Joint Force Quarterly

JFQ AWord from the Chairman

The articles on “The Security of the Americas” found in this issue provide a useful primer on the challenges to the hemisphere and the relationship of the United States with its neighbors. The current pace of change in Latin America rivals that of East Asia or Europe. However, absent significant threats or instability, these challenges have drawn little comment in the United States. In the future, Washington cannot afford to take this dynamic region for granted. It demands our close attention. (continued on page 4)

U.S.-Honduran airborne drop. U.S. Air Force

Spring 1996 / JFQ 1 JFQ Prelm P1-5 8/29/96 10:30 AM Page 2

■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman by John M. Shalikashvili

■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET 6 Letters to the Editor ■ JFQ FORUM ■ 36 The Security of the Americas 9 Joint Warfare and the by Hans Binnendijk and John A. Cope Army-Air Force Team by Dennis J. Reimer and 40 Good Bridges Ronald R. Fogleman Make Good Neighbors JFQ by William J. Perry 16 AFATDS: The Fire Support Window to the 21st Century 44 A Former CINC Looks at by Steven W. Boutelle and Ronald Filak Latin America by Barry R. McCaffrey 22 A Primer on Naval Theater Air Defense 52 Operation Safe Border: by Alan G. Maiorano, Nevin P. Carr, Jr., The Ecuador-Peru Crisis and Trevor J. Bender by Glenn R. Weidner 59 A Brazilian 29 Unity of Command— Strategic Outlook Countering Aircraft and by Luiz Paulo Macedo Carvalho Missile Threats by Vincent P. DiFronzo 64 Changing Argentine Military Culture PHOTO CREDITS by Martin Antonio Balza The cover features F–117 being refueled (U.S. Air Force/ Val Gempis); the cover insets (from top) show Stinger 67 Security and Democracy missile launch during Roving Sands ’94 (U.S. Air Force/ Steve Thurow), Venezuelan troops at National Pantheon in the Region in Caracas (DOD/R.D. Ward), M–88A1 recovery vehicle by Luigi R. Einaudi crossing into Bosnia (U.S. Air Force/Lisa Zunzanyika- Carpenter), airborne troops boarding C–141 (U.S. Air Force/Jerome G. Suson), and Chester Nimitz looking over 73 Defense of the Hemisphere: maps during World War II (Naval Historical Center). An Historical Postscript The front inside cover incorporates (clockwise, from top) marine firing down range during Bell Thunder ’95 by Jose F. Mata (U.S. Navy/Stephen Batiz), high endurance cutter Gallatin (U.S. Coast Guard), ski-equipped CH–47D Chinook during training in Italian Alps (U.S. Air Force/Mike Reinhardt), C–5 taking off for Vigilant Warrior (U.S. Air Force/Brett K. Snow), and USS Seahorse enroute to the Mediterranean (U.S. Navy/ Kenneth H. Brewer). The table of contents photos include (from top) theater high altitude area defense (THAAD) FTV–03 (U.S. Army), Miraflores Locks on Panama Canal (DOD/R.D. Ward), Salvadoran naval commandos (Julio A. Montes), SEAL in defensive perimeter during exercise in Italy (U.S. Navy/George A. Del Moral), and F–16 and German MiG–29 (U.S. Air Force/Tana R. Hamilton). The back inside cover captures SH–2F landing on USS O’Bannon during passage through Straits of Magellan (U.S. Navy/Richard Boyle). The back cover shows mobile aerostat in Caribbean (U.S. Coast Guard/ Chuck Kalnback).

2 JFQ / Spring 1996 SPRING 96 / NUMBER 11

■ ■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 76 NATO’s Military Future 124 Arleigh Albert Burke by Daniel W. Christman

82 A Fight for Lodgement: ■ OUT OF JOINT Future Joint Contingency 125 Where are the Arleigh Burkes Operations Today? by Anthony J. Tata by Mark Yost 90 Medical Dimensions of Joint Humanitarian ■ THE JOINT WORLD Relief Operations 128 Organization, Doctrine, by Leonard M. Randolph, Jr., and and Education Matthew W. Cogdell

■ OFF THE SHELF 98 Leadership, Community, and Virtue 130 Moral Obligation Versus “Beeper by James H. Toner Ethics”: A Review Essay by William G. O’Neill 104 Brilliant Warriors by Jay W. Kelley 134 A Jubilee for Airmen: JFA Book ReviewQ 111 Research, Writing, and by Thomas A. Keaney the Mind of the Strategist by Gregory D. Foster 135 Of Cabals and Complots: A Book Review 116 Days of Future Past: Joint by James L. Zackrison Intelligence in World War II by James D. Marchio

Joint Force Quarterly

Hans Binnendijk JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Editor-in-Chief by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and top- fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 136 for Patrick M. Cronin employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations details). Please direct all editorial communications to: forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, Consulting Editor Editor contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the John A. Cope Joint Force Quarterly unified commands, and joint force development. Contributing Editor (Issue 11) ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 Robert A. Silano pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 Editor or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted FAX: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 Martin J. Peters, Jr. portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Internet: [email protected] Production Coordinator without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- Calvin B. Kelley ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- A cumulative index to articles published in JFQ can be found on the National Defense University World Wide Web Copy Editor rial is quoted from or based on its contents. This publication has been approved by the Secretary of server. Access any Web Browser (for example, Mosaic or Netscape) by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. The Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government Defense. Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction. ISSN 1070–0692 May 1996

Spring 1996 / JFQ 3 Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher Latin America is a vast region with remark- ADVISORY COMMITTEE able potential, a vibrant blend of New and Old World traditions, of modern societies and ancient Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense University Chairman cultures. It is a geographic term for an amalgam of 450 million people living in 33 diverse states, each BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman with a unique history and sense of national pur- Col John W. Brooks, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College pose. To the United States, the countries of Latin America and insular nations of the Caribbean are Brig Gen Roger E. Carleton, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College partners in three distinct though interactive ways: MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College in the development of democracy, in commerce,

A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College and in the creation of hemispheric security. This region has undergone extensive politi- Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College cal development. A decade ago Latin America was MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces politically troubled, with half of its states ruled by authoritarian regimes which repressed their peo- BG Robert F. Dees, USA ■ The Joint Staff ple and mismanaged their economies. Central Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College

Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF ■ The Joint Staff

RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College Latin America spends the least BG David H. Ohle, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College on defense and has the fewest Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF ■ Air War College military personnel per capita RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College

EDITORIAL BOARD America in particular was a hotbed of instability, Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University much of which emanated from the influence of Chairman the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Manuel Noriega Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University in Panama. Most of that instability has vanished

COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from the scene. For the first time in history, every nation in Latin America is a democracy except ■ Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Cuba. Each of these nations is determined to fos- COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy ter representative institutions, respect human rights, and incorporate itself into a wider world. Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University Latin America today is striving to meet the ulti- Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College mate goal enunciated by Simon Bolivar: “to be

Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces free under the auspices of liberal laws, emanating from the most sacred spring, which is the will of ■ Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF Naval War College the people.” Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College While much economic reform is still needed, Latin America has jumped into the mainstream of Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation international economic life. Many economies in William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College the region are surging and several rank among CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College the fastest growing in the world. This has enabled U.S. exports to Latin America to increase at an av- John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago erage annual rate of 21 percent in recent years, Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College twice the rate of those to the European Union. By

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute the end of the century, U.S. trade with Latin America will likely exceed trade with Europe. James H. Toner ■ Air War College Moreover, Latin America has achieved strik- LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University ing growth while avoiding ruinous arms races. Of all regions in the world, it spends the least on de- COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College fense and has the fewest military personnel per COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College capita. Gone also is the notion that resources must be redivided to attain prosperity in the

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

4 JFQ / Spring 1996 Shalikashvili

hemisphere. Latin American nations are working between our defense forces in support of legally together to increase their prosperity, which will constituted roles is at an unprecedented level. swell their economies to $2 trillion by the turn of While much has been accomplished, much the century. remains to be done for hemispheric security. In U.S. cooperation in the search for hemi- particular, the United States, working with its spheric security has made admirable progress. As neighbors, seeks to: we have combined efforts to improve perfor- ■ increase cooperation and broaden regional success against drug traffic, a major threat to U.S. security and to the economic and social order in many Latin American countries ■ improve controls over immigration within the region ■ deepen military-to-military contacts and further multinational training opportunities ■ restructure the U.S. command and control organization to accommodate conditions in the region, including the relocation of U.S. Southern Command headquarters to Miami in 1997. While Latin America remains an active part of the world community, U.S. military activity there is inexpensive. Given the low level of the threat from extra-regional powers and the spread of democratic institutions, a high level of security has been achieved within the hemisphere with the United States contributing only a fraction of a percent of its defense budget and less than 5 percent of its worldwide security assistance outlays. Given these facts, as well as U.S. interests and commitments, a strate- U.S. Coast Guard gist might conclude that Latin America, though an Grenadian vessel important region, is an economy of force area. That on patrol. mance of our respective armed forces, we also is true, and with continued emphasis on democ- have expanded our efforts to suppress narcotics racy, the free market system, and collective security, traffic and conducted multilateral operations it will remain so. throughout the hemisphere. As old adversaries find new democratic partners, combined training JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI is becoming commonplace. Ten Latin American Chairman nations are participating today in 13 peacekeep- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ing operations around the world, including one on the border between Ecuador and Peru. Most notable among the recent peace operations has been Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. There, under the banner of the United Na- tions, 24 states, including 12 from Latin America and the Caribbean, joined in a well planned operation that stabilized this beleaguered nation. The operation represents a high water mark in hemispheric security cooperation. As Secretary of Defense William Perry noted, “Peacekeeping in the Americas, in support of conflict resolution and democracy, is more than a principle—it is a reality.” In 1995, military cooperation in the hemisphere reached an all-time high when the defense ministers of 33 nations met to discuss further cooperation. They agreed to support openness and transparency to lower threat perceptions, subordinate militaries to democratically elected regimes, and resolve outstanding disputes through negotiations. Because of this conference, cooperation

Spring 1996 / JFQ 5 ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

While it is impossible to analyze plans to in- only to examine casualties and connections be- Letters... vade Japan without discussing casualties, that was tween the invasion plans and the bombs but to an- not my chief purpose. The chapter on casualties swer some intriguing, long-ignored questions. Why BRIDGING THE GULF fills only 10 of 250 pages. While the issue of casu- did JCS choose a strategy of invasion? What were To the Editor—In “The Middle East: Chal- alties is the most hotly contested subject in the de- the invasion plans? How were they made? What lenges Born of Success” (JFQ, Autumn 95), Ambas- bate over the atomic bomb, it is far from the cen- was to be the role of the Soviets and the British, sador Freeman points out the inadequacies in se- terpiece of my book. Projecting casualties for an French, Canadians, and Australians? To what extent curity arrangements among members of the Gulf operation that never occurred and that was still in did the invasion plans depend on redeploying Cooperation Council (GCC). Developing these na- the planning stages at the end of the war obscures forces from Europe? No author can account for the tions into a collective security organization should more than it reveals. We simply do not know what intellectual baggage readers bring to his book. I in- be a top priority of U.S. policy. Providing the six the casualties would have been, and we can never vite Giangreco to reread my work. Perhaps then he GCC members with capabilities to clear mines, know. With that in mind, I set out merely to deter- will see more balance in it. track submarines, and assist the United States in mine the casualties that were projected by the mili- —John Ray Skates maintaining regional security makes sense in military planners. Within those limits, the documentary tary as well as economic terms. record is not particularly rich, but the numbers To the Editor—D.M. Giangreco provided a It allows Washington to help foster a standing I found were not inconsistent with other major op- spirited critique of John Ray Skates’s recent book in coalition with a common goal of securing the Per- erations in Europe and the Pacific. Casualty esti- your Autumn 95 issue. For my part, I want to re- sian Gulf for commerce. U.S. policy in the past has mates were made only for Olympic, not for Coronet. spond to a few points on pre-invasion thinking and been to support one power in the region, which left Furthermore, I found no revisions of casualty esti- sources as well as the use of the atomic bomb. Gi- us at the whim of that regime and exposed us to mates as a result of the massive enemy buildup in angreco states that Marshall, presumably on July potential Islamic radicalism and various external southern Kyushu in May through July 1945. I found 25, 1945 at Potsdam, informed President Truman threats. A multinational coalition alleviates this no original contemporary document that projected that total U.S. casualties for the invasion of Japan problem as the possibility of all the GCC members the kinds of numbers used by Stimson, Churchill, “could range from 250,000 to 1,000,000.” Gian- simultaneously suffering internal or external strife is and Truman after the war (aside from the discred- greco also defends the alleged recollection by Tru- unlikely. And economically, each nation could con- ited “Hoover memorandum”). The absence of large man, supposedly based on Marshall’s advice, which tribute to the cost of collective defensive forces. casualty estimates does not indicate, however, that Skates has challenged. It is paramount that we take advantage of the the military planners were unconcerned about ca- There is direct evidence on this recollection cessation of hostilities to shuttle diplomats and de- sualties. Clearly, a major Japanese buildup in which neither Skates nor Giangreco consulted that fense experts to the Persian Gulf with a strategic southern Kyushu revealed by Ultra intercepts in bears directly on the matter: What did Truman rec- plan on which nations in the region can agree. Summer 1945 shook U.S. planners because it ollect, and did Marshall advise him of the possibility Freeman’s comments on the importance of devel- promised to translate into higher U.S. casualties. of a million U.S. casualties? The relevant evidence oping GCC is both timely and pertinent. The next I do not argue that the planners were unconcerned has been available for over a decade in the files of step is to make both military and economic cooper- about casualties—only that there is no credible evi- the President’s secretary at the Truman Library. ation among Gulf states a national security issue. dence for the large numbers cited after the war. If They reveal that the famous January 12, 1953 let- —LT Youssef Aboul-Enein, USNR my numbers give aid and comfort to the revision- ter by Truman to Air Force historian James Cate Fleet Surgical Team Six ists, so be it. (found in volume 5 of The Army Air Force in World I did not set out to write a book that con- War II, pp. 712–13), which is the basis of the “mil- formed to a particular interpretation about the end lion” recollection, was not really by the former Pres- TO BE AMONG THOSE of the Pacific War, nor do I consider myself a revi- NUMBERS ident. In a handwritten reply in late 1952, he told sionist. In fact, I differ fundamentally with most of Cate: “[At Potsdam] I asked General Marshall what After scrutinizing the article To the Editor— the conclusions of the revisionists—especially the it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane (sic) entitled “Operation Downfall: The Devil Was in the belief that America utilized two atomic bombs on and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that Details” by D.M. Giangreco (JFQ, Autumn 95) which “an already defeated Japan that was desperately 1/4 million casualties would be the minimum cost criticizes my book, The Invasion of Japan: Alterna- trying to surrender.” Though this issue is much too as well as an equal number of the enemy. The other tive to the Bomb, I wondered if he had read the complex to discuss in detail here, let me say simply military and naval men present agreed.” same book I wrote. Giangreco reproaches me for that the massive buildup of Japanese forces in In early January 1953 a White House aide, things I did not say and views I do not hold. His aim southern Kyushu in Summer 1945 did not appear troubled by Truman’s low numbers, decided to in- and purpose appear to be to pillory my book be- to U.S. planners as if Japan was “desperate to sur- flate them to bring them in line with a claim by ex- cause it might give aid and comfort to revisionists. render.” Finally, my book looks at the proposed in- Secretary of War Stimson (published in Harper’s, A reader might come away from this article believ- vasion of Japan from the perspective of our own February 1947) that military advisors before Hi- ing that my principal intention was to rehash the military—a perspective that revisionists have roshima had estimated a million or more American seemingly interminable debate over casualties and largely ignored. casualties in the invasion of Japan. The aide ac- to find low casualty estimates as part of another ef- I tried in The Invasion of Japan to have the knowledged that Truman’s initial recollection of a fort to prove that dropping “the bomb” was unnec- documents speak and base conclusions solidly on quarter million or more U.S. casualties “sounds essary. This distorts both my views and purposes in their contents. While readers of Giangreco’s article more reasonable than Stimson’s, but in order to writing The Invasion of Japan. Let me try to set the would not know it, the purpose of my book was not avoid conflict [with Stimson’s claim], I have changed record straight. the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and probably a much greater number—as much as a

6 JFQ / Spring 1996 FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■ million.” That is how and why the final letter, signed only refer to the use of the bomb. The evidence is SOMALIA LESSONS by Truman, greatly inflated the numbers to include a simply inadequate to allow more than a cautious To the Editor—I am grateful for the let- million casualties and therefore is not a reliable surmise. ter from GEN Downing (JFQ, Winter 95-96) clarify- source. Hence, to conclude as Giangreco does that ing the point that SOCOM was not included de jure Strangely, Stimson’s postwar claim is unsup- Marshall gave Truman advice on July 25 about a in the odd command relations which characterized ported by reliable pre-Hiroshima sources that any possible million U.S. casualties seems highly ques- TF Ranger operations in Somalia (though SOCOM scholar has unearthed. Admittedly, President tionable. The date of any such counsel, even much de facto involvement probably awaits the future Hoover in Spring 1945 did twice suggest very high lower numbers, is suspect. Moreover, though going judgment of historians). However, we disagree on casualties, but his numbers were quickly dismissed somewhat beyond Giangreco’s claims, it is unlikely the assertion that the chain of command during by Army planners, including notably General George that Truman ever had a formal meeting at Potsdam UNOSOM II was somehow justifiable under current A. Lincoln, with whom Marshall agreed. On one oc- with his top military leaders—Marshall, Leahy, joint doctrine or the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These casion, a physicist suggested very high U.S. casu- King, and Arnold—on probable casualties or the doctrinal and legislative authorities make CINCs the alty figures, but there is no evidence that this esti- question of using the atomic bomb. None of the focal points of operational command in order to mate ever reached Stimson or that the physicist available diaries (the archival versions) for Potsdam, give them the greatest possible flexibility in match- would have been accepted as a credible source on including those by Leahy, Arnold, and Truman, as ing command arrangements with unique mission issues which he admitted were beyond his purview. well as those by Stimson and McCloy, mentions requirements. Of course, neither doctrine nor law But McGeorge Bundy, Stimson’s ghost writer during such a meeting. Only Truman, well after Potsdam, can prevent mistakes, such as the one in which the period in question, tactfully acknowledged in ever claimed that such a meeting occurred. CENTCOM decided to retain operational control of a Danger and Survival (p. 647) that the numbers At one point Giangreco, apparently conflating joint force over nine thousand miles away. probably were inflated: “Defenders of the use of the casualty with fatality estimates, claims that Skates The conclusion to draw from that experience bomb, Stimson among them, were not always care- stated Olympic would not have cost more than is noted in a UNOSOM II after action report: “Unity ful about numbers of casualties expected.” In short, 20,000 casualties. Elsewhere, Giangreco admit- of command and simplicity remain the key princi- don’t trust Stimson’s figures. tedly got matters right and notes that Skates fore- ples to be considered when designing a JTF com- Importantly, postwar claims by Stimson— saw no more than 60,000–75,000 total U.S. casu- mand architecture. The warfighting JTF commander both in the Harper’s article and a 1948 memoir, On alties, including that upper limit of 20,000 dead, in must retain operational control of all forces avail- Active Service—never included any statement that the entire Olympic operation. able to him in theater and to posture those forces Marshall was the source for the million-or-more es- Giangreco is probably correct, as another re- as allowed under UNAAF doctrine.” Even though timate. There is substantial indirect evidence—Ad- viewer of Skates’s book has suggested, that the GEN Downing apparently favors a loose form of miral Leahy’s diary for June 18, 1945, Truman’s work could have benefitted from a detailed discus- “coordination and de-confliction,” in my view on- “Potsdam” diary, and Marshall’s August 7, 1945 sion of how the author arrived at the estimate of scene command authority should include control cable to MacArthur—that Marshall did not make 60,000–75,000 casualties. But perhaps such rea- over all assigned forces, including those from such an estimate before Hiroshima. No scholar (in- soning, with counterfactual scenarios, appeared to SOCOM. While command relationships may vary cluding Marshall biographer Forrest Pogue or the be both cumbersome and distracting for an opera- with every mission, the JTF commander must al- editor of the Marshall papers, Larry Bland) has tion that never happened. Nevertheless, Skates’s ways be able to say, “You get off the plane, you found any pre-Hiroshima estimate by Marshall that substantial explanation of his numbers would have work for me.” Yet until that concept becomes a reaches a million or even a quarter million. The been valuable. standard for delegating combatant command au- highest available number is 63,000. Whether Mar- In his final sentence, Giangreco mentions thority, we will have “lessons identified” rather than shall in fact gave Truman any estimate at Potsdam possible U.S. fatalities, contends that even a pre- or “lessons learned.” is even unlikely. No contemporary archival source post-Hiroshima estimate of 20,000 would justify —COL C. Kenneth Allard, USA provides direct substantiation. There is oblique evi- the use of the atomic bomb, and warns against Institute for National Strategic Studies dence in Truman’s “Potsdam” diary entry for July “assuag[ing] the guilt of the revisionists.” One won- National Defense University 25, 1945: “At 10:15 I had General Marshall come ders if he is counting Eisenhower, MacArthur, in and discuss with me the tactical and political sit- Leahy, King, Nimitz, and other World War II leaders uation. He is a level headed man—so is Mountbat- in the ranks of those “revisionists.” ten.” Whether the phrase “tactical and political situ- —Barton J. Bernstein ation” even referred to the forthcoming Olympic Department of History operation (the invasion of Kyushu) is unclear. It may Stanford University

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Spring 1996 / JFQ 7 ANNOUNCEMENT Joint Force Quarterly

ESSAY CONTEST ON THE REVOLUTION in Military Affairs

o encourage innovative thinking on how the Contest Rules Armed Forces can remain at the forefront in 1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians (from the the conduct of war, JFQ is pleased to public or the private sector) and of any nationality. Essays T written by individual authors or groups of authors are announce the second annual “Essay Contest on the eligible. Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the 2. Entries must be original and not previously published (nor under consideration for publication elsewhere). Essays National Defense University Foundation, Inc. that originate from work carried out at intermediate and The contest solicits innovative concepts for oper- senior colleges (staff and war colleges), service schools, civilian universities, and other educational institutions are ational doctrine and organizations by which the eligible. Armed Forces can exploit existing and emerging 3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length and must be submitted typewritten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. technologies. Again this year, those essays that most They should include a wordcount at the end. Documentation rigorously address one or more of the following may follow any standard academic form of citation, but questions will be considered for a cash award: endnotes rather than footnotes are preferred. 4. Entries must be submitted with (a) a letter clearly ▼ The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of indicating that the essay is a contest entry together with the author’s name, social security account number (or passport change compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. How number in the case of non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, might emerging technologies—and the integration of such telephone number, and FAX number (if available); (b) a cover sheet containing the contestant’s full name and essay title; technologies—result in a revolution in conducting warfare in the (c) a summary of the essay which is no more than 200 words; coming decades? What will be the key measures of that change? and (d) a brief biographical sketch of the author. Neither the names of authors nor any personal references should appear in ▼ Exploiting new and emerging technologies is dependent the text (including running heads). on the development of innovative operational concepts and 5. Entries must be mailed to the following address (facsimile copies will not be accepted): RMA Essay Contest, organizational structures. What specific doctrinal concepts and Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, Washington, D.C. organizations will be required to fully realize the revolutionary 20319–6000. 6. Entries must be postmarked no later than August 31, potential of critical military technologies? 1996 to be considered in the contest. ▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies in 7. JFQ will hold first rights to the publication of all entries. innovative ways to gain significant military leverage against U.S. The prize-winning as well as other essays entered may be published in the journal. systems and doctrine? 8. Winners’ names will appear in JFQ and prizes will be presented at an appropriate ceremony in Washington, D.C. Contest Prizes Winners will be awarded prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 for the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of $500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by an officer candidate or a commissioned officer in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (or of equivalent grades). A selection of academic and scholarly books dealing with various aspects of military affairs and innovation will also be presented to each winner. JFQ

8 JFQ / Spring 1996 Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team Northrop Grumman Corporation Northrop JSTARS aircraft and light ground station modules. By DENNIS J. REIMER and RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

The Army and Air Force are natural partners in the conduct of combat operations on and over land. Since day-to-day operations are intertwined, particularly in areas of service support, we often take this partnership for granted. It was forged during World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and most recently in the Gulf War. The most important teamwork occurs on the battlefield, where our combined capabilities produce a synergistic increase in joint combat power that provides a decisive advantage over an adversary. The Army-Air Force team is robust and forward looking, unequalled among the armed forces of the world. We intend to strengthen that part-

General Dennis J. Reimer, USA, and General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, nership as we work together in are the chiefs of staff of their respective services. the future.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 9 ■ ARMY–AIR FORCE TEAM

Cooperation does not imply that we have Chartered by the deputy chiefs of staff for opera- identical views on every issue, nor that we should tions and plans of both services, the group took be combined. Each service optimizes its unique on the job of identifying and resolving these is- strengths. National security depends upon dis- sues. Building on a heritage of teamwork and mu- tinct warfighting capabilities on land, at sea, and tual respect, Army and Air Force officers have de- in the air. Moreover, each service brings separate voted months to clarifying matters of common core capabilities—the missions they perform interest and finding useful solutions. This has led best—to the joint table. One lifetime is barely suf- to shared understandings, increased trust, and ficient to master every skill needed to fight and pragmatic agreements. Numerous organizations, lead in one medium of war. Learning to fight including Air Combat Command, U.S. Army jointly in three is a tough business—leveraging Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), unique capabilities, specialties, and individual 1st Battlefield Control Element (BCE) at Fort competencies to the warfighting advantage of all. Bragg, and 9th and 12th Air Forces, have helped Such efforts are especially important in a re- the group. After a mid-year review revealed there source constrained environment. Together we can were more areas of agreement than disagreement selectively apply advances between our two services, the working group refo- in technology to compen- cused on air and missile defense and on joint relations between the Army sate for the redundancies control measures. and Air Force became strained that we have lost through The first issue centers on controlling air and the force drawdown. This missile defense assets not directly assigned to as each tried to incorporate process of leveraging one corps commanders and on theater missile defense lessons learned in the Gulf another’s strengths builds (TMD) attack operations in the area of operations on current doctrinal foun- (AO) of land component commanders (LCCs). dations to evolve a more Since CINCs often employ echelon-above-corps mature, complementary perspective of joint oper- (EAC) air and missile defense assets as theater as- ations. The savings will be measurable in both sets, the Air Force held that such units should be lives and resources, and ultimately by mission put under the operational control (OPCON) of success. joint forces air component commanders The Persian Gulf War provided a glimpse of (JFACCs). As stipulated in joint doctrine, JFACCs the dramatic changes in warfare and results of are normally area air defense commanders rapid evolutions in technology. It also demon- (AADCs) and will usually control all theater air strated the tremendous power which the Army and missile active defense efforts. Likewise, the and Air Force could generate by working together Air Force saw TMD attack operations—actions to and with the naval services and coalition part- locate and destroy hostile missile launchers and ners. After an intense air offensive disabled Iraq’s their associated command, control, and support- key capacities and reduced its warfighting capa- ing infrastructure regardless of their location—as bility, the ground offensive, supported by maxi- counterair efforts under JFACC purview. The mum tempo air operations, demonstrated the ef- Army viewed TMD attack operations inside the fectiveness of teamwork in defeating an adversary land AO as an integral part of the LCC scheme of and minimizing American casualties. maneuver and supporting counterfire operations. Both of our services gained important in- The group also examined joint control mea- sights into 21st century military operations from sures because of the apparent friction over which the Gulf War; however, there are divergent inter- component commanders should plan and control pretations of that brief conflict. Relations be- deep operations beyond fire support coordination tween the Army and Air Force became strained as lines (FSCLs). The Air Force considered JFACCs as each tried to incorporate and capitalize on best suited to coordinate operations beyond lessons learned in the Gulf. We recognized doctri- FSCLs, while the Army thought LCCs should plan nal disparities and quickly began an effort of co- and synchronize fires in the entire land AO. operative review to ensure our preeminence as When the working group could not completely the world’s finest air-land team. resolve TMD or joint control measures, we agreed to address them in a four-star review at the Army- Developing Understanding Air Force Warfighter Talks in December 1995, the Since the Gulf War, in what has become an results of which are described below. annual event, senior leaders of our respective services have met to discuss lessons learned as well Joint Doctrine as opportunities for improving joint operations. Service concerns arise when areas of responsi- At the Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks in 1994 bility potentially overlap, creating questions over we set up a working group to tackle tough issues. control of combat assets. But on a fluid, dynamic battlefield joint force commanders (JFCs) cannot

10 JFQ / Spring 1996 Reimer and Fogleman

Some Key Responsibilities.

JFACC is supported commander for • Overall air interdiction • Counterair operations • Theater airborne reconnaissance, surveillance, ted C Suppor and target acquisition JFAC • Strategic attack when air provides bulk of capability

JFLCC Su pp o rt e Land AO d JF g ACC Supportin JF Amphibious LCC ing Objective Area Support

Within their respective AOs, land/naval commanders Naval AO • Are designated supported commanders and are responsible for synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction • Designate target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations • Do not typically have responsibility for the entire joint AOR

Each component has area and functional responsibilities as well as custody of the people and resources under its command. These responsibilities may intersect when components work together. Thus we must allow flexibility for responsibilities to shift during various phases of a campaign and act to minimize mutual interference and maximize mutual support. What may be optimum for one component can come at the expense of others—by decreasing combat power or increasing risk. Joint doctrine is an excellent starting point for assisting LCCs and air component commanders (ACCs) in efforts to resolve any overlaps. Together we must learn to tailor air-land solutions to circumstances, missions, risks, and opportunities at hand. Commanders normally seek to conduct operations to gain maximum advantage at minimum risk to their forces. For example, ground com- Interior of JSTARS manders stress counterfire and maneuver opera- aircraft. permit disagreements on issues such as targeting tions while air commanders stress strategic attack, and missile defense to remain unresolved. Regard- counterair, and interdiction; yet all seek to attack less of how complementary our views on joint op- deep targets and enemy air defenses to provide erations might be, specific responsibilities produce maximum flexibility for their forces. Such opera- legitimate differences among component com- tions are not always mutually supportive, espe- manders. We must minimize the differences and cially when resources are scarce. move toward greater understanding of one another’s strengths and limitations.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 11 ■ ARMY–AIR FORCE TEAM

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera- both agencies must understand the intent of tions, published in September 1993, offers direc- commanders as well as provide timely, informed tion for every element of a joint force. It instructs decisions. JFCs, as senior commanders, to provide guidance As partners in the air-land team, mutual un- and set priorities. Moreover, it establishes the lati- derstanding of command relationships must be tude required to optimize and fine-tune arrange- strong and clear. Just as Generals George S. Patton ments between land and air forces under various and O.P. Weyland, the respective commanders of circumstances. This III Army and 19th TAC in World War II, recognized 2 as partners in the air-land team, publication serves as a the need for a strong C relationship between land common baseline for and air components, we are committed to smooth, we are committed to smooth, understanding both in seamless operations throughout the theater. seamless operations throughout and among services, and also within our Areas of Concern the theater warfighting arrange- Using the efforts of the working group as a ment, the unified com- point of departure, the senior leadership of our mand structure. No component should develop services prepared five agenda items for discussion doctrine that directly contradicts this validated last December: the role of the Joint Targeting Co- baseline. ordination Board (JTCB), joint control measures, Joint doctrine ascribes authority and respon- command and control arrangements for air and sibility to JFCs and provides a framework for con- missile defense, offensive counter-air and TMD ducting joint operations and designating the attack operations, and dual hatting of JFCs. Many roles of supporting and supported commanders. of these issues overlap and some may never be re- Both services recognize that LCCs are normally solved. But when possible, candor will pave the supported commanders in assigned AO bound- way for greater understanding. In addition, we aries and ACCs are normally supported comman- covered tangential areas that impact our overall ders for theater air operations. Joint doctrine pro- relations on the battlefield. Further advances in vides flexibility to allow JFCs maximum latitude connectivity, coordination, and perception of sis- to devise the best solution for a mission. If con- ter service doctrine will decrease differences and flicting priorities arise, JFCs will determine the increase mutual trust. precedence of priorities. However, a solid basis of Joint Targeting Coordination Board. The JTCB trust between component commanders will go a concept has been controversial since the Gulf long way towards alleviating potential problems. War. The Air Force held that the board would hinder operations, while the Army contended that it Key to Success was necessary to establish targeting priorities. Coordination among components is critical Joint Pub 3-0 codifies JTCB without going into on the battlefield. One of the best methods for great detail. JFCs typically create JTCBs and de- ensuring proper coordination of operations is fine their roles. The services accept the vision of sound command and control (C2). Modern war- JTCB, but we agree it must be focused at a macro fare requires us to increasingly share real-time, level. JTCB as a planning support function assists common views of the battlefield. We must under- components in following the intent of JFCs in ex- stand overlapping as well as occasionally inter- ecuting operations by preparing targeting guid- secting needs of component commanders, recon- ance, refining joint target lists, and reviewing tar- ciling their different views with improved risk get information. The board must maintain a management techniques. The commanders have campaign-level perspective and should not be in- optimum tools in their staffs and headquarters to volved at levels best left to the component com- conduct detailed planning and execute missions. manders, such as selecting specific targets and Moreover, they liaise with other components to aimpoints or developing attack packages. facilitate both the flow of information and timely Joint Control Measures. The heart of this doc- decisions. Senior liaison elements are important trinal discussion concerns operations beyond in sharing the broad concerns of component FSCLs but within the land force AO. Since both commanders. commanders seek to maximize results in this area BCE is a critical Army element attached to consistent with their intent to shape the battle- the senior command and control agency within space, it represents the greatest overlap of land the Air Force, the Air Operations Center (AOC). and air objectives. The land component’s capabil- Similarly, the Air Force provides Tactical Air Con- ity to exploit deep attacks before an enemy can trol Party (TACP) representatives at key Army headquarters. BCE and TACP should be fully staffed with highly trained personnel to support component commanders. Senior members of

12 JFQ / Spring 1996 Reimer and Fogleman

F–16 Falcons during Roving Sands ’95. Combat Camera Imagery (AndyCombat Camera Imagery Dunaway) Combat Camera Imagery (Jim Steele)

Patriot battery during Roving Sands ’94. adjust to them will vary with depth, terrain, resis- and more advanced tactics, techniques, and proce- tance, and resources. Air component capabilities dures (TTP) will also improve mutual support be- will vary less with distance, but since air forces tween the land and air components. operate beyond FSCLs on a normal, continual Whenever we discuss targeting the placement basis, ACCs must also manage risks to their of FSCL inevitably comes up. Joint doctrine grants forces. Coordination and deconfliction are essen- LCCs authority to place this line anywhere within tial to reducing duplication, conserving resources, their AO. To maximize the effectiveness of both maximizing results, and managing risks in this land and air forces, LCCs should coordinate the area. Managing risks requires careful design and placement of this line with ACCs to ensure maxi- tuning of control measures and authority to min- mum coverage of all enemy targets with available imize restrictions on all forces and maximize assets. It is incumbent on each component com- combat power. JFCs will normally establish for- mander to establish a level of mutual trust with ward AO boundaries and adjust as necessary to the other commanders to make this relationship balance the needs of LCCs to rapidly maneuver work. ACCs must provide LCCs making FSCL de- with the needs of ACCs to rapidly mass and em- cisions with relevant facts that will help them, but ploy airpower with minimal constraints. must trust LCCs to place FSCLs in the best loca- Between FSCL and AO forward boundaries, tion to support the objectives of JFCs. LCCs are supported commanders and must coor- Air and Missile Defense. Coordination of fires dinate operations with ACCs when possible. LCCs naturally leads to this next area of concern. This should judiciously use control measures such as issue centers on the degree of control the area air FSCLs to facilitate attack operations. ACCs should defense commander should have over EAC air de- coordinate attacks inside the land AO to comple- fense assets. The Air Force holds that JFACCs— ment support of both the needs of LCCs and the who are normally designated as AADCs—are sup- overall theater campaign plans of JFCs. Improved ported commanders for overall theater air and friendly and enemy situational awareness, rapid information sharing, expertise in BCE and TACP,

Spring 1996 / JFQ 13 ■ ARMY–AIR FORCE TEAM

missile defense and should exercise OPCON over doctrine provides JFCs with the flexibility to de- air defense units unassociated with a corps. The velop the necessary C2 arrangements based on the Army is reluctant to release such control over its situation in theater. organic EAC air defense assets. Dual Hatting. Political and operational pres- While no one disputes the right of each unit sures on JFCs were the crux of the dual-hatting to self defense, we must balance that right with issue. Because dual hatting a corps commander as the need for close coordination of fires against a division commander or a numbered air force enemy threats beyond FSCLs to prevent fratricide. commander as a wing commander would be ir- Since JFACCs will be operating forces in this area regular, the Air Force contended that a dual-hat- for counterair, interdiction, strategic attack, and ted JFC or CINC would also be irregular, resulting surveillance and reconnaissance, coordination in a possible loss of focus on theater or compo- and deconfliction are cru- nent details. During our discussions, senior Army cial. Both services agree leaders acknowledged that this could occur, but political and operational that while corps comman- the likelihood is low. Dual hatting must be han- pressures on JFCs were the ders will retain OPCON dled on a case-by-case basis. CINCs must deter- crux of the dual-hatting issue over their organic air de- mine, subject to the approval by the Secretary of fense units, AADCs as sup- Defense, whether to simultaneously retain com- ported commanders will es- mand of an entire operation as JFC and a compo- tablish rules of engagement and assign air defense nent—land, maritime, or air—or to designate an- missions for EAC assets. LCCs must communicate other senior leader as component commander. their desires but trust AADCs to make the correct This is in line with joint doctrine. Situation-spe- decisions. cific political or operational considerations will The Army and Air Force have made great influence JFC decisions to retain leadership of a strides in target identification, attack cueing, and specific functional component in addition to the responsiveness since the Gulf War, and more im- overall JFC role. provements are on the horizon. The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction emphasizes the Looking to the Future need to share information, tailor countermissile In addition to those issues discussed at the dispositions and response postures, and work to- Warfighter Talks, there are many areas in which gether to create the greatest possible risk to interservice cooperation has made great strides. enemy missiles. LCCs must communicate their While the Army-Air Force working group offers needs to JFACCs/AADCs in developing air and an avenue to pursue such developments, other missile defense plans. This close coordination is organizations including TRADOC and ACC, Army essential to ensure timely and correct decisions. fire support elements, and various Air Force wings TMD Attack Operations. Closely tied to air and numbered air forces are constantly striving to and missile defense are TMD attack operations. enhance Army-Air Force team operations. While the Air Force believes TMD is part of the To improve TTP, the services have been de- counterair effort requiring theater-wide integra- veloping a multiservice targeting TTP under the tion, the Army holds that these operations are Air, Land, Sea Application Center (ALSA). Com- broader in scope and considers existing fire sup- mon TTP will allow component commanders to port as the most responsive for attacking enemy know how other components operate. Common missiles in an LCC’s AO. Regardless of opinions, procedures, as well as improved C4I, will help en- common sense dictates that between FSCL and sure proper prioritization, deconfliction, and at- the AO forward boundary, LCCs and ACCs must tack of targets. coordinate TMD attack operations to maximize There has also been an extensive effort to effects and minimize fratricide. There will be improve connectivity in combat identification times when an airborne asset provides a more and tracking. Tests conducted by the All Service timely response to pop-up targets than a corps Combat Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET) commander’s assets. At other times a corps may in Gulfport, Mississippi, in September 1995 iden- have the appropriate weapon. The Air Force is tified specific areas which needed attention. We considering increasing the amount of “on-call” must develop both the hardware and processes to assets available for TMD attack operations. With pass real-time combat identification data among improved connectivity, coordination and ap- elements of all services to reduce the possibilities proval will become easier. Until that time, current of air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air fratricide. Although the work of ASCIET has just begun, its contributions will receive careful attention because we stand to gain much from its successes in the area of combat risk management. The Army and Air Force plan to incorporate

14 JFQ / Spring 1996 Reimer and Fogleman

ASCIET into the next Roving Sands and Blue Flag the century, through interservice initiatives and air-land combat exercises. systems like JSTARS, our commanders should Integration of this information with evolving enjoy increased interoperability and a more com- capabilities such as the joint surveillance and tar- plete view of the battlefield. Both technological get attack radar system (JSTARS) and unmanned enhancements and sound joint doctrine are es- autonomous vehicles will provide commanders sential in strengthening ties between our services. with improved battlefield information. Real-time But great technology and good doctrine alone are imagery is a step towards the information domi- insufficient. Without trust and mutual under- nance that we are striving for. standing, an enemy could exploit our weaknesses We are making significant progress in in- and possibly defeat us. creasing connectivity between Army and Air Trust is based on insight and familiarity, Force planning and fire control elements. These knowing who will do the right thing in the initiatives have the potential to greatly increase proper way. A soldier’s expectation of airpower the ability to share and deconflict data on emerg- must be based on the realization that airmen ing targets in real time. Ongoing work to link the have theater-wide perspectives and responsibili- Air Force contingency theater automated plan- ties. An airman must appreciate the vital role of ning system (CTAPS) and Army advanced field ar- airpower in land combat and understand that air tillery tactical data system (AFATDS) will ensure flown in support of LCCs must complement the our forces put the right weapon on the right tar- plans of LCCs. The Army and Air Force depend get at the right time, increasing effective fire- upon and leverage the capabilities of one another power while reducing waste and delay. Connec- to be decisive in battle. Our separate strengths, as tivity between air and missile defenses (such as well as differences, will ensure that we remain an the Army TMD Force Projection Tactical Opera- air-land team without equal. In fact, no other tions Center and the Air Force combat integration military will even come close. JFQ capability) also helps to rapidly deconflict air and surface targets. This is increasingly important as weapons and threats change and a commander’s reaction time decreases.

The Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks, as well as working group and interservice efforts, are each small steps towards greater understanding between our services. Improving connectivity, strengthening command relationships, and developing trust are key elements in ensuring the Army and Air Force remain the premier air-land team. We have witnessed numerous advancements over the past year that increase a commander’s awareness of the battlefield. By the turn of

Destroyed Iraqi fighter. DOD

Spring 1996 / JFQ 15 ■ AFATDS: The Fire Support Window to the 21st Century By STEVEN W. BOUTELLE and RONALD FILAK DOD Multiple rocket launch system.

he trend toward “third wave warfare” bombing, it is becoming more identified with ac- (namely, de-massing and customizing curate sensors, weapons systems, and munitions. forces and weapons) and creation of a T digitized battlefield has been widely A Joint Resource discussed within the Army. And although doctri- Advances in weaponry and targeting have nal and organizational implications must be fi- increased the burden of managing fire support nalized, it is clear that smaller, more dispersed operations, always a complex and exacting forces as well as joint and combined capabilities process. This difficulty, however, is being lessened will be hallmarks of future operations. Further- greatly by automation. The Army advanced field more, command and control (C2) systems that artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) is about to support JFCs must provide horizontal and vertical make its third wave warfare debut. This state-of- interoperability and be able to exchange situa- the-art system supports the need for horizontal tional awareness information across the force. and vertical interoperability, distribution of situa- This also is true of fire support—that is, can- tional awareness information, and automation in nons, rockets, missiles, mortars, naval guns, and the process of matching fire support weapons sys- bombs—which provide lethal, flexible, and deci- tems against high-payoff targets. sive assets to JFCs in prosecuting the battle. From the field artillery digital automated While fire support has long been characterized by computer of the 1960s to the tactical fire direction massed fires such as artillery barrages or carpet system (TACFIRE) of the 1980s and the initial fire support automated system of today, the field artillery community has been in the forefront in automated support for commanders in combat. Colonel Steven W. Boutelle, USA, is project manager for Field Artillery AFATDS developers have drawn on experience Tactical Data Systems and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Filak, USA (Ret.), from earlier systems—coupled with requirements is a member of Computer Sciences Corporation.

16 JFQ / Spring 1996 Boutelle and Filak

analysis and ongoing feedback from soldiers and as field artillery assets (cannons, rockets, and mis- marines in the field and advanced warfighting ex- siles). This automated analysis process also en- periments—to develop a C2 system responsive to a ables a fire support commander to automatically commander’s needs by supporting: generate and digitally distribute fire support an- ■ the integration of all fire support assets into the nexes and plans. planning and execution of support for the maneuver Second, the exchange of situational aware- commander’s operation ness information allows AFATDS to constantly ■ the application of commander’s guidance to pri- provide up-to-date graphic depictions of battle- oritize targets, enabling fire support assets to be directed field information. This provides commanders at the most relevant and important enemy assets timely information with which to formulate or ■ the automated exchange of digitized target in- adjust guidance while eliminating the need to formation and situational awareness with other units transport and post (via grease pencils and tape) throughout the joint force. bulky situation maps. While AFATDS was originally an Army system, it is now joint and under development by Target Acquisition the Army for its own requirements and those of Since it is interoperable with a variety of C2 the Marine Corps. A major portion of version 2 systems, AFATDS provides commanders with development incorporates major advances in the ability to see the battlefield the Armed Forces are taking Marine-unique require- and plan future operations. Intelligence collec- ments. Furthermore, pre- tion systems can develop large amounts of data a quantum leap in conducting liminary discussions are un- on potential targets throughout a battlefield. fire support operations in aid derway on the applicability AFATDS provides commanders interoperability of the “core software en- of a single service or JFC with the all source analysis system (ASAS), an au- gine” of AFATDS to the fire tomated Army C2 system used by the intelli- support roles of the Air gence/electronic warfare community. ASAS, in Force and Navy. This article discusses operational, turn, provides access to targeting information via technical, and interoperability features of AFATDS Trojan Spirit and tactical intelligence collection that provide JFCs and fire support coordinators systems. Trojan Spirit offers a communications (FSCOORDs) with these capabilities. gateway to national intelligence databases and multiservice tactical intelligence systems includ- Operational ing material from the Central Intelligence With AFATDS, the Armed Forces and fire sup- Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Na- port community are taking a quantum leap in the tional Security Agency, as well as tactical target ability to provide timely help for conducting fire data from systems such as the joint surveillance support operations in aid of a single service or JFC. target attack radar system (JSTARS), the Guardrail The operational capability of AFATDS is made up and Rivet Joint electronic intelligence collection of 27 major functional capabilities in five func- systems, and the Air Force tactical reconnaissance tional categories. The breadth of fire support func- aircraft (see figure on next page). tionality and horizontal interoperability of AFATDS make it the most comprehensive informa- Planning tion warfare combat system available. The fire sup- At the same time weapon systems are be- port planning function provides FSCOORDs with coming more capable of attacking identified tar- several key capabilities. gets with pin-point accuracy. It may no longer be First, since the concepts of operation and necessary to launch a wave of bombers or mass guidance are entered into its database, AFATDS an attack by tube artillery to take out a critical can assist in performing course of action analysis target. Instead, planners—through the AFATDS– on alternative battle plans. Operators can adjust ASAS interoperability capability—can open the any combination of variables to identify the im- door to a storehouse of available targeting infor- pact of the changes on the ability of fire support mation and use automated target analysis and to sustain a commander’s plans. The same degree target attack capability from AFATDS to match of flexibility allows for the application of analysis weapons assets against selected targets. If a situa- against several options proposed by JFCs to deter- tion warrants—against tactical missiles such as mine which plan is most supportable from a fire Scuds—this can be done in seconds and without support perspective. AFATDS performs this analy- human intervention. sis using information on all types of available fire While providing access to this vast array of support: air attack (including attack helicopter information, AFATDS also uses distribution crite- and fixed-wing close air support), naval gunfire, ria and graphic overlay filters to ensure that users mortars and offensive electronic warfare, as well

Spring 1996 / JFQ 17 ■ FIRE SUPPORT WINDOW

AFATDS operators in a corps fire support element National, Strategic, and Tactical Sensors Linked to (FSE) normally observe status down to the battal- Fire Support Weapons Systems. ion level. However, the AFATDS database has in-

TIBS formation on firing platoons and batteries that constitute each battalion. This data is successively TR-1 “rolled up” to develop status on the battalion. NATIONAL ASSETS Corps FSE operators can institute a parameter JSTARS that tells the computer to distill the information on subordinate units and report status at battalion level. (Concurrently, counterparts at division FSE or division artillery level can establish parameters, with the same database, at battery or firing platoon level.) Corps FSE operators can change a parameter to allow insight into specific GROUND PROCESSING GROUND information that applies to any of the firing pla- FACILITY STATION MODULE toons within a given area. The fire support execution portion of

MLRS AFATDS implements many functions which have MLRS not been previously automated. In providing au- (ATACMS-Equipped) tomated target analysis—ensuring that the right TROJAN SPIRIT target is engaged at the right time by the right AFATDS ASAS weapon/ammunition mix—AFATDS offers major MLRS FIRE DIRECTION increases in speed fire mission processing. (Perfor- CENTER mance tests indicate that AFATDS processes missions in 10 to 50 percent of the time for Army training standards.) Fire support execution fea- receive only needed information. Operator con- tures include: trolled distribution lists filter the information ■ elimination of “first in, first out” processing and which is conveyed by AFATDS to its subordinate engaging of targets: target management matrix and stations. For example, an AFATDS operator can high payoff target list tools provide for sensor inputs to establish distribution criteria for remote stations be matched against concept of the operation and fire that will provide only information of importance. support guidance to move important targets to the Although vast amounts of information reside front of the queue in the AFATDS computer, map, and overlay tools, ■ a database of unit information, extant battle- human interfaces have been designed so that op- field geometry, and fire support coordination measures erators can selectively screen to verify that target engagement complies with restrictions and guidance criteria information. Examples in- AFATDS allows JFCs or their ■ software that automatically assesses the capabil- clude multiple tactical over- representatives to centrally ities of each available type of fire support weapon sys- lays with varying parameters tem: weapon status, ammunition effectiveness and control fires by approving as well as the ability to control availability, commander’s guidance (such as limits on each mission the area depicted by scrolling selected units to conserve ammunition), and factors and zooming to portray differ- which determine the optimal means of engaging a tar- ent information. Both opera- get and generating an “order to fire” for selected units tors and commanders can select the information to engage. and area they want to view. Moreover, potential AFATDS is designed to provide JFCs, FSCOORDs, targets can be portrayed graphically and, at an and system operators with flexibility in responding to operator’s discretion, additional information on emerging needs. Each of its features is directly con- targets can be viewed by clicking on an icon and trolled by operator inputs. In all cases, operators have reviewing database entries. the option of inputting parameters that identify the The AFATDS database contains data which is points and conditions at which human intervention relevant to all levels of command. However, the and decisions are required to continue the process. information routinely portrayed at a field artillery This allows JFCs or their representatives to centrally or maneuver battalion level likely differs from control fires by approving each mission or, con- that portrayed at division or corps level. AFATDS versely, to provide more decentralized execution by addresses this situation by providing operators enabling missions that meet certain criteria to auto- with the ability to establish parameters on the matically be forwarded without human intervention. scope (breadth of information) and granularity (depth of information) that is routinely presented. By monitoring activities down two levels,

18 JFQ / Spring 1996 Boutelle and Filak

functions (such as operating system, graphical user interface, and communications management) as well as modules for common applications (such as terrain evaluation). This support software is being upgraded to meet joint standards for a common operating environment with automated information systems to increase interoperability. This will help assure that commanders or their staffs can, from any terminal, access the common picture of the battlefield and communicate with other operational facilities, regardless of service. Fire support-specific software has been integrated with ATCCS hardware and software to form AFATDS. Fire support software is modular, user friendly, and can be tailored. In addition, it

U.S. Army includes an embedded training module. The Battle command whole package is integrated in wheeled and vehicle with ASAS. tracked shelters developed under the ATCCS standard integrated command post system program. The remaining AFATDS functions are move- Shelters have one, two, or three AFATDS worksta- ment control, field artillery mission support, and tions, depending on mission requirements. field artillery fire direction operations. Movement Throughout the development process, the control provides the ability to request and coordi- hardware platform housing AFATDS has been nate convoy movements while the field artillery consistently upgraded to state of the art. Initial mission support furnishes logistical backing. Field fielding of AFATDS will be on a Hewlett-Packard artillery fire direction operations bolster the fire 735 reduced instruction set computing machine; support execution function by maintaining the sta- subsequent fielding will be on a Sun Sparc dual tus of weaponry, ammunition, and unit capability, processor terminal. These configurations offer a and by making technical fire direction calculations. tremendous computing potential for meeting the challenges of the dispersed Force XXI battlefield. Technical Concepts The operational fire support requirements AFATDS will ultimately become a part of the were thorough and accurate. The nature of the Army battle command system (ABCS), an over- threat, doctrine, force structure, missions, and arching scheme conceived as the keystone of a technology have dramatically changed since ini- digitized battlefield. When developed, it will fur- tial development in the mid-1980s. With these nish seamless connectivity from the tactical changes has come the need for AFATDS to evolve (squad/platoon) to strategic level (national com- to address future requirements. This has been mand authorities), ensuring an integrated digital done through involving AFATDS in training exer- information network to support warfighting sys- cises and advanced warfighting experiments. tems and C2 decision-cycle superiority. This sys- AFATDS was designed to operate with all tem will be realized by a migration of systems— standard Army tactical communications systems. including the current Army tactical command Within an operational facility, AFATDS terminals and control system (ATCCS)—using both an evo- share data using an internal local area network. lutionary and transitional process. In a maneuver command post, AFATDS ex- Today, AFATDS is one of five battlefield func- changes information with other components of tional area (BFA) control systems that make up ATCCS using local area network. For communica- ATCCS. As with all ATCCS BFA control systems, tions between command posts, AFATDS transmits AFATDS makes use of ATCCS common hardware and receives information on the single channel and software. Under this concept, a project man- ground and airborne radio system, enhanced po- ager provides the ATCCS component systems sition location reporting system, and mobile sub- with a suite of common computers and periph- scriber equipment packet network. Operating eral devices on which to host their respective with these systems gives AFATDS a high degree of BFA-specific applications software. The project flexibility in satisfying its communications needs. manager for common hardware and software also The challenge of minimizing bandwidth provides common support software for basic usage has also been met. For AFATDS–AFATDS communication, transfer syntax is employed to update the databases of remote stations. Under this technique, all data items are time-stamped

Spring 1996 / JFQ 19 ■ FIRE SUPPORT WINDOW DOD JSTARS aircraft.

and only those which have changed since the last JSTARS ground station module. With messages that update are sent. For communication with non- observe a four-nation common technical interface AFATDS stations, the variable message format design plan, AFATDS is interoperable with British, (VMF) is used in lieu of the U.S. message text for- French, and German automated fire support C2 sys- mat (USMTF). Studies indicate that VMF messages tems. The design plan was framed by these nations yield bandwidth utilization savings of 50 percent under the auspices of the artillery systems coopera- over the USMTF format. tion activities program. The basis of the technical The technical design of AFATDS meets Army interface is a common tactical concept document goals for commonality and interoperability and also developed under the program. The common fully promotes fire support mission requirements. tactical concept emphasizes a commitment to ensuring that all four nations are able to conduct fire Interoperability support operations on a combined basis. AFATDS is designed to be interoperable with Using messages conforming to the TACFIRE various systems and subsystems and to exchange and VMF message standards, AFATDS can ex- information with other ATCCS elements, namely, change information with emerging systems such the maneuver control system, as the combat vehicle command and control sys- AFATDS V2 will include combat service support control tem. In the future AFATDS will interoperate di- system, and forward area air de- rectly with overhead sensor systems via the com- automation processes fense command and control sys- manders’ tactical terminal (until that capability is related to requesting and tem, in addition to ASAS. This in- provided, AFATDS will get that information cludes utilizing messages that through ASAS). executing close air conform to USMTF and joint support missions VMF standards, and database Program Outline transfer processes which employ AFATDS development is a phased effort. The distributed computing environ- first phase will yield AFATDS version 1 software ment and data distribution services software. that automates half of the Army’s fire support op- Using messages that conform to the TACFIRE erational requirements. The next phase is divided or VMF standard, AFATDS can exchange informa- into subphases and will result in AFATDS version tion in the fire support community, including fire 2.0 and 2.1 software. Operationally, version 2.0 direction for the multiple launch rocket system software is focused on satisfying requirements es- (MLRS), cannon battery computer system, and tablished by the Marine Corps while version 2.1 will automate additional Army requirements. While satisfying service-unique needs, this sec-

20 JFQ / Spring 1996 Boutelle and Filak ond phase will also incorporate major additional through force development test and experimenta- software modules to enhance the ability of tion, field and command post exercises, and rota- AFATDS to participate in joint operations. tions at the National Training Center. Moreover, The inclusion of unified-build software—the the division used AFATDS in Kuwait from August heart of the joint global command and control to October 1995 during Exercise Intrinsic Action. system—provides software compatibility at the Feedback has led to improved human interface joint level for 19 fundamental computer proc- and selected operational characteristics. esses ranging from network administration to In Germany, V Corps headquarters employed database management. Aided by the further use AFATDS during Atlantic Resolve in 1994. As a di- of a standard application program, this will help rect result, implementation of a deep strike sup- to direct AFATDS towards the ultimate goal of full port capability, first scheduled for version 3, was interoperability with the automated systems of all accelerated, and AFATDS currently can support services. emerging operational requirements such as attack As a result of ongoing work by the Naval Re- on hostile tactical missile launchers. search and Development Center in San Diego, AFATDS is the fire support command, con- AFATDS V2 capabilities will include automation trol, and coordination system of choice for the of processes related to requesting and executing following advanced warfighting experiments: close air support (CAS) and battlefield air inter- Prairie Warrior (Fort Leavenworth), Warrior Focus diction (BAI) missions. This capability will ease (a Joint Readiness Training Center experiment at the daily coordination and planning of fires with Fort Polk with the 10th Mountain Division), and a the facility to electronically transmit preplanned theater missile defense experiment at Fort Bliss and immediate air support requests to the Air during Roving Sands. Each advanced warfighting Force contingency tactical automated planning experiment allowed AFTADS developers to refine system (CTAPS). AFATDS will also be able to re- functional and interoperability capabilities. ceive confirmation of preplanned CAS missions More recently, AFTADS was used during CJTF via the CTAPS-produced air tasking order (ATO). Exercise (CJTFEX) ’96 which involved more than The operator can parse, store, and display ATO 53,000 British and U.S. personnel in the southeast- data by sortie type (such as CAS, BAI, or search ern United States and along the eastern seaboard. and rescue) and incorporate sortie data for ATOs The Task Force XXI advanced warfighting ex- in the process of deconflicting air attack missions periment slated for February 1997 will be the first from cannon, rocket, and missile activity. event designed to survey the Army digitization The final phase (version 3) will lead to the concept on a wide scale. A brigade-plus of the production of the AFATDS objective system. This 4th Infantry Division will be outfitted with com- phase will automate remaining operational fire puters and force management software. AFATDS support requirements and incorporate technical will be fielded to two dozen operational facilities fire direction functionality currently resident in that deploy with the maneuver forces (including the battery computer system (for cannon opera- FSEs, officer vehicles, and combat observation- tions) and the fire direction system (for rocket liaision teams) and ten operational facilities that and missile operations). are designated to support field artillery operations AFATDS version 1 software underwent initial (including battalion and platoon fire direction operational testing and evaluation in August centers and field artillery battalion commanders, 1995 and a Milestone III production decision was S–2s, and S–3s). The software delivered has been made by the Army System Acquisition Review modified for the VMF message set designed for Council (ASARC) in December 1995. The 1st Cav- Task Force XXI operations. alry Division, as an operational test unit, has AFATDS Beta software and will become the first AFATDS is an automated tool that will assist organization in the field to receive version 1. both JFCs and FSCOORDs in managing and as- After ASARC III, it was fielded to elements of the sessing large amounts of available information 4th Infantry Division comprising the EXFOR (Task and making effective use of forces and weapons. Force XXI). In meeting the operational needs of today, AFATDS offers the flexibility to support the evolv- Employment ing requirements of Force XXI doctrine and third To ensure that the design meets the require- wave warfare. JFQ ments of warfighters, AFATDS has been placed with units and taken part in advanced warfighting experiments. The 1st Cavalry Division received the system in July 1993 and has taken it

Spring 1996 / JFQ 21 A PRIMER ON Naval Theater Air Defense By ALAN G. MAIORANO,NEVIN P. CARR, JR., and TREVOR J. BENDER

Theater air defense is one of the Navy’s fundamental and enduring missions. It evolved both technically and tactically following World War II to counter the threat to friendly forces posed by manned aircraft, anti-ship missiles, sea-skimming cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles. The ability to quickly develop and maintain an accurate air surveillance picture, coordinate defense-in-depth with available air defense forces, and provide a high firepower response have been critical to naval operations for over fifty years.

