Marketing Fragment 6 X 10.5.T65

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Marketing Fragment 6 X 10.5.T65 Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83365-3 - The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies ll Excerpt More information Introduction For most Americans, the Western Front – defined as North Africa, Italy and France, and western Germany – was decisive in defeating Nazi Germany dur- ing World War Two. After all, this was the arena in which our military dom- inated in terms of manpower, material, and planning. It was the front that received the most exhaustive coverage in the media, despite thorough wartime reporting from Russia. It was from this front that the names, which would highlight our struggle, echo down through several generations – Kasserine Pass, Anzio, Normandy, Huertgen Forest, the Bulge. And it was this long series of military engagements that would figure most dramatically in postwar pre- sentations – right down to today. Television series such as Combat during the 1960s featured American soldiers defeating Germans on a weekly basis. Movies, most notably The Longest Day, Patton, and The Battle of the Bulge, reminded Americans dramatically of the triumphs of U.S. arms. A stream of books from Company Commander to Eisenhower’s Lieutenants gave the general public detailed accounts of our wartime exploits. Media fascination with World War Two gained renewed impetus in the 1990s, as we commemorated various fiftieth anniversary events. Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Generation celebrated and romanticized in print and on television those rapidly disappearing men and women who saved the world from Hitler. Saving Private Ryan brought the same message to movie audiences and Band of Brothers continues to do so on television as we enter the twenty-first century. A controversial monument in Washington, DC, enshrines our wartime triumphs in stone. But one looked in vain during those celebrations for any mention of the Soviet contribution to victory in Europe. Even the D-Day fiftieth commemorations in 1994, appro- priate in their extensiveness, largely failed to mention that a gigantic Soviet offensive unleashed on June 22, 1944, took enormous pressure off Americans, who still had not broken out of the Normandy Pocket. This omission is all the more unfortunate in light of the fact that it was Soviet arms that really broke 1 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83365-3 - The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies ll Excerpt More information 2 The Myth of the Eastern Front the German army, no less than 80 percent of which was fighting on the Eastern Front. Even those Americans with a passing familiarity with the war in Russia have insisted that the Red Army only triumphed because of enormous supplies sent to them by America through the Lend Lease program. Only recently have the widespread awareness of the Holocaust and reve- lations about the barbaric depredations of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and its Ein- satzgruppen altered this fundamental misunderstanding. Still, the legacy of the Cold War and all it entailed – fighting the evil empire with the Germans as our friends and allies – continues to cast its spell on American perceptions of World War Two in the East. Those who have taken the trouble to learn about that titanic struggle, ironically enough, tend to view it, not as the agony and eventual triumph of an important ally, but rather through the lenses of our common enemy. The thesis of this book is that from the early 1950s on, Americans were uncommonly receptive to a view of World War Two as it was fought in Russia that was remarkably similar to that of many Germans, particularly leading circles of former German military and even National Socialists. In fact, this view of the war in the East in many respects contained elements of the Nazi worldview as applied to this theater of the war. That it was possible for Americans to adopt the outlook of their late enemies on a crucial theater of World War Two to the detriment of their former allies derives in part from the imperatives of the Cold War. After all, if the Germans were not only to be our friends, but also our armed allies, it was important to erase at least some aspects of the recent war from the public memory and to revise the terms of discussion of other aspects, particularly with regard to our new enemy – and former ally – the Soviet Union. Many Germans stood ready to help us in this regard, and they had certain advantages in doing so. For one, we had a long record of anti-Communism, which pre-dated World WarTwo, and therefore an established antipathy toward the Russians, which was easily revived after that conflict was