'Blue Boats' and 'Reef Robbers': a New Maritime Security Threat for the Asia

Asia Paciﬁc Viewpoint Vol. 60, No. 3, 2019 ISSN 1360-7456, pp310–324

‘Blue boats’ and ‘reef robbers’: A new maritime security threat for the Asia Paciﬁc?

* † ‡ * § ¶ ∥ ** Andrew M. Song, , Viet Thang Hoang, Philippa J. Cohen, , Transform Aqorau , , * and Tiffany H. Morrison * ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, Australia. Email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. † WorldFish, Honiara, Solomon Islands. Email: [email protected], [email protected]. ‡ School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. Email: [email protected]. § WorldFish, Penang, Malaysia. Email: [email protected]. ¶ iTUNA Intel and Paciﬁc Catalyst, Honiara, Solomon Islands. Email: [email protected]. ∥ School of Government, Development and International Affairs, University of the South Paciﬁc, Suva, Fiji. Email: [email protected]. ** Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia. Email: [email protected].

Abstract: Vietnamese ‘blue boats’–small wooden-hulled fishing boats – are now entering the territorial waters of Pacific Island countries and illegally catching high-value species found on remote coastal reefs. Crossing several international boundaries and traversing a distance of over 5000 km, these intrusions have alarmed Oceanic countries, including Australia. Lacking administrative capacity as well as jurisdictional authority to effectively control the vast stretches of island coastlines individually, governments and intergovernmental bodies in the region have called for strengthened coordination of surveillance efforts while also pressuring Vietnam diplomatically. This paper reviews these latest developments and is the first to provide a focused assessment of the issue. Through the lens of Copenhagen School of securitisation theory, we analyse responses of national and regional actors and their portrayal in online media to understand how blue boats are constructed as a security threat within a narrative of maritime, food and human security. Arguably, Australia together with the Forum Fisheries Agency, who advise on the governance of offshore tuna resources, have so far acted most decisively – in a way that might see them extend their strategic role in the region. We propose a comprehensive empirical research agenda to better understand and manage this nascent, flammable and largely unpredictable inter-regional phenomenon.

Introduction years, several sightings of poaching fleets from outside the region have alarmed coastal com- For the people of the Pacific Islands, fishery munities, national governments and inter- resources found in reefs, lagoons and coastal governmental organisations. Referred to as ‘blue sea areas are a crucial part of their sustenance, boats’ (or ‘reef robbers’), a flotilla of small-to- contributing to their food and livelihood secu- medium-sized fishing boats from Vietnam has rity as well as being a central element in the made what must be a long, arduous journey to Pacific way of life (Johannes, 1978; Gillett target coastal reefs in Palau, Papua New et al., 2000). Spanning over a 6000 nautical Guinea, Solomon Islands and other Pacific mile stretch of the western and central Pacific countries and territories to collect high-value Ocean, the remoteness of these islands, together species of sea cucumber and giant clam. Poten- with the small land mass and the predominantly tial impacts of this foreign fishing intrusion are coastal-residing populations further accentuate forecast to be acute and multidimensional, the central roles of fish and the ocean. In recent eliciting widespread attention and a call for

© 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington doi:10.1111/apv.12240 and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. Securitisation of blue boats in Asia-Pacific urgent action by the mainstream media as well as serve, and what (geo)political trends these devel- in the speeches of national and regional actors. At opments hold for the future. Overall, we argue the local level, poaching of sea cucumber would that this issue is en route to being securitised directly deplete the inshore resources and deprive such that urgency is raised and emergency mea- the communities of an export-based, income- sures are legitimised to bolster multilateral coop- generating opportunity. Such illegal, unreported eration on maritime monitoring and surveillance. and unregulated (IUU) fishing is also an affront to In doing so, we also highlight the political nature the efforts communities and national governments of this process, whereby potential for asserting have made towards the management and recov- one’sinfluence or sovereignty is gained or lost ery of these resources, many of which are now among various Pacificactors. under national bans and/or international protec- This study relied on publicly accessible section (Anderson et al., 2011). In addition, the ondary sources from 2015 to 2018 and informal occurrence of blue boats glaringly exposes the dif- discussions with key informants to conduct a ficulty of national governments to monitor and critical textual analysis (Vaara and Tienari, patrol the vast stretches of coastal waters in the 2002; Fairclough, 2013). English language arti- Pacific (e.g., Aqorau, 2000; McNulty, 2013). cles that emanated from the various media out- Pacific countries, many of whom qualify as small lets of PICs as well as Australia and New Zealand island developing states, are typically equipped represented material used to assemble region- with scarce surveillance capacity (Govan, 2014). relevant perspectives. Articles were searched peri- Beyond detection, the apprehension and the sub- odically between December 2017 and October sequent legal-administrative treatment of these 2018 using an online search engine with a com- boats and the crew can also take several months bination of keywords, including but not limited to and be a resource-intensive operation for Pacific ‘blue boats’, ‘Vietnamese’, ‘Pacific Islands’, Island countries (PICs). ‘poaching’, ‘sea cucumber’ and ‘illegal fishing’. Up until now, this emerging Asia Pacific issue All results were initially retained and reviewed. has been mostly reflected in increasing media Because the coverage of the same event is often attention. While analysis of occurrences and reproduced by more than one media outlet, any handling of blue boats have been presented in a repetitive reports were omitted from the final set rather bite-sized manner, their media portrayal of articles. We also examined Vietnamese lan- has nonetheless resulted in effective issue-mak- guage articles to gain a preliminary understanding ing. This is typical of a nascent and data-poor of how the issue is framed and dealt with at the phenomenon; however, there is now a need for ‘source’ location. Eighty-two articles were col- a more reflexive and coherent interpretation lected in total (55 in English; 27 in Vietnamese) in given the varied repercussions the issue could order to reach saturation (see Table S1, bring to the region. Such interpretation would Supporting Information, referenced at the end of ‘turn circumstances into a situation that is com- this paper, for a complete list). From this, we iden- prehensible and that serves as a springboard to tified key actors and events while extracting state- action’ that is, ‘sense-making’ (sensu Taylor and ments and quotes particularly useful for Van Every, 2000: 40; Weick et al., 2005). We representational purposes, as they are also in line take a discursive point of view to delineate a with the sentiments found throughout the reported narrative about the nature of the threat the material more generally. Informal discussions with incursions of blue boats pose and the meanings those in various professional circles encompassed they generate, in order to inform regional iden- both open-ended chance conversations and pre- tity and action. Approaching blue boat incur- scheduled chats but with no strict data collection sions as a maritime security issue, this paper agenda. The broad understanding gleaned from draws on the constructivist analytical frame- these discussions helped contextualise the analy- work of the Copenhagen School of sec- sis of the media articles. This work also benefits uritisation theory (Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al., from our diverse and extensive research experi- 1998) and evaluates how the acts of fishing ences on coastal, offshore and transboundary fish- incursion and the responses of various Pacific eries in the Asia-Pacific, including Vietnam and actors have been packaged from the perspective PICs. We are open-minded about the blue boat of online media, what purposes these measures incidents and have no conflict of interest.

