PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, USAID CONTRACT NUMBER AID-182-C-12-00001, ALBANIA PLANNING AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT (PLGP).
COVER PICTURE: TRAINING SESSION WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF KAVAJA. PHOTO BY PLGP.
PLGP WORKING GROUP: ROBERT KORKUTI, SARAH KEESE, AND DIAMANTA VITO
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...... 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 6
INTRODUCTION ...... 7
1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK – MUNICIPALITIES AND PUBLIC SAFETY ...... 9
1.1 LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN TERMS OF SECURITY AND VE ...... 9
1.2 LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN TERMS OF PREVENTING VE (PULL FACTORS) ...... 12
2. THE NEED TO BETTER ADDRESS RADICALIZATION AND VE ...... 13
2.1 FINDINGS ON CURRENT LOCAL PRACTICES RELATED TO PVE ...... 13
2.2 INCREASING MUNICIPAL PVE CAPACITIES ...... 17
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND NEXT STEPS ...... 19
3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL GAPS ...... 19
3.2 EXPECTED RESULTS ...... 19
REFERENCES ...... 21
ADDENDUM TO DRAFT POLICY PAPER ...... 22
ANNEX TO POLICY PAPER (JULY 2020) ...... 29
ASP Albanian State Police
CBS Community-Based Scorecard
CSO Civil Society Organization
CP Community Policing
CVE Countering violent extremism
DCM Decision of the Council of Ministers
EU European Union
GoA Government of Albania
LGU Local Government Unit
LSC Local Safety Council
MoI Ministry of Interior
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSCVE National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism.
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PVE Preventing Violent Extremism
P/CVE Preventing and countering violent extremism
PLGP Planning and Local Governance Project
LLSG Law on Local Self-Government
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VE Violent extremism
The purpose of this paper is to provide policymakers with an examination of the current legal framework as it relates to PVE, an overview of the weaknesses in present practices, and propose measures to close the gaps which exist between the theory and implementation of such efforts. The recommendations found herein are based upon the work of the PLGP at a grassroots level in six partner municipalities across Albania. These municipalities were specifically selected in collaboration with the Coordination Center for CVE (of Albania) and encompass some of those most vulnerable to the phenomenon of radicalization and violent extremism. The lessons learned and best practices developed were a direct outcome of work undertaken with a local lens in tandem with municipal governments, active civil society organizations, religious institutions, community policing forces, and women and youth special interest groups. This work utilizes both desk research and the hands-on experience of multiple experts at the PLGP. It was drafted between July and September 2019, and considers work beginning in September 2018, onwards.
The paper is organized into four sections: an introduction, outlining the structure and logic of the paper overall; a legal overview, which gives the reader an understanding of the mandates at a local level regarding public safety and the overlap with the goals of PVE efforts; an analysis of the current systemic weaknesses, along with measures to address these gaps; and a final conclusion tying together the previous sections along with recommendations for scaling this process and the development of a referral mechanism (either new or utilizing the current protocols and systems in place) for P/CVE efforts at a local level.
As part of PLGP’s collaborative work with the Coordination Center for CVE, and in recognition of their position as a lynchpin of GoA efforts, the original draft policy paper was presented to CVE staff for their input and feedback. It was communicated that Local Public Safety Councils (LPSCs) would act as a strategic point for the CVE Center’s plans moving forward. At the request of the CVE Center, PLGP developed an Addendum (which follows) to delineate ways in which the position of LPSCs could be bolstered as a support to local governments in P/CVE activities.
Unfortunately, due to the unforeseen complications and additional responsibilities brought on by the health response to COVID-19, the requested feedback to this Addendum was not forthcoming from the MoI working group as anticipated. To support the CVE Center and lay the groundwork for a (potential) future P/CVE referral mechanism, PLGP composed basic protocols for members of Local Public Safety Councils (the final document herein). When regarded as a whole, these documents can be utilized to convey a more comprehensive picture of the current state of affairs and the projected ways to mitigate the challenges faced. PLGP also acknowledges that these documents require a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon and cannot predict the shifting landscape of P/CVE in Albania. However, accompanied by the P/CVE Guide and trainings, they may act as a roadmap to help direct efforts at the local and national levels moving forward.
In the framework of United Nations Global Strategy against Terrorism, the Government of Albania approved its National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism and Action Plan in November 2015.
The Strategy proposes measures to preserve the Albanian values of religious tolerance and harmony; to protect human rights, rule of law, and democracy; and to guard Albanian society from violent extremism. The Strategy’s main activities focus on strengthening community spirit, countering extremist messaging, and enabling comprehensive long-term policies against violent extremism. To implement the Strategy effectively, the Government of Albania foresees the development of relevant procedures and regulations along with the establishment of inter- institutional structures at both the national and local levels.
In 2015, with support from the US Department of State, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) assessed violent extremism in Albania, focusing on four pilot regions: Korça, Elbasan, Kukës, and Dibër. These regions were selected based on “information from law enforcement agencies in the country on potential or actual religious radical activity and media reports (especially on Albanian citizens participating in Syria conflict).” Among IDM’s recommendations to the Government of Albania (GoA) was the involvement of local governments and civil society to increase the availability of services involved in and options for rehabilitation or religious de-radicalization. As a whole-of- society effort, they recommended this be done in cooperation with law enforcement and religious communities as well, strengthening the measures across multiple sectors.
Radicalization and violent extremism came into focus as an issue following media reports in 2012 of Albanians (both nationally and ethnically speaking) taking part in the war zones of Syria. This exodus of foreign fighters (particularly from Kosovo and Macedonia) reached its height in 2014 and has greatly decreased (to the point of practically ceasing) from 2015, onwards. The awareness of those who left and the implications for their return prompted an in-depth assessment of the situation by both the GoA and international partners.
The phenomenon of violent extremism (VE) is very contextual in nature, and the factors influencing vulnerable communities vary across affected regions and countries. According to recent research and our mapping in partner municipalities, a number of Albanians citizens travelling to Syria were driven by various factors: a sense of marginalization and isolation from society; a lack of faith in the rule of law; institutional inefficiency of state actors; the perceived inefficiency and weakness of the Albanian Muslim Community; as well as by deeper socio-economic root causes. It can also be argued, based on media reports and official sources, that the vast majority of those who left came from remote rural and extremely poor areas.
In the long run, this issue has the potential to topple the religious harmony and peaceful coexistence of practitioners which has traditionally been seen as one of the prominent pillars of Albania’s national identity.
To show their commitment to preserving these values from an institutional and strategic viewpoint, in 2015 the GoA adopted a National Strategy for the Fight against Violent Extremism (NSFVE) and an Action Plan (CMD No. 930 dated 18.11.2015), with specific emphasis on education and awareness-raising, engagement with religious leaders, combatting the socio-economic aspects of radicalization, and mainstreaming communicative tools of de-radicalization and disengagement.
In alignment with the internationally recognized best practice that local governments should be empowered to protect and support their citizens, Albanian municipalities find themselves responsible for a multitude of new aspects of this care. In 2015, a legislative change in the form of the Law on Local Self-Government (LLSG) defined the mission of the local government units and recognized rights and freedoms of citizens (as provided by the Constitution of Albania). The law also sets forth the appropriate types of public services and other local facilities which should be present in order to increase civic participation and bolster community spirit overall.
Article 29 of this law delineates the direct functions and obligations of the municipalities in the areas of public care via emergency, fire, and rescue functions to maintain physical safety. It also serves to protect social peace and harmony within the community utilizing mechanisms for social contravention prevention and dispute resolution. The two major provisions of the Article are:
• Guaranteeing the well-functioning of relations within the community, the prevention and mediation for community dispute resolution. • Prevention of administrative contraventions, enforcement, inspection and monitoring of the implementation of the acts of local government units.
There are three laws to support the implementation of these provisions: The Law 8224/1997 “On the organization and functioning of the Municipal Police” (amended), the Law 10279/2010 “On administrative offences” and the Law 8756/2001 “On civil emergencies” (amended). Municipal structures such as the environmental, territorial protection, and veterinary inspectorates provide significant contribution to the community’s public safety. The main law/ordinance enforcement local unit is the municipal police; however, municipalities also manage the local fire-fighting units. According to the regulation approved by the Municipal Council, municipal police could exercise control over the territory by imposing sanctions (fines) for administrative offences related to traffic, the environment (burning of waste), public serenity (noises), public infrastructure (street interventions), use or misuse of public areas (street vendors), and public morale (alcoholism).
1.1 Legal Responsibilities in Terms of Security and VE
While the LLSG does not have direct provisions for countering violent extremism, Article 4 of the law states that local government units should abide by and implement the Constitution, the laws, and the bylaws. This provision compels municipalities to engage in implementing Decision 930/2015 of the Council of Ministers for the approval of the National Strategy Countering Violent Extremism (NSCVE) and the Action Plan. The Albanian Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism foresees as a priority area (No. 7) the development of knowledge and expertise on CVE through research and increased information sharing. Operational intelligence, data, research, and analysis of both the drivers of violent extremism and the levels of community resilience will inform future CVE polices.
