CEU eTD Collection Second Reader: Professor JacekKochanowicz Professor Reader: Second Rieber J. Alfred Professor Supervisor: Explaining Actions, andFall the Motives German Social of Democracy intheFirst In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of A STRUGGLE FOREXISTENCE A STRUGGLE Central Central University European Czechoslovak Republic ClaudiaWhiteus Breit History Department Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Master of Arts Submitted to Submitted 2010 By CEU eTD Collection written permission of the Author. copies made inaccordance withsuchinstructions maynotbemade withoutthe from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further by theAuthor and lodgedin theCentral European Library. Detailsmay beobtained either in full or in part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, CEU eTD Collection Germany. propaganda, and party protocols,mostly found atthe Collegium Carolinum in Munich, selection of primary sources in the form of party newsletters and newspapers, memoirs, By 1938, the DSAP was the only remaining democratic party. leadershipparty which,led combined, to party’sthe rapid downfall in favor of SdP. the factors, factors outside the party’s control, and internal factors, mistakes or failures of the explore arange of maintain itsexternal I failed to popularity. nineteen-twenties, the study aims to understand why the DSAP, as the most popular German party throughout led German Party (SdP) backed Sudeten by National SocialistWorker’s Party (DSNAP) and, upon its creation in 1933, the Nazi- Sudeten-German the first of politics nationalist radical the oppose to thirties, in the and, Agreementin 1938. Iexplore party’sthe struggle find to avoice in multinational the State 1918 until annexation the of Sudetenlandthe Nazi to Germany Munichthe through Worker’s Party (DSAP) during the First Czechoslovak Republic,from it’s foundation in Abstract: For this study, Ihave used a variety of secondary sources, mainly German, and a This work examines the twenty year lifespan of the German Social Democratic Turnverband i leader Konrad Henlein. My CEU eTD Collection piece. Due thanks also go to Robin Bellers for his help in the editing process. I wouldlike to thank Professor Alfred Rieberfor helping me develop andexpand this Acknowledgements ii CEU eTD Collection ok ie ...... 87 Works Cited Appendix: Pictures and Figures...... 80 ...... 77 CONCLUSION V: 1938: Towards the End...... 61 Opposition, and Consequences...... 51 the SdP:Jungaktivismus, to Response IV: 1935-1938:DSAPin ...... 35 Sudeten Politics of Character the Changing to 1929-35:TheDSAPin Response III: II. 1918- 29: ...... 18 The Foundationsof the DSAP’s Downfall: ...... 8 I. THEORETICAL APPROACH ...... 1 INTRODUCTION Contents of Table .2Mnc n h SPsDms ...... 69 ...... 5. 2Munichandthe DSAP’s Demise 62 ...... 5. 1The CommunalElections of1938 41 3.2 1929-1935: TheDSAP and FailedActivist Policies...... 35 Decline oftheDSAP, andtheRise ofRadical Nationalism...... 3. 1TheEffect ofExternal Forces onthe Sudeten PoliticalSentiment, the 24 2.2 1918-1929: TheDSAP’s DecadeofRelative Inaction...... 19 Progress of the DSAP andaSolution the Nationalities Question...... 2.2 Czechoslovak State and Its Constitution: TheExternalHindering ofthe 12 1.2 Minorities, Czechoslovakia, andthe League ofNations...... 8 ...... Austro-Marxism 1.1 GermanDemocracy Social inthepre-1918 Context: TheLegacy of iii CEU eTD Collection CEU eTD Collection German policies were arguably the most extreme. werearguablythe German policies scope of anti- collective the in Europe, most thorough of the consideredone collaborators especially vehement form. Not only were the postwar trial of war criminals and Nazi during the war. This was no different in Czechoslovakia, where the retribution took an in collaborators territoriesretribution whichNaziGermany hadagainst the occupied and the immediate confiscation of confiscation immediate andof their the property. “persons upon whom country the cannot place reliance” andmandated their expulsion as citizens Magyar German and thecountry’s identified Beneš Decrees,which the “fifth columnists." targeted collectively as traitors, Nazis, and, more generally, as Hitler’s opportunistic Agreement, all members of the country’s sizable and historic German minority were deliberately dismemberment the of provoking Czechoslovakia through 1938Munichthe 3 Czechoslovakia. ( Postwar 2 (Oxford: Bergham 2003),166.Books, purged its country itsof roughly million three Germans, whoeither byforce or coercion Germans INTRODUCTION 1 “The Beneš Decrees, Article 4a. in Article 4a. “The Beneš Decrees, Benjamin Frommer, Milena Jesenska, “There Will Be No the most important truths of our time, a truth that will shape the fate of Europe: the one German lasted, we have done nothing tosupport those people in the German camp who resistedfascism. In thosefive years not one of us-not even thelast few beenmonths-has able to recognize one of For thefiveyears thisatmosphere [of Nazi domination of German life in Czechoslovakia]has Germany’s surrender in Germany’s 1945 unleashedagigantic surrender terrorand backlash or Just months after Czechoslovakia’s liberation, this sentiment was manifested in manifested was sentiment this liberation, Czechoslovakia’s after months Just , Dr. Wilhelm K. Turnwald, ed. (Munich: University Press, 1953). Journalist Milena Jesenska for the magazine the for Jesenska Milena Journalist National Cleansing: Retributionagainst Nazi Collaborators in Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2. is notlike the other Documents on theExpulsionof theSudeten Anschluss 1 ” in 3 2 By 1948, the State had successfully Widely as for regarded responsible The Journalism of Milena Jesenska Milena The Journalismof . 1 3Ĝ ítomnost in May 1938 CEU eTD Collection Germans.” “Czechoslovak will use I Alternatively, of State. Czechoslovak the borders within the 6 soudobe dejiny, 7. 2008), Biographische Interviews mitdeutschen Antifaschisten. things German. things amongensued fostered many an Czechs against and uncompromising, hate collective all years of The in the year. that terror same the Conference Munich infamous success atthe him a tangible rationalization for his demands on Czechoslovakia in 1938, aidinghis Hitler’s Reich. radical nationalistin party which, 1938, demanded the Sudetenland’s incorporation into had abandoned their country and homes for Germany and Austria. 5 Vertreibungsgebiete 1939/50 in Vertreibungsverluste,” “Die deutschen relations intheCzech Provinces, 1948-1948 Zdenek Beneš, Vaclav Kurl, eds. Germans3,000,400 wereexpelled. million Germans were expelled, Accordinga to 1958 demographic in study Germany, inits publication The Czechgovernment sources. various nationality and political inclination. Three million is a rough compromise drawn from 4 the for voted Germans Sudeten of percent ninety deliberately by against discriminated government. Czech-dominated the By 1938, over hardest by economicthe depression, many complainedSudetens they beingwere Munich Agreement, and even during the war, can hardly be mitigated. Having been hit the job the andin market world. socio-cultural the also willingly chose to leave the country where their native tongue was now acurse on were, by 1946, gone from the Czechoslovak landscape. Some 1,700 German antifascists and Germans, wasdead inorganizations schools, newspapers, German Czechoslovakia; I will use term “Sudeten” or “Sudeten German” to refer to Germans native to the regions Germansnative tothe refer to “Sudeten to German” or Iwill “Sudeten” term use Barbora Cermakova and David Weber, eds., bysource, widely differed expelled of Theestimation of number Germans the The strength of the Nazi contingent among Czechoslovakia’s Germans before the before Germans Czechoslovakia’s among contingent Nazi the of strength The 6 Indoing Henleinists so,the with actively collaborated Hitler and gave . (Wiesbaden - Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1958) Facing History: TheEvolution Czech-Germanof Bevölkerungsbilanzen für diedeutschen für Bevölkerungsbilanzen 2 (Prague: Gallery 2002), 219. s.r.o, 5 Sie bieben derTschechoslowakei treu: Sudetendeutsche Partei (Czech Republic: Ustav pro Ustav (CzechRepublic: Facing History, 4 Germandom, like the (SdP), Henlein’s suggests 2.5 CEU eTD Collection Germans voted politically] voted Germans 8 country. the of population German the among see theirfight as one separate from that of the DSAP, whose voter base lay exclusively in State even after the rise of Henlein. Since the party was in Czech comrades of the their interest fighting with the in Czechoslovakia, interwarparty (DSAP) was perhaps the most significant. most perhaps the was (DSAP) government. were investedin pursuing progressive policies by collaborating in mainstreamthe Czech political which fundamentally a groups unionopposed with Germany politicsand whose often overshadowing slow the decline of previouslythe Sudeten dominant German between 1918and 1938,therapid and rise extraordinary success of radical Henleinism Czechoslovak These State. revealstudies fragmentation adeep within Sudeten politics those Sudeten Germans who actively opposed Hitlerism and the dismemberment of the Communist Czechoslovakia, only few historical studies, largely German, have focused on in sources in As accessing of a result constraints massthe Nazi-enthusiasts. of a collective by no means was country of the German population the will reveal that activities wartime Czechoslovakia’s Germans. However, a deeper examination of their prewar and their itself) of Communist Sudeten Germans remained members of the KP the of members remained Germans Sudeten Communist of itself) 7 since percentage of Germanvotes elections the of Sudeten 1919 highest of the country on the eve of Hitler’s rise topower, having consistently received the Democrats attempted to temper the considerable nationalist mood mood among country’s the nationalist considerable attempted totemper the Democrats Social German the itsand constitution, State the theexistence of supported fundamentally the elections of 1935. Historically referred to as an “activist” party, that is a party which in in policies Party its new fateful German victory Sudeten of Henlein’s radical, anti-state part of the government coalition, this group was fundamentally replaced in favor of the See Figure 1: “Wie die Sudetendeutschen politisch wählten.” [How Sudeten the [How wählten.” SeeFigurepolitisch “WiedieSudetendeutschen 1: Hundredsnumber (exactis unknown internationaldue tothe of party the character The historical resistance of one such group, the German Social Democratic Party Yet only a surface level analysis would focus exclusively on the guilt of 7 Given their status as the largest German party 3 not devoted to national interests, I ý , the communist the , 8 and, since 1929, CEU eTD Collection result of interviews and archival research were a series of publications (historical analysis (historical of publications were aseries interviewsresearch andarchival of result a project which aimed at the documentation of the fates of active Nazi-opponents. The suffered after the war. the after suffered they for humiliation the andapologized antifascists, German of the efforts the recognized 2005,August fifty years theend after of war,thethe government Czech officially century. In beginningtwenty-first of the spoken of hardly until recently, were quite to promote Czech-German cooperation before andduring war,these the politicians, until cultural campaigns. state-sponsored year,finally last finally general tothe become and by recognized presented public Czech of the Czech public through generous grants from the government, and has now, in the antifascists of the period for some sixty years, the topic has been brought to the attention scholarly, but also popular attention. After virtually ignoring the existence of German study of DSAP’sthe political decline andfailed resistance notonly due deserves disastrous consequences of the radicalization of the Sudeten German population, the the liberty of Czechoslovakia’s Germans, but also the safety of the entire State. Given the Sudeten politics. The direction in which these politics were heading threatened not only hopeGerman only party, the Nazismin seemed popular of combatting of sphere the defend understandingof country. to the national federative aState-centered politics insisted on cooperation with and for democraticfightingPrague in reform of terms Instead, by in they government Prague. treatment central the perceived discriminate its or plight, economic Sudeten’s the to solution the not was Hitler that insisting Germans, from the Museum “Vergessene Helden” in Ústí in Labem.nad Helden” Ústí from Museum“Vergessene the angewendeten Massnahmen gegen die sog, feindliche Bevoelkerung betroffen waren.” Gegenern, die nach dem des Ende WeltkriegesZweiten von inden der Tschechoslowakei 9 “Erklärung der Regierung der Tschechischen Republik gegenueber aktiven gegenueber aktiven “ErklärungNS- derRegierungRepublik derTschechischen Despite a considerable effort by the DSAP to oppose radical German fascism and fascism radical by German tooppose DSAP the effort aconsiderable Despite In what was truly a multinational State, the DSAP, as the formerly most popular 9 In accordance with this apology, the Czech government sponsored Czech government the this apology, with In accordance 4 CEU eTD Collection on the party’s later leader, Wenzel Jaksch. Bachstein’s concentration of of Jaksch, however, concentration leader, Bachstein’s later Wenzel Jaksch. on party’s the internal of specifically politics, concentrating account provides aheavily party researched