The paper proceeds with a brief synopsis of N08/266/26/PDF/N0826626.pdf). Recognising the evolving concept of maritime security. Next, food insecurity as a major risk to international the history and the traditional content of mari- peace, of which fisheries form a vital supply time security concerns and actions in the Pacific in many parts of the world (Cohen and Pinstrup- are presented. Against this broad context, we Andersen, 1999; Pomeroy et al., 2007), this par- then situate the blue boat incursion and the ticular threat also invites human security con- threats it would pose to the region. The subse- cerns affecting the vulnerability and resilience quent section describes the occurrences of the of coastal populations as well as the welfare of blue boats and the regional and national reac- seafaring fish workers (Adger, 2010; Bueger, tions taken and claimed so far. We then explain 2015; Macfarlane, 2017). Likewise, intentional this development through applying the and unlawful damage to the marine environ- securitisation framework of Barry Buzan, Ole ment and climate change uncertainty are also Wæver, and colleagues. Finally, we highlight key parts of the maritime security discussion, for the implications of the securitisation narrative their potential to destabilise social and eco- surrounding this phenomenon and situate them nomic interests of coastal states through, for within the broader understanding of maritime instance, creating environmental refugees or security. The paper concludes by proposing a derailing the pursuit of the ‘blue economy’, future research agenda, which can help better which requires secure and well-managed marine prepare Pacific actors for the likely prospect of environments as a precondition to ocean-based continued threat construction on blue boats. sustainable development (Klein et al., 2010; Duarte, 2016; Barnett, 2017; Voyer et al., 2018). For the 22 PICs and Territories that comprise Maritime security in the Pacific Island region the Pacific Island region in the Western and Central Pacific, the ocean remains a source of While it is difficult to achieve a consensus over life and prosperity that has sustained Pacific definition, maritime security is increasingly peoples for generations. Maritime issues for important to international relations and ocean these countries frequently focus on the health of governance. According to Bueger (2015: 159), the marine environment including coastal the growing incidence of piracy in the past resources that provide food and tourism earn- decade together with the build-up of blue water ings, the sustainability of offshore fishing stocks navies of emerging powers such as India and for national income generated from licence China and inter-state hostilities in regions such fees, marine pollution from shipping and land- as the South China Sea have moved maritime based activities, the introduction of marine security to the global consciousness and to invasive species, and the social and ecological high-level policy agendas (see also Ross, 2009). impact of climate-change-induced sea-level rise Traditionally, maritime security has been associ- and destructive weather events. Hence, con- ated with military threats and sovereignty viola- cerns about maritime security have mainly tions of sea-based territory. A greater range of reflected these environmental and resource- defence and safety-related goals are now part of related matters rather than the naval, defence- its lexicon including the protection of the free- oriented concerns more prominently discussed dom of navigation and the flow of international in larger, more developed states (Firth, 2003; trade as well as averting dangers of terrorism, Bateman and Mossop, 2010). Similarly, analysts drug trafficking, piracy, people smuggling and have noted that the PICs do not necessarily pri- other forms of transnational crime (Klein et al., oritise the risk of maritime terrorism and piracy 2010: 5). Further, threats to a state’s security are (Fletcher, 2004; Fortune, 2006; Jones, 2009). closely linked to environmental, economic and This has meant that counter-terrorism measures social conditions. For example, in the 2008 have been at times exaggerated or even imposed Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, the by others at the expense of greater attention to Secretary-General of the United Nations the issues the PICs themselves deem more urgent identified seven specific threats to maritime (e.g. PICs having to respond to the UN Security security, which included IUU fishing (https:// Council resolutions that address terrorism and documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ strengthened container and port security