The National Plan for European Integration 2017–2020 and the National Youth Action Plan 2015- 2020 also set objectives addressing violent extremism.
The Action Plan, as an integral part of the NSCVE, has set three priorities of intervention at the community level:
• Improving the mechanisms for inclusion and engagement in the community.; • Countering extremist propaganda by embracing democratic values; and • Drafting long-term comprehensive policies aiming at preventing violent extremism.
The fulfillment of these priorities harmonizes with the following articles from the LLSG: • Article 8 of the Law which enables municipal discretion in exercising power, enabling the municipalities to undertake initiatives aiming at preventing violent extremism and radicalization. • Articles 23-28 provide for functions of the municipality that could potentially affect factors leading citizens to radicalization and/or acts of violent extremism.
Even though the main local law enforcement agency (State Police) is not part of the municipal structure, the central government has formalized several mechanisms (addressing domestic violence, countering human trafficking, child protection, and “schools as community centers”) which empower municipalities to prevent and address issues as they arise under the order and security domain. The philosophy and practice of community policing has been formalized and enforced, and as such it constitutes another important bridge within the partnerships between the municipality and the state police and that between the state police and the citizens. The recently established local security councils (LSCs) within many municipalities are a prime example of these partnerships in action.
The Mechanism of Domestic Violence. According to Law 9669/2006 “On measures countering domestic violence”, Law 47/2018 “On certain amendments and additions to Law 9669/2006,” and the Decision of the Council of Ministers (DCM) 334/2011 “On the mechanism of work coordination for the referring of domestic violence and its following procedure” the steering committee of the mechanism is headed by the mayor, while the key actor for coordinating the inter-disciplinary technical team and assisting the victims in following procedures and completing files is also a municipal employee (the local coordinator for referring cases of domestic violence). Many of the factors driving people to domestic violence, such as the lack of education, poverty, etc., are the same ones that steer them into violent extremism. Addressing these factors in the steering committee and taking suitable measures favor prevention and/or diminish risks.
The Mechanism for Countering Human Trafficking. According to DCM 499/2018 “On approving standard procedures on actions with view to protecting victims or potential trafficking victims” and DCM 814/2014 “On approving inter-sectorial strategy of the fight against organized crime, illicit trafficking and terrorism, 2013–2020, and its action plan 2013–2016”, the regional committees for countering the trafficking of women and children exist at the prefecture and sub- prefecture levels. The mayor, along with key local officials (such as directors of the social services, employment agency, State Police, State Intelligence Service, education, and public health), are
members of the committees. The anti-trafficking committees and sub-committees focus on citizens at risk, such as unemployed and uneducated women, as well as their children. This category is also vulnerable to the threat of violent extremism and radicalization, the overlap of which broadens the scope of work of the anti-trafficking committees to have potential impact in the P/CVE realm as well.
The Mechanism for Children at Risk. According to Law No. 18/2017 “On the children rights and child protection” and DCM 265/2012 “On the establishing and operating of the mechanism for coordinating work among state authorities responsible for referring cases of children at risk and its follow-up procedures”, every municipality should have a Child Protection Specialist. Also, a multidisciplinary group and child protection unit should operate at the municipal level. Child protection units face problems related to the difficult economic situation of families, school drop- outs or non-registration, domestic violence, trafficking, child exploitation, child marriage among girls and the access for persons with disabilities. These units engage in awareness campaigns for Online Child Safety related to the risk of online radicalization and manage cases of children with health issues, including mental health issues.
Schools as Community Centers. According to Decision No. 11/2016 “On approving the Development Strategy of Pre-University Education, 2014–2020”, the coordination team for the implementation of schools as community centers includes the school’s head teacher (or deputy head teacher) as the team leader, members of the parents’ board, students, teachers, police, and representatives of the local government and other social partners. Engaging the community and local government representatives in this mechanism facilitates dialogue to address issues directly and indirectly related to violent extremism and radicalization, such as young people who drop out of school and those that might be victims of street crime.
Local Public Safety Councils. According to Decision No. 83/2015 “On establishing and operating the local self-government” (amended by DCM No. 11/2018), the Agency for the Support of the Local Government has instructed municipalities to establish local councils for public safety. The council is presided over by the mayor and constitutes the most suitable forum to address local issues which fall outside of the purview of existing referral mechanisms. Local public safety councils may address both push factors (such as exclusion, inequality, discrimination, or denial of civil rights and liberties) and pull factors (such as the existence of local extremist groups or sermons of ideological/spiritual leaders) related to violent extremism and radicalization.
Community Policing. According to Law No. 108/2015 “On State Police” and DCM 702/2015 “On the approval of the Strategy of Public Order 2015–2020 and its action plan 2015–2017”, community policing officers, responsible for a designated neighborhood, maintain regular contact with municipal representatives, especially with the heads of administrative units. Community dispute resolution is an important dimension of community policing and complies with the legal obligation of municipalities under the community policing framework. This is the easiest mechanism to promote among citizens who may want to discuss a case of where there is an indication of potential violence and/or extremism.
1.2 Legal responsibilities in terms of preventing VE (pull factors)
The Law on Local Self-Government gives agency to the LGUs to fulfill the following functions: infrastructure and public services; social services; culture, sports, and entertainment services; environmental protection; agriculture, rural development, public forest and pastures, nature, and biodiversity; local economic development; and public security.
The presumed work of the municipality to address and prevent VE could be incorporated in four groups: strategic planning, public health, social welfare, and infrastructure and environment. Strategic planning. According to the Law 107/2014 “On territory planning,” all municipalities must have two important documents: the general local development plan and the territorial development plan. Drafting and implementing these documents not only facilitates sustainable economic development, but also delineates rules to support the social and economic activities of the city, harmonizing community interests overall. By optimizing incomes and expenses, the consolidated municipalities can generate funds for non-governmental organizations and provide grants for different development projects, such as those countering violent extremism and radicalization.
Public health. As evidenced by the Law 139/2015, Law 10107/2009 “On health care in the Republic of Albania,” and Law 121/2016 “On welfare services,” municipalities have a limited role in implementing primary health care services. However, the present legislation foresees responsibilities for enabling and maintaining a healthy environment, maintaining the physical infrastructure of the primary health care institutions (as part of the local government assets), financially contributing to the health institutions within their jurisdiction, and monitoring health activities in cooperation with the central government bodies as municipal functions. To counter factors related to mental health issues, there is a dire need for increased dedicated funds for maintaining and expanding the network of health services and the improvement of the entire system of mental and psychological health care services overall.
Social welfare. According to the Laws “Law 121/2016 “On welfare services in the Republic of Albania,” Law 22/2018 “On social housing,” and Law 9355/2005 “On social assistance and services” (amended), municipalities should create and manage social services for at-risk groups. Legally, the municipalities must identify individuals and groups in dire need of support and assistance, handle their cases, and monitor their lives and behaviors. This monitoring or reactionary efforts must also be combined with efforts to mitigate any potential deterioration and escalation of the situation that might lead to them becoming radicalized.
Infrastructure and environment. According to the Law 10463 “On integrated waste management” as amended, Law 8094/1996 “On public disposal of waste” and the Law 107/2014 “On territory planning,” LGUs are responsible for operating the drainage and water systems and protecting the ecosystem including forests, pastures, rivers, and creeks. Building and maintaining public infrastructure is one of the key functions of the municipality. The municipality has full investment, administrative, and regulatory authority. A clean environment, with an efficient and operational infrastructure, positively impacts the citizens’ perception of their situation in life and contributes to preventing climates which enable extremist attitudes and behaviors.
This section focuses on two major issues: a. The current practices carried out by municipalities in terms of addressing and preventing radicalization and violent extremism, and b. How to increase municipal capacities to better respond to citizens’ needs regarding the services they might require in terms of prevention of radicalization and VE.
We conclude by providing recommendations on how these issues could be addressed by means of human resources and regulations.
2.1 Findings on current local practices related to PVE
Problems were analyzed which relate to the current municipal situation in terms of enforcing the laws and regulations, the assistance provided to vulnerable communities, the allocation of human resources, and monitoring and evaluation. The most important issues in this regard include:
1. Lack of enforcement of laws and regulations; 2. Underperformance in providing specific services to vulnerable communities; 3. Scarcity of dedicated human resources; and 4. Fragmented monitoring and evaluation practices;
Lack of enforcement of laws and regulations. As shown in the second section, there are several laws and bylaws municipalities must enforce. When laws are observed, public order and citizen security services function well and create a more surety and higher quality of life for those citizens. Municipalities, especially those which are small and positioned in remote areas, tend to require a high level of financial assistance (budgets) from the central government and provide little contribution to the citizens. Many of these municipal governments exhibit a passive attitude and promote expectations that the central government will solve their problems.
