin g, supporting, in spiring, striving fo r the rei gn of justice, peace, and wholeness? Does God truly forgive and accept us in Chri st and offer etern al life? At a time of crisis, or at a fun era l, a pastor's words must be seri- ously meant to correspond to reality. Engaged in social stru ggle, Chri stians build upon the assurance that God 's reign is rea l and that the Spirit who leads and in spi res is really there. Otherwise prayer and proclamati on are a sham. Language games are inimical to se ri ous fa ith and undermine the power of faith to motivate, inspire, or console the believer. If thi s is not what the postliberals intended, they at least leave themselves open to thi s kind of interpretation and criticism. As I have been arguing here, one need not choose betwee n modern foundationalism and onto logica l agnosticism. Faith may be both rational and epistemologically 108 Refl ections on Revelation, Fa ith, and Rationality risky. A rat iona l person may, with good reasons, ta ke the ri sk of fai th by tak ing up a fo rm of fa ith that is more cred ible than its alte rn atives.

Theology as a Rational Discipline

I have spoken (in chapter 2) of the "ra di cal di sj unction of fa ith and reason," but also (in th is chapter) of" fa ith as rational. " By so saying, I am suggestin g that Christian fa ith and theology are both conti nuous and disconti nuous with genera l hu ma n know ledge and reason.101 Faith lives out of the rad ica l givenn ess of God's revelation and so does not deri ve fro m human reason as such. The truth of the gospel comes as sheer gi fl fro m beyond us, truth th at we cann ot tell ourselves but whi ch is itself "gift" fo r hum an reason, having the power to re deem and renew our rat ional fac ul ties. Yet at the same ti me fa ith li ves in a pos iti ve relationship to reason, wh ich is also God's good gift. Fa ith and rat ionali ty, then, li ve within a relationship of te nsion. Moreover, the need to communicate the gospel as public discourse demands that fa ith be communicated rationall y, maki ng contact with and honourin g the rati onal fac ul ties of those with whom we speak.

A Broader and Deeper Concept a/the Rational. At the beginning of the chapter I began to suggest a broad co ncept of ra ti onality as a genuine effort of the human perso n to be in relati on with rea li ty in all its depth and compl ex ity. Borrowing fro m Yan Huysteen, I further characteri zed ra tio nality as the pursuit of "cl ari ty, in te ll ig ibility, and optimal understandin g as ways to cope with ourselves and our world ." It is very practica l in that it has to do with li vin g we ll , for both individ- uals and societi es, and in this respect it is of great interest to li berationi st theologies, fo r whi ch prax is, as an interaction of th eory and acti on, is a cru cial concern . Fa ith in the Iib erating God is closely associated not onl y with receiving di vine reve lati on bu t also with the ra ti onality of the social analyses and the practi cal ex perience of social struggle.102 Liberation theologies must utilize reason ri gor- ously if th ey are to help peopl e di scern God's presence and ac ti vity in situati ons of poverty and oppress ion. However, these references to "coping" and practi cality should not be mi s- understood to indi cate a red ucti on of rationality to what has come to be called " instrumental reason." Reason is not merely the means to obtaining end s about whi ch reason is irre levant. Nor is it lim ited, as in modern logical empi ri cism, to the gathering of ve ri fiab le fac ts that are usefu l for obtaining desired goals. George Grant protested aga in st the co ncept of human be in gs as simply "clever beasts with a faci lity fo r math emati cs." 103 Sometimes re li gious peo pl e have sur- re ndered reason to its purely in strumen tal or ca lcul ati ve fun cti on. Bl aise Pascal is an exampl e of thi s, limiting reason to truths of fac t and math emati ca l relations, and locating fa ith not in the mind but in the heart: "Th e heart has reasons, of which reason is igno ra nt. " 104 110 f?eflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality the sense of thought based in indubitable premises, we also find an unwillingness to limit human thought to the narrow range of the logical and empirical. All of this helps to create a situation of opportunity for faith and theology, which, we hope, will not fly off into postmodernist irrationality or fideism , but rather reclaim its own proper mode of rationality. We need , then , a concept of faith as rational, and of theology as a rational discipline that is not merely esoteric and that sees theology in continuity with other spheres of rational human thought. Rather than retreat into fide ism , theology needs to recogni ze the " fiduciary" (faith-like) character of all significant human inquiry. We have seen that faith experience has much in common with and overlaps with ethical, aesthetic, and social dimensions of reality and that theology as the thought dimension of faith therefore has much in common with the disciplines that consider ends as well as means, the beautiful, and the evalu- ative dimensions of the social. The humanities and social sciences too are rational , even if they do not achieve universal agreement and even if their findings are without utilitarian value. But more than that, we have seen that the natural and physical scientific disciplines, at their more profound levels, are also selec- tive, intuitive, and committed- that is , "fiduciary" in character. 109 Theology, then , may not hive off into a private corner and refuse to engage in open, inter- disciplinary conversation with other realms of thought. While not abandoning its own autonomy, it must open itself to the critical thought of other disciplines and bring critical perspectives to bear on them as well.

