THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School of International, Political and Strategic Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia State Society and in Governance Melanesia
DISCUSSION PAPER
Discussion Paper 2010/4
Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way”: A Critique of (un)Critical Approaches1
ABSTRACT
When Fiji’s first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir supported colonial hegemony. This in turn STEPHANIE Kamisese Mara, first used the term the provided an important stimulus for the LAWSON “Pacific Way" during an address to the development of postcolonial theory as an UN General Assembly in 1970, its specific anti-hegemonic discourse critical not just of referent was the smooth transition to colonial history but manifestations of neo- independence of Fiji and several other Pacific colonialism in the contemporary period. island states that had thus far gone through In this paper I suggest that although the the decolonization process. The “Pacific “Pacific Way” is generally presented as Way" was soon used to denote a collective a counter-hegemonic discourse, in some political identity for the island states of the manifestations it provides support for other Pacific region in the postcolonial period kinds of hegemony. This is because it and, together with the “Melanesian Way", has so far evinced very little concern with developed the characteristics of an anti- colonial discourse — something that had the hegemonic practices of local elites. been noticeably lacking in Mara’s original At the same time, it continues to invest in formulation. During much the same period, the overarching West/non-West bifurcation Edward Said’s critical study, Orientalism, of the world, which also produces quite began to make its mark, especially in terms simplistic images of contemporary regional of its critique of the nexus between power politics that mask a much more complex set and knowledge and the way in which this of social, political and economic relations. Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
INTRODUCTION accountability, responsibility and sovereign rights as well as the efficacy and legitimacy of “Western” modes of governance vis-à-vis In 1970, Fiji’s first Prime Minister, Ratu Sir local institutions and practices. The latter Kamisese Mara, delivered an address to the have often been defended through invocation UN General Assembly, characterizing the of the Pacific Way, the Melanesian Way and/ experiences shared by Fiji and some other or the narrower national formulations. Pacific island states in achieving a smooth The Pacific Way idea has had a varie- path to independence as the “Pacific Way”. gated political career in the postcolonial This term soon came to denote a collective period. One commentator notes that in its political identity for the island states of the early years it reflected a romantic euphoria Pacific region in the aftermath of indepen- about a Pacific renaissance which could dence, one which claimed a unique Pacific embrace modernity while fostering a unique character as based on broadly shared social Pacific identity shared by all island states, or and political values. It also came to acquire more especially, by emergent Pacific elites a strong anti-colonial resonance, comparable “who saw themselves as founders … of the in some ways to the négritude movement of new postcolonial Pacific order”. (Ratuva, postcolonial Africa as well as the later devel- 2003: 247). While the Pacific Way idea has opment of discourses about “Asian values” sometimes prompted cynicism, especially and the “ASEAN Way” in East and Southeast to the extent that it has been perceived as Asia, all of which sought a reaffirmation of serving the interests of those elites rather local ways in the aftermath of colonial rule. than Pacific people as a whole, it still has The Pacific Way was later joined by a much positive currency. Thus despite its elit- more specific assertion of a sub-regional ist orientation, as well as the fact that it is identity in the form of the Melanesian Way. often “embarrassingly clichéd", it remains a This was a more profoundly anti-colonial popular way of representing the region col- 2 articulation of identity from the start. Along- lectively. (Meleisa, 2000: 76). side the regionalist discourses also sit a The framework for analysis in this paper number of nationalist formulations such as takes its point of departure from postcolonial such as anga fakatonga (the Tongan Way), approaches which have been so influential fa’a Samoa (the Samoan Way) and vaka- in framing the terms of debate about the viti (the Fijian Way). While focusing on more colonial experience and its aftermath. The tightly bounded notions of local indigenous paper therefore looks first at some of the identities, these nonetheless resonate with main assumptions of postcolonial theory and aspects of the broader regional articulations then the specific circumstances in which the and contribute to their substance. Pacific Way was first articulated, as well as In one way or another, all these discourses the meaning with which it was imbued. Here are manifestations of postcolonial thinking — we see that although the Pacific Way has a style of thought which is generally critical since acquired many of the characteristics of not simply of the colonial past but of the a postcolonial discourse in the critical sense continuing effects of that past in the present. in which this term is generally understood, it Thus the Pacific Way and cognate discourses was anything but in its original formulation. have persisted into the present period, often Accordingly, the next section traces some as undertones but sometimes more explicitly of the shifts in meaning and application in debates about relations between Pacific as it developed over the next few years, island states and their regional neighbours, especially through the voice of academic especially Australia and New Zealand, interlocutors. Taken together, these two sec- countries which often stand accused of tions illustrate a significant transformation in neo-colonial attitudes and practices. At the meaning, thereby demonstrating some inter- centre of these debates are broad issues of esting contradictions and tensions.3 We then governance, security, aid, development and consider the issue of neo-colonialism with dependency, which in turn raise questions of specific reference to democracy promotion Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