Although the Municipal Police have been established and are functional in the PLGP's partner municipalities, their role in maintaining peace and order borders on insignificant. It seems most of their work is to protect the municipality and act as bodyguards for the mayor. Their appearance and attitude also are unfriendly, an indication of deficiencies in their selection and training. Referring to the Law on Municipal Police, their duties encompass a broad spectrum and include many aspects related to the quality of life of citizens such as protection against physical and aural pollution, control of illegal markets and buildings, road traffic, prevention of acts of violence as a result of mental health, etc. In an ideal situation the municipal police should be one of the strongest, if not the strongest local partners in terms of PVE; however, given the current situation they do not make direct or indirect contributions in this regard.
With the assistance of the PLGP in three of the partner municipalities (Dibra, Bulqiza, and Pogradec) Local Safety Councils were established and formalized, adopting recognized rules and procedures. The LSCs primary function is to provide more security from a mayor to his or her constituents; however, their ability to address security concerns, including those of violent extremism, is often quite limited. The regulation outlines that councils should meet on a quarterly basis. Within our partner municipalities, this would not occur without outside facilitation (by the PLGP or similar entity). Despite the difficulties experienced in their initial phases, all the local actors involved in the council acknowledge its usefulness and are optimistic about the future.
Acknowledging the progress on this front, there are still municipalities which have not fulfilled their legal obligation in establishing the previously discussed local mechanisms for safety and security issues. The table below indicates the current status of these mechanisms. This is a quantitative account and does not reflect a measurement of the usefulness, efficiency, or PVE-awareness of actors integral to or acting within these mechanisms.
Existing mechanism
LGU Countering Schools as Local Safety DV Reporting Human Child Protection Community Council Mechanism Trafficking Mechanism Centers Mechanism Initiative
Dibra Yes (2019) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bulqiza Yes (2018) Yes No Yes Yes
Kamza No Yes (2018) Yes Yes Yes
Pogradec Yes (2019) Yes (2009) No Yes Yes
Librazhd Yes (2017) Yes Yes Yes No Yes (only one Cerrik Yes (2018) Yes Yes Yes (2018) meeting)
Underperformance in providing specific services to vulnerable communities. Violent extremism (VE) has many causes depending on the context, and in every region the factors that make a community vulnerable can vary. Although municipalities annually plan a fund for vulnerable groups that cannot benefit from the central economic aid, citizens with disabilities face difficulties due to the lack of physical infrastructure that enables mobility (such as inability to access public transportation, education, health services, and sports events). The Egyptian and Roma communities of our partner municipalities suffer the same issues as elsewhere in the country, including marginalization, lack of opportunities for employment, and social exclusion. Many children of these communities are either not registered or not regularly attending elementary schools as well. This lack of primary education serves to further isolate these populations and decreases their chance for steady employment moving forward into their adult lives, perpetuating the cycle of deprivation and exclusion.
All of the PLGP partner municipalities are benefiting from (centrally provided) assistance from charity organizations, but not all of them provide contributions to the social “health” of the cities. There is a “Sulejmania” foundation located in Librazhd, which the community does not hold in high regard. The organization, whose primary beneficiaries belong to vulnerable populations, are perceived as operating with great secrecy, and no one knows what happens behind closed doors (they also operate a dormitory for young boys). Municipalities are not vigilant having no capacities for vetting such organizations before enabling them to engage with these communities.
Another at-risk group are convicted people. The PLGP partner municipalities do not maintain agreements with the Probation Service for reintegration of those previously incarcerated. There are, however, several municipalities who do have agreements of collaboration with the Probation Service to deliver this service and mitigate the stigma they may receive upon returning to their communities.
Scarcity of dedicated human resources. The total number of the employees in six municipalities is 2,584 (Librazhd – 395, Cerrik – 243, Dibra – 750, Pogradec – 618, Kamza – 180 and Bulqiza – 398); however, there is not a single part-time or full-time employee specifically mandated to work on PVE, despite the fact that these areas are considered as hot spots in terms of VE. According to a recent study1 the municipality of Tirana is the only one in which a person in charge of dealing with the issue of violent extremism at a local level is appointed.
In the absence of an official responsible for PVE matters, the specialist/coordinators of Domestic Violence, Child Protection, and the Vulnerable Communities (elderly, ethnic minorities, and persons with disabilities), are currently the closest local partner or quasi focal points. The presence of these functions in our partner municipalities is introduced in the table below. In a more general view, the Directorates of Health and Social Services and Education, Sports and Youth are the main structures dealing with vulnerable communities and youth and are also important local partners in terms of awareness-raising and prevention. However, the partnership with these structures is based on goodwill and open-mindedness of those occupying these positions, rather than being officially mandated by their job descriptions.
Existing structure LGU Vulnerable Communities Specialist Domestic Violence Child Protection (elderly, ethnic minorities, persons Local Coordinator Specialist with disabilities) Dibra Yes Yes Yes Bulqiza Yes Yes No Kamza Yes Yes Yes Yes (Roma People and Persons with Pogradec Yes Yes Disabilities) Librazhd Yes Yes No
Cerrik Yes Yes Yes
1 Baseline Situation Analysis “Strengthening Civil Society to Build Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism”, Terre des Homes Albania
Another shortcoming in terms of human resources is the political instability common in Albanian government institutions. After the local election of 2019, the majority of PLGP municipal actors are facing the risk of losing their positions, jeopardizing the continuity of current projects and initiatives on countering violent extremism. Considering the importance institutional memory has in terms of VE, the existence of an official in charge PVE (outside of the politically influenced structure) could act as a firewall against the damage caused by the political transition.
The higher prevalence of religious radicalization is especially noted in rural areas, emphasizing the role the heads of administrative units can play to deter this phenomenon and the need to for specific awareness-raising and training activities on the concept of PVE and related practices. While the PLGP has conducted PVE training in all of its partner municipalities, only a handful of trainees have been heads of administrative units. Considering the limited capacities CSOs and international assistance have in terms of training and coaching local officials, the existence of a local sustainable structure to lead and coordinate PVE efforts in the remote rural areas of the municipalities is crucial.
Fragmented monitoring and evaluation practices. Municipalities should be aware of the views of the community and citizens they serve. The PLGP’s experience has shown that public opinion polls provide valuable descriptive data and information regarding the performance of the municipality. Official statistics and public opinion information form the best reference for drafting intervention plans, meeting the specific needs of each constituency.
Through various methods of international assistance, including support from USAID/PLGP, monitoring tools are being piloted in selected municipalities. One of these tools is the Community-Based Scorecard (CBS), which was implemented in the municipalities of Pogradec and Librazhd. The CBS is a monitoring tool that uses community analysis units to stimulate social and public accountability and increase the responsibility of local decision-making institutions. The CBS is also known as the “community voice,” as it enables citizens to express their views on the quality, compatibility, and efficiency of public services and also to propose changes regarding services and local decision-making. Even though the CBS is not strictly related to PVE issues, it might serve to obtain citizen’s views on VE and improve the municipal services in this regard. Other methods piloted in other municipalities are the “Social Audit Methodology” and “Citizen Report Cards”.
Some municipalities have established a monitoring and evaluation system in place for vulnerable groups. The existence of such a system helps draft targeted local and sustainable policies for these populations and covers the entire territory of the municipality, including the administrative units. There are no indications such systems have incorporated policies on CVE. Additional training on P/CVE issues for the official in charge of implementation would be required to further assess the potential for overlapping impact.
According to the “Strategy of Public Order 2015–2020 and Action Plan” local police should evaluate the state of security in the community through the “Local Safety Measurement System”. The system surveys citizens in areas (neighborhoods) on order and security issues and records their perception of police performance. The survey findings, along with police statistics, should then be
analyzed to identify the root causes and factors that lead to security issues and further serve as basis for intervention planning. There is no indication such system was or is functioning in the PLGP partner municipalities.
Despite fragmented M&E practices fueled by donors, municipalities have neither budget, nor human resources capacities available to conduct their own M&E of the systems and mechanisms previously mentioned in this paper.
2.2 Increasing municipal PVE capacities
Reflecting upon the limitations noted in the previous section, we will now introduce options to be considered by policymakers at the central and local levels. These options empower officials to act towards improving the current municipal situation in terms of preventing and countering VE. As before, we should also take into consideration the specificities of local government practices and challenges, especially in this period of transformation in the framework of territorial reform.
While it may seem that there are no legal shortcomings that might influence the performance of the municipalities in terms of security and safety, the situation is not the same in terms of PVE. As a recent phenomenon, the concept of violent extremism is not articulated in the basic laws governing the work of municipalities. Extremism and its prevention are included in the strategic documents mentioned in the first section (including the NSCVE); however, they do not indicate specific tasks LGUs should implement.