over. Toward the Germans, Americans had always had a deeply ambivalent attitude. Dur- ing wartime, negative sentiments readily emerged. In more normal times, the wellspring of positive attitudes was just as easily recalled and used to shape the public outlook (with the surviving negative ones attaching themselves exclu- sively to Hitler and the Nazis). Large segments of the American public also harbored certain attitudes, among them cultural, economic, racial, and aes- thetic, which bore a disturbing similarity to those of fascism in general and Nazism in particular, which could be tapped in shaping a new view of the war in the East. Finally, by the 1950s, Americans, who, during the war, had followed events in Russia on a day-to-day basis, remembered little about the © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83365-3 - The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies ll Excerpt More information Introduction 3 Eastern Front and were thus open to new interpretations, which faced little competition in becoming established. These factors permitted opinion-making members of the former German military, busy creating their own mythologies about World War Two, to take advantage of the Cold War climate to work on their receptive American “friends” and colleagues. This book is the story of how the Germans, through a network of former high Wehrmacht officers and Bundeswehr officers who had served in World War Two, created in the minds of the American military, then journalists and popular writers, an interpretation of World War Two in the East disturbingly similar to that projected by Hitler’s regime during the war itself and that left the Wehrmacht with a largely “clean” reputation as to its conduct of that war. This view, which the Americans gradually absorbed during the 1950s, continues in the popular literature and part of the media to this day, and indeed delineates a broad subculture of general readers, German military enthusiasts, war game aficionados, military paraphernalia collectors, and reenactors. Clearly, academic scholarship in America has always studied the war in Russia. During the past thirty years, scholars have gradually exposed the role of all the agencies of Nazi Germany, including the military, in Hitler’s war of racial enslavement and extermination in the East. Still, mainstream academic scholarship has focused on a narrow spectrum of professorial readers and has ignored the general public, whose views were shaped by German writers and their sympathizers. To be sure, awareness of the Holocaust is quite widespread today. Yet this awareness seems to be compartmentalized in the minds of many Americans, who continue to admire the German performance in Russia during World War Two despite the obvious involvement of the German military in the crimes of the regime. As our research reveals, a more specific American subculture composed of military officers, historians employed by the military, and popular historians has really succeeded in shaping the broad popular view of the German military. This view makes the German army appear as if it had operated independently of the genocidal policies and practices of the Nazi regime in the East and only played the traditional role of a military force fighting honorably for its country. Indeed, given our view of the Russians, which quickly emerged early in the Cold War, the Wehrmacht is often viewed on a heroic scale, as if its role in Russia were only a prelude to our own struggle against Soviet Communism. In this context, the defeat of the German army in 1945 on the Eastern Front shapes up to have been something approaching a tragedy. Indeed, one can observe in this popular literature something very close to a “lost cause” romanticism that, in © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83365-3 - The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies ll Excerpt More information 4 The Myth of the Eastern Front many respects, parallels that which appeared in the United States decades after the Civil War with respect to the Confederate cause. The South lost the Civil War on the battlefield, but, in many ways, won it in the history books and in the popular imagination. With regard to a sizable number of Americans, this also appears to be the case with the Nazi war against the Soviet Union. Given the dramatic change in historical memory initiated during the Cold War, it is necessary to look at how familiar Americans were with the war on the Eastern Front during World War Two itself. In Chapter 1, we review the very extensive, indeed ubiquitous, coverage aimed at Americans of the war in Russia. This coverage ranged from newspapers, magazines, books, and movie newsreels to popular radio programs and mass rallies and collections.
