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Faith As Rational

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Faith As Rational CHAPTER 3 Faith as Rational The reader may suspect th at I am about to contra di ct all that l sa id in th e pre- vious chapter, where I spoke of a radi cal di sj unction between fa ith and reason. By that I mean: Christi an faith is in no way a produ ct of human reason or of nat- ural human wi sdom, cann ot be coercive ly demonstrated by, or to, human reason, and even contra di cts natu ra l hum an reason. Mu st one then become an irratio nal human being in ord er to beli eve as a Chri sti an? Should we abandon the quest fo r a ra ti onal theologica l meth od, whi ch we have bee n pursuing since the beginning of thi s inquiry? I think not. Paradox ica ll y, we mu st continue to seek an under- standing of fa ith that is not onl y fa ith -full , acknowledgin g th e radi ca l di sjuncti on of fa ith and reason, but that is ra ti onal as we ll. Douglas John Hall , who affirm s in hi s own theologia crucis the "cogniti ve pri ority" of revelatio n as "poi nt of departure" fo r Chri sti an theo logy, ca n set the tone fo r our discussion: Nothin g at all can be ga ined by an auth oritarian, revelati on-based reli- gion whi ch gloats over every humiliati on of the human mind . The point of th e cross is not that th e fai th ful should win arguments, but th at the world mi ght kn ow peace. Partl y, thi s peace depend s upon the ex pos iti on of a theo logy of reve lati on whi ch does not humiliate but ca n fulfill and exa lt th e qu est of the in te ll ect. 1 I shall argue, then, th at fa ith ca n be credibl e to the intelli gent mind, and that fa ith must account fo r itself in a reasonabl e manner. Reve lati on does not merely negate hum an reason, but in fo rm s and illuminates it. What ls Rationality? The word "rati onality" deri ves fro m th e Latin ratio, "reason"; rationality, broadl y spea king, is reasonabl eness. The term denotes ri ght thinking or th e ri ght fun cti oning of the human mind . However, what constitutes ra ti onality, reason- 80 Faith as Rational 81 abl eness, or ri ght thinking and how it is to be identi fied or measured are hi ghly conte nti ous questi ons that philosophers have debated endl ess ly. I shall not pro- pose a uni versa l measurin g stick of ra ti onali ty ; all the best minds in th e hi story of philosophy have fa il ed to reach ag reement on thi s, and th ere is now a wide- spread opini on that none such ex ists. 2 I will offer here onl y a te ntati ve wo rkin g defi niti on and go on later to characte ri ze rationali ty more full y. My defi ni tion no doub t refl ects va ri ous contin gencies of my personal loca ti on and faith ori enta- tion, but I do not apo logize fo r thi s, sin ce no abso lute defini tion is ava il abl e. 1 propose to use th e term "rationality" to mea n a genuine effort of th e human min d to relate to rea li ty in all its depth and compl ex ity. Ra ti onality occurs above all in everyday prac ti ca l li fe ; it is a matter of prax is, in whi ch prac ti ca l ac ti on and theoreti cal thought co me together. It is also an as pect of every di scipline of thought. 3 Rati onal th ought implies, first of all , an appro pri ate attent io n to the obj ect of inquiry or whatever it is th at one seeks to kn ow. Tt ca n be described, th en, as recepti vity and res ponse to whatever it is th at one encoun te rs. It is also ac ti ve, in th e se nse that it calcul ates how best to ac hi eve prac ti ca l goals. Rati o- nality, for li be rt io ni st/prax is-ori ented th ought, seeks a reasoned correlati on of th eo ry and practice. It is capable of co ntempl atin g and refl ectin g on what those goa ls of prac ti cal ac ti on should be. Wh en I say "rea li ty in all its de pth and co m- pl ex ity," 1 impl y th at ra ti onal thought is as broad and deep in scope as the wh ole vast ra nge of matters about whi ch hum an bein gs inquire and whi ch th ey wish to accomplish in th e world . A ra ti onal person is chara cteri zed by an openness not onl y to that whi ch he or she seeks to kn ow but also to th e rationali ty of oth ers, and therefore to di s- cussion and persuas ion. The rati onal perso n possesses an attitude of mind that is willing to be chall enged by relevant ev idence and is open to others' vi ewpoints or arguments, whether th ey be logica l, ex peri ential, or practi ca l. Obviously th e bas ic laws of logic, such as th e laws of noncontradiction and of logical sequence, are essenti al to rationali ty. Wi thout reason in th is sense it is imposs ibl e to kn ow or to argue anything, even th e limitati ons of reason' An extremely irra ti onal per- son, on th e other hand , is eas il y recogni zed by others as insane or mentall y unbal- anced, paranoid , or delud ed. A more moderately irrati onal person is usuall y seen by others as cl osed-minded, rigidl y dogmati c, unwilling to co nsider evid ence, or simpl y very subjecti vist or emotivist in an arbitrary mann er. Rationali ty ma y be hindered not onl y by dogma or emot ion but also by ideo logy or selfis h interests. Rati onal persons, however, are not necessarily di spassionate or detached in the process of knowing, or of acting. In some as pects of ex istence- fo r exampl e, sexual love, th e appreciati on of mu sic, th e love of nature, reli gious devotion , or politi cal commi tment- passion and attachment are appropriate and rati onal in the broad sense; ind eed, to relate to th ese dimensions of life di spassionately would be irrati onal. Reason and passion, th en, are not incompatible. On the con- tra ry, reason is appro pri ately pass ionate about ce rtain things. Th e new fa th er, perceiving how beautiful and precious hi s new child is, kn ows rationall y what he 82 1?.eflections on Revelation, Faith, and Rationality never knew before. The lover, besotted with erotic passion, knows his beloved more truly than he has ever known anyone. The social activist, impassioned with outrage about a brutal war, sees injustice and cruelty with incisive accuracy. Of course, one must recognize the conventional truth as well: passion, whether sex- ual , aesthetic, or political, can obscure rational processes, blinding us to the com- plexities of the world around us. Rational persons, however, may disagree with each other, may be believers or unbelievers; Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, or atheists; and conservatives, liberals, or radicals. This implies that rationality and truth have to be distin- guished. When I say a person is rational (say, a thoughtful Muslim, Hindu, or atheist) I do not imply that I agree with that person's ideas or beliefs. Out of the givenness of their own experience and resources, they may be functioning very rationally in coming to quite different conclusions from those I reach out of my experience and resources. On the other hand, l may consider a person to be irra- tional whose basic faith and viewpoints I share (e.g., some Christians or social- ists l can think of) if they refuse to be accountable in any way for their beliefs. "To claim that a belief is rational is not the same as to claim that a belief is true."4 Rationality and truth are by no means identical, yet rational persons are not at all indifferent to truth, for truth is the goal of the rational person. The rational per- son seeks "truth," that is, needs to be in touch with reality in order to live and to act well in the real world. It is also the case that I may consider someone essen- tially a rational person and at the same time judge some of his/her views or atti- tudes to be irrational. Human rationality is fallible, so that, as limited finite creatures, we are rational only to a certain degree. l reluctantly admit that some rational persons would find me to be irrational in some respects. J. Wentzel Van Huysteen proposes a helpful, broad concept of rationality that coheres with what l am suggesting here.
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