Bachstein’s K. Martin party, or on Sudeten antifascism in general. itself is sparse and much of these studies are concentrated on a specific aspect of the Sudetenland, and interwar Czechoslovakia in general. Literature dealing with the DSAP well as a plethora of secondary sources which peripherally deal with the DSAP, the as andmemorandums, party newspapers members, selected party of interviews andactive war. the after population German of Czechoslovakia’s elimination the and Czechoslovakia, of dismemberment eventual the Agreement, Munich looming Sudeten nationalism,ideals the and represented bytheparty ultimately affectfailed to the historians What movement. nationalist party’s control and within it, andhowtheDSAP struggle attempted to against Sudeten the this decline, which I propose can be explained by a combination factorsof outside the I whichwill led factors in the analyze nationalism to radical nineteen-thirties. German the DSAPfrom foundationthe of Firstthe Republic in1918 itsthrough decline infavor of comprehensive narrative, a political biography of the party, which follows the fate of the thewar. andduring, after before, antifascists nad Labem called “Forgotten documentingHeroes” strugglethe andsuffering of German and interviews), a short film, and an exhibition in the former German city of Aussig/Ústí 10 (Munich, 1974). Martin K. Bachstein, The sources from which I base my study are largely rooted in political memoirs in political rooted largely are my study Ibase which from sources The The DSAP’s efforts have still not been extensively analyzed on a broad scale. Given the recent resurgence in the topic on the public sphere, I propose to write a have shown is that the DSAP’s allegiance to the State, its resistance to Wenzel JakschWenzel unddiesudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie Wenzel Jakschunddiesudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie. 5 10 CEU eTD Collection Columbia University 1989). Press, multinational State, Wingfield’s Nancy DSAP. the the follow specifically not of the German radical nationalists sheds light on crucial elements of my study, yet does emphasis on the failure of German Social Democracy considering the negativist policies 12 British appeasementpolicy and lack the of party’s the a clearly political exasperated program precarious designed handicap the movement even further. Political divisions, fragmentations within the party, to worked elements internal several that Ipropose chapter, following in the explore DSAP’s continued reign in German politics in the State. As the years progressed, as I Machergreifung and Hitler’s twenties the late of of crisis economic consequences the deal with their participation in the government coalition in 1929. The second research chapter will socialist and national party acting to deter it from early government involvement until State’s problematic constitution, and the DSAP’s lonely position as a simultaneously DSAP’s capacity for at popular support turn the of decade,the acombination of the Republic, Iwillin my argue research first chapter, were crucial in the debilitating range of participants and witnesses. works, focusing solely on the DSAP, dealing directly with first-hand accounts of a wide if primarily political andlacking firsthand accounts. My study bridges gapinthe these government, oftheDSAPin contextof Czechoslovakia’s the narrative structural detailed politics was written by J.W. Bruegel in primarily from Jaksch’s writing. the Perhaps strongest history of pre-Munich Sudeten obscures presenthis ability party’s the to evolution and struggle objectively, drawing 11 Nancy Merriwhether Wingfield, J. W. Bruegel, The structure of my study will largely follow alinear path. The early years of the in Germany in 1933, which served acted to weaken, if not cripple the Czechoslovakia beforeMunich:the German minority problem and 12 perhaps themost study most specific to the DSAP,the a provides . (Cambridge: Cambridge University 1973). Press, Minority Politics inaMultinational State. ( Czechoslovakia before Munich, before Czechoslovakia 6 Minority politics in a 11 whose particular New York, CEU eTD Collection pointed out in May 1938, that “the one German Munich Agreementin crucial the year of 1938. DSAP’s and, efforts ultimately,failure Henlein’s their tooppose later SdP andthe for successful activist,capacity antifascist its politics. In the finaldestroy to research chapter, I will explore the developments external further for easy it making position, 13 movement. Sudeten established democratic those members and supporters of the DSAP, were part of a determined and well- Germans, by October 1938, were not all part of the Hitler’s warmachine. Some, like Jesenska, 166. In this study I aim to show, as acclaimed Czech journalist Milena Jesenska rightly 7 is not like the other.” 13 Czechoslovakia’s CEU eTD Collection and national conflicts also within the Czechoslovak State. analysis of these two principles will elucidate the evolution of the enormous ideological newly created Czechoslovak State, and in postwar Europe in general. A brief,yet candid politics and their role in the State, one must also define the position of minorities in the formation and beliefs of the party. To understand the circumstances of both the party’s the didacticsthe of assuggestedbyLenin.a proletarian revolution, multinational by construction on working tempering class conflictsrather followingthan prewar period, the prewar proclaimed “Austro-Marxists” led by Bauer andOtto Karl Austro-MarxistsRenner. of the Empire by its collapse, had been framed most prominently by Austrian politicians, self- in context. ideology a historical of political conglomeration in Austria-Hungary before the war, is necessary to understand the DSAP’s complex Thus, a brief history of the evolution of the social democratic principle, as it had evolved internationalism, multicultural understanding, and economic equality within the State. protection and support of a specific ethnicity. “Social” implies theleft-wing politics of Party, officially founded in 1919. First, “German” implies an agenda based on the what a nationality-based social social democracy what anationality-based Czechoslovakia draws upon of two concepts. First, my study requires a clarification of THEORETICAL I. APPROACH 14 1.1 Vol. 11, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Conflict and Compromise), 134. Norbert Leser, “Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal,” ( German Social Democracy in the pre-1918 Context: The Legacy of Austro- of Legacy The Context: pre-1918 the in Democracy Marxism Social German The idea of social democracy, asit had developed in Austro-Hungarian the in German of Democratic Social name the appear the terms Several opposing My investigation into the role of the German Social Democrats in interwar only supranational party of the Empire, hoped to solve the empire’s is 8 and the prewar influences which dictated the dictated which influences prewar the and Journal ofContemporary History 14 While radically leftist radically While , CEU eTD Collection a sense of community a sense of people. community among of namelyproducing factor the factor,” for thesameeffective instruments both are nation] Bauer arguedin “common 1907 that descentand common culture [which defines the basis DSAP. becameideological the of the legacy how early the the Austro-Marxists of the historythe community-basedof solidarity, a“common destiny” has abilitythe unite to the particular the task of “translating internationalism into internationalism “translating thetask particular of the which, if mixed together, will be “to everyone’s advantage.” Bauer assigns the Austrians movement’s mouthpiece, movement’s unity workingthe of class,in Bauer, his editorial introduction to a1907edition the history and nationality. and history scholarly work” which dealtlargely with balancing Marxist ideas with the concept of were proximally,Otto to Bauerin according 1927 united by “particular the nature of their war. in years afterthe DSAP the the brought Austro-Marxists the that nationality, socialism, and democracy could exist side-by-side is what the legacy of 17 Pattrick (Oxford:trans. Goode, 45. Clarendon Press, 1978), “survive[d] over generations” andcan“still generations” topresent be“survive[d] over problems.” applied besides their diverse orientations to Marx, nature, and culture,” their various ideas historian Mark Blum argues, “the Austro-Marxists did not represent aschool of thought 16 (Lexington, KN: The University Kentucky,of Press 20-21. 1985), 18 Marxism. nationality and individuality when compared to the German Habsburg loyalists, Austro-Marxists of this period felt that 15 Otto Bauer, “Editorial Introduction to the First Issue of Otto Bauer, “What is Austro-Marxism,” in Otto Bauer, “The Concept of the ‘Nation,” in Mark E. Blum, Herein, as will become clear in the first chapter of my study, the reader will see Though leading Austro-Marxists differed slightly on several political ideas, they 53. Italics added. The Austro-Marxists, 1890-1918 16 While stressing the importance of a realistic approach to the Der Kampf, could coexistin the multinational Empire. While, as 18 contends that certain nations have certain qualities, certain have nations certain that contends Though Though commonalities in national providedescent 9 Austro-Marxism, Austro-Marxism. : A Psychobiographical Study Der Kampf,” living Tom Bottomore and reality.” 102-103. in 17 Austro- 15 The idea CEU eTD Collection prerequisite of social and political progress in Austria.” was the problem the nationalities “the of settlement that realized Party Democratic historian Arthur in Kogan his 1949 study on Habsburg Social Democracy, Social the with increasingly divergent nationalistinterests. By the late eighteen-eighties, writes party heterogeneous bynowa nationally centuries, and nineteenth late early twentieth the in system state. a multinational of socialist the character justify“international” to in bethe preserved must order identities with Bauer’s principle ofbalancing nationalism Marxism,and ethnic holding that principally agreed associate, close Bauer’s Renner, Karl lawsandpractices. sociopolitical dispensable formation. It provides the framework for providing a community based on enough unite to individualsthe in a cultural community.” canexist but latter the character, common its own. Common laws,” Bauer argues, “certainly are an important means of forming the laws can also produce a community. This community laws,of however, cannot stand on common community, can then andproduce culture) mean todescent common reference people based on laws, class, and ideology. If ethnicity (which I take from Bauer’s Monarchy,” 21 20 19 factions, were fully “ready to contribute to the search for a solution that would to contribute searchfor fully asolution “ready restore the that were to factions, party. nationally of diverse the cohesion of maintaining the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a political entity, as well as a certain federalizeddivided by general, state, on nationality, necessity the agreed and possibility comprehensive dialogue among the party’s multiethnic parties, who, while insisting on a Arthur Kogan, “Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg in the Nationalities of Conflict the and Democrats “Social Kogan, Arthur Blum, 26. Ibid.Italics 103. added. Bauer and Rennerpolitical ideas were roughly intotranslated party the policy of At party the congress in inleadersBrno 1899, socialvarious of democratic Journal of Modern History, Journal of 20 Vol. 1949).206. 21. No.3 (Sept., provided that 10 21 the other elements are effective are elements other the This realization led to a 19 Thus, the nation is nation the Thus, not a CEU eTD Collection Parliament. nationalities, on universal suffrage, the protection of minority rights, and onloyalty to the provide anew line, insisting party on transformation the a Austriaof into federation of languages versus partyGerman, the decided onfive major principles which would failing and serving to “split [the party] wide open along the lines of nationality.” “unquestionably stands condemned by history,” manifesto. In his article, Kogan concludes that Austrian socialism of the period nationally and,in empire divided my view, party the weakening with a less-than-clear State.” peace among thenations andfurther advancethe of andsocialpolitical democracy the of 26 25 24 23 22 language,” push “[recognitionthe of] anynational privilege,” rejecting “the demand for an official decision at all. The various national party leaders of the SDP agreed that they would Machtdiktat” national lamented DSAPparty,” founder Josef in Seliger 1920, “fell victim the to German social haddemocrats developedentirely two independent goals. “The supra- founding of the new Czechoslovak republic in 1918, the political status of the Czech and their occasional alliances with respective Czech and German nationalist groups. By the of the Empire’s destruction, the Czech and German Social Democrats drifted apart in were irrevocably interrupted by the political upheaval of the First World War. On the eve Chicago Press, 1961),Chicago 184. OszkarJaszi, Ibid, 215. Ibid, 110. Ibid, 210. Ibid, 207. 