Recommended publications
  • Ballantine Books Aviation + War Paperbacks
    BALLANTINE BOOKS AVIATION + WAR PAPERBACKS (Page counts, publication dates & book sizes are approximate) Pgs 48 Hours to Hammelburg (Charles Whiting) 201 1970 The 85 Days (R.W. Thompson) 220 1957 1918: The Last Act (Barrie Pitt) 333 1963 An Ace of the Eighth (Norman Fortier) 376 2003 The Aces Talk (Edward Sims) 303 1974 Admirals in Collision 144 1961 Air Spy: Photo Intelligence in WWII 190 1957 Aircraft Carrier 159 1954 Alamein and the Desert War 208 1968 American Aces (Edward Sims) 238 1959 Angles of Attack (Peter Hunt) 364 2002 The Atom Bomb Spies 292 1981 Battle of Britain: The Making of a Film 249 1969 The Battle of the Bulge 182 1957 The Battle of Cassino 235 1957 The Battle for Guadalcanal 320 1966 B The Battle for Leyte Gulf 190 1957 The Battle for the Rhine (R.W. Thompson) 205 1959 The Battle of Stalingrad (Vasili Chuikov) 384 1968 Behind Fascist Lines (Anna Starinov) 304 2001 Beyond Courage (Clay Blair) 181 1955 The Big E: The USS Enterprise (Edward Stafford) 512 1974 The Big Show (Pierre Clostermann) 224 1957 B The Black Sheep: VMF-214 (Bruce Gamble) 544 2003 Black Sheep One: Gregory Boyington (Bruce Gamble) 493 2003 Black Thursday (Martin Caidin) 288 1960 B The Blond Knight of Germany: Erich Hartmann 333 1971 Blood on the Shores (Viktor Leonov) 287 1994 Blood Warriors: America's Military Elite 368 2002 Boeing 707 (Martin Caidin) 213 1959 The Bomber Command 270 1974 Brazen Chariots (Robert Crisp) 190 1961 B The Bridge at Remagen 240 1957 The Canvas Falcons 397 1972 Carrier Combat 158 1967 Carrying the Fire (Michael Collins) 488 1975 B The Coast Watchers 240 1959 B Commando Extrordinary: Otto Skorzeny 180 1957 Company Commander (Charles MacDonald) 311 1961 B Count 5 and Die 152 1958 The Cuban Invasion 160 1962 Currahee! (Donald Burgett) 189 1968 The Dam Busters (Paul Brickhill) 185 1955 B The Danish Resistance 172 1957 The Day the Red Baron Died 331 1970 Death Traps 355 2003 Decision at St.
    [Show full text]
  • Empirical Approaches to Military History
    Karl-Heinz Frieser. The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005. xx + 507 pp. $47.50, cloth, ISBN 978-1-59114-294-2. Evan Mawdsley. Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945. London: Hodder, 2005. xxvi + 502 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-340-80808-5. Reviewed by James V. Koch Published on H-German (June, 2006) The world does not lack for military histories are written about in the historical surveys that of World War II, general or specific. Hence, when college students and others read. They appeal pri‐ new ones appear, it is legitimate to ask, do they marily to specialists who continue to dissect these really provide new information, insights or inter‐ campaigns, both of which are classics in the realm pretations? Both Frieser's look at the astonishing of conventional land warfare. six-week 1940 German campaign in the West that Frieser argues persuasively that Germany drove France out of the war and Mawdsley's ex‐ took several huge risks by attacking France, amination of the titanic 1941-45 German/Soviet Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (the West‐ battle on the Eastern front meet that test. Both ern Allies) on May 10, 1940. Germany was unpre‐ provide new data, or at least bring together in one pared for anything more than a very short war book data that have been dispersed over many lo‐ and chose a strategy (thrusting through the sup‐ cations. Further, both authors look at these cam‐ posedly impenetrable Ardennes, crossing the paigns a bit differently than previous researchers Meuse, and driving to the Atlantic Coast) that and prod us to reformulate our understanding of could have been frustrated in a half-dozen ways critical aspects of these battles.
    [Show full text]
  • Cossacks in the German Army
    CASS SERIES ON POLITICS AND MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Series Editor MICHAEL I. HANDEL US. Naval War College, Newport, RI 1. Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection 1905-1917 H.W. Nelson 2. The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeii 1923-1925 David Jablonsky 3. War, Strategy and Intelligence Michael I. Handel 4. Cossacks in the German Army 1941-1945 Samuel J. Newland 5. Churchill, The Great Game and Total War David Jablonsky COSSACKS IN THE GERMAN ARMY 1941-1945 SAMUEL J. NEWLAND U.S. Army War College FRANK CASS First published 1991 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Gainsborough House, 11 Gainsborough Road, London E ll IRS, England and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS c/o International Specialized Book Services, Inc. 5602 N £. Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213 Copyright О 1991 Samuel J. Newland British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Newland, Samuel J. Cossacks in the German army 1941-1945. 1. Germany. WchrmachL Foreign volunteers, 1939-1945 I. Title 940.54'0943 ISBN 0-7146-3351-8 Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Newland, Samuel J. Cossacks in the German army, 1941-1945 / Samuel J. Newland. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-7146-3351-8 1. Germany, Hccr—History—World War, 1939-1945. 2. Cossacks. 3. Military service. Voluntary—Germany. I. Title. D757.N484 1991 940.54*1343—dc20 89-25229 CIP All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.