22 Maiorano et al.

Kamikaze attack on U.S. Navy USS Bunker Hill off Okinawa, 1945. In the 1970s and 1980s, system develop- Evolution Based on Experience ment, tactics, and training were largely driven by In the 1920s, General Billy Mitchell intro- the threat of massed Soviet missile attacks far at duced a new threat by sinking a target battleship, sea from long-range bombers, missile ships, and thereby demonstrating the vulnerability of ships submarines. The decline of the Soviet threat and to air attack. Early naval air defenses relied upon simultaneous proliferation of offensive weaponry massive, uncoordinated fire from anti-aircraft ar- to littoral states prompted a reevaluation of the tillery such as 20mm, 40mm, three-inch, and Navy’s contributions to the new world order. First five-inch guns. In those days, the battlespace ex- outlined in...From the Sea, and updated in For- tended only to the visual horizon, normally less ward...From the Sea, the focus of the Navy has than 15 miles. Air defense was made up of a series shifted from an open-ocean threat to near-land of local anti-air battles fought close aboard, operations against in- strictly in self defense. Ships counted on visual kamikazes revealed shortfalls in creasingly capable re- sightings and primitive, inaccurate voice commu- gional powers. Now nication. Subsequent advances in precision aerial air defenses and ushered in an era the global maritime bombing and torpedo bombing during World of systems development threat has been re- War II posed severe threats which demanded de- placed by regional fensive capabilities. challenges that are Deploying air search radar on naval ships equally as demanding for theater air defense dramatically altered the air defense environment. forces. This change in focus has altered the pri- Long-range detection of the enemy enabled car- mary naval air defense mission from a blue-water, rier-based fighters to attrite incoming raids a open-ocean defense to a more offensive extension number of miles from the target task force. Early of naval air defenses overland. Naval theater air detection of distant raids provided defending defense objectives are clear: ships with critical reaction time to initiate limited ■ initiate and maintain control of airspace early coordination of fire among friendly units under in a crisis or conflict attack. Early detection and advance warning were ᭣ USS Bunker Hill ■ permit safe entry of follow-on U.S. and allied firing missile from essential to effective air defenses when kamikazes forces into a theater of operations vertical launching appeared in 1944 as the first true guided missiles. ■ protect and support forces and facilities ashore. system. Tactics evolved quickly, including tightly grouped U.S. Navy Navy air defense capability is built on a solid defensive ship formations and picket ships for foundation of leadership in combat systems inte- early warning. Although primitive by current gration, experience in combined arms warfare, standards, the concept of effective, coordinated and decentralized command and control. These defense-in-depth took shape. But tactics were lim- are the key strengths on which to build a theater ited by stand-alone equipment, intermittent air defense capability in the 21st century. voice radio communications, primitive analog fire control computers, the inability to rapidly exchange accurate target position data, and the lack Commander Alan G. Maiorano, USN, is the prospective commanding of a long range weapon. The war ended before an officer of USS Vincennes; Commander Nevin P. Carr, Jr., USN, is Aegis effective anti-aircraft defense was deployed. requirements officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Nonetheless, the lethality of kamikazes revealed and Trevor J. Bender is an analyst with Logicon-Syscon, Inc.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 23 ■ NAVAL THEATER AIR DEFENSE

Theater Air Defense Joint Architecture these missiles. A guided missile capability was incorporated in the designs and construction of several new classes of cruisers and destroyers by • Theater CINC flexibility 1957, built from the keel up with air defense as a • Seamless information transfer primary mission. • Interoperability with services / allies The combination of advancements in air • Weapon coordination search radars, deployment of 3–T SAMS, and shift • Near real-time information to carrier-based fighter jets significantly improved • Situational awareness air defense capabilities. The extension of target detection ranges, coupled with long-range fighters and missiles, expanded the battlespace of naval task forces to over 100 miles. Targets could now be engaged far beyond the visual horizon. New command, control, and coordination requirements were placed on naval air defense forces. Despite significant advances in radar and Marine Air Force SAM technology, performance shortfalls against Corps Surveillance Warning Control an increasingly demanding threat highlighted weaknesses in stand-alone systems. Improve- ments in search radars, fire control radars, com- JTIDS puters, launchers, missiles, and displays were

CRC HAWK piecemeal, built and supported individually with design and development agencies working independently. Search radars and display systems were managed in the Bureau of Ships while fire control CEC radars, computers, guns, and missile launchers were handled by the Bureau of Ordnance. Often Army Weapons Control Sensor Netting Navy the first chance to test and operate multiple system components occurred after installation. Combat systems were wired together by ship- Theater Wide builders, not system engineers. Lack of technical and organizational coordination created expen- sive and nearly insurmountable system interface JFC Headquarters problems. The reaction time gained by increased

Patriot / THAAD radar detection and target engagement range was offset by manual data evaluation, display, and dissemination. Continuous attention and action were required to deal with a growing volume of tactical data required by a disparate set of warfighting equipments. shortfalls in air defenses and ushered in an era of The transition from guns to missile batteries systems development. was the first step in a series of initiatives to ad- The advent of unmanned missiles and long- dress high speed threats. In the late 1950s, the range Soviet bombers led the Navy to develop de- Navy recognized that technology would one day fensive weapons and enhance ship-to-ship coor- permit an enemy to develop weapon systems that dination. Transitioning from attacking aircraft to could overwhelm first generation missile sensors faster, smaller anti-ship missiles required cultural and equipment. The flaw was in the speed and re- as well as technological changes in warfighting. liability of target information exchange between Paradigms of air defense based on lookouts and ships and aircraft. Voice communication was too shipboard guns were scrapped in favor of systems slow and unreliable to be effective against large that integrated radar data, high speed fire control numbers of supersonic missiles launched by regi- computation, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). ment-size Soviet bomber formations. As missiles In the 1950s the Navy began deploying three could carry nuclear warheads, ship formations be- guided SAM variants known as 3–T missiles: long- came more dispersed to minimize damage from range Talos (65+ miles), medium-range Terrier (20 single missile strikes, further aggravating air de- miles), and short-range Tartar (10 miles). Simulta- fense coordination. Faster and more reliable neously, a large-scale program to convert previ- means of surveillance and identification data ex- ously non-missile ships to missile shooters was change were required. initiated with vessels capable of firing one of

24 JFQ / Spring 1996 Maiorano et al.

The Navy tactical data system (NTDS) was These tactical and technical advances came introduced in 1958, the world’s first shipboard none too soon. The Soviets began deployment of tactical data system based on programmable com- a series of air and surface launched cruise missiles puters. This was an initial step in the integration in the 1960s, including the subsonic Styx. The of multiship systems in a force-wide air defense following year Badger C and Bear B/C long-range system. Conceived as a means of exchanging air bombers were equipped to fire supersonic, nu- surveillance radar information throughout a task clear-capable AS–2 Kipper and AS–3 Kangaroo air- force, NTDS replaced and automated older man- to-surface missiles from ranges in excess of 100 ual displays and reduced dependence on voice miles. The launch range of some weapons ex- communications for air defense. NTDS incorpo- tended beyond the surveillance range of radars rated target position and identification informa- aboard ships. Undetected missile launch and su- tion from a ship’s sensors, as well as information personic speeds combined to reduce reaction inserted over an electronic data link by other time, while increasing raid density threatened to ships in a task force, into one computer-managed saturate defenses. track file. Data were exchanged and updated The Navy recognized that stand-alone de- among ships several times per minute via an elec- fense components would eventually not be capa- tronic data link known as ble of responding to air threats. Search and fire Link-11. Early warning and control radars were based on analog technology E–2A Hawkeye expanded air reaction time, information and first generation computers. SAM launchers defense surveillance and exchange speed, and informa- depended upon hydraulic loading operations and battlespace beyond a ship’s tion reliability improved large rotating magazines, restricting the rate of strikingly. Link-11 data stan- fire to one or two missiles a minute. High speed, radar horizon dards and protocols were low altitude cruise missiles stressed existing mis- adopted by Britain and sile fuzing systems. In combination, the stand- Canada and soon by NATO as a whole. The sys- alone components were manpower intensive and tem’s efficacy is reflected in the fact that NTDS, could not react in the required time. upgraded over the years to keep pace with threat The widespread introduction of digital and and technology advances, remains at the heart of other electronic technologies initiated a period of naval and joint air defense management systems combat system improvements that affected al- today. most every aspect of sensor, weapon, and NTDS linked long-range surveillance sensors launcher design. This development included true and surface-to-air weapons for the first time with combat system integration for the first time. In an automated information management system 1963, the 3–T missile effort transitioned into a to support the coordinated defense of widely dis- dual-track Standard missile (SM) program which tributed forces. Air defense tactics continued to incorporated earlier designs. Though Talos was evolve as individual ships became more potent discontinued, Tartar became SM–1 (MR or defenders and anti-air warfare commanders medium range) and Terrier became SM–1 (ER or (AAWCs), responsible for defending battle groups extended range). Responding to the threat of or task forces, became capable of monitoring bat- cruise missiles, SM had an improved autopilot, tlespace beyond the range of their organic sen- proximity fuzed target detecting device, greater sors. With more reaction time and reliable target range, jamming resistance, and inertial naviga- identification and position data, further decen- tion to guide the missile from the launch ship to tralization of air defense command and control a designated homing basket. became possible. Able to oversee numerous indi- Advancements in combat system capability vidual ship engagements, AAWC could quickly were not limited to ships. In 1964, the E–2A and reliably provide command by negation or di- Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft entered rect specific target assignments when necessary. the fleet. With an aircraft version of NTDS to ex- In response, a centralized control/decentralized change track data with other ships and aircraft, execution anti-air warfare organization was im- Hawkeye expanded air defense surveillance and plemented. Area defense provided from forces at battlespace beyond a ship’s radar horizon, restor- sea or near land became a reality. With an infor- ing costly reaction time for fleet air defense units. mation exchange system (NTDS) and the requi- With the advance warning provided by E–2 air- site firepower (3–T missiles) coordinated through borne radar, carrier-based fighters and guided an effective command and control mechanism, long-range SAMs became the first line of air de- naval forces could regulate the air battlespace fense for task forces as tactics stressed “shoot the within a designated theater. archer” before an arrow was launched. Fighter and ship actions, target assignments, and the employment of weapons were initiated by preplanned operational orders and coordinated via

Spring 1996 / JFQ 25 ■ NAVAL THEATER AIR DEFENSE

NTDS by AAWC. Together, missile ships, E–2s, fire control quality tracking for hundreds of tar- and fighters exchanged data continuously via gets simultaneously. Since its radar also commu- Link-11 to mutually reinforce defense-in-depth. nicates directly with SMs in flight to provide mid- This tactic focused on heavy attrition of incom- course guidance information, the demand to ing raids, forcing enemy aircraft and missiles to dedicate a separate fire control radar for the dura- penetrate multiple, coordinated layers of defense. tion of a missile’s flight is eliminated. Target illu- Vietnam provided the first test of new air de- mination, required for semi-active homing mis- fense capabilities. Not only did systems prove to siles, is provided only for the final seconds of be reliable and effective for air defense of forces at missile flight, or endgame. The result is a dra- sea; the Navy also found that it could extend the matic increase in the number of simultaneous en- air defense envelope over land in support of gagements, since the ship is no longer limited by forces operating near the coast. Various enemy air the availability of tracking fire control directors. bases were within shipboard and E–2 radar range, The uniqueness of the fully integrated Aegis allowing naval forces to monitor and respond to weapon system is not only in the increased num- launch and recovery activities. In 1965, the ber of actions completed automatically, but also guided missile cruiser USS Long Beach engaged in the ability of operators to alter the conditions two MiGs detected 60 miles inland with ship- under which actions can be performed using au- launched SAMs. From offshore, naval forces tomated doctrine. This is accomplished by pro- showed that they could protect friendly forces grammable “if-then” statements that associate operating in port facilities, beachheads, and track criteria such as speed, altitude, IFF (identifi- coastal airfields. cation, friend or foe), and range with a specific automatic or semi-automatic action. Theater Air Defense Matures Throughout the Aegis design and develop- Throughout the conflict in Vietnam, enemy ment process, five performance factors were used aircraft frequently flew in the same battlespace as to evaluate its capabilities: reaction time, fire- friendly air forces. Tactics and procedures proved power, electronic countermeasure and environ- sufficiently responsive and flexible to enable mental resistance, continuous availability, and AAWC to manage the complex battlespace as well coverage. With design efforts focused, new initia- as adjust to various operating environments and tives and potential warfighting capabilities had to threat conditions. Air defense tactics were tested contribute to the improvement of one or more of and refined. Fleet air defense identification zone these key performance factors. The era of stand- procedures were drafted to control the intense air alone components and black boxes, which re- surveillance and identification environment over quired added shipboard manpower and unique the Gulf of Tonkin and to confirm the identity of logistics tails, had ended. In the past twenty returning friendly aircraft. Later, the procedures years, these factors successfully guided every were used extensively to track, identify, and de- modification or upgrade to the Aegis system. conflict thousands of flights over land and water Three other recent developments promise to in the Persian Gulf War. Zero blue-on-blue engage- have a dramatic impact on theater air defense: co- ments remains an essential air defense criterion. operative engagement capability (CEC), joint tac- In spite of advances, new dangers from high tical information distribution system (JTIDS), and speed sea skimming cruise missiles required more the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles. CEC than incremental improvements. Rotating radars is a computer-based information exchange sys- updated data too slowly on targets travelling at tem that allows ships or aircraft to remotely share supersonic speeds. A widespread reliance on raw radar measurement data at near real-time ex- stand-alone combat system components imposed change rates. Cooperative engagement is a nat- manpower intensive and time consuming steps in ural result of tactical computer networking which the detect-track-engage sequence. A shipboard captures major technological and reliability ad- combat system was required to automate man- vancements in high speed computer processing power intensive functions and to enable employ- and communications. With sensor netting fire ment of on board weapon systems more rapidly. control, quality sensor data can be exchanged In response to these air defense challenges, the among multiple cooperating units (CUs) includ- Navy began full scale development of the Aegis ing ships, aircraft, and ground forces, enabling shipboard weapon system in 1973. participants to view the same tactical picture. The Aegis combined virtually every aspect of potential for force-wide automated doctrine to as- anti-air warfare management in a fully integrated, sist track evaluation, identification functions, and multi-sensor, computer-aided combat system. In- engagement decisions could optimize the speed, troduced operationally in 1983, the heart of the Aegis weapon system is the SPY–1 phased array radar, which provides automatic detection and

26 JFQ / Spring 1996 Maiorano et al.

Combat information center aboard USS Vincennes. U.S. Navy (Tim Masterson) U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser launching multiple Standard missiles. reliability, and utility of data exchange. Leaders control processor (C2P) introduces the capability can spend more time evaluating data than pro- to exchange information between tactical links cessing it. (such as Link-11, Link-16, and CEC) and conduct CEC is being tested at sea today. Planned for multiple simultaneous data link operations. JTIDS operational introduction in 1996, it provides a will be the joint surveillance, warning, and com- quantum leap in data accuracy exchange between mand and control coordination net of the next air defense forces. CEC-equipped forces will be century. able to engage hostile targets not seen on their Finally, the widespread proliferation of tacti- sensors. The unparalleled accuracy of composite cal ballistic missiles (TBMs) is the most recent and track data will allow missiles in flight to be threatening challenge to effective air defense. The handed off to other units better positioned to con- Gulf War clearly demonstrated the tactical and trol the engagement endgame. The implications strategic impact of TBMs and stressed the political for coordination of air defense actions across the and military importance of TBM defense. Like entire theater of operations are enormous. anti-ship cruise missile defense at sea, TBM de- In addition to CEC, JTIDS is being fielded by fense of forces ashore has become an essential to all services. This system is a high speed, secure, successful operations in regional conflicts. To jam-resistant, voice and tactical data communica- achieve this capability quickly and affordably, the tions system over Link-16. It provides users with Navy is capitalizing on prior investments in SM real-time position, status, special purpose, and and the Aegis weapon system, which are being identification information on friendly, unknown, and hostile tracks. The associated command and

Spring 1996 / JFQ 27 ■ NAVAL THEATER AIR DEFENSE

commander (AADC) afloat to a counterpart ashore without loss of continuity. Navy theater air defense is a model of jointness and the product of technological evolution, training, and operational lessons. AAWC is normally stationed on board an Aegis cruiser. In the open ocean they control and coordinate air defense assets, including guided missile ships and early warning, combat air patrol, airborne tankers, and electronic warfare aircraft. Land- based aircraft are coordinated through AAWCs who are responsible for proper identification, check-in, and flight safety. Coordination among air defense units is accomplished via Link-11 (increasingly by JTIDS) and optimized by CEC among shooters. Flexible and robust tactics are in Photo Lab) place to support Navy, joint, and allied air defense requirements, near-land or in open ocean, including operations from crisis prevention to re- Independence gional conflict.

U.S. Navy ( The Navy theater air defense capability is de- Task Force 70 in rived from equipment, computer programs, tac- western Pacific. tics, and training that have evolved over fifty modified to incorporate a TBM capability. De- years. Periodic validation in combat has proven fense against TBMs from ships at sea will permit a the efficacy of these capabilities and demon- safe entry of joint forces into a hostile theater. strated the Navy’s essential contribution to air de- The real-time exchange of tactical informa- fense. Driven by a changing threat, tactical and tion among the services is fundamental to joint technological improvements have ensured that operations along littorals. With multiservice track the Navy maintained its air defense capabilities in data exchange provided by JTIDS and planned every potential theater of operations. For the fore- CEC deployment with real time shooter-to- seeable future, the Navy role in air defense will shooter coordination, the C2 architecture to or- include four key components: chestrate theater air defense units at sea and ■ fleet and amphibious objective area air defense ashore will be in place. against cruise missiles, aircraft, and tactical ballistic missiles Synergism among re- ■ overland area tactical ballistic and cruise missile flexible and robust tactics are in cent air defense ad- defense of joint and coalition forces place to support Navy, joint, and vances—Aegis, CEC, ■ tactical TBMD for defense-in-depth and reassur- JTIDS, and theater balance of allies allied air defense requirements listic missile defense ■ joint theater air defense battle management and 3 (TBMD)—makes them C prior to and during transition to AADC ashore. force multipliers and ensures robust air defense Navy ships and aircraft are forward deployed and seamless transition to a joint command 365 days a year in virtually every region of the structure on arrival of follow-on forces. world. They can establish an air defense umbrella Since Vietnam, air defense tactics and proce- at sea or overland, bring organic firepower for dures have been developed to address specific re- area and self defense, and provide doctrinal au- quirements of near-land and amphibious opera- tomation to help watchstanders remain vigilant tions, emphasizing early coordination with for long periods of time under stressful condi- marine and joint forces ashore. The reorientation tions. CEC-equipped, TBMD-capable Aegis ships of the Navy toward littoral operations imposes (with SM block IV variants) ensure that the Navy added C3 requirements on commanders ashore. stays in the vanguard of joint theater air defense Forces operating ashore or in an amphibious ob- in the 21st century. JFQ jective area require defenses against cruise missiles, hostile air, and tactical ballistic missiles. The increasing emphasis on joint operations in regional conflicts established a clear demand for theater air defense battle management procedures to quickly transition from an area air defense

28 JFQ / Spring 1996 Unity of Command—Countering Aircraft and Missile Threats

By VINCENT P. DIFRONZO DOD P–51s escorting bombers during World War II. oint force commanders (JFCs) must achieve threats—aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and maintain air superiority against a range and surface to air missiles—must be neutralized of threats. Controlling the air is a prerequi- to attain air superiority.1 Jsite for force projection, surveillance, inter- Because all components and allied forces have diction, strategic attack, and surface maneuver. some assets to counter such threats, JFCs face a Politically, command of the air environment can dilemma in integrating them. Lessons from World be an integral aspect of coalition cohesion, espe- War II to Desert Storm highlight the role unity of cially when population centers are at risk. command plays in neutralizing threats. In terms of The joint warfighting capability assessment emerging capabilities, these lessons also reinforce (JWCA) process was instituted to ensure that the the relevance of command which unites offensive warfighting needs of CINCs and defensive operations, since the former can are met. To support this profoundly reduce stress on the latter. Moreover, myriad aircraft and missile process, the air superiority countering aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic threats must be neutralized JWCA team established a missiles is tied to theater air operations and is cen- framework, based on a strat- tral to airspace control. For instance, fighter and to attain air superiority egy-to-task analysis, for con- surface based air defenses must be integrated under trolling the air. It focuses on a single air commander to maximize effectiveness, gaining unimpeded use of airspace while denying minimize fratricide, and avoid inhibiting offensive it to an adversary. One aspect of the strategy-to- air operations such as close air support and inter- task analysis is that myriad aircraft and missile diction. Therefore, joint force air component commanders (JFACCs) must have responsibility and authority to control joint operations to counter aircraft and missile threats. Major Vincent P. DiFronzo, USAF, is a fighter pilot assigned to the directorate of operational requirements at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 29 ■ AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE THREATS

The World War II Record Even though coordination alone is normally Operations in Western Europe in the latter not adequate to achieve unity of effort, most of part of World War II, when contrasted to Desert these operations occurred prior to the invasion Storm, reflect the importance of unity of com- when competition for Allied air resources was not mand in air superiority. Allied unity of command based on requirements for ground combat or air for air superiority fifty years ago was mar- defense and there was time to debate strategy. But ginal, whereas in the Gulf War there were despite overcoming command discontinuity in op- very clear lines of authority. In the Euro- erations against manned aircraft, the Allies were pean theater the Allies had two comman- not as fortunate with Operation Crossbow—coun- ders with different concepts of how air- tering V–1 cruise missiles and V–2 ballistic mis- power might achieve their objectives. siles—for which a special committee was estab- General Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. lished to direct intelligence and operational efforts. strategic air forces, felt the Luftwaffe had to Crossbow directives were inconsistent and, be defeated before the Normandy invasion despite ample information on launch sites and by striking enemy aviation and oil indus- their infrastructure, the lack of perfect intelli- tries as well as the Luftwaffe itself. But Air gence became an excuse for delaying critical tar- Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, geting decisions. For instance, the original launch who had responsibility for Allied tactical infrastructure for V–1s was completely destroyed forces dedicated to support the land inva- prior to the initial attacks, delaying the V–1 of- sion, held that air superiority could be fensive by several months. But the committee chose not to target alternate launch sites which U.S. Air Force achieved by waiting to fight off the Luft- Squadron Leader waffe over the beaches of Normandy dur- were under rapid development. Ultimately, the Joseph Berry, RAF, ing the landing. It is an understatement to char- Germans staged the V–1 offensive from those credited with downing acterize Leigh-Mallory’s approach as high risk.2 sites and Allied operations against them were er- 60 1/3 V–1s. Strategic bombing losses had become prohib- ratic. Moreover, the committee failed to direct itive in 1943 and the Allies had not established targeting against three supply dumps used for the air superiority. Spaatz realized that an all out ef- final assembly of V–1s, despite the fact that a sin- fort, including P–51s and medium bombers under gle attack on one site led to a marked reduction Leigh-Mallory’s control, would be needed to de- in launches for a week. feat the Luftwaffe. But the air marshall would not Nor did the committee come to decide on release medium bombers for counterair opera- the best weapon system to employ against launch tions. After debating this question for weeks, sites. Despite evidence that low altitude fighter Spaatz won support from Air Chief Marshall Sir attack had the pin-point accuracy to neutralize Arthur W. Tedder, the deputy supreme comman- such facilities with minimal sortie expenditure, der, who directed Leigh-Mallory to support the the committee refused to commit fighters, prefer- counterair operation. P–51s began escorting ring to use heavy and medium bombers which heavy bombers deep over German territory as were too inaccurate for the task. The Allies com- fighters and medium bombers attacked Luftwaffe pensated in mass and committed 31,000 sorties, airfields. Direct air and ground attacks against the or 22 percent of the air effort between November German air force greatly increased Allied bomber 1943 and May 1944, to strike the original launch survivability and imposed a 20 percent monthly infrastructure. However, the payoff was marginal pilot attrition rate on the Luftwaffe. because alternate launch sites and supply depots Meanwhile, Spaatz ordered controversial at- were ignored. tacks against the enemy oil industry. Primarily Defensively, the Allies had no capability because of persistent attacks on the Luftwaffe and against V–2 ballistic missiles, employing fighters its source of fuel, not a single German aircraft and anti-aircraft (AA) guns against V–1 cruise mis- successfully threatened the landing force during siles. Fortunately, because they had successfully the daylight hours of June 6, 1944.3 Within the countered the aircraft threat, air defenses in Lon- first week of the invasion, the few operational don, Antwerp, and Liege were optimized against German fighters within striking range were di- V–1 missiles, greatly increasing air defense effec- rected to “abandon the ground support role” and tiveness. concentrate on air defense. Meanwhile, the con- Air Marshall Sir Roderic Hill was responsible tinuing bomber offensive destroyed 90 percent of for AA, fighters, and barrage balloons in the de- enemy aviation fuel by the end of June 1944, ren- fense of Britain. Initially AA guns were not appro- dering the Luftwaffe ineffective against ground priately calibrated to engage V–1s, so Hill re- forces and only marginally effective against air stricted gun operations and modified the rules of operations. engagement to take full advantage of fighters. After the guns had been modified, he saw an opportunity to improve the entire air defense system

30 JFQ / Spring 1996 DiFronzo

by repositioning guns to optimize their effective- Lieutenant General Charles Horner, USAF, inte- ness while restricting fighters. Six weeks after the grated offensive air operations as well as directing guns were repositioned, air defense performance “a combined, integrated air defense and airspace peaked as the guns and fighters intercepted 90 of control system in coordination with component 97 cruise missiles in one day. Although unity of and other friendly forces.” command for this regional defensive effort was In Desert Storm, we confronted a sophisti- valuable, it was not sufficient. cated, battle-proven air threat. Iraqi fighters had As the locus of V–1 attacks shifted to the con- made mass raids during the Iran-Iraq conflict, in- tinent and V–2 attacks began, Hill could not effi- cluding chemical weapons delivery.6 Moreover, ciently redirect his fighters for preemptive strikes intelligence assessed possible chemical and bio- or defense of critical assets across the channel be- logical storage bunkers at several airfields, leading cause there was no theater commander concen- General Norman Schwarzkopf to fear a massive trated on counter V-weapon operations with “Tet-like” attack by Iraq’s air force. The enemy which timely coordination could be effected. also had employed Scuds against Iran, and the Overall, the Crossbow committee was a poor coalition was concerned that these missiles could vehicle for offensively countering V-weapon oper- be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction ations. According to one official history, the Al- (WMD). In addition to posing a significant offen- lies, “hampered by their failure to make clear-cut sive threat, Iraq also had an advanced air defense choices between the various courses open to system with SAMs and fourth generation fighters, them, never achieved the singleness of purpose all coordinated through a complex command and which might have helped them to stake success- control system. fully on information that fell short of certainty.” 4 The coalition launched Desert Storm with The chroniclers of the Army Air Forces were even the distinct advantage of unity of command for more pointed: air operations and a clear strategy to deny sanctu- There were serious faults...in the organization of ary to the enemy. All elements of Iraq’s air force, ground-based air defense system, and supporting AWACS. controls over the [Crossbow] campaign....As to the 3 U.S. Air Force failure in organization, below the supreme comman- C were attacked simultaneously the first night of der’s immediate staff, Crossbow channels were, in the war. This included synchronized attacks on their complexity and gradually fading dispersion of early warning sites as well as command nodes by authority, hardly to be rivaled.5 Army attack helicopters and Navy Tomahawk missiles. The missions were planned under JFACC In the end, the Allies suffered 32,000 military and by the joint air operations center in Riyadh and civilian casualties as the result of V-weapons. disseminated on the air tasking order. In retrospect, despite disunity of command During the initial hours of the campaign, the Allies succeeded against the manned aircraft Iraqi SAM operators came to fear high-speed anti- threat because General Spaatz was able, through radiation missile (HARM) attacks and transitioned persistence and personal commitment, to mar- to non-radar guided launches, greatly increasing shal unity of effort against the Luftwaffe. Opera- survivability but severely limiting lethality. We tions against the V–1 and V–2 lacked unity of persistently targeted airfields since enemy fighters command and effort and thus failed to neutralize posed a multi-role offensive and defensive threat. the threat. Airfield attacks, compounded by 14 Iraqi air-to-air losses in the first two nights, convinced Baghdad The Lessons of Desert Storm to disperse its air force rather than challenge We again floundered over unity of command coalition airpower, much like the SAM operators for air operations during both the Korean and Viet- who chose survivability over effectiveness. nam conflicts. Then, in 1986, the Joint Chiefs of Offensive missiles, primarily Scuds, also were Staff codified the concept a challenge. Allied aircrews had not trained against Iraq had an advanced air of a single joint air com- Scuds, and intelligence on infrastructure was mander in Joint Pub defense system with SAMs sparse. A total of 1,245 sorties were flown against 3–01.2, Counterair Opera- the Scud infrastructure, including production facil- and fourth generation fighters tions. According to it, ities, hide sites, lines of communication, and C3. counterair operations are Another 1,215 sorties were launched as combat air “all measures such as the patrols (CAPs) to attack launchers and support ve- use of SAMs, AAA, fighters, bombers, and ECM to hicles. Of these, a thousand were diverted to alter- defeat the enemy air and missile threat both before native interdiction or strategic targets after the and after launch.” Fortunately, this doctrine was time allotted for a CAP expired. Inadequate sensors applied during the Gulf War, with unity of com- and cumbersome communications made it diffi- mand for all air operations to include air superior- cult to find and attack transporters, erectors, and ity. As JFACC and area air defense commander,

Spring 1996 / JFQ 31 ■ AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE THREATS

launchers (TELs). However, fighter presence may Throughout the campaign, unity of com- have deterred Scud launches. mand for air operations led to a coordinated of- Special operations forces (SOF) were also inte- fense and defense that included assets from all grated into counter-Scud operations. Initial aircrew components and coalition members, unlike expe- reports of success, combined with compelling bat- riences in World War II. A fully integrated joint tle damage video, reinforced by a sharp decline in approach is even more important against emerg- Scud launches, convinced air planners that these ing threats. attack operations were effective. Despite limited battle damage assessment capability, coalition SOF Threat Trends teams also verified several Scud TEL kills. More- The aircraft and missile threat of the future over, the Scud launch rate during Desert Storm was will be more capable and diverse than in past 35 percent lower than against Iran in the so-called conflicts, including increased lethality, range, ac- “War of the Cities” of 1988 despite the fact that curacy, stealth, and progressive countermeasures. Iraq possessed more launchers and missiles during Fourth generation threat aircraft such as the the Gulf War.7 Attacks against infrastructure and MiG–29 are being produced and exported, while TEL facilities—operations not exercised by the Ira- older aircraft like MiG–21s are being modified nians in 1988—were a likely cause for reduced with fourth generation weapon capabilities. Addi- launches. Furthermore, the enemy executed 80 tionally, advanced SAMs are being acquired percent of its launches at night, most in poor worldwide and counter-stealth capabilities are in weather. This is a logical way of limiting vulnerabil- high demand. ity, consistent with the actions of Iraqi air defense Offensively, ballistic missiles are being ac- and air force counterparts who also more highly quired by developing nations as more advanced valued survival. Overall, there was a trend that re- missiles are produced with increased ranges. For flected a reduction in launches by enemy aircraft, instance, the maximum range of Iraq’s modified Scud is 600 kilometers. North Korea recently tested the 1,000-kilometer Nodong missile and also is working on the Taeodong II, a missile with a 3,500 kilometer range. Anti-ship cruise missiles have been a threat since the 1960s, and the spread of stealth technology will increase the risk to naval forces, especially in littorals. Land attack cruise missiles could also be a serious threat if guidance improvements are married with stealth capability. The accuracy of cruise missiles will improve with access to advanced internal navigation technology and satellite navigation information, such as the American global positioning system and Russian global navigation satellite system. But the most serious trend, WMD proliferation, does not typically rely on accurate delivery

DOD vehicles. A number of states, including Iraq, Iran, Iraqi aircraft bunkers North Korea, Syria, Libya, and former Soviet re- during Desert Storm. guided SAMs, and Scuds despite the capacity to em- publics, possess or are seeking the technology for ploy those weapons.8 nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities. Patriot represented the coalition’s only defen- These weapons can be paired with aircraft, cruise sive theater ballistic missile (TBM) capability. De- missiles, or ballistic missiles. spite the controversy over tactical effectiveness, Patriot missiles protected forces and population Air Superiority Trends centers in both Saudi Arabia and Israel. While pri- The United States is moving to counter the marily relying on Scuds for offensive air attack, diverse aircraft and missile threat. A review of fu- Iraq launched one mission with two F–1 Mirages ture systems illustrates how different systems into Saudi airspace, possibly with Exocet anti-ship must be synchronized to achieve unity of effort. missiles. Saudi F–15s destroyed the fighters under Future fighters such as the F–22, with its high AWACS control. In this case, our forces were pro- speed and low observability, will enable our tected in a time-critical situation with standard- forces to dominate the air over enemy territory ized procedures and unity of command. early in the campaign, clearing the path for other attack and surveillance aircraft and protecting friendly forces from aircraft and cruise missile attack as well as preventing aerial observation.

32 JFQ / Spring 1996 DiFronzo

Collectively, improvements in attack operations systems since Desert Storm are significant. For post-launch strikes, overhead detection of TBMs is now processed more effectively to locate launch sites, probably the greatest shortcoming in attack operations during the Gulf War. Soon after launch, evolving battle management systems will be able to pass launch point estimates to fighters, ATACMS, and attack helicopters. Cur- rently, F–15Es, F–16s, and F–18s have moving target indicator (MTI) radar modes that allow them to track fleeing TELs. Additionally, U–2 sensor information is being processed in-theater in near real-time, in contrast to Desert Storm operations where control and processing resided in the United States. JSTARS offers a wide area capability with MTI for moving targets and synthetic aper- Vincent P. DiFronzo Vincent P. ture radar for fixed target location. Unmanned Apache cruise missile aerial vehicles provide similar capabilities deep in awaiting buyers. enemy territory. Improved surveillance systems will ensure Much remains to be done to exploit inherent early detection of cruise missiles and aircraft. sensor capabilities to detect and identify time- AWACS, E–2s, and potential aerostats will offer critical targets. Intelligence and surveillance in- cues via LINK–16 to fighters as well as terminal formation must be combined in near real-time, systems. Wide-bandwidth communications, such analyzed, and preferably data-linked to shooters as the Navy cooperative engagement capability to minimize time-lines. Further, from a planning (CEC), will allow raw and execution standpoint, joint battle manage- systems must remain integrated data from multiple sen- ment will be essential for capitalizing on these sors to be fused in real- varying capabilities which will also be in high de- in air defense architecture to time to enhance the mand for other mission areas. provide layered defense common air picture. Overall, a significant investment is being With sufficient sensor made in weapons systems which either directly or data, CEC can extend indirectly contribute to attaining air superiority. the engagement range of terminal systems be- These will be complimented by battlespace aware- yond the horizon line-of-sight. ness and battle management tools. A challenge to SAMs can be neutralized by HARM, the joint JFCs will be ensuring unity of effort to prevent standoff weapon (JSOW), the Army tactical mis- piecemeal use of these systems. The first step to- sile system (ATACMS), and the Navy tactical land ward success is a logical doctrinal construct. attack missile system (TLAMS). Non-lethal SAM suppression will depend largely on the upgraded Air Superiority Navy EA–6B. Detailed centralized planning along According to joint doctrine, “The purpose of with joint battle management will support timely unity of command is to ensure unity of effort decentralized execution. under one responsible commander for every ob- The Patriot PAC–III will offer an improved jective.” Current doctrine recommends that JFCs capability over the PAC–II of Desert Storm and, normally designate JFACCs as supported comman- along with Navy lower-tier assets, will provide a ders for counterair operations.9 This obviously in- basic TBM point defense while preserving or im- cludes command authority for all joint operations proving defenses against the air-breathing threat. to defeat both aircraft and SAM threats, based on Therefore, these systems must remain fully inte- JFC guidance. However, for operations against grated in air defense architecture to provide a lay- cruise and ballistic missiles, doctrine sanctions di- ered defense in the future. The Army THAAD and vided responsibility among the components. Navy upper-tier will engage TBMs at higher alti- There are a number of advantages to com- tudes and defend larger areas. The airborne laser pletely integrating counter-TBM and cruise mis- will intercept TBMs during the boost phase, pro- sile efforts with overall air superiority operations. tect wide areas, and deposit warhead debris over First, JFC needs to ensure forces and vital interests enemy territory—a deterrent to WMD use. Be- are free of air attacks. Defeating part of the air cause such systems take time to field, we will be even more reliant on offensive measures as part of an overall counterair strategy in the interim.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 33 ■ AIRCRAFT AND MISSILE THREATS

threat is inadequate in an era when delivery vehi- Ultimately, JFCs must integrate air defenses cles are becoming more accurate and lethal and to maximize the attrition of enemy air vehicles can project WMD. Second, all systems with an while minimizing fratricide. Previous exercises aircraft defense capability also have capabilities have identified a positive correlation between against missiles—Patriots, Aegis destroyers and high threat attrition and high fratricide. Several cruisers, and Hawks either can or will soon be variables influence that link, including clear com- able to counter aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballis- mand authority, joint training, combat ID capabil- tic missiles as fighters engage aircraft and cruise ity, and interoperable communications links. JFCs missiles. JFACCs, who derive their authority from and components can influence our capability in JFCs and maintain a dialogue with JFCs and other the short term by integrating aircraft and missile components, can capitalize on strengths in one defense operations under JFACCs and pursuing defensive system to offset weaknesses in others, joint training consistent with this approach. based on the overall enemy air order of battle. Historically, positive control over terminal Last, offensive operations can be prioritized to systems by JFACCs through decentralized battle compensate for weaknesses in defense and vice- management systems such as AWACS has limited versa. fratricide. Positive control of terminal systems Operational capabilities used to counter air- also minimizes procedural routing constraints on craft threats often overlap with those used against CAS and short range air interdiction missions, ef- cruise missiles. To operators of surveillance and fectively giving corps or MAGTF commanders weapon systems, cruise missile and aircraft radar more offensive airpower to support close combat tracks will often appear identical in their flight operations. This will remain the case against air- profile, airspeed, and altitude. This normally craft and cruise missiles because of their similar means that rules of engagement, combat ID, and flight profiles. Finally, positive control never in- weapons control measures will be similar if not the fringes on the right to self defense and does allow same for defense against aircraft and cruise mis- surface commanders the flexibility to position or- siles. Furthermore, overlaps and voids in engage- ganic air defense units as required to protect their ment capability between surface-based systems and forces. However, procedural control is normally fighters must be managed to optimize overall sys- adequate for ballistic missile engagements, given tem capability. For example, surface based systems that engagement airspace is deconflicted, since designed to engage TBMs at high altitude can be there is minimal risk of fratricide. Of course, augmented by fighters to take on low-altitude JFACCs can also influence overall defensive per- cruise missile and aircraft threats. This level of formance by reducing the diversity and number teamwork requires clear command authority and of threats through offensive operations. an integrated communications system. More importantly, JFACCs can prioritize of- In addition, overall rules of engagement and fensive operations to compensate for weakness in defensive force lay-down must be consistent with defense. Unfortunately, current joint doctrine the air concept of operations and airspace control considers attack operations against cruise missiles measures.10 As airspace control authorities, and ballistic missiles to be part of “counterair, JFACCs are charged with safe passage of joint and strategic attack, interdiction, fire support, maneu- combined offensive, surveillance, and support ver, antisubmarine warfare, antisurface warfare, missions to include military airlift and civil avia- strike warfare, amphibious operations, or special tion. Integrating air defenses with other airspace operations.” 11 This approach, wherein attack op- requirements in a combat zone is daunting be- erations are considered as part of every mission, cause of the enormous demand on limited air- dilutes focus on the objective. space. For example, JFACC deconflicted 3,000 sor- Additionally, responsibility for planning and ties per day during the Gulf War while execution is divided among components based monitoring and controlling 160 restricted opera- on shifting areas of operation (AOs). Doctrine al- tional zones, 122 airborne refueling points, 32 lows AOs to extend beyond the traditional depths CAP areas, 10 air transit routes, 60 Patriot engage- of maneuver force operations which enables sur- ment zones, 312 missile engagement zones, 60 re- face commanders to influence interdiction stricted fire areas, and 17 airbase defense zones. against forces that will have a near-term impact Because of the underlying friction between air- on operations.12 Consistent with joint doctrine, space control measures and air defense (including targeting of short range ballistic missiles that pri- missile defense), any change can cause a ripple ef- marily threaten surface forces should fall under fect. Thus, centralized planning under JFACC is the purview of surface commanders as part of essential with a streamlined battle management structure to support decentralized execution of air defense while simultaneously providing airspace control.

34 JFQ / Spring 1996 DiFronzo

their counterbattery objective. But changing re- former was the approach in Desert Storm and was sponsibility based on ground maneuver bound- successful given the constraints of the coalition. aries for strikes against theater-ranging air threats, The latter reflects the World War II model which which may not be the priority for surface com- led to gross inefficiencies and marginal results. manders, could expose all forces to increased risk. Current and emerging capabilities potentially Conversely, maintaining command continu- overlap and there are some voids in offensive as ity in the counter-TBM fight serves the interests of well as defensive operations. To optimize capabili- a theater. JFACCs plan as well as execute theater- ties, a clear command and control process is re- wide deep strike operations, to include joint sup- quired for centralized planning and decentralized pression of enemy air defense (JSEAD), air-to-air, execution. If air superiority is more difficult to surveillance, joint interdiction, and strategic at- achieve in the future because of threat diversity tack. In addition to attack assets, offensive opera- and WMD, we must maximize our potential by tions against individual mobile missiles such as ensuring unity of effort through unity of com- Scuds may require surveillance and reconnais- mand. A single commander is at the center of this sance support when organic weapon sensors are command process and must be vested with the not adequate for target discrimination. Until the authority to make decisions and resolve conflicts. aircraft and missile threat is defeated, both air-to- To accept anything less threatens the warfighting air and JSEAD assets must be synchronized not capabilities of JFCs. JFQ only to support attack missions but also to protect surveillance and reconnaissance assets. Moreover, NOTES attack operations will compete with demands by 1 J.N. Donis, Analyses of Selected Issues for the Initial JFCs for interdiction, strategic attack, and other Air Superiority and Strike Joint Warfighting Capability As- counterair opera- sessments (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analy- the current JFACC counterair process tions. Because of ses, 1995), p. 14. their deep strike 2 Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in offers a solid foundation to counter and air superiority Europe (Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1992), responsibilities, pp. 5, 123, 299–317. theater missiles 3 JFACCs can effi- Omar N. Bradley et al., The Effect of Airpower on Mili- ciently integrate tary Operations in Europe (Wiesbaden: n.p., 1945), p. 21. 4 F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second attack operations into campaigns for JFCs. By World War, Vol. 3, Its Influence on Strategy and Operations stepping up attacks on the threats that are most (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 544. difficult to defend against, they can also compli- 5 Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air ment aircraft and missile defense. Forces in World War II, Vol 3, Argument to V–E Day The current JFACC counterair process offers (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983), p. 541. a solid foundation for joint unity of command to 6 Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keaney, Gulf War counter theater missiles, both offensively and de- Air Power Survey: Effects and Effectiveness (Washington: fensively. Centralized planning will occur at the Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 147. 7 joint air operations center. Liaison personnel inte- Ibid., pp. 330–32. 8 grate component capabilities into the master at- Ibid. Combines charts from pp. 110, 140, and 337. 9 Joint Pub 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Wash- tack and air defense plan in accord with JFC guid- ington: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. IV–5. ance. Liaison personnel are key to this process 10 Joint Pub 3–52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in since they provide weapons systems expertise for a Combat Zone (Washington: Government Printing Of- joint planning. They can also articulate the con- fice, 1995), p. II–6. cept of operations as well as the protection priori- 11 Joint Pub 3–01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile ties of their respective components which allows Defense (Washington: Government Printing Office, JFACCs to resolve issues at the lowest level. How- 1994), p. III–12. ever, because there is often a shortage of assets, 12 Joint Pub 3–0, p. IV–14. no plan will satisfy everyone, and some issues must be resolved by JFCs. For decentralized execution, component battle management nodes play a critical role, and as these systems become more jointly interoperable overall effectiveness will increase significantly.