22 As the years progressed, the party’s fragile structure and weak national cohesion Finally, after a series of disputes concerning the official use of minority 24 23 in a sense avoiding the most crucial problem increasinglyplaguing The most important “decision” made in Brno, seemed to be the lack of a of the newly created Czechoslovak constitution,forcing the party to split The dissolutionoftheHabsburg Monarchy 11 25 unitedthe program eventuallyBrnoof (Chicago: University(Chicago: of 26 not CEU eTD Collection only only in concepts.” other relation to and reform. and 27 Nations of League the and Czechoslovakia, Minorities, 1.2 the AgeofNation-States and early twentieth century, it would be the added problem of the “minority” which empires, and Ottoman Romanov, Habsburg, the of breakup by the created states European central new various minority, at the end of the First World War, gained a new meaning with the emergence of they found themselves,leading to persecution and years of war. The definition of a minorities were those who did not conform to the dominant religion of the state in which religious centuries, eighteenth and seventeenth the In years. of hundreds for conflicts definition of a minority. The idea of a minority has been part of Europe’s various chapters, I will show how these two issues intertwine. issues I will two howthese show chapters, mutually rather but deeply exclusive, In on dependent one another. followingthe connection to the Austro-Marxists, who felt that socialism and ethnic issues were not jurisdiction and loyalty to the Czechoslovak political system indicates a deeply rooted party “multinational” by envisioned early the Austro-Marxists. both, position weakeningthe lost, of andespecially German of sector originally the the With the party essentially splitin two, the initial multinational character of the party was suddenly in adefensive position, highly totheterritorialtied base of Sudetenland.the Germanpredominant of party,the sector into nowformally DSAP,the organized 28 Sozialdemokrat, Josef “2.DSAP-Seliger, Parteitag in Karlsbad (3.-7.October 1920),” printed in Alain Fenet, “The Question of Minorities in the Order of Law,” in “A minority,” writes historian Alain Fenet, “cannot be defined on its own, but Where the idea of “nationality” had shaped the courseof history in nineteenththe As I will explain in the next chapter, the DSAP’s devotion to territorial 27 The Czech Social Democrats created their created previously TheCzechSocialparty, Democrats leaving the own April April 1940, 48. , Gerrard Chaliand, ed. (London: Pluto Press, 1989), 13. 28 Here, Fenet indicates the mercurial nature nature mercurial of the Fenetindicates the Here, 12 Minority Peoples in Der CEU eTD Collection 30 Company, 228. 2004), System andCentral Europe, (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10September (St. Germain-en-Laye, 1919) ( 31 17March 2010. Australia. of Commonwealth buildingbut project, rather annoying which obstacles majority the had to overcome. In nation- in the equals not were they group, majority the with co-citizens technically in country politics the nationalist of existencelead tothe andrise German would wouldnationality conflictbetween bethe German and citizenship which Czechoslovak sovereignty over such territory,” states in the region, were to duly assume the “nationality of the state exercising intoconflict. On the one hand, Czechoslovakia’s inhabitants, like those of other new followed the prescriptions of the Treaty of Saint Germain, whose terms frequently came minorities. respective their assimilate areality” to byattempting nation-state] “fiction the [of make the to country, attempted fragmented of a nationally fearing practical the dangers Each state, their national identities, which, in many cases, was Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, or Romania, they were nevertheless entitled to maintain language or religion.”language or interests of inhabitants of that state who differ from the majority of the population in race, official identity. On the other hand, the treaty demanded that the state “protect the ethnic different andlinguistic groups, by peppered several in which, multinational, Thesenewstates, reality, were Versailles. wouldlead toEurope’s nextbig tainting conflict, the hoperung in by Peace the of 29 “Section IV: Clauses Related to Nationality,Article 70,” Ibid. “TheCzecho-Slovak State,” Article 57. Miklos Lojko, ed. This confusion manifested itself on a profound level. Where these minorities were in 1920, implemented was draft final whose constitution, Czechoslovakia’s “ 29 Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Successor States Successor the in Nationalism and Ethnicity 31 So, while these inhabitants were to become citizens of (Aldershoot, HA (Aldershoot, and VT: Ashgate Burlington, Publishing 30 giving every occupant of these territories a new and all maintained that they were true nation-states. 13 Australian Treaty 1920: Series not their constitutional identity. It identity. constitutional their Treaty of Peace with Austria ” in The Versailles CEU eTD Collection years. hundred eight over for living been had they territories whose in State new the of nationals perceived by many German citizens to mean that they were simply guests, not equal co- state and the nation commensurate with each other in theory,” he argued, “itreduces heargued, in with other each theory,” and nation the commensurate state foreseen by the acclaimed British historian, Lord Acton as early as 1862. “By making the Czechoslovakia was built upas a for thefactthat save minority from German for the complaints scope little was Krejci “there PavelManchonin Jaroslav argue, and historians circumstances,” these minorities to participate in parliamentary elections as national political groups. “Under generous towards its minorities than required by the Treaty of Saint Germain by allowing yearsthe following independence, Czechoslovakia’s 1920 constitution was moreeven 1914-1918 (USA:Noble Printers,Offset 1969 (English version), Inc., From: Garrigue Masaryk, Thomas citizens.” Germans are second-class our colonists, 1927 book on self-perceptionthe of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia uponits founding. In his later corrected tempered,thisMasaryk,or which bold had impact statement, an enormous 34 All mineindicated. unlessotherwise translations 33 Social Change 32 “the State which country’s Germans as “colonists and immigrants” whose fate was to be determined by newly elected PresidentMasaryk,in his firstpresidential address, referred to the 1918, In the of government. were tolerated majority-dominated rulingbuton the terms considered as partners but only as minority, albeit afully respected one.” majority relations. The minority was notin a position to decide Ibid. 21. Glotz, Peter Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin, 34 Here, Krejci and Machonin make a crucial observation about postwar minority- The condition of the minorities in which these new states found themselves was The Making of aState Die Vertreibung (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), 14. Italics added. we [the Czecho-Slovaks] [the (Berlin:20. Ullstein Buchverlage, 2004), Italics added. , Masaryk maintains it “ does not mean that, as composite The Making ofThe Making aState:Memories andObservations, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory 1918-92: ALaboratory for Czechoslovakia, created.” 14 nation-state in which the Germans were not 33 This infamous statement was their position in the state, 432. 32 CEU eTD Collection 36 (orig. "Nationality," (orig. Verso,New York: 1996),36. 38 37 the LeagueofNations or institutions which were to ensure that their obligations were respected.” treaties,” argues League historian F. P.Walters, “had no made no provision for the organs “Minorities in failedapplication. practical and miserably their twenties early thirties boundary.” practically a subjectto condition all other nationalities which may be within the 35 EdvardBeneš. foreign minister includingleaders, Czechoslovakia’s theoretically 1922, the League had minority-majority officially taken issues in their own hands, minorities, comprehensive definition of “persons belonging toracial, religious, orlinguistic League had officially the abandoned “minority,”term substituting itwith a more postwar European structure atlarge. By 1922, as stated in the Murray Proposals, the period, showing that these issues were not just aconcern of the state, but also of the deal with minority issues, which seemed to threaten the relative calm of the postwar and define,classify, meticulously to working League began formed newly of Nations, the “policed”by system, Europe, of post-Versailles the newunder the states discrimination would be subject “the decision of the Permanent Court [of the League].” laws the of abide the state. In must the case of a breach of these laws,minorities the countrythe or minority in questionrights, minorities’ respect must majority the where that L.P Mair, Ibid. 404. Ibid. 65. Lord Acton, “Nationality” in Acton, Lord “Nationality” Yet despite League’s the Yet Given increasingtrouble causedthe my minority and perceived dissatisfaction 36 35 ” and proclaimed a dualistic structure of minority-majority relations, citing The Protection ofMinorities: TheWorking andScopeof the Minorities under limiting the free reign of majority politics, amove disputed by many state The HomeandForeign Review (London: Christophers, 1928),65-65. Mapping theNation, willingness 15 todeal with these issues, the resolutions of , 1862) Gopal Blakrishnan, ed. (London and (London ed. Blakrishnan, Gopal 37 Thus, by 38 Furthermore, CEU eTD Collection interference would be detrimental to these new countries as awhole. newto these countries be detrimental would interference assimilation in the affected countries, a Foreign Office official even suggesting that such of process wereslowing the minority League’s treaties leaders feltthe that Britain’s and borders, their national of were with stability the more concerned Mark Mazower, the minority issue, and rather in their own national affairs. The French, argues historian largest League’sseemed that the membersand werelessmost powerful with concerned inpurpose region,the no with consequential on effects minority issues. Central European minority issues. Their treaties seemed to have only a theoretical keep a balanced,supposed to traumatized limp Europe remained organ awhen itcame what exactly exactly what toprotect them.was beingdone “wrapped insilence and discretion,”making it forhard majority,the minority or know to either party,fearing an explosive reaction. As a result, League committee meetings were Leaguethe around tiptoed the majority minority and institutions, careful not to offend 41 Vol.No. 2, 126, Human Diversity 51-52.(Spring 1997), 40 39 World War Two years had disastrous consequences not only for the minorities consequences of an unsolved, orunheeded minority settlementin interwarthe and post and minorities,it seemed, were more or less left tofend for themselves. The disastrous trivial. made treatment its concernwithminority and to failure, Leaguewasenroute the bulwarks, will refuse tosettle down.” they Leagueof Nations before canbethe aired that theirgrievances imagine people these minorities,” he suggested in 1922, “to settle down under their present masters...So long as Ibid, 52. Daedalus, Europe,” in Nations and Leagueof Interwar “Minorities the MarkMazower, Ibid. 403. Where the League itself expressed aninterest in solving minority itproblems, To drive the final nail in the League’s coffin, Germanyleft Leaguethe in 1933, 41 With seeminglythe lackadaisical support of Europe’s two 16 39 Thus, the international organ which was 40 “Allow these CEU eTD Collection DSAP led to the party’s decline in favor of the radical nationalism of the SdP. the of orientation leftist liberal, the with combined issues, minority regarding policies security. In the course of this paper, Iwill show interwar Europe’s arguably failed for thesakeofinternational in minority intervene failurepolitics the Leagueto of the explosive situation, seemingly byideologicalunsolvable political or cooperation, proving intervention (by the League and the “appeasers” of France and Britain), were left with an majority in Bohemia had notreconciled national differences, and, outside without Sudeten German politics, as well as the Czech government’s attitude towards minorities. hostile neighbors. This atmosphere is crucial to understanding the radicalized state of themselves, but also for the “nation-states” which found themselves at the mercy of By the mid-thirties, both nationalities, the German minority and the Czech 17 CEU eTD Collection factors (that is factors not relating directly to party internal leaders) and party and decisions is notrelatingto directly (that factors factors external what and way, in apositive evolve to failed nineteen-twenties in the relations politics. State participation in the government, even after the DSAP’s decided shift activism, to orpro- initial failure tojoin government,which State the implicitly hindered later party problem. Another factor leading to the weakness of the party by 1929 is the DSAP’s confines,indefinitely hindering the development of solutiona State to nationalitiesthe advocated byGermanpro-State tocomeparties fruition to within government’s the democratically makingstable, andnationally itbalanced government, for difficult reforms Czechoslovakthe constitution of February1920, crippled the developmentof a strong, minority; the Germans. Ipropose that a series of decisions, especially those espoused in housed an extremely multinational population, and one particularly large andproblematic established the country as a nation-State, though its physical reality was a State which sentiment of its Germans. Its constitution and the policies which emanated from it and relative the of State political of the the affected strength this undoubtedly period inevitable and the consequent decline of formerlythe DSAPdominant cannot be judged as the (Stuttgart: Seliger-Gemeinde,(Stuttgart: 39. 