312 © 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd Securitisation of blue boats in Asia-Pacific measures). In this regard, Bateman and Mossop for regional maritime enforcement (see Aqorau, (2010: 101) observed that, ‘increased port security 2000; Bateman and Mossop, 2010). has had a social cost, as local people are now The implementation of the Niue Treaty, how- denied fishing or other recreational access to ever, has been slow and intermittent at best, wharves and jetties used by international shipping.’ marred by complex factors such as a sensitivity As part of the traditional ocean-going activity, to national sovereignty, particularly when for- fishery and fishing vessels provide a salient eign (or regionally managed) vessels are entry point to maritime security discussions in allowed to conduct enforcement operations in the Pacific Island region (Martin, 2005; national areas of jurisdiction (Bateman and UNODC [UN Office on Drugs and Crime], Mossop, 2010; see also Radio New Zealand, 2016). In addition to being a main conduit for 2017a). PICs have only gained independence illegal fishing, the possibility that fishing vessels from Western colonial powers in the second could be involved in the trafficking of weapons half of the 20th century, and some only as and drugs and people smuggling has been long recently as the 1990s (e.g. Palau). Hence, will- noted. While the security of air access points ingness to cooperate closely with other actors has seen significant improvements over the can be affected by ‘a perception that the state is years (Bateman and Mossop, 2010), control of giving up something seen as a sovereign right, seaborne activity is understandably challenging or natural sphere of influence’ (Bateman and due to the geographical expanse of the region Mossop, 2010: 111). Concerns about sover- (spanning over a marine area of 30 million eignty have also influenced the relationship of square kilometres). This challenge is exacer- PICs with Australia and New Zealand – the two bated by difficulties of inter-country and agency larger, more advanced ‘metropolitan’ states in coordination, which is needed to compensate the region (e.g. see Murray and Overton, 2011). for the limited domestic capacity (e.g. shortage Australia and New Zealand, in part driven by of patrol vessels, surveillance aircraft and oper- their own national interests to secure a ‘peace- ating costs relative to the size of national mari- ful’ Pacific (i.e. free of resource depletion, trans- time jurisdictions). Nevertheless, significant national crime and terrorism risks) have collective efforts have been mustered to address identified a need for improved maritime security IUU fishing in the region. Since 1999, the and devoted significant resources to increase Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) has played a key the infrastructural and bureaucratic capacities role in managing and supporting member coun- (e.g. patrol boats and training of government tries in the implementation of a satellite-based officials) of the PICs to respond to ocean-based Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to track the threats (Rolfe, 2003; Fortune, 2006; Hayward- movement of large-scale tuna-catching vessels in Jones, 2015). However, the sense that metropol- their exclusive economic zones (EEZ). FFA also itan countries are at times ‘seeking to impose administers and provides support for multilateral their will and to establish arrangements that suit treaties that aim to set up a cooperative framework them rather than the PICs’ has not gone for region-wide surveillance. For instance, the unnoticed in the region (Bateman and Mossop, 1992 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Sur- 2010: 111), with Fortune (2006: 59) also stating veillance and Law Enforcement in the South that ‘most PICs are uncomfortable addressing Pacific Region (and the 2012-finalised Agreement what New Zealand and Australia regard as the on Strengthening Implementation of the Niue most serious security challenges’. This antago- Treaty, i.e. the Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement), nistic dynamic that exposes differences of prior- contains provisions on the sharing of resources ities has been similarly observed in the western and data as well as procedures for flexible cooper- Indian Ocean, where national Somalian actors ation in monitoring, prosecuting and penalising have tended to attach more importance to the illegal fishing vessels. Having the potential to aspects of blue growth and human security extend its scope to cover a broader range of suspi- while external donors have stressed anti-piracy cious activities beyond fisheries, the Treaty also or counter-terrorism activities (Bueger and has the means to facilitate improved coordination Edmunds, 2016). of air surveillance, regarded by some commenta- Such challenges are reflective of the general tors as the most pressing operational requirement problem of coordination and cooperation that