This matter can be reduced to either air superiority as one mission with a single commander for theater-wide efforts or to counteraircraft and countermissile operations as separate entities. The

Spring 1996 / JFQ 35 ■ JFQ FORUM The Security of the Americas By HANS BINNENDIJK and JOHN A. COPE

Caracas. DOD (R.D. Ward)

hile ethnic strife and decade by constructive images replete This largely unfamiliar and under- regional conflict con- with a fresh vocabulary—democratic valued area to the south of the United tinue to erupt around reform, market economy, peace opera- States encompasses 33 Latin American the world, the geopo- tions, confidence building, transna- and insular Caribbean states, ranging W tionalism, and cooperative security. from Brazil, the fifth largest country in litical situation has markedly become more peaceful in the Americas. This Such expressions are evidence of a rev- the world (with a land mass greater than transformation is obvious in the dis- olution that has quietly awakened the that of the continental United States), course used to describe the area. Gone hemisphere, offering greater hope for to Barbados, one of the smallest. There are terms that once distorted North solidarity and security than at any are some 451 million people in the re- American images of Latin America and time in history. New economic, politi- gion, a third of them in Brazil and a the Caribbean—communist subver- cal, and cultural rhythms that are gain- quarter in Mexico. The population is ex- sion, military dictatorships, death ing strength in many nations are not pected to exceed 750 million by 2010, squads, nuclear proliferation, hyperin- random or unrelated developments, as São Paulo and Mexico City become flation, and U.S. imperialism. These nor are they cyclical in nature. These two of the largest cities in the world. terms have been replaced over the last are unique responses to profound local The emerging market democracies experiences and a of Latin America have replaced the tra- transformed in- ditional means of protectionism and ternational envi- statism with private initiative, foreign Hans Binnendijk and John A. Cope are, respectively, director ronment. investment, and export-oriented and senior research professor in the Institute for National growth. Additionally, the region has Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

36 JFQ / Spring 1996 Binnendijk and Cope experienced the ascendancy of subre- occasionally, the use of force to pre- ial of the Americas. Moreover, there gional cooperative regimes such as the vent rivals from undermining the in- was a rapid effective response in early North American Free Trade Agreement fluence of the United States and its 1995 to fighting between Ecuador and and the Southern Cone Common Mar- ability to keep regional events from Peru over a contested part of their fron- ket as well as an end to international- getting out of control. Except for the tier in the Amazon. Close partnership ized conflict in Central America. Over- Cuban missile crisis, no country in the among the guarantors of the 1942 Rio laying the slow processes of economic hemisphere has posed a direct threat protocol, which includes the United reform and realignment is a shift from to the United States. States, facilitated a cessation of hostili- authoritarian government to constitu- During the Cold War, Washington ties and separation of forces, creating tional democracy. focused on the Caribbean Basin and the basis for a diplomatic solution. The In 1979, the democratic commu- was less attentive to South America. recent case of Haiti also demonstrated nity included only Costa Rica, Colom- U.S. strategic priorities stressed protect- effective and extensive regional cooper- bia, Venezuela, and the Caribbean ing access to and movement within ation during maritime interdiction of members of the British Common- the region (including unrestricted use arms and oil prior to September 1994 wealth, and stability in the region was of the Panama Canal), maintaining as well as during Operation Uphold presence through its military Democracy and the follow-on phase bases in and around the Carib- under the United Nations. except for the Cuban missile crisis, bean, and assuring access to The United States is beginning to no country in the hemisphere has fuel and nonfuel minerals. realize that it has a substantial stake in posed a direct threat Neighbors regarded the U.S. ap- peaceful, stable, and prosperous Latin proach as fixed exclusively on American and Caribbean nations and its own goals, with little regard that Washington’s traditional one- deteriorating. Today, however, 32 of 33 for the interests or priorities of other sided strategic approach is no longer Latin American and Caribbean states states. Their leaders sensed a tendency useful in assuring its security interests. have representative governments. Only to look southward only through North By collaborating with allies and friends Cuba retains an authoritarian system. American eyes and rely on U.S. solu- in the region, the United States will This “quiet revolution” has stimulated tions to local problems. Actions often benefit from trade and investment op- substantial Asian and European trade were taken unilaterally and without portunities, some relief in immigration with and investment in American mar- consultation, resulting in diplomatic and other spillover effects of instability kets. Of greater potential consequence, confrontations and mutual distrust. outside its borders, and long-sought this transformation has promoted an During the 1980s Washington after advancements in core values. unprecedented awareness of hemi- found that security was not the only re- Working together is a function of ne- spheric community based on common gional policy issue. There were core de- cessity in order to be free of traditional values, interests, and concern about the mocratic values to be upheld in the and non-traditional threats and appre- future. Domestic developments have Americas. The United States perceived hensions in the region, such as territo- led nations in Latin America and the that it had an obligation to back mod- rial claims, drug-trafficking, organized Caribbean to reconsider their attitudes erate forces which advocated a commit- crime, and terrorism. toward Washington, resulting in more ment to human rights, social justice, harmonious relations despite long- and representative government, and The Core Issues standing asymmetries in North-South championed democratization. Support Although the Caribbean basin still power and episodic U.S. engagement. for this political transition took many commands public attention, often nar- The possible outcome of the shift to- forms, ranging from public manifesta- rowing the scope of U.S. interests and ward political and economic homo- tions and technical assistance for newly blurring distinctions between domestic geneity, while still indeterminate, sug- elected governments to relatively sig- and foreign policy, Washington is try- gests the emergence of Brazil as a power nificant amounts of military aid for the ing to interact on a wide range of issues and, as well, the concept of South Salvadoran state during its civil war across the hemisphere. Opportunities America as a distinct region with its and U.S. military action to restore and vulnerabilities are increasingly own strategic perspectives. democracy in Grenada and Panama, transnational in nature. Thus the need and more recently in Haiti. is greater than ever for the United The Stakes North-South relations are more States and its neighbors to successfully The overreaching U.S. security ob- positive and cooperative in the current address regional core issues: trade and jectives in Latin America and the Car- transformed context. In December development; political, economic, and ibbean are to ensure the area remains 1994, for example, leaders of the hemi- social reform in fragile democracies; stable, democratic, and friendly to sphere’s 34 democracies gathered in and stemming drug traffic. commerce and trade, and to maintain Miami for the Summit of the Americas. Latin America is once again the a regional military presence. Since the Then, in July 1995, senior defense offi- fastest growing market for U.S. exports enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, cials from these nations convened in and investment. The average annual this goal has entailed diplomacy and, Williamsburg for the Defense Minister-

Spring 1996 / JFQ 37 ■ JFQ FORUM rate of growth in exports was 21 per- Rangers securing drop cent from 1987 to 1993, twice the rate zone during Fuertes of the European Union. Oil is another Defensas ’95. economic factor. Venezuela is the Chilean vessel largest supplier of refined petroleum to Almirante Williams the United States. Mexico, Trinidad, during Unitas 32–91. and increasingly Colombia are major suppliers, reducing U.S. dependence on the oil fields of the Middle East. World commerce continues to pass through Panama, where the issue of re- Kavanaugh) Joint Combat Camera (Bredan F. duced U.S. military presence after final implementation of the Panama Canal treaty is still open to exploratory discussion. The possible retention of a small military infrastructure after the year 2000 has strategic significance, signaling that the United States has both a commitment to the region and a desire to cooperate in facing transnational threats. The sustained appeal and credibility of democratic governance and free markets are vital to the United States. Of immediate concern is the outcome of political, economic, and social reforms that affect commerce and trade and, perhaps most significant, drive decisions to U.S. Navy (John Bivera) emigrate. Sixty percent of over a million legal immigrants annually to the United States in recent years come from the the flow, and cooperate in the curtail- economic reforms over the last decade Americas, mainly Mexico. But this pic- ing of money laundering. There also is and a secure intra-American environ- ture is incomplete. The region also gen- deep U.S. interest in reinforcing justice ment have eased tensions over territorial erates well over half of the estimated two and democracy by helping neighbors disputes. But old enmities and suspi- to four million undocumented arrivals defeat internal threats from illegal nar- cions persist and conflicts are still possi- and an additional 1.1 million who are cotics activities to core institutions— ble. The difference is a commitment apprehended and turned back. Control political parties, legislatures, courts, which exists now to use legal frame- of illegal migration and refugees can and law enforcement. works and diplomacy to find equitable, only begin abroad. As the United States draws closer to lasting solutions. The region is also the source of all its neighbors, there are opportunities for the cocaine, most of the marijuana, cooperation, but there is also the danger Defense Engagement and a growing share of the heroin en- of adverse consequences from setbacks The Department of Defense has and disturbances in the region. long exercised an important role in Latin It will take time for most Latin America and the Caribbean by encour- the most serious threats to national American and Caribbean states aging military cooperation on shared stability are caused by domestic to strengthen fragile govern- professional interests. However, the na- ments, create accountable in- ture of U.S. security interests today, the crime and violence stitutions, counter corruption, emergence of common concerns, and a right injustice, and meet the steady reduction in military resources tering the United States. This amounts needs of minorities. Elected leaders still have caused engagement in the region to an estimated 300 metric tons of co- fear social conflict within their borders. to become more diverse and innovative. caine, two-thirds of which enters via The most serious threats to national sta- As articulated in U.S. Security Strategy for Mexico, roughly 2,000 metric tons of bility are caused by domestic crime and the Americas, issued in 1995 by the Of- marijuana, chiefly Mexican, and 37 violence which is increasingly linked to fice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense metric tons of heroin from Colombia poverty, drug traffic, and unresponsive for International Security Affairs, this and Mexico. The inter-American republic policy. Fortunately, political and defense engagement encompasses pro- sponse to the illicit traffic in drugs in- viding intelligence, operational, and lo- volves attempts to cut the U.S. de- gistical support for counterdrug efforts; mand, coordinate the interdiction of encouraging the peaceful resolution of

38 JFQ / Spring 1996 Binnendijk and Cope

transformations in the hemisphere. Em- phasis is on developing low-profile multilateral cooperation to address shared security concerns, expanding professional contact, and encouraging development of a military ethos suitable for democratic society. For the foreseeable future, engagement will be successful to the extent it meets U.S. core interests, continues to demonstrate commitment to the region with a rapid-response capability for natural or diplomatic emergencies, and lowers the odds of intra-regional conflict and need to deploy forces in a crisis. Partnership Is the United States ready for inter- American partnerships? Does it recognize that security now and for the foreseeable future will be more closely tied to its American neighbors than before? Secretary of State George C. Marshall, a distinguished statesman not usually associated with the Americas, replied af- firmatively to these questions in 1947 while testifying before Congress on the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act: “. . . with the Atlantic Ocean on one side and the Pacific Ocean on the other, between us and the great disturbances in the world of other peoples, it is all the more important that the West- ern Hemisphere be maintained on as unified a basis as possible. That is to our interest and to the interests of every country in the Western Hemisphere, and therefore I think in the best interests of the world.”

U.S. Southern Command (Tad A. Browning)U.S. Southern Command (Tad As in Marshall’s day, the United Guyanese troops States is drawn to the East and West negotiating obstacle outside its immediate neighborhood in course. disputes, adopting defense ministers and their staffs, bilat- pursuit of its global interests. In the confidence and se- eral working groups, academic activities past, attention to inter-American af- curity building measures, and achieving which facilitate political-military dia- fairs has tended to wane and the focus nonproliferation and conventional arms logue, combined planning and informa- on solidarity and security has vanished control goals; promoting democratic tion sharing, military deployments that from the national view, often to our norms in civil-military relations; and bolster U.S. diplomatic efforts (such as mutual detriment. Secretary of Defense deepening professional contact among restoring democracy in Haiti or deploy- Perry, General McCaffrey, and other military counterparts. Traditional and ing peace observers and logistic support distinguished American authors from non-traditional U.S. policy objectives along the Ecuador-Peru border), multi- North and South who contributed to place a high premium on leveraging de- national military exercises, humanitar- this JFQ Forum put the hemisphere in fense assets to expand security contacts ian relief, and innovative human rights proper perspective and underscore the and strengthen professional collabora- initiatives. complexity of regional defense issues. tion. The focus is no longer solely on Defense strategy today in the They introduce a scene that is rich in forces deployed in the region, but rather Americas reflects the influence of un- fresh possibilities for greater mutual on military and civilian defense contacts precedented political and economic understanding and partnerships as and programs in the United States and well as more flexible and positive pro- overseas. Examples include meetings of fessional thinking. JFQ

Spring 1996 / JFQ 39 ■ JFQ FORUM

Good Bridges Make Good Neighbors By WILLIAM J. PERRY

small group of U.S. soldiers Most previous Secretaries of De- linked in a considerable and expanding is serving in a peacekeeping fense looked south and saw only secu- economy. The gross hemispheric prod- operation in the jungles on rity problems. When I look south uct will exceed $13 trillion by the end A the border between Ecuador today, I find security partners. Just ten of the decade. Thanks to this growth, and Peru after both nations agreed to years ago, nearly half the nations of per capita income in Latin America is end their boundary dispute at the ne- the region were ruled by military dicta- expected to increase by a fifth—a suc- gotiating table rather than on the bat- torships. Now all but Cuba are democ- cess that promises to ease poverty and tlefield. The agreement raise living standards to enhance politi- to stop fighting and de- the hemisphere has embarked on a new cal stability. If these trends continue, in- militarize the border was cluding new agreements on free trade, brokered by Brazil which era of democracy, peace, and stability Latin America will be a larger U.S. trad- along with Argentina, ing partner than Western Europe. Chile, and the United States provided racies led by elected governments. With such a growing harmony of troops to monitor the agreement. Nearly every part of the Americas is interests, the Americas have an unpar- This is only one example of the free. The end of the Cold War offers a alleled opportunity to create an era of historic opportunities that now exist chance to consolidate these many trust, cooperation, and unity, and a for the nations of the Western Hemi- democratic gains. With a decline in in- community of free, prosperous, and se- sphere to build stable bridges of com- surgency and increase in bilateral and cure nations. As President Clinton has munication, cooperation, and trust multilateral cooperation, peace domi- indicated, “We’ve arrived at a moment that increase the security of our neigh- nates the region. of very great promise and great hope borhood. Times have changed. The Negotiation has replaced con- for the Western Hemisphere.” hemisphere has embarked on a new frontation. All parts of the hemisphere That promise and hope were con- era of democracy, peace, and stability. are reaching out to one another as even spicuous in December 1994 at the Sum- traditional enemies become trading mit of the Americas in Miami. This was partners. In the the first gathering of hemispheric lead- process, the Ameri- ers in more than a generation and the The Honorable William J. Perry is Secretary of Defense. cas have been

40 JFQ / Spring 1996 Perry

defense and military links will help ad- Transparency and confidence- dress threats to peace and stability, building mean being open about de- promote hemispheric cooperation, and fense plans, programs, and policies. foster the growth of military institu- They involve sending soldiers to each tions that serve and benefit democracy. other’s military schools and holding As the first step in further cooperation, combined training exercises to rein- the defense leaders of the 33 democra- force cooperation and trust. Openness tic nations present accepted an invita- is an unusual concept when applied to tion from the United States to attend defense because the art of war involves the first Defense Ministerial of the secrecy and surprise while the art of Americas in Williamsburg, Virginia, peace involves the opposite. Openness last summer. about defense matters reduces chances Williamsburg—where Jefferson, that nations will arm and act out of Washington, and Madison drafted the fear of the unknown. It fosters trust be- framework for the first democracy in tween the military and public, a key the hemisphere two centuries ago— ingredient in a democracy. was the perfect site for this historic The second area of discussion was meeting. Among stately halls and cob- defense cooperation. While the hemi- blestone streets, the ministers met many militaries in the region are making to sketch out a fundamental changes in the way they relate

U.S. Navy (Johnny D. Bivera) framework to se- Bridge of the Americas cure democracy to democratic governments over Panama Canal. throughout the hemisphere. They set realistic goals and did not endeavor sphere is generally peaceful, sporadic to resolve the hemisphere’s security security issues do arise. Among them challenges. Rather, they focused on are illicit drugs that poison communi- ways in which defense establishments ties, threaten societies, and undermine could build ties. Such personal rela- national security. Working coopera- tions are invaluable to communica- tively on such challenges is an effec- tion, trust, and cooperation among native and efficient use of our resources. first of exclusively democratically- tions—sometimes even more than In the process, nations and militaries elected leaders. The participants ex- written agreements or formal relation- can learn from one another and about plored a number of common inter- ships. one another, as well as how to perform ests—democracy, trade, technology, While this meeting was held in better in cooperative operations. and environment—and outlined an ac- and hosted by the United States, it was The third area of attention was tion plan on the economic and politi- not a “U.S.” event. Instead, it was an the proper role of armed forces in 21st cal future. Because a meeting of freely American event in the broadest mean- century democracies. In varying de- elected heads of government would not ing of the term, with North, Central, grees, defense and military establish- have been possible during the Cold and South America as well as the ments face major changes in reducing War, the summit was a notable political Caribbean participating equally. In the their forces and reconfiguring for mis- symbol; but it was also significant for same sense, the meeting did not oper- sions in the next century. In the same its political substance. The nations ate under a U.S.-imposed agenda. It way the Armed Forces have seen their agreed that the future would be built was guided by an itinerary collabora- strength and spending reduced over on strong democratic institutions, sus- tively developed following discussions the last ten years and are reexamining tainable development, and free trade. among all the nations throughout the their roles and missions in the post- Moreover, they agreed to develop a Free previous year. This mutually accepted Cold War era, many militaries in the Trade Area of the Americas to ensure agenda set the right tone because it re- region are making fundamental that goal. flected a democratic process and changes in force structure, plans, poli- After the summit, which concen- demonstrated, in a practical sense, the cies, or even in the way they relate to trated on political and economic mat- best way to secure and advance democ- democratic governments. ters, the governments also recognized racy in the hemisphere. At the ministerial meeting defense the need to cooperate on security mat- The agenda consisted of three establishments were urged to share ex- ters. Creating closer links among de- major areas—transparency and confi- periences and ideas on how to ap- fense and military establishments and dence building, defense cooperation, proach change and forge stronger ties committing to uphold the democratic and the role of the military in democ- process will bolster democracy, stabil- ratic societies. Each is important to ity, and economic reform. Specifically, post-Cold War hemispheric security.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 41 ■ JFQ FORUM between civilian and military institu- Secretary Perry In the area of tions. Just as the latter learn more briefing the press on defense coopera- about serving in a democracy, civilian July 26, 1995. tion, we are build- expertise is required in defense and ing on significant military matters. Similarly, armed contributions which the region has forces might contribute to national de- made to international peacekeeping. velopment in areas such as infrastruc- For example, 20 countries from this ture and public works, functioning like hemisphere support 15 of the 16 cur- the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and rent U.N. peace operations around the National Guard. As agreed in Miami world. Forces have served together to both civilians and the military must restore order in both El Salvador and protect human rights, and military Haiti. Regional militaries have com- training can be adapted to reflect that. bined for humanitarian hurricane re- Participants at the Williamsburg lief efforts. U.S. Reserve forces are get- meeting accomplished more than ting hands-on training by working reaching an agreement on a common with Latin American militaries to build agenda. As Jefferson outlined the prin- roads, schools, and wells in rural areas. ciples of a new democracy two cen- The hemisphere’s annual Unitas exer- turies ago, the defense leaders of this cises help navies cooperate while other hemisphere outlined six principles to multilateral exercises expand our abil- guide regional security relationships ity to join together in peacekeeping into the next century which they DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) and counterdrug missions and build called the Williamsburg principles: interoperability. ■ the preservation of democracy as Pursuant to the Williamsburg the basis for mutual security country and world about the kind of agreements, there will be a full range ■ the critical role of the military in forces we are building, the rationale for of combined exercises. Also, Argentina supporting and defending sovereign demo- them, and the amount being spent on and Canada offered to open more cratic states those forces. places in their peacekeeping training ■ the respect of the military for demo- Canada also presented its national centers to students from other coun- cratic authority, constitutional law, and defense policy document. And all par- tries, and the United States proposed human rights ticipants discussed a variety of infor- expanding education for civilians in ■ the spread of openness in discussing mation-sharing measures, such as stan- national security studies. defense programs, policies, and budgets dardized reporting to the United Already this year in Santiago, gov- ■ the resolution of disputes through negotiated settlements—not military ac- Nations on defense expenditures, full ernments of the hemisphere reached tions participation in the U.N. Register of accord on military confidence-building ■ the need for greater cooperation in Conventional Arms, and sharing these and transparency measures. For exam- peacekeeping and the fight against nar- reports with the Organization of Amer- ple, they agreed to give advance notice coterrorists. ican States. of military exercises, exchange infor- These principles are truly revolu- There have also been positive re- mation on defense policies and doc- tionary since they represent consensus sults from implementing the commit- trine, invite observers from other na- and commitment on the part of 33 na- ment at Williamsburg to redress hemi- tions to exercises, and develop border tions to the cause of peace and democ- spheric conflicts through negotiation. communications. The U.S. Southern racy in the hemisphere. That unity of A coalition headed by the United Command and the Inter-American In- purpose would not have been possible States and joined by many neighbors stitute of Human Rights co-hosted a ten years ago. The precepts are all the of Haiti worked with the United Na- conference on human rights training more revolutionary because they are tions to create a stable environment in February 1996, which resulted from already being implemented. for the safe return of its democrati- discussions in Williamsburg. The guar- At the meeting, the United States cally-elected president and conducting antor nations to the Ecuador and Peru demonstrated its commitment to national elections. And the collabora- peace process agreed to extend their openness in defense and security mat- tion among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, border presence through June 1996. ters by announcing a policy of notify- and the United States played a critical ing all democratic governments in this role in the agreement between Ecuador hemisphere before holding significant and Peru to demilitarize their border. With the support of U.S. Southern Command, multilateral military exercises in the re- That agreement and Operation Sup- a special Spanish-language edition of this gion. To further underscore the resolve port Democracy in Haiti set a signifi- JFQ Forum on “The Security of the Americas” for openness, I distributed copies of cant precedent: peacekeeping in the is being published simultaneously for distribution the 1995 Department of Defense An- Americas in support of conflict resolu- by U.S. Military Group commanders throughout nual Report to the President and the Con- tion and democracy is more than a the region. gress. This document informs the principle—it is a reality.

42 JFQ / Spring 1996 Perry

The United States has also participated in improved bilateral activities that serve as a model for cooperation. In October 1995 at the invitation of the Mexican minister of defense, I became the first Secretary of Defense to make an official visit to that country. Since the United States and Mexico have developed closer economic ties under the North American Free Trade Agreement and closer political ties with President Clinton’s visit to Mexico, this was another opportunity to build a new bilateral security relationship based on openness, trust, and cooperation. The U.S.-Mexican security relationship is already underway in several areas, particularly in disrupting narco- trafficking. Beyond that, military-to- military bonds are growing as leaders build working relationships; our navies have begun staff talks; airborne forces have jumped out of each other’s aircraft; U.S. officers teach English at

Mexican military schools, while Mexi- DOD (R.D. Ward) can officers teach Spanish at U.S. facili- Venezuelan airborne ties; and the carrier USS Kittyhawk re- troops. cently received a warm welcome on a The nations of the hemisphere ministerial later port call to Acapulco. can still do much more. To ensure that this year, and de- Such bilateral activities will erect a we do, the defense ministers decided at fense leaders across the hemisphere are new bridge between Washington and Williamsburg to develop a process for now shaping the agenda for it. Mexico City. The United States already working together. Just as James Madi- If these activities continue, the de- engages in similar activities with many son created a democratic process for fense establishments of the Western nations in the hemisphere, including a our Republic by drafting the U.S. Con- Hemisphere may well fulfill the dream stitution, the hemispheric de- of the great Latin American liberator, the challenge ahead is to transform fense leaders developed a Simon Bolivar, who spoke of the Amer- process to achieve the six icas becoming the greatest region on common interests into concrete Williamsburg principles, a earth: “. . . not so much by virtue of activities and achievements mechanism the Argentine their area or their wealth, but by their minister fittingly dubbed the freedom.” The United States has a “Williamsburg process.” This tremendous stake in Bolivar’s dream bilateral working group with Argentina procedure is based on dialogue and becoming reality and a major opportu- and, more recently, with Chile. In consensus-building and techniques to nity to advance it by building bridges March 1996, I became the first Secre- energize and consolidate democracies, with neighbors throughout the Ameri- tary of Defense to visit Venezuela. I am and extends from formal agreements cas. The poet Robert Frost suggested encouraging every hemispheric nation to personal relationships. that “Good fences make good neigh- to fully participate in a range of activi- The Defense Ministerial of the bors,” but this does not always hold ties, such as more officer exchanges, Americas laid a foundation for inter- true. Instead, when neighbors share more multilateral peacekeeping train- hemispheric defense cooperation. The common ideals and concerns, and ing and exercises, and more coopera- challenge ahead is to build on that and work together to achieve goals, it is tion on other real-world missions transform good intentions, good will, good bridges that usually make good (such as disaster relief). Nations should and common interests into concrete neighbors. JFQ develop more defense and military activities and achievements. The contacts, broader dialogue, and openly Williamsburg principles must be share information on everything from imbedded in security relationships defense plans, policies, and priorities throughout the hemisphere. Turning to specific missions. them into action will require consistent dialogue and frequent meetings. Argentina volunteered to host the next

Spring 1996 / JFQ 43 ■ JFQ FORUM A Former CINC Looks at Latin America By BARRY R. MCCAFFREY

Latin America and the Caribbean are poorly un- greater. In South America, a troubled Argentine dictatorship miscalculated derstood by many North Americans whose super- and tragically went to war against ficial awareness of the nations to their south is Great Britain. At home, there was a rancorous debate over how to influ- limited to Cuba and Mexico, and perhaps to a be- ence the civil wars in Central Amer- lief that the other countries of the region are ho- ica—a controversy that culminated with the Iran-Contra hearings. Nicara- mogeneous and Spanish-speaking. These people gua was seen as a communist foothold do not understand that the largest community in and Washington was appropriately intent on preventing a victory by Marx- South America speaks Portuguese, that most in ist insurgents in El Salvador. Indeed, the Caribbean speak Spanish, and that Dutch, U.S. policy toward Latin America was French, Guarani, and Quechua are important lan- understandably heavily influenced by East-West ideological struggles. As late guages. This perspective is further distorted by the as 1987 there were 25 Marxist insur- prism of the 1960s and 1970s, when Latin Amer- gencies supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua in the area. In re- ica was regarded as a land of military dictator- sponse, U.S. naval forces loitered off ships where elites ruled and human rights were Central America, Washington trained and advised conventional and guerrilla violated. That false impression still endures today forces, and the U.S. military considered and influences U.S. policy toward the region. how to more actively support allies who were mired in vicious internal warfare throughout Central America. For this reason, Latin America is tate a counterbalancing U.S. presence Today the scene has improved ranked low by Washington when it or rapid reinforcement. Nor are there dramatically. The Central American in- comes to economic, political, and in- rogue states that challenge the interna- stability of the 1980s is essentially ternational security priorities. Indeed, tional order or sponsor terrorism. Eth- over. A U.N. peacekeeping operation only one of six stated U.S. principal nic and religious strife do foreign policy objectives, countering not tarnish the political in South America, the transition from drug trafficking, is regarded as at stake scene. Finally, no failed in the area. The low prominence of the states are fomenting civil authoritarianism to democracy has Americas partially reflects a perception war, chaotic fiefdoms, de- largely been completed that there are no vital national security privation, or unchecked vi- interests to the south of the United olence. From all perspec- States that threaten our survival. Nor tives, it is a good news part of the successfully oversaw a reconciliation does the region have many problems world. But unfortunately this means process in El Salvador. The disruptive in common with other areas of the that the United States is tempted to ig- Sandinista regime has been voted out world. It is not haunted by unstable nore the area. of office in Nicaragua. The corrupt dic- regimes that blackmail other states. During the 1980s the reality was tatorship of Manuel Noriega was re- Neither are there hegemons that different, and many contend that U.S. placed by democracy in Panama. Only threaten their neighbors and necessi- attention to that part of the world was in Guatemala has turmoil persisted in a civil war which now seems to be General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), is director of the Office on slowly ending. In South America, the National Drug Control Policy and previously served as commander in transition from authoritarianism to chief, U.S. Southern Command. democracy has largely been completed.

44 JFQ / Spring 1996 M C Caffrey

U.S. and Ecuadorean the central focus, al- forces during though this type of Unitas exercise. planning is done. Nevertheless, the command is a strategic military headquarters which has as its primary function the command and control of deployed U.S. forces committed to national security policy objectives. To- ward that end, SOUTHCOM each year oversees the deployment of more than 50,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen from the active and Reserve components. The three major elements of this strategy are building regional cooperative security, supporting the national counterdrug strategy, and fostering the development of appropriate Latin American militaries. Historical insecurities and border

U.S. Navy (Johnny D. Bivera) disputes continue to affect Latin Amer- ican contingency planning, procure- ment decisions, and force deploy- While Jeffersonian democracy Given the low level of threat to ments. SOUTHCOM believes that may not be the rule, political systems U.S. interests, few defense resources are increasing professional interaction are becoming more responsive to wider apportioned to the region. Less than .2 among militaries fosters cooperation in constituencies. Military institutions are percent of our military (both active and the security arena. This contact can re- essentially loyal to constitutional and Reserve) is assigned there. In fact, there duce the insecurities that influence de- democratically elected governments. are more DOD civilians in Japan than fense planners and can help resolve More than 830 million people in the U.S. troops permanently assigned in long-standing disputes. National forces Western Hemisphere live in democra- Latin America. The share of the defense can then concentrate on peacekeeping, tic regimes, with only Cuba enslaved budget expended in the region is simi- counterdrug operations, illegal migra- in tyranny. Our collective economies larly small. So why does one of the five tion, arms smuggling, and the coopera- constitute a $13 trillion market. Intra- U.S. regional combatant commands tive effort to manage land, sea, and air hemispheric commerce is striking. U.S. watch the area? Absent the focus that a frontiers. trade is greater with Brazil than China unified command brings to U.S. secu- The primary SOUTHCOM vehicle and with Venezuela than Russia, and rity dialogue with any region, meaning- for promoting contact among the greater with 3 million Costa Ricans ful security relations languish. A look at armed forces of Latin America is the than 100 million Eastern Europeans our security affiliation with sub-Saharan foreign military interaction program. and with 14 million Chileans than a Africa supports that assertion. This program includes multinational billion Indians. By the turn of the cen- exercises, conferences and symposia, Regional Cooperative Security tury, Latin America will have a $2 tril- personnel and unit exchanges, staff as- lion economy. It will trade more than The role of U.S. Southern Com- sistance and assessment visits, and ori- $600 billion in goods and services, and mand (SOUTHCOM) is to support the entations that are pursued without the level of U.S. trade with the region objectives of U.S. policy in its assigned seeking to mediate or eliminate dis- will exceed that with Europe. area of responsibility (AOR)—Central agreements. Instead, we seek collabora- Clearly, this part of the world war- and South America with contiguous tion through activities that involve rants continued U.S. attention based waters—and assist friendly nations. It common interests. on positive political and economic de- is distinguished from the other re- Peacekeeping Exercises. The mili- velopments. Despite its being an area gional commands in how the military taries of Latin America contribute to where no vital national security inter- instrument is used. SOUTHCOM is not various multinational peacekeeping ests are at stake, we must still address about power projection or forward operations. Argentina, Brazil, Colom- the flow of drugs from and through it. presence to dissuade potential adver- bia, and Venezuela have participated Moreover, we must prevent uncon- saries or assure access to strategic re- with great valor and effectiveness in trolled immigration from the region. sources, but it could be. Planning con- former Yugoslavia. Brazil has played a In the past five years, eight of twenty- ventional military operations is not superb leadership role in peace opera- seven operations conducted by the tions in Angola and Mozambique, Armed Forces dealt with unchecked both Portuguese-speaking nations, immigration from Cuba and Haiti.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 45 ■ JFQ FORUM while 39 percent of the highly profes- one conducted in 1941. Fortunately, years. In 1990 Colombia produced no sional Uruguayan army has peacekeep- this latest episode was halted by quick heroin, yet today it accounts for 5 to 10 ing experience. Currently, 10 Latin diplomatic and military efforts on the percent of the international supply. American countries are participating in part of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Heroin sold on U.S. streets is ten times 13 U.N. missions around the world. the United States, who committed to more pure than in the 1970s and sells at In August 1995 SOUTHCOM facili- guarantee the accord reached after the 1.5 times the price. Each year, the drugs tated a multinational peacekeeping ex- 1941 clash. Since March 1995 military that come to the United States from ercise in Argentina to foster coopera- contingents from these guarantor na- Latin America—including almost 300 tion among national military forces tions have progressively solidified a tons of cocaine—cause irreparable within the southern cone. The effort standing cease-fire. The Military Ob- harm, contributing annually to 10,000 was led by the visionary chief of staff of server Mission to Ecuador and Peru deaths and a $67 billion price tag asso- the Argentine army, and featured a sce- (MOMEP) has supervised the separa- ciated with drug abuse. nario that replicated challenges facing tion of some 10,000 personnel located The economic power of drug traf- in the disputed area. Another fickers makes them almost invulnera- MOMEP is being conducted at 150,000 troops were demobi- ble to the unassisted counterdrug ef- lized and returned to peacetime forts of Latin American governments. essentially no cost to Argentina, garrison duty. We are enor- In Colombia, for example, annual pro- Brazil, Chile, and the United States mously proud that Ecuadorians ceeds from trafficking by the cocaine and Peruvians have been inte- cartels is about $8 billion. This is more grated into the four-power ob- than total legal exports in 1992 and peacekeepers in Bosnia. A computer- server force in which they constitute about 10 percent of the gross domestic assisted command post exercise drew the majority of mission personnel. product (GDP). The influence of the players from the U.S. Army Peacekeep- This casualty-free observer mis- cartels is so great that allegations of ing Institute, U.S. Army School of sion is being conducted at essentially their contributions to the 1994 presi- the Americas, XVIII Airborne Corps, no cost to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and dential campaign led to a constitu- 10th Infantry (Mountain) Division, and the United States. Ecuador and Peru tional crisis. Undoubtedly, the notion U.S. Army South. This was the first time agreed to provide $15,000 daily, a bar- of a narco-democracy is a threat to the that protagonists in the War of the gain if compared to fighting a war—a entire region. Triple Alliance (1865–70)—Argentina, half billion dollars for one month of Closer to home, the route for 70 Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—came tactical skirmishing. The mission has percent of all cocaine entering the together in an exercise that emphasized created military conditions that could United States is Mexico. Traffickers the benefit of multinational military lead to a diplomatic settlement. This made an estimated $30 billion profit activities to regional security. A similar process must be given time to take last year according to Mexico’s attorney exercise is scheduled for Montevideo in root. If an accord is not reached, the general. Drugs have been transported August 1996. hemisphere risks serious fighting be- into Mexico with almost total impunity In addition, SOUTHCOM sup- tween these nations. SOUTHCOM has on commercial jets and then to the U.S. ported multinational exercises (at the a small contingent high in the Andes market. Methamphetamines, once an Joint Readiness Center, Fort Chaffee, to support the effort. U.S. soldiers and almost exclusively domestically manu- Arkansas; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Na- airmen are providing helicopter lift, in- factured drug pushed by California tional Simulation Center, Fort Leaven- telligence, logistics, and command and biker gangs, is produced in Mexico for worth, Kansas; and Joint Task Force- control for this remarkable peacekeep- buyers in the United States. Clearly, the Bravo, Honduras) which addressed ing mission. illegal drug trade is a transnational mutual interests such as narco-guerril- threat that requires international coop- las, disaster relief, or peacekeeping. Counterdrug Strategy eration to be countered. Moreover, wargames that once focused Latin America is the source of the Over the past six years SOUTH- on neighbors are no longer played. world’s cocaine. Peru is the origin of COM counterdrug efforts have sought During the last year, approximately two-thirds of the world’s coca and Bo- to build a consensus on the drug threat 10,000 Latin American troops took livia is the second largest producer. in the region. Among them is the depart in SOUTHCOM-supported train- Colombia is the only other country that velopment of multinational capabili- ing aimed at building regional cooper- raises a significant crop. The cocaine ties that can be directed against the ative security. potential of South American coca in drug trade. There have been numerous Peacekeeping on the Ecuador-Peru 1994 exceeded 800 metric tons with a encouraging tactical successes. Sus- Border. In January 1995, a traditional value of over $30 billion in the United tained operations against small planes dispute between Ecuador and Peru States. The cultivation of Colombian flying coca paste between Peru and over an undemarcated section of their opium has exploded over the past five Colombia are paying off. Smugglers border erupted. Although the fighting risk interception and being shot down was confined to a remote jungle area, or having their aircraft impounded or mobilization by both sides threatened destroyed after landing. That increased a bloody conventional war similar to risk is reflected by a nine-fold increase

46 JFQ / Spring 1996 M C Caffrey in costs, amounting to $180,000 per United States. Nor have international nate to SOUTHCOM and normally flight in 1995. It is also seen in de- efforts succeeded in reducing the over- have command and control over de- pressed prices for coca leaves in Peru all supply. In Bolivia, for example, ployed U.S. military elements within where the cost has dropped by over 60 where the U.S. Government has main- the country to which they are accred- percent in some cases as supplies ex- tained an extensive counterdrug pres- ited. Defense attachés on the other ceed the ability to process and trans- ence for the last decade, there has been hand respond to the Defense Intelli- port coca paste. We have great respect no significant decrease in acreage dedi- gence Agency and are essentially for the valor and skill of the Colom- cated to coca. A contributing problem friendly and overt intelligence collec- bian and Peruvian police and military is that there is no government agency tors. Some have suggested merging in their struggle against this violent in- analogous to SOUTHCOM to consoli- these two organizations to conserve ternational threat. date international counterdrug efforts. manpower. Yet there are fewer than Nevertheless, such successes are Thus the approach to this not directed by an operational instru- transnational problem has ment that is capable of having a pro- been to work on a country- defense spending in Latin America is nounced effect on the price, purity, by-country basis. One solu- extremely low; in fact, no other region and availability of cocaine in the tion is to create a regional coordinator for counter- expends so little on a per capita basis drug programs undertaken by U.S. agencies. The tactical success of 200 military personnel assigned to interdiction efforts inspired by such positions in Central and South SOUTHCOM—which amount to less America, and consolidating them than 1 percent of the U.S. counterdrug could result in both functions being budget—suggest that unity of effort executed poorly. can bring greater success. This menace SOUTHCOM experience suggests demands international will, coopera- a variety of observations about the mil- tion, and sustained operations. itaries of the region to examine. Despite accusations to the contrary, National Military Forces national military forces do not cause most The primary value of SOUTHCOM regional ills. Defense spending in Latin programs is extensive interaction with America is extremely low; in fact, no national military forces in the AOR. At other region expends so little on either the forefront of the command’s efforts a per capita basis or as a percentage of are security assistance organizations GDP. Like most militaries of the world, (SAOs) and defense attaché teams that these proud national institutions are U.S. Navy (Scott M. Allan) are part of U.S. missions. These activi- products of unique historical, political, Coast Guard inspecting ties serve complementary but mutually merchant ship. Unloading C–5 at exclusive functions. SAOs are subordi- (continued on page 50) Howard Air Force Base, Panama. U.S. Air Force (FrankU.S. Air Force Oplanic)

Spring 1996 / JFQ 47 ■ JFQ FORUM U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

MISSION: The primary mission of declared independence from Colombia. The responsibility of U.S. Atlantic Command U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is to Army arrived in 1911, three years before the (ACOM). This change satisfies two key ob- establish and implement plans, programs, canal opened. U.S. military strength peaked jectives. The first is to enhance the com- and policies in peacetime, conflict, and war at 67,000 in Panama during World War II. mand’s interaction with the navies of Central which will contribute to the defense of the After the war, Army, Navy, and Air Force and South America. The second is to have United States and its allies, and protect and components were joined to form Caribbean one commander in control of all U.S. military promote U.S. interests in Latin America. Command which was redesignated SOUTH- activities in the Caribbean basin as well as Other major missions include conducting COM in 1963. Under the Panama Canal in Central and South America. Because of disaster relief and humanitarian operations; Treaty, signed in 1977, the waterway will be long-standing relations between the monitoring security assistance programs in turned over to Panama on December 31, Caribbean and ACOM, including ongoing the region; conducting combat, counternar- 1999. However, the United States is commit- U.N. operations in Haiti and counterdrug cotics, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, ted to guaranteeing the neutrality of the operations across the region, the transfer and nation assistance; defending the canal “indefinitely.” will occur in two phases (see map). Phase I, Panama Canal; and implementing the implemented on January 1, 1996, trans- Panama Canal Treaty-2000. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY: The ferred responsibility for the waters adjoining geographic region assigned to SOUTHCOM Central and South America. Phase II—to be BACKGROUND: The command traces recently was expanded to include the waters executed only on order of the Secretary of its origins to the arrival of marines in adjoining Central and South America and the Defense, but not earlier than June 1, 1997— Panama in 1903, days after Panama Gulf of Mexico, areas that were formerly the will transfer responsibility for the Caribbean Sea and its island nations, the Gulf of Mexico, and an additional portion of the Atlantic Ocean.

Brazilian carrier Minas Gerais off Rio de Janeiro. U.S. Army (Larry Lane) Miraflores Locks, Panama Canal. U.S. Navy (Tracy Lee Didas) U.S. Navy (Tracy

48 JFQ / Spring 1996 COMPONENT COMMANDS: SOUTHCOM U.S. Army South (USARSO); U.S. Southern headquarters, Quarry Heights. Air Force (USAFSO)—12th Air Force; U.S. Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, SOUTHCOM (MARFORSOUTH); and Special Operations Command SOUTHCOM (SOCSOUTH). JFQ DOD (R.D. Ward)

Mexican training ship SOUTH GEORGIA ISLAND MALVINAS / FALKLAND Comodoro Manuel ISLANDS Azueta in Tampa. The geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal SOUTHCOM operations includes Central Phase I and South America and the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans from 92° West, east to 30° West, north to 8° North, west to the Guyana/Venezuela coastal border, and coastal waters out to 12 nautical miles north to the Belize/Mexico border. On order of the Secretary of Defense, but not earlier than June 1, 1997, the Caribbean Sea and its island nations and European possessions, ARGENTINA the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic Ocean south of 28° North and URUGUAY west of 58° West will be added to this area of responsibility. In 1997, SOUTHCOM headquarters will be relocated CHILE from Quarry Heights, Panama, to PARAGUAY Pacific Ocean Miami, Florida.

·West BOLIVIA West ° ° 30 92 BRAZIL U.S. Navy (John Bouvia)

PERU

ECUADOR

Atlantic Ocean COLOMBIA SURINAME FRENCH GUIANA GUYANA Quarry Heights 8° North VENEZUELA PANAMA COSTA RICA

NICARAGUA Caribbean Sea EL SALVADOR S HONDURAS GUATEMALA JAMAICA BELIZE PUERTO RICO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC E W HAITI

CUBA Carlos Hernandez-Gonzalez West °

58 Gulf of Mexico Venezuelan army MEXICO N BAHAMAS Miami troops. 28° North Phase II UNITED STATES

Spring 1996 / JFQ 49 ■ JFQ FORUM

(continued from page 47) SOUTHCOM contacts with regional al- man rights conference. Other partici- lies have reinforced this continued pants included the Secretary General and social dynamics. Each reflects focus on more professional and demo- of the Organization of American these factors in its organization and cratic values. States, Cesar Gaviria, and representa- corporate ethic. Less military is not the In all dealings with Latin Ameri- tives from academe, the media, diplo- solution to challenges of poverty, in- can militaries, SOUTHCOM seeks to matic corps, and nongovernmental or- justice, economic development, and function in a collegial manner. It is ganizations. The involvement of drugs in Latin America. only through shared, respectful dia- interagency, nongovernmental, and Most national military forces are pro- logue that change can be achieved. academic spheres in the SOUTHCOM fessional and honorable. Moreover, The reality is that the command can- human rights program has been key to many have strong support and trust not be the agent of radical change in its success. It reinforces the concept from citizens. They are led by superbly the region’s militaries. SOUTHCOM that the military is accountable di- qualified officers such as Martin Balza must assist in a balanced manner, ever rectly to civilian governments and in- of Argentina, Benedito Leonel of mindful of the right of each nation to directly to the people they protect. Brazil, Moises Orozco of Venezuela, establish its own forces and doctrine as and Jaime Guzman Morales of El Sal- a function of national sovereignty. The Future vador who understand national secu- The Panama Canal Treaty signed rity and fiscal realities. They are work- Human Rights in 1977 by Presidents Carter and Torri- ing to maintain disciplined, modern While the region has been marked jos transferred both the ownership of forces capable of accomplishing their by enormous political and economic and responsibility for the canal to constitutional tasks. success, there have also been egregious Panama. Moreover, it stipulated that National military forces may be inap- abuses of human rights committed by the U.S. military presence in Panama propriately organized and equipped. Some state and non-state actors including would end at noon on December 31, navies seek blue water capabilities in- the military, police, insurgents, politi- 1999. U.S. forces are drawing down and stead of more functional brown water cal organizations, and individuals. But returning facilities at a pace that can be ones, purchasing diesel submarines and there is reason to believe the human accommodated by the local authorities. destroyers instead of coastal and riverine rights record will continue to improve. While no U.S. vital national security in- patrol craft, while air forces acquire jet Strengthening of democratic institu- terests demand a continued forward air-to-air fighters instead of short take- tions and the end of Cuban-Soviet in- presence in Panama, it could have mili- off and landing utility aircraft, coastal spired insurgency make subversion, tary utility. Many argue it would also patrol aircraft, and helicopters. Their terrorism, and associated restraints on contribute to regional stability. A post- armies feature main battle tanks, ar- civil liberties less likely. Individual 1999 presence would only be feasible if tillery, and conscript regiments instead rights have also been strengthened by the U.S. and Panamanian governments of professional active/reserve units orga- societies that hold governments more conclude that a common good can be nized for peacekeeping, counterdrug, accountable and by contributions from served by such an arrangement. In Sep- and engineering/medical operations. In non-governmental organizations. tember 1995 Presidents Clinton and most cases a focus on external threats As each nation debates how to ad- Balladares agreed to hold exploratory may be less appropriate than one address the legacy of human rights talks on the matter. dressing the new challenges of the 21st abuses, SOUTHCOM has moved to in- In 1997, the 800 personnel of the century. Some Latin Americans see the tegrate human rights into all of its in- joint SOUTHCOM headquarters will re- belief that a force’s professionalism is a teractions with Latin American mili- locate to Miami, the point of conver- function of its similarity to First World gence for the Caribbean military forces as contributing to a dis- the sweeping progress in Latin America and Central and South connect between organization and mis- America. Miami was se- sions. It is encouraging to note that our calls for new strategic thinking and lected for its regional ties: senior colleagues reject the notion that international security arrangements 85 percent of the flights the trappings of a modern military by U.S. flag carriers to force—doctrine, echeloned headquar- Central and South Amer- ters, traditional branches, war colleges, taries. The military utility of respecting ica operate out of Miami; all Latin etc.—automatically confers profession- human rights in peace as well as war is American and Caribbean countries alism. stressed. In February 1996, SOUTH- have consulates there; 30 percent of Our allies reject the notion of na- COM and the Inter-American Institute U.S. trade with those countries goes tional military forces that are corrupt, dis- of Human Rights sponsored a confer- through its port; and more than two trustful of civilian rule, and concerned pri- ence in Miami on “The Role of the million Latin Americans visit yearly. By marily with self enrichment. One Armed Forces in the Protection all indicators, Miami is the economic, example of such an organization was of Human Rights.” Six government communications, and transportation the Panamanian Defense Force that ministers and eight chiefs of services under Manuel Noriega formed a part- attended this first regional military hu- nership with Colombian drug cartels.

50 JFQ / Spring 1996 M C Caffrey U.S. Marine Corps (Timothy E. LeMaster)

Scout training in Panama. hub of the Americas. It is the logical threats, U.S. suc- place for the headquarters responsible cesses will be tacti- for U.S. military operations in the cal and episodic.

Caribbean and Latin America—the They will mostly U.S. Marine Corps (Timothy E. LeMaster) SOUTHCOM charter under the recently cause non-state ac- Extracting marines modified unified command plan (see tors to shift their patterns of operation. during exercise on map on page 49). The drug cartels and sophisticated ille- SOUTHCOM Panama Canal. gal alien smuggling rings will continue believes that mili- The sweeping progress in Latin to violate state sovereignty almost at tary operations America, the result of democratic and will. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces can today offer a model for security dia- economic reform, calls for new strate- contribute to national and regional se- logue in the context of interstate rela- gic thinking and international security curity by continuing modest interac- tions that are not fundamentally based arrangements. As a free trade area em- tions with the militaries of Latin Amer- on traditional security concerns. The bracing all of the hemisphere emerges ica. We can help defuse conventional command is about professionals col- within the next ten years, a goal set at military crises—as we did on the laborating to tackle transnational the Miami Summit of the Americas in Ecuador-Peru border. We can help com- problems and achieving efficiency December 1994, we cannot afford to mitted nations stop drug traffickers through shared ideas. It focuses on ad- ignore the nontraditional threats to from violating sovereign land, sea, and vancing regional security through ex- our national security that emanate air space—as we have done with coordi- changes and confidence building mea- from the region: illegal migration, drug nated efforts against the Colombia-Peru sures. Finally, the intention of trafficking, terrorism, and violations of airbridge. We can contribute to the on- SOUTHCOM is to contribute to stabil- intellectual content and patents of U.S. going debate over appropriate roles and ity, the precursor of democracy and products. In fact, many people see missions of the armed forces in democ- economic growth. Current U.S. mili- lower trade barriers as a downside that ratic societies. While this is a debate tary strategy for the Americas is sound. creates vulnerabilities which will be ex- that must take place in each country, we Washington spends only a fraction of ploited by international criminal orga- can share our experience. Forums such its defense resources in the region— nizations. This is a serious concern as as the Williamsburg Defense Ministerial less than .2 percent of its budget and customs formalities on the U.S.-Mexico which brought together defense leaders under 5 percent of security assistance border are liberalized under the North from the hemisphere and SOUTHCOM- funds. These are sums that many part- American Free Trade Agreement. sponsored symposia facilitate those de- ners of the United States in the region Most problems cannot and should bates. We can also help countries reor- feel is money well spent. JFQ not be addressed in military terms. In- ganize and modernize their forces under stead, they require collective efforts by democratic leadership. all societies affected. Absent a coherent interagency strategy to address these

Spring 1996 / JFQ 51 U.S. Army (Stuart J. Gubler) Santiago River (fore- ground) and Yaupi River on Ecuador-Peru border. Operation Safe Border: The Ecuador-Peru Crisis By GLENN R. WEIDNER

In January 1995, the hemisphere was shocked by an outbreak of fighting between Ecuador and Peru over a long-festering border dispute. During a six-week period, more than 100,000 men were mobilized, fleets were deployed, air forces capable of striking the respective capitals of each protagonist were repositioned, and both sides suffered as Colonel Glenn R. Weidner, USA, is commander of the U.S. many as 300 casualties in fierce com- Military Group-Honduras and served as commander of the U.S. Contingent, Military Observer Mission, Ecuador-Peru. bat in the upper Cenepa Valley.

52 JFQ / Spring 1996 Weidner

Coming in the wake of the De- cember 1994 hemispheric Miami summit, the conflict posed a serious threat to regional stability. Rapid, effective responses by guarantors of the 1942 Pro- tocol of Rio de Janeiro—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States— helped to stop hostilities and created conditions for negotiating a diplomatic solution to a complex and highly emotional problem of long standing. The Military Observer Mission, Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP) may become an historic example of effective multinational peacekeeping. This operation was successful because of unprecedented cooperation between political and military representatives of the guarantors and the strong desire of the bel- ligerents to end the hostilities quickly. The roots of the conflict lie in a U.S. Army (Douglas Ide) dispute between the two countries A corner of disputed territory. over the delimitation and demarcation of the border along an isolated stretch of jungle highlands characterized by the past fifty years, usually near the protocol brought the parties to the ne- extremely difficult terrain and contin- January anniversary of the signing of gotiating table and ultimately to a uous cloud cover.1 Although the dis- the protocol. peace agreement, the Declaration of pute extends back to the colonial pe- Itamaraty on March 17, 1995. riod, the consequences of a war Border War The declaration required that between these countries in 1941 was In December 1994, Peruvian intel- both sides cease hostilities, demobilize, particularly relevant to the observer ligence confirmed that the Ecuadore- and support activities of a military ob- mission. In that year, Peru invaded ans had established base camps in the server mission provided by the guaran- southern Ecuador and forced a settle- disputed area.2 Combat operations tors that had an initial mandate of ment under the 1942 Rio Protocol. began with Peruvian air and ground at- ninety days and could be extended on tacks in the vicinity of the request of the parties. The accord’s lan- both sides managed to introduce Cenepa and at the confluence of guage provided for the separation of the Santiago and Yaupi Rivers. forces under observer supervision and more than 5,000 troops in a Over six weeks, both sides man- obligated observers to establish opera- 70-square kilometer area of jungle aged to introduce more than tions centers and recommend an “area 5,000 troops in a 70-square kilo- to be totally demilitarized” by each meter area of extremely dense side. The accord committed both par- That agreement committed both par- jungle. Meanwhile, general mobiliza- ties and guarantors to construct a defi- ties to a cessation of hostilities and de- tion produced the forward deployment nition of procedures for the observer fined a common border based on the of six Peruvian divisions along the mission which would detail its organi- limited geophysical data which existed coastal plain, as well as the equivalent zation and employment. Finally, it at that time. of four Ecuadorean brigades to their committed the two parties to begin Unfortunately, the demarcation immediate front. With fleets at sea, substantive talks, with the assistance of was never completed because of a geo- high-performance aircraft forward-de- the guarantors, on the underlying bor- physical anomaly that was discovered ployed, and combat in the Cenepa re- der issue, with a view to demarcation in the upper Cenepa Valley in 1946. gion, the danger of escalation was sig- and a return to normal relations. Since 1960, Ecuador has insisted that nificant. By mid-February, however, as Brazil’s offer to provide a general the protocol is not executable in that the extent of casualties and the eco- officer as the chief of the observer mis- area and is suggesting a claim to exten- nomic impact of the fighting became sion was accepted by the guarantors sive territory in the Amazon Basin. increasingly clear, a battlefield stale- with qualifications. Deliberations over Peru, on the other hand, asserted that mate developed. Diplomatic pressure the definition of procedures, princi- the protocol is valid and has consid- from the guarantor nations of the 1942 pally on the issue of command rela- ered the disputed territory to be sover- tionships, lasted for almost a month, eign. As a result, numerous small-scale during which time a number of cease- clashes have erupted in the area over fire violations erupted in the conflict

Spring 1996 / JFQ 53 ■ JFQ FORUM

Reaching outpost by air. MOMEP Deploys On March 10, the definition of procedures was signed. Late that same night, a JCS execute order was released permitting deployment of the U.S. contingent. An advance party of the support element arrived in Ecuador and began to receive deployment aircraft at Patuca and Macas, a C–130-capable strip some 60 kilometers to the north. The observer contingents deployed from Brasilia on March 11, di- viding between the Peruvian regional military headquarters at El Milagro and the Ecuadorean base at Patuca. U.S. Army (Douglas Ide) The coordinator, Lieutenant Gen- eral Candido Vargas de Freire from Brazil, and a staff that consisted of senior colonels from each national contingent, arrived at Patuca on March 12. There they found that the U.S. support element had established headquarters facilities, an encampment for troops, and barracks for observers on a base occupied by the Ecuadorean 21st Jungle Infantry Brigade. UH–60s had arrived earlier that day, self-deploying from an intermediate staging base at Guayaquil. As the sun fell behind the mountains, the MOMEP staff met to spell out an approach to operations and a strategy for initial contacts with local commanders of the two parties. Concept of Operations

U.S. Army (Douglas Ide) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTH- Briefing visitors at COM) had analyzed the mission and Coangos. provided the U.S. contingent commander with guidance on certain fundamentals. For example, no operation zone and around isolated outposts for administrative and disciplinary would be undertaken unless it led to along the demarcated border some 60 purposes, less OPCON, over their con- achieving the results outlined in the kilometers to the northeast. tingents. The U.S. colonel would retain Declaration of Itamaraty; also, the A compromise on command rela- command as well as OPCON over the safety of personnel and equipment was tionships was finally reached in early support element. The political direc- paramount. MOMEP had no mandate March. To preserve the coequal status tion of the mission would be exercised to enforce the peace since it was only of guarantor contingents, the Brazilian via a committee consisting of a repre- constituted to observe and verify com- general was defined as coordinator sentative of the Brazilian foreign min- pliance under the terms of the accord. rather than commander. Each nation istry and the ambassadors of Ar- For those reasons, the United States would contribute up to ten officers as gentina, Chile, and the United States adopted a policy of no foot patrols in observers, led by a colonel, and the resident in Brasilia. (This function was the conflict zone because of the danger United States would provide an ele- later assumed by a group of so-called of mines and the proximity of the con- ment consisting of aviation, opera- high functionaries who represented testing forces, and forbad use of the he- tions, intelligence, communications, the guarantors directly from their re- licopters of either party for observer op- and logistical support. spective capitals.) The ad hoc commit- erations. The U.S. representative also The Brazilian general would exer- tee of ambassadors was advised by at- stressed the requirement for the parties cise operational control (OPCON) over tachés in Brasilia, under the to accept a defined demilitarized zone the observers from all four nations, coordination of a general officer from (DMZ) as a precondition for operations. while the colonels retained command Brazil’s armed forces general staff.