    [Show full text]
  • Barbarossa Revisited: a Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941)
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 1982-03 Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) Stolfi, Russel H.S. Journal of Modern History, Volume 54, (March 1982), pp. 027-046 http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44218 Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) Russel H. S. Stolfi Naval Postgraduate School In the Soviet Union in 1941, a complex, ill-understood play of events projected the German field armies in the east close to Moscow in the late autumn of the year, but ended with their ultimate defeat. The reigning Soviet interpretation of the campaign remains the one in which the natural strengths of the Russian motherland and the inspired leadership of the Communists predetermined a Soviet Russian triumph over the invading Germans. Western historians and writers also gener­ ally agree that Hitler subjected himself and the Germans to inevitable defeat by the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, critical reapprais­ al of the opening stages of the Russo-German campaign fails to sup­ port the present Soviet and western views of the war, showing rather that the German successes of the first four weeks virtually assured the seizure of Moscow-the rail, road, political, psychological, and demo­ graphic plexus of the USSR-in the late summer of 1941.
    [Show full text]
  • Battle for the Ruhr: the German Army's Final Defeat in the West" (2006)
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2006 Battle for the Ruhr: The rGe man Army's Final Defeat in the West Derek Stephen Zumbro Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, dzumbr1@lsu.edu Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Zumbro, Derek Stephen, "Battle for the Ruhr: The German Army's Final Defeat in the West" (2006). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 2507. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2507 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu. BATTLE FOR THE RUHR: THE GERMAN ARMY’S FINAL DEFEAT IN THE WEST A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of History by Derek S. Zumbro B.A., University of Southern Mississippi, 1980 M.S., University of Southern Mississippi, 2001 August 2006 Table of Contents ABSTRACT...............................................................................................................................iv INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................1
    [Show full text]
  • Rigg Bm.Pdf (651.5Kb)
    notes note on sources Although oral testimonies are subject to fallible human memories, they have none- theless proven invaluable in explaining several documents collected for this study. Documents never before seen by historians, found in people’s closets, basements, and desk drawers, created a much fuller and complex history, especially when their owners supplied the background and history of the documents as well. These sources helped re-create the unique and tragic history of the Mischlinge, which is still so little understood over half a century later. The thousands of pages of documents and oral testimonies (on 8 mm video and VHS video) in this study are now part of the permanent collection at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, Germany, as the Bryan Mark Rigg Collection. Although interviews need to be treated with some skepticism, they have repeatedly shown that oral history often enriches rather than contradicts historical documents. All too often, history is written without the human element, that is, without knowing what these people thought, felt, and believed. Oral history helps reconstruct many of these people’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs through their diaries, letters, interviews, and photographs. In this way, a healthy combination of hard documents or primary sources and secondary sources and testimonies expands our sense of this history. Often one reads about men and women but feels no human connection with them. The interviews were done to try to bridge this gap and to pro- vide readers with the means to enter these men’s and women’s thoughts and feelings to understand them better and to deepen readers’ knowledge of this history.