© 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington 313 and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd A.M. Song et al. needs to be addressed in order to institute an effec- important delicacy in many parts of East and tive maritime security regime (Bueger, 2013). In Southeast Asia including Hong Kong and main- the following section, we explore how blue boats land China, its harvest and export to these Asian are providing additional impetus for strengthening markets are integrated into an efficiently oper- regional security and interdependence. More ated market chain (Purcell, 2014; Barclay et al., specifically, we analyse the ways in which the 2016; Fabinyi et al., 2017). Concurrently, nota- nascent phenomenon of the blue boat incursion ble patterns of over-exploitation similar to is subject to processes of ‘securitisation’,enrolled boom-and-bust cycles followed by harvest or to promote added urgency to bolster the security export bans in countries such as Papua New rationale. Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have been evident (Anderson et al., 2011; Hair et al., 2016). Tropical sea cucumber species can retail (as a dried or processed product called bêche- Blue boats in the Pacific de-mer) at AU$150–300 per kg in Hong Kong and Chinese markets (Purcell et al., 2018) pro- Blue boats and their operation viding a considerable financial incentive for Blue boats are a label given to fishing boats blue boats operators whose wooden-hulled from Vietnam that have been spotted poaching boats represent a relatively small investment high-value sedentary species in the remote (reportedly costing around AU$15 000–35 000 coastal reefs of the Pacific Islands. Blue simply each) (Blaha, 2016). Furthermore, consumer because of the painted colour of the hull which demand in China is expected to rise in line with is in fact very typical of fishing boats in Viet- the growing middle class (Fabinyi et al., 2017). nam, these are relatively small boats of The growing encroachment of blue boats into 10–15 m in length, which can carry 10–17 crew the Pacific may also be driven by depletion of onboard. First making headlines in 2015, the fish stocks in waters nearer to Vietnam in the blue boats have now been sighted (and South China Sea (Pomeroy et al., 2009). In addi- apprehended) in the waters of many PICs tion, fishing in these traditional fishing grounds including Palau, the Federated States of Micro- has been made more problematic by Chinese nesia (FSM), Papua New Guinea, Solomon political and para-military interferences (Dupont Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia as well as and Baker, 2014; Zhang and Bateman, 2017). Australia. They travel more than 7000 km and Since the late 1990s, the Vietnamese Govern- stay up to three months at sea, allegedly ment has implemented strategies that encourage enabled to stay those durations by the outward expansion of its fishery by limiting suspected logistical arrangement of tranship- nearshore fishing and subsidising construction ment carriers arriving to receive the caught fish of bigger vessels capable of venturing to off- and provide fuel in the course of their trip shore waters (Pomeroy et al., 2009). In (Blaha, 2016). Between December 2014 and searching for new areas to operate, the intrusion September 2016, the FSM seized more than blue boats intrude into the waters of to the nine Vietnamese vessels and arrested approxi- Pacific Islands and Australia; this is part of the mately 169 crew members (Carreon, 2017a). In wider trend that sees them also in the waters of Australian waters, according to the Australian neighbouring countries, such as the Philippines, Fisheries Management Authority, the number of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Blue boats foreign fishing boats caught operating illegally purportedly travel through unpatrolled marine is reported to have increased from six in 2014 routes whenever possible, and look for to up to 20 in 2016 with most originating from uninhabited islands to scour the surrounding Vietnam and Indonesia (Field, 2017). area for sea cucumber; the boats then move fur- Sea cucumber appears to be the main target ther towards inhabited islands in search of more of blue boats. Two blue boats intercepted in the (Phòng, 2017, translated). Collection of sea waters of New Caledonia in November 2017 cucumber in foreign waters is apparently easier were found to be carrying on board 10 tons of and less dangerous in operational terms, too, gutted and salted sea cucumber in 58 barrels since sea cucumber is still found 6–7 m deep, (Carreon, 2017b). As sea cucmber is a culturally whereas one must dive 60 m, and even 80 m in

314 © 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd Securitisation of blue boats in Asia-Pacific waters near Vietnam in the South China Sea warning), this sudden loss of livelihood can lead (Voice of America, 2017a, translated). Mr Phan to a considerable hardship for many island Huy Hoàng, President of Fisheries Associations inhabitants (Koczberski et al., 2006; of Quang Ngai Province, from which the Christensen, 2011). highest incidence of blue boats originate, has As well as jeopardising resource management portrayed the operation thus: ‘with a small and income generation efforts, controlling the wooden fleet, fishers turn off communication incidence of blue boats has also inflicted large equipment and turn off the lights as well. They financial and administrative burdens on PICs. keep moving quietly. No one monitors, no The essential procedures for achieving border-, means can detect them … People are willing to human- and biosecurity would entail activities be hung to get the 300-time higher profits, just pertaining to monitoring, capturing and the san- like drug trafficking’ (in Hoàng, 2017, trans- itary disposing of the boats as well as fair and lated). Participating in such a journey is a pre- humane prosecution, detainment and repatria- carious undertaking with potentially dire tion of the crew. For instance, Suzanne Lowe- consequences. Crews reportedly have no con- Gallen, Chief of Compliance and Technical Pro- tract of employment and no insurance; and jects for the FSM, stated that surveillance and when there is a problem such as occupational arrests of nine blue boats that had been illegally accidents or arrests, the owner assumes no fishing in FSM waters during the past three years responsibility and even cuts off all ties with the had cost the government over AU$250000 fishers (Voice of America, 2017b, translated). It (in PNA, 2016a). Similarly, French authorities is also possible that some of the crew are vic- estimated US$1.5 million (~AU$2.1 million) as tims of human trafficking conducted by the the total cost of handling the November 2017 owners of the blue boats, although such claims infraction in New Caledonia, with New Cal- remain unsubstantiated at time of writing edonia’s representative to the Western and Cen- (Buchanan, 2017). tral Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Manuel Ducrocq being quoted as saying: Impacts and responses ‘For 12 crew members, we are obliged by the Poaching of coastal marine resources, such as French law to see that they are accompanied by sea cucumber, can directly endanger the liveli- 15 police officers … So not only do we have the hood security of coastal communities and a sig- cost of surveillance, the interdiction and then nificant source of national export revenue in the their accommodation but in addition we must Pacific (Gillett, 2009). Sea cucumber fisheries pay 15 return airline tickets for our police to are estimated to be the second-most valuable ensure these people arrive in Vietnam. That is a export fishery for the PICs after tuna, and more huge cost which is borne by the government and cannot be recovered’ (in Rika, 2017). live tonnage in sea cucumbers is extracted and traded annually than all other reef fisheries combined (Carleton et al., 2013; Gillett and The growing risk of blue boats has been met Tauati, 2018). Sea cucumber are often a pri- in the region with strong rhetoric and swift mary source of income for the fishers who par- action. Vietnam is being diplomatically pres- ‘ ticipate in the fishery; for instance, sale of fresh sured by the PICs to to do more to prevent this ’ and dried white teatfish (Holothuria fuscogilva), illegal activity (see PNA, 2016b). This issue has respectively, can fetch an average fisher-to- been raised at the annual WCPFC meetings buyer price of AU$31 per piece and AU$61 per (in both 2016 and again in 2017) where the kg in Fiji (2014 data) and AU$9 per piece and Vietnamese delegate was directly confronted AU$39 per kg in Kiribati (2011 data) (Purcell and asked to provide a response. The FFA has et al., 2016). Other livelihood options available also requested an update on the implementation in rural areas may be relatively more stable of the Vietnamese Prime Minister’sofficial (e.g. production of copra), but are a far less directive issued in May 2017, which specified a lucrative source of income. Hence, when sea range of (Vietnamese) domestic actions to con- cucumber stocks collapse or the fishery closes trol the behaviour of its fishing vessels (see (in many instances, swiftly and without much WCPFC, 2018). The WCPFC Executive Director,