54 JFQ / Spring 1996 Weidner

General Freire felt strongly that Original Security Area and Demilitarized Zone. the DMZ was too sensitive an issue to

in dispute X raise at this point; the parties would X Rio begin endless haggling, preventing the AquaricoX Napo mission from proceeding to the separa- Daule Manta Portoviejo Latacunga tion of forces. To Freire, the DMZ rep- Rio Rio resented the end result of MOMEP ac- Ambato tions rather than a control measure for conducting operations. Nonetheless a Riobamba general outline for a four-phase opera- Babahoyo tion was accepted. Describing the con- Guayaquil E C U A D O R

Guayas Rio ditions for both parties, and the corre- Santa Elena sponding tasks for MOMEP, it contemplated a preparatory phase Gulf of Azogues Rio (MOMEP deployment, liaison, a secu- Guayaquil Cuenca

Pastaza rity area as a substitute for the DMZ,

and initial requirements for the order Tumbes Santa Rosa X Rio Rio

Zorritos Zania of battle in the area), supervision of X Morona

Rio Santiago the cease-fire, separation of belligerent Los TUMBES X LORE Organos Loja forces, and finally the demobilization X Lobitos Cabo Macara of units outside the conflict zone and Blanco X Borja Talara in dispute La Tina establishment of the DMZ. This con- Brea X in dispute

Lomitos X cept was accepted by both parties. Chira 26 JUNE PROPOSED DMZ Lagunitos Mirador Portachueo Rio Rio Rio ChinchipeAMAZON SECURITY AREA In the meantime, Latin American Paita Chulucanas San r

o observers, less U.S. counterparts and Ignacio d

Tablazo o Plura Huancabamba

l Sechura e Nunshatkame D Sagua a MOMEP concentrated on Jaen r HITO 14 e i l Punta i

d Negra r Olmos o Banderas observer reliefs and plans C LAMBAYEQUE P E R U to separate forces in the Base Norte Isla Lobos Lambayeque Ferrenafe security area de Tierra Chiclayo Pucala Celendin Pimentel Monsefu Chepen Cajamarca Tiwintza communications, deployed to two Coangos Pacasmayo Chilete concentration points by Peruvian and Puerto Etens Base Sur Ecuadorean helicopters and relieved at- Cueva de los Tallos LA LIBERT tachés who had acted as interim ob- Santiago de Cao's nepa Ce PV1 Soldado Pastor Trujillo o servers while the Brasilia negotiations Ri were concluded. On March 17, UH–60s Source: U.S. Southern Command. brought a complete multinational observer team to Coangos. On the 21st, the requisite assurances of control over air defense weapons were obtained mission requirement to submit a list- ■ Ecuador had managed to infiltrate a unit into the Peruvian rear, capable of at- from Peru, and a U.S. observer and ing of units, personnel, and weapons tacking their primary base at PV1 or cutting communicator were transported to in the area but were reluctant to trust the other party to comply with their main supply route into the upper PV1 to join Argentinean, Brazilian, and Cenepa. It was clear that the Ecuadorean MOMEP directives. The staff consid- Chilean observers who rotated by Pe- unit had to be removed at the start to per- ruvian helicopters from El Milagro. ered a series of factors in preparing the mit future Peruvian withdrawals. From then on, relief of both posts was plan before communicating it to the ■ Two contested bases, Tiwintza and conducted at 3-day intervals (weather parties: Base Sur, were invested with a degree of permitting) without incident. ■ Units were intermingled on the bat- emotional significance that far outweighed tlefield due to the density of the jungle and their political or military significance. Both Separation of Forces the narrow concealed trails between fight- sides claimed to have taken them. Ecuador insisted that MOMEP publicly take physical Between March 12 and 31, ing positions. Mines had been emplaced possession of their version of these bases to MOMEP concentrated on conducting throughout the area—some 6,000 by Ecuador alone—often without proper reg- confirm its battlefield gains. MOMEP re- observer reliefs at the two concentra- istry. Generalized withdrawals were certain fused to do any such thing. tion points and preparing plans to sep- to provoke firing incidents or mine injuries. ■ Peru’s national elections were arate forces in the security area. The scheduled for April 9. President Fujimori two parties had cooperated with the had announced the taking of Tiwintza and

Spring 1996 / JFQ 55 ■ JFQ FORUM

DMZ Agreement By early May 1995, MOMEP had accomplished most of the specified tasks in the Itamaraty accord and also settled into a routine of aerial patrols over the security area, relief of observers on Coangos and PV1, and periodic insertion of operations centers at Base Sur and Tiwintza. With the upper Cenepa clear of troops except for token forces at Coangos and PV1, MOMEP had achieved conditions for the recommendation to the parties of a DMZ, as required in the mandate. Six options which had been prepared as early as April ranged from a narrow strip between Coangos and PV1 to a 20 kilometer strip that ran the U.S. Army length of the border. Each was ana- Military representa- lyzed from the standpoint of military tives of guarantor justification and political significance. any action by MOMEP that tended to prove nations (Argentina, MOMEP to verify MOMEP had to maintain complete im- or disprove that statement would compli- Brazil, Chile, and the demobilization in partiality and divorce the DMZ from cate Peru’s domestic political situation. United States) and areas outside of ■ Because of its relative logistical ca- MOMEP coordinator ultimate adjudications of territorial the conflict zone. claims while considering each side’s pabilities, Ecuador could conduct aerial ex- general. Sensing eagerness traction from a number of landing zones view of its sovereign interests. on the part of within the conflict area, but Peru had to Accordingly, MOMEP proposed to move forces on foot to PV1 or Cueva de los both sides to demobilize, the staff di- guarantor diplomats in Brasilia that the Tallos for pickup by helicopters—a process rected them to provide a demobiliza- existing security area become the DMZ that could require up to 48 hours for each tion plan to MOMEP. Then the staff with garrisons of 50 troops at PV1 and unit, given the terrain and weather. met with both liaison officers to con- Coangos. The recommendation was de- The MOMEP staff designed a six- struct a simultaneous and proportional livered on May 3. While Peru accepted week program of directed withdrawals schedule of withdrawals into peace- immediately, Ecuador rejected it, citing of 60-odd units deployed in the con- time garrisons of those units deployed that it was unjust and betrayed earlier flict zone. Each side was told to first forward during the conflict. MOMEP assurances that the security concentrate by echelon, drawing com- From May 3 to 13, two MOMEP area was not to be related “either to a bat outposts and patrols to squad-level verification teams traveled to various final border solution or to a demilita- positions, and squads to platoons. demobilization sites on each side of rized area.” At the heart of Ecuador’s They then received phased require- the border. Each received a briefing by protest was a minor logistics base, Ban- ments for extraction of specific units. the unit commander, presided at for- deras, within the DMZ. Each unit was notified to move to des- mal demobilization ceremonies, and During the last stage of the sepa- ignated points. Helicopters then took inspected the garrison or abandoned ration, the Ecuadorean liaison officer them to the MOMEP observers, who position to verify that forces had re- brought up the issue with MOMEP, logged in departing soldiers, weapons, turned to a peacetime readiness pos- stating that Ecuador should not be re- and equipment. Troops moved on ture. The verification was admittedly quired to evacuate Banderas, because it from there by air and road (in the case superficial, given the rapid pace of de- was in uncontested Ecuadorean terri- of Ecuador) to garrisons. This proce- mobilization and small size of the ob- tory and had long been the site of a dure, despite evident flaws from an ac- server mission. Nonetheless, by May border detachment. He based the con- countability standpoint, resulted in 13 each side had substantially returned tinued need for occupying Banderas on the extraction of over 5,000 soldiers, to its pre-conflict military posture. If the security and humanitarian support without incident, in just five weeks. It slight variations existed in the postwar of the indigenous population of 60 to was successful simply because the par- configuration of forward units in 70 families. ties were eager to comply with a peacetime garrisons, they were not sig- Two-tiered negotiations by guar- process that permitted them to disen- nificant enough to permit either side a antor high functionaries and the vice gage without renouncing their honor destabilizing capability. foreign ministers of Peru and Ecuador or territorial claims and the fact that were held on June 19–26. While the MOMEP provided a veneer of control. diplomats dealt with normalizing rela- As the separation of forces contin- tions, the MOMEP staff explored DMZ ued, both Ecuador and Peru pressured adjustments and a draft definition of

56 JFQ / Spring 1996 Weidner

Supplemental Security Area Northeast of Demilitarized Zone. MOMEP II With the establishment of the de- Tashapa (E) militarized zone on August 1, the Puerto Morona Rio Kaank Y MOMEP staff returned to negotiating aup i procedures for continuing the mission. Early on, U.S. Ambassador Luigi Ein- HITO 22, CORTE DE audi had outlined a long-term plan Cangas LA QUEBRADA SHAIME whereby most observer tasks would be Jempeket SOLADO MONGE turned over to military officers of the HITO 21, ENFILAMIENTO parties to permit a drawdown of guar- CONFLUENCIA antor presence. This approach, to- TENIENTE HUGO ORTIZ SANTIAGO–YAUPI gether with an expanded MOMEP CAHUIDE mandate to verify demobilization and Kaputia demilitarization, was at the heart of ETZA VIEJO TAMBILLO the draft given to the liaison officers. Mirador The integration would be conducted SANTIAGO Cusumaza CHIQUEIZA incrementally from the top down over Mayalico Subteniente Castro ninety days and result in a combined ETZA MOMEP staff, support element staff, a INCA ROCA ic yl and observer teams. a MOMEPM ZONE Both parties agreed in principle to HITO 19, CUSUMAZA- PACHACUTEC

io BUMBUIZA Rio Santiago this approach at the Brasilia talks. But R at Quito in early August they opted for R ldado Cisneros io C a more gradual integration process HITO 18, DIVISOR DEL h iq u linked to diplomatic progress but not CONTRAFUERTE i s a to a drawdown of MOMEP. As stipu- a lated in the draft, the liaison officers Source: U.S. Southern Command. hito=boundary marker wanted an effective veto on withdraw- ing guarantor observers from the mission. While the United States favored more rapid integration, the consensus procedures with the liaison officers. verification team situated at Banderas, was that changes in the wording would However as the Ecuadorean presence at a compromise was finally reached. An not be accepted by both parties. All Banderas was revealed, the Peruvians historic meeting was arranged in Lima concerned recognized the implicit right threatened to break off negotiations. for July 24–25 for the two liaison offi- of the guarantors to make decisions MOMEP met through the night of cers to sign a DMZ agreement on be- with regard to the continued commit- half of their respective gov- ment of their observers; as a result, the ernments. It described a definition of procedures was endorsed this agreement was announced at the quadrangle (see the inset by the guarantor high functionaries map on page 55) covering closing of the Hemispheric Defense and accepted by the governments of the majority of the security Ministerial in Williamsburg the two parties on August 22. area but left Banderas ex- With this success and the stage set cluded. As a confidence for integration and negotiations on the June 25–26, promoting an adjustment measure, each side agreed to periodic underlying issue, a situation arose that that had been sketched out in a private inspections near the DMZ to assure an threatened to derail the peace process.3 meeting between the liaison officers. equilibrium of forces. Since the completion of the separation Both sides informed the guarantors News of this historic agreement of forces in May, a number of cease-fire that they wished to suspend talks to was transmitted in time to be an- violations had occurred in areas adja- consult their respective capitals. The nounced by Secretary of Defense cent to, although not part of, the secu- MOMEP staff returned to Patuca faced William Perry at the closing session of rity area/DMZ. Between May 3 and with the obligation to take action re- the Hemispheric Defense Ministerial September 30, the two parties reported garding the apparent Ecuadorean pres- that was being held in Williamsburg— over 20 incidents accompanied by ence at Banderas. a fitting example of regional coopera- pleas for MOMEP intervention. Many At the urging of the guarantor tion on defense issues in line with the involved mines which resulted in three diplomats, the MOMEP staff initiated a principles enunciated at that impor- killed and one wounded, and small three-week series of meetings with the tant meeting. arms fire which escalated to mortar liaison officers in Quito and Lima to and artillery duels. In both cases, each break the impasse. Based on adjust- party accused the other of deliberately ments drafted in Brasilia and a MOMEP provoking the incident and attempting

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to sabotage the peace process. Refusing Yaupi and Santiago rivers was desig- 18 officers from Peru and Ecuador have to endanger observers, and wary of ex- nated as a supplemental security area been integrated into MOMEP and the ceeding its mandate, MOMEP exhorted (see map); inventories of outposts, guarantor observer contingents have the parties to cease active patrolling, troops, and weapons were demanded been reduced to four members each. concentrate in border outposts, and re- from the two sides; and a phased with- The U.S. support element remains at a move indirect fire weapons from the drawal of garrisons and indirect fire strength of 60 troops. A long-standing area. But neither side would comply weapons was designed, leaving a maxi- policy on border contacts has been without MOMEP verification. mum of 80 soldiers for each side at the readopted by both sides, and signifi- The mission adopted a strategy designated outposts. MOMEP observers cant progress has been made on the similar to that which had produced fa- verified that troops and weapons had diplomatic front. The January 1996 vorable results earlier. An area extend- arrived at the nearest battalion head- meeting of foreign ministers in Lima ing 10 kilometers to either side of the quarters (Santiago, Ecuador, and Am- led to a formula for sustained negotia- demarcated border from the DMZ to a pala, Peru). tions on the underlying issue. point east of the confluence of the These steps, together with in- With a minimal investment in re- creased helicopter patrols, helped sta- sources by the guarantors of the 1942 bilize the situation. Since March 1996, Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, MOMEP can claim extraordinary success in manag- 11 FEBRUARY 1996 ing the situation both at the tactical level and through participation in DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT TO PEACE negotiations to establish the demili- BETWEEN ECUADOR AND PERU tarized zone as well as the structure BY THE GUARANTOR NATIONS’ ARMED FORCES of an extended (and integrated) peace observer mission. Substantive Recognizing the successful efforts by the armed forces of Ecuador and Peru to support negotiations on demarcation are the the peace process by showing constraint, discipline, and professionalism, fully integrat- next step for guarantor diplomats. ing Ecuadorian and Peruvian observers into the Military Observer Mission (MOMEP), and creating the conditions for peaceful diplomatic negotiations we acknowledge these The hope is that integrating both par- five principles: ties into the observer mission will ob- viate armed encounters and also pro- 1. To further encourage the Ecuadorian and Peruvian armed forces to move toward in- duce a climate of confidence and creased trust, openness, and candor in their bilateral military relations. self-reliance in which to negotiate. The 2. To fully support the diplomatic initiatives toward peace undertaken by our respective fear is that without continued partic- governments, as well as to encourage the diplomatic bilateral efforts conducted by the ipation by guarantor observers in day- governments of Ecuador and Peru. to-day operations, the mission could 3. To maintain open communication and transparent actions between Ecuador and Peru lose credibility and control as diplo- and the military commands of the guarantor countries and to share our observations mats deal with the lengthy and difficult with each other in order to further the cause of peace. problem of achieving mutual conces- 4. To develop confidence and security-building measures between the Ecuadorian and sions to produce a final settlement. JFQ Peruvian armed forces as means to reduce tension and discourage any future armed conflict to resolve differences. NOTES

5. To continue our commitment to the Military Observer Mission Ecuador Peru 1 See William L. Krieg, Ecuadorean-Peru- (MOMEP), provided there is continuous progress toward the peaceful resolution of the vian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon (Washing- dispute between Ecuador and Peru. ton: Department of State, External Research We pledge to meet together as necessary to strengthen our firm resolution to promote Program, 1986). unity and friendship between the armed forces of Ecuador and Peru. 2 This overview is based on a combina- Having visited Lima and Quito together on 9 through 11 February 1996, we declare our tion of SOUTHCOM reports and briefing mutual support and commitment to peace between Ecuador and Peru. material provided to MOMEP by the liaison officers of the two parties. 3 The sources for events that occurred Lieut. Gen. Mario Cándido Díaz General Benedito Onofre Bezerra Leonel after the author’s departure on August 23, Chief of the Joint Staff Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff 1995 are SOUTHCOM reports and inter- ARGENTINA BRAZIL views with both Colonel Steve Fee, U.S. contingent commander, and Coronel Jorge Lieut. Gen. Raúl Tapia Esdale General Barry R. McCaffrey H. Gomez Pola, senior Argentinean repre- Chief of the National Defense Staff CINC, U.S. Southern Command sentative to MOMEP. CHILE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

58 JFQ / Spring 1996 A Brazilian America, lacking national reserves and foreign investment, lies motionless in the station of underdevelopment awaiting a mighty locomotive to pull it into the terminal of modernization. In the meantime, Latin America imports capital goods and technology and is an exporter of raw materials and cheap manufactured goods. It is also an at- tractive market. In Central and South America, a range of border disputes, the Malvinas, and multilateral interests in Antarctica contribute to political instability. In the Caribbean, the agoniz- ing swan song of the Castro regime can already be heard. The decline or collapse of nation- states can be anticipated with the formation of regional, continental, and extra-continental blocks or conglomer- ates. Paradoxically, there is a strengthening of nation-states in search of national identity as they witness the inability and lack of resources on the U.S. Army (Tad A. Browning) U.S. Army (Tad part of international organizations to resolve their disputes. This suggests that nation-states are too large to settle Strategic Outlook small controversies, yet too small to settle large ones. By LUIZ PAULO MACEDO CARVALHO The new international order still lacks clear definition, yet one finds no shortage of friction or threats to security. There is an assumption that no so- he end of this millennium compounded by religious fundamen- lutions exist without U.S. support, at will go down as the era that talism and international terrorism, has least in the short term, although it ap- witnessed the collapse of the no respect for borders. Narcoterrorism, pears that reason may prevail over T Berlin Wall, the demise of underscoring the impact of organized might as we enter a new century. the Soviet empire, and the termination crime on urban centers afflicted by mi- of the Cold War, a period characterized gration, has emerged as a new social A Cold Peace by the repudiation of totalitarianism, threat. The predominance of market Alternating periods of war and the resurgence of democracy and na- economies and strengthening of trad- peace have been a feature of world his- tionalism, the awakening of the Pa- ing blocks are cause to rethink the tra- tory. Each generation perceives war as cific, and the geopolitics of economic ditional concept of sovereignty. a solution to continuing conflicts, blocks. Ruptures and changes have re- Decline in the strategic impor- many fueled by self interest or a desire sulted from the clash of fragmentation tance of the nations of Latin America to reign over other men. The 20th cen- and globalism. The Old World became in the face of geopolitical quirks, ex- tury has been scourged by professional a battlefield with the breakup of the cept for the Caribbean, has turned politicians who have failed to use rea- former Yugoslavia, while Czechs peace- them into outcasts. This has forced son to reduce tensions that caused two fully separated from Slovaks. The esca- them to compete, without much hope, world wars. Since the fall of Rome, 75 lation of ethno-nationalist violence, for a place among the megablocks with percent of the deaths attributed to war transnational eco- have occurred in this century. nomic power. Thus, The end of the Cold War created a Coronel Luiz Paulo Macedo Carvalho, Brazilian Army, is the heterogeneous wave of euphoria based on the suppo- director of the Brazilian Geography and Military History freight train of Latin sition that the threat of a nuclear holo- Institute and the Brazilian Army Library. caust was finally averted, leaving

Spring 1996 / JFQ 59 ■ JFQ FORUM mainly limited re- Augusta/Sikorsky gional or local helicopter. armed conflicts. But the reality of the ensuing years has been a series of unexpected events: the Persian Gulf War, massacres in Soma- lia, armed conflict in Sudan, renewed fighting in Angola and Mozambique, the return of guerrillas in Namibia, ethnic disorders in South Africa, cease- fire violations in the eastern Sahara, separatism in Assam, Punjab, Kashmir, and Timor, chronic strife in Cambodia, continued carnage in Lebanon, civil war in Afghanistan, brutality in Bosnia, Russian genocide in Chechnya, further instability in El Salvador and Nicaragua, crisis in Haiti, border disputes between Ecuador and Peru as well as Colombia and Venezuela, clashes between Armenians and Azer- baijanis and Georgians, Abkhaz and Eduardo Pesce Eduardo Ossetes, Hutus and Tutsis, Kurds and Turks, Tamils and Sinhalese, and Is- raelis and Palestinians, and others. The In reality, the post Cold War era that is, disarmament and reduction of world faces a torrent of conflicts even will be known by a specter of violent the armed forces of weak states in if they are legacies of the past. disaggregation of states that may lead favor of the G-7 nations which, under The Gulf War did not eliminate to war. Unless the international com- the pretense of U.N. sponsorship, the threat of conflict in an important munity identifies and courageously would assure collective security. This strategic area, given the national interfaces the roots of conflicts resulting could pose serious threats to the con- ests of the “group of seven” (G-7)— from noncompliance of individual cept of national sovereignty. Canada, France, Germany, Great human rights, disrespect towards racial Despite stabilization or reduction Britain, Italy, Japan, and United States. identities, and sovereignty of national of nuclear arsenals, existing stockpiles Moreover, the international commu- still have enough power to annihi- nity has responded differently to each the new world order assumes late all life on the planet. Moreover, threat that has emerged, showing no no nuclear powers promise total consistent strategy for peace after the continuation of global military elimination of atomic arsenals; yet Cold War. One reason is that present apartheid—disarmament of they assume the right to prevent conflicts differ from those for which weak states in favor of the G-7 others from mastering the complete their forces were traditionally pre- cycle of atom disintegration even pared. Another is that the world is un- for peaceful ends, since possessing dergoing a great transformation, and states, world violence as a whole will nuclear weapons confers political and the international community has yet not diminish, and humanity will fail military status in diplomatic negotia- to redefine its role, thus generating to correct its dangerous course. tions. Moreover, conventional mistrust among weak and less devel- Much has been said about disar- weapons stockpiles are growing and oped countries. mament, and progress has admittedly proliferating which promotes instabil- Today’s insecurities are worsened been made; however, development and ity. Europe is the most militarized re- by a range of uncertainties virtually production of modern weapon systems gion, in contrast to the Third World unknown to previous generations. Nu- continues, especially in the industrial- where unresolved conflicts fuel arms merous contemporary internal con- ized northern hemisphere. Billions of races in which 60 percent of the hard- flicts are a legacy of colonialism since dollars are still being spent in the sale ware comes from G-7 countries, a prac- the borders of half of the U.N. mem- of weapons from the First to the Third tice inconsistent with their advertised bers were arbitrarily imposed by the World. Other than the 1993 Chemical disarmament policies. colonial powers. Thus, it should come Weapons Convention specifying the The image of blue helmets as as no surprise that separatist and irre- destruction of production facilities, no global policemen is questionable. The dentist movements have surfaced. existing treaty calls for either disman- General Assembly, which is dominated tling or converting weapons plants. by many new and insignificant coun- The new world order assumes continu- tries, has its decisions contested by the ation of global military apartheid—

60 JFQ / Spring 1996 Carvalho great powers; likewise, the veto power It is illusory to expect the United and targeting equipment capable of process- of larger countries on the Security Nations to prevent every limited con- ing data at incredible speeds. Council raises suspicion among flict from assuming violent and large- ■ Microelectronics will allow the fur- smaller states. Moreover, lack of a per- scale proportions. Deterrence alone, ther development of invisible weapons of manent budget for peace operations, through effective employment of a extreme automatic precision. The main limiting factor will be the high cost. combined with growing debt and late powerful force when necessary, will ■ The art of war will undergo pro- contributions by numerous member guarantee the right of mankind to live found changes. states, exacerbates crises. Complicating in peace and liberty. ■ Vertical coordination will gain matters is article 2 of the Friendly Na- greater importance: ground forces, traditions Charter, which does not confer Future War tionally supported by aircraft, will trade the authority to intervene in matters After both world wars, new interna- roles and support air operations. Conse- that essentially fall under the internal tional orders appeared with the creation quently, the role of naval air forces will be jurisdiction of a state. It is becoming of the League of Nations in Geneva reconsidered. (1919) and the United ■ There will be no need to find and Nations in San Francisco totally destroy enemy combat, political, international law does not justify and economic power—or to break enemy (1945). The victors be- foreign intervention in internal matters will by employing massive ground forces came keepers of the and occupying its territory. peace based on a balance ■ Precision attacks against previously increasingly difficult to distinguish be- of power. With the end of the Cold War, selected targets, using stand-off strategic tween internal and international con- the United States emerged as the sole su- weaponry, will reduce casualties and collat- flicts and predict their repercussions. perpower, although it has shared this eral damage but lead to disintegration of an The concept of self-determination col- role with other G-7 members. enemy political system because of severe lides with that of humanitarian action. Accordingly, great wars will only damage to industrial and power facilities, The interpretation of interna- be fought by more developed states. In communication centers, transportation net- tional law, even in the face of serious other words, as we reach the end of works, and populations. Such weapons will not distinguish civilians from soldiers. human rights violations, does not jus- the millennium, only the United States ■ Electronic warfare and intelligence tify foreign intervention in internal has the ability to fight and sustain a will become especially important. matters. Thus, even though it has total nuclear war, a fact that in itself ■ Operations will be considerably never been stated absolutely, sover- makes such an occurrence unlikely. shortened. eignty becomes more important in Otherwise, full-scale conflicts between ■ Command, control, and communi- terms of the rights and duties of states. Third World countries would be cations (C3) will be extremely valuable. Hence, it is no surprise that some al- avoided or resolved by U.S. predomi- ■ Air defenses will have to be modern- leged foreign intervention in weak nance or G-7 global power, using the ized to counter invisible high precision states is not universally accepted. In United Nations as a tool, or by interna- weapon systems, undetected even by radar the future, nations will be hard-pressed tional economic sanctions. If diplo- under adverse weather and visibility conditions. to justify such practices. matic negotiations or economic pres- ■ The computer will dominate the Finally, peacekeeping requires sures fail, then a U.N.-sponsored force battlefield; accordingly, victory will lean to- above all that peace be achieved, since would be employed with the consent ward the side with effective information powerful states only resolve questions of the Security Council. However, such systems, operated by highly qualified spe- pertaining to their interests, confirm- coveted universal peace remains far cialists in data processing, that exceed ing La Fontaine’s adage that the best from a reality. enemy command and control capabilities. reason is always that of the strongest. Scientific and technological break- ■ Data automation will eliminate ex- The days of amateurism are gone. Both throughs in the coming decades will cessive manpower and require well-trained diplomats and politicians have not produce significant material develop- personnel in relatively smaller numbers. ■ been realists. The credibility of the ments which will change the nature of Aircraft will give way to unmanned aerospace vehicles. United Nations will be compromised if warfare, with profound implications ■ Smart weapons will replace conven- conflicts are resolved for the economic for the structure and the employment tional and nuclear ones. However, nuclear and political interests of world powers of armed forces. weapons might be used in desperate situa- or multinational corporations, to the ■ State-of-the-art, high precision con- tions, which will attract new members to detriment of universal principles of re- ventional weapons must replace nuclear the atomic club with comparatively primi- spect for human dignity. Such suspi- weapons of similar destructive power, with- tive systems and limited stockpiles. cions are based on the decisions taken out their malignant and devastating conse- ■ Combined operations will reach by the Security Council, an organiza- quences. their apex through increased aerospace and tion that ignores human rights viola- ■ The line distinguishing nuclear and naval power. ■ tions when convenient or uses them to conventional weapons will disappear. Space will be a decisive factor. justify interventions. ■ Automated, computerized, high pre- Most states cannot stay abreast of cision weapon systems will be available, car- the scientific and technological devel- rying more powerful explosives and highly opments as applied to the art of war penetrating munitions and possessing electronic components and target acquisition

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To address the appropriate role of the armed forces in society, it is necessary to know how they are institution- alized. This requires a knowledge of their lawful missions—in other words, their constitu- Avibras launching tional role and Astros II SS–60. goals. Generically executable missions are permanent in almost all armed forces and are only distinguished by the political and ideological connotations imposed on them by their legal role. The role of the armed forces is a function of the regime and the times; hence, it varies with political fluctua- tions. While in some nations military expression is institutionally adapted to one party or the personal power of a discretionary ruler, in democratic states the law normally decrees that Exército do Brasil Exército the armed forces guarantee a regime le- gitimized by popular representation. which forces them to accept the new despite the contributions of interna- Their role therefore changes only order imposed by the larger powers. tional organizations to peacekeeping, when a new group assumes power and Weaker states can only fight limited or there is no justification for converting sets a new course. Examples include regional small wars, using conven- Third World armed forces into militias. passage of the Tzar’s forces to the Sovi- No outside system can suppress ets and their return to the Russian na- despite international peacekeep- all the tension afflicting unjust tion; democratic transformation of ing, there is no justification for societies that lack the means to Nazi and socialist military institutions maintain order and secure their into a reunited Germany; the greatness converting Third World armed place on the world stage. Hungry, of the military role in the United States forces into militias ignorant, and socially inferior and Britain; and the tumultuous his- combatants cannot resist the on- tory of many Ibero-American regimes. slaught of developed and better When a people achieve the level tional weapons or old nuclear and trained adversaries. Without good of nationhood and create the state, chemical weapons to counter the health and education, no armed force one of its essential traits is maintaining power of the strongest countries. will be able to ensure respect and sta- independence and ensuring that na- For some time, an astonished bility among states. tional will is not subjected to any out- world will witness hostilities among Years ago, Adlai Stevenson stated side powers. The state also underwrites emerging nations that risk peace. The at the United Nations that we do not the supremacy of internal order—inter- new international order—in which any envision a world devoid of conflict. Re- preted as the inherent power of the military institution unable to take part gardless of how war evolves in the new state to impose itself on the other in- in an unrestrained arms race is viewed world order at the dawn of the next stitutional powers within its territory. as a national guard or militia depen- century, the universal and enduring In keeping with Brazilian consti- dent on the great powers under the role of armed forces remains constant: tutional tradition, article 142 of the shield of international organizations— to deter aggression, defend the home- current constitution states that the anxiously awaits a new strategy. land, and guarantee law and order armed forces are permanent and regu- both internally and externally. Thus lar national institutions and destined Armed Forces the role of the armed forces must be for the defense of the homeland, the Although the world may be less consistent with the goals of society in guarantee of constitutional powers, dangerous politically, it is more com- general. Militaries are extensions of the and the maintenance of law and order. plex economically and faces greater societies to which they belong, which This role is consistent with the na- risks of conflict. Great wars may be is why they are national institutions. tion’s level of political evolution. But averted, but fierce economic competi- Any disharmony between the armed maintaining law and order is not tion warns of dangers arising from a forces and society can hamper stability, within the scope of the armed forces in widespread loss of control which de- liberty, and social peace. some countries. generates into armed conflict. Thus,

62 JFQ / Spring 1996 Carvalho

support collective security, and providing relief assistance in catastrophies and emergencies. It Brazilian destroyer has become clear CT Paraíba. that in all countries the military forms the basic element of coercive organization that serves the law. Resting on the shoulders of the armed forces—on their structural efficiency, training, and respectability—is social peace in the international arena and national prestige in the commonwealth of nations. Hence, they are material safeguards of both the existence of a sovereign state and the achievement of its goals. It is on their power that the status and self-determination of the state rely in national and in-

U.S. Navy (Catherine T. Hogan) U.S. Navy (Catherine T. ternational crises. Thus, we cannot accept the notion of entrusting the defense of the state to alliances or third parties, nor rely on mercurial decisions Defense of the homeland means The first inviolable commitment by international organizations to as- integrating and protecting national of the armed forces is defense of the sure national integrity. territory and democratic institutions of nation—its moral and material patri- the representative regime, federation, mony, territorial integrity, political- Regardless of whether the world and republic from aggression, be it in- economic independence, and institu- feels less threatened in the aftermath ternal or external, overt or covert. The tions. Second, the military is required of the Cold War, the military is less dis- guarantee of constitutional powers for the collective defense of the Ameri- pensable than ever in the new world specifies providing security to the ex- can continents against aggression. order. It is a permanent national insti- ecutive, legislature, and judiciary so Hemispheric stability resides in the tution whose roles—originating in the they may conduct their legal responsi- preservation of peace from north to constitution—remain universal and south. Finally, the armed largely unchanged and cannot be rele- the first inviolable commitment of the forces are the instrument gated to militias, other states, or infor meeting the interna- armed forces is defense of the nation ternational organizations. Were this tional commitment to not so, the principles of sovereignty maintain world peace and self-determination, the foundation bilities, independently and harmo- among nations. These three objectives of international law, the declaration of niously, free from any type of pressure. summarize the basic missions of Brazil- human rights and duties, and the U.N. The guarantee of law and order is sum- ian military institutions. charter would be compromised. JFQ marized as enforcing respect for estab- Without hampering missions established legal norms or those derived lished by constitutional decree, the An extended version of this article was pub- from them, which puts the armed armed forces carry out activities of mili- lished in the Portuguese-language edition of forces in a peculiar position. Even if tary interest in scientific-technological, Military Review (vol. 75, 3rd quarter 1995, the law did not prescribe such a role, economic, and social areas where there pp. 35–44) under the title of ”O Papel das society would find it difficult to accept is a lack of participation from the private Forças Armadas no Século XXI.“ JFQ is grateful to Coronel Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, the military being impassive in times or governmental sectors. They also sup- Brazilian Liaison Officer, U.S. Army Combined of chaos. It would be illogical and port civil defense in disaster relief, emer- Arms Center, for providing this English trans- utopian for the state to forego the use gencies, or humanitarian assistance. lation. of force in the face of an external or in- During a seminar on “Army Edu- ternal threat. The old aphorism that cation Policy for the Year 2000” held the armed forces should be a giant under the auspices of the Brazilian mute only finds acceptance among the army staff and including military per- ill-intentioned. The incapability of sonnel and civilians from the First speech is an organic handicap that World, there was unanimous consent must not become a military attribute. that the generic roles of armed forces consist of defending the homeland, participating in multinational forces to

Spring 1996 / JFQ 63 ■ JFQ FORUM

n 1990 Argentina began a transformation of the land component of its armed forces based on assess- Iments of current and future defense needs, national objectives, economic conditions, and a changing international situation. This historical challenge was met by the Argentine army which implemented actions to achieve that end. The army is a disciplined and cohesive institution that performs its mission with composure, perseverance, motivation, devotion to duty, and faith in a future which it deems bright. It has also adapted to structural changes undertaken by the nation and shared 155mm Citer gun. in the sacrifices which these difficult reforms have imposed on the Ar- gentine people. This has led to the first changes in force structure since a reorganization in 1964. Both geopolitical developments and extraordinary technological advances during the 1980s precluded the army from responding to demands posed by this national

Ejército Argentino Ejército challenge. The Malvinas War clearly indicated the failure of our doctrinal and operational framework. Budget policies CHANGING and cost reductions embraced by the Argentine government, like other countries, compounded structural problems. To meet this reality, studies Argentine were required to guide development of the army. Thus, a long-range goal was implemented by a comprehensive and ambitious project, “The Military Ground Component of the Future,” Military which spanned over twenty years (until 2010). That project, with subsequent revisions and adaptations, has become synonymous with the army’s Culture future. From the start the effort has been focused in a coherent and coordi- By MARTIN ANTONIO BALZA nated manner. Its most distinctive characteristic is that it is not static. On the contrary, it is flexible enough to assimilate changes deemed necessary by the defense establishment while also ensuring room for evolution. Notwithstanding the lack of addi- Teniente General Martin Antonio Balza is chief of staff of tional funding to embark on this evo- the Argentine army. lutionary process, by the end of 1991

64 JFQ / Spring 1996 Balza the required actions had been taken Argentine peacekeeper, unprecedented sit- and continue to be systematically im- Croatia. uation among na- plemented. The concept behind re- tions which have structuring the army was a process of introduced a volunteer force. The pos- transformation which implicitly had sibility for individuals to voluntarily to start with cultural modernization. choose to join the army as an officer or Our actions had to lead to profound noncommissioned officer is an innova- changes in the corporate culture of the tive and invaluable recruitment alter- army including: native not previously employed in Ar- ■ respect for and subordination to the gentina. Another remarkable change is constitution and the law the fact the army decided to offer ■ a positive attitude toward commu- women the same recruitment opportunity service to integrate the army into society nities as men, opening a series of posi- ■ a call to excellence tions which will be gradually ex- ■ command based on shared objectives panded as the system is consolidated. ■ encouragement of higher levels of At the same time the Argentine responsibility, participation, and initiative army has maintained and continues to among subordinate levels of command stress the importance of ethical values ■ assignments based on competence that are fundamental to the military ■ promotions based on merit ■ modification of seniority through- profession. Discipline, honesty, devo- out a military career tion to duty, loyalty, obedience, self- ■ modernization of the army’s educa- sacrifice, courage, and individual ex- tional system George Beauchamp ample have been emphasized in the ■ replacement of mandatory military past and will continue to be objectives service with a voluntary army. for developing the Argentine soldier. Qualitative changes in the educa- soldier of the future, defense needs, Defense is a function of state that tion provided to personnel is funda- resource availability, and demands can only be entrusted to the military for mental to the process of transforming posed by society. Its adoption led to implementation. Our primary mission profound changes, is and will continue to be the defense of vital national interests, regardless of the implementation of a voluntary army was both cultural and structural, ranging existence of internal or external threats. a historical milestone and our greatest from education and The challenge for the future is to iden- challenge in the 1990s training volunteers to tify threats that may arise in the in- the operation of units, ternational order. In this new world equipment, personnel order our traditional mission remains any organization. In this sense educa- practices, legal developments, etc. valid. It essentially consists of having a tional requirements were raised in an We should underscore that the credible deterrent. However, new dan- effort to gradually adjust the profes- army implemented this particular gers have resulted in new subsidiary sional skills required for the 21st cen- recruitment system without any prior tury during the course of training and experience or a transition period—an Torpedo boat Indomita development. With that in mind the at Ushuaia. curricula at institutions such as the military academy now enable graduates to earn university degrees. Non- commissioned officers graduate with high school diplomas. This transformation also includes establishment of military institutes of higher education for civilian personnel, which has led to a paradoxical situation at our military university where the majority of the students are civilians. Likewise, the implementation of a voluntary army was a historical milestone for Argentina and our greatest challenge in the 1990s. The idea was to address the formation of the Robert L. Scheina

Spring 1996 / JFQ 65 ■ JFQ FORUM Robert L. Scheina Super Etendard, Espora Naval Air Base. ing and the establishment of civil-military relations which are devoid of prej- udice and misconceptions. The first step was to abandon our apocalyptic vision and arrogance and begin accept- George Beauchamp ing the right of dissent and respecting Argentine and Spanish the will of the people. We have been observers monitoring Cuban withdrawal doing that for several years to leave the roles that armies—as the institutions This would from Angola. past behind and to build the Argentina with the greatest aptitude—have as- not have been of the future—a nation that has found sumed. achieved without maturity in pain, and one that some- The Argentine army has con- the active, intelligent, and selfless par- day will come together in a fraternal ducted peacekeeping operations ticipation of our servicemen and embrace. among various other missions in an ef- women who, in turn, are able to count The Argentine army will meet and fort to help maintain international on the understanding and support of exceed all these expectations. It is pre- order and balance in compliance with Argentine society. The respect of the pared to fulfill its commitment while resolutions of the U.N. Security Coun- army for republican institutions and upholding the traditions and ethical cil. Our military has thereby gained constitutional power has deep roots, values that are fundamental to the mil- national and international recognition which is one of the most important itary profession. Our human as well as for its professionalism, devotion to achievements of the modernization spiritual heritage, solid and virtuous, is duty, and discipline evidenced while process. consistent with the truth and with the participating in multinational peace- Additionally we have been able to values, interests, and objectives of Ar- keeping forces. This motivation has en- overcome barriers that isolated us from gentine society. JFQ abled us to overcome other difficulties the community. Society as a whole and strengthen our commitment to now has the political will to attain world peace, in keeping with the ob- peace and well-being. This has been jectives of Argentine foreign policy. possible through mutual understand-

66 JFQ / Spring 1996 Security and Democracy in the egional dynamics currently rates in several Latin American coun- facilitate military support for tries have for some years been higher Region democracy and peaceful con- than in the United States and Canada. R flict resolution in the West- If this trend continues, the glaring gaps By LUIGI R. EINAUDI ern Hemisphere. Yet although condi- in the quality of life between North tions have greatly improved, continued and South America could narrow in the success will require both civilian and future. military leadership. With Canada, Mex- But the most impressive trend is ico, and the United States in the North political convergence. Since the early American Free Trade Agreement 1980s, democratic systems have with- (NAFTA), the Anglophone Caribbean stood leadership changes, severe still as solidly democratic as ever, and austerity, and major adjustments. democratization in South America Democracy and economic moderniza- complementing the resolution of in- tion are proving compatible and are contributing to a reborn awareness of the value of freedom. But there is no guarantee that new opportunities for regional cooperation will be fully developed. Already there are reactions against the reformist optimism that opened the 1990s. Yet the potential for a new era of hemispheric prosperity and good neighborhood is real. Security Concerns Extracontinental threats have lost significance, but travail in Haiti and looming Joint Combat Camera (Kyle Davis) instability in Cuba make Argentine, Barbadian, clear that local problems re- and U.S. police ternationalized conflicts in Central main. More generally, the ills of monitors in Haiti. America, the 1994 Miami summit credi- poverty, misgovernment, terrorism, bly set the integration of the entire drug traffic, and mass migration can hemisphere as a common goal. overwhelm the most settled bound- Change toward a more harmo- aries, entrenched relationships, and nious regional order is broadly evident. precise legal guarantees. In sharp contrast to strategic rivalries in A southward flow of automatic other parts of the world, Argentina and weapons through Miami has replaced Brazil ended their nuclear competition Cuban-trained guerrillas as threats to and accepted international safeguards. local authorities. Criminal and terrorist With Chile, they banned chemical and groups hostile to organized societies biological weapons. In another sphere, possess levels of technology and fire- Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, power that contrast starkly with the Peru, and Venezuela followed Chile in historically unarmed governments of dismantling centralized economies. the Commonwealth Caribbean and And giant federal even the capabilities of some Latin Brazil is adapting American nations. From Chiapas down Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi is a senior policy advisor at well to new demo- the Central American isthmus and the Department of State and served as U.S. permanent cratic and produc- along the continent’s Andean spine, representative to the Organization of American States. tive forces. Growth

Spring 1996 / JFQ 67 ■ JFQ FORUM explosive mixes of race, poverty, politi- of proximity, language, culture, shared Cooperation cal violence, and institutional failure problems, and history. That neighbors With the entry of Canada in 1990 cause more casualties than the head- can solve some problems best is being and of Belize and Guyana in 1991, the line-grabbing calamities of earthquakes demonstrated from NAFTA to the Eu- Organization of American States (OAS) and hurricanes combined. ropean Union, from the Southern became for the Western Hemisphere Democratic traditions largely en- Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) what the United Nations represents for abled the Commonwealth Caribbean to to the Association of Southeast Asian the world: a body whose membership escape totalitarian temptations even in Nations and the Organization of includes its entire potential universe. the 1960s and 1970s. But articulated in- African Unity. (The only obvious exception, Cuba, is terests and favorable changes do not Yet an acceptance of regionalism still formally a member and many look guarantee social stability. Exacerbated comes only grudgingly. Globalists see forward to the day when a democratic by economic dislocations and modern it as second best or as indicative of fail- Cuba will reoccupy the seat it was sus- ure, nationalists as another pended from in 1962.) More impor- old injustices and social problems can threat to national identity, tantly (unlike the U.N. charter which and liberal economists as a challenge international cooperation does not invoke the word “democ- protectionist “circling the racy”), the OAS charter commits all its wagons.” In today’s uncer- members to representative democracy. communications, old injustices and so- tain conditions, however, regionalism Acceptance of the principle of nonin- cial problems can challenge the respon- can be a building block to work out tervention by President Roosevelt in siveness of national elites and interna- principles and relationships for the 1930s gave meaning to the sover- tional cooperation. And unattained broader global cooperation. eign equality of states, thus helping to development and missed opportunities Historically the United States saw lay the cornerstone of the modern can expose and magnify the faultlines itself solidly anchored in the Americas inter-American system. For years, how- of otherwise forgotten resentments from the Monroe Doctrine to the ever, OAS wallowed in internal contra- against neighbors. Good Neighbor policy. But World War dictions, cheap rhetoric by dictators, Our hemisphere cannot be iso- II ended the “America First” debate, and Cold War distortions which com- lated from the broader world. The end and the United States has had world- bined to sap its potential and earn of the Cold War has challenged global wide commitments ever since. This public disdain. order on a scale comparable to the end global outlook was reinforced during Conditions changed as this of the world wars. The response to the the Cold War. With the dissolution of decade began. In 1991 the annual OAS disintegration of the Soviet empire re- the Soviet empire, the United States general assembly was hosted in Santi- mains unclear. Will we overcome cen- became the only genuinely global ago by a Chilean government eager to trifugal nationalisms as happened after power. It is the only country that sees draw attention to its transition from World War II or indulge them as oc- itself as having a role in every region— military to civilian rule. In 1973, the curred following World War I? More- in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and coup by General Pinochet against the over, will we find workable responses Africa as well as throughout the West- elected government was not even com- to deforestation, population overflow, ern Hemisphere. mented on by OAS, many of whose and global warming? From this perspective, NAFTA may members were under military rule. All Not only are such issues taxing in be a first step toward re-anchoring the 34 delegations in Santiago represented themselves, however; we are barely United States in the region. Certainly democratic governments. The result able to discuss them for lack of com- Washington has not moved so directly was revolutionary: unanimous adop- mon reference points. Politics, like na- to bolster its position in its immediate tion of resolution 1080 calling for au- ture, abhors vacuums, so this is one in neighborhood since the days of tomatic consideration of any interrup- name only; but it is filled with far Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Good tion of democratic processes in a more particularisms and localisms Neighbor policy. However, NAFTA can- member state. Over the next two years, than the grand strategists have been not be a mask for a Fortress Americas this OAS procedure was applied in the accustomed to accommodating, which policy. Canada and the ABC states (Ar- case of Haiti to withhold recognition may actually be part of the problem. gentina, Brazil, and Chile) are main- of the regime issuing from a military stays of the General Agreement on Tar- coup, and also in Peru and Guatemala Regionalism iffs and Trade (GATT) and peace to oppose unconstitutional seizures of For all its shrinkage the planet is operations. Future success “beyond power by civilian presidents. big and complicated. The United Na- NAFTA” will be neither exclusionary Since 1990 the organization has tions can’t do it all, nor can the United nor isolationist, but rather GATT-com- been in the forefront of efforts to de- States. And most other countries have patible in economics, democratic in fine the legal grounds for international their hands full with domestic con- politics, and universalist in spirit. cooperation in support of democracy. cerns. A compromise between the ab- OAS missions have disarmed insur- straction of globalism and weakness of gents in Nicaragua and Suriname while unilateralism already exists. It is called protecting human rights. Moreover, “neighborhood” and has the attributes observers supported elections in

68 JFQ / Spring 1996 Einaudi

The Military Democratization in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s involved tran- sitions from military to civilian rule. As the backbone of displaced authoritarian regimes, military institutions were seen as opponents of democracy even among civilian leaders and movements who owed Cubans being their success to sup- searched on arrival port from men in at Guantanamo. uniform. Such tension must be overcome and new understandings developed if democratic governments in the region are to function in the midst of social discontent, economic reform, and international uncertainty. Build- ing institutions and promoting justice

U.S. Navy (Alexander Hicks) requires setting boundaries between civilian and military authority. Are military personnel accused of human rights abuses subject to military or civil Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, cooperate, even to face urgent global courts? Who makes the decisions on Haiti, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Im- problems. counternarcotics policy or spending on plementing the Miami summit will From the standpoint of interna- arms? Should military personnel vote? rely to an extent on the success of OAS tional cooperation, in fact, democracy Such questions can be controver- as a coordinator and a sounding board. may be as important among nations as sial. Moreover, they are complicated by within them. In our hemisphere, the lack of an agreed model of authority. Sovereignty veto-free OAS structure and accompa- Liberal traditions subordinate the mili- The world is marked by truly nying search for consensus brings a tary to civilian authority in all matters transnational forces, some with ap- notable dose of democracy to relation- but grant military personnel the politi- palling destructive power. Added to the ships expressed through the organiza- cal rights of citizenship. Corporatist tra- evils of dictatorship and protectionism tion. A regional approach has two ad- ditions emphasize military autonomy are pollution, mass distribution of vantages: bringing all concerned in spheres of military competence, parties together is an efficient form hence limiting or denying civilian au- democracy may be as important of communication, and maintain- thority in military affairs, but refuse po- ing the equality of states by shar- litical rights to military personnel. among nations as within them ing information and discussion on Well into this century, Latin a one-country/one-vote basis re- American constitutions regularly gave drugs with their antisocial effects, and duces the asymmetry of purely bilat- the military a corporatist right, even population growth that often over- eral settings and facilitates coopera- duty, to preside in a nonpartisan man- whelms existing social arrangements. tion—even bilateral cooperation. The ner to determine when politicians had At the same time, electronic communi- first advantage typifies multilateralism violated their constitutional mandates. cation has created a new and transcen- and is singularly useful in supplement- Those practices, incomprehensible to dent universe. ing normal communication channels. those educated in a liberal tradition, The search for solutions must re- The second has special significance in have all but vanished from constitu- spect what is invisible from space and this hemisphere, where bilateral coop- tions written over the last generation. increasingly ignored on earth: the in- eration can be inhibited by the dispro- But corporatist attitudes remain power- ternational boundary distinguishing portionate power of the United States. ful, nowhere more than among mili- one sovereignty from another. Al- Gradual negotiation of common posi- tary officers, whose function is to de- though very much under challenge by tions in a regional setting is thus a way fend the state from its enemies and impending waves of anarchy, with en- to resolve transnational issues without who likely see freedom as meaningless tire areas beyond the reach of any cen- sacrificing the rights of sovereignty. without social order. Officers have all tral government, the nation-state re- too often been caught in cultural po- mains the basic unit of world larity with and against advocates of in- organization. And states need to be or- dividual rights. ganized and energized before they can

Spring 1996 / JFQ 69 ■ JFQ FORUM

United States (with its disproportionate power and the votes it will control) can justify military intervention in Latin America or the Caribbean under international law. One extreme formula- tion of this anxiety Raiding drug is that, using democ- laboratory in Bolivia. racy and human rights as excuses, the United States seeks to use OAS and IADB as mechanisms to place armed forces in Latin America under its command as en- forcers of U.S. intervention. Two other hypotheses about U.S. policy circulating within Latin Ameri- can military circles are that with the Cold War over the United States wants

U.S. Army to abolish all national military forces in the region because it considers them obstacles to democratic enlarge- Both civil-military and liberal-cor- The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War ment and commercial expansion, and poratist differences can be reconciled highlighted fundamental differences in that the United States seeks to coopt over time by habits created by the rule perceptions and military alliances. In Latin American militaries as police to of law. But the challenge is mutual. The Latin America (as distinct from Canada fight the drug war outside its borders. military must realize that democracy is and the Caribbean), association with There are two major flaws in these not anarchy, that human rights are es- the United Kingdom made the United conspiratorial depictions of U.S. policy. sential to their own dignity and honor, States almost as much a loser as Ar- The first is that these are “big lies,” in- and that civil authority is the only gentina, some of whose leaders had corporating enough from authentic source of legitimacy. Civilians, in turn, acted believing the United States concerns emanating from Washington must accept that the nation is symbol- would understand their cause. The Rio to give them an air of plausibility. The ized by the uniform as well as the flag, Treaty, then already under ideological second is that such misunderstandings that unarmed world peace still remains attack, appeared scrapped by U.S. loy- in the past prevented effective regional a utopian ideal, and that military coop- alty to NATO. cooperation that could have forestalled eration is essential to consolidate de- In Latin America as a whole, the the use of force. mocratic gains and economic reforms. abandonment of Cold War rationales In Panama OAS took on Noriega Civilian and military leaders must turned the clock back to historic na- without success for several months in deal with the single most pernicious tional rivalries, arms transfers, long- 1989 before events led to U.S. action. and destabilizing element in hemi- standing boundary disputes, and mu- In Haiti OAS and IADB had an oppor- spheric politics today: impunity. Abuse tual distaste derived from writing one’s tunity to provide military training dur- of power and privilege, corruption, history as an anti-history of neighbors. ing 1991-92 under conditions that human rights violations—these evils In Central and South America, these might have contributed to a political know neither nationality nor civil con- external issues were compounded by solution. But anti-military and anti-in- dition nor uniform. Impunity from uncertainties over civil-military rela- terventionist attitudes precluded OAS punishment—whether the accused are tions, mechanisms of command and from acting. When the United States civilian or military—greatly destabilizes control, or internal distribution of po- initiated another effort a year later, state authority. The path to mutual re- lice and intelligence functions. this time under the United Nations, spect can only be built when all are There is also a panoply of problems Haitian paramilitary goon squads had equal under the law and must obey it. associated with the United States. The been reinforced and conditions had disproportion of power between the polarized and deteriorated even fur- The Past United States and its neighbors, turned ther. The opportunity to reverse the Democratization in the hemi- into fear by the historic use of that coup and reduce the suffering of the sphere has strengthened regional politi- power to intervene militarily, has Haitian people had been lost. cal cooperation, but not military rela- blocked clear subordination of the mili- With the Rio Treaty in disuse and tionships. Moreover, the end of the tary instrument—the Inter-American no provisions in the OAS charter for Cold War has undermined the extra- Defense Board (IADB)—to the political the use of force, armed peacekeeping hemispheric threat rationale on which body (OAS). The reasoning is that, if the activities will be left either to the regional military cooperation has been latter is authorized a military arm, the United Nations or to unilateral action based for more than half a century, first against the Axis, then the Soviet bloc.