as part of the broader “good governance" yet to penetrate the thinking, or perhaps agenda. Here we look at several critiques of “unthinking", of various politicians, journal- Australian policy in particular, and the way ists, bureaucrats, consultants and other in which debates about Australia’s relations experts located in metropolitan centres far with the Pacific islands has been framed. from the everyday lives and experiences To the extent that these critiques embrace of Pacific islanders (Fry, 2000). Postcolo- the principles of postcolonial analysis they nial approaches themselves, however, are also embrace some of its shortcomings. The scarcely beyond criticism, especially to the concluding section therefore suggests that extent that they remain concerned with good critical scholarship, if it is seriously to issues of cultural identity at the expense of address problems of hegemony in the Pacif- pressing issues of political economy which ic islands, needs to avoid adopting the more are, for many, a matter of life and death. Arif simplistic postures of postcolonial analysis Dirlik and Aijaz Ahmed, in particular, have that has limited its scope to date. also take postcolonial theorists to task for abandoning or at least playing down class posTcolonialism as a category of analysis (Dirlik, 1997; Ahmed, 1994). As for postcolonial theory’s concern with unmasking historical ideas Edward Said’s critical study Orientalism which supported colonialism, even sympa- (Said, 1978), is widely regarded as the thizers such as Michael Hardt see a need to founding text in the genre of postcolonial move on, arguing that “the residues of colo- studies. It is a study in comparative lit- nialist thinking are not the central pillars of erature, but at the same time is much more contemporary forms of domination”.(Hardt, than that, setting out a scathing political 2001: 248). To these critiques it may be and social critique of key aspects of Euro- added that postcolonial approaches often pean colonialism. Said’s notion of Oriental- have a strong tendency to gloss over cases ism consists in a discourse through which involving forms of local (non-Western) domi- Europeans have historically represented the nation and subordination because they do “Orient" as an exotic space occupied by an not fit the particular normative framework inferior “Other" (the Oriental) against which of the postcolonial genre which has been positive images of Europe and the Euro- set up largely as a critique of “Western" pean self have been constructed. These practices. claims are embedded primarily in a critique This paper therefore takes issue with of colonial power relations and, in particular, postcolonial theory’s claims to constitute a the links between power, representation counter-hegemonic discourse. I argue that and knowledge. A recent text proposes that while it has certainly contributed a great postcolonial critique emerges as the product deal to the critique of (Western) colonialism of resistance to colonialism and imperial- and its mechanisms of oppression and ism and therefore identifies primarily with control — which I have no intention of the subject position of anti-colonial activists defending — it often relies on a normative (Young, 2001: 15, 19). Postcolonial analysis framework based on overly simplistic images is therefore associated largely with forms of of oppressors and oppressed. This produces resistance to European or Western imperial- a two-dimensional view of the world which ism and colonialism, the body of ideas which tends to evade confronting other hegemonic supported it, and its ongoing effects. practices, especially those of indigenous or The intellectual impact of both Said’s local elites either during the colonial period or original work and the wider field of postco- in its aftermath, including the contemporary lonial theory developed over the past few period. The next section illustrates some of decades has been considerable, spread- these points through a close study of the ing well beyond the confines of academia. initial emergence of the Pacific Way concept Some would argue, however, that its insights which was anything but anti-colonial in its have not spread far enough and that it has original manifestation. This also highlights Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
some of the ironies of its later appropriation or of the Pacific Way and related issues. One reconstruction as a postcolonial discourse. important speech, reprinted in this volume, delivered at the conclusion of negotiations at The Emergence of Whitehall on the new constitution for an inde- pendent Fiji in early May 1970, and therefore the Pacific Way almost contemporaneous with his UN Pacific Way speech, illustrates his attitude to Britain When Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara first publicly and its political institutions. enunciated a version of the “Pacific Way" Today marks a long journey … close before the UN General Assembly in October on one hundred years … Through it 1970, its specific reference point was Fiji’s all, we have had the help and guid- very recent transition to independence. In ance of the United Kingdom. Many of contrast with other parts of the former colo- her traditions are firmly grafted, not nial world, Mara remarked that this had been only on our political institutions, but on achieved without great drama or political our whole national life. The rule of law, turbulence. parliamentary democracy, respect for … But this is nothing new in the Pacific. the rights of minorities, a sense of fair Similar calm and orderly moves to play, give and take, are all taken for independence have taken place in granted in Fiji, but they are, in a very Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, in real sense, a legacy from the British. Nauru, and in Tonga. We like to think Should we ever wish to forget the Brit- that this is the Pacific Way, both geo- ish — which God forbid — it would not graphically and ideologically ... (Mara, be possible. Your ways and your ideas 1997: 238). are too much part and parcel of our own. … (Mara, 1997: 104). Since the application of the phrase was at this point limited to those island states lying Several of Mara’s remarks about the largely within the central Southwest Pacific UN’s Decolonization Committee are also which had thus far acquired independent worth noting, for they reflect long-standing status, it was scarcely an all-encompassing attitudes among Fiji’s indigenous elites to term. However, as prefigured in the speech, the prospect of independence. On a number it was soon to gain much broader currency of occasions, Mara comments negatively on and capacity as other commentators and forces within the UN during the 1960s that interpreters expanded its ambit and rein- were pushing decolonization for remain- terpreted its message. The most prominent ing colonies: “In 1962 Western Samoa had was a New Zealand-born academic, Ron become independent and Nauru was on the Crocombe, who, five years after Mara’s way. In Fiji we were trying to stem the tide of original speech on the subject, composed independence whipped up by agitation at the a pamphlet of some fifty pages in length in United Nations." (Mara, 1997: 170). which the Pacific Way was invested with a At least some other authors have largely great deal more meaning Crocombe, 1976). ignored such sentiments or provided distort- More will be said about Crocombe’s work ed accounts of Fijian attitudes. Michael Haas, shortly, but for the moment Mara’s thoughts author of a substantial work on the Pacific are worth exploring further. His memoirs Way as a regionalist enterprise, asserts that; published in 1997 under the title, The Pacif- “In the context of the eventual attainment ic Way may seem a promising starting of independence in the South Pacific, Fiji’s point but despite the title, we find little on Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara … began to give a the substance of his Pacific Way. Despite series of addresses concerning the Pacific this, the memoirs provide valuable insights Way based in part on the views of Ratu Lala into Mara’s personal attitudes, especially Sukuna, who struggled for Fijian indepen- towards Fiji’s colonial past, and so we have dence until his death in 1958”. (Haas, 1989: some access to his original understanding 9). The latter part of Haas’s statement is a Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