Feleti Teo, confirmed the adversarial sentiment French aircraft was able to locate the boats, among the PICs, ‘in the context of the [WCPF] which enabled the patrol vessel to overtake and Commission there has been attempt to link (blue board the blue boats. This case has been boats to membership) because, as you know, heralded regionally as a successful illustration most of the blue boats originate from Vietnam of multiparty cooperation among local, national and Vietnam is a cooperating non-member’ and international actors, as it led to pinpointing (in Carreon, 2017c), implying that the continued and ultimately apprehending the blue boats and poaching by blue boats could have an effect on their crew (Movick, 2017). Since then, FFA con- the success of Vietnam’s application to be a vened a special meeting in Brisbane in May fi member of WCPFC. 2017 attended by the senior of cials of the PICs Countries within the Pacific region appear to collectively develop a strategic response to keen to apply a coordinated approach to the address the broad consequences of border and surveillance and apprehension of blue boats. resource violations from blue boats as well as to Operation Rai Balang is an annual 10-day mari- plan a concerted diplomatic action directed time surveillance sweep led by the FFA’s towards the Vietnamese Government (FFA, 2017b). Two key outcomes explored were the Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre and ‘ ’ joined by nine Micronesian and Melanesian draft Blue Boat Strategy and the expansion of FFA’s mandate to include coastal inshore areas states as well as the aerial and maritime defence (Tauafiafi, 2017a). Regarding the latter, with a assets of the ‘QUADS’ (Australia, New Zealand, region-wide surveillance system already in France and the US); it conducts unannounced place for offshore oceanic fishery resources, this patrols in the EEZs of the PICs and the high seas consolidation of mandate within FFA is (i.e. areas beyond national jurisdiction) to detect expected to enable a more effective coordination and seize IUU fishing vessels. Expanding from of blue boat surveillance – a significant proposi- the primary target of large-scale distant-water tion we further elaborate in the subsequent fleets such as purse seiners or long-liners, the section as part of the nascent securitisation 2017 operation was the first of any FFA surveil- narrative. lance operation to support a secondary mission of searching for, and reporting, blue boats via air surveillance sorties in the 14.7 million km2 wide patrol area (FFA, 2017a). Three blue boats Securitisation of blue boats were pursued out of the Papua New Guinea EEZ, which supplemented the results of the Offering a concept of security that is broad and 2016 exercise, in which the detection and arrest generic enough to encompass different sectors of three blue boats was achieved within the of security (military, economic, societal and waters of Palau and FSM (FFA, 2016). environmental) at the individual-, state- and The capture of three blue boats in March international-level, Barry Buzan and Ole 2017 near Indispensable Reef, 50 km south of Wæver have argued that there is a genuine Rennell Island in Solomon Islands, provides an logic to how an issue becomes understood as a example of a coordinated, multi-agency security threat. Constructionist in its epistemol- approach to conducting surveillance and detec- ogy, their ‘securitisation framework’ enables an tion, and ultimately arrest. After receiving a analysis of the political process by which threats report of blue boat sighting from a registered are constructed and issues are elevated on the commercial fishing vessel operating in the area, security agenda (Bueger, 2015: 161). According the FFA, which is headquartered in Honiara, to this Copenhagen School of thought, alerted the Royal Solomon Islands Police securitisation implies that a particular issue is Force, who dispatched a patrol boat the follow- successfully claimed as an existential threat ing day. The French Government also provided (e.g. a matter of survival) to a certain referent aerial support upon request of the FFA by object (e.g. state sovereignty or community live- deploying an aircraft from New Caledonia to lihoods). Such claims (i.e. ‘speech acts’) are Solomon Islands on an emergency basis. With made by ‘securitising actors’, who typically rep- an updated report from the police and fisheries resent political elites empowered or authorised authorities based in Santa Ana Island, the to speak about security (e.g. governments,