70 JFQ / Spring 1996 Einaudi The White House

by the United States. Neither is a satis- Within the hemisphere, Brazil them than to ask them to undertake factory embodiment of collective re- contributed officers to the OAS mis- missions. Even more importantly, par- gional will. sion in Suriname and the U.N. effort in ticipation in peacekeeping operations El Salvador, Venezuelans served with will not replace the process of redefin- Mission Expansion the United Nations in Nicaragua, and ing the role of the military. Moreover, The end of the Cold War prompted an OAS-authorized, IADB-planned de- we should not have needed Somalia to a search for new military missions and mining effort in Nicaragua was remind us to greet changing missions rationales—even as downsizing was un- with skepticism. History is derway. One of the most important is Haiti drew less military than political replete with situations in peacekeeping, a mission spurred by the support from the hemisphere which new missions and Gulf War reminder that danger still doctrines can lead to trou- abounds despite the “new world order.” ble. Their adoption without While Canada has a peacekeeping tradi- manned by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, careful preparation can create political tion, out-of-area activities by Latin Amer- Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uru- instability and bring discredit to mili- ican militaries have been infrequent. guay. Argentina, Canada, Caribbean tary institutions. In the 1960s, coun- Brazil and Mexico fought in World War II Community and Common Market terinsurgency and civic action mis- and Colombia took part in Korea. Such (CARICOM) states, Guatemala, Hon- sions in Latin America contributed to contributions are multiplying as coun- duras, and Suriname participated in displacement of civil authority and ul- tries of the region participate in peace op- Haiti in an effort which drew less mili- timately to military coups. In the erations—Argentina in Croatia, Cyprus, tary than political support from the 1980s, assigning increased military as- Mozambique, and the Persian Gulf; hemisphere. sets to the drug war resulted in politi- Brazil in Angola, Mozambique, and for- These efforts should not be mis- cal controversies but fortunately not in mer Yugoslav republics, as well as on the taken for a new equilibrium. Interna- coups. As the 1990s progress, redefin- Rwanda-Uganda border; Chile in Cam- tional organizations are by definition ing the role of the military will require bodia, Kashmir, and Kuwait; and mendicants, and it is hard to think of a careful and unprecedented consulta- Uruguay in Cambodia, Mozambique, the faster way to financially bankrupt tion with civilian authorities. Most is- Persian Gulf, and the Sinai. sues are much more difficult than

Spring 1996 / JFQ 71 ■ JFQ FORUM peacekeeping, which, though expen- economic progress, and moderniza- every step and enabled MOMEP to sive, has obvious benefits for military tion. But until these conflicts are re- maintain independent communica- modernization and international order. solved, governments will have to fac- tions and transport. Another secret of Some difficulties are economic in tor territorial concerns into their its success was that the mission fo- form but political in content. What defense plans. Military modernization cused on military concerns it could ad- materiel acquisitions are necessary in and arms transfers will thus stay on dress professionally; it was explicitly an environment of reduced tensions? the hemispheric agenda for the fore- precluded from political matters. For What will be the budgetary balance be- seeable future. Much of the Cold War example, while MOMEP had responsi- tween military and social spending? In security system was built on U.S. ex- bility for separating forces and defin- an era of government downsizing, no cess stocks from World War II and ing a demilitarized zone, resolving the sector will get all it wants. Other ques- Korea which have not been available underlying conflict was left to the tions are quintessentially political. for some time. Moreover, even with diplomats. MOMEP actions were dis- How much downsizing is enough? bargains the cost of weapons from the tinctly identified as not bearing on How can civilian demands for trans- developed world are close to prohibi- where the border was or should be. parency be reconciled with security? tive. Worse, minimal acquisitions may Finally, experience has shown that, be perceived as threatening despite political convergence, international sovereignty and security are by other countries. The pur- American security cooperation still must chase by Ecuador in 1995 of be approached with caution. National different sides of the same coin four Kfir fighters was sovereignty and security are in many re- enough to raise fears of a spects different sides of the same coin. What happens in rural areas where South American arms race. Yet these Despite common rhetoric, working prin- military units are virtually the sole rep- aircraft were one-for-one replacements ciples emphasize limits and separate resentatives of authority? What hap- that introduced no new technology. spheres of action and interest. pens when criminals have more fire- A logical approach would be an The 1995 Defense Ministerial of power and mobility than police? The arms transfer regime responsive to the the Americas gathered together defense traditional authoritarian answer is to twin imperatives of defense and re- officials regardless of whether they order the military into action. The de- straint, and respected both regionally were civilian or military. The meeting mocratic answer is slower but maybe and internationally. It should provide was pivotal to using political conver- more stable in the long run—to bring for prior consultation and confidence gence in fostering not only better inter- military and civil authorities together building measures among and within American communication but also to decide what to do. countries and be flexible enough to en- civil-military dialogue within a consti- Finally, there are voices for mili- sure weapons for national defense yet tutional context. Future conferences tary intervention against domestic cor- restrained enough to preclude destabi- could develop common guidelines for ruption, inefficiency, and crime. Such lizing and wasteful transfers. For exam- training exercises and arms transfers calls are typically softened by populist ple, restraint on one system could be ac- (including reliable supplies and con- appeals and promises; but interference cepted in return for assured supplies of trols). But in the immediate future, the by the military in the prevailing legal another. No transfers would be consum- best way to further communication order offers little hope for the disad- mated without involving both military may be through informal dialogue, ed- vantaged. It would be hard to imagine and civilian leaders. Conditions for a ucation, and study rather than any or- a quicker end to the promise NAFTA supply/restraint regime are coming into ganized action. Civilian and military holds for the hemisphere than a return being. Weapons of mass destruction leaders still tend to inhabit separate to the false solutions of authoritarian- have been banned. Constitutionally universes with no general agreement ism embodied in even the most appar- elected democratic governments are on their respective roles. More should ently “justified” coup. dominant. But levels of civil-military be done by training civilians in security communication required to define a matters, military officers in human Future Directions regime with confidence and verification rights, and both in public administra- The border conflict between are still weak. tion and regional comity. In a similar Ecuador and Peru in 1995 brought into Second, the Ecuador-Peru clash vein, OAS has emphasized confidence- focus several issues with major impli- showed that multilateral cooperation building measures. cations for hemispheric security. Per- on sensitive security issues is possible. The United States should avoid act- haps the most crucial have to do with Close coordination between civilian ing alone in hemispheric security mat- military missions and how to organize and military officials in guarantor na- ters. Working with other nations will cooperation. tions, among guarantors, and between sometimes fall short, but consultation First, traditional concerns such as guarantors and both parties was criti- will uncover allies. And if Washington defending national frontiers remain le- cal. That required patience, discretion, develops solutions with others rather gitimate missions for the military. Set- respect for sovereignty, and intelligible than unilaterally by the sheer weight of tling such disputes is key to stability, procedures. The Rio Protocol, the Dec- its power, it will help consolidate secu- laration of Peace of Itamaraty, and the rity and democracy to the benefit of all mission terms of reference covered the peoples of the Americas. JFQ

72 JFQ / Spring 1996 Defense of the Hemisphere: An Historical Postscript By JOSE F. MATA National Archives PB4Y–1 on patrol, 1943.

n times of major crisis, the nations estimated that subsequent operations lated the need for the new world to of the Western Hemisphere have could project combat power to Brazil. unite against threats from the old traditionally put aside their differ- The fall of France in 1940, the anom- world to avert war. The Declaration of Iences and united in a common alous status of French colonies in Lima in 1938 reaffirmed that American cause. Such was the case during World Africa during 1940–41, and German republics would help each other if at- War II when the Americas came to- successes in North Africa in 1941–1942 tacked. Subsequent meetings took gether in collective defense well before gave substance to this view. As the cri- place in Panama in 1939 and Havana becoming actively involved in that ter- sis intensified continental security be- in 1940. The former resulted in the De- rible conflict. The defense of the hemi- came more critical for the Americas. In claration of Panama that promulgated sphere was a top priority then as it is March 1942, General George Marshall, a neutral zone of 300 miles into the today. Historically, the Monroe Doc- chief of staff of the U.S. Army, ex- Pacific and Atlantic for belligerent war- trine has been the cornerstone of U.S. pressed his concern to the Inter-Ameri- ships. The latter, prompted by the de- security policy in the region. An out- can Defense Board (IADB) and re- feat of France, Belgium, and the side threat to one country was viewed quested a quick response to the threat: Netherlands, discussed administration as a threat by all its neighbors. Thus, Without delay, we soldiers must show the of French and Dutch possessions in when aggression in Europe and Asia way to our countries, not only how to de- this hemisphere, especially regarding began to spread across the Atlantic and fend our nations and the heritage of our potential Axis interference. Finally, the Pacific Oceans between 1939 and American tradition, but also to make sure Rio de Janeiro conference of foreign 1941, Washington, in partnership with there will be no challenge to our strong po- ministers in 1942 established IABD to many nations in Latin America, took sition and united strength. coordinate and plan defense measures. steps to deal with what was becoming It was comprised of military, naval, a world-wide conflict. and air attachés from most nations of Defensive Arcs In April 1939, the Joint Army- the hemisphere who met regularly to Navy Board determined that the only Before World War II, Washington consider improvements in regional de- way in which the hemisphere could be adopted the so-called “good neighbor” fense. The Rio conference also recom- assailed was from a base of operation policy to promote a spirit of coopera- mended an immediate meeting of mil- on the coast of West Africa. The board tion throughout the region and facili- itary and naval technicians from each tate a series of conferences addressing nation be convened in Washington to the defense of the suggest defensive measures. This con- hemisphere. At the ference was significant because it was Buenos Aires con- the first time military representatives ference in 1936, Colonel Jose F. Mata, USA, is director of the Inter-American of each nation discussed hemispheric President Franklin program at the U.S. Army Center of Military History which Roosevelt articu- fosters historical contacts with Latin American armies.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 73 ■ JFQ FORUM security. A common threat unified the Americas as the “good neighbor” pol- South Atlantic Air Routes, 1941–43 icy gradually evolved into a more cohesive strategy that promoted both co- UNITED STATES Principal Airfields Other Airfields TUNISIA hemispheric security BERMUDA O 500 1000 revolved around a defensive MORRISON Statute Miles Miami arc of bases from HOMESTEAD ALGERIA BORINQUEN ATLANTIC OCEAN Newfoundland to the (PUERTO RICO)

Windward Islands Antigua Vernam FRENCH WEST AFRICA CAPE VERDE ISLANDS (JAMAICA) Saint Lucia Dakar WALLER (TRINIDAD) SIERRA LEONE operation and the interests of every LIBERIA GOLD American state. ATKINSON HASTINGS COAST ROBERTS In the Atlantic, hemispheric secu- Accra BRITISH rity revolved around a defensive arc of Amapa GUIANA EQUATOR BELEM land, naval, and air bases from New- Sao Lulz foundland and Bermuda to Puerto Rico Fortaleza BRAZIL NATAL and the Windward Islands. In the Pa- ASCENSION ISLAND cific, a similar security perimeter RECIFE stretched from the Aleutians through Source: Barry W. Fowle, editor, Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II (Fort Belvoir, the Hawaiian Islands to Panama with Virginia: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of History, 1992). outposts in the Philippines and islands. While all Rainbow war plans incorporated defensive arcs or perimeters, they relied on participation by all nations in the Western Hemisphere Navy protected the sea approaches. Following the attack on the U.S. through bilateral or multilateral agree- The former had to safeguard the trans- Pacific Fleet and Hawaiian Islands in ments and provision of support bases Atlantic routes and convoys of mer- December 1941, the Western Com- and forces. The United States therefore chant ships with troops and critical mand received a higher priority. The pursued basing rights in the hemi- supplies bound for allied nations. Only theater was reinforced by antiaircraft sphere for defensive perimeters. The when the threat of invasion subsided units and 250,000 soldiers to defend Destroyer-Base Agreement between were the theaters reduced and eventu- the west coast. The Navy had initially Washington and London in 1940 se- ally inactivated. In practice, the Allied given top priority to the Pacific theater. cured bases in Bermuda, the Bahamas, offensives in Europe, Axis inability to At the time the Japanese posed the Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad, project power overseas, and German greatest sea threat while the British and British Guiana in exchange for 50 intelligence ineptitude limited Axis ef- navy was strong enough to control the vintage destroyers. At the same time fectiveness in the Western Hemisphere Atlantic and contiguous waters. But as the formation of the U.S. Army to the U-boat campaign. victories at the Coral Sea and Midway Caribbean Defense Command pro- Since a critical portion of the de- reduced the Japanese threat in the Pa- vided for multinational defense of the fensive perimeter consisted of land for- cific, the havoc caused by German sub- Caribbean, Panama Canal, and the cor- tifications, the Army upgraded coastal marines in the Atlantic became a press- responding sealanes. defenses with the latest artillery pieces ing problem. During the first six The U.S. Army Caribbean Defense and target detecting radars. These mea- months of 1942 Allied losses to U-boats Command formed part of a larger sures significantly improved the range rose from about 200,000 tons to Continental Defense Organization and effectiveness of ground defenses, 700,000 tons monthly, mostly from which included Eastern, Central, enabling them to engage targets at merchant ships sunk off the coast of Southern, and Western Defense Com- longer range. Washington also offered Brazil and in the Caribbean.2 mands. Of the 379,000 soldiers as- displaced guns to its Western Hemi- The sinking of merchant ships signed to continental defense, 185,000 sphere allies under provisions of Lend- probably posed the most significant were combat troops including 140,000 Lease legislation to improve their threat to the hemisphere and war effort who served in antiaircraft and coast ar- coastal defenses, thereby helping them since it could interdict the flow of tillery units. The Navy created Eastern, to establish a more coherent defense troops and materiel. The situation so Western, Gulf Sea, Caribbean, and against invasion.1 concerned Marshall that on June 19, Panama sea frontiers to defend 1942 he told Admiral Ernest J. King, sealanes. The Army had responsibility chief of naval operations, that “losses for land-based air defenses while the by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard

74 JFQ / Spring 1996 Mata and in the Caribbean now threaten our Mexico, for example, allowed the Brazil had planned to deploy a larger entire war effort. . . .” At that time the forward basing of U.S. aircraft to sup- expeditionary force—comprised of Navy was still preoccupied with halting port Panama. In the process, the three infantry divisions, an armored the Japanese advance in the Pacific and United States and Mexico drafted plans division, and aviation squadrons with also lacked the forces to conduct a for defending the Mexican northwest support units—but encountered diffi- comprehensive anti-submarine cam- and U.S. southwest. Farther south, culties in organizing and transporting paign in the western Atlantic. Brazil was critical because of its prox- it. Nevertheless, such contributions in- imity to north Africa. Thus, the United creased the strength and effectiveness Cooperation and Foresight States sought bases in the ports of Re- of Allied combat forces and solidified The Atlantic crisis was overcome cife, Natal, and Salvador, and on Fer- the war effort by providing access to only by innovation, cooperation, dedi- nando de Noronha Island. Marines raw materials. Additionally, the de- cation, sacrifice, and support of each guarded Brazilian airfields at Belem, ployment of combat forces by Latin service throughout the hemisphere. Natal, and Recife. The Army built a American nations underscored their One initial response to U-boat attacks major airfield in Puerto Rico. Trinidad commitment to the war.3 was the conversion of commercial and Aruba contributed minesweepers, Allied landings in North Africa yachts to patrol ships for the northern cutters, and bases, while Cuba fur- further reduced the threat to the West- ship lane patrol. These vessels policed nished small gunboats to escort ern Hemisphere, and the defeat of the coastal waters and provided advance Florida-Havana seatrains, and one sank Afrika Korps in 1943 removed the warning to convoys. Similar unarmed a German U–176. Moreover, a reaction prospect of an invasion of Brazil. In ships, the so-called “hooligan navy,” force of 50,000 troops was available to addition, the enemy submarine fleet were used, with yachtsmen forming a had been greatly reduced together coastal picket patrol by May 1942. the security of the Americas with any threat to the continent Moreover, civilian pilots disqualified from the Pacific. However, the de- from military service because of med- was critical to establishing fense structure of the hemisphere ical or age restrictions volunteered bases for launching offensive remained intact until the end of without pay to establish the Civil Air World War II and ultimately pro- Patrol, which ultimately reported 173 operations vided the foundation for postwar enemy submarine sightings. The Army cooperation. agreed to allocate bombers to the Navy World War II united a hemi- for long range anti-submarine pa- defend against enemy landings. Conti- sphere and in the process brought to- trolling. An anti-submarine warfare nental security was a joint and coali- gether the peoples of many nations. school opened in 1942 which trained tion effort. The timely commitment by the United 1,374 men from 14 nations. Produc- Although the western theater saw States to the “good neighbor” policy fa- tion of submarine chasers was a na- extremely limited combat compared to cilitated this climate of cooperation. tional priority that resulted in hun- others, the security of the Americas Genuine unity of effort led to both sta- dreds of ships being available for was critical to establishing bases for bility and security in the hemisphere convoy escort duty by 1942. The launching offensive operations. This despite a grave outside threat. JFQ coastal convoy system, also organized secure environment facilitated produc- in 1942, ran the length of the U.S. east tion of equipment and resupply of NOTES coast and interconnected with other global forces. The cooperation and 1 Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The major shipping points in the Gulf of foresight of key leaders throughout the Framework of Hemisphere Defense: U.S. Army Mexico and Caribbean as well as off hemisphere regarding basing agree- in World War II (Washington: Office of the Brazil and West Africa. ments and security assistance made Chief of Military History, 1960); and Each nation in the hemisphere collective defense possible. Bilateral Stetson Conn, Byron Fairchild, and Rose C. played a defensive role by patrolling its agreements also served to anchor secu- Engelman, Guarding the United States and Its coasts and waters. This was especially rity in the hemisphere. The United Outposts: U.S. Army in World War II (Wash- the case in the Caribbean where criti- States and Mexico, for example, agreed ington: Office of the Chief of Military His- cal shipping lanes to Europe and Africa to allow their forces to cross each tory, 1964). as well as traffic passing through the other’s border if warranted. Some na- 2 For shipping losses to U-boats and de- Panama Canal had to be protected. tions also provided offensive forces. tails on other events, see Barrie Pitt, The Many nations agreed to base U.S. Mexico deployed a fighter squadron to Battle of the Atlantic: World War II (Alexan- forces to reinforce the defensive perim- Luzon in the Pacific while Brazil mar- dria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1977). eter. The United States augmented this shaled an infantry division and sup- 3 Charles E. Kirkpatrick, Defense of the coalition under bilateral agreements port troops which fought with the U.S. Americas: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World and security assistance, and the Navy Fifth Army in Italy. Brazil also sent a War II, World War II commemorative series stationed vessels and aircraft in the fighter squadron to the European the- (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military Caribbean and South America to facili- ater and its navy helped to escort con- History, 1991). tate patrol and escort missions. voys across the Atlantic. Moreover,

Spring 1996 / JFQ 75 ■

NATO’s Military Future By DANIEL W. CHRISTMAN

ohenfels is a household name to many American soldiers. For decades, 7th Army trained in this part of Germany for large Hscale mechanized combat on the plains of Central Europe. While the old Warsaw Pact that provided the focus of that training has disappeared, our soldiers still hone their combat skills—from tank gunnery to small unit maneuvers—there and at nearby Grafenwohr. Even though tank main gun rounds are still cracking down range, profound changes are underway at the 7th Army training center: former Cold War

warriors of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s would be DOD (R.D. Ward) struck by its transformation. Hohenfels remains capable of accommodating thousands of troops in a combat maneuver setting. But of equal importance, it is also now a proving ground for the There is tremendous symbolism in the Ho- new NATO non-article V missions that extend be- henfels of the mid-1990s. While tank gunnery is yond collective defense. the traditional NATO article V mission of collec- This capability was illustrated vividly when tive defense, mock villages and role playing repre- Secretary of Defense William Perry toured Hohen- sent the new NATO role in operations other than fels and Grafenwohr in November 1995 to ob- war. This highlights an essential truth: the military serve the 1st Armored Division preparing for the future of NATO depends on achieving a balance Bosnia operation. First he visited a range where between continuity and change. For the United M1A1 crews were firing qualification tables for States in particular, this means balancing readiness tank gunnery. Less than an hour later, he encoun- and training for high intensity combat with prepa- tered American soldiers at mock villages in peas- ration for non-article V operations such as those in ant costumes and assorted uniforms playing the former Yugoslavia. European militaries, on the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs. Hohenfels proved to other hand, must maintain their combat compe- be ideal as a setting in which to prepare troops tencies in the rush to adopt new missions. Striking for the Implementation Force (IFOR), just as it an appropriate balance is not easy, especially in a had prepared troops for armored mobile warfare period of sharply constrained resources. in past years. Continuity Any discussion of NATO’s military future should begin with the theme of continuity since that is the foundation for NATO adaptation. As Lieutenant General Daniel W. Christman, USA, is assistant to the adaptation proceeds, it is crucial that the Alliance Chairman and has served as U.S. military representative to NATO. not divest itself of the fundamentals that have

76 JFQ / Spring 1996 Christman

served it so well in the past. Rather than remak- and Eastern European nations to realize their ex- ing NATO, we must build on the qualities and at- pectations with regard to contact with the West. tributes that have made it a success. The final reason relates to reconstituting It is useful to recall the agreed Alliance ap- conventional defense capabilities by the Alliance proach to security, one only recently recon- should a major threat materialize in the future. firmed. In the 1991 strategic concept NATO rec- Leadership development is widely recognized as ognized that “The military dimension remains the long pole in the tent in this reconstitution ef- essential. Maintaining an adequate military capa- fort. Force reductions—clearly necessary in the bility and clear preparedness to act collectively in wake of the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution—must not the common defense remain central to the Al- leave the Alliance with an inadequate basis for liance’s security objectives.” 1 This mission re- leadership development; that is, too few units quires a capability to guarantee the territorial in- into which developing leaders can be integrated. tegrity and fundamental security interests of all Nations must ensure that new generations of mil- Alliance members as well as politico-military deci- itary leaders can both learn and practice military sionmaking structures and procedures needed to fundamentals. If we forget this important point, effectively employ forces. we dangerously mortgage the Alliance’s future. NATO military authorities have normally We need, in short, to ensure we do not lose achieved this mission with capable conventional our core combat competencies and structures as forces, integrated military command structure, and we embrace new missions. Collective defense re- workable standardization agreements. The benefits mains the fundamental purpose of NATO and of such capabilities were ob- should be the basis for a rational transformation vious to the world during of the Alliance to respond to new demands. Non- some NATO countries find it Desert Storm. The seamless article V capabilities are derivative from article V difficult to sustain more than integration of NATO ground requirements—not the reverse. and air assets by the coali- We also need to preserve and build on struc- a battalion-sized deployment tion contributed signifi- tures and procedures that enable 16 sovereign na- cantly to the defeat of a re- tions to discuss and agree to political objectives, gional hegemon whose antics threatened not just then transform the objectives into guidance for regional stability but the interests of Alliance mem- NATO military authorities. This is a unique bers thousands of miles from the Persian Gulf. strength of NATO which must be preserved. But core military capabilities are not only decisive for a contingency like the Persian Gulf. Change They are also important for reasons closer to However profound the changes over the past home in Brussels. First, an adequate conventional six years have been for the Alliance, the next six force structure offers a rotation and training base years are likely to create an even greater transfor- for non-article V missions such as the Balkans. mation of European security space. As one analyst Regrettably, some NATO land component force noted, NATO is being reinvigorated in unantici- structures have been cut so severely that many pated ways, not simply by its participation in IFOR, countries find it difficult to sustain more than a but also as a result of the prospect of enlargement.2 battalion-sized deployment for an extended pe- In this light, three challenges are likely to arise for riod. This reality will hopefully provide a floor those serving the Alliance in uniform. under existing structures and lead to a review of Operations. We must ensure that our concep- the adequacy of conventional capabilities for a tual differences over reorganizing NATO do not range of NATO missions. As an aside, the French, stand in the way of undertaking new tasks, even though not currently fully integrated, are the first if that means an ad hoc organizational response to of our major European partners to recognize the get the operation off the ground. NATO simply need to fundamentally restructure their forces to cannot be paralyzed by debates on theory. The Al- make them deployable and sustainable in suffi- liance deployment to the Balkans is a reassuring cient numbers to deal with likely challenges. case in point. Currently 60,000 NATO troops are Second, the great increase in military-to-mil- deployed there, and earlier deployments under itary contact programs with Central and Eastern Sharp Guard and Deny Flight reflect ministerial European nations highlights the importance of and head of state decisions in London, Rome, an adequate structure with which forces can in- and Oslo that endorsed NATO peacekeeping ac- teract and train. For North America, this means tivities. Participants at the meetings may not staying engaged on the continent. For Europe, it have envisioned the scope of these deployments; means retaining sufficient structure for Central but they did recognize the need to broaden the traditional NATO approach to military involvement as well as to alter structures and procedures to facilitate new operations.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 77 ■ NATO’S FUTURE

U.S. and Russian commanders at Tuzla air base. Combat Camera Imagery (Ken Bergmann)

interoperability experience, and we about them, than could be learned in a decade of seminars and classroom instruction. Nothing could be more illustrative than the operational integration of Russian and French forces in IFOR. Their incorporation on the practi- U.S. Air Force (JeffreyU.S. Air Force Allen) cal level is proceeding extremely efficiently. On Unloading C–130 in Russian integration, a significant effort was made Sarajevo for Joint last autumn by Generals Joulwan and Shevstov, Endeavor. endorsed by their respective defense ministers, to Unfortunately, the deliberate pace of restruc- get the military playbook for Bosnia right. And turing the Alliance internally was overtaken by they succeeded. The effectiveness of this coordi- the more dramatic and more rapid pace of exter- nation in Mons and Brussels has been evident on nal events. As a result, NATO has been forced to the ground with the remarkably smooth inclu- adapt on the fly. Although it has been a difficult sion of the Russians in the U.S. sector. The Russ- and at times frustrating path to get to this point, ian brigade serves under the tactical control of operations on the military side are proceeding su- General Nash, commander of the 1st Armored Di- perbly. This is largely true because NATO mem- vision, and receives operational instructions from bers have not waited to get the theory right be- General Joulwan through General Shevstov. One fore acting. As some observers have said, we are will not find this command arrangement in any literally reconstructing the Alliance “brick by field manual, but it works. As one senior officer brick, from the ground up; it’s not the theory that in theater remarked, the relationship between is going to drive the practice but the practice that General Nash and his counterpart is “as good as will drive the theory.” 3 you can get.” Secretary Perry placed this point in context Further, the Russian troops, operating in a when he addressed the Wehrkunde conference in particularly delicate and difficult area of Bosnia, Munich on February 4, 1996. “It is in Bosnia, have shown great professionalism and serious where future NATO members are showing them- commitment to the mission. All indications are selves ready and able to shoulder the bur- that interoperability between the Russian Federa- dens. . . ,” he stated. “It is in Bosnia where we are tion and NATO is both feasible and practical. showing that we can work as partners with Russ- Clearly, there is potential for combined operations ian forces. Bosnia is not a peacekeeping exercise; on a larger scale. As Secretary Perry has stressed in it is the real thing.” The members of the Partner- ship for Peace (PFP), including Russia, are likely to learn more about us from this year of practical

78 JFQ / Spring 1996 Christman

this regard, Russia and NATO do have a special re- the NATO command structure. LTS is a crucial ele- lationship in Bosnia; every day that the Russian ment in the process of examining and transform- brigade commander, Colonel Lenstov, engages ing the Alliance. with General Nash displays Russia’s commitment Besides resource priorities, however, other is- to participate in the future security architecture of sues are impacting the outcome of the study. First Europe. It is a perfect example of building the new is the realization that we must move from an es- NATO architecture from the ground up, brick by sentially static, defense-oriented structure to one brick.4 These are important bricks. that is more flexible, mobile, and responsive in a Similarly, French integration has not been an crisis—that is, to one more reflective of the Al- issue during the IFOR deployment. As any Ameri- liance’s new strategic concept. The recent an- can officer with NATO experience can attest, on nouncement by France that it intends to partic- the practical military level, ipate more actively in the military activities of on the practical military level, U.S. forces have always the Alliance has also impacted on the study. The worked superbly with their decision reveals, in part, a growing realization in U.S. forces have always French counterparts. Desert Paris that the so-called European pillar must be worked superbly with their Storm and Bosnia highlight grounded within the Alliance, not separate from French counterparts that fundamental point. it. In fact, France has, for all practical purposes, Differences do exist at the abandoned the notion of a two-pillar alliance in policy level about the the- favor of an enhanced European role in NATO. ory behind non-article V operations. However, The overall goal of this internal examination theoretical differences expressed in Brussels or must be to strengthen the ability of the Alliance elsewhere have not blocked progress on the to respond to a variety of crises while maintain- ground. As with NATO’s Russian experience, the ing its core mission of collective defense—and to challenge will be to take the practical lessons do so while cutting overhead in a manner which learned in standing up IFOR and use them in fi- respects regional sensitivities. This will not be nalizing the architectural drawings of the new Eu- easy, but NATO military authorities are already ropean security structure. some distance toward this goal. Notwithstanding the success in interoperabil- One element of this organizational evolution ity and coordination demonstrated in Bosnia, at merits special mention: the combined joint task some point we must draw on these experiences force (CJTF). This is a concept that would extend and implement the restructuring that has been the strength of the integrated military structure long studied. When this is done, we must ensure into new mission areas and more easily accom- that a coherent and integrated alliance remains, modate operations outside the territorial limits of one that can carry out military operations across a the 16 NATO members. CJTF also facilitates the spectrum of missions it may be called on to per- inclusion of PFP nations in non-article V opera- form. NATO must be careful not to establish mili- tions such as Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. tary, crisis management, or military planning The NATO Military Committee agreed on six committees which function uniquely for non-arti- principles for CJTF development to guide the cle V missions. In the short term, we simply can- Alliance as it comes to closure on this important not afford two alliances. And, in the long term, bi- internal adaptation: furcation in the approach to non-article V and ■ preserve the integrated military structure article V missions is a certain way to disengage ■ provide for separable but not separate forces in this hemisphere from the European continent. support of European Security and Defense Identity Internal Adaptation. The second issue has al- (ESDI) ready been suggested: the Alliance must ensure ■ maintain a single command structure for article that it does in fact adapt itself internally to re- V and non-article V missions spond even more efficiently to new missions and ■ retain the role of the Military Committee in advis- political requirements down the road. The need ing and transmitting strategic guidance from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to NATO Military Authorities 5 for such adaptation was recognized at least two ■ avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies years ago. At that time, military authorities were ■ preserve the ability of Major NATO Commands advised that expenditures on NATO overhead to do timely contingency planning. would soon crowd out nearly all operational and discretionary funding for key programs such as NATO member countries are close to agree- PFP. The NATO Senior Resource Board concluded ment on this concept. Although we have cut that the Alliance could no longer accept salami through theological arguments in the field to es- tactics in budgetary and structural cuts. This real- tablish several CJTFs (for example, Sharp Guard, ization prompted the NATO chiefs of defense to commission a long-term study (LTS) to streamline

Spring 1996 / JFQ 79 ■ NATO’S FUTURE

Italian troops during Strong Resolve. U.S. Navy (Mark Therien)

NATO and PFP. Internal change will not be enough. For long-term viability, NATO must adapt externally. Initiatives such as NATO enlargement, a formalized NATO-Russia relationship, and PFP represent important measures that project stability and security to the East. Because of the central role which NATO’s military is playing and must continue to play in PFP, however,

U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call) U.S. Navy (Franklin P. this program will be the focus of the third and Landing craft crossing final challenge. Norwegian fjord. Few understand what the projection of stability means in practice. Consider two examples Deny Flight, and Joint Endeavor), it is time to drawn from recent NATO experience with PFP. stop doing things on an ad hoc basis and imple- The first took place in the midst of the euphoria ment a badly needed structural reform. that accompanied the launching of PFP, prior to More broadly, it is imperative that we get on the Budapest summit conference on Security and with a more sweeping structural adaptation of the Cooperation in Europe in December 1994. At the Alliance for future operations and implement time Hungary and Romania were resisting practi- quickly those aspects most important to meeting cal steps toward military cooperation partly be- the new security challenges to European stability. cause of the traditional ethnic tension. Yet, prod- We cannot afford to continually study the issue. ded by the West and the realization that these Instead, we must take the lessons learned from the differences were impeding integration in Euro- ongoing IFOR deployment and institutionalize pean security institutions, the two countries the 90 percent solution. Structures and procedures scheduled unprecedented combined ground and can be further refined as the Alliance grows. air maneuvers on and over each other’s territory. This small but significant step added a measure of stability to an historically unsettled part of the continent. Perhaps a more timely example is the 1995 naval exercise sponsored by Bulgaria under PFP.

80 JFQ / Spring 1996 Christman

Bulgaria served as the bridge between Turkey and unglamorous but essential training events. This Greece to reduce tension in the Eastern Mediter- would eventually lead to conducting complex, ranean. Despite being members of NATO, both large, free-play exercises that extend partner capa- nations have tradi- bilities in agreed mission areas of peacekeeping, tionally found it dif- humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue. PFP enables nations to evolve ficult to exercise side- Partners must, in turn, expand their representa- toward the political-military by-side; but for at tion at Mons and Brussels; they must also ensure least one month, PFP that representatives are properly qualified, so structures common to the Alliance helped to lower a sig- they can conduct detailed accession negotiations nificant barrier to which, for some, surely lie ahead. stability in the Alliance by bringing them to- Perhaps most importantly, the Alliance must gether in a military training setting. ensure that PFP has the resources to meet its This partnership is one of the most important goals. U.S. contributions totaled $130 million for security investments the Alliance can make. PFP 1995–96 which reflects the importance attached enables nations in Central and Eastern Europe to to the program and our leadership. We must en- establish true interoperability with Alliance forces sure that this critical program is similarly re- and, perhaps more significantly, to evolve toward sourced by our allies in the out years. Funding is the political-military structures and habits of co- literally the lifeblood of the partnership. operation common to the Alliance. A quick review of PFP activities shows just During the summit in Brussels in January 1994 how far we have come in the past two years in re- the North Atlantic Council reaffirmed that NATO ducing the barriers that for so long artificially di- remains the core security institution in Europe as vided Europe: well as the forum for U.S. engagement there. As the ■ 27 nations have joined the partnership. participants agreed: “We confirm the enduring va- ■ Partnership coordination cells have been estab- lidity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is lished in Mons at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers based on a transatlantic link, the expression of a Europe to conduct the military planning needed to im- shared destiny. It is reaching out to establish new plement partnership programs; there is also representa- patterns of cooperation throughout Europe.” 6 tion at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The United States sees, and must continue to ■ Partner nations have conducted nearly 50 exer- see, an important role in this shared destiny. This cises throughout both Central and Eastern Europe and is reflected in our national military strategy by on NATO allied territory, including at the Joint Readi- the central role accorded engagement. We have ness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. learned at great cost, in two world wars in this ■ Partnership programs have moved beyond simple tactical skills, incorporating a range of military as century, the significance of both engagement on well as political-military elements. the continent and continued U.S. leadership. The ■ Most noteworthy is participation by 13 partner somber and majestic American cemeteries which nations in the NATO-led IFOR mission in Bosnia, with dot the European landscape speak clearly of that their forces working side-by-side with the Alliance in a commitment to Europe and of the role of institu- peacekeeping operation. tions such as NATO in maintaining this vital link- Despite tangible accomplishments, much re- age during a time of unprecedented change. JFQ mains to be done. NATO is postured to take the partnership to an essential second stage of matu- NOTES ration. In this regard, we must strengthen the de- 1 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Handbook fense planning element of the partnership to ac- (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), celerate the movement of partner nations toward p. 241. higher levels of interoperability. This planning 2 Elizabeth Pond, “Europe Welcomes American Mili- process, which has existed within the Alliance for tary Leadership,” The Wall Street Journal (European Edi- decades, has provided a remarkable mechanism tion), December 6, 1995. 3 for integrating national forces into an interopera- Ibid. 4 Ibid. ble whole. In fact, defense planning is the foun- 5 The three NATO Military Authorities are the Chair- dation on which the highly effective NATO mili- man of the NATO Military Committee, the Supreme Al- tary structure is built. It is now time to extend a lied Commder Europe, and the Supreme Allied Com- version of that mechanism into the partnership. mander Atlantic. This will reap enormous benefits for NATO, pro- 6 NATO Handbook, p. 242. foundly deepening cooperation and also preparing the willing and able for eventual membership in the Alliance. Further, the Alliance must transform PFP exercises into a robust, integrated program, built on

Spring 1996 / JFQ 81 ■ Airborne Division d 82

Loading aircraft. A Fight for Lodgement: Airborne Division d 82 Future Joint Contingency Operations By ANTHONY J. TATA

During the summer of 1994 the world watched in horror as Rwandan government forces composed of members of the Hutu tribe killed their rival Tutsi countrymen in a ghastly civil war. That campaign of terror was intended to methodically destroy the Tutsi minority while isolating the outside world from the conflict. Hutu forces seized Rwanda’s only major airport, openly stating that their goal was to block the West from sending airland relief forces and supplies to surviving Tutsi men, women, and children. The Hutu victory was total. While stark, brutal images of this tragedy remain, the strategically relevant issue is that the Hutus knew how to hinder intervention. The Rwandan civil war will go down in history for its savagery, yet it is a Lieutenant Colonel Anthony J. Tata, USA, is special assistant to commander in chief, U.S. Army Europe; he formerly served as executive model that can shape future officer, 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. contingency plans and forces.

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Simply put, in an era of sovereign borders Campaign plans must call for joint forces capable and nationalistic forces, dissidents simply need to of seizing and establishing bases of operations deny a strategic lodgement to their adversaries. that will support construction of a theater of op- There will not always be seaports like Dhahran or erations and facilitate the concept of operation. facilities like Howard Air Force Base through which to build up combat power. Contingency Courses of Action operations will most likely require forcibly open- Since the nonpermissive solution is some- ing lodgement. Only by exploiting the capabili- what simpler to predict, the following discussion ties of the Armed Forces under joint task forces makes the assumption that forcible entry is re- (JTFs) can the Nation conduct strategic power quired to establish the base of operations. JFCs projection to seize lodgements and also achieve have an array of forces to choose from when quick, decisive victory with minimal casualties. planning a contingency operation. They may select Marine amphibious or air assault forces, The Theory Army light, air assault, or airborne forces, or spe- To establish a theater of operations a joint cial operations forces. Indeed, they may decide to force must translate a few concepts into reality. employ a combination to maximize the strengths Because the United States no longer enjoys of each. prominent forward basing, a joint force must pos- In considering all types of forces, power pro- sess, first and foremost, a base of operations to jection methods may be categorized as strictly air- build and further project combat power. Only land or sealand, a combination of airland or then can it establish lines of communications sealand and airborne assault, or strictly airborne through which a tactical plan is executed. assault. As in the case of Somalia, using a strictly Naturally, the base of operations and support- airland and/or sealand approach for lodgement ing lines of communications are predicated on the drives the joint force to sequentially apply com- enemy disposition. Therefore, the joint force must bat power. Regardless of the service component, also identify decisive points at which it may direct all airland and sealand techniques require ferry- its combat power. Frequently these decisive points ing back and forth or economizing the force to may also be the enemy center of gravity or more the point that the risk may become unacceptable. indirect targets aimed at weakening the enemy’s It also takes longer to secure a lodgement, get strength prior to engaging it directly. onto lines of communication, and begin seizing Concepts such as bases of operations, lines of decisive points. communication, decisive points, and centers of The airland and sealand options depend on gravity translate into forcible entry the availability of open airfields, usable ports, or nonpermissive entries plans for JTFs that focus on lodge- accommodating beaches. Even if airfields and ments and simultaneously seizing ports are available and are not blocked by enemy require rapid projection other objectives. Even an unsophis- forces, sequential combat power build-up is slow. of overwhelming ticated enemy understands that in- With multiple permissive entry ports as well as combat power tervening forces must have bases of airfields, Desert Shield required five months to operations. To refuse a base is to build sufficient combat power for Desert Storm. forestall intervention. Conflicts will As a force begins to project from a lodgement, accordingly boil down to initial struggles to es- airspace becomes congested with helicopters and tablish lodgement, without which little else is planes competing for air corridors, increasing the possible. risk to an operation. But most dangerous to the Power projection means getting there joint force is that it is tied to one location, which quickly with something that can make a differ- may become easy for an enemy to interdict. In ence. Whether a base of operations exists in per- Rwanda government troops preemptively seized missive or nonpermissive entry environments is the airport before any outside forces could airland. largely irrelevant. To be effective, joint forces Sealand or air assault from naval platforms were must plan for the worst case scenario when not an option in the landlocked nation. threats arise: nonpermissive entries require rapid Using the abstract model a strictly airland/ projection of overwhelming combat power. U.S. sealand course drives JFCs to seize a lodgement, Army Field Manual 100–5 provides succinct guid- build sufficient combat power, then execute ance on this point: ground tactical plans. The period between the An important strategic consideration for planning seizure of lodgement and executing the ground contingency operations that involve the potential for tactical phases allows an enemy time to seize the combat is to introduce credible lethal forces early. Commanders should be prepared to deploy sufficient combat power to resolve a crisis on favorable terms.1

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airfields or alternate drop zones. If airland forces cannot conduct parachute drops, closure will depend on the availability of operational airfields. Wargaming revealed that the essential advantage of combining airland/sealand and airborne forces is an accelerated build-up of combat power. Sixty C–130s can drop four fully equipped battalions in thirty minutes compared to thirty- six hours to airland the same size force. This course of action also allows commanders to place combat forces away from lodgement so that joint forces can seize critical objectives at the outset. More aircraft can drop added battalions and enough heavy equipment to give a force tactical mobility. The airland force could be rigged for airdrop to provide flexibility. Analysis based on wargaming shows that the key disadvantage in this course of action is that Airborne Division d

82 the airland force may be tasked with critical mis- Troop leaders prep. sions, while its closure is dependent on airfield availability. An enemy would still have time to react to the objectives of airland forces. Moreover, initiative in areas not proximate to chosen lodge- although decreased, the time for combat power ments, and perhaps even to increase defensive pos- build-up still suffers at the hands of a sequential tures, take hostages, or attack friendly vulnerabili- air flow determined by the maximum operating ties. Adversaries could also exploit this time lag to on ground capacity of airfields. Typical airfields influence international media to undermine na- can handle four C–141s or eight C–130s every tional will and distort perceptions by the public. hour, which equates to nearly a battalion. That In a generic theater with one airfield, one ground capacity is calculated to include the time it port, and three groups of 40 targets, wargaming takes an aircraft to land, taxi to an offload point, confirmed that a force of eight combat battalions offload, back taxi, and take off. Under analysis, could airland or sealand, build combat power, these calculations resulted in the combination and then seize objectives in 48 to 72 hours. It fur- force seizing all 40 objectives in 24 to 48 hours. ther revealed that cratering airfields or demolish- ing ships in port could exponentially delay clo- Airborne Assault sure and contribute to a piecemeal commitment JFCs may employ a strictly airborne assault of force. force to seize lodgements and execute portions of a ground tactical plan which offers the most Airland /Sealand and Airborne Assaults rapid closure. The Air Force can provide adequate Augmenting joint forces with airborne assets C–130s and C–141s to airdrop assault echelons of creates a course of action that utilizes a mix of nine combat battalions with enough equipment, airborne and air/sealand forces. Airborne forces supplies, and support personnel to seize a lodge- seize airfields and decrease the risk of airlanding ment and other objectives simultaneously.2 once assault objectives are seized. These forces As one assessment of the difference between can also airdrop airfield repair packages, vehicles, airborne and airland forces in the planning for and tanks to give JFCs capabilities to repair air- Operation Just Cause pointed out: “The fact is, we field damage and simultaneously seize lodge- could get an airborne division on the ground in ment. Capturing a second drop zone away from ten minutes or we could get an airlanded brigade airfields affords JFCs with flexibility in initiating in a day and a half.” 3 That comment emphasizes ground tactical plans immediately or reinforcing the fact that an airborne unit requires only the the fight for lodgement. pass time over a drop zone and assembly time to Airland forces then arrive when the airfield be a cohesive combat force, while an airland force was estimated to be opened by airborne assault builds combat power sequentially and slowly. forces. However, an enemy can extensively dam- With simultaneity as a linchpin for quick, deci- age airfields, thereby increasing repair time and sive victories with minimal casualties, the air- potentially disrupting subsequent time phased borne assault option appears the best suited to force deployment lists. Yet if airland forces are also meet the Nation’s high expectations. rigged for parachute assaults, runway conditions become immaterial. Forces may be dropped onto

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Wargaming demonstrates that airborne as- A division must focus its efforts by identify- saults quickly assimilate combat power and deny ing the likely war plan. Then the staff should co- an enemy influence over operations. Other ad- ordinate with higher headquarters as well as vantages are that when airfields are heavily de- other services to develop detailed planning. A di- fended or damaged, forces could simply use alter- vision can then derive its mission essential task nate drop zones, then list (METL) and develop its emergency deploy- attack airfields. This con- ment readiness exercise (EDRE) program that in- the Army can exploit all means firms that the airborne tegrates contributions by the other services. A of employment to seize lodge- assault option is a sound training management cycle should define method for establishing wartime missions and develop plans, establish ment and establish lines of bases of operations while METLs, then plan, execute, assess training, mod- communication seizing the initiative at ify plans, and finally retrain. outlying objectives. Force build-up and objective Planning seizure rates are linked and prove that simultane- The impetus to train and be ready for H- ity in forcible entry operations is best achieved by hour is dominated by the planning process. maximizing airborne capabilities. While tactical decisionmaking produces a concept that can drive training, other steps are re- The Army Role quired to create a well synchronized, successful The Army can exploit all means of employ- plan. One proven technique for contingency ment—airland, sealand, air assault, and airborne planning is to employ the four phases of air- assault—to seize lodgement and establish lines of borne operations: ground tactical, landing, air communication necessary to enable JTFs to carry movement, and marshaling. the fight to an enemy. Accordingly, the Army has a A division must first develop a ground tacti- vital role in fulfilling joint power projection re- cal plan based on the course of action conceived quirements of national military strategy. While during tactical decisionmaking. The staff develops combatant commanders attempt to resolve crises a template of the threat and directed objectives, in their AORs with available forces and flexible de- then groups them by proximity or similarity, fi- terrent options, force projection may be needed. nally matching friendly resources against all areas The Army offers the unique capability to a which call for force. Uphold Democracy required combatant commander to put trained and ready the 82d Airborne Division to seize 40 objectives in forces on the ground anywhere in the world on 12 hours over an urban center with the popula- short notice—a rapidly deployable force to seize, tion of Denver and geographic area of Boston. Ac- hold, and control territory, with staying power cordingly, a requirement was stipulated to close that complements other forces in achieving tacti- maximum force as quickly as possible. cal through strategic objectives. Army divisions Resolving a ground tactical plan leads to de- are the basic contingency force fighting unit and veloping a landing plan to include selection of they are instructed to prepare for such instances: drop zones, beach landing areas, or landing zones “The first rule of anticipation in a force projec- which best facilitate mission accomplishment. A tion era is to expect to be alerted and deployed. landing plan facilitates executing a ground tacti- Commanders everywhere in the Army must hold cal plan, including seizure of lodgement. For the that view.” 4 Haiti mission, 82d Airborne chose two drop zones Operation Uphold Democracy, the planned that afforded flexibility as well as rapid seizure of invasion of Haiti, validates the model described several primary objectives. above. Analysis of the invasion plan provides accu- After designating a landing plan, air and sea rate and timely visibility on the Army’s ability to movement plans must be developed to close the contribute in a forcible entry joint contingency op- force into country. Initially, staffs must avoid eration where no friendly lodgements existed in making a ground tactical plan conform to stated country and those available for seizure were scarce. airlift and sealift constraints. Efforts must be The charter of all Army divisions is to con- made to provide resources for ground tactical tribute to joint forces by being trained and ready plans. The 82d Airborne Division had 60 C–130s for H-hour. Indeed, when President Clinton re- for drops over Port au Prince International Air- called the 82d Airborne Division, the 10th Moun- port and 45 C–141s for drops over Pegasus drop tain Division executed a permissive entry as JTF– zone. Another eight C–141s carrying 864 person- 190. Uphold Democracy showed that division nel were rigged for an airdrop but slated to air- level contingency operations from the continental land at H+4 hours, providing the airport was United States (CONUS) are possible in the future. open for airland operations. Also, three ships were scheduled to off-load at the port within the first 48 hours.

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Finally, marshalling plans are perhaps the most difficult for a division-level contingency operation. The 82d Airborne Division plan accommodated 113 aircraft involved in the assault force air movement plan and three ships available in the sea movement plan, as well as follow-on airland by using multiple air and sea ports of embarkation in CONUS. While the four phases of airborne operations provide an excellent framework for planning contingency operations, detailed synchronization is required to account for the overlap and myriad actions of all phases. Wargaming and synchronization of battlefield operating systems are the best means of integrating contingency operations from the marshaling through ground tactical phases. Training A contingency division can extract METL from the newly developed “most likely war plan” with an eye on fitting into JTFs. Tasks such as “maintain division readiness to deploy worldwide within 18 hours notice directly into combat,” “alert, marshal, and deploy the division,” and also “conduct an (airland, sealand, or airborne) assault to seize an (airfield, landing zone, Airborne troops en route. beachhead, or port) and/or establish a lodge- Airborne Division ment” become obvious METL items in a power d projection world.5 82 Determining related battle tasks allows division commanders to isolate key components of likely war plans and establish aggressive joint The intelligence community must focus on force oriented EDRE programs. By challenging utilizing national assets and translating a wealth readiness each month, commanders can increase of information into exploitable intelligence at readiness and shape contributions to joint forces. battalion level. Thorough intelligence preparation In time EDREs should be more complex and diffi- of the battlefield is a requisite. Accurate worst cult in order to exercise the maximum number of case analyses that does not underestimate an forces. For example, the 82d Airborne Division enemy must be provided. Timely en route intelli- with the Air Force conducted a battalion airfield gence is essential to contingency operations. A di- seizure and noncombatant evacuation on an un- vision probably cannot insert its long range sur- familiar runway in South Carolina in late 1993. veillance detachment prior to H-hour. Other The heavy drop included two bladders of fuel to methods exist to attain early entry intelligence. sustain aviation operations during the exercise. Timely imagery is the prime source of intelligence In July 1994, by contrast, the entire division, in contingency operations requiring forcible several Air Force wings, Marine and Navy air- entry. G–2 staffs must practice these tasks during naval gunfire liaison company teams, and special EDREs to develop the skills to operate in a contin- operations forces participated in “Big Drop,” an gency environment. EDRE in which fifty C–141 equivalents and The maneuver community is responsible for twenty C–130s dropped eight battalions, a secu- synchronizing all battlefield operating systems rity element, and 28,000 gallons of aviation fuel. and other services in its tactical plans. When The aviation brigade used strategic self-deploy- training is planned, a division staff should recall ment, concluding with a four-hour flight over that an assault force ground tactical plan drives a ocean at night, refueling at a new aviation assem- joint force plan. Airland and sealand start only bly area, and mounting an air assault of three bat- when lodgements are secure. As such, to train talions on multiple objectives within an hour of a and be ready for H-hour, a division must continu- parachute assault. Establishing a lodgement and ously plan and execute complex joint training executing a ground tactical plan require extensive that tests actual force levels and timelines. battlefield operating system synchronization which can be trained steadily while not deployed.