    [Show full text]
  • Austrian Lives
    Austrian Lives Günter Bischof, Fritz Plasser, Eva Maltschnig (Eds.) CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN STUDIES | Volume 21 innsbruck university press Copyright ©2012 by University of New Orleans Press, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to UNO Press, University of New Orleans, LA 138, 2000 Lakeshore Drive, New Orleans, LA, 70119, USA. www.unopress.org. Printed in the United States of America. Book and cover design: Lauren Capone Cover photo credits given on the following pages: 33, 72, 119, 148, 191, 311, 336, 370, 397 Published in the United States by Published and distributed in Europe University of New Orleans Press: by Innsbruck University Press: ISBN: 9781608010929 ISBN: 9783902811615 Contemporary Austrian Studies Sponsored by the University of New Orleans and Universität Innsbruck Editors Günter Bischof, CenterAustria, University of New Orleans Fritz Plasser, Universität Innsbruck Production Editor Copy Editor Bill Lavender Lauren Capone University of New Orleans University of New Orleans Executive Editors Klaus Frantz, Universität Innsbruck Susan Krantz, University of New Orleans Advisory Board Siegfried Beer Sándor Kurtán Universität Graz Corvinus University Budapest Peter Berger Günther Pallaver
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of the Eastern Front: the Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture by Ronald Smelser and Edward J
    Concordia University - Portland CU Commons Humanities Faculty Articles & Other Works Humanities Department 12-1-2008 Review: The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi- Soviet War in American Popular Culture by Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II Gerd Horten Concordia University - Portland, ghorten@cu-portland.edu Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.cu-portland.edu/humfacultyresearch Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Horten, Gerd, "Review: The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture by Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II" (2008). Humanities Faculty Articles & Other Works. 20. http://commons.cu-portland.edu/humfacultyresearch/20 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Humanities Department at CU Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Humanities Faculty Articles & Other Works by an authorized administrator of CU Commons. For more information, please contact libraryadmin@cu- portland.edu. The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. By Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). xii, 327 pp. $ 21.99, ISBN 978-0-521-71231-6. Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II present an intriguing and utterly compelling argument in their book, The Myth of the Eastern Front. Contrary to the stereotypical Nazi villains of popular post-World War II war film, the authors argue that a very different kind of narrative of the German soldier emerged on the Eastern Front. Fueled by the onset of the Cold War and starting in the 1950s, American military officers, politicians and, finally, the public “were uncommonly receptive to a view of World War II as it was fought in Russia that was remarkably similar to that of many Germans, especially leading circles of the former German military and even National Socialists” (p.
    [Show full text]
  • The German Wehrmacht in Wwii: Operational Histories, Battles
    50 THE GERMAN WEHRMACHT IN WWII: OPERATIONAL HISTORIES, BATTLES Heroes in Death: The von Blücher Brothers in the Stalingrad 1942-1943: Uniforms • Equip- Army Group North: The Wehrmacht in Russia Fallschirmjäger, Crete, May 1941. Adrian Nisbett. ment • WeaponsWehrmacht: Tank Crews, 1941-45 Werner Haupt. After long years of studying The life stories of the three von Blücher brothers,members Infantry, Snipers, ArtilleryRed Army: Tank sources and literature, Haupt presents the military of the famed 1st Fallschirmjäger Regimen. who all died Crews, Infantry, Snipers, Pilots Edited history of one of the larger theaters of WWII. The during the battle for Heraklion airfield, Crete, on May by Jean-Patrick André and Jacques Scipion. completion of the history of Army Group North is the 20 & 21, 1941. Also described are paratroop training, This book is a not only a concise history of result of the author’s utilization of all German and the battle in which the brothers died, and the aftermath combat operations, but also a detailed look Russian literature, as well as those combat diaries of their tragic deaths. The book is illustrated with more at the uniforms, weapons, and equipment of and documents of the committed troop units that than 140 photographs, many from the von Blücher family both the Wehrmacht and Red Army as used are available in German archives. and most never before published. during the battle. Superb color photography Size: 6”x9”45 • 70 bw photos/maps • 416pp. Size: 7”x10” • 141 photos • 176pp. showcases the wide variety of items used by ISBN: 0-7643-0182-9 • hard • $39.95 ISBN: 978-0-7643-4631-6 • hard cover • $35.00 select service branches.