The best method to prevent the radicalization of citizens and their propagation of acts of extremism is to create a specific referral mechanism2. Implementing this ideal scenario requires legal intervention along with additional human and financial resources. While there are cases in academia where “…documented cases exist in which families, teachers, or social workers have noticed signs of radicalization to violence, and even reported their suspicions to local authorities, but no action was taken to intervene,3” we have no evidence that similar cases occurred in our partner municipalities. From this perspective and considering the high number (six) of other mechanisms operating at the local level, we would suggest a collaborate referral approach. Instead of creating a new referral mechanism, municipalities would use the existing ones to refer citizens at risk of being involved in violent extremism for the appropriate assistance. Out of those previously discussed (see Section 1.2), the mechanism of domestic violence appears to be the most stable, well-developed, and best suited for this overlap. However, the inclusion of VE in one or more
2 A P/CVE referral mechanism is typically a multiagency and and/or multidisciplinary program, platform, or initiative that: 1. Includes representatives from a plurality of municipal or other government agencies, community-based organizations, and CSOs, 2. Receives referrals from members of the community or government entities of individuals identified as most vulnerable to, or at the early stages of, engaging with extremist violence but who have yet to cross a criminal threshold, 3. Assesses the risk and protective factors, as well as vulnerabilities of the referred individual to determine the appropriate course of action; and 4. Designs, delivers, monitors, and evaluates individually tailored interventions or support plans that address the risk factors and vulnerabilities of those deemed most at risk of or vulnerable to VE and help steer the referred individuals down a different, non-violent path. OSCE Guidebook, 2019, Pg. 29. 3 Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization, OSCE, 2019, Pg. 32
existing mechanisms and the following necessary processes and protocols would require a more comprehensive study to predict the efficacy of such implementation.
The experience acquired during the establishment and development of local safety councils has demonstrated the importance such forums can play in coordinating key local actors in addressing the roots of VE, especially the mayor and the head of local police. In some cases, additional challenges may be faced when the mayor belongs to the opposition party (as was our experience in Kamza). Unfortunately, this can engender a spirit of reciprocal mistrust which undermines the establishment of an LSC. Taking this into consideration, this shortcoming could be avoided via the formalization of the LSC through a legal act (DCM). The resultant bylaw should also provide more specific instruction on how an LSC addresses root causes of radicalization and VE. Even though LSCs facilitate the communication and coordination between the mayor and local head of the ASP, due to the different lines of reporting there is nothing binding them institutionally. To empower mayors to better monitor their areas of responsibility, protect citizens, and prevent crime, it would be beneficial for mayors to have input regarding the appointment of police commissars. This ability to influence appointments is in line with community policing best practices, as currently implemented within the ASP’s Community Policing Philosophy.
The ethnic minority Roma and Egyptian communities and those living in remote areas far from the city centers are the poorest and most marginalized populations in Albania. These groups experience extreme forms of material deprivation. In addition, they also encounter high levels of social exclusion, as they are less likely to be able to meet daily needs and decreased participation in the processes that have direct bearing on their lives as individuals such as employment opportunities, healthcare, and access to education. Empowering vulnerable local communities must be a multi-sectorial response in order to extend human security and access to the socio-economic and civic rights for all Albanians.
As referenced in Section 2, an office or an official should be designated to be responsible for PVE matters. The topic of PVE is nuanced and cross-cutting; without a concerted, focused effort it risks falling through the cracks or becoming blurred to the point of inefficiency. The scope of work of this position should include experience with different referral mechanisms, cooperation with the various stakeholders such as the religious communities, and ideally training in M&E. The PVE office/official should be also the focal point for citizens to report incidents and/or request assistance regarding at-risk citizens in their communities.
The existing legal framework enables municipalities to set up and organize the necessary order and security services to guarantee the implementation of administrative measures.
3.1 Organizational gaps
While efforts are progressing to address violent extremism at the strategic level, there are still unexplored opportunities and challenges in relation to the technical actions or multiagency platforms where individual cases are referred, assessed, and discussed. Clearly, an established path of reporting and action is needed. However, a rush to engage or hasty research in developing a referral mechanism can do long-term damage and/or contribute to the very problem it is designed to address. Thoughtful and concerted input from many actors is necessary to move forward an appropriate mechanism in this case.
A final methodology for the design process will be designed in collaboration with the Coordination Center for CVE. The methods chosen are expected to forge and strengthen partnerships between the PLGP, CVE Center and other actors which are vital to the successful prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. Throughout the whole process, attention will be given to the Albanian Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. The suggested process will be divided into three phases:
• Phase 1 – Initial Analysis (background/desk research) to include information-gathering and meetings with key actors at the central and local governments, police, civil society, and the international community of practice. This phase may also include surveys and focus groups. • Phase 2 – Development of options and validation of their potential. During the second phase, the joint team of experts will delineate options for a potential CVE referral mechanism in Albania. The suggested options should be corroborated through a validation workshop. • Phase 3 – Consolidation culminating in a detailed design. During the third phase, the team will review the draft per the feedback acquired at the validation workshop. At the final consolidation point, hampering factors and potential risks should be identified.
3.2 Expected Results
At the end of this process, the following outcomes are expected: • An improved understanding of different mechanism modalities at the local, regional and international levels for all parties involved.
• Increased understanding regarding the benefits of developing and operationalizing a P/CVE referral mechanism, to include the negative consequences such mechanism might cause (observing the theory to do no harm). • Identification of next steps for the implementation of a multiagency platform wherein individual cases are referred, assessed, and discussed. • Identification of local governmental capacities to handle P/CVE in terms of human resources (local focal point) and finances. • Unified vision regarding mandates, protocols, and roles and responsibilities of the practitioners involved in P/CVE.
Baseline Situation Analysis “Strengthening Civil Society to Build Youth Resilience to Violent Extremism”, Terre des Homes Albania, 2017;
Creating a unified system for reporting local government finance indicators (policy paper), PLGP, August 2017
Community Mapping Assessment of the Municipalities of Bulqizë and Cërrik, PLGP, 2018; Law no. 139/2015, “On Local Self-Government”; Mapping assessments of the Municipalities of Pogradec, Librazhd, Dibra and Kamza, PLGP, 2019 Manual for the Local Officials, USAID PLGP, 2015. The guide for “Effective Municipalities, Active Communities, and Safer Citizens”, PLGP, 2019
The National Strategy Countering Violent Extremism and the Action Plan, DCM, 2015;
Understanding Referral Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism Navigating Challenges and Protecting Human Rights A Guidebook for South-Eastern Europe, OSCE, 2019. National Action Plan on Implementation of the Resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, 2018-2020 (adopted by DCM No. 524. dated 11.09.2018).
The purpose of this addendum is to provide: 1) an examination of the current status of Local Public Safety Councils (LPSC) in Albania, 2) a comparative assessment among similar practices in Kosovo, 3) an analysis of LPSCs in Albania (strengths, weaknesses and opportunities) and 4) conclusions and the way ahead.