1983), imKampfgegenHenlein undHitler Sozialdemokraten ausder Tschechoslowakei deutschen Dokumentation der dersudetendeutschenVerfolgung Sozialdemokraten: II. 1918- 29: The Foundations of the DSAP’s Downfall: 42 Problematic Position oftheDSAPinCzechoslovakia andProblems PartyFacing the “You must liveinyour house, evenif youdid not choose the house inwhich youlive.” Ernst Paul, “Man muss wohnen,” in Adolf Hasenöhrl,ed, In the following pages, I will discuss how the framework of Czech-German of framework the how discuss will I pages, following the In Though theenormous success of Henlein’s result of Czechoslovak State policy in the nineteen-twenties, political decisions Ernst Paul, former DSNAP Member, 1983 Member, DSNAP former Paul, Ernst 18 Sudetendeutsche Partei Sudetendeutsche Kampf, Widerstand,Kampf, in the thirties 42 CEU eTD Collection failed to award failedany to degree of political autonomy to German, national orother, groups, it nations, non-Czechoslovak of existence the ignore entirely not did assembly national along the lines of their historic, national desires. most Czech leaders towards the new State. It was newthe State. leaders towards Czech most Such a statement, while celebratory and jubilant in nature, reflects the general attitude of leading Czech politicians in an early manifesto atthe State’s declaration in 1918, October nation-state of Czechs and Slovaks. “Czechoslovakian people,”a as even or exclaimed population, a group of multinational a as than rather “Czechoslovaks” of nation singular Austrian State. cede to keeptheselands to historic refusing united, new Sudetenlandthe the to German- of Crown St. Wenceslas, newly the maintained unreserved Czechs rightempowered their with the help of Woodrow Wilson and Tomas G. Masaryk and perceived by its creators to be and an by itsto creators perceived 2.2 Czechoslovak State and Its Constitution: The External Hindering of the Progress the of Hindering Question External The Nationalities the Constitution: Solution Its a and and State DSAP the of Czechoslovak 2.2 twenties. in the DSAP the and State the between evolution a positive of in failure instrumental continued the within were of party) control the (factors the factors Gebrueder Stiepel Ges. m. b. H.,1923 Republik, derTschoslowakischen Verfassungsgesetze Manifest desNationalausschusses vom 28. Oktober 1918,” 43 44 Dr. Franz Soukup, Ant. Svehla, Georg Stribrny, Dr.Al. Rasin, Dr.Srobar, “(IV.) Ibid. The constitution February of 1920 reflected this attitude. While the revolutionary At its very foundation, the State’s people were, without reserve, addressed as a The largest crack in the foundation of the Republic was that it was conceived as you do as a free memberon, of themoment great familythis from do, of you free What states. people! states!...Czechoslovakian stepped into the ranks ofthe world’s sovereign, free State culture Czechoslovak the Today, realized. been has dream ancient your Einheitstaat ), 12. 19 , or a nation-state. As the heirs of the their Dr. Leo Epstein, ed.(Reichenberg: state which 44 Studien-Ausgabe der , and it was 43 they theirs had established to construct to CEU eTD Collection population. which upon State’sthe foundingin 1918, constituted about fifty percent of country’sthe 46 151. inderTschechoslowakei Nationalitäten Figure from: Alfred Bohman, Republik. Tschoslowakischen governmentin Prague. (“Artikel X, 3, as acommittee the to of representatives send acertain number regularly which would stipulated by the Treaty of St. Germain en Laye were awarded their own parliament and 45 the basis of the new State’s democratic security. Nevertheless, German exclusion was a assembly did not necessarily reflect an anti-German bias, but more of a decision made on neighboring Hungary. Communist a potential threatening, most exacerbating the right-wing oppositional agitation with dire results passions, for national theCzech Government,”intensified have only would constitution the with connection the time may have feared that “any discussion of the [German] autonomy in question in between Ludwig Czech’sprivatesecretary Czech leaders1930 andsuggests 1938, that of move. In tactical laws were seen, so historian Vaclav Kural, “as an undesired complication.” founding country’s the of development in the involvement minorities’ other or German, Tschoslowakischen Staat,1918-1938 Tschoslowakischen 47 48. American Slavic and East American SlavicandEast European Review in Czechoslovakia,” Propaganda Anti-Masaryk “The Communist (Karel Hulicka, Czech nationalistbeen party having formed as National the in Party Democratic 1919. real first radical the marginal, nationalism was of Czech radical the threat Furthermore, campaign Masaryk, whowasaccusedofbeing against extremely anti-Soviet. in at1918. TheCommunist threat timethe didnot extend beyond apropaghanda The the threat posed by the Communists and Czech nationalists was not arealistic danger Vaclav Kural, conditions by the which Ukraine, Sub-Carpathian is the rule this to exception The J.W. Bruegel, German exclusion in drafting the constitution seemed to have been more of a of more been have to seemed constitution the drafting in exclusion German 45 Drafted entirely by Czechs with only a small minority of Slovaks. Any Konflikt anstatt Gemeinschaft?: Tschechen anstatt undDeutscheim Konflikt Czechoslovakia Before Munich, Czechoslovakia Before Czechoslovakia before Munich before Czechoslovakia 47 Thus, German exclusion from the revolutionary national revolutionary the from exclusion German Thus, 135-6.) Menschen undGrenzen, 4: Bevölkerung Band und (Prague: Institut für internationale Beziehungen), internationale für Institut (Prague: Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der (Koeln: VerlagWissenschaftund Politik, 1975), uprising which was already raging in raging already was which uprising 20 , Vol. 16, No. 2 , Vol. 16, (Apr., 1957),160-174.) , J. W. Bruegel,future DSAP chairman 57. 46 CEU eTD Collection institutions (including schools) were to be established at “their own costs.” While givingminorities the rightto freely speak their languages, own nationally oriented heavily centralized character, with Czechoslovak as the official language of the country. constitution of the country of which almost aquarter of the population was German. into the incorporated heard werenotand leaders national Theviews of German fact. 49 Republik Tschoslowakischen 48” 52 51 50 der Republik der Verfassungsgesetze Tschoslowakischen of minorities was also declared illegal. declared also was minorities of for nationality,language, race, or religion.” have “full and unconditional protection of their lives and their freedom, without regard each that guarantee the weregiven minorities speak Czech, from from bureaucracy. speak Czech, the their written reports, essentially eliminating German administrators, who largely did not in use “Czechoslovak” be bureaucracy able to were to within State the administrators definition of “catering” to the nationality was leftmysteriously vague. Finally, all minorities (if they constituted more than twenty percent of a certain district), yet the integrate into the dominant Czechoslovak nationality. In a way, post-1920 rights of the minority as a collective unit, the State seemed to be pushing its minorities to the ignoring In rights. national collective of freedom the for account to entirely failed it minority, a of members individual the of right the respected fully State the Though other. “XI. Schutz der nationalen, relig “26. Das Nationalitäten.- u. Sprachenrecht Sprachengetz: 3.” Ibid 3.” Sprachengetz: Sprachenrecht u. Das Nationalitäten.- “26. Ibid. 208. “Gleichheit,106,2.” Ibid, 194 Sprachgesetz Nr. 122,” Sprachgesetz Nr. The resulting constitution rejected the federalization of the State and took ona and took oftheState federalization the rejected constitution The resulting While democratic in one sense, the constitution seems utterly undemocratic in the undemocratic utterly seems constitution the sense, in one democratic While Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der , 165. ö 52 sen und Rassenminderheiten, 130.” 51 Administrative organs were to cater to national 50 21 Attempts at the “violent denationalization” “violent at the Attempts individual inhabitant of the State would , 207 . 265. Studien-Ausgabe 49 Furthermore, 48 CEU eTD Collection it did not, so Kural “go so far as to make coexistence impossible.” Though thelaws of 1920 certainly notdid facilitate conciliation between thetwogroups, autonomypractically institute to unwillingness an weakened fragile relationship. already leader’s continued Czechoslovak The Czech country. of andthe the Germans between government’sthe failure toreconcile its minorities would eventually the poison relations willingness on the part of minority parties like the DSAP to participate in the government, amarked its despite conception, years In followed the ahealthy which not document. Czechthe language in Austria. old forunlike towards Czech notEmpire’s nationalistthe the resentment, disregard attitude followed, engender resentment towards Stateamongthe its German population de facto traditions (in this case Czechoslovak) over all others. By instituting Czechoslovak as the Czechoslovakia mirrored a “reversed Austria” a“reversed mirrored Czechoslovakia 54 53 existence of large minority voting districts and in alarge mandate thus voting German of largeminority districts Senate existence the prevent the in an to attempt districts Czech with districts large German-speaking by joining interests to Czech benefit districts electoral of country’s the establishment the manipulated Paul,DSAP leader Ernst to according assembly, revolutionary within Czechoslovakia’s borders. First of all, the Czechoslovak leaders of the original imbalancenational which was caused by hugepopulation the of national minorities bodies, asdefined by ignored, constitution,the or perhaps manipulated, purposefully the Czechoslovakia. multiethnic in confusion national the to solution eventual an decade would nextthe holes tothe in point for constitution,the possibility weakening the Kural, 57. Kural, 51. From From pointthe of view oflanguage andminority laws, the1920 constitution was Apart from the laws of 1920, the general structure of the State decision-making language of State,the Czechoslovakia's language lawsin would, yearsthe which 22 53 by favoring one language, set of 54 Only the events of CEU eTD Collection into parties which combined national interests with economic interests. economic with interests national combined which parties into proliferation,”in words, other to uninhibitedthe fragmentation nationallyof based parties proportional voting, Leff points out, generally led to the “loss of control of party Czech, Magyar, or Slovak vote, was logically split by class interests. The system of book in her Leff economic and ethnicity-based voting, aproblem examined byhistorian Carol Skalnik introduction a proportionalof representation government was obviousthe between rift government. the in participation proportional of thepower Republic,the weakening of minority German the by a preventing in party early the electedGerman years reduced numberof representatives democratically 57 State, 1918-1987 Czechoslovakia’s founding fathers made it difficult for pro-State German parties, like the Czech-German conflict within the borders of the new country. The shortsightedness of voicein Czechoslovakia. more decisive Czechoslovak national autonomy, German the governing may parties have had a platform for astronger, concerns as a group. Given a system which accounted for national interests in the form of national their express to room little had minorities national base, voter fragmented each German party, the DSAP included, worked individually rather than together. With a underminingother, progress the of German national interests. Under these conditions, parties of 1920s,livingthe in relativeagainst, prosperity,rather worked than with each Czechs, functionally “[giving] the impression of a nation-state.” and House of Representatives, according to Paul an “ingenious” move on the part of the 56 55 Leff, 64. Carol Carol Skalnik Leff, Bohman Ernstquoting Paul, 166. The problem from resulting verythe multinational make-up of and State the the As Ihave demonstrated, founding the Statethe of added to alreadythe existing National Conflict in Czechoslovakia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton of University Press, 1988), 64. Nation ConflictinCzechoslovakia: TheMakingand Remaking of a 23 . 