Modes of Rationality in Va rious Disciplines. At the same time, theology, like other disciplines, must recognize its own unique character and the specific methods that are proper to its unique object of inquiry. While it is true, we may say, that human reason is one, there are nevertheless many quite different modes of rationality. As a discipline of faith , and of a particular faith , Christian theology (like other disciplines) does operate a posteriori out of its own peculiar sources and carries its own distinct mode of rationality. The mode of inquiry in every discipline is determined by its object, that is, by that which it seeks to know. There is not, then, one mode of rationality that can adjudicate among all disciplines or, more narrowly, among various religious truth claims or philosophies. There are many very different kinds of realities which present themselves to us, a multitude of different objects of inquiry. It is not possible, therefore, to prescribe a priori for any kind of inquiry the appropriate way to knowledge, for each reality pre- scribes the mode of inquiry by which it can be known. In fact , it is only when we already know something about an object of knowledge that we know how to learn more about it. A mathematician or logician, for example, knows how to use methods of deductive reasoning to increase awareness of the intricacies of number or to analyze the structure of arguments. But empirical scientists must be rational in a very different way. Geologists, metallurgists , and chemists, for example, know how to force information out of physical objects in a laboratory; Fnith as Rational I I I because they a lready know something about the properties and behaviour of met- a ls, gases, and chemi cals, they know how to learn more and ind eed how to apply th e in fo rmati on obtain ed to techn o logical purposes. T he hi sto ri an, on the other hand , must pu rs ue th e rea lities or obj ects o f the past (hi stori cal events and the interpretati on of thei r meaning and in terconnecti ons) in yet another way. Written records and manuscripts must be consulted. T he testimoni es of people who li ved thro ugh a war, th ro ugh an electio n, or th rough a sci en ti fie revolution must be gath ered, carefully heard, compared, and weighed, if th ese events are to be understood- a qui te different fo rm of reason and very different method from that fo und in mathemati cs or chemistry. Onl y when an hi storian has actua ll y learned something about the past can s/he know how such an inquiry should be pursued. It woul d be irrational, even absurd, fo r th e hi stori an to use the meth ods of chemists, or chemi sts th e methods of logicians. It is possible to use the term "scienti fic " very broadly fo r all such a posteriori methods of rational inqui ry (as the medi evals used the te rm scientia to mean any disciplined pursui t of truth). T. F. Torra nce stated the matter clearl y many years ago:

In all scientific kn owledge, we let the natu re of what we know prescribe for us the speci fie mode of rationa li ty we adopt toward it. T hat is why in every science we operate w ith a distincti ve fo rm of inquiry proper to th e natu re of the obj ect we in vesti gate in it. 11 0