316 © 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd Securitisation of blue boats in Asia-Pacific bureaucracies, lobbyists and pressure groups). countries in the region, is around the issue of In turn, if accepted by a relevant target audi- border security and being able to have enough ence (e.g. international community), these maritime domain awareness regarding the move- fi claims as a ‘securitising move’ will lead to ment of small craft vessels, shing vessels in and … legitimising special or ‘emergency’ measures out of our various economic exclusion zones [For example], Vanuatu has had issues in the that would not have otherwise been possible past with yachts coming in with drugs and you had the discourse not taken the form of existen- know it is along some of the transshipment tial threats. Hence, securitisation is about the routes from the US to Australia and also to fi discursive process that justi es taking actions New Zealand. So, these are concerns we are outside the normal bounds of politics in order really trying to look at and have these reflected to avert what is perceived as a threatening in the policy’ (in Cullwick, 2018). development (Buzan et al., 1998). In the case of blue boats, alarmist language As such, the sovereign control of maritime has already been used to depict the boats them- domain has effectively been elevated as another selves, the impact of their activities and the referent object. broader dangers they pose. The Director Gen- In the current shaping of the blue boat dis- eral of FFA, James Movick, preferred to call course, FFA appears to be one of the most vocal them ‘reef robbers’ (Movick, 2017). Blue boats securitising actors, if not the most dominant. have also been compared to a ‘thief in the FFA’s core mandate is to assist member coun- night’, who enters the home and steals the most tries to sustainably manage offshore fishery precious possessions (Carreon, 2017a). Another resources such as tuna and other pelagic fish FFA official remarked, ‘When they go to a reef, stocks located in their EEZs. FFA’s operations, they don’t catch a few [sea cucumbers], they therefore, do not extend into coastal waters catch them all. Sea cucumbers need a certain where the risk of blue boats appears to con- amount of number to reproduce. Blue boats will verge the greatest. Then, why is FFA visibly obliterate them from the reefs. They [sea cucum- active in intervening in the operations of blue bers] will never grow there again’ (in Tauafiafi, boats? James Movick of FFA explained in a 2017a). In this discourse, the imperative to con- media interview, trol the incursions of blue boats is thus conspicu- ously linked to the referent objects- that is, the ‘We do have a very effective tool in place [refer- status of the marine resources as finite and under ring to the Regional Fisheries Surveillance Cen- threat- and then the survival of the coastal com- tre] and we do need to use it, as these are munities who depend on those marine resources problems affecting the sovereignty of our coun- for their livelihood and food security (see tries, the livelihoods and opportunities that exist Cullwick, 2016; Tauafiafi, 2017b). for our own people to harvest these resources … Forming part of the speech act, blue boats are So we have the responsibility but also the oppor- also spoken about in the same breath as mari- tunity of using the regional MCS [monitoring, control and surveillance] framework’ time border security and associated trans- (in Tauafiafi, 2017b). boundary crimes such as drug trafficking. Papua New Guinea Fisheries Minister Mao Zeming Probing further, in representing FFA’s position, stated, ‘It is not just an illegal fishing matter to Movick was clear on the new direction required be addressed by the [PNG] National Fisheries to ward off blue boat intrusion that centres on Authority. It is a national security issue which aerial surveillance. He was quoted as saying, must be raised at the highest diplomatic levels’ (in Albaniel, 2016). Similarly, Viliame ‘ Wilikilangi, a regional security advisor to the They [blue boats] are a particular concern because they are small wooden vessels that are Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, confirmed the not easily detected by our day-to-day activities disruptive role of blue boats in preserving terri- and the traditional [radar] tools that we have torial control of member countries: built around the industrialised tuna fishery … Moving forward, this new form of threat will ‘Our focus on maritime security, which is some- require us to evolve tools and practices crafted thing we’ve identified across a number of to local conditions. Aerial surveillance will