56 The German vote, like the like vote, German The 55 This tactic resulted in a 57 Instead, German CEU eTD Collection Republic. loyalty the to for their Czechleaders to trust difficult madeitinclusion their towards its and early State in to acceptthe actively its government, disinclination participate the Republic. Although the DSAP, like the many other German parties, would later come forever be tainted by fundamentaltheir be unwillingness to included within the borders of would Czechoslovakia towards attitude whose revolutionaries, bothersome anti-State, role in creating their position in the State, labeling them,in the eyes of the government, as included, the DSAP Germanpartiesreluctancethe of inCzechoslovakia, played acrucial unwillingness to join a State ruled by the Czechoslovak majority. In retrospect, the early marked a Germans showed region’s whichtime the during Treaties, Peace Versailles the which reared their heads ugly in early the years of Republic.the misunderstandings,mistakes, uncompromising dogmatism, and inheritedresentments various in found be can questions these to answer The thirties? early inthe power lose the DSAP? What early mistakes may the party have made which caused it to so easily aims. its political thanfor thesuccessof rather weakness by 1929. It’s political inflexibleoften agenda, andresolute, against, worked failures, that is, within the control of the party leadership, led to the party’s relative internal of aseries DSAP’scontrol, outsidefactors the constitution, Czechoslovakia’s 2.2 1918-1929: The DSAP’s Decade of Relative Inaction Relative of Decade DSAP’s The 1918-1929: 2.2 twenties. the of end the at upsurge nationalist the in preventing crucial were which whose position in the State remained unclear in the first ten years of the Republic, years DSAP, to facilitate reforms which would satisfy a potentially explosive German minority, The first mistake occurred even before the official founding of Czechoslovakia in of even Czechoslovakia founding the official before mistake occurred The first Which led factors to this failure of national compromise from pointthe view of of Aside from the framework of the constraints dictated by the framework of 24 CEU eTD Collection document from Carolinum Collegium.) Carolinum from document 61 60 Ernst Klett, 1981),336-337. Haustain, Georg W. Strobel and Gerhard Wagner, eds (Stuttgart: Verlagsgemeinschaft documentthe which would govern country’s the until politics 1948. favor. in their decision Allies’ the influence to sought which council national revolutionary Social Democrats joined the German Agrarians and the German Clericals to create a citizens of new of the Republic. citizens baptism,” in the words of Emil Franzel, DSAP party historian, of the Sudeten Germans as “bloody with Czechmilitary, of metthe the violence by a series of demonstrations Von Von Negativismus zumAktivimus,” 59 der Tschoslowakei Tschoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: Zur Enwicklung,” 58 Bohemian Kingdom, which included the heavily German-speaking areas. Czech leaders, on the other hand, cited their historic right to all lands of the former forright national self-determination as outlined by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen points. citing their of Austria, new State to the territories of Sudeten the thecession advocated includingnational groups, Josef German Social Democrat had,inSeliger, 1918, at the founding of the Republic labeled the German politicians,in the eyes of Czech DSAP, German historian Fred Hahn argues that the anti-State attitude of German parties and Germans in the framework of the new State. In his article on the evolution of the parties would later lament, which planted the first seeds of the conflict between Czechs Emil Franzel, “Die Bluttaufe derSudetendeutschen: der4.März 1919.” (Loose Hahn, 336. Fred Hahn, “Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Partei im Tschechoslovakischem Staat: im Partei Tschechoslovakischem Sozialdemokratische FredHahn,“Die Deutsche Siegfried Lammich, Karin “EinführungSchmid, in der Verfassungsordnung der 60 Not included in draftingthe of constitution,the German desires found novoice in To fight their impending “imprisonment” inimpendingTo fight “imprisonment” their Czechoslovakthe German State, the It was this reluctance to join Czechoslovakia, members of the “activist” German members“activist” of the join was Czechoslovakia, to It reluctance this In March of that year the German Social Democrats organized astrike succeeded organized Democrats year Social German of InMarch that the (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1971),12. 61 Ostmitteleuropa: Berichte Ostmitteleuropa: Berichte und Forschungen 25 in Die Staatsordnung 58 Leaders of German 59 , Ulrich CEU eTD Collection leaders, as“rebels.” leaders, 64 inquoted J.W Bruegel, 63 negotiate with rebels.” (from Emil Franzel,“Die Bluttaufe der Sudetendeutschen”) 62 and theirhistorical status as colonists to the region. “To this end,” Masaryk remarks, “our state, the of boundaries historic the on based sovereignty to right real no had Germans the and Masaryk humanitarian in President writes, his memoir, tolerant famously the Even process. State-forming the against working “rebels” advocates agency for party’s the more goals. oriented economically class consciousness. The opportunity to join a German nation was thus also seen as an achieve as ameans to acertain sawnational self-determination German Democrats Social Austro-Marxists, made it difficult toconform to what was being asked of them. The the State. Yet the historical context of the German Social Democrats, the heirs of the old practical, given the later positive attitude that most German parties would assume towards Czechs.” willing co-founders of a Bohemian state and, thereby, anationality equal to that of the he“Back then,”of wrote year“the the Germans 1918, becomehavecould peacefully in come. and years Czechs wouldform to the Germans the which between relationship tothe earlypoor dissidence these agreed werecrucial of Like Spina,that Franzel acts Agrarian party and anti-Henlein activist, wrote that he Emil Franzel quotedin Hahn, 136. Franz Spina, “Die Politik der deutschen Parteien in der Tschechoslowakei (1938),” as Aloissaying quoted first Rašin, Financeminister, Czechoslovak “One not does The Czech leaders, however, saw German separatism andsawits separatism sawGerman as treason, however, The Czechleaders, seems thenew idea of circumstances acceptance the “prompt” of a In retrospect, 64 people, they had they people, apprehension of the politicaltemporary helplessness of the German political advantages if,during the revolution of 1918-19, in correct [was] convinced that the Germans could have gained considerable their collaboration in the affairs of the State. 62 In 1928, Professor Franz Spina, later member of the German Czechoslovakia before Munich before Czechoslovakia promptly started negotiations with the Czechs about 26 63 , 30.Italics added. The Making ofThe Making theState , that CEU eTD Collection German vote went vote parties in German participation tothose central whichsupported the acceptance of their presence in Czechoslovakia. By 1920, almost eighty percent of the a consistentmore actions pro-State parties demonstrated later the“activist,” popular the State, Slav-dominated the into incorporation their rejected initially Czechoslovakia always work and fight.” Wiener 64.) Volksbuchandlung, 1960), exceeded all the votes for other German parties for puttogether. German other thevotes exceeded all Czechoslovakia bywinning the majority of German a combinedvotes, sum which Sozialdemokratische ArbeiterParteiSozialdemokratische country’s first official election, under their new party name, die privilege,” Germans must de-Austrianize themselves and get rid of the old habit of mastery and 65 declared, “will, under all circumstances, in “will, underall circumstances, declared, Czechoslovak State, ruling out the option of new in the involvement political DSAP’s the mandated finally Seliger Joseph to German Austria in the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. Months later, party leader Czechoslovaks. indicating his desire for them to accept their new country and the new dominance of the (J. W. Bruegel, party.DSAP asalegitimate 68 67 66 (New York:Horward Fertig, 387. 1969), Thomas G. Masaryk, At this point, in June 1919 however, the State had not yet officially recognized the Protokoll,34. Italics 1919, added. politics. from abstaining deliberately of politics the for term German Though nearly all local German parties from which emerged within borders the of In the summer of 1919 the Sudeten Germansfinally were denied their annexation 65 implying that the German’s of period superiority had definitively andpassed, Ludwig Staatsmann Czech:Arbeiterfuehrer und 67 The MakingofaState: Memories andObservations, 1914-1918 True to word, the German Social Democrats participated in the , constituting the strongest German party in whatever state 27 Abstinezpolitik they may find themselves, find may they . 66 68 “Social democrats,” he (Wien: Verlag der (Wien: Verlag Deutsche CEU eTD Collection GČ which I will discuss in the next chapter. 71 2010> http://www.czso.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/22005E7C52/$File/4219rr_1.pdf.May <01. government in government Prague. 70 Bruegel, 69 rapprochement with the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party ( political party, unable to find a practical connection to any major party until its brief instruggle 1918 actively existencethe supported State,the were of acrippled issues.Alone in a new, coalition-based State, the German Social Democrats, who, after a disconnected from other German parties, with whom they disagreed principally on social They were also interests. national based divergent on Democrats Social Czechoslovak from the themselves severed found German Social Democrats Republic, the new of foundation the From the difficult. for Germans thecountry’s progress economic position within Sudeten politics made the realization of its party goals, real social and which preceded them. in ispolitics examine of years the Sudeten it framework to the important Czechoslovakia, discuss, served as decisive factors in the rise of popular German nationalism in Hitler and the disastrous consequences of the economic crisis in 1929, as I will later while promoting the well-being of the German working class. While the rise of Adolf achieve acertain linguisticdegree of theSudeten regioncultural and autonomy within to diligently working government, new the of authority the reject, than rather accept, vote was the country’s most popular German party and showed a consistent desire to The Czech Social Democrats werecalled Democrats TheCzechSocial “Elections for Nationalthe Assembly, 1920-1935,” Figurebased votes on 1,577,692 toward German parties in yearthe 1920.(J.W. lnická, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Worker’s Party. Worker’s Social Democratic lnická, Czechoslovak the Following the DSAP’s initial reluctance to join Czechoslovakia, its uncomfortable its Czechoslovakia, join to reluctance initial DSAP’s the Following Ludwig Czech 69 , 79) The DSAP, whoin 1920 held 11.29percent 28 ý eskoslovenská sociáln eskoslovenská ý esky U Statisky ý SDSD) Č demokratická strana demokratická 70 of the country’s Ĝ ad. 71 in 1928, CEU eTD Collection Principally, the DSAP rejected cooperation with the “bourgeois” parties of German of the parties “bourgeois” with the cooperation DSAPrejected the Principally, an entirely party. since who colleagues, Social Democratic separate 1917constituted their own party aims. First, as a German party, they were severed from their former Czech found itself in a constant state of tension between the Republic, other German parties, and within the State. other hand, they were still determined to find a solution to the German minority problem hand, the DSAP was willing to participate in the new Czechoslovak State, yet, on the State...Only lovethe of peopleour and rights our binds us together.” explained Seliger, “who we believe deserve their liberation from the old Habsburg slave- divergent goals. “We are notheld together by hate against the Czechoslovak people,” his successor, Ludwig Czech, the DSAP worked to straddle these two politically these years, early influence underthe strong leader party of the andlater Seliger, under interests in both German national and general socioeconomic issues within the State. In year. that of in October crisis economic world of the catastrophe unexpected not preparedforthelooming minority and Czechoslovak majority. Thus, by 1929, the nationally fragmented State was theGerman between or compromise astable relationship to facilitate in position the in the government, unable to realize any itsof proposed aims, and, most importantly,not involvement direct their preceded which years ten the of sheet” balance “negative of kind population, DSAP’s the failure participate to in rulingthe coalition until 1929 reflects a 72 Josef 1919quoted Seliger, in Hasenöhrl, 21. In the new Republic the DSAP was isolated on all sides, and therefore, the party The most obvious handicap of DSAPthe wasits seemingly juxtaposing dual As the party with the consistently largest voter base among the country’s German Machtergreifung 29 of Adolf Hitler in Germany, orthe 72 So, on the one the on So, CEU eTD Collection openly advocate revolution.” advocate openly State, felt that “the Communists were using the Parliament as stage on which they could the towards attitude “activist” with their Democrats Social German the Furthermore, the ‘terroristic’ methods of class-warfare and accused them of ‘ “despised explains, Meiler Olaf historian German democrats,” “The Social communists. Czechoslovak the to aversion their for reasons fundamental had Czech, and German both historian Nancy Merriwhether Wingfield out. points nationality question, which was of paramount interest to all factions within the DSAP,” as The party leadership, however,felt that these demands failed to “directly address the newand government demanding its membership inthe Third Communist International. definitive shift left,to the Leninist towards Communism, opposing in participation the for a advocated largelyinReichenberg, centered wing, German Social Democratic moderates of the worker’s movement. Already in 1919 the more radical elements of the profile. welfare, the DSAP had no ally fitwho their very narrow social and national specific basis for Henlein’s SdP. In their quest for apolitical balance between national and social course, the German National Socialist Party (DNSAP), which would later provide the of of DSAPthe by diminishing Social Party membershipDemocratic and embodyingyet political right, most notably the German Agrarians, the German Clericals, 76 undKommunisten: 1918 -1929(Munich: Seliger Gemeinschaft, 34. 