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Great Inagua Island, Bahamas. Airborne Division d 82

The primary fire support tasks in a contin- threats are minimal, air defense forces should gency operation are to provide and/or control practice using “weapons safe” controls whereby fires across a division zone as well as to integrate grip stocks and rounds are connected only by psychological operations and nonlethal fires into order of the commander. the scheme of maneuver. A division should re- Training combat service support for contin- hearse counterfire techniques in training with gency operations requires a division to work the AC–130s. While JTFs are responsible for preas- full marshaling phase of its EDRE program, then sault fires, a contingency division should rou- execute CDS resupply and medical evacuation tinely practice employing them in support of as- planning. Combat lifesavers, tactical mobility, and sault forces. advanced trauma life support packages dropped Engineers play a vital role in providing mobil- with assault forces provide initial medical coverage ity support to ensure a lodgement can receive the until sophisticated equipment can be airlanded. follow-on flow of forces Assault forces should train taking three days of command and control of forcible and equipment. Light supplies into theater without overloading soldiers. airfield repair packages, In reality, combat service support planners should entry operations requires that port opening teams, lighten individual loads, deliver rucksacks, and key leaders communicate en tanks to push containers push package resupply by combat direction system route and on the ground off runways, and drop, slingload, or airland. hotwire teams to start Command and control of forcible entry op- and move vehicles erations requires that key leaders communicate which serve as obstacles are the kinds of tools used en route and on the ground. JTF and division by engineers and assault forces in response to rudi- staffs should practice using airborne command mentary but effective capabilities of adversaries. posts such as EC–135s, airborne command and Air defenders have a critical role in protect- control centers, and joint airborne command and ing lodgement and staging bases from air attack, control command posts. Also, EDREs and other particularly during vulnerable periods before sig- exercises should use secure en route communica- nificant assets are airlanded. Both Stinger missile tions and hatchmount satellite communications gunners and Avengers can be airdropped with as- on aircraft with key leaders. Forces then should sault forces for immediate protection. When air practice the evolution of communications in theater, moving from rucksack radios to vehicle radios, then to retrain directed communications,

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and finally ending with theater-wide mobile sub- Uphold Democracy scriber equipment communications supported by With no friendly lodgement or forces in contingency communications packages. country, the concept for Haiti called for a genuine forcible entry plan. The mission statement of the Soldiers and Equipment 82d Airborne Division indicated that the opera- Being ready for H-hour means recruiting and tion would involve an attack by conducting mul- retaining quality soldiers who are prepared for tiple airborne assaults with follow-on airdrop/air- difficult training and missions. Joint forces are re- land as the situation dictated. The essential tasks sponsible for accomplishing missions while car- were to establish three JTF lodgements, protect ing for both soldiers and their families. Aggressive American citizens and property as well as desig- family support group programs, including suit- nated foreign nationals, and neutralize the Hait- able facilities and instruction, allow the individ- ian military and police to create the conditions ual soldier to concentrate on the task at hand. for restoring democracy in Haiti. Today’s high quality soldiers are afforded With 40 D-day objectives, the 82d Airborne leadership opportunities that increase readiness Division required an airborne assault force of 3,848 to meet the demands of lodgement and contin- paratroopers using two drop zones and 113 air- gency operations. NCO courses produce team and craft. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment squad leaders who can take charge in the absence would seize the primary drop zone, Port au Prince of orders. Historically, lodgement battles have International Airport, and follow-on objectives, in- often rested on actions by small bands of para- cluding facilities that served as the seaport for troopers executing a mission in a decentralized lodgement. The 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment way. The battle staff NCO course provides divi- would relieve the 504th and expand the lodgement. sions additional expertise in tactical operations The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment would seize centers. Airborne, air assault, and Ranger training a second drop zone, Pegasus, a large division sup- instill confidence in junior leaders. Officers at- port command element, the aviation brigade as- tend basic and advanced courses to increase tacti- sault command post, fuel/ammunition handlers, cal proficiency while the U.S. Army Command and a security element. Notably, this drop zone and General Staff Officer College teaches field was designed for the 82d Aviation Brigade to arrive grade officers about employing forces on the op- from an infiltration site, drop its external store fuel erational level to achieve strategic goals. Profes- tanks, and pick up the air assault task force. Some sional development programs and individual 71 heavy equipment platforms would be dropped reading programs must also reinforce lessons into Pegasus, providing 28,000 gallons of aviation taught in the classroom. Although smaller, the gas airdropped with refueling pumps, six M551 Force XXI Army consists of well trained leaders Sheridan tanks, enough mobility to move a rifle and soldiers capable of training and executing company, the better part of an antitank company, forcible entry operations. and back-up engineer equipment. Modern equipment is key to outfitting sol- Operationally, Pegasus drop zone was an ex- diers for seizing lodgements and force projection. tension of the division’s base of operations and The Army continues to exploit the mismatch in an alternate drop zone in the event an airborne capabilities of its adversaries. For example, night assault at the airport was untenable. Tactically, vision goggles and OH–58s provide contingency the drop zone was a consolidation point for most forces with the ability to exploit the darkness and of the division’s mobile assets, providing a force achieve tactical surprise. Other technological ad- that could swing around the exterior of Port au vances critical to contingency operations are Prince to seize outlying objectives and block the Q–36 counterfire radars, Avengers, and all source ingress and egress of enemy forces to and from analysis systems. the lodgement. Developing a plan, training to it, and em- Division artillery would provide indirect fires ploying state of the art technology enables from the airfield and command and control of today’s Army division to be a credible asset for joint fire support assets. The division support JTFs. The unique ability to seize a base of opera- command would consolidate containerized deliv- tions and rapidly stifle an enemy makes it partic- ery system bundles at Pegasus and help to run the ularly suited as the force of choice for power pro- airfield once the airland began. Since the division jection. As enemy forces realize that an opposing would fight primarily at night, every soldier in force cannot effectively intervene without a the airfield assault force had night vision goggles. lodgement, and that airpower alone is insufficient as demonstrated in the Balkans, the first The Scenario order of business for JFCs will be to open the door Light rain fell on the assault force at Pope Air to a theater of operations. Force Base as its paratroopers rigged their equipment beneath the wings of C–130 Hercules and

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C–141 Starlifter transports in preparation for a ■ Conduct emergency deployment readiness exer- combat airborne assault on two drop zones in cises that rehearse key components of the plan, particu- Haiti. Another 4,500 paratroopers were processing larly with joint forces. through marshaling areas for airland operations to ■ Plan marshaling, air movement, landing, and execute follow on missions and link up with 810 ground tactical phases in detail. ■ Be innovative in planning—where particular pieces of equipment the division sent by fast sealift types of forces are not required employ them in versa- and another 323 to be brought in by airland. tile ways as force multipliers. As directed by President Clinton, 32 C–130s ■ Emphasize troop-leading procedures at division left Pope and conducted an aerial link-up with 28 level—enforce the one-third/two-thirds rule, execute C–130 heavy equipment drop aircraft from rest plans, and conduct rehearsals. McDill Air Force Base. In addition, 53 C–141s at ■ Never underestimate an enemy—study the three different ports of embarkation taxied into courses of action open to each adversary. position for subsequent airdrops. ■ Rehearse mobilization plans because they al- Meanwhile, the division exchanged 24 liai- ways require support from other units. son teams with higher, adjacent, and subordinate By adhering to these guidelines, a division units. The 82d Aviation Brigade strategically self- staff can provide major subordinate commands deployed and infiltrated 33 UH–60s, 17 CH–47s, with planning and training necessary for combat and eight OH–58s to success. Uphold Democracy involved all types of the President had put in motion Great Inagua, a remote forces. This discussion has focused on how one di- island in the Bahamas vision fit into the establishment of a theater of op- the largest airborne invasion off the northwest tip of erations, prepared for that role, and executed two since Market Garden during Haiti, where crews were phases of its assigned portion of the operation. exchanged and the air- World War II craft refueled. They were Joint forces will demand more resources and being preparing to travel greater integration to keep pace in the future. the last 200 miles to a selected pick-up zone and First, we should replace aging C–141s with suffi- to execute three battalion level air assaults in the cient C–17s to project power and conduct forcible first eight hours of the operation. JTF–180, with entries around the world. Without strategic lift for the 82d Airborne Division en route, was trained airdrop, the Armed Forces will be hamstrung in and ready to seize lodgements and execute the conducting strategic forcible entries. Second, we tactical plan. should procure fast sealift to move forces quickly The President had put in motion the largest to regional hotspots. Without adequate forward airborne invasion since Market Garden during basing, fast sealift becomes paramount to follow- World War II and one day prior to Uphold De- ing airborne or airlanded forces with sustainment mocracy. That a JTF was capable of placing eight for continuous operations. Finally, CINCs should infantry battalions, one armor battalion, an as- continue to hold annual joint training exercises sault helicopter battalion, a cavalry squadron, and focus them on power projection, forcible and three days of combat service support assets in entry scenarios. No service can conduct forcible theater in four hours in a tactically coherent fash- entries independently of JTFs. CINCs must con- ion demonstrates that the Army and its sister ser- tinue to practice establishing JTF headquarters, vices can meet the joint force commander’s needs and staffs should be tested on command and con- in establishing a lodgement while simultaneously trol of the myriad forces involved in JTFs. JFQ executing a ground tactical plan. NOTES Force Projection 1 Department of the Army, FM 100–5, Operations d The preparations by the 82 Airborne Divi- (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 2–1. sion for Uphold Democracy offer considerations 2 82d Airborne Division, “Uphold Democracy: Mili- for joint contingency forces. They indicate what tary Operations in the Republic of Haiti,” Operation must be done in order to depart CONUS in good Plan, annex C: Air Movement Plan (September 9, 1994). repair and deploy directly into combat. 3 Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (New York: ■ Be trained and ready not only to fight but to Lexington Books, 1991), p. 89. marshal and move on short notice. 4 Department of the Army, FM 100–5, p. 1–1. ■ Focus training on the most likely war plan—bat- 5 82d Airborne Division mission essential task list tle focused training. (May 1994). ■ Develop a plan which exploits and maximizes the capabilities of all components. ■ Identify an enemy’s center of gravity and attack it directly or through decisive points with overwhelming force using simultaneous operations.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 89 ■ Medical Dimensions of Joint Humanitarian Relief Operations By LEONARD M. RANDOLPH, JR., and MATTHEW W. COGDELL

As missions shift from major war to regional conflict, the medical structure is also adopting jointness and a different posture in support. A significant humanitarian focus has been given to regional affairs, and health care plays an important part in it. This analysis examines joint medical operations during Provide Relief, Restore Hope, and support for UNOSOM II.1 U.S. Air Force (James Mossman)

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Randolph and Cogdell

Provide Relief A surgeon’s office was established as part of The effort to feed the starving masses in UNITAF. The JTF surgeon, a Navy captain, was a southern Somalia began in August 1992 with the medical officer with a staff of three medical ser- arrival of a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) vice corps officers from the Army, Navy, and Air humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) in Force. Later the functions of JTF surgeon were as- Mombasa, Kenya. Its role was to determine the sumed by dual- and ultimately triple-hatted med- command and control and the logistical support ical commanders. Preventive medicine assets, necessary for the joint task force (JTF) to conduct which included an Army problem definition and relief operations. The team’s medical members as- assessment (PDA) team and a Navy rapid diagnos- sessed the medical infrastructure in Mombasa and tic forward laboratory, augmented the staff. The Nairobi. Based on the relatively small number of early deployment of these teams was a lesson personnel who were to deploy in support of Pro- learned in the Gulf War. vide Relief—about 700—and the suitability of From a medical outlook, Restore Hope was host nation facilities, arrangements were made to more logistically intense than Provide Relief and use hospitals in Mombasa for patient stabilization required expanded resources. Because its scope had and temporary holding. One changed, a new medical mission was developed to accommodate joint and combined operations in Restore Hope was more hospital stored U.S. blood products in the event they Somalia. It would involve a range of medical ser- logistically intense and were needed for American vices for disease and for both noncombat and required expanded resources personnel. Further special- combat injuries. Theater medical services would ized care was available from include evacuation, hospitalization, logistics, labo- host nation facilities in ratory, blood management, veterinary, preventive Nairobi. Definitive care was available within U.S. medicine, dental care, and unit command, control, European Command (EUCOM) or the continen- and communications. Planning was to include tal United States (CONUS). Organic assets of de- routine care of U.N. forces and humanitarian med- ploying units provided initial medical care and ical care of local citizens though these were not treatment. specified tasks. The following assumptions guided Aeromedical evacuation (AE) flights were ei- medical planning for Restore Hope: ther scheduled or diverted from Dhahran in Saudi ■ casualties were to be expected, as were illness Arabia with assets supporting Operation Southern and injuries Watch (the no-fly zone in southern Iraq). A cost- ■ host nation medical infrastructure would be in- lier alternative was to request a dedicated AE mis- adequate or nonexistent sion from Ramstein, Germany. Because of the ar- ■ medical capabilities of troop contributing nations would not meet U.S. standards duous ten-hour flight from Kenya to Germany, ■ U.S. medical forces would be required to treat refueling would take place in Djibouti where a Somalis French military hospital was available for patients ■ hospital capabilities would be afloat (on Navy whose conditions had deteriorated and required ships) for the first 30 days care that the AE crew could not provide. ■ shore-based capabilities would be most vulnera- Throughout the operation, food was airlifted ble to Somali requests for assistance (not a significant to relief centers in southern Somalia as well as factor) northern Kenya near the Somalia border. For four ■ some continued hospital capability afloat would months Provide Relief ran coincident with Restore be a haven for U.S.-only casualties (also not a factor) Hope and concluded at the end of February 1993. ■ hospital beds would be manipulated by type of specialty Restore Hope ■ a public assumption that we would treat Soma- lis was not assessed Despite providing the equivalent of 112 mil- ■ afloat hospital capability would require alterna- lion meals, the magnitude of the famine and the tive capability ashore breakdown of government meant that the Pro- ■ too much medical support would be recover- vide Relief airlift could not ameliorate the starva- able, but too little would not. 2 tion in Somalia. Consequently, Restore Hope The deployment of a hospital ship was con- commenced on December 9, 1992, the result of a sidered in the planning stage of Restore Hope. decision to step up relief with a command and The chief advantages of deploying a hospital ship control element known as Unified Task Force were to reduce the possibility of being inundated (UNITAF). by host-nation patients like shore-based facilities, providing a more secure environment for medical resources, and reducing requirements for shore- Brigadier General Leonard M. Randolph, Jr., USAF, currently commands based logistical support. In lieu of a hospital ship, 60th Medical Group, and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Cogdell, USAF, is assigned to Medical Readiness Division (J–4), Joint Staff.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 91 ■ MEDICAL DIMENSIONS

a shore-based deployed hospital was chosen after consulting with the Joint Staff. Medical capability in the area of operations (AO) was austere and limited to treating patients with illnesses or injury of short duration. This was done to expedite their return to duty or stabi- lize wounds before evacuation from theater. Dur- Make-shift pharmacy ing phase I of Restore Hope (approximately the in Somalia. Joint Combat Camera Center (Terry Mitchell) Joint Combat Camera Center (Terry

Medical civic action in streets of Mogadishu.

Loading patients on board C–141. Joint Combat Camera Center

Joint Combat Camera Center (Terry Mitchell)

first 25 days), Marine collecting and clearing rooms, two intensive care unit beds, 29 ward beds, companies offered limited medical care ashore. and 144 overflow beds which had been Marine Enhanced medical care was provided afloat. Host bunks prior to disembarking. With appropriate nation hospitalization staffing, medical care was provided to casualties American personnel were to treat in Somalia was not with minimal injuries using these bunks. considered for use by Early in the operation two surgical teams coalition and Somali casualties U.S. personnel. (with a total of 23 medical personnel) augmented on an emergency basis only USS Tripoli, an the ship’s company of one medical officer and ten amphibious assault corpsmen. Among the members of these teams ship, provided sup- were an orthopedic surgeon, three medical offi- port until a shore-based hospital became opera- cers, an anesthesiologist, and a nurse anesthetist. tional in mid-January 1993. Medical facilities During phase II (days 25 to 91), organic aboard USS Tripoli consisted of two operating medical support accompanied forces deploying to Baidoa and other major interior relief centers.

92 JFQ / Spring 1996 Randolph and Cogdell

Personnel assigned to an Army evacuation hospi- An air transportable hospital deployed to tal established shore-based hospitalization capa- Cairo West provided resuscitation, basic surgery, bility using deployable medical systems and emergency dental capability at the interme- (DEPMEDS) equipment ashore at Mogadishu In- diate staging base level. The function of the hos- ternational Airport. The equipment for the land- pital, like the French military hospital in Dji- based hospital was initially to come from a pre- bouti, was to attend to patients requiring medical positioned ship, Green Valley. Difficulties in care beyond the capability of the aeromedical off-loading because of inadequate berthing facili- evacuation crew at the refueling stop. ties resulted in transporting equipment from the A field hospital replaced the evacuation hos- United States by air. The evacuation hospital’s capital on April 23, shortly before operations in pabilities included orthopedic, thoracic, neuro, support of UNOSOM II began. It was situated in and general surgery. the American embassy compound because of the An Army medical group provided command crowded conditions at the airfield and was re- and control for the evacuation hospital as well as placed by a combat support hospital on August two veterinary and four preventive medicine de- 14. The medical group rotated without replace- tachments, a medical clearing company, a dental ment. A newly established medical task force detachment, a medical logistics battalion, a surgi- (MTF) absorbed its functions. MTF was controlled cal detachment, a mental health detachment, by a field hospital commander who was dual-hat- and both an air ambulance company and ground ted, having assumed the responsibilities of JTF ambulance company. The medical group com- surgeon. mander also assumed the duties of JTF surgeon. Three battalion aid stations and three medical UNOSOM II companies were also located ashore. When U.S. Forces Somalia Command was es- In addition, an aeromedical evacuation sys- tablished as part of UNOSOM II to support the tem composed of active and Reserve personnel transition of humanitarian relief operations to was established early in the AO during phase I. Its U.N. control, which began on May 4, the MTF major components consisted of an aeromedical commander became the U.S. Forces Somalia sur- evacuation control center (AECC), a mobile aero- geon, a third hat. Terms of reference developed medical staging facility (MASF), an aeromedical by CENTCOM stipulated that medical assets were evacuation liaison team (AELT), and aeromedical provided specifically for U.S. forces. American evacuation crews. AECC provided the command personnel were to treat coalition and Somali casu- and control for the deployed AE system. MASF alties on an emergency and exception basis only. provided a holding and treatment facility for up UNOSOM coalition hospitals from Sweden, Pak- to 50 stabilized patients for 4–6 hours before istan, and Romania cared for all other personnel evacuation. AELT provided a communication and treated a small number of Americans during link, and aeromedical evacuation crews consisted mass casualty situations. When Pakistani troops of flight nurses and technicians. Because of the were ambushed on June 5, the U.S. MTF sup- distances, an aeromedical evacuation operations ported U.N. medical facilities. This mass casualty team (AEOT) and six AE crews deployed to Cairo incident was a turning point for the forces sup- West Air Base to provide mission support and porting UNOSOM II. strategic crew staging for transiting AE missions. On October 3, three UH–60 helicopters were Aeromedical evacuation personnel and flight downed in an unsuccessful effort to capture Mo- surgeons primarily used C–130 aircraft within So- hammed Aideed. Eighteen Americans were killed malia to evacuate patients to Mogadishu. Retro- in this action and in the ensuing combat and res- grade C–141 aircraft were used for patients who cue operations. MTF treated 73 patients during needed further medical care in EUCOM or mass casualty operations that day. A few days CONUS. Flight surgeons deployed to provide clin- later, a second mass casualty operation was initi- ical assessments of the suitability of casualties for ated after a mortar attack on Mogadishu’s airfield. aeromedical evacuation. Thirteen patients were treated by MTF. From Oc- On March 10, to conserve the system tober 3 to 9, the workload included 96 hospital strength of aeromedical evacuation, AECC func- admissions, 70 evacuations, and 45 surgical pro- tions at Mogadishu transferred to AEOT at Cairo cedures, with five deaths.4 This week represented West. One AELT and two modified AE crews (each the highest U.S. combat casualty load during the with a flight nurse and two technicians) re- operation. mained in Somalia. Aeromedical evacuation per- As the situation turned hostile, transporting sonnel, based at Cairo West, rotated in and out of casualties from the medical task force hospital to Somalia as mission requirements dictated.3 Mogadishu airport became unsafe, and Army medical evacuation (Medevac) assets were used to complete safe and timely transfers of evacuees.

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operational import, disease vector ecology infor- Figure 1. Restore Hope: Disease/Non-Battle Injuries.* mation, personal protective measures, and preventive medicine countermeasures. The other

25 publication dealt with anticipated diagnostic dif- 17.5 % Affected/Week ficulties. It reiterated clinical aspects of significant Total U.S. Deployment diseases, including clinical presentation, labora- 15 U.S. Troops Deployed (in thousands) 20 tory test interpretation, treatment, prognosis, and 12.5 prevention of infectious diseases. It also ad- 15 dressed malnutrition, stress, and neuropsychiatric 10 problems. 10 7.5 The first line of defense against some dis-

% Troops Affected eases is immunization. Administering a range of 5 immunizations in a compressed period of time 5 2.5 prior to deployment was a challenge that continued in-theater in the form of administering im- 0 0 Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb munizations missed during the rush of deploying. ’93 ’94 Drugs for malaria chemoprophylaxis were chosen *All categories. based on scant geographical distribution data. In May 1993, a number of soldiers and marines who had served in Somalia surfaced at medical clinics in CONUS with malaria. Noncompliance with chemoprophylaxis and poor protective measures Preventive Medicine were the most notable causes. But prophylaxis Like the Desert Storm/Desert Shield theater breakthrough noted in several patients was con- in its initial stages, current and specific disease sistent with similar findings in other malarious prevalence information concerning Somalia was areas of the world. not available from medical intelligence sources or Predeployment tuberculin skin testing was even international health organizations. Com- also required. The extreme flurry of activity due pounding this deficiency was the virtually com- to the immediacy of deployment resulted in a no- plete degradation of health care infrastructure in table loss-to-follow-up in reading many tuber- Somalia. This necessitated a preventive medicine culin skin tests. Early 1992 tuberculosis (Tb) mor- effort to not only support U.S. forces but assist in tality rates among Somali refugees were reported providing limited support for other U.N. troops to be extremely high. Even prior to the civil un- and those civilians who are invariably involved rest the disease was a major health problem, during such operations. moderately to highly endemic, and known to be Since health care providers were not familiar resistant to multiple drugs. In addition, some with diseases in Somalia, diagnostic problems U.N. personnel came from countries in which Tb were anticipated. More- is a major health problem. Thus importing drug- over, most U.S. troops resistant Tb into the United States was a serious the Somalia experience were immunologically concern. Redeployment screening procedures for Tb resulted in significant progress naive to endemic diseases and hence more suscepti- and other health hazards were implemented for in conserving mission strength ble to increased morbidity all personnel. Some units reported minimal to and mortality than the in- high (about 5 percent) rates of skin test conver- digenous population. Drug resistances were a sions because of Somalia exposure, although known and expected treatment problem. To many cases were ambiguous with regard to prede- counter the infectious disease threat, some ployment tuberculin-reactive status. Documenta- preparatory measures were taken. Information was tion on measurements (or even positive/negative distributed to heighten awareness of disease po- readings) of tuberculin tests was traceable to tential, immunizations and chemoprophylaxes flawed immunization records that could have led were addressed, an in-country disease surveillance to over-estimating exposure. Also, various units program was readied, and redeployment disease which were retested three months after redeploy- precautions were planned. ment from Somalia showed an unexplainable loss Two publications that addressed the disease of reactivity. threat were widely distributed at the start of the Obtaining immediate disease surveillance deployment. One was aimed at medical and pre- data was key to establishing disease prevalence in ventive medicine personnel as well as comman- Somalia and early identification of disease/injury ders and troops. It assessed both infectious diseases and environmental health factors with

94 JFQ / Spring 1996 Randolph and Cogdell

this number was still extremely low, given the Figure 2. Restore Hope: Heat Injuries. risk in the AO (figure 2). Because of the temporary nature of the operation, redeployment was considered early in the 0.6 game and potential problems were addressed: % Affected/Week general health during deployment by means of 0.5 health questionnaires (filed in health records); messages alerting health care workers to potential 0.4 disease considerations (also recorded); briefings to alert troops of disease manifestations; implemen- 0.3 tation of terminal malaria chemoprophylaxis;

% Troops Affected and repeat tuberculin skin testing 10–12 weeks 0.2 post-return. Moreover, servicemembers, comman-

0.1 ders, chaplains, social workers, and families were alerted to the psychological adjustment problems 0 of returning to normalcy. Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug SepOct Nov Dec Jan Feb ’93 ’94 Preventive medicine influences are typically easy to measure only when ineffective. Given numerous adverse factors in theater (for example, the austere environment and logistical character of the area, difficult climate, unknown threats from a range of diseases, and unpredictable na- trends. The PDA team, augmented with a rapid di- ture of the operation), preventive medicine ef- agnostic lab-capability (joint forward laboratory), forts reflected by low DNBI rates must be re- deployed with the initial JTF directly under the garded as unprecedented. While this triumph was control of the theater surgeon. Through their en- partly due to lessons learned during Desert ergetic efforts, a disease surveillance network that Shield/Desert Storm, the Somalia experience re- reached all service medical treatment facilities was sulted in significant progress in conserving mis- established immediately and continued until the sion strength, which must be remembered. major withdrawals ended in March 1994. As a result, timely outbreak information was obtained Medical Logistics for trend analysis and disease investigation that The Gulf War was a starting point for plan- also was performed by the PDA team in its first ning medical logistics support. Marines initially non-exercise utilization. Its merits were conclu- provided class VIII (medical supply) support. After sively proven by remarkably low disease/non-bat- thirty days of Restore Hope, the Army picked up tle injury (DNBI) rates throughout the operation. the mission as single integrated medical logistics The level of activity associated with rapid de- manager (SIMLM) for class VIII support to all units ployment as well as the mental stress which ac- in theater. Just as in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, companied Restore Hope and operations in sup- coordination was effected with EUCOM to utilize port of UNOSOM II were predictable problems. the U.S. Army Medical Material Center, Europe The factors that increased health risks included: (USAMMCE), as the source of class VIII material to time zone adjustment, heat acclimatization, di- sustain medical logistics battalions (MLBs) in So- etary change, increased accident rates from mov- malia as well as the air transportable hospital in ing/packing/unloading and the high tempo of ac- Egypt. Class VIII support for emergency requisi- tivity in new surroundings, and the psychological tions and routine items that were not stocked by strain from family separation, culture shock, geo- USAMMCE also were provided by the Defense Per- graphic disorientation, uncertainty about mission sonnel Support Center. duration, threat of bodily harm, et al. A combina- Overall, medical supply support was deemed tion of chaplains, combat stress teams, briefings, a great success, with the single item manager con- and publications for commanders, servicemem- cept proving more effective than in Desert Storm/ bers, and health-care workers addressed these Desert Shield mainly because medical units de- challenges. Although many factors were difficult ployed with the appropriate initial support sup- to measure, DNBI surveillance data was far lower plies plus resupply packages of 15–30 days. This than predicted (see figure 1). Specifically, ortho- allowed MLBs to more easily sustain the force pedic/minor injury, gastrointestinal disease, and without outfitting units with class VIII at the out- psychological complaints were very low. Though set of the operation. In addition, MLBs not only heat injuries were high during initial deployment deployed early but carried their initial inventories. when compared to the balance of the operation,

Spring 1996 / JFQ 95 ■ MEDICAL DIMENSIONS

Casualty transfer which logistics would have been ineffective. It in Somalia. combines government proprietary message han- dling software and off-the-shelf hardware for satellite communications and message preparation. This system can send and receive requisi- tions, supply status, and various transactions over landlines or satellites under the defense automatic addressing system (DAAS). It operated via satellite communications offered by the IN- MARSAT commercial system that is linked by portable, collapsible terminal with telephone and data transmission service. Some Lessons The creation of a JTF surgeon element during the initial days of Restore Hope was critical. The surgeon’s staff expedited coordination of joint medical support and requirements. During a lull Joint Combat Camera Center in activity, the functions of the surgeon were passed to the medical group commander, and later to MTF commanders. When the level of un- friendly activity in Somalia increased, it was difficult to augment the staff. The surgeon was faced with a herculean task of acting as hospital commander, U.S. Forces Somalia surgeon, and JTF So- malia surgeon. The retention of a dedicated skele- ton surgeon’s office would have constituted a significant asset in the coordination of medical activities as the operational tempo increased. Relying on USS Tripoli for emergency hospitalization was crucial during the first month of Restore Hope. Lacking medical infrastructure in Somalia, the capability aboard USS Tripoli was the only source of hospitalization prior to land-based support. Because the weather, darkness, and other conditions could have compromised evacuations, a rapidly deployable land-based facility was needed. Establishing a pre-positioned hospital aboard Green Valley was problematic. High seas Joint Combat Camera Center Surgical module, and shallow harbors prevented unloading. Mogadishu. DEPMEDS equipment from CONUS provided an alternate land-based hospital to be deployed and In the deployment phase of Restore Hope, set up in the 30-day planning window. communications in the tactical AO were austere, Predeployment preparations must include a characteristic of modern contingency/humani- preventive medicine assets during the early stages tarian operations. Communications thus took of planning. Education was a cornerstone in pre- place over tactical single channel ultra high fre- deployment preparations for Somalia. It involved quency satellite communications (SATCOM), reacquainting health care workers with diagnos- commercial SATCOM-international maritime ing diseases endemic to the region and education satellite, single channel radio (SCR), high fre- in local medical threats/countermeasures. Immu- quency radio, and limited super high frequency nizations, Tb testing, and chemoprophylaxes are SATCOM links. Units communicated in the AO high priority measures that must be emphasized. predominantly over voice links. Limited data The illusion that chemoprophylaxis offers total communication was available via facsimile or safety must be replaced by awareness that protec- data transfers over tactical satellite or SCR, a con- tive measures are vital in preventing many vec- straint which medical logistics units overcame. tor-borne diseases. Units targeted to specific re- MLBs utilized a prototype system, known as the gions should be maintained at 100 percent quad-service satellite transmission and receiving system for medical supply support, without

96 JFQ / Spring 1996 Randolph and Cogdell medical readiness for deployment. While this is Medical support for forces engaged in hu- the best tactic to counter a failure to complete manitarian relief operations in Somalia was medical predeployment processing, units do not highly successful because of forward thinking always enjoy the prior knowledge of their target and flexibility in the planning and delivery of destinations. health service support on all levels. Joint medical There appears to be a shortfall in medical in- planning expertise and activities were crucial in telligence which is probably a problem inherent meeting health requirements. As the Armed in any intervention. PDA teams provide dynamic Forces evolve in the post-Cold War era, the med- disease data on which constant adjustments in ical lessons drawn from Somalia may prove to be medical tactics can be made. Deploying a team typical and thus should be carefully evaluated for early with initial forces, forming a comprehensive future application. JFQ disease surveillance program, immediate disease outbreak investigations, and command level of NOTES recognition (directly under the theater surgeon) 1 The authors collaborated with CAPT Sterling E. were factors that contributed immensely to suc- Garnto, USN; LTC John T. Harris, USA (Ret.); MAJ Dou- cess. Similar use and control of PDA teams should glas S. Phelps, USA; and LTC Steven J. Yevich, USA, in be the standard in future military deployments. the preparation of an earlier version of this article and Finally, the most important factor in all mili- gratefully acknowledge their support and comments. tary preventive medicine endeavors, command 2 Joseph P. Hoar, “A CINC’s Perspective,” Joint Force support, must be secured. It ensures timely and Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 58. regular reporting of disease surveillance data and 3 See 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, “Opera- enforces recommended countermeasures as prob- tion Restore Hope After Action Report,” June 15, 1993, d lems are identified. Command support is the only and 32 Aeromedical Evacuation Group, “Medical After- Action Report for AEOT: Operation Restore Hope,” effective means of ensuring implementation of March 18, 1993. preventive measures. But it can be optimized only 4 Headquarters, Medical Task Force 46, “Situation by educating commanders, a developmental Report for Operation Continue Hope, October 4–10,” process in which health care workers must ensure October 11, 1993. that commanders understand the priority of prevention over treatment. Dedicated Medevac helicopters were indispensable not only for evacuating casualties from the interior to Mogadishu, but within the capital itself. They were not available in the early days of the deployment, and such support was provided by general support helicopters whenever possible. Competing requirements would have seriously detracted from the medical mission if combat had increased. The Medevac helicopters came by sea from Europe necessitating ship deck qualification training for Army Medevac pilots. Aeromedical evacuation was another critical element that performed well during this effort. Air Force medical personnel at Cairo West and Mogadishu airport, in concert with other medical task forces and ships, provided timely support to evacuees. The establishment of staging bases at Djibouti and Cairo West was an important factor in safe and successful aeromedical evacuation. Communications austerity in the early stages of force projection is a characteristic of rapid tactical military operations today. It is essential that medical communications contingency planning be closely integrated with the total contingency communications planning process. In addition, it is crucial for the medical communications personnel, supported command J-6, and JTF J-6 to work closely during the deployment and execution phases to ensure that suitable communication assets are allocated to the medical mission.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 97 ■

Leadership, Community, DOD and Virtue By JAMES H. TONER

James MacGregor Burns has stated that “Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize...institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.” 1 Although he is an acclaimed scholar, this propo- sition, though not erroneous, seems somehow incomplete, color- less, and impotent. But if Burns’s grasp of leadership is inadequate, one can peruse hundreds of works in search of a definition of leadership without finding a wholly satisfying explanation. Augustine of Hippo, the fifth century philosopher and Father of the Church, noted that one knows what time is until asked to define it. Leader-

James H. Toner teaches international relations and military ethics at ship may resist definition in the Air War College and is the author of The Sword and the Cross: the same way. Reflections on Command and Conscience.

98 JFQ / Spring 1996 Toner

Terms which have the greatest meaning for The definition proposed herein emphasizes us—love, faith, honor, and justice—invariably that leaders inspire appropriate (correct, fitting, withstand simple (or even complex) definition. suitable, rightful) conduct. Leadership that pro- But can one really comprehend something with- motes inappropriate (incorrect or wrongful) con- out being able to define it? Thus I offer this suc- duct may be tyranny, despotism, or dictatorship, cinct definition: leadership is the ability to inspire but it is not genuine leadership, which one takes appropriate action beyond the expectable.2 While to be a positive influence. The dictionary states this denotation is unlikely to find its way into the that to lead is “to go before or with to show the academic literature on the subject, it serves as a way.” One must again acknowledge that “the point of departure for looking at leadership. way” can be harmful—such as when gang leaders If some action or conduct is routine, ordi- incite followers to violence and crime—though a nary, and predictable—that is, expectable in every fair reading seems to suggest something construc- sense—leadership is very tive as well as hopeful. Therefore leadership in- leadership inspires appropriate likely unnecessary. It is spires appropriate conduct beyond the expectable. in the nature of leader- That is, I contend, what leadership does. But if conduct beyond the expectable ship to offer something that is what leadership does, how does it do it? beyond the expectable. If a group of people may be How Leadership Works expected, for instance, to achieve a desirable out- Over the course of decades, military profes- come regardless of leadership, one might fairly as- sionals have rightly insisted that leaders inspire ap- sume that, with effective leadership, the same propriate conduct beyond the expectable by ap- group might be able to achieve even greater pealing to duty, honor, and country—and refusing things. Thus, leadership contributes to success on to lie, cheat, and steal. Yet these venerable con- the margins—it is value added. One might think cepts, which have encouraged thousands of leaders of it as yeast that has a positive catalytic effect. to do what they ought to even in times of peril and For example, the motto of the U.S. Army In- crisis, are vague. Strong adjurations to virtue and fantry School at Fort Benning is “Follow Me!” It is admonitions against vice are necessarily indistinct. an effective credo, capturing in two words the The ancient Greeks told us that exceptions to essence of leadership: the infantry leader, exert- broad rules might sometimes have to be granted. ing the power of his own will and influence, en- Equity means fairness. Aristotle taught that equity ables a squad or platoon to do things that they could mean the rectification (correction) of the law would be unlikely to do absent his direction. But when law was deficient by reason of its universal- most of this is pretty self evident. If leaders are ef- ity. That is, if rules and regulations apply to every- fective, they get results not otherwise calculated one, a law might well be wrong when it applies to in and from people. someone under certain circumstances. It is wrong Most definitions of leadership contain syn- to steal. But what of taking a loaf of bread to feed a onyms. One thesaurus gives direction, guidance, starving family? Can there be mitigating or extenu- instruction, administration, authority, command, ating circumstances? Can the injunctions of duty, control, domination, superiority, and supremacy, honor, and country always teach what we want which are all very useful terms. But nouns dodge a them to? If soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines in- very critical adjectival question: How do we sepa- scribe duty, honor, country on their hearts, will they rate good leadership from bad? Returning to the lead appropriately? analysis offered by Burns, one finds that his dissec- We know how critical the notion of duty tion of the subject (at least in the brief quotation must be to soldiers who exist—and leaders who cited above) is value-neutral. My definition sug- lead—in order to accomplish the mission. Sol- gests that leadership inspires: a positive, produc- diers go into harm’s way—they risk life and tive influence. Another denotation, “to guide or limb—to get the job done. They are, properly, control by divine influence,” reveals that the in- taught to say “yes sir” or “yes ma’am” when finitive is intended almost exclusively to convey given an order—and to execute that order something affirmative and beneficial. While one promptly and efficiently. At the U.S. Military might refer to Hitler as having inspired Germans in Academy, cadets are taught to say “No excuse, the 1930s, as having been charismatic (which origi- sir” when confronted with their shortcomings. nally meant a spiritual or divine gift), using such Results matter, and complaints are impermissible terms in the context of Nazi Germany is wrong. about why the orders or magnitude of the job Bennis and Nanus correctly point out that “Man- precluded success in the assignment. “Duty,” said agers are people who do things right and leaders Robert E. Lee, “is the sublimest word in the Eng- are people who do the right thing.” 3 Use of the ad- lish language.” jective right is of paramount importance.

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But we also know, since the post-World War II order. Integrity is the most important responsibil- war crimes tribunals, that devotion to duty is not ity of command.” 4 Legal orders must be obeyed. enough. Orders occasionally must be questioned. Leaders inspire appropriate conduct. The notion that only the superior officer responds We try in so many ways to soften the lan- to questions of propriety is gone, as it should be. guage, but the soldier’s job is to kill and prepare Every soldier is responsible for the orders that he to kill, to die and prepare to die. The Code of or she issues—or follows. Blind obedience is Conduct is very clear about the ultimate obliga- wrong. There may well be a duty not to be dutiful. tion of the soldier, whose very life may be put in Duty is not the highest good of the soldier. danger to accomplish the mission. Officers are Honor sometimes seems so rare that I shrink never to endanger the lives of their soldiers for from writing that honor itself is not enough, for light reasons; but never must they shrink from what is meant can be terribly mistaken. In the the terrible responsibility of accepting risks, even film A Few Good Men, a young Marine NCO re- mortal danger, for their troops and themselves if gards unit, Corps, God, and country—one pre- necessary. The military may well be involved in sumes in that order—as his source of honor. The operations other than war, but the first responsi- story presents two twisted, grotesque leaders, a bility of the Armed Forces is to win the Nation’s lieutenant and a colonel, with a sense of “honor” wars. When a choice must be made between that is warped beyond recognition. A twisted troop safety and mission accomplishment, the sense of honor may be worse than no honor at all. duty of the soldier must be mission first. At the Naval Academy, midshipmen recently The infantry lieutenant forever has the re- cheated on an exam and sponsibility of pointing at one soldier and saying, the highest obligation must subsequently covered up “Smith, point man!” None but the cavalier, how- for one another, contend- ever, would say such things carelessly. There must be to honor, and then to duty, ing that loyalty to one’s be no question that genuine concern for the wel- and then to countrymen buddies was higher than fare of soldiers (or patients, pupils, clients, or cus- loyalty to the honor con- tomers) is key to leadership. What the leader gives cept at Annapolis. That no- to followers is very likely to be returned. But for tion may hold sway among members of a street the military leader, concern for troops cannot re- gang but cannot be allowed to take root in an in- place devotion to duty; and devotion to duty can- stitution educating commissioned officers. Honor not replace fidelity to a high sense of honor. The of this sort is not the highest good of the soldier. trinity of principle, purpose, and people thus comple- Country—a short term for patriotism—is a ments the idea of honor, duty, country(men).5 The desirable quality to most Americans. We react highest obligation of a soldier must be to honor, with sorrow and anger to a traitor who sells out and then to duty, and then to countrymen. If any his homeland for greed and personal debauchery. leader mistakes the proper order—putting, say, We expect the Armed Forces to represent our people ahead of principle and thus implicitly con- country well. Every day soldiers don the uniform doning cheating at the Naval Academy—he or she of the United States, and they should understand cannot inspire appropriate conduct. The leader- that wearing it is a privilege and responsibility. ship offered will be defective and dangerous. But patriotism can be carried to extremes, and But we have said that principle can be mis- history is replete with cases of those whose first understood. How can leaders be educated to un- loyalty to their homeland resulted in evil. Reli- derstand the proper order of principle (honor), gious people, for example, cannot value loyalty to purpose (duty), and people (countrymen)? Since country ahead of faithfulness to God. Patriotism the ancient Greeks, educators have sought to in- is a valuable sentiment and a worthy conviction, culcate wisdom and virtue into students, fre- but it is not the highest good of the soldier. quently without success. Indeed, in many if not But if the watchwords and creed of “duty, most universities and colleges today, even discus- honor, country” are not enough to tell us how to sion of trying to teach “wisdom and virtue” will be leaders—and which values to exalt—who do terrify professors and, in particular, administra- we consult? This is not to offer a new formula to tors. “You shall know the truth, and the truth West Point but to suggest, for purposes of instruc- shall make you free” has been transmuted into tion, a new ordering of “duty, honor, country.” “You shall know the truth, and the truth shall Taken properly, the highest virtue of a soldier, make you flee.” Whose version of “wisdom” shall and hence his leader, is honor—authentic, not we teach? Whose notions of “virtue” shall we in- warped. Things done in the line of duty that vio- culcate? In a multicultural society, does any pub- late a proper awareness of honor tarnish the shield lic university have the right to teach “wisdom and disgrace the uniform. Genuine honor is based and virtue?” on integrity. As a former service chief put it, “Any order to compromise integrity is not a lawful

100 JFQ / Spring 1996 Toner U.S. Marine Corps (R.J. Pixler)

Specific questions of campus politics can be as it is, one can forget that the colonels of the fu- left to faculties in Tuscaloosa, Ann Arbor, and ture are the lieutenants of today. If the lieutenants Tempe—until graduates of those institutions pin are poorly educated, we must expect misfits and on the gold bars of second lieutenant or ensign. malcontents among colonels within a generation. Once commissioned, those young leaders must Leaders educated by Federal service academies, know how to order principle, purpose, and peo- ROTC, and OCS/OTS are likely to have the raw in- ple, for there is the fountain of leadership. Per- telligence to become—I do not say to be—good sonal background, even educational experience, leaders. But they will require the seasoning, expe- may be at odds with the views, values, and veri- rience, conditioning, and mentoring of their pro- ties which have sustained the Armed Forces for fession in order to mature into the kinds of leaders more than two hundred years. How are young of- the Nation wants and very much needs. ficers to learn the time-tested truths of military In one word, leaders will learn virtue (and leadership? How are they to master what “princi- thus be able to inspire appropriate conduct) by ple” and “honor” are about? How are they to dis- being responsable. I have not misspelled the word cover what “purpose” and “duty” really mean? responsible; I mean “responsable”—being able to How are they to grasp what taking care of people respond. Leaders must know what to respond to. demands? Experience in the workplace or the If they respond first to opportunities for success streets is hardly enough. An education—at Al- and advancement, they will be careerists but not abama, William and Mary, Holy Cross, even An- professionals. If they misunderstand the order of napolis, it seems—is not enough. This is certainly principle, purpose, and people, they will make not to impugn any institution; nor is it anti-intel- the kinds of mistakes referred to earlier. Leaders lectual, intended to denigrate higher education. must be able to respond to the chief challenge of Rather, the point is that leaders today need a so- leadership: being technically and tactically and ethi- cialization, maturation, and seasoning beyond cally proficient. the academic expertise represented by degrees. It is obvious that good leaders must know That socialization process is the responsibility of their profession. Competence in soldierly skill is each service. fundamental. But competence without character is an invitation only to masterful despotism. And The Source of Integrity character consists in “responsability”—that is, To lead well—to inspire appropriate action being able to respond to challenge and crisis in a beyond the expectable—leaders must have both manner based on integrity. Here we have at last wisdom and virtue, customary products of long come to the chief difficulty in almost all writing experience and worthwhile education. As obvious

Spring 1996 / JFQ 101 ■ LEADERSHIP

profession. In making decisions, leaders are responding not just to present circumstances but to standards set in the past, and aspirations and opportunities of the future. As professionals, leaders profess faith in comrades. They are responsable— that is, able to respond—to those comrades. Alasdair MacIntyre of Notre Dame, perhaps our foremost moral philosopher, observed that “I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations, and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.” 6 It is this inheritance, this sense of community, from which we derive a sense of purpose and ethical orientation. It is to this feeling of oneness, bonding, and confrater- nity that we are responsable. This brotherhood is found in Paul’s letter to the Romans: “What I wish is that we may be mutually encouraged by our common faith.” That feeling was described by Walter Lippmann when he wrote that there is a sense of community which, “though so insub- stantial to our senses binds, in Burke’s words, a man to his country with ‘ties which though light as air, are as strong as links of iron.’ That is why young men die in battle for their country’s sake and why old men plant trees they will never sit

DOD (R.D. Ward) under.” 7 In his farewell at West Point, Douglas MacArthur made much the same point: “The long, gray line has never failed us. Were you to do on the ethics of leadership. It requires little study, so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, after all, to say that good leaders are men and in blue and gray would rise from their white women of integrity. But what is integrity? I offer crosses. . . .” 8 the simple definition that it is “responsability.” A simple definition of integrity tells us that it Those with integrity respond to crisis and chal- means “the quality or state of being complete; lenge as their profession would urge. In moments unbroken condition; wholeness; entirety.” In the of indecision, leaders with in- sense that an integer is a whole number and not a tegrity respond to the silent fraction, integrity suggests community. Young as vital as honor is, another promptings and the unspoken leaders who absorb the sense of wholeness and of concept of compelling guidance of those who have tradition and of common faith which writers gone before; in moral and from Paul of Tarsus to Lippmann and MacArthur importance is shame military emergency, leaders have believed and taught thus ground their moral find unvoiced counsel in the educations in virtue; they begin to know how to history of their services and biographies of the order appropriate conduct and how to conduct champions of yesteryear. themselves wisely. Leaders are never alone. They walk in the As vital as honor is, another concept of com- shadow of great lieutenants. Each service has rites pelling importance is shame, the feeling that by and rituals, trappings and traditions, customs and inappropriate words and actions, one has disap- conventions, that disclose volumes on what is pointed the best of his community. Shame is the done and must be done, what is not done and must belief that, by failure of moral or physical never be done. Leaders soon perpetuate a commu- courage, one has proven unworthy of the tradi- nity of service. Those who went before—and tion he or she is expected to uphold and exalt. served well and nobly—admonish, instruct, and The shamed one is thus unable to look profes- counsel young leaders who are prudent enough to sional colleagues squarely in the eye and implic- listen. Heroic murals and statues, customs, uni- itly say, “I took this action because, in my best forms, and reveille and taps—all these things faith- fully teach new leaders that they have entered a

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judgment, it was right.” Actions and words that NOTES produce shame are ordinarily wrong. They destroy the wholeness (past, present, future) of a 1 In a book by the same name (New York: Harper Col- profession and devastate the bonding, commu- ophon, 1978), Burns defines leadership as “inducing fol- nity, and sense of unity of those whose deeds lowers to act for certain goals that represent the values and the motivations...of both leaders and followers” (p. 19). built the integrity of that profession. 2 James H. Toner, The Sword and the Cross (New York: Integrity, then, is about wholeness and com- Praeger, 1992), p. 49; and The American Military Ethic munity and having sufficient piety and decency (New York: Praeger, 1992), p. 54. to know when one ought to be ashamed of be- 3 Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders: The Strate- traying it. Every leadership decision but the most gists for Taking Charge (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), mundane involves ethical judgment. Therefore, p. 21. But their next sentence totally misses the point: every significant leadership decision is potentially “The difference may be summarized as activities of vi- “transforming,” leadership that occurs when we sion and judgment—effectiveness versus...efficiency.” 4 “engage with others in such a way that leaders John D. Ryan, quoted in War, Morality, and the Mil- d and followers raise one another to higher levels of itary Profession, 2 ed., edited by Malham Wakin (Boul- der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 180. motivation and morality.” 9 Good leaders do not 5 See my book True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden simply want their followers to do something; good of Military Ethics (Lexington: The University Press of leaders want their followers to be somebody. The Kentucky, 1995), chapter 4, for more detail. repetition of appropriate action develops the 6 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, kinds of habits which help us act as we should. In Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), p. 220. doing the right thing, leaders set examples, build 7 Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy purposeful organizations, create and enhance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), p. 36. community, inculcate virtue because they are 8 “Duty, Honor, and Country,” Vital Speeches of the wise, and are wise because they are virtuous. Day, vol. 28, no. 17 (June 15, 1962), p. 520. The power “Good leaders,” Malham Wakin observed, “are of this valedictory is not denied; but “duty, honor, country,” though valuable and venerable as rhetoric, is good teachers.” 10 Teachers do more than transmit not an amulet that guarantees good leadership. ideas; they practice a kind of transforming leader- 9 Burns, Leadership, p. 20. His other type of leadership, educating students, soldiers, and patients. ship is “transactional,” which means “one person Good leaders show their subordinates “the way.” tak[ing] the initiative in making contact with others for James Bond Stockdale, a prisoner of war in the purpose of an exchange of valued things.” Vietnam for eight years, contends that good lead- 10 Malham W. Wakin, “Foreword,” in Military Leader- ers “need to be moralists—not just poseurs who... ship: In Pursuit of Excellence, edited by R. L. Taylor and W. E. exhort men to be good, but thinkers who elucidate Rosenbach (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. xiv. 11 what the good is. This requires first and foremost a See James Bond Stockdale, “Educating Leaders,” in clear idea of right and wrong and the integrity to Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence, edited by R. L. Taylor and W. E. Rosenbach (Boulder, Colo.: West- stand behind your assessment of any situation.” 11 view Press, 1984), p. 67. See also Roger H. Nye, The Good ethics must be taught by good leaders; and Challenge of Command (Wayne, N.J.: Avery, 1986). good ethics is caught from good leaders who inspire appropriate conduct beyond the expectable. Lead- ers learn from the past, are responsible in the present, and plan for the future. They know their principles, purposes, and people; and their sense of community and their pride of profession endow their actions and orders with mature judgment. In such mature, settled judgment will be found the union of leadership and virtue, of effective command and wise conscience. JFQ

Spring 1996 / JFQ 103 ■ BRILLIANT Warriors By JAY W. KELLEY

There is little doubt that military education is an important complement to military training. But while everyone would agree on the value of both training and education to the Armed Forces, just how much professional military education (PME) a warrior needs, its form and timing, and the impact of information technology on what is taught is open to debate. This article seeks

to animate and encourage that exchange. (KenU.S. Air Force Wright)

One thing is certainly undebatable: people are the most critical element in the military. They must fight our wars. Technology provides the Training and Education tools to fight, and training enables a warrior to Military training and PME do not aim at pro- use them to his best advantage. And viding jobs or adventures. They are necessary for the purpose of PME is to leverage success in warfare. Training creates competence If we should have to fight, the most powerful factor in the in using machines or tools required for tasks. It is we should be prepared to warfighting equation: the human about teaching things that are known and using do so from the neck up, mind. Our training institutions and things that operate mechanically, electrically, or their capabilities are superior. Train- somewhat predictably. Education, on the other instead of from the neck ing has repeatedly reengineered it- hand, aims at teaching intellectual constructs and down. self to take account of advances in appropriate principles so that the right tools are information technology, simula- available and can be selected to achieve a desired —Jimmy Doolittle tion, and discoveries about how effect. It is about learning whatever we do not mature students learn best. It is know but envision we must know to survive and challenging, experiential, and sometimes fun. But succeed. Said another way, training teaches the PME has not even kept abreast of improvements archer how to use the bow and arrow—how to in training, let alone with needs of national mili- aim the right arrow at the right bull’s-eye. Educa- tary strategy. tion ensures that the archer also sees the value of Unless PME better prepares warriors, our best gunpowder as an improvement over archery. The training may be wasted. To understand the test of training is competence in environments changes that must be made in PME, we must dif- that exist now and are understood. The test of ed- ferentiate between training and education. ucation is success in different environments that are perhaps not fully understood. Over the last several years, Air University has engaged in studies of the future. Spacecast 2020 is Lieutenant General Jay W. Kelley, USAF, is commander of Air University being followed by Air Force 2025, which is being and previously served as vice commander of Air Force Space Command. conducted at the direction of the chief of staff,

104 JFQ / Spring 1996 Kelley

U.S. Air Force. The latter study examines the air Some things are common to all futures. Sim- and space capabilities that the Nation will need, ply put, soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of systems and technologies that might contribute 2020 must become as “brilliant” as their tools. For to them, and con- example, the Army mobile digitized Force XXI and the test of education is success in cepts of operations the Marine Corps initiative Sea Dragon—or what- environments that are perhaps not for best utilizing ever they become on the way to the far future— new capabilities. can only be understood or prosecuted by thor- fully understood Closely related are oughly trained and superbly educated forces. DOD studies and Given the distinct possibility that nontraditional seminar wargames that explore the revolution in missions will increase, and that the Armed Forces military affairs (RMA). Each service and the Joint are not likely to grow in size, the education and Staff are looking into the future to understand training hurdles that we face are immense. the operating environments that the Armed What should planners study to enable them Forces might face. to devise simultaneous strikes on 5,000 targets with precision-guided munitions? What sort of Alternate Futures education will prepare combatants to deploy Moving into the future, Carl Builder has re- from CONUS to link up with coalition forces to minded us, is like driving into fog.1 Turning on the fight within twelve hours? How does one train high beams to see specific objects only illuminates marines to fight brush fires in California one the fog more brightly. To make out shapes requires week and survive firefights in combat the next? lower beams, peripheral vision, and the ability to observe relationships between shapes, the road The Environment ahead, and the means of illumination. It also re- Studies indicate that the operating environ- quires making implicit assumptions about what is ment of the far future probably will include five perceived explicit and then challenging them. The attributes important to those who are planning first thing one sees, to pursue Builder’s analogy, is military training and PME today. that there is more than one future visible in the Humans will still fight. Combat can occur any- fog. Each alternate future is internally consistent, where from the earth’s surface to cislunar space. It often equally plausible, and could actually be the can break out in environments ranging from jun- future. Some are benign while others are arduous. gle to polar ice, from cities to orbital heights. It can Combined, they delimit strategic planning, iden- involve national armies, irregular forces, terrorist tify risks, and suggest challenges and opportuni- groups, or organized crime. And even though na- ties that may lie ahead. Alternate futures are de- tion-states will not wither away, they may have scriptive, and not predictive or normative. They more powerful competitors in the future. are planning stories or scenarios. Aware of these al- The military will be smaller. Capabilities will be ternatives, planners can ignore any or all. The ob- more tightly integrated: speed, precision, and the jective is to clarify the shapes in the fog to reduce expertise to operate in ambiguous circumstances surprise and risk for decisionmakers. will become treasured operational values. Cost will Alternate futures need not be precisely right, be as important as capability in organizing, train- just plausible and approximately right. This is ing, and equipping this force.3 A cadre of nearly preferable to stumbling along in the dark or transcendent professionals—but not six-million clinging to the present and ultimately being ill- dollar men or robocops—will constitute the force. prepared for the unexpected. While a creative The services probably will not be merged, and nei- process, generating alternate futures is rigorous ther a space nor information corps is likely to be and exacting. Just as we know the past by infer- created. We will still need the means to develop ence, we can gain similar insight into futures. experts in land, sea, and air and space warfare—in- Businesses spawn alternate futures at great excluding information operations that cut across all pense because they pay off. Failing to look ahead combat media. This force will work together with might lead to missing new customers or losing many members of the interagency community as their market share. Militaries that do not look well as contractors. All elements of this future ahead may lose nations. force must understand their contributions and There are other methods for looking ahead how other contributors are integrated to meet the besides alternate futures, some better than others. objective. Knowing how one’s own part of this But all have a common objective: to provide in- force functions will not be good enough; one must sights into tomorrow so that our present actions know how others work too. can prepare us. Thus, the task is to look ahead, describe the operating environment, delineate the skills it may demand, and postulate actions likely to produce the desired results.2

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M–1 main battle tanks. U.S. Marine Corps

The standard for this interests without a loss of cultural or national force will be its ability to identity. Electronic linkages among economies, make rapid precision increased leisure and business travel, and ease of strikes, both physical and interpersonal contacts will facilitate greater coop- U.S. Air Force (MarvinU.S. Air Force Lynchard) electronic-photonic, and eration. Threats to one global partner will imperil F–117 Stealth fighter. operate in situations of others more than today. Yet military-to-military high ambiguity. Precision and engagement speed exchanges, coalition training exercises, and actual (strikes and restrikes) will compensate for smaller operations will link allied warriors and promote a forces. Events will unfold so rapidly that time and kindred spirit among them. We should preserve timing become critical. The ability to act rapidly the capability to act unilaterally, but—like it or over great distances with a minimum of casualties not—coalition operations will be the norm. or damage (including harm to the ecosystem), Tomorrow’s subordinates and leaders will be dif- then withdraw or terminate quickly, may deter ferent. The same genetic material will be influ- potential adversaries. enced by a vastly different environment. By early There will be myriad interactive smart machines. in the next century both leaders and the led may The explosion in information technology, accord- appear as different from our perspective as those ing to Carl Builder, is the key of 1965 appear to us now. disturber of our time. “Brilliant” By 2025 we will have been systems—many small—are in- If you tell me, I’ll listen. joint for nearly fifty years, and escapable consequences of an If you show me, I’ll see. the speed bumps of today will eruption in computing power as If I experience it, I’ll learn. have been flattened. The demo- well as information technologies. graphic composition of Con- —Lao Tze Microchips could turn up in al- gress will be different. Whereas most anything by the middle of less than 40 percent of current the next century, which would make “dumb” members have served in the Armed Forces, the things smarter. Microchips communicating with a percentage may be much smaller over next thirty central processing unit will constitute a smart net- years. A significant aspect of continuity is that work. And when smart networks communicate, the military will obey the President, respect the almost brain-like systems will emerge. Admiral Constitution, and operate under the control of William Owens and others have referred to such civilian authority. an occurrence as a coming “system of systems.” In thirty years intelligence will be embedded in most Determining the Output things, many interacting with humans. Thus it is Given the likely attributes of the future envi- likely that the Armed Forces could ultimately be- ronment, we must examine the desired output as come an “organism of organisms.” a prelude to describing the input and the contri- Coalitions will be the norm. Technology and a bution of training and education. What skills and common dedication to improving quality of life will combine to shrink the planet and harmonize