1. Examination of the current status of Local Public Safety Councils (LPSC) in Albania
LPSCs in Albania first emerged in 2016 when, with the support of the OSCE, the first council was established in Elbasan. Currently, thanks to the continued assistance of the OSCE, EU Commission, USAID, SIDA and the Dutch Embassy, LPSCs have been established in most municipalities nationwide. According to the CVE Center, only the municipalities of Selenicë, Sarandë, Tepelenë, Memaliaj, Peqin, Libohovë, Poliçan, and Kurbin have not established LPSCs at the time of this writing. The process of establishing LPSCs in Albania has not been accompanied by laws or bylaws, and there are no government offices or officials in charge of dealing with LPSCs at either the national or local level. The only regulatory document in existence is an official letter from March 2018, from the Agency for Local Government Support advising LGUs to set up LPSC working groups. In the absence of a legal framework, municipalities have adopted draft regulations as presented by the various supporting organizations (see above). What these disparate groups have in common is their similarity to the Kosovar model of LPSCs. In most cases, the regulations have been approved by the mayors, although in some cases approval has been granted by the LPSC itself or the municipal council. Many regulations reference the Law 139/2015 “on Local Self-Government” and the Law 108/2015 “On State Police”; however, neither of these laws has provisions specific to the establishment or operation of LPSCs. USAID’s Planning and Local Governance Project (PGLP) has nearly two years of experience in establishing and supporting LPSCs in Bulqizë, Dibër, Pogradec and Kamëz. This experience has shown that the current partisan operational system of the councils is far from effective, both in terms of general safety and especially in the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. While there is a clear willingness of the police to attend and contribute to these meetings, municipal leaders do not seem inclined to proactively establish LPSCs or maintain their operability. Although they (mayors) have adopted regulations as recommended by the international community, there is no observed evidence that these rules are respected (for example, there is a lack of prescribed quarterly meetings). This conclusion is drawn not only from the PLGP’s experience in our partner municipalities but also from others where we have conducted training (Bilisht, Kavaje, Librazhd, Durres, Shkodër, and Berat). The lack of legal regulations, along with a lack of mayoral civil and managerial capacities, has resulted in some municipalities formalizing LPSCs for statistical purposes only (reported to the Ministry of Interior in the framework of EU accession processes) without regard for council sustainability. Another shortcoming lies in the directionality of instigation-LPSCs are not created as a local necessity (bottom-up) but rather by donor organizational insistence or central government direction (top-down). For example, PLGP was invited by partner municipalities to support their
establishment of LPSCs not as a response to local security issues but in order to fulfill the request of the ASLGU. Per the OSCE Guidebook4: “Any mechanism should not be imposed from the outside.”. In the same page of the Guidebook it is stipulated that, “The decision to develop one [mechanism] and the choice of model should be informed by consultations with local stakeholders, taking into account the capacities and willingness of the relevant institutions, organizations, and actors that will need to be involved, and reflecting the local context and culture.”. Per the regulation municipalities have adopted: “The LPSCs are forums of representatives of local public institutions, CSOs and communities, whose main mission is to increase the awareness and cooperation among all local actors to prevent and solve problems related to the safety and security of the citizens.”. Understood in this context, LPSCs are not a referral mechanism, as they are sometimes incorrectly identified. The main goal of a “referral mechanism” is not awareness-raising (which could be served by LPSCs), but the identification, protection and assistance of persons through referral, involving both relevant public authorities and civil society. Global P/CVE forums and recent applicable literature (e.g. the OSCE Guidebook) recommend that states consider the development of multidisciplinary referral mechanisms. Municipality-led model has been settled worldwide for broader crime prevention purposes. The UK’s Channel Programme, Denmark’s SSP (schools, social work, and police), Canada’s situation table, Finland’s anchor model, and Holland’s safe houses are perhaps the most well-known examples of the preventative approach, becoming an increasingly popular tool for P/CVE. These models use the multi-disciplinary & multi-agency approaches where a person deemed at risk of extremism is referred to a “hub” that consists of professionals working on designing and leading an intervention which can include mental, vocational, or spiritual counseling. Conclusion. Although LPSCs have the potential to operate as cross-cutting, whole-of-society entities when properly developed and sustained, they should not be misconstrued at present as the lynchpin for a referral mechanism on the topic of radicalization and P/CVE efforts. Their current dependence on donor instigation and lack of a legal support leaves them vulnerable to the “box- checking” model of establishment without regard to operational sustainability.
2. Comparative assessment between Kosovo and Albania regarding the establishment of LPSCs
LPSCs in Albania were established following the observed model utilized in Kosovo, which provides a basis for the following comparative assessment. In Kosovo, the process of creating Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSCs) began in 2008. According to the Law No. 03/L-035 on Police (4 June 2008), MCSCs are an “advisory body chaired by the municipal president, with membership representing all communities within the municipality”5. Four years after the Police Law was changed, the updated law (No. 04 / l-076) gave the Director General of Police the authority to establish the so-called Public Safety Committee in each municipality6. The United States Department of Justice and the Department of Public Safety of the
4 Understanding Referral Mechanisms in P/CVE and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, OSCE, April 2019, Pg. 97 5 https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=2528. Article 7. 6 https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=2806. Article 7.
OSCE Mission in Kosovo nurtured this process, focused on the prevention of inter-ethnic incidents and hate crimes. Pursuant to the Police Law, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Local Government Administration issued the Administrative Instruction No. 27/2012 MIA - 03/2012 MLGA “On MCSC”7. This document sets out, inter alia, the composition of the council, duties and rights. Article 18 foresees that members are paid for their work by the budget of the respective municipality and provides for a structure which operates at three levels: Municipal Community Safety Councils, Local Public Safety Committees (LPSC) and Community Safety Action Teams. In 2014, the Ministry of Local Government Administration published a Manual on LPSCs8, which provided clear administrative instruction and delineated the mandatory components for the establishment and functioning of the Councils. International references to similar practices in the US, UK, Australia and Croatia were attached to the Manual, providing context for best practice recommendations. Despite the legal and sub-legal arrangements, as well as the relatively long history of the establishment and functioning of these councils/teams, their efficiency and sustainability is still met with skepticism in Kosovo. Per the assessment of the Kosovo Center for Security Studies9 (key findings), unless MCSCs receive external support, there is limited public outreach and functionality by the MCSCs themselves. While the MCSPs were established to deal with all local safety and security problems, there is a P/CVE-specific referral mechanism in the city of Gjilan which was established with the support of ICITAP. This mechanism is considered the first of its kind in the region10 and should be closely scrutinized for potential modification to scale moving forward. Unlike Kosovo, the piloting of LPSCs in Albania has not been accompanied by a legal or uniform regulatory structure. This lack of legal regulation, the involvement of many international and local actors in the process, and the resultant implementation of different models, has created a kind of confusion in terms of both the composition of LPSCs and the operational systems they apply. Compositionally, councils are chaotic as the selection of council members is often conditioned by the preferences of the mayor. This leaves them open to a lack of expertise and the potential for high turnover (lack of institutional memory) as the municipal structure shifts. Operationally, they perpetuate inconsistencies as different municipalities have chosen various modes of LPSC establishment according to the model offered by their own supporting actor (OSCE, national donors, etc.). Conclusion. Kosovo’s LPSC model is quite different to the Albanian model both in terms of legal instruments in effect and institutional involvement. The impetus for LPSCs in Kosovo (primarily the prevention of ethnic conflicts) also differs from Albania. In Kosovo, the establishment of LPSCs is regulated by laws/bylaws and has the full support of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Local Government. Both ministries house dedicated offices related to LPSCs (the MoI has the Department of Public Safety). In Albania, there is limited oversight for LPSCs provided by the Agency for Support of LGUs, which is housed within the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Local Government does not exist. A small unit (the Community Policing Sector) exists in the Police
7 https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=8203 8 https://mapl.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Udhezuesi-per-KKSB_14-janar-2015-gj-angleze-1.pdf 9 http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Vler%C3%ABsimi_i_Mbik%C3%ABqyrjes_Demokratike_dhe_Mekanizmave_ t%C3%AB_Qeverisjes_s%C3%AB_K%C3%ABshillave_Komunale_p%C3%ABr_Siguri_n%C3%AB_Bashk%C3%ABsi_(alb,eng,srb)_809361.pdf 10 https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2019/03/SCN_Western-Balkans_Regional-Assessment-Report_13032018.pdf
Headquarters composed of three officers, whose responsibilities encompass LPSCs, among many other issues. The head of the unit joined the CVE Center during their recent field visits to raise awareness of P/CVE issues and empower LPSCs, further strengthening coordination efforts on this front.
Comparative analysis
Nr. of Countries Years since Office(s) in P/CVE Legal framework municipalities with LPSCs first charge of referral for LPSCs LPSCs established established LPSCs mechanism to date
The Police Law, Ministry of 34 municipalities. Not The LPSCs Interior established in Kosovo 12 Administrative Ministry of Local Leposavic, North Yes, Gjilan Instruction, Government Mitrovica, Zvecan and The LPSC Manual Zubin Potok11
53 municipalities. Not established in 8 (Selenicë, Sarandë, Albania 4 No No No Tepelenë, Memaliaj, Peqin, Libohovë, Poliçan dhe Kurbin)
3. An analysis of LPSCs in Albania (strengths, weaknesses and opportunities)
Strengths If the absence of legal regulation is a deficiency in terms of the current functioning of LPSCs as explained above, it might be considered an advantage in terms of agility and the ability to respond to the ever-changing security landscape. A lack of current regulation provides flexibility and an opportunity for monitoring and modification prior to codification down the line. Looking to international best practice models, along with the lessons learned from the implementation up to this point, allows for a contextualized model with increased chance for success. Recognizing that other security mechanisms exist with targeted focuses (Domestic Violence, Child Protection, Human Trafficking, etc.), the LPSCs constitute a suitable, broader security forum in which to address both push (exclusion, inequality, discrimination) and pull (local radical groups or extremist preaching) factors in violent extremism and radicalization. The contextualization of these factors within the umbrella of security concerns provides a forum for community issues to be discussed without the stigma of a specific “extremist” mechanism. As the mechanism develops, this broad coverage may also lend itself to an incorporation of actors from the more specific referral systems and the creation of an overarching “human security” referral mechanism.