1989), Tschechoslowakei (DSAP) im Spannungsfeld zwischen tschechischen Sozialdemokraten 75 74 73 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KP Ibid. Olaf Meiler, Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Wingfield, 18. Also known as the German Christian Socialist Party. Further complications arose out the split between the radical leftists and leftists radical the between out split arose the complications Further The definitive split between the DSAP and Communists, who became the 76 ý ) in) 1921, had a profound effect on the power 30 74 Moreover, the Social Social Democrats, the Moreover, Putschismus.’” 73 and, of 75 CEU eTD Collection history,” Bruegel writes parties, afront against the country’s working-class parties. “It is a curious irony of major Czechoslovak with forming, government, the parties entered German right-wing did notparticipate in the government for another full fouryears. Instead, the moderate reflected the powerlessness of the DSAP, who despite winning the popular German vote, Czechoslovak Social The Democrats. coalition,in whichremained untilplace 1929, the first time excluded the for which Coalition,” “Gentlemen’s so-called part of the Small andTraders joined Clericals), who the governing Czechoslovak parties in 1926 as Agrarians, (the parties “bourgeois” German bythe the DSAPwasweakened twenties, Democrats. increasingly working toundermine the cause of both the Czech and the German Social representative and three senatorial seats in seats senatorial Prague. and three representative shrunken 78,000, and,to threeyears later in 1925, to68,000 members, losing fourteen split,its membership down went by By 17,000 people. membership1922, DSAP constituency. In 1920 the DSAP 120,000 boasted members,yet directly following the consequencesfor the DSAP’s popularity workingamong the classby itssplitting continually weakening and fragmenting themembership of quotas both parties. Communist Party (KP and eventually even the Social Democratic parties (both the DSAP and the Groups, Youth split Socialist firstthe to served Democrats Social andthe Communists the of division The State. the within existence lonely party’s in the “enemy” another 77 Ibid, 26-28. Aside from Aside tothe party’sthreat in Communistthe popularity nineteen- the The splitbetween the Communists and German Social Democrats had dire did not find their way to an agreement with the German Social German the with agreement an to way their find not did that the party most willing to compromise, the Czech Social Democrats, ý ), which included all nationalities of the Republic, was 31 77 Thus, the new Czechoslovak ý SDSD), CEU eTD Collection 81 80 party,” the party,” the withits Czech Wherehadfailed DSAPinterests national toreconcile“brother its the parties had. “bourgeois” right-wing the where issues national basic overcome to failed had ideology, international afundamentally Socialism, observation. Bruegel makes apertinent Here, improve until the pressure: on parties twothe tomendyet their differences,” their wouldnot relationship andin sohaddoing began moving closer together as a political force, whoput“moral 79 effectively plunging both parties into four years of opposition. 78 motives. positive accusing development, these ofhavingparties strictly class, rather nationalthan heavily Czech coalition, they too began to consider a relationship the Czechoslovak parties of the “Gentlemen’s Coalition” for ignoring German national issues by joining a temper the bourgeois government. As much as the DSAP had criticized the German parties in governingthe coalition. of German presence three the made,despite minority German was autonomy the of increased move towards no Germans, country’s of the comfort economic relative importantly,in of andperhaps more Republic, the In theseyearsof prosperity relative “standardize administration”, which did not take account of minority groups or politics. country via the creation of provincial diets (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia), serving to satisfy German national equality. Instead, the government seemed to be centralizing the Ibid, 83-84. Wingfield, 81. Both the Bruegel, DSAP did not see the entrance of German parties into the government as a The DSAP, still waiting in the wings, was desperately awaiting its chance to 80 During the three year reign of the “Gentlemen’s Coalition,” little was done to ý ý Ludwig Czech that created the first Czechoslovak-German coalition. Czechoslovak-German first the created that right, Czech minded nationally the was it instead that and Democrats, SDSD, its bourgeois had opposition SDSD, managedovercome differences, to these SDSD and the DSAP had joined the SecondInternational in August 1925, ý SDSD was no longer part of the ruling coalition. (Wingfield, 69.) , 95-96. 32 78 79 81 CEU eTD Collection ý “common status...as part of the loyal opposition.” Social Democrats, with whom they slowly began to grow closer with in light of their 84 “Kundgebung und Entschliessung Ibid I,” sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik, 1928),6.) Jänner 1928 inPrag Sozialdemokratischen Protokoll Aller ParteienderTschechoslowakei: Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei,Genossen Dr. Ludwig Czech.” ( 83 82 (Wingfield, 93-94.) 87 86 85 proletariat. country’s the regime” against working wasa“classoriented wasaregime which decided congress among all proletarian forces” in an effortagainst the ruling bourgeois coalition, which the working class one step closer desireto realizing their achieve deep-rooted to aunion “overestimated” by both parties. byboth “overestimated” resolutions were seemingly ineffective and, in the opinion of DSAP delegate Ernst Paul, the newfound friendship between the two parties became the foundation for anew, left- vote, of the percent with poplartwenty-one mostparty Czech second became the 1925, percent of the entire country’s vote, and the more easily agree on common sociopolitical goals.” common agreeon moresociopolitical easily Ernst Paul “notconcentrated on facilitating an agreementof a national program, butcould State. proletarian in between of nations understanding the State” the order to more found effectively atrue struggle whichhad separated them yearsten earlier, offhandedly“bridge vowing to SDSD held theirfirst common congress which the DSAP hoped would bring “the Ernst Paul,“Zur Ibid Vorgeschichte,” Ludwig“Die Czech, Eröffnungsrede desVorsitzenden der deutschen Ibid, 87. Votes for Votes CSCSD hadthe increased percent by sincefifty-two the 1925elections. Ernst Paul “Man muss wohnen” in Hasenöhrl, 29. “Kundgebung und Entchliessung IV,”Ibid, 57. When in January 1929 the DSAP won the German vote with a total of seven 85 By the turn of the decade DSAP and the (Prag: Verlag derdetuschen (Prag: Partei-Vorstandes des 83 Despite the reconciliatory atmosphere of the congress, its final 84 The congressonly national the vaguely addresses , 4. , 55. 33 ý SDSD, recovering from their losses in 82 In January 1928, the DSAP and the 86 ý SDSD were, according to Der Erst Kongress Der Erst am 28.und29. 87 CEU eTD Collection Hitler and his Sudeten supporters wereall-tooeager toanswer. Hitler andhisSudeten supporters popular party, the DSAP had notsolved the question which,in the years that followed, agreement with the activist, pro-State Germans. In ten years as its constituency's most of could failurethe consequences terrible thisnational predict the point, a peaceful of and the later rise of Adolf Hitler,in 1933, had become a dangerous liability. No one, at to achieve nationally goals.oriented This unsolved national question, by yearthe 1929 German’s decadeastheSudeten popularone mostshowed party their weakness relative of balance-sheet” “negative DSAP’s majority. The of Czechoslovak rights the linguistic the favored and constitution whose asanation-state, treat to continued government the future of German politics in the country. The DSAP included Czech, Slovak, and German nationals, who all disagreed fundamentally on the which government, the of internationality very the by obscured were goals national Welfare. working-class with party, leaderparty Ludwig as Czech appointed newthe for Minister all-national the joined wing coalition. Laying aside theirmore national goals of national autonomy, the DSAP Although DSAPthe had finally managed tojoin governingthe its coalition, ý SDSD-led coalition in early 1929 in its self-recognition as a as self-recognition its in 1929 early in coalition SDSD-led 34 still represented a minority a minority in represented what CEU eTD Collection attention notand support just of German citizens, but of Germans living outside its Chancellorin 1933, promised an end to the economic plight of Germany, attracting the Hitler and National Socialism in neighboring Germany. Hitler, who became the German caused by the financial crisis, many Sudetens began to closely follow the rise of Adolf 1929 wasthefirst of events.these Facing unemployment unprecedented marketcrash of in Yorkstock October years following New the the depression economic The territories. in Sudeten the atmosphere a radicalnationalist tocreate another one to the decline of the DSAP in the late nineteen-twenties and the thirties, combining with ledleadership, to popularity increased the parties nationalist and,German of conversely, Character of Sudeten Politics III: 1929-35: The DSAP in Response tothe Changing 89 Kampf, Widerstand, Verfolgungdersudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten, 164. 88 of Decline the Sentiment, Political Nationalism Sudeten the Radical on of Rise Forces the and External of DSAP, the Effect The 1 3. finally, why failed.they assessment on how and why the DSAP opposed this new strain of Sudeten politics, and, describe the effectinternational events had on Sudeten politics,followed by an destroyed the relative calm in German-Czech relations. In the following pages, Iwill forever which and events byboth European world They were affected to Czechoslovakia. By 1933, Czechoslovakia’s unemploymentrate had reached 5.01percent. “Die Bastion” letzte article byJosef Hofbauer, exactdateunknown, roughly 1935, in Two important factors, completely outside of the control of the DSAP party German politics in Czechoslovakia were not isolated to the Sudeten even region or isolated Sudeten tothe werenot in Czechoslovakia politics German Today, the Czechoslovak Republic is morefree thanall of her neighbor states, and its workers are alsomore free than workers inGermany. In their own interest,the Sudeten German workers mustdefend the -Josef Hofbauer, Member of DSAP Party Executive Committee Czechoslovak Republic. 35 88 89 and poverty and CEU eTD Collection 92 91 them andmore markedly.” them sooner History Sudetenland, “fatally write were editorsthe dependent,” of Czechpublicationthe such as the textile, motor, glass, and toy manufacture, all based largely in the heavily industry on and was hitthus hardestthe by depression.the High-yieldindustries based economy an had country, the of borders industrialized heavily the on located because in position of Sudetenland, The andtheir geographic Czechoslovakia. economic a decade create. almost to had which taken relations German two external phenomena which would forever destroy the cooperative mood of Czech- borders. Thus, Sudeten “activist” politics, then led by the DSAP, became the victims of 90 parties. As Sudetenland.the This resulted in a dramatic increasein popularitythe nationalistof in Prague asinherently inanti-German its failure toprovide adequate financial relief to were affected. percent estimated to have affected 19.2 percent of the population, where in Czech areas only 9.16 degree of unemployment than Czechs.the InGerman inareas, unemployment 1931 is disproportionally affected by the economic crisis,with German citizens facing a higher Ibid. Ibid. Facing History, The economic distress affected the political inclinations of ethnic Germans ethnic of inclinations political the affected distress economic The As a result of visiblethis inequality,many Germans began toview thegovernment “on exports at a time when customs barriers erected because of because crisis of the affected erected at a barriers “on customs time when exports Facing History [which describes an anti-State attitude] received a fresh impetus. started to reflect the also nationalwhich stereotypes and prejudices.attitudes, Negativismor opinions ofpolitical a radicalization towards undoubtedly affected political sympathies, contributing significantly implications of that grim situation [of German unemployment]. It It would be a mistake underestimateto the and social psychological 92. 91 points out 90 As a result, Czechoslovakia’s citizens were 36 92 Facing CEU eTD Collection Czechs and foreign workers in German areas,” foreign workers Czechs and 96 95 94 . 