become more vital and be utilized more broadly 2017. This support, for the first time, added a than for just enforcing tuna fisheries alone’ (civilian) patrol aircraft under the direct opera- (FFA, 2016). tional control of the FFA, who will have year- round access to the feature with FFA members FFA’s deputy Director General at the time, Wez determining surveillance priorities (see Brady, Norris, also elaborated on the broader vision of 2017; Radio New Zealand, 2017b). It is also this strategy, aimed at strengthening the ‘communication and cooperation’ capability in addition to the origi- ‘It [aerial surveillance] means we will be able to nal objective of surveillance and monitoring deploy it around the region in support of when (see Tauafiafi, 2017c). For Australia, this initia- our members have their patrol boat out at sea tive represents a new model of support with an and that is when we get the best value out of estimated annual cost of AU$10–15 million combining that capability … The increased being funded as part of the new AU$2 billion aerial assistance capacity will broaden our scope dollar Pacific Maritime Security Program and the impact that we have on a whole range supported by the Australian Department of of issues from the detection of sort of non-tuna Defence (Brady, 2017; Department of Defence, illegal fishing like the blue boats that we have 2018). In this way the initiative would allow the seen from Vietnam, but also allowing us to over ’ time and as the members get more comfortable programme to formally link with Australia s to move into looking at broader trans-national Defence Cooperation Program, which is respon- crime risks that are not necessarily fisheries spe- sible for the security and stability of a larger cific … This is where the future I see us having geographical area that comprises not only the to move. To understand that there are other bor- Pacific Islands region, but also Southeast Asian der control issues where our regional [MCS] nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philip- framework can play a role’ (in Tauafiafi,2017c). pines and Timor Leste (see Tauafiafi, 2017c). Though inconclusive at time of writing, there Encouraged by the effective response demon- are indications that PICs are accepting the new strated in the capture of blue boats in Solomon reality of their coastal waters as being under Islands in 2017, the intent of the FFA is report- threat from blue boats, a reality that is socially edly to seek a full mandate from the member constituted by the speech acts of various countries to expand its operation to coastal regional and national actors in the last few waters (see Tauafiafi, 2017a,2017b). Such an years. Following the well-publicised incident in extension, if approved, would enable the their waters last year, the Solomon Islands Gov- agency to monitor the territorial waters of PICs ernment, for instance, formed a high-level with greater frequency and intensity and even cross-sectoral task force to deliberate on the deploy foreign aircrafts into the country on an ways to enhance interagency cooperation and emergency basis. While this would be a highly coastal community alertness. A national strategy sensitive proposal from a sovereignty perspec- to deal with blue boats is also being led by the tive, if not an outright aberration, it likely builds Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources on a precedence called the 2000 Biketawa together with other ministries (R. Masu, pers. Declaration in the Pacific, which sets out a comm., 2018). In countries where no official regional framework that allows a collective sighting of blue boats has yet been docu- intervention into domestic affairs in times of mented, there is an admission that this issue political or security crisis and gives the extra requires close watch. Tokelau’s fisheries officer, fi power to the Paci c Island Forum (the preemi- Feleti Tulafono, cautioned, for example, nent inter-governmental body made up of heads of state) in determining when and how that ‘Whilst their transgressions may be occurring takes place (Frazer and Bryant-Tokalau, 2006). ’ half a world away from Tokelau, our immediate FFA s aspiration is in some ways also tied to a neighbours Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Cook securitising move of Australia, who as a metro- Islands are now concerned with this new threat politan partner and the largest donor of foreign that a strong and vigorous public awareness aid to the Pacific region launched a plan to campaign should be developed’ Tauafiafi, boost the aerial surveillance capacity of FFA in 2017a).

Discussion: Wider implications and research changing conditions of threats that demand agenda finer resolution yet broad coverage, the regional dialogue has so far emphasised multilateral In many PICs, customary marine tenure pro- aerial surveillance capacity together with the vides the foundations for the rights that coastal involvement of fishers themselves, community- people have in deciding how their marine based actors and provincial authorities to report resources are used and managed. It is these local sightings (see Fig. 1; also Song, 2015 on foundations upon which community-based the idea of ‘civilian scouts’). Blue boats are forms of management have persisted and gained therefore bolstering the need for closer coopera- traction as the principal mode (and scale) in tion not only among governments and agencies which coastal fisheries should be governed in but also including the dispersed, informal actors the Pacific region (Johannes, 2002; Govan residing at lower and resource user-levels to et al., 2006; SPC, 2015). Yet, there are some create a greater network of interdependencies. enduring and emerging issues that community- From this, we aver that tackling blue boats is based management alone may not be able to becoming the newest extension of the regional address. In the face of globalisation and increas- maritime security apparatus. Aside from the ing demand for resources, it is useful to exam- added security challenges, its securitisation ine one such governance challenge and its (as with any intentional political endeavour) intricate connections with larger political- would also present opportunities for increasing economic and geographical trends (Howitt influence for those willing to act vocally and et al., 2013), which we illuminate using the decisively to negotiate the risks. The recent case of ‘blue boats’ in the Asia Pacific. activities have shown that FFA and Australia, in This paper has analysed some of the early particular, have swiftly (and in part jointly) speeches and actions of national and regional engaged with the issue – a securitising move actors visible in the public communicative from which these actors may derive certain domain to explore how the recent phenomenon organisational and strategic benefits in years to of blue boat incursion is being positioned come. Both the Australia’s 2016 Defence White within the maritime security discourse in the Paper and the 2017 Foreign Policy White Pacific Island region. Based on the initial evi- Paper, which reaffirm enhanced commitment to dence gathered for this purpose, we posit that safeguarding maritime security in the Pacific, as blue boats and their poaching activities are well as the latest consensus among PICs to being devised as a fresh means to strengthen expand the Biketawa Declaration to incorporate regional awareness, cooperation and capacity the non-traditional security topics including for maritime security. The main novelty of blue fisheries and human and environmental security boats arguably stems from their small, rudimen- (i.e. a Regional Security Declaration to be tary and even ungovernable characteristics. known as the Boe Declaration), provide a wider Such attributes pose a different set of security political backdrop which would favour the con- challenges compared to large-scale industrial tinued salience of blue boats in the security fleets, who tend to be technically more detect- discussion. able (via VMS and on-board observers), admin- In coming years, the actual events of the blue istratively traceable (via vessel registration, boat incursion may cease due to the changing catch reporting and audit trails) and politically macro and micro economic conditions motivat- recognisable (via ties to lobbyists, industries and ing the fishing trips as well as the controlling high-level diplomacy). The incursion of blue effort of the Vietnamese Government and/or the boats thus invites a new way of approaching effective deterrence from the Pacific actors. For the topic of maritime security in the region. Spa- instance, the recent warnings of the European tially, it adds a coastal dimension that repre- Union to ban Vietnamese seafood imports has sents a vast shore-based area nearly impossible prompted the Vietnamese Government to dem- to oversee using centralised means and conven- onstrate some progress in curbing IUU fishing tional radar. There is also a degree of informal- of its offshore fleets (L. Son, pers. comm., 2018). ity and randomness associated with these boats Yet, as long as the threat itself is maintained to and their crew. In order to respond to the persist, there will be a lingering appetite for a