It may not be useful today to use the word "scientific" in this broad way, since it might suggest to people that all inquiries should fo llow th e methods and processes of verification fo und in the natural sciences. It is important to recogni ze th at modes of verification also vary in relati on to the many kinds of realities we seek to know and understand. We test our results in metallurgy quite di ffe r- ently from the way we test, or de fend, our conclusions in hi story. The kind of agreement or consensus one hopes fo r among inquiries vari es also. T here may be easy and general agreement among meta llurgists about whi ch appli cation of heat and chemi cals should be used to obtain copper from ore, or among astronomers about the day and hour of the appearance of Hall ey's comet. There may be less agreement among hi storians about the factors that led to the eru ption of World War !. Two very intell igent, learned, and rational hi stori ans may di sagree profound ly, even passionately, about the fac tors that have bro ught about the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. No doubt they wi ll share and agree about certain facts, but they may gather and select di ffe rent sets of data, weigh and eval- uate matters quite differentl y, and reach opposing conclu sions. In the social sciences too, economi sts, political scientists, and socio logists may study the same phenomena using rigorous and meti cul ous meth ods of research and reach startlingly di ffe rent conclusions about inflati on, unemployment, labour and management re lati ons. 111 I do not im ply that the truth cannot be reached or at least I I 2 Refl ections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality app rox im ated in th ese areas. However, the more compl ex th e obj ect of inquiry, the more di ffi cult for rational inquirers to pro ve or verify th eir con clu sions to oth ers. When we move to areas such as human and soci al psychol ogy, Iit erary analys is, philosoph y of law, art cri ticism, or mu sicology, we find it even more diflicult to test, ve ri fy, or find co nsensus. One ma y say th at th e fidu ciary dimension of the ra ti onal increases as one moves into th e areas of the human, the social , th e aesth eti c, and the ethi ca l. Nevertheless, eva luative th ought, as di stin ct from th e empirical fac tu ali ty and logica l analys is of math emati cs, ma y be rati onal. For exampl e, 1, fo r one, am un willing to ad mi t th at "Mary Had a Littl e Lamb" is as bea utiful or va luable as a Mozart concerto . I may have difficulty veri fy in g thi s to a little child, but rati onal perception, 1 in sist, is nevertheless at work . The mu si- cologist may be abl e to throw 1ig ht on wh at constitutes one a trite ditty and the other magnifi cent arti stry. l maintain th at literary theory and musicology, aes- theti cs and ethi cs, sociology and hi story are every bit as rati onal as geology and astronomy, if they pursue th eir inquiries in a mann er appropriate to th e rea li ties they seek to kn ow and understand . All thi s mea ns th at the ra tionality of a di scipline ca nn ot be measured simply by its potential fo r uni ve rsal verifi ca ti on and agree ment. Th e acti vity of literary, arti sti c, and phil osophi c di sciplines may find it difficult to reach consensus, but ca nn ot fo r that reason be dismi ssed as irrational or as mere opinion. Nor would I agree th at th ey should be dimini shed as nonrational. This would be an intoler- abl e diminution of the powers and depth s of the human mind. Nor would I agree that in fo rm ed viewpoints in th ese areas are merely th e ex pression of subj ective preferences, even if su bjectiv e or perso nal elements com e into pl ay. l suggest th at ra ti onal di scernm ent occurs and that rational conve rsation is possibl e when, for exampl e, ethi cists debate the ri ght and wron g of sexual behaviour, or the pro per goa ls of a soc ial and economi c system. We have seen that at a th eoretical level, th e thought of ph ys ica l sci enti sts too can move very close to the th ought of theologians and philosoph ers. But thi s too is rational thought in its crea ti ve, intuitive dimensions. Again , one mu st dis tingui sh between rati onality and truth, even though the rational person, by defini tion, seeks truth, that is, seeks to relate with reality in all its depth and compl ex ity. Rati onal persons may di sagree, while remaining rati onal. Th e rational, I am say in g, mu st be recogni zed fa r beyond the realm of the so-ca ll ed hard sci ences, those di sc iplin es wh ere uni ve rs al assent is more or less obtainabl e. Uni versal ve rifi ability, th en, cannot be the measure of rati onality. 1 may add briefl y here, since thi s point was made earli er, that rati onality occurs not onl y in academi c di sciplines of thought but perhaps more importantly in ordina1y life, wherein one negoti ates the ways and means but also di scern s the end s and goal s of practical existence. Thi s applies also in the realm of personal relationships. We know persons rati onall y (appropriately) in relationship and most deeply in relation ships of trust and love. Here more than anywhere we see the continuity of the rati onality of fa ith and theology with other fo rm s of the rational. Faith as Rational I 13

When all is sa id and done, we have to speak also of discontinuity. Thi s is because God- th e objec t of inquiry in theo logy- is utte rl y incom parable, ul ti- mately mysteri ous, far beyond any possibili ty of human comprehension. As with other objects of inqui ry, we ca n onl y kn ow how to seek th e know ledge of God when God is already known. The question is: How do we actuall y know God? The know ledge of God, for Chri stians at least, is more li ke personal know ledge th an any other. It is not first or essenti all y an academic disci pline at all ; it is know ledge in re lationshi p, know ledge by self-reve lation. Speaki ng a posteriori (after the fact), Christians have always sa id : We kn ow God in God's own personal se lf-d isclosure in Jes us the Chri st.