serious misrepresentation of the historical in conservative ideologies that are certainly record. Neither Sukuna nor any other of Fiji’s evident in Fiji’s colonial record, if not else- chiefly elite “struggled" for independence. If where. The transformation of the Pacific Way anything they resisted for as long as they into something resembling a more genuine could. Indeed, it is possible to read many postcolonial discourse, and which therefore parts of the colonial historical record as one lent itself more readily to a critique of neo- of cooperation between British colonizing colonialism, was left to a prominent expatri- agents and the eastern Fijian chiefly elite ate academic commentator on Pacific affairs who saw many advantages in the colonial whose work we consider next. arrangement. Class identification must also count as a factor since the upper levels of the From Mara’s Way to British colonial service, when encountering Crocombe’s Way strongly hierarchical structures of authority with paramount chiefs at the apex, were very much inclined to see the self in the other, and Ron Crocombe’s interpretation of the term vice-versa.(see Lawson 2010b; Cannadine, Mara had first coined appeared in a fifty- 2001). Those most strongly supportive of page pamphlet, The Pacific Way, published independence were in fact Indo-Fijians — a six years after Mara’s speech. Crocombe’s group almost completely excluded from the pamphlet noted the extent to which it had ambit of the Pacific Way. been taken up around the island Pacific, It is easy enough to pick out many “probably because it satisfies both psycho- statements illustrating a close relationship logical and political needs, in that it helps to between the British colonial authorities and fulfill a growing demand for respected Pacif- certain indigenous elites in Fiji, but it would ic-wide identifying symbols and for Pacific be misleading to suggest that all aspects of unity" and because “effective unifying con- the relationship between the British colonial cepts can reduce the extent and intensity administrators and Sukuna, Mara and other of neo-colonial dependency of the islands Fijian leaders were entirely congenial. Of countries [sic] on the richer Pacific border- course there were serious differences over lands". Crocombe, however, targeted not policy matters from time to time. There were only neo-colonialism, but the broader history also several dissident movements among of colonialism in the Pacific, stating that: “The indigenous Fijians during the colonial period, colonial experience left a common unpleas- although some of these were as much ant taste in the mouths of islands people: a opposed to the chiefly elite as to the colo- common humiliation, a common feeling of nial regime. And clearly the experiences of deprivation and exploitation”. (Crocombe, colonialism elsewhere in the Pacific as well 1976:13). Although this may have been how as in other parts of the world were often very some Pacific islanders felt, nothing could different. This is why one needs to be care- be further from the sentiments embodied in ful about making any grand generalizations Mara’s original formulation and in his other about the colonial experience or its legacy. statements which form the broader context. To summarize, Mara’s original articulation Crocombe’s analysis, however, was not of the Pacific Way can scarcely be consid- altogether uncritical of indigenous pratices, ered “postcolonial" in the critical sense out- and he noted the potential for the Pacific lined above. The fact that it was put forward Way idea to operate in the service of elite as an object lesson in model behaviour by privilege. He also identified a core of island both the former colonies and by the coloniz- elites from Fiji, Tonga and what was then ing powers reflects very different sentiments Western Samoa for whom the Pacific Way from those assumed by postcolonial critiques had particular significance. He therefore sug- which often see nothing but the dynamics of gested that the Pacific Way applied primar- domination and resistance in colonial rela- ily “to an inner group of English-speaking, tionships while sweeping aside the conver- tropical islands of the south Pacific; and only gence of class hierarchies and empathies secondarily and with less intensity of involve- Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
ment or meaning to all other Pacific islands”. Pacific Way discourse since at least the Crocombe further proposed that the chiefly mid-1970s. ideology emanating from the core island groups exhibiting strongly hierarchical socio- Neo-colonialism in political structures had considerable strength the Pacific Islands and influence over the broader region , at least to the extent that “the idea of chieftain- ship had become an accepted part of the “Neo-colonialism" refers generally to a situa- Pacific Way … ". He went on to suggest that tion in which relatively more powerful coun- in the Pacific Way discourse, the differences tries tend to exercise economic, cultural between these highly stratified hereditary and/or political power over weaker or smaller hierarchies on the one hand, and the “bot- countries. The latter may have formal inde- tom up" egalitarian systems of societies in pendent status but sovereignty is seen as other parts of the Western Pacific — namely heavily compromised by continuing relations Melanesia — on the other, tended to be of dependence on either the former colonial minimized, “for the development of Pacific power, or on other powers with interests in unity necessitates a playing down of internal them, or both. The term “neo-colonialism" differences and a maximizing of similarities”. was first articulated by the Ghanaian lead- (Crocombe, 1976: 11). er, Kwame Nkrumah, who also advocated Crocombe also noted that the model a form of pan-Africanism as a means of prevailing in the core group, with its strongly resistance. (Nkrumah, 1966). To the extent hierarchical sociopolitical structures, had that it was a regionalist discourse which considerable strength and influence over the sought to bring African states under a single broader region, at least to the extent that “the umbrella of identity, it shares many similari- idea of chieftainship had become an accept- ties with the Pacific Way. A major difference ed part of the Pacific Way, even though there between Nkrumah and Mara, however, was is some vacillating between valuing privilege that the former was a left-leaning intellec- and valuing its opposite — equality”. But he tual strongly influenced by Marxism. Mara warned that if the Pacific Way became too could scarcely have been more different. closely identified with an elite or with the His was a thoroughly conservative outlook older generation, it may well lose the capac- which projected a very different perspective ity to appeal to a broader cross-section of on the colonial past, although he was wary Pacific people. (Crocombe, 1976: 12). enough of a neo-colonial future. Another Crocombe’s treatment of the Pacific Way major point of difference was with respect to thus differed significantly from Mara’s formu- the