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BURUNDI | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation Burundi | No 3 | June to July 2007 BURUNDI | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation Burundi is facing a major political crisis (see graph). President Pierre Nkurunziza’s government has been paralyzed by divisions within the CNDD-FDD and boycotts from opposition parties. In the wake of Hussein Radjabu’s dismissal in early February, the CNDD-FDD has not only lost hundreds of members inside the country and abroad but also its majority in parliament. This has a far reaching implication for the functioning of the state. During the last five months, not more than 4 out of 34 legislative proposals by the government were adopted. Since the constitution prevents the president from dissolving the parliament, the CNDD-FDD would have to seek the support of FRODEBU and UPRONA in order to reach the required quorum and to move things forward. However, the opposition seems to be unwilling to collaborate with the weakened ruling party. Instead, it is insisting on additional ministerial posts while accusing the government of undermining the Arusha Accords and the constitution as well as violating human rights and being involved in corruption. Relations with FRODEBU have deteriorated significantly, leading to allegations of a planned removal of the head of state. In response, FRODEBU spokesperson Pancras Cimpaye stated on 3 June that his party does not intend to overthrow a government, which has already overthrown itself. At the same time FRODEBU reportedly called for Nkurunziza’s resignation, sought an impeachment and joined the boycott of Radjabu supporters and CNDD-Nyangoma of the new parliamentary session, which opened on 4 June. On 12 June, the Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale (OAG) expressed its concern over the on-going dispute between the CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU, warning that it is likely to stir up renewed unrest in the country. In a move to break the deadlock within the National Assembly, the government on 21 June replaced seven provincial governors with other members of the CNDD-FDD. On 26 June, following the government’s approval to create a commission to investigate the ‘illegal sale’ of the Falcon 50, FRODEBU announced that it would resume its participation in the National Assembly. Cooperative and Conflictive Domestic Political Events (relative) A further setback for the government came with the long-awaited reshuffle of the cabinet. On 27 June, Nkurunziza advised the three main political parties, CNDD-FDD, FRODEBU and UPRONA, to submit the names of candidates to be appointed as ministers within 24 hours. A half an hour consultation on this issue held the night before between the head of state and the presidents of the opposition parties was apparently of little importance. On 29 June, FRODEBU requested a 24 hour extension of the deadline for forwarding suggestions for ministerial positions; several days later, it said that its members could not be rushed to join the government while their concerns relating to the massacre of Muyinga, negotiations with the FNL, embezzlement, and violations to the constitution were not addressed. Ultimately, FRODEBU announced that it would not take part in the up-coming government, as Source: FAST event data did UPRONA, whose demands for a fourth ministerial post had not been accepted. According to unconfirmed reports, Nkurunziza contemplated imposing a state of emergency in early July. Instead he unveiled his new team of ministers, which include Karenga Ramadhani, former Minister of Communication whose reputation has been tainted by the Falcon 50 affair and Immaculée Nahayo, former President of the National Assembly who was removed from office in March for ‘reasons of incompetence.’ Both are said to be associates of Radjabu. Nkurunziza also appointed Philip Njoni and Yves Sahinguvu, both of who are close to Pierre Buyoya. This has been considered a victory for those UPRONA members who want to reunify the party against the will of its president, Aloys Rubuka and others. The new cabinet has been unanimously rejected by the opposition including UPRONA, FRODEBU, and the CNDD-Nyangoma and Radjabu factions; on 16 July its inauguration was boycotted by 40 opposition and 17 CNDD-FDD party legislators, who say that the reshuffle was not sufficient to overcome the institutional crisis that followed the removal of Radjabu. FRODEBU and CNDD-Nyangoma – the latter’s leader had just returned from exile – said they would only participate in the National Assembly if none of the newly elected members of government show up in parliament. Internal disagreements about these latest developments also worsened existing splits in the parties. On 15 June, Senator Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was suspended by FRODEBU for having participated in a parliamentary session while his party staged a walk-out. The rupture seemed to be irreversible after Ntibantunganya attended the inauguration of the new cabinet on 16 July. Likewise, on 19 July UPRONA announced the exclusion of Vice-President