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actions are needed in a world with these attrib- education aims at big constructs acquired in com- utes? In the most compressed terms possible, edu- plicated ways. Knowing the environment and the cation must help military professionals acquire a desired output, what then is the input? The Presi- variety of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. dent of 2025 may be attending high school at pre- A constantly improving understanding of human sent. The Chairman and service chiefs of the far motives and interpersonal skills necessary to achieve future are cadets or midshipmen, lieutenants or cooperation. In other words, the essence of leader- captains today. The environment and experiences ship may be perceiving what makes people tick. which form them will be significantly different. Understanding how human beings of different We thus begin with a different input: different backgrounds and cul- people with a different orientation. tures (or services) act in military professionals in the far th different circumstances The 13 Generation future must learn more about is integral to under- Differences in this generation are marked.4 They are the first to grow up with television and leadership and human behavior standing the sources and nature of coopera- mature with computers, video games, and tion, friction, and con- portable communications devices. They are fitter flict among people. Military professionals in the and healthier and destined to live longer. They far future must learn more about leadership and care for the planet and the environment. They human behavior—their own as well as that of have experienced more (earlier) than previous their subordinates and adversaries. generations. They demand stimulation, excite- A strong commitment to right conduct that al- ment, and fast paces in their lives. They seek di- most invariably results in right behavior. Note the versity. They will enter the Armed Forces for chal- qualifier “almost.” Because human nature will not lenges and responsibilities unavailable elsewhere. change, and freedom to choose is important, there What should PME offer these leaders of the next will be misconduct and mistakes in spite of our century? best efforts. In thirty years democracy will evolve, One answer is to ignore their differences and but it will remain based on a passion for individual force them into the mold of traditional PME; an liberty and the belief that people ought to respect environment, John Warden once said, in which the rule of law. As public servants in a society that “Socrates would be comfortable.” However, they cherishes a free press, we will come under closer will come to our hallowed halls already trained scrutiny than today. Erosion of public support and will expect no less challenge in education. may be worse than defeat in battle. Education can The traditional approach is not likely to work. provide confident assurance of virtue, right con- Rather, PME must come at the right time, offer duct, and fidelity to core values. the right experience, point to the right informa- The eagerness to discover new tools, the ability to tion, provide a nearly risk-free laboratory to inno- find inventive uses for existing tools, the initiative to in- vate, apply technology to unusual conditions, novate, and the ability to know—as well as the willing- make connections, and reach conclusions that ness to take—acceptable risks. The tools and ma- can be tested. If we can envision alternate futures, chines available for everything, including fighting, we can employ technology to create them as vir- may be as numerous in the far future as they are tual realities. If we can use technology to teach marvelous. Comparing technologies of 1965 with students to operate in them, we can prepare them those of today, space systems (except for spacelift), to cope with the real future. The role of tomor- stealth, and sensor improvements stand out as ini- row’s professional military educator is thus more tially military innovations. Strong advances in in- important, not less. Those responsible must, in formation, biochemistry, and medicine were devel- short, prepare each of their charges to be a “bril- oped by the private sector. Yet warriors of 1996– liant warrior.” 2025 must have the knowledge and incentive to Brilliant means training and educating peo- identify and select emerging developments that ple committed to the warrior ethic in such a way can enable dominant military capability: basic sci- that by 2025, compared to today, they will be ence (chemistry and physics), pharmaceuticals, smart, adept, agile, savvy—professional warriors. electronics, air and space, and information tech- They should have the attributes to survive, suc- nology. We need to know more about space opera- ceed, and lead others in whatever future presents tions since our quality of life and success in battle itself. They must be lifelong learners, thinkers, and will increasingly rely on them. prudent risk-takers. Our gift to them will be a PME Certainly areas of technical competence that system that forces them to think, encourages them training must provide will be more numerous, but to learn how to learn, and gives them the confidence to perform in new operating environments. Remember that there will be fewer warriors in the future and that cost will rival capability as

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a criterion for organizing, training, and equipping process. Whereas today many civilians at PME in- them. Two standards for evaluating PME are effec- stitutions may have tenure, tomorrow they may tiveness—when the desired knowledge is achieved be contract employees, visiting scholars, and for- and right actions result—and cost—when the mer warriors. Today, curricula are built around highest value is acquired and best return on an Clausewitz, Mahan, and the great captains. To- investment occurs. Both must be applied with an morrow, curricula may provide stressful experi- awareness of the changes that will unfold natu- ences in virtually real leadership situations and use rally between now and the far future. The debate joint doctrine and combined arms in coalition has begun, now it must be enlivened. wargames, along with instruction on ethics and area studies. Envisioning, creating, and teaching Forming Brilliant Warriors such curricula requires competent educators. Alternatives for meeting specific knowledge These and other challenges await us all: Con- and behavioral objectives are many. Choosing gress, special commissions, the Office of the Sec- will define their characteristics; but a PME system retary of Defense, Joint Staff, unified commands, must also choose its general characteristics. The services, training and education commands, and process of choosing is difficult: there are public troops. Those with responsibility for PME should laws to be satisfied; the Joint Staff is involved; remember Ervin Rokke’s tongue-in-cheek chal- and services, training commands, and using com- lenge: “As academies, we will advise others to mands participate. Strategy reviews, force struc- change but will likely ensure that revolutionary ture, roles and missions commissions, and new change takes place most slowly within our own legislation will also affect choices. organization.” 6 This will not suffice. If we fail to As the Armed Forces integrate and the de- adapt and innovate, we are not fit to be leaders, fense establishment shrinks, there will be efforts let alone educators. to reduce infrastructure costs and investment. Today, each service has both a command and Characteristics of PME staff and a war college. Tomorrow, service compe- Even as general characteristics of a system to tencies may be taught by robust departments on produce brilliant warriors are being chosen, spe- one campus—a move that the British are making. cific choices must be made. These elements, like Another alternative is the general ones, must satisfy certain criteria. I to combine all the in- proposed effectiveness and cost. The aim is to if we fail to adapt and innovate, termediate and senior bring the powerful learning experiences of life, we are not fit to be leaders, let colleges into one school leadership, and warfare to PME. Experience may for each service and remain the best teacher. Given such objectives, alone educators transform the National what are the alternatives? The answers are hy- Defense University into potheses which should be tested and debated. a PME institution for general/flag officers. Cur- rently, warriors are likely to attend both staff and A constantly improving understanding of human war college, spending twenty or more months in motivation and interpersonal skills is necessary to residence. Tomorrow, resident study may be achieve cooperation to attain the desired objective or much briefer. Today, selection for resident PME is effect. the responsibility of the services. Tomorrow, joint ■ more psychology, anthropology, or social science? selection boards may identify officers for school- ■ interactive learning with artificial intelligence as ing. a tutor or more classroom teachers? At present PME is technology-poor. In the fu- ■ virtual reality systems that allow the student to ture, and if the private sector is encouraged, it live in future environments? could have powerful technologies which could ■ more role-playing, case studies, biography? create different virtual realities and use resident ■ increased international officer and civilian en- PME as the crucible for learning experiences that rollment? ■ more theoretical models to study and evaluate? may not be duplicated in or provided to the field.5 ■ more virtual travel or military-to-military ex- For example, we might want a warrior to experi- changes? ence operating in a known environment such as ■ studies of mathematics and chaos theory? Somalia or Bosnia. But we may also want to create ■ multidisciplinary teaching teams? a less certain or future environment. ■ more history or less? PME is discontinuous and episodic. Resident Educating brilliant warriors requires that dis- and non-resident programs in the future may find tance learning expose the leaders to continuous warriors engaged in a deliberate life-long learning PME. Yet even distance learning must be tiered so that everyone receives a customized curriculum

108 JFQ / Spring 1996 Kelley

USS Independence. Photo Lab) Independence U.S. Navy (

with more eager students receiving a more chal- careers—some intentionally on short notice—to lenging course of studies. Some warriors, al- prepare the warrior for senior command and staff though in PME, may remain at the “mainte- responsibilities. Exceptionally well qualified offi- nance” level for their entire careers. Only those cers, as indicated by their selection for general or demonstrating command potential will attend flag rank, would go on to a National Defense Uni- resident PME. It need not last a year or occur at versity of the future just past the 20-year point. traditional sites. It could be a series of short resident learning opportunities. These would aim to A strong commitment to right conduct that al- provide experiences that distance learning can- most invariably results in right behavior. not. Foremost among them is performing in ■ more ethics education or less? stressful circumstances of alternate futures. Thus, ■ deeper study into the American system of gov- resident PME must begin to offer a more experi- ernment? ential curriculum that bears on conflict, human ■ a curriculum requiring difficult personal resource relations, and military leadership. Knowledge is allocation choices? about making connections and choices, so the ■ placing students in alternate future environ- approach must be multidisciplinary and multicul- ments with high ambiguity and uncertainty? tural. More international officers and civilians ■ more health and fitness activities or less? ■ more, fewer, or no seminars? must participate. One sort of learning opportu- ■ more or less reading and writing? nity in residence for air officers might focus on ■ more personal mentoring or less? joint and coalition air and space operations in an alternate future environment. A different type for Richard Kohn of the University of North naval officers would allow them to experience Carolina and others have expressed concern over that operational environment. These PME learn- the current state of civil-military relations in this 7 ing opportunities might occur several times a country. For America to maintain its position in year between the 10- and 15-year point in their the world, our leaders must appreciate national ideals, how government and decisionmaking work, and the Constitution. Moreover, they must be educated in the core values of their services as

Spring 1996 / JFQ 109 ■ BRILLIANT WARRIORS

well as professional ethics. It is on these founda- As critical components of national security tions that distance learning in the next 5 to 10 strategy, military training and PME intersect the in- years ought to be built, since civilian institutions terests of three of our most conservative institu- may not sufficiently emphasize them for warriors. tions: the military, academe, and the bureaucracy. In any event, education must broaden awareness These institutions are not so much adverse to of possible future challenges, and technology change as they are slow to change and quick to re- could allow warriors to experience them by persist unnecessary change. We have the brilliant edu- forming in virtually real futuristic environments. cators to help produce brilliant warriors, but we lack a vision of where we want PME to go and what The eagerness to discover new tools, the ability we want it to be. While classrooms may be wired to think creatively of new uses for existing tools, the and students may be issued laptops, these develop- initiative to innovate, and the ability to know—and ments could be little more than natural, although willingness to take—acceptable risks. unimaginative, improvements without vision. ■ a wargame, research, or book-centered curricu- There is no time like the present to begin lum? thinking and debating changes necessary to keep ■ more studies on the relationships between tech- PME relevant and valuable. The future, whatever nology and war or less? it proves to be, will be our measure. Unless we act ■ formal education and experience in creative now, thinking about the future will become so thinking? much intellectual arm-waving. We will not have ■ formal education in logic, rhetoric, and critical brilliant warriors to face tomorrow unless we pre- thinking? pare today. This discussion suggests some ways, ■ a mandated or self-selected curriculum? but they are not the only ones. We cannot dodge ■ opportunities to experiment with and fight different force structures? the obligation to choose: PME will change. That ■ formal education in operations research and op- being the case, we must choose wisely. JFQ erations analysis? ■ more emphasis on the sources of conflict and NOTES change or less? 1 Carl Builder, “Guns or Butter: The Twilight of a Brilliant warriors must be critical thinkers. Tradeoff?” paper presented to the Air University National I.B. Holley of Duke University has identified the Security Forum, Maxwell Air Force Base, May 1995. 2 lack of education in critical thinking as a serious Richard C. Chilcoat, “The ‘Fourth’ Army War Col- shortfall in today’s PME curricula. Such skills are lege: Preparing Strategic Leaders for the Next Century,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 4 (Winter 1995–96), pp. 3–17. enhanced by a curriculum that emphasizes re- 3 Gene McCall et al., New World Vistas: Air and Space search. The French use a research-centered model Power for the 21st Century, summary volume (Washington: in senior joint PME. Research into the past may be U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 1995), pp. 4–5. less germane to brilliant warriors than creative 4 Neil Howe and William Strauss, “The New Genera- and disciplined thinking about the future, al- tion Gap,” The Atlantic, vol. 270, no. 6 (December though studying the past warns us against repeat- 1992), pp. 67–89. ing its mistakes. More and better wargames (in- 5 Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York: Vin- cluding analytical ones) are needed to bolster tage Books, 1995), pp. 116–28. 6 curricula to improve critical and creative thinking. Conference Report: Professional Military Education and The study of joint matters—of the JOPES variety— the Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, SAIC document 95–6956, May 22–23, 1995. which is not educational, does not require critical 7 Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in thinking, and clutters senior PME curricula today, Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest, no. 35 would fill the 10- to 15-year interval of continu- (Spring 1994), pp. 3–17. ous distance learning. Readings and interactive discourse in strategy and history, making use of advanced distance learning, would offer basic dis- cernment for warriors who lead warriors. Perfor- mance in distance learning programs should be a factor in selection for resident PME.

110 JFQ / Spring 1996 Beneath the rule of men entirely great A broad-based education expands— and fuels the self-guided growth of— the pen is mightier than the sword. one’s horizons. It develops the intel- —Lord Lytton lect and inculcates the spirit of inquiry for a lifelong pursuit of learning. The measure of education, far from being the level or even the sum y of formal schooling, rests more in the degree of open-minded- Research, Writing, ness and active mental engagement it engenders. Any institution that relies on professionals for success and and the Mind of seeks to maintain an authentic

learning climate for individual commentar growth must require its members to read (to gain knowledge and the Strategist insight), discuss (to appreciate opposing views and subject their By GREGORY D. FOSTER own to rigorous debate), investi- gate (to learn how to ask good questions and find defensible answers), and write (to structure thoughts and articulate them s the pen truly mightier than the cope with—much less shape—a future clearly and coherently). sword, or are these timeless words of pronounced complexity, uncer- The only military enterprise actu- mere hyperbole? The pen and the tainty, and turbulence will depend in ally designed with education in mind is I sword are literal instruments for large measure on the prevalence of the senior level of professional military dealing with the world around us. But strategic thinkers in our midst. education (PME). Since PME is primar- they also are metaphors for shaping our Ideas and the ability to generate ily oriented to training, and since the actions by brain or brawn, wit or muscle. them seem increasingly likely, in fact, pressure to dilute education with prac- Whether one chooses pen or sword to be more important than weapons, tical training is always present, there may depend on whether one believes economic potential, diplomatic acu- are several things worth noting about knowledge is power. That belief, in turn, men, or technological advantage in de- officers who attend war colleges. First, may hinge on how knowledge is determining who exercises global leader- they are successful and able profession- fined and power understood. Can the ship and enjoys superpower status. als by military standards. Their fifteen expression of ideas move others as Thus it is imperative to develop, nur- or more years of service have demon- swiftly, as effectively, as permanently as ture, and engage strategic thinkers at strated that they are mission-oriented the use of force or the lure of riches? all levels—critical, creative, broad- and get things done. Most arrive pre- Does truth—or simply the command of gauged visionaries with the intellect to pared to engage in discussion, even ideas—provide leverage over others? Are though they may find themselves ideas weapons? Conversely, can force strategic thinkers are broadly immersed in a climate of candor inspire and persuade or only coerce? largely alien to them. Many come If strategy is ultimately about ef- educated, not narrowly trained prepared to read, something they fectively exercising power, the answers may have regarded as a luxury in to these questions may convey a good dissect the status quo, grasp the big past assignments. Some arrive ready to deal about our faculty to think strategi- picture, discern important relation- write. But few are really equipped to do cally; and that ability, especially among ships among events, generate imagina- research, which they see as too acade- military officers, may reveal even more tive possibilities for action, and oper- mic. They have succeeded thus far about the future of the U.S. military ate easily in the conceptual realm. without it and don’t expect to do it in and America’s place in the world. Based Almost by definition, strategic the future, especially as they attain on recent events, there is ample ground thinkers are broadly educated, not higher rank. Finally, they see them- to conclude that our ability simply to narrowly trained. They seek not sim- selves as real-world decisionmakers ply direction but to grapple with the who act, not scholars who ponder. underlying questions of whether, Gregory D. Foster teaches political science and sociology at why, and what if. the Industrial College of the Armed Forces where he has held the J. Carlton Ward distinguished professorship.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 111 ■ MIND OF THE STRATEGIST

What do these observations sug- dusty archives or looking for obscure Like information, opinions are not gest about the military as an institu- texts? Is it conducting controlled exper- knowledge. Rather they validate the tion? On the one hand war college stu- iments in a sterile laboratory? Is it truism that a little knowledge is a dan- dents, although a special and relatively meticulously observing and document- gerous thing. Opinions often derive small segment of the officer corps, are ing human behavior? It could, of from nothing more substantial than entirely representative of their profes- course, be any or all of these things; but impression, assumption, or specula- sion. They have attitudes and beliefs it need not be—and in fact, in the sense tion—things qualitatively quite distinct that mirror prevailing military culture. intended here, it generally isn’t. from reasoned judgment born of con- They also form the pool from which In simple terms, research is sub- crete fact. Where there is a foundation tomorrow’s generals and admirals will stantial inquiry into a question, prob- of knowledge, it is typically only partial be selected. As such, their views will lem, or subject which requires the knowledge that obscures its own in- have a major impact on the dominant identification, collection, and objec- completeness and feeds the sort of false military ethos. What is important to tive treatment of evidence on all sides conviction that can so easily mutate them is what will be important to the of an issue to reach a well-reasoned, into zealotry or bigotry.

commentary military as an institution. What they defensible conclusion. Research is an It is knowledge—not preconcep- think led to their success is what the exploration in critical thinking, not a tion, predisposition, or conventional institution will emphasize in preparing polemical exercise; an investigation, wisdom—that we ought to strive for. their successors. That is what research helps us ac- War college students provide clear the military largely discourages quire. Moreover, doing research is a evidence that the military places little window to the process of reasoning. stock in serious, expository writing— independent thought and It is one thing to hold attitudes or much less in research. These officers critical inquiry beliefs. It is another to understand are the cream of the crop. Some write how we arrived at such imperfect well; most do not—although they conceptions of reality—whether by think they do. Some show an affinity not a crusade; a quest for truth, not a way of gut or brain. Experience arms for research; most do not and generally vehicle for propaganda; evidence in us almost always with conviction, see no reason they should. They are search of an answer, not an answer in hardly ever with wisdom—yielding victims of a system that prizes decid- search of evidence. what is, to our minds, unassailable re- edly non-objective advocacy, adheres What is the value of doing received truth. These convictions often to stultifyingly routine staff proce- search? For one thing, it adds to our blind us to real truth and, in the dures, and relies on rigid protocols for knowledge. At least that should be its process, lead us to deny the validity transmitting the written word. Taken intent. Only by looking beneath the and even the legitimacy of alternate in combination and over time, such surface can we escape the wages of ig- points of view. practices breed habits that are largely norance. Ignorance is not bliss. It is As an institution, the military antithetical to sound research and the height of irresponsibility—a breed- largely discourages independent good writing. ing ground for incomprehension, in- thought and critical inquiry. This is an Even conceding such conditions, competence, and intolerance. What we unfortunate, self-defeating contradic- the question remains: Should the mili- don’t know will hurt us; even worse, it tion for a profession whose raison d’etre tary be producing academic eggheads? can hurt others. is closely tied to outwitting adversaries Certainly not. But it should be produc- We are surrounded by a flood of and grappling with uncertainty. Undue ing strategic decisionmakers, planners, information—more than ever before. emphasis on obedience and loyalty to and advisers whose expertise is defined But information is just an input to the the chain of command stifles dissent less by narrow knowledge and arcane thought processes that supposedly pro- and erodes the spirit of inquiry so criti- technical and operational detail, less duce knowledge. More, or even better, cal to institutional vitality. Pervasive by dutiful obedience to authority, than information does not necessarily lead doctrine, regulations, and operating by a sophisticated grasp of complex is- to more, or even any, knowledge. In procedures breed an orthodoxy that sues and a capacity to influence major fact, relative to the amount of informa- drives out any felt need for originality. events. That is where research and tion available, there now may be less Even the deeply ingrained sense of in- writing—and the requisite intellectual knowledge. Is that possible? Could we dividual duty so central to the institu- disposition and discipline to do literally know less than our forebears? tional ethos tends to be subverted into them—come into play. The evidence must speak for itself. It a mind-numbing workaholism that certainly is true that the more we learn, leaves many dedicated military profes- Eyes and Ears of the Mind the more we realize the extent of our ig- sionals drained of sufficient energy to What is research? The answer, less norance. It also is true that for every systematically develop their powers of obvious than one might suppose, is crit- question we answer, new ones arise that reflection and contemplation. More- ical to establishing the utility of the en- beg for yet more answers. over, there are few rewards for such terprise. Is research navigating through Just as we are inundated with in- “unproductive” intellectual pursuits. formation, so too are we deluged by opinion—on every conceivable topic.

112 JFQ / Spring 1996 Foster

By the time officers reach senior rank, smoke and beyond rhetorical mirrors is have begun the transformation from they have been thoroughly schooled what distinguishes the exceptional de- unquestioning consumer to critical— in what to think, yet poorly prepared cisionmaker or strategist. perhaps even original—thinker. in how to think. And if they have spent As strange as it may seem, would- the staff time expected of most officers be generals or admirals are potentially Tongue of the Mind by this stage in their career, they will more vulnerable to manipulation by When Cervantes referred to the have fully internalized distinctly anti- alleged experts than neophyte political pen as “the tongue of the mind” he y rational thought processes of success- appointees—at least when it comes to may well have meant to distinguish the ful bureaucratic and political advocacy. major policy issues. Officers spend mental relationship from the physical Aside from yielding knowledge, their pre-executive careers in a rigidly one that connects mouth to brain. After research releases its practitioners from hierarchical system where they are ex- all, many people speak at great length the grip of certitude that characterizes pected to defer to authority and attend without prior thought. The mouth apparatchiks or true believers. Unlike to all-consuming details that free their doesn’t require high-octane fuel; it can the latter—who are content to let au- seniors to deal with weightier matters. run on fumes. Writing is different. It

thority figures tell them what to This leaves little opportunity to look can’t be supplemented by vocal inflec- commentar think—those who follow the rigors of up from the weeds. By the time they tion, body language, or immediate clari- inquiry learn firsthand how elusive an- are eligible for senior schooling, defer- fication. It has to stand on its own. swers can be, how much effort goes ence—to rank and expertise—is in- Thus Boswell characterized truly good into the search for them, and how de- grained in their character. Moreover, writing as “disciplined talking.” pendent for success any such search is they are likely to be narrowly focused However, only in an elementary on the questions that precede it. specialists who, if they have literary in- sense is writing merely a tool for com- While research is basically about terests beyond doctrinal manuals and municating. More importantly, it is a searching and re-searching for answers, military biographies, are more at- catalyst for ideas. Think of what hap- it is the habit of inquiry growing out tracted to trade publications than to pens when one writes—even if it is of such pursuits that is ultimately im- broad-gauged policy journals. only a perfunctory memo. Is the pen portant—to strategic thinkers no less When these officers are then ex- simply a mechanical extension of the than to intelligence analysts, detec- posed to larger issues and the daunting hand by which thoughts flow from tives, or other investigators. When we volume of opinion on the market, their head to paper? Or doesn’t the act of do research, we learn how to ask good tendency is to defer to purported ex- writing stimulate the mental juices and questions, what constitutes good an- perts who have found their way into give birth to new ideas? Doesn’t the swers, and what it takes to find them. print. At that point, realizing there is struggle to choose the right word or We discover where to look for evi- little that hasn’t already been said or weave a seamless paragraph elicit no- dence, how to weigh it, and how much thought on any subject, they confirm tions that weren’t there before? Does- credence to give its sources. We learn Abraham Lincoln’s adage: “Books serve n’t this force us to be more exact? what is and isn’t defensible. Most criti- to show a man that those original Writing has two consequential cally, we learn to identify shoddy or thoughts of his aren’t very new at all.” purposes. First, it enhances our ability specious reasoning. In the final analy- Once past this initial stage of intellec- to think. In fact, it could be called a sis, the ability to see through mental tual subjugation, though, these officers high-stress performance test for the quickly discover how much more detri- mind. Second, it is a way to leave tus there is than quality. They then will

Calvin and Hobbes by Bill Watterson

Spring 1996 / JFQ 113 ■ MIND OF THE STRATEGIST

something tangible to posterity. Few of imperatives engender a minimalist ap- banal. As with all aesthetic forms, the us think about legacies. But when all is proach to writing that sets its own di- final arbiter is the eye of the beholder. said and done, ideas, schools of minished standard of literacy. But what if readers, immersed in bu- thought, and worldviews are the One might ask what effect the reaucratic discourse, are unable to dis- lifeblood of institutions, regimes, and stunted forms of normal bureaucratic tinguish the good from the bad? societies. This is a point that should communication have on the thinking Most military writing tends to be not be lost on the military. of decisionmakers and their staffs. Do descriptive and reportorial. This is How does writing affect thinking? strategic failures reflect a dearth of stra- comforting to a culture that values the Studies indicate that writing activates a tegic thinking stemming from retarded factual over the hypothetical, the lit- part of the brain that otherwise lies thought processes? Might these proc- eral over the figurative, the authorita- dormant. Only when hand and eye esses, in turn, be developed more fully— tive over the speculative. But descrip- work in tandem to put words on paper tapping unused regions of the brain— tive writing, far from being mind- do some thoughts buried in our sub- by more attention to good writing? expanding, can be mind-numbing. It conscious come to life. And when we Good writing and good thinking requires little thought beyond the lin-

commentary seek clarity, coherence, and a convinc- are not the same thing; but experience ear, one-dimensional variety—only ing counterpoise to anticipated criti- suggests that they are highly cor- awareness and accuracy. cisms, we exercise our minds more related. The mere effort of trying to Good writing thrives on concep- write well almost assuredly im- tualization born of originality. Think- good writing and good thinking proves thinking. By contrast, ing for oneself requires the higher are not the same thing; but they sloppy, convoluted, pedantic writ- order intellectual skills of analysis (dis- ing reveals thinking of comparable secting and illuminating concepts), are highly correlated quality. Good writing requires synthesis (combining concepts and practice and exposure to the good generating new ones), and evaluation strenuously than if we engaged in writing of others. While writing more (establishing criteria and making judg- more conversation or even debate. doesn’t guarantee writing well, it im- ments). Whereas employing these Experienced bureaucrats might proves the odds. But if one works higher order skills focuses on matters argue that one need only draft read- where mediocrity is the norm, it may of substance, another feature of good able correspondence and generate be impossible to tell the difference. Ex- writing—logical organization—con- cryptic point papers and vu-graphs to posure to truly good writing, then, is cerns the structure and coherence of succeed. Serious writing is neither re- the only remedy. an argument. It exposes the anatomy quired nor appreciated. Bosses want There are no universal standards of one’s thinking by asking: Is there a completed actions that signify produc- of good writing nor foolproof ways of logical flow of ideas from an introduc- tivity—and that beget routinization learning it. Substantive writing that is tion, which states an author’s hypothe- and standardization—and decision- riddled with technical flaws may be sis, to the main body of the composi- makers insist that whatever impinges considered every bit as good or bad as tion, where he develops a central on their schedules be short and sweet. technically flawless writing that is thought and presents evidence, to a Being busy, they prefer to be briefed conclusion, where he brings his formu- rather than to read. These managerial lation to closure? If there is no such

Calvin and Hobbes by Bill Watterson

114 JFQ / Spring 1996 Foster flow, if the elements of the argument ensure the appropriateness and credi- an institutional commitment to educa- and their linkages are not clear, if read- bility of their imagery. tion that includes serious and sus- ers are left confused, the author has Felicitous style can lift the mind to tained attention to writing and re- failed. A meandering argument reflects impressive heights. Quite the opposite search. The task is to convince the haphazard thinking, while merely might be said of the most elemental military that such a commitment, long stringing together the words of others feature of good writing—grammatical absent, is in its best interest. betrays a lazy mind. and mechanical soundness—where the It is ironic and disappointing that y Style is the most telling indicator emphasis is on strict adherence to rec- virtually all the reputed “experts” on of quality writing. It gives writing the ognized standards of correct language strategic and military affairs familiar to power to inspire. To the denizens of usage. For many, such considerations the public are civilian academicians, any bureaucracy—including military are too mechanistic and inconsequen- consultants, and journalists. Where are professionals—style is basically anti- tial to warrant serious attention. Yet it the great military minds of our day? style: the turgid, stilted bureaucratese would be a mistake to conclude that Are there any? Or are they too busy to that over time has infiltrated their care? Is that why we must suffer ex-

minds, subverted their language, and it is ironic that virtually all the perience-impaired analysts pontifi- commentar become their lingua franca. As anyone cating on strategy after advancing exposed to it for a nanosecond knows, reputed “experts” on strategic straight from graduate school to bureaucratese is a bastard tongue dis- affairs are civilian think tanks, or journalists-cum-seers tinguished by its reliance on passive expounding on the future of war- voice (the time-honored way of ob- fare? Is that why disparaging refer- scuring accountability), its often-in- seemingly rote compliance with rules ences to the so-called “military mind” scrutable circumlocutions to accom- of word form and placement, punctua- endure? modate the rules of formal English, tion, and spelling is somehow unre- These are questions we should and its blatant glorification of jargon. lated to the quality of one’s thinking. ask. The military, as the most action- Jargon has no purpose other than There is much to be said for flout- oriented institution in a mind-numb- to enable insiders to converse among ing linguistic conventions whose only ingly action-oriented society, tends to themselves while excluding the unini- justification seems to be that they de- eschew intellectual pursuits. Like oth- tiated. It reaches its zenith in the una- rive from grammarians of yore. But it is ers who subscribe to the work ethic, bridged correspondence and memo- an altogether different matter to assault military professionals work extremely randa that are bureaucracy’s lifeblood. literacy through unclear, imprecise, hard and feel good about having ex- Even material written for public con- inconsistent, even illogical thought: erted all that effort in the service of the sumption, which is subject to radical subject-verb disagreement, dangling Nation. But the work many of us do is editorial surgery before release, can modifiers, mixed construction, vague far more consumptive than produc- provide a telling glimpse into just how pronouns, or sentence fragments. By tive; it burns calories and consumes deep-seated the predisposition to “lan- the same token, technical correctness time but leaves little more in its wake guaginal mayhem” truly is. alone cannot compensate for or dis- than new work for others. The antithesis of—and antidote guise the link between monotonous Actions are fleeting, but ideas en- to—jargonizing is, simply, plain Eng- prose and monotone thinking—as dure—primarily through the written lish. Writing clearly is the first rule of when someone invariably uses declara- word. If men like Clausewitz, Mahan, style. The key to writing plain English, tive sentences punctuated only by com- and Liddell Hart are icons of strategic say its proponents, is to “write the way mas and periods. thought, it is because their ideas and you talk.” This is indeed sound advice The elements of good writing— the wisdom contained in them have for those with a firm command of the higher order intellectual skills, logical been transmitted through their writ- English language. But since many of organization, stylistic elegance, and ings. Armed only with the pen, they us—senior officials included—don’t al- grammatical and mechanical sound- left indelible marks that extended their ways speak distinctly or cogently, more ness—bear a demonstrable relation to influence beyond that of their sword- appropriate advice would be to write as the powers of the mind. And these wielding brothers in arms. There is no we ought to talk. powers, more than arms, wealth, tech- reason we should not be capable of de- Writing with clarity establishes nology, or diplomatic and political ma- veloping future generations of strate- only a floor of stylistic acceptability or neuvering, will determine how well we gists of the same caliber who can leave competence. True stylistic elegance steer our way into the future. an equally rich legacy. JFQ comes from the more sophisticated use of such techniques as allusion, irony, Warriors as Intellects and the nonliteral figures of speech To be effective in the strategic that literary types call “tropes”: meta- realm, the military must produce its phor, simile, hyperbole, and the like. own strategic thinkers. This demands Such devices enrich language and offer authors higher levels of both concep- tualization and precision—if only to

Spring 1996 / JFQ 115 DaysDays ofof Officer on board USS Hornet studying reconnaissance photos of Hong Kong.

FutureFuture Past:Past: Naval Historical Center (Charles Kerlee) Joint Intelligence in World War II By JAMES D. MARCHIO

Ample experience has demonstrated that neither Army intelligence nor Naval intelligence is complete without the other. On theatre and higher level, joint intelligence is necessary. Liaison and interchange of information is not enough to secure complete exploitation. —Report issued by the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (November 8, 1945)

oint intelligence existed long before the dissemination—remain familiar to JTF comman- Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Persian Gulf ders and J-2 staffs today. So too are problems War. During World War II, joint intelligence posed by bureaucratic infighting over roles and re- Jorganizations and operations were initiated sources as well as reluctance on the part of some at national and theater level. These efforts in- to fully support joint efforts. creased collection, enhanced production, and ex- Ultra and Magic are terms that frequently pedited dissemination of critical intelligence to come to mind when military professionals and commanders as well as national policymakers. scholars discuss the role of intelligence during The emergence of joint intelligence between 1942 World War II; but joint is a term that deserves in- and 1945 and its fate after the war provide valu- clusion in such discussions. While lacking the im- able lessons for today. The problems it con- pact of Ultra or Magic, joint intelligence efforts fronted—conflicting intelligence reports, inaccu- contributed to Allied operations in virtually every rate battle damage assessment, and inadequate theater. Joint intelligence operations enhanced collection, improved production, and expedited dissemination of critical information. Nonethe- Major James D. Marchio, USAF, is assigned to the Joint Exercise Support less, joint intelligence efforts during the war were Division, Directorate for Intelligence (J-2), Joint Staff, and has taught at neither universally accepted nor appreciated. the Joint Military Intelligence College.

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Origins of Joint Intelligence the Solomon Islands and North Africa. But prob- Several forces played a role in shaping the lems arose with added requirements. Duplication evolution of joint intelligence operations during of effort, competition over collection resources, World War II. Intelligence failures in the first delayed or unsuitable dissemination, and con- year—from Pearl Harbor to North Africa—were flicting assessments over enemy losses increas- the most important factors that pushed reforms ingly affected military and civilian intelligence and, in turn, joint intelligence. However, the support. For instance, in arguing for creation of a changing nature of the conflict, the British expe- special joint body to weigh enemy casualties in rience, and bureaucratic battles over a national March 1943, the secretary of the Joint Intelli- intelligence organization which predated the war gence Committee (JIC) lamented that a joint esti- all influenced how joint intelligence emerged. mate of casualties had not yet been made; more- Senior military leaders were aware of intelli- over, estimates available in Washington varied by gence problems and were leading proponents of over 100 percent. joint solutions. General Other forces spurred joint initiatives. The George C. Marshall and Ad- British experience during the first three years of joint intelligence operations miral Ernest J. King recog- the war provided a combat tested endorsement of joint operations. London had operated a joint in- emerged at both national and nized that national intelligence was fragmented. telligence committee since 1940, using central- theater levels Multiple agencies were pro- ized, coordinated intelligence to guide military ducing intelligence without and civilian intelligence operations. Congres- coordination. This led to duplication, incomplete sional prompting and previous efforts by the Joint analysis, and inadequate dissemination. Ultimately Board to encourage joint operations and greater what was provided had little use to planners, deci- interservice cooperation added pressure as well. Fi- sionmakers, or operators. As Captain Ellis M. Zach- nally, William J. Donovan’s push to establish a na- arias, USN, observed: “We found that very little tional intelligence organization—embodied first truly valuable information was produced which in the Coordinator of Information and later in the higher echelons could accept as absolutely reliable Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—generated fur- and useful for orientation and action.” ther interest in reform and joint solutions. The conduct of the war in Europe and the An Organization Emerges Pacific also played a large role in determining the extent of joint intelligence operations. In trying Joint intelligence operations during World to satisfy the requirements of large-scale offensive War II emerged in each phase of the intelligence operations, intelligence personnel slowly discov- cycle—collection, production, and dissemina- ered that the solution lay with joint efforts. tion—and at both national and theater level. Joint intelligence bloomed during 1943 and Collection. One of the first areas to witness joint 1944 as U.S. forces transitioned from basically de- operations was collection. The creation of joint in- fensive to offensive operations requiring exten- telligence collection agencies (JICAs) in 1943 was sive interservice cooperation. The island hopping intended to ensure adequate support at both na- campaign in the Pacific and Allied operations in tional and theater levels. The Joint Chiefs and other the Mediterranean and in Europe emphasized national-level organizations recognized early that large-scale joint operations which, in turn, re- theater intelligence organizations had “neither the quired joint intelligence. As one senior naval in- trained personnel nor the time to collect and pre- telligence officer observed about the central Pa- pare the information needed in Washington for cific: “As we move westward the Army part is strategic planning and training purposes.” In argu- becoming more and more important. We need ing for JICAs, proponents cited less duplication, Army men we can expose to Ultra and who [can more effective use of skilled personnel and re- provide]...assistance in Army Order of Battle, in sources, and reduced operational expenditures. Army Air Force Order of Battle, and if they have JICAs were operational in four theaters: such a thing in Army traffic analysis.” Increased North Africa (JICANA, later renamed JICAMED), land-based air operations and massive bombing Africa-Middle East (JICAME), China-India-Burma in both theaters likewise generated requirements (JICACIB, which in 1945 became only India- for target and flak intelligence and post-strike Burma), and China (JICA/China). They were at- analysis. tached to their respective theater headquarters as The availability of new sources also increased separate staff sections. Composed of Army and the need for joint intelligence exploitation. Little Navy officers together with civilians and enlisted intelligence other than Ultra was initially avail- support personnel, JICAs ranged from 27 person- able in the autumn of 1942; but the volume of nel in JICA/China to 77 in JICAME. captured documents, prisoners, and aerial pho- tographs increased greatly as operations began in

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Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, in January 1944, prior to pre-invasion bombardment. Naval Historical Center

JICAs performed three primary tasks. First, Production. At national and theater level, they collected, screened, and transmitted to joint intelligence production accompanied joint Washington “all information, exclusive of com- collections. JIC was formed in 1941 to prepare bat intelligence, within the theater” desired by daily summaries and such special information the War and Navy Departments. As theater collec- and intelligence studies as were needed by higher tion coordinators, JICAs provided logistical sup- authority or indicated by the situation. The J.I.C. port, tasking, and guidance to all human intelli- Daily, and later the Weekly Summary, partially met gence (HUMINT) sources, including OSS agents, this requirement. JIC eliminated a host of largely in the JICA area of responsibility. Lastly, JICAs en- redundant intelligence publications by replacing sured lateral dissemination of pertinent intelli- the OSS The War This Week, War Department Situ- gence among various agencies, military and civil- ation and Capabilities of the Enemy, and Office of ian, within each theater. Naval Intelligence (ONI) Fortnightly Summary of JICAs were assisted by the Joint Intelligence Current National Situation. Agency Reception Center (JIARC), created in Au- Serving as the permanent JIC working com- gust 1943 in Washington. JIARC managed admin- mittee, the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) turned out istrative instructions and support to JICAs. Impor- intelligence estimates on enemy strength, capa- tantly, it coordinated War Department collection bilities, and intentions, and specialized technical requirements and requests for information (RFIs) subjects. Intelligence estimates drafted in 1942 re- sent to theater JICAs. JIARC worked closely with ported on both German and Japanese economic theater JICAs to ensure the appropriate agencies and military status as well as studies on the “Fea- or JICA assets were tasked to satisfy the collection sibility of Supplying Russia via the Bering Strait” requirement. and “Axis Munitions Capabilities.” By 1943, JIS was working closely in producing intelligence estimates in direct support of the Joint War Plans Committee.

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But efforts went beyond current and estima- of Japan). In fact, JICPOA weekly production tive intelligence support. The Joint Intelligence eventually reached 2,000,000 sheets of printed in- Study Publishing Board (JISPB), with representa- telligence and over 150,000 photographic prints. tives from the War Department G–2, ONI, OSS, A–2 Dissemination. Mirroring and facilitating col- [Army Air Corps], and Office of Chief of Engineers, lection and production were efforts in the area of was created in May 1943 when it became clear that dissemination. Both JIARC and the Joint Electron- the activities of G–2, ONI, and OSS were duplica- ics Information Agency (JEIA) had key roles in tive, particularly in preparing foreign area studies. speeding dissemination of critical intelligence. Consequently, JISPB commissioned a series of joint JIARC, for example, formed a joint selection panel Army-Navy intelligence studies (JANIS) that pro- for prompt inspection, selection, and centralized vided basic topographical data on likely opera- distribution of all JICA reports. The panel helped tional areas. These studies included information reduce the number of copies needed from the from 20 government agencies and ranged from field while providing a more efficient mechanism Bulgaria to Japan and Indochina. Over 2,000 copies to disseminate information. JIARC also managed of each JANIS study were disseminated. courier service to ensure prompt, secure delivery Joint production also emerged in target, tech- of JICA-collected intelligence that made weekly nical, facilities, and battle damage assessment in- distribution runs and provided direct contact and telligence. In late 1942, the Joint Army-Navy As- exchange of opinions between intelligence officers sessment Committee (JANAC) was convened at in Washington and those in the field. Marshall’s request to provide more accurate esti- The purpose of JEIA was to improve dissemi- mates of enemy naval strength and to eliminate nation of time sensitive technical intelligence. Es- service disputes over enemy naval and merchant tablished by the Joint Communications Board in losses. This committee functioned throughout the October 1943, its efforts to speed dissemination war and produced reports with detailed informa- of electronic information among and within the tion on each sinking. Simi- Army, Navy, and the Office of Scientific Research initiatives to vest more power larly, the Joint Target and Development were critical to maintaining Group, Technical Air Intel- our lead in radio communication, radar, and elec- in joint bodies met resistance ligence Center, and Joint tronic devices, and in developing effective coun- throughout 1942 and 1943 Airfield Group brought to- termeasures. As part of the JEIA effort, a joint gether officers from each panel met daily to examine collected informa- service and often represen- tion. When necessary, critical technical intelli- tatives from OSS, Foreign Economic Administra- gence reports were reproduced overnight and dis- tion, and Royal Air Force in the hope of avoiding seminated the next day. JEIA also prevented redundant and conflicting production. Launched needless duplication and unnecessary dissemina- between June and November 1944, these activities tion by cross-checking incoming reports against proved essential in identifying Japan’s strategic vul- previously received ones. JEIA processed 10,000 nerabilities and guiding allied exploitation efforts. electronic documents during its two-year exis- Joint intelligence production extended to tence, with nearly 80 percent on an expedited theater level as well. Each JICA, for instance, pro- basis (16–24 hours). duced limited theater intelligence, conducting studies when other means were unavailable. The Resistance and Success most significant theater production effort, how- Establishing and operating joint intelligence ever, occurred in the central Pacific, with the organizations like JICA, JICPOA, JISPB, and JEIA Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area was anything but quick or easy. Initiatives to vest (JICPOA). This activity was established in Septem- more power in joint bodies met resistance at na- ber 1943 to collect, collate, evaluate, and dissemi- tional and theater level throughout 1942 and nate strategic and tactical intelligence for the 1943. Moreover, even when launched many joint commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Truly intelligence efforts were not as broad or binding joint, it fully integrated representatives from all as some had hoped. Ambivalent support resulted the services. By 1945, it had 1,800 personnel as- in ad hoc committee arrangements based more signed to its facility in Hawaii as well as hundreds on voluntary cooperation than structured agree- at its Advanced Intelligence Center (AIC) on ments or procedures. Guam and at other locations. JICPOA became an The failure to set up the Joint Intelligence intelligence factory, producing various area hand- Agency (JIA) is the most poignant example of books, maps, and intelligence summaries aimed such resistance. Although backed by King and at supporting theater combat operations. The Marshall in Autumn 1942, JIA was never estab- products were used by operational planners and lished. The original proposal envisioned a strong, commanders in drafting plans for operations from Galvanic (Tarawa) to Downfall (the invasion

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centralized agency that could unify disparate in- that it can operate in harmony with the wishes of telligence collection, production, and dissemina- the theater commander, and that its product is tion efforts by the services. After favorable review commensurate with the cost in personnel and by the Joint Chiefs, the JIA proposal was returned money.” to both the War Department G–2 and ONI direc- Similar opposition arose at theater level. De- tor for further study and development. Yet signifi- spite strong support from the Marine Corps as cant differences remained. Ultimately a compro- well as Pacific Fleet for forming a joint intelli- mise was forwarded to JCS in March 1943 which gence center in Spring 1942, JICPOA did not be- reduced JIA authority and role. But the Joint come a reality for another 14 months. In re- Chiefs were reluctant to approve it. Admiral sponse to CINCPAC, the vice chief of naval William D. Leahy told his colleagues that he saw operations noted that after looking at inherent no reason to establish the agency. He asserted difficulties in directly initiating such a joint pro- that JIC was performing all the necessary intelli- ject, it was preferable to constitute the activity as gence functions for JCS. He warned that “it primarily a naval center. would be inadvisable for urgent information of Why were the initiatives opposed? Several an intelligence nature to be delayed by being related explanations emerge. Foremost was the passed through an additional agency.” Respond- belief that joint organizations did not fully appre- ing to Leahy’s concerns, King asserted that “there ciate service-unique requirements. Consequently, should be no delay whatever, but rather that a they could not meet individual service needs or more valuable product should result.” General those of component commanders. Interservice as Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold suggested that the sub- well as intraservice friction also undermined sup- ject deserved more study before approval; thus port. Despite many cooperative G–2/ONI projects JCS directed the deputy chiefs of staff to review during the war, each maintained its own separate the issue further. intelligence structure and resisted any attempts to More bureaucratic delay and reorganization restrict its operations. Intraservice discord like- within G–2 and ONI eventually sealed the fate of wise made joint efforts more difficult to conduct. JIA. In late March, the Army deputy chief of staff How could consensus be reached among the ser- recommended against the G–2/ONI directive, vices when the Signal Corps and G–2 were bat- proposing a vastly different structure based on tling over control of Ultra information within the joint regional intelligence organizations. The first War Department? such organization would control activities in the Joint intelligence also faced difficulties be- Western Hemisphere south of the United States cause it required new organizations, procedures, with headquarters in Miami. G–2 concurred with and thinking. Joint intelligence initiatives con- the regional proposal but expressed doubts about fronted bureaucratic inertia and a legacy that whether this structure would work in combat the- viewed intelligence as a service prerogative. Col- aters. ONI, on the other hand, refused to commit lecting, producing, and disseminating intelli- to the proposal until its internal reorganization gence jointly forced officers trained by individual was completed. The joint deputy chiefs advised services to operate in very different ways. More- JCS in May that the case was in the hands of the over, without a strong proponent or institutional Navy and that action was suspended. Six more sponsor in the intelligence community, joint in- months of inactivity prompted the joint deputy telligence initiatives encountered an uphill battle. chiefs to recommend that the proposal be re- Ironically, progress in joint initiatives under- moved from the JCS agenda and pursued as mined larger, more comprehensive efforts such as “practical.” JIA. Opponents cited progress in operating JICAs Even approved initiatives reflected such am- and JIC in arguing against further measures. Simi- bivalence and constraints on joint organizations. larly, wartime requirements were a dual-edged For instance, the directive authorizing JICAs gen- sword, spurring joint initiatives while warning erated considerable disagreement between G–2 against excessive tinkering in the face of the and ONI over both the breadth of their mission enemy. and the control of intelligence assets. The nar- Finally, the personalities, viewpoints, and in- rower G–2 interpretation won out. Nevertheless, telligence requirements of theater commanders JICAs were almost abolished shortly after stand- and their staffs were key to how joint intelligence ing up. They were operated on a trial basis for was received. Unlike the Pacific Ocean Area, the three months with a restriction “that no addi- South West Pacific Area (SWPA) never developed tional JICAs be established until those [in opera- a joint intelligence organization. According to the tion demonstrate] that the organization is sound; after-action report, the reason was that the chief of staff failed to recognize its importance and G–2 lacked the power to accomplish it. One observer confirmed this situation, noting that efforts to

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Joint Intelligence Command Pacific Ocean Area at Pearl Harbor. Naval Historical Center Nimitz visiting fleet air photo squadron on Guam, May 1945. Naval Historical Center

create a joint organization in SWPA were unlikely and intelligence eliminated much duplication to succeed: “I am fully aware of the fact that poli- and resulted in a much greater proportion of in- tics and personalities make any such reorganiza- telligence as distinguished from unevaluated in- tion impossible.” formation reaching Washington. The JICA report Ultimately the operational records of such cited the agency’s “joint character . . . for an econ- activities were their best weapon in overcoming omy of personnel and a reduction in unnecessary opposition and silencing criticism at national and duplication.” The JICPOA experience provided an theater level. JICA, JANIS, JEIA, and JICPOA were even stronger endorsement of joint intelligence lauded for their efforts and products. The chief of and the synergism of joint efforts. The end result staff, Pacific Ocean Areas, praised JANIS studies, was enhanced support to military commanders indicating that they were indispensable refer- and policymakers. ences for the shore-based planner. Similarly, JICPOA earned high marks for designing and pro- War’s End ducing a target-area map acceptable to all ground, The final months of the war and its after- naval, and air forces. And JEIA success in cutting math are indicative of how far joint intelligence the dissemination time for important intelligence had progressed in four years. Yet this period also information from 60 days to 16 hours was much highlights the reservations some still held regard- appreciated by military and civilian organizations ing joint operations. Encouraged by success dur- and contributed considerably to advancing the ing the war and praise in various after-action re- electronics and counter-measures program. ports, several joint organizations continued after The process by which joint intelligence was the cessation of hostilities. JIC continued to serve produced also won praise because it yielded qual- the Joint Staff and government policymakers, ity results with limited resources and dissemi- providing current intelligence and other support. nated it quickly and appropriately. In evaluating In discussing its future after Japan’s surrender, JIC its own accomplishments, JICA concluded that the coordination effected by its theater JICAs in the collection of non-operational information

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consumption at national and theater level. It also decreased the need for large volumes of intelligence and its rapid dissemination. Domestic political pressure to demobilize and cut military spending also spurred efforts to dissolve wartime overhead. With established Army and Navy intelligence organizations in place, some saw joint intelligence agencies as redundant and expendable. Opponents cited the increased coordination and additional bureaucratic layers required for joint operations as justification for dissolution. Many reservations about joint operations voiced early in the war remained and were strengthened by these arguments. In fact, as late as March 1945, joint intelligence was not being fully accepted. In discussing efforts to establish a joint air intelligence cell at the Advance Intelligence Center on Guam, an officer at JICPOA complained of “the heart- breaking road ahead,” with many giving only “lip Naval Historical Center service” to the concept of joint intelligence, Powerful supporters of lamenting, “some days I feel we are making joint intelligence. observed: “It is axiomatic that joint strategy and progress in that direction; some days I feel we are planning should be based upon joint intelligence slipping backward.” While JICPOA eventually cre- [and]...this need is not limited to the period of ated the air intelligence cell, its experience sug- hostilities.” Similarly, JISPB remained operational, gests that jointness was not universally accepted both completing JANIS on-going studies and be- or appreciated. In fact, less than two months after ginning studies on potential operational areas. Japan’s surrender, Marshall was appealing yet JEIA also continued operations; but its mission again for a better intelligence system, advocating and authority were reduced when it became a one with a joint agency as its centerpiece. subcommittee of the Joint Communications Lessons of the Past Board. New joint intelligence efforts were even Joint intelligence in World War II faced many begun in the wake of Germany’s defeat. The Joint of the same problems as today. The Persian Gulf Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) was created War dramatically illustrated that conflicting battle in June 1945 to con- damage assessments and inadequate or slow dis- tinue collection, pro- semination did not disappear with the defeat of with Army and Navy intelligence cessing, and dissemi- Germany and Japan in 1945. The criticisms of intelligence voiced during and after Desert Storm by organizations in place, some saw nation of technical intelligence started ear- General Norman Schwarzkopf and others in many joint intelligence as expendable lier in the war. In addi- respects echoed King, Marshall, and Congress fifty tion, JIOA was tasked years earlier. The problems of JICA in managing with identifying and transporting German and national and theater collection assets and re- Austrian scientists to the United States for interim sponding to various RFIs in 1943 also have not di- and long range exploitation, efforts codenamed minished over time—nor have more efficient uses Project Paperclip. of resources or impediments to doing so. Many But most joint intelligence activities were would agree that the claim by JISPB in 1945—that disbanded. Neither service approved a proposal to “few intelligence activities in Washington take the continue JICAs and JIARC. Consequently, JICAs trouble to find out what other people are doing in in the Mediterranean, Africa-Middle East, India- their own lines” which caused “needless duplica- Burma, and China theaters were deactivated be- tion of work and conflicting information”—is still tween August and December 1945. JICPOA was an accurate criticism. likewise disbanded in October 1945 while JANAC The solutions to many problems experienced continued in operation until 1947. during the war are also relevant. The creation of Several factors explain the short lifespan of theater JICAs and the national level JIARC pro- joint intelligence. Most importantly, conditions vide lessons that may assist the recently activated changed. The end of the war greatly decreased Defense HUMINT Service (DHS). Similarly, the successes as well as shortcomings of JICPOA offer valuable insights into refining theater-level JICs in combatant commands. The same is true of the

122 JFQ / Spring 1996 Marchio wartime experience of JISPB and the new Com- Yet such optimism must be tempered. The bined Intelligence Publishing Service in DOD. joint environment may quickly become less hos- Beyond these lessons, the experience of joint pitable as controversies over service roles and intelligence during World War II reveals that missions persist and related budget battles for many of the same forces prevail today. The impli- limited resources intensify. cations of intelligence requirements are foremost The relevance of studying joint intelligence among them. Just as the shift from defensive to operations is apparent. Even this brief look at the multiservice offensive operations drove the birth intelligence operations during World War II indi- of joint intelligence in 1942–45, military, politi- cates that many lessons—paid for in blood and cal, and fiscal realities in the post-Cold War pe- treasure—await rediscovery. History can assist the riod mandate a key role for joint intelligence. In- intelligence community in rapidly relearning creasingly, complex and varied operations other these costly but valuable lessons, guiding its reor- than war (OOTW) and organizations—including ganization now as well as in the future. JFQ adaptive joint force packaging—demand that military and civilian as well as national and theater NOTES level intelligence assets work closely together. This article is based largely on materials in the Na- Finally, the history of joint intelligence re- tional Archives, Naval Historical Center, U.S. Army Cen- veals many obstacles and sentiments that con- ter of Military History, and Armed Forces Staff College. tinue to impede joint intelligence initiatives and The bulk of formerly classified memoranda and reports operations. Legitimate as well as exaggerated con- cited are found in National Archives Record Groups cerns over the ability of joint intelligence to ade- (RG) 218 (CJCS Central Decimal File 1942–45), RG 319 quately meet service and component needs first (Army Staff, Records of Assistant Chief of Staff Intelli- surfaced in World War II. So did parochial service gence), and RG 457 (National Security Agency). Other interests that limited the authority of joint orga- information was extracted from the Office of Naval In- telligence United States Naval Administration in World nizations, leading to loosely structured coopera- War II, guide no. 26a, vols. 1–4, July 10, 1946, Naval tion rather than required joint action. Current ef- Historical Center; the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific forts to shield component intelligence assets and Ocean Area (JICPOA) final report; U.S. Pacific Fleet and to ensure that joint doctrine is authoritative Pacific Ocean Areas, “Report of Intelligence Activities in rather than directive suggest such sentiments the Pacific Ocean Areas,” October 15, 1945, Armed have not disappeared. Today, as in 1942, both op- Forces Staff College; and the General Headquarters Far erators and intelligence officers must overcome East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General such reservations. Given new and more complex Staff, Operations of the Military Intelligence Section GHO, missions, diminished resources, and the ever in- SWPA/FEC/SCAP, vol. 3, Intelligence Series (I), 1951, creasing importance of intelligence for smart U.S. Army Center of Military History. A variety of memoirs and secondary sources were also weapons and future conflict, there is an even consulted. W.J. Holmes’ firsthand account of the cre- greater need to operate jointly. ation and operation of JICPOA, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. The current atmosphere is conducive to Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific during World jointness. Both the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), and Defense Intelligence Reorganization Act continue Thomas F. Troy’s comprehensive discussion of the birth to spark joint initiatives. Bureaucratic as well as of national intelligence, Donovan and the CIA: A History congressional pressure to reorganize the intelli- of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Fred- gence community—symbolized by the Com- erick, Md.: Aletheia Books, University Publications of mission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. America, Inc., 1981), proved to be most valuable. Intelligence Community, efforts by the House Per- manent Select Committee on Intelligence under “Intelligence Community 21st Century,” and the decision to consolidate eight agencies into the Na- tional Imagery and Mapping Agency—auger well for joint operations. Technological developments—such as the joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS) and joint worldwide intelligence communications system (JWICS)—and organizational changes facilitate joint operations. The creation of the National Military Joint Intelli- gence Center and strengthening the Military Intel- ligence Board should also help overcome resistance to joint intelligence operations.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 123 ■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

Admiral Arleigh Albert Burke (1901–1996) Chief of Naval Operations

VITA orn in Boulder, Colorado; graduated from Naval Academy (1923); USS Arizona (1923–28); USS Procyon (1928–29); postgraduate student, Naval Academy and University of Michigan (1929–31); naval gun factory, Washington Navy Yard (1931–32); USS Chester (1932–33); battle force camera party, U.S. Fleet (1933–35); Bureau of Ordnance (1935–37); USS Craven (1937–39); commanding Bofficer, USS Mugford (1939–40); naval gun factory (1940–43); commander, destroyer divisions forty-three, forty-four, twelve, and twenty-three (1943–44); chief of staff and aide, first carrier task force, Pacific (1944–45); research and development division, Navy Department (1945–46); chief of staff and aide, Atlantic Fleet (1946– 47); General Board, Navy Department (1947–48); commanding officer, USS Huntington (1948); office of the chief of naval operations (1948–50); chief of staff, Naval Forces, Far East; commander, cruiser division five; military armistice delegation, Korea (1951); director, strategic plans, office of the chief of naval operations (1951–54); commander, cruiser division six (1954–55); commander, destroyer force, Atlantic Fleet (1955); chief of naval operations (1955–61); died at Bethesda.