11 https://mapl.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RAPORTI-Versioni-i-fundit-23.03.2018-ANGLISHT.pdf
The communication and cooperation among the mayor and the head of local police is crucial in terms of security and safety. LPSCs provide a platform for the facilitation of joint efforts between these two key actors and expedite the resolution of local problems, including those related to radicalization and VE. Weaknesses As a local mechanism encompassing all security and safety matters, there is a risk that the concerns related to radicalization and violent extremism could become conflated or neglected due to disinformation and general overwhelm. Albanian communities have other safety concerns which LPSCs are meant to deal with. Because the topic of radicalization and VE remains a “hot potato” of responsibility, many local officials are still reluctant to articulate the phenomena publicly. While the establishment of LPSCs in their current state contributes on a strategic level to address the root causes of VE and radicalization, the provision of technical assistance to community members at risk of involvement remains unaddressed. Per the OSCE Guide “Understanding Referral Mechanisms in P/CVE and Radicalization,” similar forums established in the UK, Denmark, Germany, Kosovo, France, Denmark, Belgium, Canada and Holland function mainly on an ad hoc basis to discuss individual cases and actions involving persons who show signs of radicalization. Another functional weakness of LPSCs results from limited municipal capacities in terms of security and safety, especially with regards to budgetary support. For example, municipal police have an insignificant role in maintaining urban order (as previously discussed in the policy paper), and because of budgetary problems LGUs are struggling to manage local firefighting units. Other municipal structures related to security and safety, such as the environmental and territorial protection inspectorates are unable to provide significant contribution to the community’s public safety. Although the DV referral mechanism has legally been a mandated responsibility of the municipalities for nearly nine years (DCM 334/2011), there are still practical shortcomings, mostly related to the shelter and treatment of victims. The same issues are apparent in relation to another human security concern, the mechanism for children at risk (DCM 265/2012). These pre-existing, legally mandated responsibilities have saturated LGU capacities in the security sector and dilute any motivation or resources available to address an additional mechanism (LPSCs) which is NOT mandated as such. Even though LPSCs are established to provide contributions to the local law and order, the support these forums have from the main national institution in charge of enforcing the law (Ministry of Interior and Albanian State Police), seems to be nominal at worst and peripheral at best. Opportunities Strengthening LPSCs through legal improvements. In order to avoid potential overlap and confusion in terms of local mechanisms, one solution could be the establishment of one overarching security and safety referral mechanism. The assumed improved mechanism (LPSC) would cover all safety/security problems including P/CVE. A mechanism that addresses all forms of VE as part of a wider violence prevention and safeguarding framework is most likely to attract local support12. The current mechanisms (DV, Human Trafficking, Child Protection) are regulated by DCM, therefore the Prime Minister’s Office possesses the legal power to improve the current framework and create
12 Understanding Referral Mechanisms in P/CVE and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, OSCE, April 2019, Pg. 13
an all-inclusive referral mechanism. As part of the PM’s Office and in alignment with their vision to empower LPSCs, the Coordination Center for CVE would be ideally positioned to undertake such an initiative for improvement. Strengthening LPSCs through municipal structural improvements. The current structural status quo makes apparent the insufficiency of LGUs to provide security and safety to its citizens. The establishment of an office or department in every LGU, wherein all the existing law enforcement municipal functions (mentioned above) are included, would generate space for P/CVE efforts. The presumed office would also oversee the LPSCs. According to the Law on Local Self- Government, the design of the municipal structure is the responsibility of the mayor. However, the central government (PM’s Office) directs the priorities in terms of national safety and security and has the potential to intervene via DCM. This foreseen DCM must include both structural and legal improvements as outlined above and would provide an outline for required functions related to security at a local level. Improving the current LPSC model. While the top-down approach in terms of raising the effectiveness of LPSCs is crucial, the bottom-up methodology remains an untapped option for improvement in the interim. Pursuit of both directionalities would also provide a balance between national leadership and local ownership. Based on PLGP’s observations and experience on the ground, along with the OSCE Guidebook, we would propose the current platform of LPSCs be reshaped with a new focus on the citizens and providing procedures/protocols that municipalities can follow to assist citizens at risk. As an all-encompassing mechanism, the prescribed inclusion of the DV Coordinator, CPU Coordinator, and Gender Equality Employee (among others) would allow for improved communication between those responsible for vulnerable populations within the community. The ability to provide awareness of citizens at risk within the framework of human security recognizes the observed phenomenon of coinciding violence within the family as a potential risk indicator for broader community violence. The improved mechanism could then serve as reference document for legal improvements (as previously outlined) in a later stage. Sustainability of capacity-building and functionality via governmental institutionalization. Although the Kosovo model has a longer operational history than in Albania, the reliance on donor-funded initiatives has left them open to gaps in sustainability and lack of message continuity related to human security at the local level. Areas which received initial trainings have fallen out of circulation as funding cycles ended and officials in different municipalities were left without “next steps” in the process. In order to avoid this confusion and to align trainings with policy updates, trainings should be institutionalized on an annual or biannual basis nationwide. The membership of LPSCs is currently malleable; however, each includes policing component. By conducting an initial training of trainers within the State Police, the CVE Center could ensure a consistent dissemination of knowledge. Annual or biannual P/CVE awareness trainings for local officials (based on the model currently in practice) would then be held by the police and reported to the CVE Center. This broad coverage mitigates the phenomenon of oversaturation of “hot spots” and is the most preventative, as different areas become vulnerable to radicalization. The Ministry of Interior would include this measure as part of their Plan of Activities which is reported to the CVE Center, who would then act as a monitoring body for the quality and content of the trainings moving forward. Housing this responsibility within the government divorces it of donor- dependence and ensures sustainability beyond the life of individual projects. It also lays the groundwork for a reporting pathway and future mechanism development and increases the capacity for prevention among the police.
4. Conclusions and the way ahead
The points outlined in the “Opportunities” section of this document are empirical in nature, based on the assessments and observations of PLGP as discussed. The intention of this Addendum is to delineate ways in which the position of LPSCs could be bolstered as a support to local governments in P/CVE activities. As a partner in this effort, PLGP relies on the expertise of the CVE Center to move forward with the most-useful option, selecting from those previously mentioned or as a separate proposal. Considering the constraints of project timelines, there is a deadline of June 2020 to implement the agreed-upon action.
The purpose of this Annex is to provide: 1) Summary of the Policy Paper (PP) and PP Addendum and 2) Protocols for LPSC members regarding the identification and assistance of citizens at risk for radicalization and VE.
1. Summary of the draft Policy Paper (PP) and PP Addendum
In September 2019, a policy paper was introduced to the Coordination Center for CVE. This document was intended to provide an examination of the current legal framework as it relates to PVE, an overview of the weaknesses in present practices, and further propose measures to close the gaps between theory and the implementation of such P/CVE efforts. The recommendations given were based upon the work of the PLGP at a grassroots level in six partner municipalities across Albania. Following the review of the legal framework and municipal structure, as well as the identification of organizational disparities, PLGP proposed the initiation of a joint process (in collaboration with the CVE Center) to develop a CVE referral mechanism whereby individual cases are referred, assessed, and discussed. The suggested process foresaw three phases culminating in the delineation of options for a potential CVE referral mechanism in Albania. At that time, PLGP received no official directional feedback on this proposal and was unable to move forward in the joint process. In early April 2020, an examination of the current status of Local Public Safety Councils (LPSC) in Albania was delivered to the CVE Center in the form of the Addendum to draft Policy Paper. This document was drafted following the CVE Center’s confirmation that LPSCs are (or will be, where lacking) the preferred mechanism for the prevention and countering of violent extremism in Albania. The Addendum utilized PLGP’s in-depth examination of LPSCs: noting the vulnerabilities in terms of their legal, organizational, and structural regulations. With these aspects in mind, PLGP suggested a several opportunities for strengthening LPSCs. These avenues included bolstering the councils through legal and/or municipal structural improvements and/or a revision towards institutionalization and standardization of an improved model. The CVE Center, as the policy- making body, was requested to provide directionality for the further development of concrete recommendations, in order that PLGP could expound in an additional policy paper or white paper. The CVE Center received the Addendum enthusiastically and elected to refer the decision to the working group at the Ministry of Interior (as the most relevant ministry for LPSCs). At the time of the writing of this annex (July 2020), there has been no official direction given from the MoI or CVE Center on the options contained in the Addendum. Despite the shortcomings identified, LPSCs remain the CVE Center’s selected mechanism to address issues of radicalization and VE.
2. Protocols for LPSC members regarding the identification and assistance of citizens at risk for radicalization and VE
Background As a supporting measure, prior to the project close, PLGP committed to advance processes by providing the Center with a set of basic protocols for members of LPSCs. These protocols are preliminary and may be further elaborated and/or implemented in the future, when LPSCs or
another referral mechanism is institutionalized. PLGP is aware that it is premature to draft protocols without having a formal mechanism in place; however, we produced this effort to help the Center and MoI as they plan for the future of P/CVE in Albania. In the coming months, if/when a Working Group is established with experts from the line ministries and other stakeholders, the time will be right to explore the entire legal framework and generate appropriate legal frameworks and standard procedures for every member of an LPSC. Individual protocols will require the involvement of the respective field's expert and be formed in a collaborative, whole-of-government process. Also, the aforementioned Working Group may also reference the joint P/CVE Guide, which provides a comprehensive screening of laws/bylaws connected to VE push/pull factors.
