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BRAZIL, the UNITED STATES, and the MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (Unclassified)

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BRAZIL, the UNITED STATES, and the MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (Unclassified) LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CftUFORWA 93340 I NPS- 5 6-90-006 T$ NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND i THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME by SCOTT D. TOLLEFSON Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100 FEDDOCS D 208. 14/2 NPS-56-90-006 FeddtotA -WS^, (4 Cl NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA Rear Admiral Ralph W. West, Jr. Harrison Shull Provost Superintendent , This report was prepared in conjunction with research funded by the Naval Postgraduate School Research Council. Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. This report was edited by: inUlVlAS <^. BKUfNfcAU liUKDUIN SCHACHEK Chairman Dean of Faculty and Department of National Graduate Studies Security Affairs DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 . H ">£ K ir ^If^f^^ TTaST REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE \i REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS "NriASSTFTFR 2i security Classification authority 3 DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OP REPORT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Zb DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE UNLIMITED DISTRIBUTION 4 PERFORMING ORGANISATION REPORT NUM8£R(S) S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBEfl(S) NPS - 56 - 90 - 006 ' 6d NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 60 OFFICE SYMBOL 73 NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION (if tpphctble) Naval Postgraduate School 56 6< ADDRESS (Cry Sf3f* *nd HP Code) 7b ADDRESS (City. Sure. »nd HP Code) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL DEPT. OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MONTEREY^ CA 93943-5100 8a NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IOEN Tif iCATlON NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If ippliabit) Research Council O&MN, Direct Funding 3c AOORESSK<ry. Stite ind ZlPCode) io source of funding numbers PROGRAM PROJECT TAS< WORK JNIT NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL ELEMENT NO NO NO ACCESSION NO MONTEREY, CA 93943-5100 1 T.TlE (includt Security CUuifiation) BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (Unclassified) PERSONA L AuThOR(S) SCOTT D. T0LLEFS0N 3d 'YP£ OF REPORT ' 3D T'ME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Yen, Month Oiy) IS PAGE COoNT FINAL REPORT from JAN 89 toMAR 90 1990, MARCH 19 102 '6 Supplementary notation COSATi COOES IB SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverte if necemry *nd identity by block number) f EiO GROUP subgroup 9 ABSTRACT if identify .toy . (Continue on reverie necemry r nd block number) ,....„. .. ,. , ,, _ This technical report analyzes Brands development of ballistic missiles in light of U.S. pressures to stifle that development. The first section describes and critiques the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); the second analyzes the U.S. application of MTCR guidelines toward Brazil; the third assesses Brazil's ballistic missile capabilities; and the fourth considers Brazil's response. The report concludes that the U.S. policy of restricting space and missile technology to Brazil under the MTCR has succeeded in stalling Brazil's missile program, but has also (1) further strained Brazilian security relations with the United States; (2) weakened U.S. influence over Brazil's rocket and missile programs; (3) strengthened Brazilian ties with European suppliers (especially France) of space and missile technology; (4) driven Brazil into closer technological cooperation with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union; and (5) intensified Brazilian negotiations with Iraq and Libya. As Brazil moves away from the United States (its traditional supplier of space and missile technology), it is becoming relatively more autonomous and less vulnerable to U.S. restrictions on space and missile technology. The successful implementation of an internationalist development strategy by Brazil's new president, Fernando Collor de Mello, could provide the United States with an exceptional opportunity to improve relations with Brazil. The United States could possibly negotiate the easing of MTCR restrictions on space technology to Brazil without jeopardizing the goal of ballistic missile non-proliferation. ;0 D S'R'3UTiON/ AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION fiB^MCLASSlFlEOAjNL'MITED SAME AS RPT Q OTlC USERS 22i SiAME OF RESPONSIBLE iNDiViOUAL ZZb TELEPHONE (include Are*Code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL SCOTT D. T0LLEFS0N (408) 646-2521 Code NS To ODFORM 1473. 