We believe in command, not staff. We believe we have “real” things to do. The Navy believes in putting a man in a position with a job to do, and let him do it—give him hell if he does not perform—but to be a man in his own name. We decentralize and capitalize on the capabilities of our individual people rather than centralize and make automatons of them. This builds that essential pride of service and sense of accomplishment. If it results in a

certain amount of cockiness, I am for it. But this is the direction in which we U.S. Navy should move. Portrait by Orlando Lagman. —Letter from Arleigh A. Burke to RADM Walter G. Schindler, May 14, 1958

124 JFQ / Spring 1996 Where are the Arleigh Burkes Today? By MARK YOST oint j out of

Arleigh Burke made a name for himself—“31-knot Burke”—as a hard-charging destroyer squadron commander in the Pacific theater during World War II. He went on to be the only chief of naval operations to serve three terms, and along the way he oversaw the construction of nuclear carriers, ballistic missile submarines, and highly mobile amphibious forces. But it was earlier, as a captain, that Burke showed his real mettle in a military culture quite different from today’s.

In the aftermath of the war, senior military The Navy was no less gracious, calling Air leaders vigorously debated our strategic posture. Force doctrine on strategic bombing “childish” The Air Force, recently separated from the Army and labeling the B–36 a “billion dollar blunder.” and with the support of President Truman, held Helping to make the case was Burke, who headed that bombers had been the decisive factor in the the organizational research and policy division war and would be the best force to win the peace. (OP–23) in the office of chief of naval operations. The Navy had other ideas. The keel had just There he and his staff began to get the best of the been laid for USS United States, the first so-called Air Force with strategy papers that bolstered the super carrier. The Navy thought that forward-de- argument for carrier forces. As a result, Burke’s ployed carrier battle groups were the best means staff was put under veritable house arrest with the of projecting American power. A spirited debate arrival of the inspector general and Marine secu- ensued over whether the Air Force with its doc- rity guards. But their views had the backing of se- trine of strategic bombing or the Navy with its nior admirals, many well-known, such as Ernest carriers could do the job better. King and Chester Nimitz. This fracas almost cost “The Army Air Force is tired of being a subor- Burke his career and was part of what became dinate outfit and is no longer going to be a subor- known as “the revolt of the admirals.” dinate outfit,” declared Brigadier General Frank Not long after the revolt began, North Ko- Armstrong in 1947. “It was a predominant force rean troops crossed the 38th parallel. U.S. forces during the war. It is going to be a predominant then made their famous landing at Inchon, and force during the peace, and you may as well make the debate over the utility of carriers was put to up your minds, whether you like it or not, that rest. This brief account points out how the strate- we do not care whether you like it or not: The gic issues facing the United States then were much Army Air Force is going to run the show.” the same as now, although the environment is totally different. In the late 1940s, the Armed Forces were largely unchallenged in a world that had just Mark Yost is an editorial page writer who covers witnessed the end of a global conflict between the defense issues for The Wall Street Journal Europe; forces of good and evil. Then the Nation was he served in the Navy during the 1980s.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 125 ■ WHERE ARE THE ARLEIGH BURKES?

struggling to redefine its role—as well as that of its or one of the service academies, he quickly learns military—as the strategic landscape underwent a the rules of the game,” Lehman says. “Don’t rock rapid transformation. While the budget deficit of the boat. Don’t take a risk that may result in you that day, twice the gross domestic product, had getting a ‘B’ on your evals, and spend as much been a small price to pay for defeating the Axis, it time in Washington as you can, preferably in a nonetheless resulted in a dramatic decline in de- joint billet....The net result of all this is that ju- fense spending and a struggle among the services nior officers aren’t learning to be warfighters any- over shrinking resources. more, they’re learning to be staff fighters.” Today the strategic situation is much the Tom Linn, a lieutenant colonel assigned to same. The United States is largely unchallenged. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and one of the In the aftermath of the Cold War the Nation is few sources who would go on record, agrees with struggling to redefine its role as the only super- Lehman. “We’re sending a terrible message to ju- power and the role its military should play in the nior officers today. When I was a junior officer, world. And today, a budget deficit nowhere near you were encouraged to go out on a limb, think

out of joint the size of the one following World War II is pres- out of the box. As a young lieutenant you were suring the services to do more with less. supposed to make mistakes. And you were en- But there is one significant difference be- couraged to learn from them. Today, everyone’s tween the post-World War II era in which Burke so fearful of getting a ‘B’ on their evals that they flourished and today: the absence of vigorous de- don’t take risks. I’m sorry to say that it has given bate over national security and military strategy. us an officers corps that avoids risks, is self-cen- Imagine an Air Force general speaking as candidly tered and career oriented, and that possesses few today as General Armstrong did in 1947. It is al- independent thinking skills.” most unheard of. Certainly policy and strategic issues are hotly making a strong case for contested behind closed doors the capabilities of any one at the Pentagon, and service staffs are fully aware of the service is taboo stakes in current budgetary maneuvers. But the military no longer has intellectual debates like those in the wake of World War II. Why? Based on discussions with military leaders, service planners, defense analysts, and—most importantly—junior officers, a disturbing image emerges. There is no vigorous debate because the emphasis today is on jointness. Strategy has become so politicized that making a strong case for the capabilities of any one service—even when

not openly pillorying the others—is taboo. DOD “I would seriously think twice about publish- GEN John W. Vessey, Jr. ing an article in, say, Proceedings or another professional journal that didn’t have a strong joint Senator John McCain, a Naval Academy theme or made a strong case for the tactics and graduate who comes from a distinguished line of strategies of one service,” said a Navy officer who sailors (to include a grandfather who served with asked not to be identified. “Even if I didn’t attack Burke in the Pacific), concurs with Lehman that another service, the clear rule is that if you’re not today’s atmosphere inhibits junior officers but advocating joint warfighting, you might as well points out it is nothing new. “I’m sorry to say not say anything. If you do, it’s going to irrepara- that this stifling of debate is heavily indoctri- bly hurt or possibly end your career.” nated into the officer corps and has been for Why have the Armed Forces strayed from some time now. You can clearly see it from the the open, vigorous debates of Burke’s day to the Joint Chiefs and other senior Pentagon leaders stifling environment described above? John right down through the ranks. The Joint Chiefs Lehman, the outspoken former Secretary of the today, I hate to say it, are very dedicated, very Navy, suggests that the basic attitude of “go along hardworking, very unimaginative people. They’ve to get along” is fostered in the minds of junior of- gotten where they are because they learned their ficers. “When a young officer comes out of OCS lesson early on not to rock the boat and make waves for the administration.”

126 JFQ / Spring 1996 Yost

A few maverick officers have succeeded But in fairness, civilian leaders must also ac- through a combination of skill and outspokenness. cept some of the blame. Like every bureaucrat But they are the exception. One is General John who gets a taste for power, their penchant has Vessey, USA, who served as the Chairman under been to consolidate it, often against the advice of President Reagan. Going into the 1980 presidential experienced and knowledgeable senior military campaign, the White House put out the word that officers. But it is more than just bureaucrats in the Joint Chiefs and other senior officers were ex- the Pentagon. Nearly every administration since pected to publicly support Salt II. Under no cir- Truman has tightened the grip on military leader- cumstances would opposition to the agreement be ship, which discourages debate. How did this sit-

tolerated. “One of the few uation arise? Some maintain that a relative atti- oint j nearly every administration holdouts was John Vessey, tude of complacency started when MacArthur who was in Europe at the was fired and others that it surfaced in Vietnam has tightened the grip on time,” Lehman notes. “He when senior officers fudged body counts to sat- military leadership knew Salt II was a bad treaty isfy the objectives of decisionmakers. Observes

for us, and regardless of what C.W. Watson, a retired Army officer: “Unfortu- out of the administration thought, nately, somewhere along the way military officers he wasn’t going to support it. When Reagan came have lost that tradition of resigning rather than into office he reviewed everyone’s record and saw carrying out orders that, while lawful, they fully that Vessey was one of the few who hadn’t shilled know to be not in the best interest of our country for the Carter administration. That was enough for and its defense.” Reagan: he made Vessey the Chairman.” “If we’re going to change this culture, it re- Mavericks have not fared so well of late. One ally has to come from within the ranks,” muses is General Merrill McPeak, former chief of staff of Tom Linn. “Senior officers who recognize the im- the Air Force. After the “Bottom-Up Review” ap- portance of innovative tactical and doctrinal peared, McPeak testified before Congress that the thinking must encourage this in junior officers review was an “abstraction, the budget a reality.” and, more importantly, protect them from those And on plans to cut forces, he indicated that they who might stifle them or sabotage their careers were “designed by someone who must be in a po- because of their outspoken views. That may lead sition of not having to take responsibility for the to tensions among general officers, but it is a bat- combat results.” Later, as the Commission on the tle—possibly bloody—that must be waged to Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces deliber- achieve the level of strategic and tactical thinking ated, he publicly defended the Air Force doctrine that helped to win the Cold War and made us the on strategic bombing and virtual presence. “The fighting force we are today.” Joint Chiefs are just caretakers,” McPeak recently Although this may sound like a call for an- confided. “That’s who they look for now. Just like other revolt of the admirals, the central question the message that’s sent to the junior officers. It’s remains: Where are the Arleigh Burkes to lead an really very stifling and none of the services do intellectual debate today? JFQ too much innovative thinking today because of it. The Marines tend to think out of the box a lit- This essay is based on a series of interviews conducted tle bit....The others, especially the Army, are, by the author earlier this year. well—unimaginative, to say the least.” If even senior officers fall victim to prevailing culture, what is the solution? Perhaps more importantly, where did the spirit of the revolt of the admirals end and one of near total compliance with civilian leadership pick up? Certainly the senior leadership of the Armed Forces must accept some blame. While military officers have always been aware of their constitutional obliga- welcomes your letters and tion to defer to civilian control, they have an JFQ equal responsibility to safeguard the Nation. comments. Write or FAX your There must be ways of doing that without being correspondence to insubordinate. (202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219, or over the Internet to [email protected]

Spring 1996 / JFQ 127 ■ THE JOINT WORLD

warfare specialties. Other exercises, such In addition to a number of new Organization as PAC JTFEX, also provide a valuable joint doctrine proposals which were framework for friendly cooperation and briefed at the meeting, the following PACIFIC JTF have stabilizing effects across the entire projects were approved: Pacific Basin. Where possible, combined U.S. Third Fleet—onboard USS Coro- ■ Joint Pub 3–13, Joint Doctrine for forces are fully integrated into the PAC nado and home-ported in San Diego—is Information Warfare JFTEX lineup to provide additional train- ■ undergoing a major transformation. It is Joint Pub 2–01.3, Joint Intelligence ing for all participants. Most recently, Ca- Preparation of the Battlespace no longer enough to train forces in isola- nadian maritime forces and ships and a ■ Joint Pub 4–01.8, Joint Reception, Stag- tion for exclusively naval missions or diesel submarine from the Chilean navy ing, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) conduct business from a traditional flag- contributed to this training experience. ■ Joint Pub 4–01.5, Reserve Component ship. Today, Third Fleet focuses on By Spring 1997 USS Coronado will be Call-up (RCC) preparing its staff and assigned forces to ■ Joint Pub 1–06, Financial Management fully fitted-out with C4I systems and carry out a full range of joint and com- for Joint Operations. other facilities needed for deployment bined operations. forward in the Pacific. JFQ Other significant decisions made by Under the PACOM two-tiered com- JDWP include: mand and control model (see “A Com- mander in Chief Looks at East Asia” in ■ inclusion of third party logistics Doctrine ■ rules of engagement (ROE) develop- JFQ, Spring 95), three subordinate comment guidance manders were designated potential JTF JOINT DOCTRINE ■ joint doctrine for risk management in commanders. But with a changing situa- joint operations tion in the largest theater, it became clear WORKING PARTY ■ a definition and discussion of com- that an added sea-based JTF commander manders’ critical information requirements th was needed. Therefore in November 1994 The 17 meeting of the Joint Doc- (CCIR) CINCPAC designated the commander of trine Working Party (JDWP) was held on ■ a revision of Joint Pub 3–55.1, Joint Third Fleet as JTF commander for contin- April 16 and 17, 1996, at the Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for gency operations in the Pacific. Warfighting Center. Sponsored by the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, to be staffed prior to reformatting With the support of the chief of Joint Doctrine Division, Operational ■ a title change of Joint Pub 1–0, Doc- naval operations and commander in Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), the meeting included representa- trine for Personnel and Administrative Support to chief of Pacific Fleet, the issue was how Joint Operations to Doctrine for Personnel Support tives from service headquarters, combat- to bring Third Fleet up to this new task. to Joint Operations CINCPAC specified that when certain ant commands, Joint Staff, and doctrine Moreover, JDWP agreed to assess OPLANs are activated, Third Fleet and development centers. Joint Pub 3–05.3, Joint Special Operations USS Coronado will move forward to the In opening remarks delivered on be- Operational Procedures; Joint Pub 3–05.5, mid and western Pacific. But USS Coron- half of CJCS, the director of the Joint Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mis- ado is more than an amphibious ship Staff conveyed satisfaction with the ac- sion Planning Procedures; Joint Pub 3–07.4, turned flagship. The traditional role of a celerated pace of joint doctrinal develop- Joint Counterdrug Operations; Joint Pub flagship was to provide fleet commanders ment without any sacrifice in quality. He 3–56.1, Command and Control of Joint Air with a suitable ship from which they and also spoke about the next level of joint- Operations; Joint Pub 3–58, Doctrine for their staffs can conduct business. Today, ness and its three pillars: the linkage of Joint Operational Deception; Joint Pub the need for a flagship has been replaced joint doctrine to joint training and plan- 4–01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proce- by demands for a capable command and ning, the linkage of service doctrine and dures (JTTP) for Joint Movement Control. control platform. A ship required for joint doctrine, and the incorporation of joint operations must provide advanced lessons learned from exercises and ongo- levels of interoperability and connectiv- ing operations—as well as the assessment ity. For a start, it must quarter 25-person of approved and emerging doctrine. deployable augmentation cells sent forward by CINCs to assist JTF commanders. Moreover, JTF spaces must be quickly configured to house JFACC activities including 15 contingency theater air control planning system work stations. A Joint Doctrine flexible situation room with a plans mod- on the World Wide Web ule and JTF battle watch station is also In an effort to enchance awareness of and needed to allow commanders to bring their key staff members together to think increase access to joint doctrine, a World and act as a unit. Wide Web site has been established at Modification of USS Coronado will be completed in time for deployment to http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. For more RIMPAC ’96. Conducted every other year, information, contact the Joint Doctrine this exercise takes training to a high level Division (J-7), Joint Staff, at (703) 614-6469 / of combined interoperability with forces from up to five other nations. This year it DSN 224-6469. JFQ will involve 48 ships, over 200 aircraft, and 20,000 personnel representing all

128 JFQ / Winter 1995–96 THE JOINT WORLD ■

Of special interest were two infor- National Defense University (NDU) de- and the changing nature of warfare have mation briefs: veloped the Military Education Policy been captured in the new Joint Vision ■ “Joint Doctrine and the Internet”— Document (MEPD) in 1990. That docu- 2010 which OPMEP fully supports. all unclassified joint doctrine pubs are now ment, and a 1993 revision, specified edu- Over the next several years, JPME ef- available on the internet via the World Wide cational requirements for joint specialty forts will continue to tackle the changing Web (see the display advertisement on the officer (JSO) nomination. demands of joint warfare. Updated policy facing page). Unlike previous policy, OPMEP does will address how new, high-leverage con- ■ “Writing for Joint Force Quarterly”—the not focus exclusively on educational re- cepts such as C4ISR and information war- JFQ Forum in the Winter 1996–97 issue of the quirements for JSOs. OPMEP calls for fare compete with more traditional mili- journal will contain contributions on joint JPME from the precommissioning level tary operations within curricula. doctrine by combatant commanders and (in service academies, ROTC, and OCS/ Education technology—computer based, service chiefs. OTS) to the NDU Capstone Course for interactive, deskside instruction; telesem- The next meeting is scheduled for new general and flag officers. Extending inars; advanced wargaming and simula- Autumn 1996 at the Joint Warfighting JPME to the precommissioning and pri- tion; increased access to research data- Center. JFQ mary levels was a key suggestion in the bases—will be exploited to bring CJCS JPME Panel Report (see letter from enhanced JPME to wider audiences on a Brig Gen Baker in JFQ, Summer 95). It is timely basis. Enlisted JPME policy will JOINT PUBS UPDATE arguably the most significant education also become a reality in the future. Joint policy change contained in OPMEP. curricular development will provide ser- The following joint publications Moreover, the Office of the Secretary of vice schools and colleges at every level have recently been approved: Defense, Joint Staff, and services fully with professional course material tailored ■ Joint Pub 3–50.2, Doctrine for Joint agreed on the need for a “cradle-to- to their missions and requirements. JFQ Combat Search and Rescue, consolidates joint grave” career approach to JPME. and service doctrine into a single-source of JPME, like service PME, is a sequen- guidance and procedures for timely, measured tial and progressive system where each responses for combat search and rescue education level builds on knowledge got- PME HISTORY (January 26, 1996). ten from the previous level. At the pre- The U.S. Air Force Academy will ■ Joint Pub 3–13.1, Joint Doctrine for commissioning level, students gain a host a military history symposium enti- Command and Control Warfare, is focused—but basic awareness of joint matters. This is not intended to provide comprehensive doc- tled “Rites of Passage: Educating and knowledge is expanded to issues of force trine—on command and control warfare in Training Junior Officers in the Twentieth support of the broader concept of information application and integration on the tacti- Century” on November 20–22, 1996. For warfare (February 7, 1996). cal, operational, and strategic levels in further information, contact: Major Kern, ■ Joint Pub 3–12.1, Joint Theater Nuclear later primary, intermediate, and senior HQ USAFA/ DFH, 2354 Fairchild Drive Operations, contains guidance for nonstrategic PME, respectively, while Capstone exam- (Suite 6F37), USAF Academy, Colorado nuclear force employment (February 9, 1996). ines key aspects of warfighting and strat- 80840–6246; telephone: (719) 472–4727/ ■ Joint Pub 3–12.3, Nuclear Weapons Em- egy integration. FAX: (719) 472–2970; or via Internet: ployment Data, volume 2, includes technical OPMEP capitalizes on this structure [email protected]. JFQ procedures and unclassified weapons effects and has substantially more emphasis on data on nonstrategic nuclear weapons employ- joint doctrine, multinational operations, ment (February 14, 1996). ■ Joint Pub 3–01.5, Joint Theater Missile technology, systems integration, and in- Defense, furnishes doctrine to counter theater novative thinking for winning war in fu- missile threats, with particular emphasis on ture battlespace. Moreover, these areas the growing threat from developing nations— and the U.S. ability to protect vital national interests against such threats (February 22, 1996). JFQ Don’t Forget...

Education THE SECOND ANNUAL NEW PME POLICY Joint Force Quarterly The Chairman has approved a new ESSAY CONTEST ON THE professional military education (PME) policy document, Officer Professional Mili- tary Education Policy (OPMEP), to coordinate career JPME for officers. OPMEP is Revolution the latest in a series of policy documents. The impact of the Goldwater-Nichols leg- in Military Affairs islation on JPME was reinforced in hearings held by the Panel on Military Educa- All entries must be postmarked no later than tion of the House Armed Services August 31, 1996. Committee between 1987 and 1989. In response, the Joint Staff, services, and See page 8 for details.

Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 129 ■ OFF THE SHELF

Conscience for an individual soldier general context of moral thought—but it MORAL OBLIGATION is a dimension of mind and heart and cannot be adequately approached be- cannot by nature be a dedicated instru- yond broader contexts of the nature of VERSUS “BEEPER ment of duty or professional motives. reality, the good, and truth and knowl- Conscience is inherently a judgment not edge. This also includes large segments of ETHICS” only about a given action or policy, but intellectual tradition. Without such well- A Review Essay by also about what kind of person one in- rooted orientation, moral or ethical edu- tends to be, about the quality of charac- cation may dwell primarily on the fail- WILLIAM G. O’NEILL ter one actually intends to possess. Ethics ings and evils of contemporary society. in the last analysis serve that choice of That may create an attitude that over Foundations of Moral Obligation: character and, at their best, reinforce it in time becomes an antithesis to secular The Stockdale Course outstanding and difficult cases as well as ideas and practice; in effect, a self-en- by Joseph Gerard Brennan amidst what may be the everyday welter dowed sense of purity amid decline. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1994. of conflicting demands. 269 pp. $14.95 Although neither book represents a Footfalls of History [ISBN 0–89141–528–9] course in specific applied ethics, Toner Foundations of Moral Obligation is a offers some brief illustrative cases; and survey of moral philosophy inspired by True Faith and Allegiance: while neither author details the intrica- the ordeal of Admiral James Stockdale as a The Burden of Military Ethics cies of particularly pressing ethical prob- POW in Vietnam. Later, when president of by James H. Toner lems, Toner’s general theme is the ques- the Naval War College, Stockdale collabo- Lexington: University Press tion of the sometimes conflicting rated with Brennan in developing a course of Kentucky, 1995. loyalties of the conscientious warrior and based on that experience. The book’s 202 pp. $25.00 conscientious citizen. But an important chapters are lessons, lectures, and major [ISBN 0–8131–1881–6] factor is that both books provide an im- themes from the course. Of special note is portant corrective to a growing trend in the manner in which biographical details wo recent books on military ethics works on ethics to circumscribe the dis- are woven into the presentations. Intellec- Tapproach their theme from the stand- cussion of ethics to the management of tual history and philosophical theories are point of providing both students of conduct or to the establishment of con- seen as derived from and inspired by the ethics and members of the Armed Forces ventional rules within a profession or lives and times of great persons. with a broader context of intellectual tra- sector in terms of which its members can Initially, historical examples are dition, social mores, and educated values. agree to interpret ethical questions. given to show the profound effect of Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stock- This bias threatens to make right prison isolation on individuals. In these dale Course by Joseph Gerard Brennan, and wrong, good and evil, and values situations, those capable of profound re- emeritus professor of philosophy at themselves simply artifacts of a propri- flection decide on fundamental options Barnard College, consists of lectures pre- etary internal debate in varied profes- for living. A transformation of soul can sented at the Naval War College. True sions or fields of endeavor. In the mili- emerge providing ultimate meaning for Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military tary, the trend could be exemplified by one’s future. The conviction that it is bet- Ethics by James H. Toner, who teaches at setting values in light of the debate over ter to suffer evil than to commit it be- the Air War College, provides the views the proximate causes of a war or conduct comes essential. Brennan begins by ex- of a political theorist on the special situa- of a campaign. The problem might be ploring the resolution that can emerge to tion of soldiers, sailors, marines, and air- seen in a crude analogy: in order to be a forsake dark ignorance, as in the example men as servicemembers and as citizens of good driver a mastery of traffic ordi- of Plato’s cave. a wider society. While neither volume is nances—such as speed limits, turning on Basic to the background of a moral a detailed ethics text nor an investigation red, etc.—is not adequate if one does not education is the question: what does one of a category of particular problems in know the route to a destination. For say or think about evil? Brennan then military ethics, both instruct the inquirer philosophers, who since the fourth cen- poses the timeless problem of how to un- into military ethics and offer means of tury B.C. have taken the dominant role derstand the existence of an all-knowing, revalidating one’s ethical moorings. in the ethical education of society from all-powerful, all-gracious God as creator Cynicism about the incompatibility the poets and dramatists, questions of ul- and Father of a world awash in hideous of a particular walk of life or profession timate ends or ultimate meaning cannot evils, including deliberate moral deprav- with ethics is hard to ward off. Military be evaded. ity—which frequently victimizes the ethics faces a similar challenge. At the Both Brennan and Toner address most innocent and helpless of mankind. outset it must be understood that mili- ethical education as an undertaking of One confronts a decision between the tary ethics or other special ethics does great importance. Education in ethics, of gnostic view that there is a dualism of not stand in isolation from the rest of course, is crucial wherever teaching takes good and evil powers governing reality, philosophy and is not fundamentally sui place. Any form of education communi- or the Augustinian view that evil is not a generis. Even moral philosophy itself does cates values for learners to either accept positive force but rather an absence of or not stand in isolation from the rest of or react against. Ethical education of distance from the moral order and the philosophy nor from the lofty concerns members of the Armed Forces is an espe- goodness of God. Ultimately the answer which preoccupy moral theologians. cially important concern in our society. to this problem is seen to lie in signifi- Such education is a matter of moral cant measure in the extirpating of self as meaning. Meaning is profoundly linked primary in the world and in seeing the with context. Not only is it impossible to interrelatedness of all of our sufferings. William G. O’Neill teaches philosophy and find such meaning solely through spe- What does one say or think of love? is former department chair at Iona College. cialized courses in ethics—outside the This is another fundamental question in

130 JFQ / Spring 1996 OFF THE SHELF ■ the background of moral thought. Is love to be eros, an attraction to beauty in the classical Greek sense, or is it to be agape, the selfless love of Christ in his sufferings and teachings? There is both a difference and a tension between these two aspects and ultimately, in the richness of me- dieval theology, religious traditions are shown to have presented the more powerful selfless love as the driving force of the universe. Happiness is next explored as the end for which everything else is sought or done. Aristotle’s formal teleological view is explored as the basis for his doctrine of virtue and character formation. Character is a key to happiness, through both the moral and intellectual virtues. Thus understood it is the development of the soul, the full realization of a human. This profound sense of fulfillment is not mere self-actualization or feeling good about oneself, but the actualization of DOD the fullness of human nature. Both practical wisdom and intellect are introduced as the faculty of human moral knowing Subsequent chapters in the course As these lectures unfold there are and development. Virtue in this way is explore special dimensions of philosoph- points where Brennan’s explanations personal and also social. ical insight into key issues relevant to a (but not Stockdale’s inspiring ideas) are Moving to the philosophy of lm- moral orientation. The existentialism of too tangential for an introduction to manuel Kant, Brennan explores the cru- Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus with moral philosophy. But Brennan’s style is cial concept of duty. Kant, a man of the its emphasis on individualism and free- replete with anecdotes as well as literary, Enlightenment, saw freedom as the dom are examined. Sartre proclaims the scientific, and historical allusions. There- essence of the moral self. Therefore duty fundamental irrationality of moral fore some philosophical extravagance is for its own sake, rather than simply for choices because such choices are those excusable. Also, one might regard the the results achieved, is what is morally for which no true determining right rea- course as a scattered version of an intro- meaningful. Acts of moral worth are the son can be provided. There are—in the duction to moral philosophy rather than acts of a rational being with a motive of case of the rugged and free individual— a closely ordered system. But his gener- duty. Moral decisions are made, moral no excuses or extenuating circumstances. ally historical order is still a palpable acts are done, not because it is good pol- The most important thing is, as in Stock- structure overall. The cumulative effect, icy but simply because it is right. Moral dale’s imprisonment, what a man has in any case, is a number of memorable worth arises directly from the will seek- done with what was done to him. Like high points. They inspire reflection and ing good. Ethics is sovereign and self-jus- Camus’ absurd man, one “fights back” give a sense of the depth to the study of tifying because it is not an aspect of psy- and in some sense succeeds by cramming ethics, especially for those beginning a chology or sociology. Ultimately, ethical as much living as possible into whatever study of moral philosophy. decisions are made on categorically uni- life one has. versal principles such that one never Leninism and Soviet thought are ex- General and Specific makes an exception for oneself nor for plored in their materialistic and dialecti- True Faith and Allegiance aims to link the case at hand and never treats oneself cal foundations and their strictly protec- an understanding of the military profes- or another person purely as a means in- tive anti-relativism. Evolutionary theory sion with the general field of ethics. stead of an end. is also seen to provide insights of a foun- Toner proceeds from his conviction that The principles of utilitarianism fol- dational nature, coming from Charles soldiers can be moral and therefore must low through a critique of the life of John Darwin, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the be moral. Hence, he seeks to present Stuart Mill. Brennan is remarkably effec- Leakeys, etc. One’s stance on evolution foundational ideas and a sourcebook on tive in presenting utilitarianism in regard depends upon an ultimate belief either military ethics. His approach is to chart a to issues that matter the most. He offers a that all is the result of mindless chance course between two popularly if care- refreshingly humane and well-drawn in a complicated physical set of systems, lessly subscribed extreme notions: that view of this strain of philosophy which or that all is a process of directed teleo- the military is not and cannot be ethical stresses Mill’s focus on the social well- logical change. Finally, the life and work by the very nature of its activity and being of all. In addition to analyzing the of Ludwig Wittgenstein are reviewed by commitment, and that anything the mil- concepts of pleasure and pain, benefit focusing on the crucial silence underly- itary may do is always ethical because all and harm, he emphasizes the central im- ing aspects of the intellectual roots of is fair in war. Toner sees his work as a cor- portance of freedom and liberty and the making choices. Whereof one cannot rective to the skeptical aspect of modern great worth, value, and beauty of the speak one must keep silent. Some things, ethical texts which, in addition to their common good. in effect, cannot be said but only shown.

Spring 1996 / JFQ 131 ■ OFF THE SHELF confusing language, fail to instill a sense under a guise of obedience. Loyalty to Codes of Ethics that there is such a thing as moral turpi- the Nation is crucial, but not to an indi- The primary challenge to contem- tude to be strictly avoided. vidual concept of national interest. Loy- porary ethics in America is said to be an Military ethics rests upon a triad: alty depends on a well formed con- excessive desire for status and wealth. evil indeed exists and should be resisted science, not upon strength of will or One is encouraged to deduce that oppos- by force; there are such things as human conviction alone. ing cupidity succeeds programmatically duty, obligation, and responsibility; and in the world and gives the military an appreciation of virtue is vitally important Military Education ethical edge. In any case, the current and must be inculcated by both word In this discussion, the distinction is state of values in this country reveals the and deed. Summarily, military ethics is made between professional military edu- need for the traditional cardinal virtues the study of what is honorable and what cation (PME), which is focused on values of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and is shameful conduct in military service. and deals with people, and military train- justice. This is important because much To undertake such a study one must ating, which is about skills and concerned evil is actually within the individual’s tack the moral nihilism seen throughout with things. But training must never be disposition, not just in the external society and adhere to examples of good divorced from education on values. world of actions. Society is morally autis- individuals who stand out. It is the clar- There is an obligation for the Armed tic, and its values are massively at vari- ion call of a crusade. Forces to provide rigorous training to the ance with those required by military cul- In the opening chapter Toner out- level of true competence—not only in ture, an account that makes soldiers lines his approach to ethical study: ethics warfighting but, especially for officers, in appear somewhat messianic. is a standard of right and wrong conduct judgment and intellectual acuity. In applying the thesis of faith and focusing on our behavior as well as that PME, as distinct from training, ap- allegiance to issues affecting the military, of others. Ethics is not only descriptive propriately involves fidelity to purpose as Toner provides an ethical analysis of cer- but prescriptive and so is not relativistic. its principal orientation to values. This tain key questions. Should women serve He iterates a theme which is repeated speaks to the tension between obeying in combat? The answer is yes, but not in later that contemporary American society legal orders without hesitation but not the infantry or on submarines. Should fails in many areas of values and accom- obeying illegal ones. Toner examines ten homosexuals serve in the military? The plishment: mores, art, education, popular cases, eight recorded instances and two answer is no to flagrant homosexuals be- culture, film, et al. However there are fictional. They deal with conflicts center- cause the military exists in a society sources of ethics which can be tapped in ing on mistreatment of prisoners and which generally disapproves of homosex- studying what is right and wrong for the killing prisoners or hostages, atrocities in uality as a way of life. About fraterniza- military: customs, rules, goals or out- war, and hazards to military trainees or tion, warnings are given in terms of gen- comes (teleological sources), and circum- troops in actual combat. The cases all eral ethics and special military aspects. stances (situationism). The development question whether to follow or not to fol- About resignation, the judgment is that of character involves the struggle to do low orders. it should be exercised rarely and with what should be done. The reader is to The general schema is to see respon- careful consideration. conclude that truly right-thinking people sibility or loyalty arranged hierarchically: Military education is a general will do better at ethical understanding first, loyalty to principles; second, loyalty theme in both books under review. Ethics and character development than will so- to purpose (the mission, rationale, or ob- and morality are always essentially about ciety at large. jective); and third, loyalty to persons, in- the good life, and they prompt us to con- In the discussion of military subor- dividuals, groups, or masses. In this con- template on what the good life is. Such dination to constitutional sovereignty, text one must realize that persons are reflection is important for the things the soldier is seen as accepting responsi- often the substance of the principle which one fights to defend anyway. bility for the safety of the body politic which governs or the purpose at hand. Moral education or values education is whereas the rest of society generally does Clarity remains important. not simply inculcation nor is it some sort not. The distinct and unique task of the Cautions are sounded about ex- of psychology of values. At its best and military involves being trained to kill for tremes in military culture, the evils of when most fitting, it is a rational founda- a committed cause. This is correlated to egoism—personal and professional—and tion provided through an exploration the requirement of being prepared to die the entrepreneurial ethic. Moreover, six and critique of values in the context of a for that same cause. Hence, the safety of tests of right and wrong are proposed: philosophical course. the lives of one’s troops or one’s own life shame, community, legal, situation, con- is not a first priority in war. While this sequences, and God. These tests pro- The Reactive School has not been strictly observed in some posed by Toner, however, usually are Ethics is always about truth at the cases, it remains a sacred measure of loy- seen as elements of reflection, the mo- level of the meaning of life. To propose, alty in the military. ment of ethical deliberation before the as is the vogue, that one can approach This is a fidelity beset by certain fact of decision. They raise red flags prior ethics simply as a dimension of manage- dilemmas. It involves obeying constitu- to a decision rather than acting as a lit- ment, as setting out the rules while tional precepts. But whose interpreta- mus for rightness or wrongness, honor or claiming little more than that certain tion? Generally one is responsible to a shame. The text concludes with useful things work well in getting the job done higher authority, though not always. recommendations on teaching ethics in without ignominy or complication, is in- Conscience dictates and duty demands the military. sufficient. When examining any profes- that wrong orders, either illegal or clearly sion or field of endeavor we can learn an immoral, should not be followed. Respon- important point: if its ethics are simply deat superior is not an absolutely univer- about that activity, then it is not an au- sal principle. Some things are too shame- tonomous study or concern and it makes ful for debate and should not be done

132 JFQ / Spring 1996 OFF THE SHELF ■ the sense of right and wrong an internal medical committees or senior practition- tuals more generally. Toner’s work seeks element or creature of that group and en- ers and deal with procedures for emer- to foster values by a rigorous education. terprise. Ethics of “[fill in the blank]” is a gencies, triage, referral to courts, termina- He warns soldiers that even great profes- factitious conception. The study or disci- tion of treatment, etc. sional competency without education in pline of such an ethics, among other dif- In the business world, even where values can lead to a My Lai massacre. ficulties, would tend to develop largely in codes of ethics are enshrined and ethi- This concern is, of course, es- response to the characteristics of emerg- cists are engaged through the medium of timable. Training and technical skills do ing conflicts and have priorities deter- a vice president for corporate ethics and demand education in values at a founda- mined by the typical malefactor or viola- values, major policies with some of the tional level. But it is the particular inten- tor. Ethics, to be rational, must be in a greatest ethical impact on employees or tionality that needs careful considera- significant degree autonomously customers are often decided directly by tion. Toner’s education in values is a grounded. the most senior managers and top level determined course toward getting stu- Deficiencies in education on moral executives. Such decisions usually in- dents to believe those specific things values leave us open to networks of volve personnel administration as well as which he feels they must. This set of be- rationalizations on conscience. Some of customer relations and advertizing. Deci- liefs is auditioned for us in his jeremiad the most bothersome of these come from sions on downsizing, plant closures, and descrying the squalid state of common the teleopathic (excessively devoted to a technological change also arise under American values and, to a degree, our cause or purpose) bent of mind which in- special circumstances. Operative values culture. clines people to extremes in pursuit of too frequently flow directly from the Because ethical education must be corporate goals or profits by any promis- highly situated principle of maximizing profoundly based on a commitment to ing strategy. Personally, teleopathy—as profits. values, so must values be intellectually expounded by Kenneth Goodpaster—be- Some of the most useful contribu- grounded in some ultimate conviction comes excessive devotion to career, to ad- tions of ethicists in the professional or about a worldview, a profound sense of vancement through gradations of goals business world are likely to be in advanc- the meaning of life and human con- during a professional life. For the sake of ing national policies and legislation sciousness and knowledge. Values are not corporate goals or career, no amount which incorporate an ethical orientation to be engineered to fit an agenda estab- of overtime, supererogation, or neglect at a general level and focus on the com- lished at the level of these values them- of personal concerns or duties can be mon good and overall quality of life. selves. We cannot assume the bases of thought to be utterly blameworthy. Being Questions of ethics or morality at base values at the start of education in values. a team player or getting ahead overrides have to do with wisdom and virtue and Toner has designated training as appro- all. are not only concerned with the best way priate to skills and education as appropri- Loyalties can have bad as well as of doing something but with what is ate to values. But without the initial in- good properties. They can be mature as worth doing. When wisdom and virtuous tellectual exploration as a propaedeutic, well as immature in focus and degree of principle are well understood, our most the result would be “values training.” dedication. In ethical reasoning such fail- important and efficacious institutions Values are most appropriate when ings can lead to rigorous or quasi-legalis- and activities can be related to these. they appeal to our reason as the bases of tic elaboration of technicalities and rules A person needs to be “about some- our will and emotion. Insight into truth divorced from fuller human reality and thing” at his or her core and feel deeply and meaning are integral to a commit- substituted in place of a well-grounded why some things are worthwhile and oth- ment to values, for well-founded dedica- ethics and morality. Just as ethics cannot ers are worth everything. Whether a per- tion and allegiance. The depth and be ultimately subordinated to any other son resolves this well or poorly, rightly or breadth of Brennan’s intellectual offer- system or purpose neither can ethical or wrongly, the effort is crucial to being fully ings, as well as Stockdale’s reflection on moral education be a subordinate part of human. It is especially important in the his detention and conversion, provide some system of courses. Often moral the- case of members of the Armed Forces as both excellent conceptual underpinnings ory is relegated to one or two chapters in well as others for whom honor is quintes- and substantial motivation for values ed- a book on the ethics of “[fill in the blank].” sential. Conscience, duty, orders, leader- ucation. The search for meaning at depth ship, professionalism, loyalty, courage, characterizes their approach. One should Beeper Ethics and judgment—and their evil opposite start here before exploring faith and The phenomenon sometimes called qualities—all derive from the inner devel- allegiance. JFQ “beeper ethics” (a term introduced by opment of a person. This progress may be Arthur L. Caplan) is a manifestation of advanced in silence and solitude, through another systematic difficulty. To illustrate reflection, or amidst a profusion of diffi- this point, think of ethicists jumping cult, even stressful activities. into the midst of conflicts or doubt. Ethi- cists on the staffs of hospitals and mental The works reviewed provide impor- institutions frequently find the on-the- tant foundational material for ethical ed- Missing an Issue? spot aspect of decisions taxing. Medical ucation. People of honor will search for Copies of back numbers of JFQ are professionals often regard analytical ap- outstanding persons as models. They will proaches and reflective considerations to seek principles as ideals for forming con- available in limited quantities to be impractical and unhelpful. Policies science and understanding their personal members of the Armed Forces and with the most impact on actual ethical dedication to duty and the need to do the institutions. Please send your performance in such situations are fre- right thing. In the course of ethical edu- request to the Editor at the address quently handed down as decisions by cation it is of utmost importance that a or FAX number listed on the dialogue continues among special ethi- masthead. JFQ cists, philosophers generally, and intellec-

Spring 1996 / JFQ 133 ■ OFF THE SHELF

essential prerequisite for all land and air Readers looking for indications of A JUBILEE FOR warfare.” These remarks, made ten years the revolution in military affairs will find before the Wright Brothers flew, embody Mason careful in his judgments and per- AIRMEN a recurring theme of airpower’s first cen- haps somewhat of a traditionalist. He tury: the “promise” of airpower technol- calls for even more emphasis on the elec- A Book Review by ogy, given well in advance of actual tronic warfare environment and extols THOMAS A. KEANEY achievement. Mason also cites it as a cau- the value of satellites as well as un- tion for the future. His ability to draw on manned vehicles (but sees a continued such themes and to synthesize aircraft dependence on manned aircraft). His Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal and doctrinal development makes this a faith in technology is tempered by his by Tony Mason truly superior study. look at other periods in this century, London: Brassey’s, 1994. Not solely a history of airpower nor comparing the dominance of the F-117 320 pp. £30.00 speculation on the future, Centennial Ap- in the Gulf with the fleeting dominance [ISBN 1–85753–069–1] praisal shows Mason equally at home of the German Gotha bomber in 1917 dealing with both. His coverage of avia- and the British Mosquito during the latter s the surge of publications and events tion history is skewed to the latter half of stages of World War II. Acommemorating the anniversary of the century and deals with aspects of air- If there is a revolution, Mason finds World War II subsides, two dates in avia- power not normally emphasized. The it in the preeminence of U.S. “differential tion history are prompting their own ret- half century of airpower through World airpower” that is derived from superiority rospectives: the 50th birthday of the U.S. War II occupies less than a quarter of the in four areas: an aerospace industrial Air Force in 1997 and the 100th anniver- book. More recent conflicts such as oper- base, a capacity for research and develop- sary of the first flight by the Wright ations over Bosnia and in the Arab-Israeli ment, the ability and inclination of a Brothers in 2003. wars and the Gulf War (as seen from government to allocate resources for an Tony Mason, a retired air vice mar- both the Iraqi and coalition perspectives) air force, and the size and quality of that shal of the Royal Air Force and the au- receive more analysis. No doubt reflect- force. He cites the United States as the thor of a number of books on airpower, ing his interests, Mason devotes more at- only nation that can meet all the criteria describes the history of military airpower tention to the role of airpower in NATO and claim overwhelming preeminence. from 1893 to 1993 in Air Power, A Centen- and Warsaw Pact strategies than to the Such superiority is more vital and long nial Appraisal. Anniversaries aside, this Korean and Vietnam Wars combined. lasting to Mason than any technological volume comes at an important moment Throughout, his analysis is incisive and advantage. But no preeminence goes un- for a U.S. audience, particularly consider- well argued. Only one section needs a challenged, and he sees Russia as the ing the debate over the strategic role of qualifier, a chapter on airpower and arms most likely U.S. competitor. Mason de- airpower and what components of it are control. The focus is limited to negotia- votes an entire chapter to reconstitution needed in force structure of the future. tions on the Conventional Forces in Eu- of the Russian aircraft industrial base Despite the success of airpower in rope (CFE) Treaty and aircraft-counting and reorganization of its air force. In the Gulf War, the subsequent drawdown rules for it. There exists no more lucid China he detects potential for regional of U.S. forces presents some unanswered discussion of the treaty, but its applica- dominance but not the capability to questions. Did Desert Storm show air- tion to airpower in general and to arms close the airpower differential with the power at its maximum potential or is it control is minimal. United States. at the dawn of a revolution in military Particularly timely is the chapter on The particular strength of this book technology in which it will become even peacekeeping operations. Mason writes is Mason’s comprehension of the neces- more dominant? Do more recent military about ongoing operations in Bosnia sary elements of airpower. Beyond num- operations in Somalia and Bosnia reveal a (using mainly 1993 and 1994 newspaper bers, he understands the nature of factors more realistic picture of what is ahead? accounts as sources) and attempts to ranging from personnel policies to the Will U.S. preeminence in the air face fu- reach conclusions on the relative advan- need for well-developed aerial refueling. ture challenges and what form will they tages and disadvantages of airpower in Using the history of airpower he con- take? Mason provides context for exam- that environment. His examination of is- cludes that its proponents must stop rely- ining these questions. He singles out the sues, such as the effectiveness of offen- ing on the promise of things to come United States as having “differential” air- sive airpower in those circumstances and and stand or fall “like any other military power—a capacity well beyond any com- the role of airlift, provides an excellent power, by its relevance to, and ability to bination of other countries—and draws starting point for debate. Even after two secure, political objectives at a cost ac- important lessons about our past and in- further years of experience in the ceptable to the government of the day.” dicates where we should be going. Balkans, his observations have not been The insight and solid analysis found Mason dates airpower from a lecture overtaken by events. in this book make it an important contri- given in 1893 by Major J.D. Fullerton of But in arriving at his conclusions, bution to any discussion on the future of the British army to military engineers Mason runs into a common dilemma: airpower in the United States or else- meeting in Chicago. He prophesied that limited scope. He interprets peacekeeping where. An unabashed advocate himself, aeronautics would bring “as great a revo- as involving humanitarian assistance, Mason succeeds in portraying airpower lution in the art of war as the discovery protection, self-defense, and peace-en- in a national context, urging his readers of gunpowder,” that “future wars may forcement (not further defined). His task to get beyond either zealotry for airpower well start with a great air battle,” and is thus to look for commonality in events or the residual parochialism in armies that “command of the air would be an ranging from the Gulf War to Somalia. and navies against its independence. JFQ Only recently has literature on peace op- Thomas A. Keaney teaches military strategy erations (and military doctrine in partic- and operations at the National War College. ular) begun to delineate this field.

134 JFQ / Spring 1996 OFF THE SHELF ■

The opening section of The Plot the lower level of society than the OF CABALS AND spells out its underlying hypothesis in de- ‘Elect’.” Moreover, their object is to elim- tail. Essentially there are two conflicting inate technological progress and the pur- COMPLOTS axiomatic social systems. One, based on suit of science and reason, abolish self- paganism, posits that man is an animal, government, and retain their numbers at A Book Review by or is barely lifted above animals, or per- desired levels. JAMES L. ZACKRISON haps is even a superior animal or “some- And this is where things get compli- thing of that sort.” Man can, through cated. The mechanism for imposing such some kind of special magic, rise above de- a viewpoint is the new world order es- The Plot to Annihilate the pravity to become a demigod. The second poused by former President George Bush Armed Forces and the Nations system, based on the Bible, envisions which is a project to eliminate the armed of Ibero-America man as created in the image of God, by forces as institutions in Latin America as Washington: Executive Intelligence “virtue of a creative potentiality which revealed in a book entitled The Military Review News Service, Inc., 1994. corresponds to God as the Creator of the and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military 391 pp. $15.00 Relations in Latin America, edited by Louis [ISBN 0–943235–11–1] Universe.” Life under the latter system is considered sacred by virtue of the indi- Goodman. The agents of this plot range vidual being created in the image of God. from the International Monetary Fund to t is easy to dismiss the theme of this These systems of society are at odds with left-wing French intellectuals. Ibook as yet another odd conspiracy one another, and have been since the be- The Plot finds a test case in the inva- theory. After all, the blurb on the back ginning of recorded history, or as Mr. sion of Panama, already occupied by U.S. cover tells us that the introduction is by LaRouche eloquently puts it, “since the forces and using the U.S. dollar as its cur- “U.S. economist and former political pris- role of Solon of Athens in kicking out the rency. The first step taken by Washington oner” Lyndon H. LaRouche. I would sus- usurers and establishing a republic based after the invasion was to disband the Pa- pect this publication has not sold well in on law at Athens, which is the real begin- namanian military and create a police the United States: a search of a library ning of European civilization.” force. The second case is El Salvador, network showed only three holdings of Without the hyperbole this makes where the United States had been secretly the title in the country. Yet it has sold sense. The problem with the book ap- negotiating with the Farabundo Marti Na- thousands of copies in Latin America, pears quickly, however. A connection is tional Liberation Front (FMLN). In 1990, and the Mexican military printed a spe- made early on between the militaries of according to the authors, General George cial edition of more than 500 copies. It is Latin America as defenders of Christian Joulwan, commander in chief of U.S. reportedly on the required reading list at ideals, in that their armies conquered an Southern Command, ordered a negoti- several regional military academies and empire to spread and glorify God and ated settlement. FMLN was to infiltrate staff colleges. Students of Latin American have since been defending Christianity the government and the armed forces affairs will ignore this book to their own and the Christian states to which they be- were to be reduced, all in the name of de- detriment. But if it is only a LaRouche long. It follows that anyone who opposes mocratizing the Americas. As a result of conspiracy, why is it attracting attention the military opposes God and is therefore these two test cases, two military institu- among Latin American readers? a pagan—to be subdued at all cost. tions in the region were decreased to neg- The answer is in its alternative defin- The “grand conspiracy” starts here. ligent threat levels. ition of terms used in works on civil-mili- According to this volume, the elimina- While this book rehearses some use- tary relations. If one accepts this ersatz tion of national military institutions is ful data, it is all manipulated to support jargon, most of the book makes sense. For only the latest step in a long effort by the the tangled web of conspiracy outlined instance, there is a lot of discussion in the British Empire to bring Spain and her for- above and loses credibility. The assump- United States over the proper roles and mer colonies in Latin America under tion that the United States, acting at the missions of the armed forces of Latin total Anglo-American rule. “With few ex- behest of British imperialism, plots to un- America. There are specialists and policy ceptions, that strategic objective has dermine and destroy the armed forces of wonks who think that the money spent dominated United States policy toward the region through nongovernmental or- on the militaries in the region would be Ibero-America since the turn of the cen- ganizations, academic symposia, and ob- better applied to other government func- tury, when Anglo-American empire inter- scure or nonexistent agents is of course tions. There are those who think that ests seized firm control over U.S. institu- patently absurd. If the U.S. military was there is no credible regional threat to the tions in the government of that evil plotting to annihilate counterpart mili- sovereignty of the nations in the hemi- Mason and admirer of the Confederate taries in Latin America, it would use its sphere, so their armed forces should be cause in the U.S. Civil War, Teddy Roo- own assets instead of LaRouche’s bizarre dismantled. There are academics men- sevelt.” The American Freemasonic register of academics, diplomats, and the tioned throughout this book who meet movement, the Scottish Rite of Freema- rest of his cast of characters. While those regularly and present papers on such top- sonry, and corrupt Catholics in the people no doubt have influence, they ics. But it stretches credulity to accept United States become the agents of certainly do not enjoy as much as The that these facts combine to form a con- British imperialism. This oligarchy uses Plot ascribes to them. spiracy. all its powers to destroy the sovereign na- The balance of this book is devoted tion-states of the region and their institu- to case studies and an “interview” with tions, in particular the armed forces who LaRouche. While there are numerous ex- defend that sovereignty. Why? Because amples of the twisted logic which is uti- James L. Zackrison is an analyst with the the “oligarchy has classified people of lized to weave this conspiracy, a look at Office of Naval Intelligence and currently Mediterranean, black, and Oriental and only a few demonstrates the alternative a visiting fellow at the National Defense so forth origins as being qualified to be University. helots—as being an animal species on

Spring 1996 / JFQ 135 ■ OFF THE SHELF A Note to Readers and Contributors reality at work here. In discussing coun- DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Military terdrug efforts as a mission for the mili- personnel and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make tary, the term “eradication” is used to in- their requirements known through command channels. Corrections in shipping instructions for dicate the elimination of the illegal drug service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below. trade. When the proceedings of a conference published in the United States claim ■ ARMY—Contact the installation publications control officer or write to the U.S. Army that eradication is not working and that Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 the effort should be reoriented toward in- (reference Misc. 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Geopolitics is the effect of ge- In addition, bulk distribution is made to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, ography on the nation-state. service colleges, and other activities. Changes in these shipments should be communicated to the For analytical purposes, a critical Editor at the address below. distinction is contained in the statement that there is “no moral difference be- SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see tween the oligarchy of Britain and the the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) on the order United States—essentially the Scottish Rite-related Freemasonic oligarchy—and and mail with a check for $16.00 ($20.00 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account Bolshevism. There never was.” Although number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, that claim is true, it is also irrelevant. Pennsylvania 15250–7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512–2233. Individual copies may be Capitalism and Bolshevism are not con- purchased at GPO bookstores nationwide for $8.00 each. cerned with morality, rather they are philosophical arguments for the owner- CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as ship of property. Even stretching the from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including point to include two different systems foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for articles, but contributions of yields the same conclusion: neither is 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the about morality. But the authors of The editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material Plot use an illogical and irrelevant connection between two opposing systems (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do not send originals. to form a key element in their conspiracy Manuscripts are reviewed by the Editorial Board, a process which takes two to three months. theory. Adding the appropriate perspec- To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. tive to that connection removes a basic Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or building block from the theory, thus authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but negating the reasoning of their evidence. endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Bibliographies should not be included. 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