Figure 1. A ‘blue boat’ poster produced for the Solomon Islands in 2017, which can be replicated for other countries, and eventually in the local languages. Source: SPC (2017). [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

security discourse and the ensuing surveillance economic and even naval influence over PICs practice. The nature of smaller fishing vessels is (Windybank, 2005). While how much of the such that they are more difficult to track and Chinese influence should amount to a security account for, with a vast number of them origi- concern is unknown (and in fact not directly nating from numerous landing sites stretched essential for discussion in this paper), it might across the Asia–Pacific. Hence, it is perhaps be worth keeping in mind the contemporary not entirely unthinkable that there could be a history of fishing boat expansion in China, their ‘Chinese version’ of the blue boats appearing in frequent incursions in the nearby seas of dis- the Pacific Islands at some point in time (see puted or foreign jurisdiction such as the Yellow also Wong, 2016). In recent decades, influx of Sea and the South China Sea, as well as their Chinese loans, aids and infrastructure develop- alleged dual role as a para-military unit (Dupont ment has been a noticeable trend in the region and Baker, 2014; Zhang and Bateman, 2017). (Shie, 2007; Zhang and Lawson, 2017) and Thus, with potential to grow into a more flam- arguably a contentious topic for the metropoli- mable international relations issue, the threat tan countries such as Australia and the small transboundary fishing boats pose New Zealand in fear of losing diplomatic, could be of enduring concern to those

320 © 2019 The Authors. Asia Pacific Viewpoint published by Victoria University of Wellington and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd Securitisation of blue boats in Asia-Pacific addressing maritime security in the Pacific understandings and priorities vary in terms of its Island region. security implications, and why? What effect Research on this topic would support the does this issue have on regional cooperation or wider trends observed in maritime security stud- the ‘Pacific Regionalism’ ethos? ies. According to Bueger and Edmunds (2016), How can the claimed linkage of blue boats maritime security issues are increasingly with larger-scale and arguably more sinister characterised by interconnectivity across scales problems of corporate IUU fishing, transnational and sectors transcending traditional boundaries shipment of illicit goods and sea slavery and and jurisdictional responsibilities. This means human rights violation be validated? What that the future study agenda requires critical should be done to reduce such risks and make and expanded attention to the ways security the undertaking of small fishing boats more gov- cooperation have become more diffuse, com- ernable? Should ‘desecuritisation’ be the goal plex and diverse involving state, private and (i.e., shifting of issues back into the mundane, other non-state actors, including local fishing normal bargaining processes without the need communities, as well as a holistic approach to for emergency measures), and if so, how? deal with different but interlinked forms of mari- We anticipate all this should help gain a time crimes and risks. Furthermore, the issues of more accurate and comprehensive grasp on this port security, illegal fishing or environmental relatively new and under-identified phenome- degradation remain particularly underexplored. non. Identifying the sources of the issue, context Calling for ongoing in-depth studies that employ and reactions and how these mesh into domi- more sociological and interdisciplinary observa- nant narratives to produce the ongoing out- tions (Bueger and Edmunds, 2016; Song et al., comes should be the collective endeavour of a 2017), the research on the blue boats and their wide range of actors in the region, namely all security implications can represent a useful con- those concerned with the provision of food, tribution to the maritime security praxis and identity, and sovereignty that coastal waters debate that ultimately affects how we view and confer upon the people of the Pacific Islands. evaluate the oceans, and the transboundary per- formances within. Our initial sense-making of the blue boat Acknowledgements phenomenon raises a crucial set of questions for future empirical research, which include but are This work was undertaken as part of the CGIAR not limited to: Research Program on Fish Agri-Food Systems • What are the (geo)political, economic and (FISH) led by WorldFish. The program is historical developments including climate supported by contributors to the CGIAR Trust change that constitute domestic push factors Fund. This work was supported by the that encourage or compel Vietnamese and other Australian Government through Australian Cen- fi boats and crew to venture into the Paci c? Also, tre for International Agricultural Research fi ’ what are the shers internal logic and liveli- (ACIAR) project FIS/2016/300 and the hood concerns that directly affect their motiva- Australian Research Council through the ARC tions and agency with respect to transboundary Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies. fi shing work? Authors thank two anonymous reviewers for ’ How has the Vietnamese Government s their insightful comments on an earlier version position on the blue boats evolved, what have of the paper. been their stated responses and actions, what have they achieved and what are the opportunities and limitations of their control, if any? References What are the perceptions of various regional actors in the Pacific and their Adger, W.N. (2010) Climate change, human well-being and – organisational responses on this issue (including insecurity, New Political Economy 15(2): 275 292. Albaniel, R. (2016) PNG Fisheries Minister raises grave con- the national ministries of PICs and those of cerns about illegal fishing incursions. Pacific Islands Australia as well as inter-governmental bodies Report December 28. Retrieved 2 December 2017, and independent experts)? How do their from Website: http://www.pireport.org/articles/2016/12/

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