Martin Nduwimana, who had signed a decree naming the new members of the cabinet but not those mandated by his party. Radjabu appeared in court on 29 June amid rumors of his imminent assassination. Radjabu’s lawyer expressed concern on 22 July over Radjabu’s security since the door to his client’s cell had been smashed and cannot be closed. Nonetheless, Radjabu allegedly continues to coordinate the activities of his supporters and some consider his release to FAST Update | Burundi | No 3 | June to July 2007 be essential for internal reconciliation of the CNDD-FDD. Meanwhile, Nkurunziza has to fear that once set free, Radjabu will again take control over the ruling party and will be eager for revenge after his humiliation. One month after Nkurunziza and FNL leader Agathon Rwasa’s promising meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, Burundi fears a renewed outbreak of hostilities. Between 21 to 24 July all 28 representatives of the FNL delegation participating in the Mécanisme Conjoint de Vérification et de Suivi (MCVS) including military chief Jean Berchmans Ndayishimiye fled Bujumbura and went back in the bush with some rifles stolen from South African peacekeepers. They question the goodwill of the government as well as the impartiality of the South African mediation. While Pasteur Habimana, spokesperson of FNL, said that his party will not resume the armed struggle, Godefroid Niyombare, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Burundi National Defence Force, is convinced of the opposite. Following warnings, important movements of army troops were reported in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza since 20 July. Again on 23 July, after his return from a visit to Equatorial Guinea, Nkurunziza met with the high command of the military and police. On 27 July, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon voiced deep concern over the situation and called on the FNL to resume its participation in the MCVS. On 27 July, the army accused the FNL of killing 4 civilians in Masama village, Bujumbura rural. The period under review registered several reports of FNL combatants being involved in recruiting. Security has also been impaired by widespread armed banditry (mostly spread by ‘unidentified armed men’), sexual violence and struggles over land property, quite often resulting in murder. Armed groups have been involved in training activities and on 12 July, a mass grave was discovered in the commune of Muhuta. Nkurunziza’s government has been criticized for its failure to implement effective mechanisms of disarmament of the population. As a consequence, large numbers of light weapons are still widely in circulation. On 15 August, the Burundian army announced a series of measures to address insecurity, which has again been increasing lately. Further incidents of violence during the period under review involved security forces: the most prominent being the shooting of a Russian diplomat on 23 June at a checkpoint south of Bujumbura. In spite of enormous internal security challenges, the Burundian government is determined to convey troops and military equipment to Somalia to boost the peacekeeping mission of the African Union. In support of this commitment, French Ambassador to Burundi Joël Louvet signed an exceptional aid allocation of 500,000 Euros on 14 July. The brewing political crisis has been paralyzing the whole country. Workers in the public sector are still waiting for the adoption of a law guaranteeing them the 34 percent pay raise as promised by Nkurunziza in early May. For that reason, the employees of the ministry of justice (with the exception of judges) have started to strike on 4 June. Moreover, Burundi risks loosing a USD $40 million grant from the World Bank because the National Assembly has so far failed to decide on how to use this money. After the expiry of the initial deadline on 31 July, the World Bank extended the ratification of the grant until 21 August. In regards to Burundi’s recent integration into the East African community, there is a urgent need for tax reform. The regional block (including Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) forms a customs union, which will result in a USD $30 million reduction in Burundi’s national budget. To make things worse, the country expects a two-thirds decrease in coffee production for 2007. The cultivation of Burundi’s main cash crop suffers from price drops, bad weather conditions and the low morale of producers. During his visit to Burundi, Tanzanian President Jiyaya Kikwete obviously concerned about his neighbor’s problems in the agricultural sector, allowed the sugar company SOSUMO to extend its plantations on Tanzanian territory. On the other hand, on 16 June Tanzania announced the closure of Burundian refugee camps sheltering around 150,000 people at the end of the year. If implemented, this policy will substantially aggravate Burundi’s existing social and economic problems. Large parts of the population are dependent on relief efforts by national and international organizations, mainly for food aid and medical assistance.
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