role of indigenous elites which Nkrumah lation in two important respects. First, while saw as perfectly capable of selling out the Mara’s contained no hint of hostility to colo- interests of the masses. This is not a sub- nial rule in terms of his own personal experi- ject with which Mara engaged much, if at ence, Crocombe’s emphasized that colonial all. Indeed, with respect to his own country, rule was a source of humiliation for all those Mara expended much effort in defending subject to it — whether they realized it or elite indigenous institutions as essential to not. Second, Mara infused the Pacific Way, the preservation of Fijian identity in the face at least implicitly, with the values of tradi- of alleged threats posed by the immigrant tional chiefly rule. Crocombe incorporated Indo-Fijian community. these in his expanded version of the idea, This section is primarily concerned with but sounded some clear warnings about the how the promotion of democratic politics potential abuse of elite status. Where Mara within the island states — something which and Crocombe did tend to converge was on directly challenges the power of traditional the theme of neo-colonialism, although this elites in the core island states of the South- is much more explicit in Crocombe’s work. I west Pacific — is often regarded as a mani- suggest that it is this, more than the colonial festation of neo-colonialism against which past, that has been a principal driver of the the Pacific Way and cognate concepts have Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
been deployed. While there are a number of A major catalyst for discussions sur- important players in the region, including the rounding democracy in the Pacific islands European Union, the US, Japan and, more and the role of Australia and New Zealand in recently, China and Taiwan (in a rivalrous promoting democratic values was the coup relationship), it is Australia and New Zea- in Fiji in May 1987 when Lieutenant-Colonel land which are most commonly targeted as Sitiveni Rabuka marched into parliament engaging in neo-colonial practices. Both are accompanied by armed soldiers, rounded members of the Pacific Islands Forum them- up and incarcerated members of the elected selves and therefore more closely involved government at gunpoint, and declared him- in the politics of the region. self in charge. This government had only “Democracy promotion" has become weeks before defeated the Alliance Party led closely associated with the activities of the by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara at general elec- US, especially in the Middle East, with signif- tions conducted under the very constitution icant negative consequences for the regard that Mara had worked to develop together in which it is held as a foreign policy strat- with Indo-Fijian leaders and the former colo- egy.4 The manner and extent of “democracy nial power. But the constitution had not guar- promotion" engaged in by Australia and New anteed perpetual power for Mara’s party and, Zealand with respect to the Pacific Islands is in the face of considerable political disunity scarcely in the same league, but it has none- among indigenous Fijians, the Alliance lost theless raised concerns about the degree to government after 17 years in office. It was a which it represents neo-colonial interference loss that he and the party did not take well. in the sovereign affairs of island states as The coup was justified in terms of the rights well as reflecting notions of superiority and of indigenous Fijians vis-à-vis the “immigrant overbearing attitudes generally. race" of Indo-Fijians, under which rubric the Democracy promotion itself is multi- value of indigenous ways, and by implication faceted with one of the most prominent and the Pacific Way, was asserted very forcefully widely criticized aspects being associated over and above “alien" institutions such with the World Bank’s “good governance and as parliamentary democracy and all that it anti-corruption" agenda. While the stated entailed. Given the prominence of chiefly aims of the agenda are hardly objectionable, classes in Fijian politics to that time, chiefly directed as they are towards poverty- systems and the values associated with reduction and raising standards of living for them such as consensus decision making the world’s most under-privileged people, its were valorized as authentic expressions of association with neo-liberal political economy indigenous identities. These were contrasted is another matter. The latter is geared explicitly with the inauthenticity of liberal towards privatization, deregulation and the democratic values said to promote dissensus hollowing out of government capacity in the and conflict and which were therefore contrary delivery of social goods, and has attracted to the Pacific Way’s core value of consensus much-deserved criticism for undermining (see, generally, Lawson, 1991). state capacity. Indeed to the extent that Similar debates about the merits and states are sometimes seen as “failed" or at demerits of democracy have marked pro- least “failing" we are entitled to ask whether cesses of political reform in Samoa, espe- certain neo-liberal impositions linked to the cially in relation to the extension of voting good governance program as well as to rights to all Samoans in the early 1990s, and the broader dynamics of globalization are in Tonga which is presently experiencing the themselves a factor. These aspects of “good most thoroughgoing changes to its consti- governance", however, are not the main tutional structure in more than 130 years.5 concern here. Rather it is the problem of In both countries, political reforms have instituting and/or sustaining basic democratic sought to provide greater opportunities for institutions in which governments may be participation by ordinary citizens — that is, held to account — not simply to Western those without chiefly or “noble" status — by donors but to their own people. at least voting for their own representatives Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
or, in the case of Tonga, by having more than many (commoner) Tongans have pushed for just three “commoner" representatives in the democratic reforms. The answer can only be parliament at all. These reforms have been that commoners, who surely do “understand" pursued in the face of opposition by conser- Tongan politics and society, actually reject vative chiefly figures who, not surprisingly, certain key aspects of anga fakatonga that have sought to preserve their own political support the existing system. status and privileges. But by far the most Established elites within the islands, significant point to emerge from all this is however, have not been the only ones that the pressures for democratic reform in to denounce external criticism. One New both Samoa and Tonga have come largely Zealand business leader (a member of the from within. Neither country has been sub- board of the New Zealand Pacific Business ject to serious external pressure to institute Council), commenting on political crises in reforms. the region in general and Fiji’s latest coup in In Tonga the reform process has been particular, suggested that instead of expect- instigated almost entirely by its own home- ing Pacific islanders to conform to “so-called grown pro-democracy movement which