    [Show full text]
  • 293585335.Pdf
    Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began the largest and most costly campaign in military history. Its failure was a key turning point of the Second World War. The operation was planned as a blitzkrieg to win Germany its Lebensraum in the east, and the summer of 1941 is well known for the German army’s unprecedented victories and advances. Yet the German blitzkrieg depended almost entirely upon the motorised panzer groups, particularly those of Army Group Centre. Using previously unpublished archival records, David Stahel presents a new history of Germany’s summer campaign from the perspective of the two largest and most powerful panzer groups on the eastern front. Stahel’s research provides a fundamental reassessment of Germany’s war against the Soviet Union, highlighting the prodigious internal problems of the vital panzer forces and revealing that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion. DAVID STAHEL is an independent researcher based in Berlin. Cambridge Military Histories Edited by HEW STRACHAN, Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford GEOFFREY WAWRO, Major General Olinto Mark Barsanti Professor of Military History, and Director, Center for the Study of Military History, University of North Texas The aim of this new series is to publish outstanding works of research on warfare throughout the ages and throughout the world. Books in the series will take a broad approach to military history, examining war in all its military, strategic, political and economic aspects.
    [Show full text]
  • Revisiting a "Lost Victory" at Kursk Jonathan Page Klug Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Jpk80911@Aol.Com
    Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2003 Revisiting a "Lost Victory" at Kursk Jonathan Page Klug Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, jpk80911@aol.com Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Recommended Citation Klug, Jonathan Page, "Revisiting a "Lost Victory" at Kursk" (2003). LSU Master's Theses. 3416. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/3416 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu. REVISITING A "LOST VICTORY" AT KURSK A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Arts in The Interdepartmental Program in Liberal Arts by Jonathan P. Klug B.S., United States Military Academy, 1995 August 2003 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank my wife Toni for patiently tolerating the many cloistered hours of effort it took to complete this thesis. I would also like to thank all of the mentors who guided me over the years on this project - Dr. Stanley Hilton, Major Curtis King, Dr. Steve Waddell, and Dr. David Glantz. I would be remiss if I did not also thank Captain Franz Rademacher and Captain Michael Lee for proofreading this document with regards to grammar, usage, and coherency.
    [Show full text]
  • Kursk Kann Das Veranschaulichen
    349 Die Frage nach der Wirklichkeit des Krieges ist eine der schwierigsten historiographi- schen Fragen; das Beispiel der Schlacht von Kursk kann das veranschaulichen. Obwohl sie als größte Panzerschlacht der Welt und Wendepunkt des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges stets im Mittelpunkt des Interesses stand, sind zentrale Fragen nach wie vor ungeklärt. Sie werden durch diese konzise Schlachtbeschreibung nicht nur definitiv beantwortet. Diese zeigt auch, fast wie in einem Lehrstück, wie sehr gerade eine politische, psycholo- gische und moralische Grenz- und Ausnahmesituation wie der Krieg die Mythenbildung fördert. Roman Töppel Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht Horst Naumann (✝) gewidmet 66 Jahre sind nunmehr seit der Schlacht bei Kursk vergangen. Angestoßen durch die langsame Öffnung des russischen Militärarchivs Anfang der 1990er-Jahre und durch kritischere russische Publikationen über diese zentrale Schlacht des „Gro- ßen Vaterländischen Krieges“ ist in den vergangenen Jahren viel zur Aufarbei- tung der militärischen Ereignisse im Sommer 1943 geleistet worden. Doch wirken die alten Mythen, welche die beteiligten Militärs nach dem Krieg verbreiteten, immer noch nach, schon weil sie jahrzehntelang die zeitgenössischen Quellen ersetzen mussten. Dieser Beitrag will einige solcher Behauptungen kritisch beleuchten. So stellt sich beispielsweise die Frage, ob die seinerzeit führenden deutschen Militärs wie Generaloberst Walter Model, dessen 9. Armee von Norden zum Angriff auf Kursk antreten sollte, wirklich gegen eine Offensive waren, wie häufig angenommen wird. Und stimmt die Aussage von Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, die deutsche Offensive sei auf ihrem Höhepunkt wegen der angloamerikanischen Landung auf Sizilien am 10. Juli 1943 abgebrochen worden? Hat man damit einen deutschen Sieg verschenkt? Einige Historiker behaupten dies bis zum heu- tigen Tag.
    [Show full text]