16Dec.2009. program. antidemocratic fundamentally and anti-Jewish, pan-German, its in inGermany party Nazi the of rhetoric program DNSAP, often described as a “twin Hitler movement,” largely followed the dominant tide of German Social Democracy of the nineteen-twenties. In the twenties, the international German international character. for its Czech-centered democratic, which they detested government Czechoslovak the from self-seclusion and base voter small their to due twenties in the attention (DNP), with itwhich was inextricably linked. The DNSAP andDNP had received little Socialist Worker’s Party (DNSAP) and its partners, the tiny German National Party regions. Sudeten plightthe of to more nationally politics a whichoriented way represented out of national desperate the The failure of torectify Czechleadership the this Zusammenhängen undAuswirkungen. maßgebende Darstellungin ihren Grundlagen, dersudetendeutschenNot 93 Verfolgung der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten, 155. dersudetendeutschenVerfolgung Sozialdemokraten, party’sorganization the paramilitary conditions in the Sudetenland, attracting especially younger voters, many of whom joined votership increasedby people.thirty-five thousand approximately “Stammtafel des sudetendeutschen Nationalsozialismus,” in Nationalsozialismus,” des sudetendeutschen “Stammtafel Ibid. Wiskemann, 195. Hans Krebs, marschiert,” “Sudetendeutschland Founded in 1903, the DSNAP’sinitial mandatedprogram the “fightfor the Until 1933, the radical German nationalist was embodied by the German National The growth of the DNSAP can be clearly linked to the worsening economic Weltanschauung 94 Volksport ed.Erich Kühne, (Leipzig, 1938) against Marxism against the against] [and overflow 37 93 . 95 representing a radical alternative to the Between1925and 1929,the DNSAP’s perceived Sudetendeutscher Die Schicksalskampf: inequality a inequality led towards turn Kampf, Widerstand,Kampf, 96 Between Between 1930 and . of CEU eTD Collection Wiskemann, 54. Since the foundation foundation Since the of Republic, Sudeten the the anti-Semitism. particularly, and, anti-Slavism, pan-Germanism, and nationalism German 1880-1940,” Quotation from Mark Cornwall,“The Struggle onthe Czech-German Language Border, press referred to “as typical examples of treasonable pan-German irredentism.” nationalist activism, often holding large festivals, often turned violent, which the Czech German Sudeten the Habsburg rule, ideally suited for his new position as head of SdP.Originallythe founded in 1860 under 1932, party membership hadmore than doubled. nationalism, and thus Henlein, as leader of leaderGermand Sudeten the of as and thusHenlein, nationalism, 99 itself inin later, lose toparticipate and semi-political renamed elections, order organization 98 97 the the head of the German State and the consequent foundation of the DSNAP’s successor, Machtergreifung radicalization of Nazi politics in the Sudetenland was the rise of Hitler and eventual Nazi in year. same the 1933, the party instrumental was in creating the framework for Henlein’s SdP,established DSNAP party (along with DNP)wouldthe bedisbandedby in Czechgovernmentthe Though right. revolutionary the to a turn and quo status political the with dissatisfaction to Henlein,he was approached by Reich Nazis in autumn of 1933 and askedtake to over Partei (SdP) Sudetendeutsche in governmentbecameinvolved Germany, Hitler’s party’sthe resurrection asthe in circumstances political of inlight growth its by threatened felt who government, Czech party in Czechoslovakia. After the dissolution of the DNSAP under pressure from the Czechoslovakia, which would give Sudeten German Nazism its place as the most popular German Initially founded as the Wingfield, 121. Sudetendeutsche Partei Sudetendeutsche Partei Sudetendeutsche Perhaps the most import factor leading to the popular rise of nationalism and Turnverbände The English Historical Review in Germany in 1933,whichmarked the official of ascendance Hitler as , or Gymnastics societies, were historically linked with German Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront . Itwouldbe this political movement, formed outside of (Sudeten German Party). 98 led by Turnverband Turnverband , Vol. 109, No. 433 , Vol. 109, (Sept, 1994),938. 38 97 was a forum aforum forof theexpression was This move clearly indicated adeep Thisindicated clearly move Turnverband leader Konrad Henlein. (Sudeten Geman Home Front), a had been active in active been had Turnverband 99 According , was CEU eTD Collection 103 2010> http://www.czso.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/22005E7C52/$File/4219rr_1.pdf.May <01. 198. and Moravia Bohemia Provinces of 102 101 Attorney-general by H.M. Stationery off., 1946), 29. German MajorWar Criminals the leadership of the Sudeten ofGermans. leadership the Sudeten the 100 contributed(VDA), over threehundred thousand the organ NS international its through Reich, the support the SdPfinancially. SdP. of the fortheestablishment responsible other propaganda expenses. other seats to the DSAP’s eleven. DSAP’s the to seats definitivelyvotes, the DSAPousting from itsin seat governmentthe with thirty-three sixty-sixunexpected percent of Sudeten the vote, overfifteen percent of Republic’sthe Wenzel Jaksch noted that “the dark days of depression created a mystical mood in the negativists [those anti-State parties or individuals] to gain.” everybody.” As a result, Wiskemann remarks “the activists continued tolose and the for jobs and enthusiasm happy with filled earth on heaven a become had Germany “that believe to began Wiskemann, Elizabeth historian contemporary the according neighboring Germany as a result of Hitler’s rearmament policies, many Sudetens, in general rates steadilyin As atmosphere regions. unemployment Sudeten declined like the National Socialists looked to the working class for voter support, but also in the delineating the decline in support for activist parties, and particularly of the DSAP, who, Elizabeth Wiskemann, Elizabeth “Elections fortheNational Assembly, 1920-1935,” Radomir 75. Luza, Konrad Henlein, “The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetenland," Apart from reestablishing Sudeten Nazism, Hitler, now Chancellor, was able to The change in Sudeten attitudes towards The changein State towards the attitudes was notSudeten only invisible figures Czechs andGermans:Study oftheStruggle A in theHistoric 101 102 In 1934, the year 1934, the In preceding 1935parliamentary the elections, By the elections of 1935, the Henlein party had taken an . Vol. 2.(London: Pub. under the authority of H.M. (London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1967) 100 Thus, Hitler and his party were directly 39 Verein fürdasDeutschtum im Ausland Reichsmark ý esky U Statisky 103 to the SdP for election and future party chairman The Trial of Ĝ ad. CEU eTD Collection masses.” 104 nationalism? German radical challenge DSAP the did election, nation-wide next the before years six next in the how, But history. Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy in hardthese times, changing course the of Sudeten and From statements like the above, fascism could be seen a preferable substitute to that observed in whereshe Eger, a in sentiment dramaticto change political depression economic 106 borderlands. 105 Maria Lippert, an active member of the DSAP in the German city of Eger decline.led toits intheSudetenland situation swiftly desperate the to rectify coalition from suggest period the that perceivedthe failure of DSAPthe aspart of rulingthe constituency. The DSAP, as part of the government, thus became the enemy. Sources which mixed activism with national couldpolitics, hardly itssatisfy increasingly pro-Nazi program,practicallyin the working DSAP, Its support the hour. to class their darkest the andspecifically politics, activist The rise of German radicalism can also be seen as an indirect result of the failure of the twenties, arriving, in 1929, with a “negative balance sheet” in the eyes of its skeptics. charming them with its speed, its leader’s charisma, and its pan-German aspirations. and its new leader had influenced clearly thestrugglingmasses in Sudetenland,the (Munich:Aufbau Verlagsgruppe), 65. Die Anderen DeutschenausdenSudeten,1935-1989 Hoffnung: Wenzel Jaksch quoted in Wenzel quoted Jaksch Luza, Maria “Von Lippert, den eigenen in unterdrückt” Volksgenossen Eger (known as Cheb in Czech) was a predominantly German city in the Sudeten As I have argued in chapter three, the DSAP had little to show for its activism in 104 The power and radiance of Nazism, emanating from neighboring Germany unemployed, work. And that was a good reason to vote for the Nazis. the for vote to reason good a was that And work. unemployed, massively were who people, give to try not did and region, Sudeten DSAP. Even worse was that at the time, the government failed to invest in the unemployment played a role in the in the decline of voterfor support the 68. perceived 40 failure of the German coalition parties, like parties, coalition German the of failure , Alena Wagnerova, ed. Helden der 105 106 links the CEU eTD Collection constituency. Under the party party constituency. the leadership Under of conservative politically Ludwigthe Czech, economic situation which was causing such discontent among the country’s German thirties, the DSAP used its position in the current coalition to attempt to improve the determination to support its voter base in light of the economic depression. In the early theirfateful decline infavor of SdPinthe 1935. response failed to temper the radicalism and popularity of their right-wing adversaries by pages,will I how andexplain why DSAPthe responded to these politicshow and their respond to the threat of Henleinist and Hitlerite politics in the thirties. In the following can, in Czechoslovakia politics German on monopoly near its and popularity its maintain to nationalism German radical of ability the ingeneral, activism and Democracy Social German from away failedradical nationalism. against initswhole, Sudeten efforts May 1935 showed that the party’s pro-active policies of the past six years had, on the The failurewin of in DSAPthe toNazi-sympathetic popular the against SdP the vote government centered politicalthe impossibility of duly withinparticipating of framework the Czechthe thirties, in the and, in twenties DSAP the of failures the both uncover to seemed Germany from pressure of with political combined the economic depression emanating radicalism external the 1935, and 1929 between years the In in Czechoslovakia. politics German and would,international factors in nextthe nine years, neverrecover its popularity in January 1929 wasfinally part of governingthe coalition, wasdeeply shaken by these at the same time, the beginning of the end of its popular reign. The DSAP, which since 3.2 1929-1935: The DSAP and Failed Activist Policies Activist Failed and DSAP The 1929-1935: 3.2 From From theDSAP’s pro-State position standpoint, a practical can by be explainedits causeof shiftthe domestic weretheimmediate forces not and While international The year 1929marked years of ten dominancethe of politics,German and, activist and conversely, simultaneously representing the interests simultaneouslyinterests the of representing a troubledminority. be attributed to the DSAP’s failure to effectively be failureto theDSAP’s to attributed 41 CEU eTD Collection tenure in the coalition than as an opposition party. as an opposition than inthecoalition tenure argued that more could be achieved,in terms of economic reform,from continuing their that nationalof reform and governmentopposition. Czech’ssupporters within party the older members of the party,“promised less risks and was an easier policy to justify” than nationalities Accordingproblem. Bachstein, to policy, this especially supported by the economic situation in the Sudetenland by reforming the welfare system, not the its steadfast allegiance to the coalition and to the political status quo, hoping to rectify the then the Minister for Welfare and later Minister for Public Works, the DSAP continued in 110 109 108 107 asan of acts Germanminority the oppressor that State “Czechoslovak purported the negativist camp. As summed up by Czech politician Jaromir Ne itscitizens, policies were still regarded as unfair biased and by increasingly the popular country. poured over 100million crowns into economicthe assistance the throughout programs nothing.” than more infinitely is it but enough Wiskemann, acontemporary witness to the events, maintains that “this [amount] is little crowns, Czechoslovak twenty to ten from ranged vouchers the of value the Although for(to theunemployed) foodand whichwereexchangeable life other necessities. relief initiatedprogram, by Czech, wasintroduced. The governmentdistributed vouchers unemployed. the to assistance proposal tripleto unemploymentbenefits and period the quadruple of government which had during been created more prosperous times. In1931,Czech carrieda through Ne Wiskemann, 195. Wingfield, 82-83. Bachstein, 42. þ as was a member of the Despite the government’s effort to provide equal relief for German and Czech Thus, the DSAP embarked on a mission to reform the current welfare system, 108 ý Furthermore, in the summer of the same year, a hunger- SDSD would succeed Czech as Minister of Welfare. 42 109 Overall, the Czechoslovak government Czechoslovak the Overall, 107 þ as, 110 such propaganda CEU eTD Collection 113 2010. 112 and East European Review and East bread in the Reichenberg district,” Wiskemann points out, points Wiskemann district,” Reichenberg in the bread areas. “I have spoken to Germans who have regularly helped distribute coal, potatoes, and in aid that reports also early the equally thirties, wassupplied inandin German Czech who spenttime Sudetens the among Wiskemann, in areas. million German to seventeen crowns on public works (such as street and bridge reconstruction)in Czech areas, and up German borderlands. Between 1934 and 1935,the governmentspentfourteen million concentratingthus the government’s forbudget public and works welfarelargely on the distress, of economic degree the highest with regions in those instituted were schemes Czech assumed hisas Minister post for Public he Works, consciously ensured public that under the government’s various relief plans, historical sources suggest otherwise. When government? DSAPthe the and against were accusations the accurate how Yet region. in Sudeten strife the blame theeconomic continued for to party logically the the DSAP, and primarily Czech, were responsible for taking action in the crisis, they were Since relations. government-minority deteriorated and movement nationalist radical the government. in the position dominant his of favor Ludwig Czech’s name and his supposed lack of forsupport his German constituency in bitterly referred to the government’s food vouchers as “Czech cards,” playing on a pun on which itis endeavoring to reduce to economic and social misery.” 