PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, USAID CONTRACT NUMBER AID-182-C-12-00001, ALBANIA PLANNING AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROJECT (PLGP). COVER PICTURE: TRAINING SESSION WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF KAVAJA. PHOTO BY PLGP. PLGP WORKING GROUP: ROBERT KORKUTI, SARAH KEESE, AND DIAMANTA VITO COPYRIGHT @TETRA TECH. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY TETRA TECH. TETRA TECH ARD CONTACT: SARAH LEDDY SENIOR TECHNICAL ADVISOR/MANAGER [email protected] TETRA TECH ARD HOME OFFICE ADDRESS: TETRA TECH ARD 159 BANK STREET, SUITE 300 BURLINGTON, VT 05401 TEL: 802 495-0282, FAX 802 658-4247 WWW.TETRATECH.COM/INTDEV DISCLAIMER This paper is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Tetra Tech and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 6 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK – MUNICIPALITIES AND PUBLIC SAFETY ................................................... 9 1.1 LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN TERMS OF SECURITY AND VE ........................................................................................ 9 1.2 LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN TERMS OF PREVENTING VE (PULL FACTORS) ....................................................... 12 2. THE NEED TO BETTER ADDRESS RADICALIZATION AND VE .................................................. 13 2.1 FINDINGS ON CURRENT LOCAL PRACTICES RELATED TO PVE ........................................................................... 13 2.2 INCREASING MUNICIPAL PVE CAPACITIES ....................................................................................................................... 17 3. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND NEXT STEPS ................................................................................... 19 3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL GAPS ........................................................................................................................................................ 19 3.2 EXPECTED RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................................... 19 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................................ 21 ADDENDUM TO DRAFT POLICY PAPER ...................................................................................................... 22 ANNEX TO POLICY PAPER (JULY 2020) ....................................................................................................... 29 ASP Albanian State Police CBS Community-Based Scorecard CSO Civil Society Organization CP Community Policing CVE Countering violent extremism DCM Decision of the Council of Ministers EU European Union GoA Government of Albania LGU Local Government Unit LSC Local Safety Council MoI Ministry of Interior M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NGO Non-Governmental Organization NSCVE National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PVE Preventing Violent Extremism P/CVE Preventing and countering violent extremism PLGP Planning and Local Governance Project LLSG Law on Local Self-Government USAID United States Agency for International Development VE Violent extremism The purpose of this paper is to provide policymakers with an examination of the current legal framework as it relates to PVE, an overview of the weaknesses in present practices, and propose measures to close the gaps which exist between the theory and implementation of such efforts. The recommendations found herein are based upon the work of the PLGP at a grassroots level in six partner municipalities across Albania. These municipalities were specifically selected in collaboration with the Coordination Center for CVE (of Albania) and encompass some of those most vulnerable to the phenomenon of radicalization and violent extremism. The lessons learned and best practices developed were a direct outcome of work undertaken with a local lens in tandem with municipal governments, active civil society organizations, religious institutions, community policing forces, and women and youth special interest groups. This work utilizes both desk research and the hands-on experience of multiple experts at the PLGP. It was drafted between July and September 2019, and considers work beginning in September 2018, onwards. The paper is organized into four sections: an introduction, outlining the structure and logic of the paper overall; a legal overview, which gives the reader an understanding of the mandates at a local level regarding public safety and the overlap with the goals of PVE efforts; an analysis of the current systemic weaknesses, along with measures to address these gaps; and a final conclusion tying together the previous sections along with recommendations for scaling this process and the development of a referral mechanism (either new or utilizing the current protocols and systems in place) for P/CVE efforts at a local level. As part of PLGP’s collaborative work with the Coordination Center for CVE, and in recognition of their position as a lynchpin of GoA efforts, the original draft policy paper was presented to CVE staff for their input and feedback. It was communicated that Local Public Safety Councils (LPSCs) would act as a strategic point for the CVE Center’s plans moving forward. At the request of the CVE Center, PLGP developed an Addendum (which follows) to delineate ways in which the position of LPSCs could be bolstered as a support to local governments in P/CVE activities. Unfortunately, due to the unforeseen complications and additional responsibilities brought on by the health response to COVID-19, the requested feedback to this Addendum was not forthcoming from the MoI working group as anticipated. To support the CVE Center and lay the groundwork for a (potential) future P/CVE referral mechanism, PLGP composed basic protocols for members of Local Public Safety Councils (the final document herein). When regarded as a whole, these documents can be utilized to convey a more comprehensive picture of the current state of affairs and the projected ways to mitigate the challenges faced. PLGP also acknowledges that these documents require a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon and cannot predict the shifting landscape of P/CVE in Albania. However, accompanied by the P/CVE Guide and trainings, they may act as a roadmap to help direct efforts at the local and national levels moving forward. In the framework of United Nations Global Strategy against Terrorism, the Government of Albania approved its National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism and Action Plan in November 2015. The Strategy proposes measures to preserve the Albanian values of religious tolerance and harmony; to protect human rights, rule of law, and democracy; and to guard Albanian society from violent extremism. The Strategy’s main activities focus on strengthening community spirit, countering extremist messaging, and enabling comprehensive long-term policies against violent extremism. To implement the Strategy effectively, the Government of Albania foresees the development of relevant procedures and regulations along with the establishment of inter- institutional structures at both the national and local levels. In 2015, with support from the US Department of State, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) assessed violent extremism in Albania, focusing on four pilot regions: Korça, Elbasan, Kukës, and Dibër. These regions were selected based on “information from law enforcement agencies in the country on potential or actual religious radical activity and media reports (especially on Albanian citizens participating in Syria conflict).” Among IDM’s recommendations to the Government of Albania (GoA) was the involvement of local governments and civil society to increase the availability of services involved in and options for rehabilitation or religious de-radicalization. As a whole-of- society effort, they recommended this be done in cooperation with law enforcement and religious communities as well, strengthening the measures across multiple sectors. Radicalization and violent extremism came into focus as an issue following media reports in 2012 of Albanians (both nationally and ethnically speaking) taking part in the war zones of Syria. This exodus of foreign fighters (particularly from Kosovo and Macedonia) reached its height in 2014 and has greatly decreased (to the point of practically ceasing) from 2015, onwards. The awareness of those who left and the implications for their return prompted an in-depth assessment of the situation by both the GoA and international partners. The phenomenon of violent extremism (VE) is very contextual in nature, and the factors influencing vulnerable communities vary across affected regions and countries. According to recent research and our mapping in partner municipalities, a number of Albanians citizens travelling