has “western-style” democracy", Australian and campaigned for decades for some form New Zealand political leaders, as well as the of parliamentary democracy to enhance media, needed to adopt a more sensitive accountability. The reaction of many mem- approach. And rather than impose sanctions, bers of the royal family and nobility over the they should concede that the Pacific Way years has ranged from disparaging com- may be a superior way of resolving Pacific ments about the abilities of commoners to disputes (Flanagan, 2007). What exactly participate in important matters of policy to he thought this entailed, however, was not overtly repressive measures such as the altogether clear, although it seemed to mean incarceration of pro-democracy figures and that “traditional society, culture and values", the closing down of critical media. It is under which he said had functioned satisfacto- such circumstances that the Pacific Way has rily in the past, ought not necessarily to be often been invoked to support authoritarian replaced by “Westminster-style" democracy practices and to brand those with the audac- which, it was further asserted, had taken ity to question their leaders as “un-Pacific". over twenty-five centuries to evolve. Apart (Ratuva, 2004; see also Roberston, 2005). from being a grossly inaccurate reading of Where statements of support for the the historical development of parliamen- pro-democracy movement have come from tary democracy in the UK, it shows very countries like Australia and New Zealand, little knowledge of how “introduced" political these have rankled deeply with the estab- institutions have actually been adapted in lishment. In a previous article, I noted a the region. Tonga’s constitutional monarchy, familiar condemnation by the then king’s defended (by conservative elites) as the very youngest son and Prime Minister, Prince essence of the Tongan-ness, is based sub- Ulukalala Lavaka Ata who accused outsiders stantially on the British model as it existed in critical of the Tongan establishment of simply the mid-nineteenth century. not “understanding" Tongan politics and soci- While most of Fiji’s constitutions resemble ety. Addressing Westerners at large who, he the Westminster model in some respects, said, wanted to impose their (democratic) its most important provision — namely values on Tonga: “You don’t see things as a those concerning elections and eligibility Tongan … You see things as a Westerner. So for office — bear almost no resemblance to it’s very hard for you to understand". (cited in contemporary Westminster practice. There Lawson 2006a:100). This de-legitimation of is certainly nothing in the latter that supports outsiders as incapable of “understanding" racially designated seats and constituencies. is one thing, but if the autocratic system Similar points can be made about Samoa’s under which Tonga has been ruled to date constitutional set-up. Further, none of the truly reflected widely shared Tongan values, constitutions have simply been “imposed" the question then becomes one of why so from outside. They all represent negotiated Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
political settlements with local conditions are of course alternative sources of aid, and very much in mind. Thus, as Peter Larmour the rivalry between China and Taiwan in suggests, too much can be made of the particular has seen a substantial increase in foreignness of the state and its institutions aid flows in the Pacific islands as they vie for (Larmour, 2003: 24). It must also be recognition and influence. China’s increas- emphasized that calls for democratic reforms ing presence in the region, in particular, has have come largely from within rather than caused some consternation in Canberra and from outside the societies concerned. These Wellington where the no-strings-attached issues aside, the same commentator also aid packages are seen as undermining good point outs that if Australia and New Zealand governance programs, especially in the area make too much of a fuss about democracy of corruption. One report cites a US$25 mil- and human rights then Asian countries, lion package to Solomon Islands provided by which have no concerns with such matters, Taiwan, ostensibly as aid to victims of ethnic could displace them both economically violence, as going straight into the pockets and geopolitically. For Australian and New of officials, militia leaders and police. Other Zealand business elites, this is probably projects funded by China to build infrastruc- more to the point. ture, such as new government buildings, As mentioned above, the role of Australia use only Chinese architects, engineers and and New Zealand in pushing for reforms in labour on the sites, and so underemployed both Samoa and Tonga has been low-key. local people are left out. The report recom- With respect to Samoa’s reforms, these mended that China co-ordinate its aid effort were simply welcomed as enhancing demo- with countries like Australia to ensure that cratic politics in the country by providing for funds go to where they are needed most. greater popular participation. With respect Interestingly, the report noted further that this to Tonga, New Zealand government figures might remove some of the bargaining power have made critical comments from time to from Pacific leaders “who are skilled at play- time — often depicted as “hectoring", and ing aid donors against another”. (Australian these have usually been met with predict- Broadcasting Commission, 2008). This latter able defensiveness on the part of the Tongan remark suggests that there is more to the elite who of course reject New Zealand’s aid game than a simple model of relations right to “interfere". But practical action such of neo-colonial dependency between donor as even a threat to suspend aid has not been and recipient suggests. contemplated. Indeed a suggestion by Ton- To return briefly to the issue of democracy gan pro-democracy leader, Akilisi Pohiva, and the coups in Fiji, the latest coup leader, in 2008 that New Zealand aid be suspend- Frank Bainimarama, has of course been ed until the country had become properly subject to the same condemnations from democratic was flatly rejected by the then Australia and New Zealand as have previous New Zealand Foreign Minister, Phil Goff coup leaders, and he has reacted with the (reported at