Introduction Protocols are standard agreed-upon procedures, which should be followed in a prescribed situation or process. Some protocols specify the procedure in a more detailed and precise manner (IT, military, health, etc.) due to the facility and the need to fully standardize activities, while in others (sport, culture, etc.) there is more flexibility in the approach. In the case of the CVE mechanism, these recommended protocols fall into the second category, in order that they can be adapted for a variety of scenarios. The Policy Paper Addendum provides significant, in-depth information regarding the LPSCs; however, for the purposes of the protocols, please see the following brief description of their composition and connection to P/CVE issues:
• LPSCs include local actors relevant to addressing security and safety problems. A comprehensive and inclusive LPSC would be composed of (but not limited to) the mayor and other municipal officials; the head of local state police; community leaders; representatives of judiciary, social, health, and educational institutions; citizen associations; religious communities; media; and the local business community. The composition of the Council should reflect the ethnic composition of the community as well. In the absence of any dedicated mechanism, LPSCs may serve as a P/CVE mechanism in terms of leading and coordinating the efforts to mitigate the pull and push factors leading to radicalization and VE. The mechanism model assumes that the individual institutions do not have sufficient capacity to deal separately with complex issues and that only by working together are they able to provide adequate support to their citizens. • LPSCs are not a referral mechanism. A referral mechanism operates both at the strategic and operational levels. Basic standards of a referral mechanism include access to information; an obligation of confidentiality; coordination of relevant actors; risk assessment and planning; documentation and data collection; access to and availability of services; staff training and capacity building; and monitoring and evaluation. Referral mechanisms prioritize early identification of at-risk citizens (especially children and youth) and are able to quickly and efficiently respond to the contributing factors. This may include mitigation of socio- economic issues impacting entire families or redirection of other push-pull indicators in a positive, constructive manner (for example, providing a sense of belonging through involvement with an organized Youth Group). It is important to note that children and young people are not viewed as “perpetrators” in these instances, but as victims of circumstance in need of services and support. In addition, the referral mechanism does not
act in an investigatory capacity. Investigations should be managed outside of such a mechanism. The following section of this paper outlines basic protocols for police, judiciary (judge/prosecutor), educational institutions, social services, health services, religious institutions, and CSOs. As a rule, three basic principles should be applied in every protocol: 1. Indispensability and proportionality: Information should be shared only when necessary. The professional assessment of citizens and/or risks must guide the need, timeliness, and extent of informational exchange. 2. Consent: Whenever possible, the person in question should be asked to consent to sharing information. When no consent is given, personal information cannot be shared, unless conditions are met for consent exemption. 3. Legitimacy and confidentiality: Data sharing by public sector entities should be carried out in compliance with the provision of the Law on Data Protection and Public Information.
Protocol for Police: A representative of the police commissariat, normally the chief, is a key actor in an LPSC. Per the regulation some councils have adopted, the Police Commissar is also the deputy head of an LPSC. The police representative should share general concerns regarding radicalization and VE primarily in terms of prevention. Specific cases may be also shared when intervention is sought from other members of the Council. Regarding specific cases, the following prevention protocols should be applied: 1. When informed in an LPSC meeting of indications a person is at risk of radicalization and VE, the first step the police should undertake is to collect additional information from others (schools, social services, sports clubs, CSOs, religious authorities, etc.) about that individual. In order to gather as much relevant knowledge as possible, the police should also interview the specified individual and consult with other active referral mechanisms as applicable (DV, Child Protection, etc.). 2. After obtaining this information, the police officer must assess the validity of the data. This step is crucial in directing follow-on actions. Once determined, the officer can further decide whether there are elements of crime and judge if immediate action must be taken to protect life, public order, and peace. In this context, the information provided must be strenuously scrutinized. In addition, one should consider the citizen’s history-if they have been previously reported to/by the police and/or convicted by the court. 3. For any situation of violence (domestic or otherwise) where the individual is involved as a perpetrator or victim, additional information should be collected. When looking at case history, police should attempt to ascertain whether it was an isolated incident or if there are ideological connections motivated by violence. If the act of violence is linked with radicalization and/or violent extremism, a comprehensive assessment should be undertaken, and preventative measures enacted in cooperation with other members of the LPSC. 4. If there is reasonable suspicion that a crime is about to be committed or has already been committed, the police officer consults with the public prosecutor and begins the investigation. In such cases an LPSC does nothing further about the individual involved, having completed their role as a point of identification/information-gathering. However, the
police, as part of the LPSC, should discuss with the Council the various factors which led to the incrimination of the citizen. The analysis of the case and follow-on discussions can be incorporated into a dynamic action plan to prevent other community members from becoming vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremist ideologies. 5. Even when additional legal actions are not taken against the individual, the police have a key role to play. In cooperation with the LPSC, when an individual is determined to be at risk of radicalization but has not committed any illegal action, the police may provide legal advice or preventative mentoring to mitigate further risk factors. 6. The community policing officer (who is usually well-known by community members) should prioritize concerns citizens might have in terms of radicalization and VE. For example, if an officer receives a report from a parent or teacher regarding a child/youth at risk (who may have not necessarily committed a crime), the case should be addressed without delay. Depending on the case specifics, it may be referred to the LPSC or another mechanism, such as the CPU, as appropriate. 7. In terms of prevention, police should also work closely with schools to develop initiatives and talk with children about topics such as narcotics, violence, cybercrime, road accidents, and the prevention of radicalization and VE, along with localized concerns as relevant.
Protocol for Judiciary (Judge/Prosecutor): Representatives of the court and prosecutor’s office have a special role in LPSCs when it comes to assisting at-risk youth. Children and youth can interact with the judiciary system in two roles: as witnesses or victims of criminal/misdemeanor acts, or as lawbreakers themselves. Regardless of the role in which the child or young person encounters, it is important that the judiciary representatives understand the relevant vulnerabilities, respect the rights of the individual, and prioritize prevention/rehabilitation over punishment. In any case, the court acts when a law is violated (or there is a suspicion of violation), and only after the prosecutor files an indictment. There are two basic protocols that judiciary might follow to assist children or youth at risk of radicalization and VE: 1. As a member of an LPSC, the judge/prosecutor should provide input in analyzing the situation of youth at risk of radicalization and VE and share information of such cases whenever possible, while respecting principles of anonymity and data protection. 2. In their daily work, representatives of the judicial system may provide the following contributions in terms of assisting at-risk youth (this list is not exhaustive): o Ensuring the prioritization of procedures concerning children/youth at risk of radicalization and VE; o Treating children and young defendants with appropriate sensitivity and safeguarding the testimony of children outside the courtroom; o Communicating regularly with other institutions and mechanisms in cases of youth charged with offenses related to radicalization and extremism; o Noticing elements of radicalization in other criminal proceedings (and proposing appropriate preventative measures through the LPSC, see above); o Prioritizing action in situations when children/youth are affected by radical propaganda (especially via the Internet); o Accelerating procedures regarding hate speech and hate crimes, especially when they are religiously and/or nationalistically motivated; and o Participating in media and other social projects opposing radicalization and VE.
Protocol for Educational Institutions: Educational institutions such as schools, clubs, and community associations are some of the most influential actors in the mental and psychosocial development of children and youth. As such, they are recognized as the most suitable institutions for preventive work, early identification, and response to many negative phenomena impacting youth, including radicalization and VE. From this perspective, representatives of the educational system within an LPSC have a vital role to play in terms of both prevention and reaction. 1. The local Education Department Director, who is normally a member of an LPSC, should regularly report on issues related to children/youth at risk of radicalization and VE in schools, both in their identification and steps taken to mitigate these issues. Unsolved or ongoing cases may also be referred to the LPSC to solicit support or input from other council members. 2. One such initiative to moderate risk is “Schools as Community Centers”. In most schools, a coordination team is created, which includes the school’s head teacher (or deputy head teacher), members of the parents’ board, students, teachers, community police, and representatives of the local government and other social partners. This team discusses student issues related to radicalization and VE, among other social topics. 3. When a teacher has concerns that a student is a victim or perpetrator of any kind of violence, they first speak with the affected student in order to clarify any doubt. If these concerns are founded, the teacher then informs the head teacher (who may carry it forward to the LPSC or appropriate authority). The same method is applied when a teacher observes that a student’s attitudes, behaviors, or actions are not in accordance with customary norms of the educational system. This may include a student showing signs of marginalization or exclusion which may in turn make them more vulnerable to radicalization or extremist ideologies. 4. The head teacher, through the “Schools as Community Centers” initiative (or other ad hoc groups composed of a psychologist, school security officer, teachers, etc. where relevant), can then analyze the situation and plan appropriate intervening measures. The same method is applied when information that a student is at risk of radicalization and VE is provided from another institution outside of the school, such as health services, sports club, the religious communities, or police. 5. The student’s family should be notified of their child’s involvement in this assessment process and support plan. An individual support plan for an at-risk student must be applied in accordance with human and children’s rights and may include activities intended to change behaviors within the family, class, and/or community. Therefore, engagement with the family at all stages of intervention is crucial. In cases where the family setting increases the child’s risk, measures will be taken to ensure their safety through the appropriate mechanism, such as CPU. 6. Similarly, if the school board feels unable to solve the case by itself or fails to process the case, it should be referred to the LPSC or to a referral mechanism such as Child Protection or Domestic Violence Referral Mechanism. 7. Depending on the gravity of the situation and severity of the case, the school board has the agency to decide if the police/prosecutor’s office should be informed. In such cases, they
then share what steps the school has undertaken, any cooperation with other institutions, and a detailed description of the relevant person and their behavior. However, even in severe cases and whenever it is possible, it is recommended that the school keep open lines of communication with the family and peer group of the individual, in order that the affected child/youth may reintegrate into their community.