The Word Made Flesh: Object o/lnqui1y. Kn ow ing God is, of course, an utterly unique mode of kn ow ing, whi ch we ca ll fa ith . As I have said in the prev ious chapter, know ledge of the God of th e cross is radi ca ll y "given," a gift of the Holy Spirit, quite di scont inuous with other kin ds of know ledge, even contradictin g and overturning the natura l wisdom of spec ul ative human reason. Thi s is an encou nter with Oth erness in fi ni te ly greater than ourselves. Thi s Oth er is pre- sented to our apprehension, yet, in profoun d mys tery, is utterly beyond our com- pre hension. Thi s Oth er is not avai labl e to our manipulation, but, unli ke any other "object," 11 2 ca ll s fo rth adoratio n. That God spea ks a Word to human be ings is the fundamenta l convicti on of Israel and th e church. Yahweh spoke the dabar to Israel th ro ugh the medi ati on of th e prophets, who interpreted events of hi story as God's Ii beratin g presence and activ ity. The peopl e hea rd the Word in its ow n persuas ive power, its own convin ci ng, converti ng capacity to command and pro mise, to judge, in spire, and conso le. The proph ets of Israel never argued, li ke fo undationali sts, fro m pre mi ses to conclusions about God's rea li ty, presence, or will . Rather, the dabar of God came upon them with power, the power of God's ruah (S piri t) . Not that there was never confusion or di sagreement about what was tru ly God's Word an d th e work of God's Spiri t. According to Jeremi ah, speaking of th ose he regarded as fa lse pro phets, "The proph ets are nothing bu t wind , fo r the Word is not in th em" (J er 5: 13). A process of di scernment was necessary on the part of those who li ved within a community and a traditi on, and ra ti onality pl ayed its part in that process of di scernment. The pro ph etic di scernment was often a startlin g one, speaking agai nst th e communi ty 's genera l understanding of God, and it was rec- ognized onl y much later as trul y a Word fro m God.113 It is John 's Gospel that ex pli citly identifi es Jesus of Nazareth , crucified and risen, as God's Word made fles h. John is uti li zing a hi ghl y rat ional Greek concept- logos- to address hi s Hell eni sti c context, that is, the Stoic concept of God's mind and reason. Yet John is also very much in conti nuity with th e whole Hebra ic tradition of God's dabar. Th e Word of God, says John , is God's own self. It is God's own mind and reason, God's own etern all y self-co mmun icating Being. Just as, when you or I spea k in a self-revealing way, it is my very self, or 11 4 Refl ecti ons on Revelation, Fai th, and Rationality you r very se lf, th at is give n and commu nicated to others. My wo rd is my very self go ing fo rth fro m myse lf. So also, " In the beginning was the Word , and the Word was with God and th e Word was God" (J n I: I). God's Word , God's ve ry self, goes fo rth from God, creates, and redeems: "All thin gs we re made by [the Word] and without [the Word] nothing was made that was made. In [the Word] was Ii fe and that Ii fe was the Iig ht of hum an beings" (J n I :2-3 ). Jo hn goes on to say that God's Word , whi ch had been spoken hitherto by the prop hets, now took human fo rm. God now communica ted in fu ll identity with a human person, namely, Jesus of Nazareth: "A nd the Word became fl esh and we beheld hi s glory, glory as of the onl y begotten of th e Father, full of grace and truth" (Jn I :14 ). To know and recogni ze God 's "glory" is, aga in , not arri ved at on the basis of premi ses and argum ents. In him we we re confronted by "grace and truth ." John is ta lking about a kind of direct percepti on. To "behold hi s glory" is to be struck with awe, wi th worship and tru st. It is to be met by so mething that- or rather Someone who- grasps hea rt and so ul , mind and strength, by the sheer power of self-g ivin g love. I am reminded agai n, as mentioned earlier, of the man who sa id he tried to dismiss the Jes us story as a hoax or a delusion, or as pure legend or myth. But in the end the "glory" of Jesus would not go away. The story was too powerful and compe lling, and , try as he mi ght, he coul d not reasonabl y di spose of Jes us or ex pl ain him away. In th e Word made fl esh, th en, the li fe , death , and res urrec ti on of Jesus Chri st, God becomes uniquely vi sibl e and audible as an object of inqui ry. God gives Godself to be kn own in thi s humble way, in th e ra ising to li fe of thi s good and free human being, who di ed courageously in love. It is the whole Christ, Christ "clothed in hi s gos pel," Chri st the teacher and hea ler, the human one of compassion and courage, crucified and risen, present with us by the power of the Spiri t, who confronts us as the object of our inqu iry, making it possible fo r us to know who God is. Agai n, Torra nce states it clearl y:

Hence in Jesus Himse lf, word and deed, language and event, were inex- tri ca bl y interwoven in Hi s revealing acti vity. Hi s words were done as well as spoken and Hi s deeds spoke as much as Hi s words, fo r in Him God's word has become phys ical, hi stori cal event, while th e very fa ct and ex istence of Jesus was itself Word of God. 11 4

To know God rati onall y, then, is in thi s respect rather like knowin g anything or anyo ne rationall y. All obj ects of knowledge and all subj ects or persons must be known in a mann er appro priate to th eir nature. As know ledge of persons is kn owledge in relati onship, so also kn ow ledge of God is knowledge in relati onship, but in thi s unique instance, thi s spec ifi c relati onship of fa ith, it is one of loving worship, obedi ence, and tru st.