immediate predecessor, Laisenia Qarase, government and the media which came to 10 who Bainimarama was instrumental in prominence in the 1990s and which paint- appointing as interim prime minister in the ed a “doomsday" scenario for the islands caretaker government after the 2000 coup, — unless island peoples remake themselves was at that time also critical of suggestions by abandoning certain local practices and that Fiji should follow “Western" democratic taking some “hard decisions". Fry’s own norms (BBC, 2008). After his own ousting, analysis is framed very explicitly in a post- however, his support for “Western" democratic colonial mode of analysis which takes as its elections and constitutional processes point of departure Edward Said’s articulation strengthened dramatically. of “Orientalism" which, says Fry, is highly Numerous other instances could be cited relevant “to other contexts in which people to illustrate the point that political actors are grouped together and represented by will almost invariably support democratic outsiders who wish at the same time to man- institutions when they deliver desirable age, control, or prescribe for the peoples political outcomes — desirable, that is, they are depicting”. (Fry, 2000: 29-30). But from the point of view of their particular no mention is made of island elites who are interests — but often condemn them as also implicated in framing and representing “culturally unsuitable" when they don’t. Pacific islanders in ways that reflect their Similarly, criticisms from Australia and New own positions of power, their own particular Zealand can easily be dismissed as neo- constructions of “knowledge", and their own colonial arrogance and interference when interests in social control. This includes not it suits various political actors, but those only political figures but conservative church same actors may prove only too ready leaders, business people and so on.6 to accept (neo-colonial) aid packages or The invocation of “outsiders" implies its benefits on other occasions. On the other essential opposite, “insiders", which brings hand, both the Australian and New Zealand into question the problematic notion of “the governments are often content to deal with native point of view" as a singular category.7 undemocratic regimes as long as they are Given that “native societies" of Pacific island stable, secure, and don’t present a threat to states are often highly pluralistic, it seems broader regional security. Tonga and Samoa obvious that there are multiple ways of are hardly models of liberal democracy but, being “a native" and therefore seeing as “a as we have seen, they have not been native". The insider–outsider dichotomy has subject to “neo-colonial intervention" beyond any number of further ramifications, at both occasional critical remarks during times of regional and national levels. With respect to political unrest. the latter, Malama Meleisea has argued that the objectification of Samoan-ness through Postcolonial Critiques fa’a Samoa is a common defence against of Neo-colonialism: “outsiders" (Meleisia, 2005: 86). Much the same can be said about the Tongan and Missing the Mark? Fijian variants while the Pacific Way pro- vides a broader defence against what Borof- Pacific islanders involved in coups or other sky describes as “Outlanders" (non-Pacific distinctly undemocratic practice are not the Islanders). He further suggests that oppos- only ones to accuse Australia and New ing Outlanders offers a ready way to mobilize Zealand of neo-colonial propensities. A num- Islanders — silencing the differences within ber of academics and other commentators, and becoming a call to action against “oth- located in a variety of metropolitan settings, ers"8 (Borofsky, 2000: 13). None of these have weighed in with more serious and considerations enter into Fry’s analysis. penetrating criticisms. Of these, Greg Fry’s Another critique of Australian approaches essay on “Framing the Islands" represents to the Pacific islands offered by journalist a thoroughgoing attack on certain Austra- and writer Nic Maclellan concerns the period lian neo-colonial attitudes and practices in after “9/11", the Bali bombing and the war Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
in Iraq, when issues of transnational crime, the election of an Australian as head of the immigration policy and national security, regional Pacific Forum (sic), despite indig- 11 have been accompanied by rhetoric about a enous opposition”. (Chappell, 2005: 316).11 regional “arc of insecurity" and failed or failing While not denying that large countries are states in Australia’s Pacific neighbourhood. very often overbearing vis-à-vis smaller, As a consequence, he, says, less attention weaker, aid-dependent countries, such anal- has been paid to pressing concerns in the yses lack nuance. The Solomons interven- more mundane field of human security and tion was invited, not forced, and consisted development for ordinary Pacific islanders in not simply of Australian personnel but con- their everyday lives. He offers a particularly tingents from Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New stringent critique at the “Pacific solution" Guinea and Tonga (Shibuya, 2006). The devised by the Howard government for Australian who headed the Forum from 2005 detaining asylum seekers from the Middle until his death in August 2008 was strongly East and elsewhere in Pacific island locations supported by a number of Pacific island rather than having them interred on Australia leaders, and was awarded posthumously the territory (Maclellan, 2003: 1). This “solution" Cross of Solomon Islands for his “outstand- resonates uncomfortably with the US practice ing contribution" to the Regional Assistance of detaining suspected “illegal combatants" Mission there (Pacific Islands Forum Secre- offshore in Guantanamo Bay and has been tariat, 2008). widely — and rightly — condemned by A fourth critique also takes explicit aim human rights groups. This particular critique, at neo-liberal/neo-colonial elements of however, does not point out that Pacific Australian intervention, suggesting that the islands have themselves cooperated in Australian state and investment groups this “solution". Once again, Pacific Islander have clear imperial ambitions in the region. leaders are depicted as having no agency, Noting the link between aid and good no role to play in such policies. Yet it is governance, it is further suggested that the President of Nauru, home to one of the good governance agenda promoted by the Howard government’s detention centres, Australia faces “immediate confrontation that sought very proactively to be considered with the post-colonial aspiration of “self- for a new regional processing centre for governance", only recently attained in all refugees under the Gillard Government’s the island states”. (Anderson, 2007: 13–14). plan, and was looking to sign up to the The paper also notes that the demand for UN’s convention on refugees to enhance open markets has been accompanied by its chances (see
Said’s original condemnation of “Orientalism", tions, media and the like in their dealings 12 such critiques are too often unidimensional. with the islands. As mentioned earlier, while Said constructed Orientalism as a critique of much postcolonial analysis presents as a European colonial and other practices that counter-hegemonic discourse — and often was highly selective and which ignored other shrouds itself in an aura of moral superior- aspects of European social and political ity in the process — it rarely subjects the thought that did not always frame “others" hegemonic practices of indigenous elites to in the terms he described.12 Nor did his anything but superficial scrutiny. work investigate complexities introduced by considerations of class or gender. Conclusion The limited scope of Said’s analysis therefore left him open to a range of criti- cism, including the extent to which his work From the time of its original articulation, the was infused with an implicit Occidentalism Pacific Way idea has undergone some inter- — a way of representing Europe or “the esting transformations. Initially conceived in West" in terms at least as simplistic and terms of the orderly political transitions expe- essentializing as his construction of Orien- rienced by Fiji and its immediate