Protocol for Social Services: Social services have a very important role in assisting vulnerable communities and citizens at risk of radicalization and VE and may provide crucial contributions in both prevention and reaction. The social services representative should share general concerns regarding vulnerable communities with the LPSC, focusing on any measures taken to prevent radicalization and VE, and the challenges they face. Specific cases may be shared when intervention or assistance from other members of the Council is needed. When specific cases of individuals at risk are referred, social services should apply the following measures: 1. If an employee of social services, at any time, notices that a citizen is the victim or perpetrator of any form of violence, or is being informed of such by other institutions, community members, etc., they should immediately report the case to their direct supervisor. The same instruction applies when a citizen openly demonstrates affection towards radical narratives. Social services representatives should also share this information at LPSC meetings. However, before sharing the information officially, preliminary verification/assessment steps should be applied (see below). 2. In order to clarify circumstances and analyze facts as objectively as possible (and thereby estimate the level of risk), consultations should be conducted with various institutions and legal mechanisms. The DV and Child Protection mechanisms (including inter-sectorial technical groups) are part of social services directorates and consequently the most accessible for this process. Police, which take part in the above-referenced mechanism, should also be consulted in order to get an overview of the individual at risk and ascertain if they are under police investigation. 3. This preliminary assessment may also be reflected in a holistic package to support the individual at risk. The support plan should include measures and activities the social services can undertake independently and/or in cooperation with other relevant actors. The involvement of family members (if not the source of radicalization), respected community leaders, friends, teachers, religious leaders, etc. may also be included in a rehabilitation plan. In any case, support plans should include specific tasks to enforce, responsible persons, and methods of mutual reporting for clarity and continuity. 4. In line with developmental capacity, it is especially relevant when the affected citizen is a child or youth to include activities such as involvement in sport or cultural activities and social skills acquisition in a plan of support.
Protocol for Health Services: Health services are essential in terms of human security and provide for the public good. Along with social services, health services are the main caretakers of vulnerable communities, and it therefore follows, important contributors in terms of the prevention of radicalization and VE.
1. The local director of health services as a vital part of the LPSC should report regularly regarding internally declared cases of violence. This follows the mandate that all employees in health care institutions have the legal obligation to report cases when signs or symptoms indicating abuse, neglect, violence or ideologically motivated violence are noticed. 2. Mental health and associated treatment are important factors contributing to societal norms and are relevant to maintaining citizens’ health, thereby potentially preventing violent acts. Local problems related to mental health and preventative measures taken should be reported periodically to the LPSC. 3. Health care facilities are an entry point for citizen aid. Healthcare workers and health associates at all levels of the healthcare system are ideally positioned during the checkup, medical examinations, home visits, and conversations with family members to be the first to notice any abuse, neglect, signs of violence, and even indications of violent extremism. 4. If a health professional is concerned that their patient is a victim or perpetrator of violence, including VE, they should ascertain as much information as possible from the patient and report the case to their manager, as required by law. In a case where symptoms of radicalization and VE may indicate the eventual perpetration of a crime, it is necessary that police are notified as well. Any involvement with a child or young person within health care facilities must be actively monitored, recorded, and documented in alignment with child protective measures. 5. Along with their involvement in the LPSC, representatives of health services take part in two additional mandated referral mechanisms: DV and Child Protection. The role of the health care worker is varied within these pathways, as they operate in the identification and also the therapeutic redress for victims and perpetrators of violence.
Protocol for Religious Institutions: Religious representatives also play an important role in LPSCs in the identification, referral, and prevention of individuals at risk or associated with radicalization and VE. Due to the strong relationship spiritual leaders have with their worshipers, they often act as a first line response in noticing exposure to risk factors such as a search for identity and belonging; real or perceived discrimination; and social isolation. They also have knowledge of stressful life events (sudden loss, financial changes, etc.), behavioral changes (including provocative questions about interpretations of faith), or other warning signs of radicalization. If and when these signs are observed, cases may be handled in the following manner: 1. If the cleric or religious representative realizes there are those among their followers who reveal signs of religious radicalism (by words or symbols), it is their duty to provide advice and assist the individual at risk. By law, activities of religious institutions are based in human rights and democratic principles and are guided by the principle of preparing children/youth for a responsible way of living in a free society. 2. Beyond personal observations, one might become aware of an at-risk individual through referral by family members, friends, or others in the community. If so, the intervention should be the same as outlined above. 3. When cases occur, the religious representative to the LPSC should inform the Council of the individuals at risk of radicalization, regardless if the case is handled by the religious community itself or in cooperation with other institutions. They should also refer any unsolved cases which require the LPSC to intervene.
4. Addressing families as a source of radicalization for their children (i.e. those who hamper their daughters to join public schools) should be one of the main tasks of the religious representatives within the LPSC, both in terms of reporting and also in contribution to the joint plan of action undertaken by the Council. 5. When a religious representative has a suspicion or is given witness account of the perpetration of a crime, they should inform the police. In that case, they should provide police with information surrounding the circumstances of the crime and any other relevant details. They should also share any measures which have been undertaken by the religious institution alone or in cooperation with other institutions.
Protocol for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): CSOs, especially those working with youth, are an essential part of the LPSC. Their active participation at the local level is vital for promoting democratic values within communities and building ideals of mutual respect and tolerance, including with those of different backgrounds and beliefs. Local CSOs, as with all community institutions represented in the Council, must have a systematic approach that involves identification, referral, and intervention related to children/young people at risk. 1. The representatives of CSOs to the LPSC should periodically share their views on the local situation regarding radicalization and VE, as well as any concrete preventative actions intended to mitigate these risks. 2. Due to their communitarian approach, CSOs are positioned as a friendly, open door to provide advice and assistance to community members who might have concerns in relation to radicalization and VE. Working within the communities, CSOs’ staff may also notice changes in the behavior of a child or youth, or be made aware through shared concerns by family members, neighbors, etc. 3. When a specific case involving at-risk children/youth requires the CSO to take preventative measures, they should first involve the family members. After getting familial consent, the CSO can begin an analysis of the situation and determine the most important aspect: can the case be treated by the organization itself, or should it be referred to another existing mechanism, such as the LPSC; “School as Community Center” initiative; or Domestic Violence, Child Protection, or Countering Human Trafficking Mechanism? 4. Working with people at risk of radicalization and VE is complicated and requires multi- agency and inter-institutional involvement. However, depending on the specifics of the case and CSO capacities, support may be managed through this method via a support plan. The contributions of health and social services, community and religious leaders, schools, and others may be included in the plan where appropriate as well. 5. If the activities taken by the CSO did not give the expected results in accordance with the individual support plan, the CSO may also refer the case to the LPSC or other existing local mechanism at that point. 6. If at any point the CSO has reasonable doubts or becomes aware that a crime was committed or may be committed, law enforcement agencies must be informed immediately. The CSO should also provide police with information regarding the case, what the CSO has undertaken alone or in cooperation with other institutions, a detailed description of the person’s behavior, parental involvement, and any other relevant data.
7. CSO staff should be specifically vigilant during the preparations for and/or enactment of public events and activities. Any relevant behavior noticed by a member/activist of the CSO, especially as it relates to violence and ideologies of violence, should be taken seriously and reported to the police.
Final Note PLGP would like to reiterate that the protocols outlined herein are very basic and should be viewed as preliminary. The creation of comprehensive protocols would require first and foremost the establishment of an official referral mechanism for P/CVE. Once mandated, a group of experts from relevant institutions such as police, judiciary, health, education, social services, CSOs, and religion, would determine the standard procedure/protocols for each member in a collaborative fashion. It should also be noted that targeted trainings in the recognition and referral of cases related to radicalization and violent extremism serve as the foundation for even this basic protocol. Ongoing awareness-raising efforts and trainings must be conducted on a rolling basis to ensure complete coverage and up-to-date knowledge of these localized push-and-pull factors is maintained.
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PLANNING AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT IN ALBANIA
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