84 mar 83 APR edition w»y be used until e«hausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF thiS PAGE All other editions *'t obsolete UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i ACKNOWLEDGMENT ii INTRODUCTION 1 I. THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 4 A. The Implementation of the MTCR 5 B. General Critique of the MTCR 7 II. U.S. POLICY 12 A. Bureaucratic Politics: Competing Views 12 B. U.S. Concerns 15 1. Brazil's nuclear program 15 2. Brazil's policy and pattern of arms exports 17 3. Brazil's potential threat to regional (Latin American) security 18 4. Brazil's potential threat to U.S. security 19 5. Brazil as U.S. competitor 19 III. BRAZIL'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM 21 A. Rationale 21 B. Space Program as Precursor 2 6 1. Origins 28 2. Role of the United States 29 3. Civilian-Military Role Conflict ... 32 4. Sonda Program 3 6 C. Current Missile Capabilities 39 1. Military applications of Brazil's space program 3 9 2. Current ballistic missile projects . 42 D. Problems Facing Brazil's Missile Program .... 49 1. Technological Constraints 49 2. U.S. Restrictions 51 3. Inadequate funding 54 IV. BRAZIL'S RESPONSE: SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS .... 58 A. MTCR Signatories 62 1. France 62 2. The Federal Republic of Germany ... 67 3. United Kingdom 68 4. Canada 68 B. MTCR Non-Signatories 69 1. People's Republic of China 69 2. Soviet Union 76 3. Iraq 83 4. Libya 88 C. Others 89 FINAL CONCLUSION 92 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) TABLES Table 1: Sonda Rockets 3 7 Table 2: Shares of Major Suppliers in Brazil's Imports of Major Conventional Weapons, 1951-1985 64 i APPENDIX Missile Technology Control Regime: Statement by the Assistant to the President for Press Relations, April 16, 1987 97 Missile Technology Control Regime: Fact Sheet to Accompany Public Announcement 98 Summary of the Equipment and Technology Annex . .100 List of Acronyms 101 BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES. AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME NPS-56-90-006 by SCOTT D. TOLLEFSON March 1990 ABSTRACT This technical report analyzes Brazil's development of ballistic missiles in light of U.S. pressures to stifle that development. The first section describes and critiques the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) ; the second analyzes the U.S. application of MTCR guidelines toward Brazil; the third assesses Brazil's ballistic missile capabilities; and the fourth considers Brazil's response. The report concludes that the U.S. policy of restricting space and missile technology to Brazil under the MTCR has succeeded in stalling Brazil's missile program, but has also (1) further strained Brazilian security relations with the United States; (2) weakened U.S. influence over Brazil's rocket and missile programs; (3) strengthened Brazilian ties with European suppliers (especially France) of space and missile technology; (4) driven Brazil into closer technological cooperation with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union; and (5) intensified Brazilian negotiations with Iraq and Libya. As Brazil moves away from the United States (its traditional supplier of space and missile technology) , it is becoming relatively more autonomous and less vulnerable to U.S. restrictions on space and missile technology. The successful implementation of an internationalist development strategy by Brazil's new president, Fernando Collor de Mello, could provide the United States with an exceptional opportunity to improve security and trade relations with Brazil. The United States could possibly negotiate the easing of MTCR restrictions on space technology to Brazil without jeopardizing the goal of ballistic missile non-proliferation. , ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author wishes to acknowledge the support received from t the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation Research Program and to thank the following for their comments on earlier drafts of the report: Professor Thomas C. Bruneau (Naval Postgraduate School) Professor Renato Dagnino (Universidade de Campinas) , Professor Edward J. Laurance (NPS) , Fabrice Edouard Lehoucg (Duke University) , First Lieutenant Julio Eduardo da Silva Menezes (Brazilian Air Force) ; Lieutenant Thomas A. Murphy (USN) , and Lieutenant Colonel David A. Pagni (USA, Defense Intelligence Agency) The views expressed in this report are entirely those of the author, and should not be interpreted as representing the views of the individuals named above, or the official views of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the Naval Postgraduate School, or any other government agency. 11 INTRODUCTION This report is a case study of Brazilian-U.S. relations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) . It analyzes Brazil's development of ballistic missiles in light of U.S. pressures to stifle that development. 1 Brazil, a leading Third World exporter of arms, has launched a series of sounding rockets and is now developing a ballistic missile that eventually could be topped with nuclear warheads. It has succeeded in enriching uranium, and may have the capacity to build nuclear weapons by 1 A ballistic missile is defined as a "self-propelled weapon- delivery system that is guided during a portion of its ascent, then follows a ballistic (unpowered and unguided) trajectory over the remainder of its flight path."
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