neighbours talism. It also tended to depict native people in the Southwest Pacific in the process of as passive victims of imperial depredations. decolonization, and at that stage lacking any In a subsequent work, Said stated that he hint of critique with respect to the colonial had not meant to suggest such passivity and experience itself, the Pacific Way idea none- acknowledged that there had always been theless evolved into a regionalist discourse elements of resistance (see Said, 1993). with strong postcolonial resonances. In the Even so, his observations on the dynamics course of this transformation, the colonial of colonial relations did not go beyond cat- past and many of its legacies came to be egories of domination and resistance — a treated much more negatively and critically. binary that has over-simplified a much more More importantly, however, perceptions of a complex field of interaction which included neo-colonial present have become dominant not only opposition but collaboration and themes in Pacific Way discourses, especially cooperation in the colonial project as well. in the context of “good governance" agendas Furthermore, the latter strategies are hardly promoted by a variety of actors including absent from the contemporary sphere of Australia and New Zealand. postcolonial politics where islander agency The alignment of these agendas solely at all levels is alive and well. To suggest oth- with an instrumental neo-colonialism, how- erwise is indeed to belittle the dynamism of ever, is unsustainable. Among other things, it politics and society in the Pacific islands. suggests that Pacific islanders do not value To summarize this section, there is little good governance and that corruption, non- doubt that aspects of the foreign policy accountability and non-democratic forms of behaviour of Australia and New Zealand can politics are acceptable to significant sec- be cast in neo-colonialist terms, especially tors of the population. Having said that, it is since both are important aid providers and certainly the case that other aspects of the both have used aid conditionality in the good governance agenda concerned with broad context of democracy promotion and the promotion of neo-liberalism, including “good governance" more generally. How- deregulation and the hollowing out of state ever, consideration of other factors surround- capacity are matters of genuine concern ing democracy promotion and the quest (and are by no means defended here). There for domestic security by groups within the is therefore a need to adopt a more nuanced islands, as well as those outside, reveals a approach to critiques addressing the broad more complex story.13 These complexities idea of good governance and what it means are missed in postcolonial analyses which in the contemporary Pacific. too often seek only to critique the behaviour On the more specific question of democ- of outside powers, aid agencies, corpora- racy promotion, it is certainly the case that Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
liberal/Western forms of democracy do the society. Keeping the ordinary folk involve competitive elections and are there- in the dark and calling them ignorant 13 fore adversarial in character. Further, to the made it easier to control and subordi- extent that the Pacific Way embraces “con- nate them (Hau’ofa, 1999: 28). sensus” as a core value, aspects of democ- racy do indeed appear to clash with this This is the kind of critique that is able to particular value. But it would be a mistake to go beyond at least some of the familiar but say that the value of consensus is absent in often misleading binaries found in so much democratic systems. It is actually essential in postcolonial analysis: Western/non-Western, supporting the legitimacy of those institutions oppressors/oppressed, bad guy/good guy, which provide not merely for elections but and so on. Maintaining these dichotomies also for changes of government by constitu- do not serve the cause of serious critical tional means. The idea of “consensus” as a political, social or historical studies. If criti- core elements of the Pacific Way or any of cal scholarship is to do its job in addressing the “national” ways mentioned here is, in any the general problem of hegemony in human case, scarcely unproblematic. In terms of relations, and the variety of forms that domi- local politics, it has been closely associated nation and subordination take, then it must with conservative chiefly leadership where look to exposing hegemonic practices wher- “consensus” may mean little more than con- ever and whenever they occur rather than formity with the wishes of that leadership. confining such investigations to a single set This has in any case been extraordinarily of relations posited in a simplistic opposi- difficult to achieve at national leve (Hender- tional format that limits the scope of genuine son, 2003: 229). Furthermore, if consensus critical analysis. has hitherto characterized relations between Pacific island nations in regional fora, then it author notes is because contentious political issues have usually been avoided, at least until recently.14 Critiques of Australian/New Zealand neo- Stephanie Lawson is Professor of Politics colonialist policy and practice in the Pacific and International Relations at Macquarie Uni- islands also tend assiduously to avoid nega- versity. She has previously held teaching and tive assessments of indigenous actors. One research positions at the University of New exception is the kind of regionalist discourse England, The Australian National University, promoted by Epeli Hau’ofa in his notion of the University of East Anglia and the Univer- Oceania as a “sea of islands”. In this there sity of Birmingham. Her research focuses on is no shortage of criticism of former colonial issues concerning culture, ethnicity, national- powers and “the belittling views of indige- ism, and democracy, and combines compar- nous cultures” purveyed by Europeans from ative and normative approaches to the study the earliest years of interaction, and which of world politics. She is the author of many continues to this day. But as Hau’ofa goes articles dealing with these issues in the Asia- on to point out, Pacific region as well as globally. Her books Europeans did not invent belittlement. include Culture and Context in World Poli- In many societies it was part and tics (Palgrave 2006), International Relations parcel of indigenous cultures. In the (Polity Press, 2003), Europe and the Asia- aristocratic societies of Polynesia par- Pacific: Culture, Identity and Representations allel relationships of dominance and of Region (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); The subordination with their paraphernalia New Agenda in International Relations: From of appropriate attitudes and behavior Polarization to Globalization in World Poli- were the order of the day. In Tonga, tics? (Polity Press, 2001); Tradition Versus the term for commoners is me’a vale, Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga “the ignorant ones”, which is a survival and Western Samoa (Cambridge University from an era when the aristocracy con- Press 1996), and The Failure of Democratic trolled all the important knowledge in Politics in Fiji (Clarendon Press, 1991). Postcolonialism, Neo-Colonialism and the “Pacific Way"
Endnotes Contending Visions of Community in 14 Pacific Region-Building, Working Paper 2004/3, Canberra: The Australian National 1. This an abridged version of a paper University, 2004, p.5. originally prepared for presentation at the 18th Biennial Conference of the 7. For a pertinent discussion of the politics Pacific History Association (PHA); 8–12 of “the native point of view” see Teaiwa, December 2008, Suva, Fiji. Some of the 2005, pp.15–36. more historical aspects of this longer paper have been reworked in a different 8. For a pertinent discussion of the reactive article forthcoming in the Journal of objectification of culture in different Pacific History (December 2010), “ ‘The historical contexts, including processes of Pacific Way’ as Postcolonial Discourse: oppositional reification and inversion, see Towards a Reassessment”. The present also Thomas (1992). version was prepared for presentation 9. Had the Liberal–National Coalition under to the State, Society and Governance Tony Abbott won government, the “Nauru in Melanesia Program (SSGM), The Solution” would have gone ahead. Australian National University, 4 February 2010. I’m grateful to the audiences at both 10. The title refers to an earlier article (Reilly, the PHA conference (including the late 2000) in which recent troublespots in the Ron Crocombe) and the SSGM seminar region are highlighted and compared participants for their helpful comments directly with the poor performance of sub- and insights. Thanks also to Karin von Saharan African countries across a range Strokirch and the anonymous readers for of political, economic and social indicators. the SSGM Working Paper series for very 11.The appointment of an Australian as helpful feedback on the topic. Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands 2. This form of regional identity is dealt with Forum is also criticized in Fry, Whose in another paper (see Lawson, 2010b). Oceania, 2004, p.11 where it is stated that the appointment flew in the face of efforts 3. The material in these sections is a brief by a generation of Pacific islanders to summary of the more extensive treatment decolonize South Pacific regionalism. of these issues in the forthcoming article in Lawson (2010a, forthcoming). 12. For specific illustrations of this point see Lawson (2006b) and Porter (1994 4. For a broad overview, see Carothers esp. p.159). (2004). Democracy promotion has also formed an important part of the EU’s 13.One careful study of the Solomon’s foreign policy strategy, coming under the intervention is critical of both Australian terms of its “normative power” mission. For policy and its motivations on the one a recent commentary, see Sjursen (2006). hand, as well as that of local actors, and therefore provides a well-balanced and 5. The reform roadmap is set out on the ultimately more useful critical study. See government website
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2004/1: Phillip Gibbs, Nicole Haley and Abby McLeod, Politicking and Voting in the Highlands: The 2002 Papua New Guinea National Elections 2004/2: David Hegarty, Ron May, Anthony Regan, Sinclair Dinnen, Hank Nelson and Ron Duncan, Rebuilding State and Nation in Solomon Islands: Policy Options for the Regional Assistance Mission 2004/3: Michael Goddard, Women in Papua New Guinea’s Village Courts 2004/4: Sarah Garap, Kup Women for Peace: Women Taking Action to Build Peace and Influence Community Decision-Making 2004/5: Sinclair Dinnen, Lending a Fist? Australia’s New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacific 2004/6: Colin Filer, Horses for Courses: Special Purpose Authorities and Local-Level Governance in Papua New Guinea 2004/7: Robert Muggah, Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 2004/8: Sinclair Dinnen and Edwina Thompson, Gender and Small Arms Violence in Papua New Guinea 2005/1: Nic Maclellan, Conflict and Reconciliation in New Caledonia: Building the Mwâ Kâ 2005/2: Michael Morgan, Cultures of Dominance: Institutional and Cultural Influences on Parliamentary Politics in Melanesia 2005/3: Hank Nelson, Fighting for her Gates and Waterways: Changing Perceptions of New Guinea in Australian Defence 2005/4: Allan Patience, The ECP and Australia’s Middle Power Ambitions 2005/5: Jerry Singirok, The Use of Illegal Guns: Security Implications for Papua New Guinea 2005/6: Jaap Timmer, Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua 2005/7: Donovan Storey, Urban Governance in Pacific Island Countries: Advancing an Overdue Agenda 2005/8: Jon Fraenkel, Political Consequences of Pacific Island Electoral Laws 2006/1: Hank Nelson, Governments, States and Labels 2007/1: Peter Larmour, Evaluating International Action Against Corruption in the Pacific Islands 2007/2: Brij V. Lal, “This Process of Political Readjustment’: Aftermath of the 2006 Fiji Coup 2007/3: Hank Nelson, The Chinese in Papua New Guinea 2007/4: Paul D’Arcy, China in the Pacific: Some Policy Considerations for Australia and New Zealand 2007/5: Geoffrey White, Indigenous Governance in Melanesia 2008/1: Brij V. Lal, One Hand Clapping: Reflections on the First Anniversary of Fiji’s December 2006 Coup 2008/2: Paulson Panapa and Jon Fraenkel, The Loneliness of the Pro-Government Backbencher and the Precariousness of Simple Majority Rule in Tuvalu 2008/3: Kate Higgins, Outside-In: A Volunteer’s Reflections on a Solomon Islands Community Development Program 2008/4: Sarah Kernot & Lai Sakita, The Role of Chiefs in Peacebuilding in Port Vila 2008/5: Debra McDougall, Religious Institutions as Alternative Structures in Post-Conflict Solomon Islands? Cases from Western Province 2008/6: Abby McLeod, Leadership Models in the Pacific 2008/7: Nicole Haley, Strengthening Civil Society to Build Demand for Better Governance in the Pacific. Literature Review and Analysis of Good Practice and Lessons Learned 2008/8: Richard Eves, Cultivating Christian Civil Society: Fundamentalist Christianity, Politics and Governance in Papua New Guinea 2008/9: Into A. Goudsmit, Nation Building in Papua New Guinea: A Local Alternative 2008/10: George Williams, Graham Leung, Anthony J. Regan and Jon Fraenkel: Courts and Coups in Fiji: The 2008 High Court Judgement in Qarase v Bainimarama 2008/11: Keith Joseph & Charles Browne Beu, Church and State in the Solomon Islands 2009/1: Elizabeth Reid, Interrogating a Statistic: HIV Prevalence Rates in PNG 2009/2: Michael Green, Fiji’s Short-lived Experiment in Executive Power-sharing, May-December 2006 2009/3: Peter Coventry, The Hidden Mechanics of Solomon Islands Budget Processes - Understanding Context to Inform Reforms 2009/4: Hank Nelson, Mobs and Masses: Defining the Dynamic Groups in Papua New Guinea 2009/5: Nick Bainton & John Cox: Parallel States, Parallel Economies: Legitamacy and Prosperity in Papua New Guinea 2009/6: Robert Norton, The Historical Trajectory of Fijian Power 2009/7: Alan Rumsey, War and Peace in Highland PNG: Some Recent Developments in the Nebilyer Valley, Western Highlands Province 2010/1: Asenati Liki, Women Leaders in Solomon Islands Public Service: A Personal and Scholarly Reflection 2010/2: Nic Maclellan, War and Peace in Highland PNG: Some Recent Developments in the Nebilyer Valley, Western Highlands Province 2010/2: Polly Weissner, Youths, Elders, and the Wages of War in Enga Province, Papua New Guinea
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