111 Wiskemann, 195-196. Joža Bruegel, Joža Jaromir Though the German negativist press would continually complain discrimination of Ne always broken down. has evidence the me, to thing of kind this prove to wished have Germans when occasion the population...On Czech of the favor in discrimination of kind any to witnesses been never had they methat assured they and þ as, “Economic and Social Problems in German-Bohemia,” in Problems Social and “Economic as, Memoirs , 20. , 20. 12May , Vol. 15, No. 45 (Apr, 1937), 600. 113 43 112 These accusations further enflamed further These accusations 111 Many Germans The Slavonic CEU eTD Collection Wingfield, 123-124. 115 der Industrie speaking. German- largely were rates unemployment highest the with counties seventeen unemployment among Czechs and Germans. By 1935, fifteen of the country’s top balanceinequality of manage the not to Czech,did DSAP,under the factthat documented explained the pain and suffering they experienced as part of the depression. It is also a more easily treatment of discriminatory accusation continued thenegativist’s that works suggests that government relief programs were, in fact, not discriminatory,it seems Although Wiskemann’s observation and the proportional distribution of money in public 114 promised to radically change the entire system, the DSAP merely sought to reform it. direct comparison to the radical ideas of Henlein and those of the DSAP. Where Henlein investmentin areas. struggling State increased economically programthe ithad followed for pastthe six years, citing demandsfor shorter working and speeches by party leaders on its program forits next term, which was largely in line with demonstration against “open and disguised fascism, and for freedom and fread” included to Henlein’s public speech onemonth later in Karlsbad. The rally, advertised as a which drew acrowd of 20,000 supporters.In response, DSAPthe held arally in response Henlein helda speech highlighting his party’s demand German for cultural autonomy, and were often followed by mass demonstrations. In October 19234 in B 1935 elections, DSAPmembers began to hold publicspeecheslarge which drew crowds within the government and their program for the future. In the months before the May reaffirming its faith in the Czechoslovak system, this move was simultaneously a big a simultaneously was move this system, Czechoslovak the in faith its reaffirming SeeFigure 2 “Counties with Highest Unemployment, Highest with “Counties Although DSAPthe continued its workwith The DSAP sought tomeet the threat of fascism head-on, clarifying their position 114 , featured in, featured Wingfield, 162. 44 Mitteilungen desdeutschenMitteilungen Hauptverbandes the government, the DSAP strongly 115 Here, we can observe a ö hmisch Leipa, CEU eTD Collection shown on the cover of a weekly political magazine which shows a collage of pictures to connect their party with prosperity, peace, growth and stability. A similar message is was two pronged. On one hand, as demonstrated by the above quotation, the party hoped publicmedianewspapers and propaganda, party speeches, This approach other outlets, also fought threat the of negativistpolitics in their Sudeten messagestothe public through Czechoslovakia, the DSAP felt,it was defending the principle of democracy itself. stand against political extremism, and notnecessarily as a patriotic ambition. In defending From this statement, wecan understand the DSAP’s pro-State attitude as a defensive article the argues, of Europe,” states democratic Sozialdemokrat increasingly Thisviewradical in and repressive. waspresented DSAP party newspaper the State to be a reflection of their democratic principles in a Europe which was becoming issues. nationality members of the DSAP toattempt a shiftin party policy which dealtmore directly with radicalized German masses, inspiring, as I will address in the next chapter, right-wing May 1935,it would become clear that purely activist policies did notsatisfy the in in of success fatefulelections the SdP the unprecedented of time.politics the In the structure, which had gripped the emotion,not and necessarily intellect,the of Sudeten nationality failedproblematic toaddress because State’s itmistake tragically the 116 Sozialdemokrat Therefore, apart from proactive government participation in these ways, the DSAP in the ways, these participation apart from government proactive Therefore, From From ideological in DSAPstandpoint, an continuedthe considered participation strengthened, whose existence safeguarded and whose fate assured. fate whose and safeguarded existence whose strengthened, see to want we importance whose politics European Central firmly by this State, not as a historical necessity, but as a factor in humanity and love of peace...It is for this reason that today we stand last democratic stronghold of the rule of law, of a European outlook, of Czechoslovakia has special relevance. In Central Europe, she is now the in October 1933, on the eve of Hitler’s , 28 Oct 1933 , 28Oct inquoted Bruegel, 45 Czechoslovakia before Munich, before Czechoslovakia Machtergreifung . “Among the 116 107. CEU eTD Collection adopts their program tactics.” and program their adopts now completely immersed in the program of [Germany’s] Hitler party and carelessly ismovement “the Sudeten German socialist national Geißler that argues newsletter, the across the Sudetenland as early as January of that year. Thus,it was the DSNAP who Geißler points out that it was, in fact, Czech who instituted these unemployment measures March luxury 1931, a DSNAPthe claimed deniedtomembers of Germanother parties, specialinstituted benefitsunemployment for members of trade DSNAP-led unions in told by the DSNAP tomembers of their party. Though the party claimed to have DSNAP’s deference to Nazi to politics. deference DSNAP’s member Rudolf Geißler identifies the DSNAP as 119 monthly newsletter then increasingly popular DSNAP. The February edition of the Social Democratic potential dangerof Nazism. the about people timewarn and same atthe theState, to allegiance negativist’s German of these connections to the Nazi party in Germany, sought to simultaneously discredit the sincerity policies. Thislargely approach, inspiredby DSNAP’sandthe the SdP’s denial of their DSNAP’s, and later the SdP’s later the and DSNAP’s, freedom freedom of speech focused and on progress the of the working class. world!,” giving the impressing of a growing and stable party builtin interestthe of DSAPthe flag flying proudly in wind,withthe subtitlethe “We are building anew and a crowd, of front in given been speech a political bridges, building workers showing 118 117 Rudolf Geißler, “Kampf dem Hakenkreuz,” SeeFigure 3. Hazenkreuz Evidence from as early as 1931 points to the use of this tactic in discrediting the On the other hand, the DSAP sought toinform the public about the firstthe is German for swastika. for is German Freundschaft true reflects the general use of this strategy in action. Party 119 intentions in an attempt to discredit their logic and logic their discredit to attempt in an intentions Furthermore, the author endeavors to uncover lies uncover to endeavors author the Furthermore, 118 In his article, which appears on the front page of 46 Freundshaft Hakenkreuzler , Feb. 1931. in reference to the to in reference 117 CEU eTD Collection Hitler.” out although that Henlein admitrefused to it, hewanted nothingmore than “copy to mockingly totheSdPas“the messiahs,” andrefers newly Sudeten-German points minted DSAP’s propaganda strategy, which tried to demonstrate demonstrate linkthe between to strategy,DSAP’s propaganda Sudeten which tried allegiances were notwith the State, but rather to Germany. directly associating Henlein with Jaksch Hitler, attempted toshow Henlein’s that social disunity [Sudeten-German]people.” the andpolitical the “perpetuate of advocates. Henlein, who Jaksch portrays as a staunch capitalist, is attempting to supposedly he which community nationality-based the of enemy an as Henlein identifies one of pure “fascism, tempered by Czechoslovak patriotism.” appeared in Decemberthe 1933issues of the have, therefore, the DSAP to thank,” Geißler writes. failed to collect it’s trade union’s due benefits two months earlier. “For these benefits we 122 unconditional the respectabandon for individualnever “shall rights.” (Luza,party 74.)the that announces document the Furthermore, natural conditions for their existence at the frontiers of their respective States.” fundamentally opposed Nazism and Fascism on the grounds that either ideology “lose the 121 120 DSAPthe endeavored toshow publicthe the SdP’s real intentions. sentiments and continually any denied tofascistconnection or Nazi ideology until 1938, uncoverfraudulent Henlein’s politics. Since the SdP party publicly denied any anti-State of the SdP in 1933. Following the party’s rapid rise in popularity, the DSAP aimed to respectively of respectively Czech of and Polish origin 80-81). (Bachstein, man,Walter Brand, were his Henlein leader,right-hand fact and the SdP’s that the on light shed repeatedly also time the at propaganda DSAP level, superficial more a On 124 123 Wenzel Jaksch, “Arbeiterfront gegen Henleinfront,” Ina summary theirof line party in late 1934,the SdP officially that they announced Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Besides their failure to address the nationality problem in everyday politics, the The DSAP continued its attack against radical nationalist politics the creation after politics againstnationalist radical its attack The DSAPcontinued 122 At best, Jaksch maintains, Henlein’s program is not one of activism,but rather 47 Trib ü ne 120 , another DSAP monthly, Jaksch Tribüne 123 , Dec. 1933. Furthermore, Jaksch Furthermore, 121 In an article which 124 In CEU eTD Collection ferocity of this fight against Henlein fascism.” Henlein against fight this of ferocity assistance, common campaigns, and common demonstrations which would “direct all the against“aggression pact” Henleinfascism. Theletter included for mutual aproposal coming up,the Communists approached the DSAPhoping form to a “united front,” opportunities during period. In this Septemberwith 1934, 1935communalthe elections radical nationalism in the Sudetenland,itis also important to examine missed 1961), 293-294.1961), von 1933 unddeutschertschechischer Antifaschisten bis1938 in document Gerhard Fuchs, von 12. September 1934zurHerstellung der Einheitsfrontgegen den Henleinfascismus,” propaganda. accusatory DSAP’s reception”the than better tohave seemed a“far of working“betrayal” the class, DSAP’s the which wasfocused on probably seen as statingalready the obvious. Conversely, SdP’s the propaganda, much of ý Germany. werealready supporters Nazi of annexation the voters of Sudetenlandthe to strong losses largest hebelieved theDSAP’s that partof 1935electoral after thatthe Henlein Germany. DSAP functionary and German Bodenbach’s mayor, Fritz Kessler, revealed nationalism, andmaybe evensupported these groups SdP voters had already made the connection between German Nazism and local Sudeten nationalist politics and Hitler,it did notseem to bother its audience. Likely, NSDAP or 128 forces. nationalist bourgeois- face often enemy, to acommon organizations must withrevolutionary communists work more moderatethe working-class political 127 126 125 SDSD-DSAP coalition, and, perhaps, still exhausted after its splitfrom the communists “Angebot der KPTsch an die Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei “Angebot derKPTsch in an Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutsche der die A concept whose roots go back to the 1917 revolution, and represents the idea that the Wingfield, 126. Kessler quoted in Bachstein, 82 While Ihave largely concentrated on the failed efforts of the DSAP toresist The DSAP, however, duly declined the offer, still strongly invested in the existing 125 Thus, warnings tying the SdP to Nazism may have gone in vain, and were Gegen Hitler und Henlein: Dersolidarische Kampf 48 128 because 126 of their association with (Berlin:& Loening, Rütten 127 ý , an SR CEU eTD Collection of the German vote and ten percent of vote, entire andof the percent vote ten German of the samewonsixty-seven the one, thepercent SdPsurprising asthe success, previous having surprising losses in 1935elections.the Although resultingthe coalition remained largely ideologically undermine their opponents were largely without success considering their movement. size antifascist the havethe of increased Needlesssay, to however, physicalthe strength power and of combinedthe parties would difficultto say whether ornot they would have posed a greater threat to the Henleinists. distrust of the Communists. the of distrust turned down, most likely, Bachstein surmises, because of Jaksch’s inherent personal offered to form a “unity front” with the DSAP against the SdP, yet were continually party because of a “gap in [DSAP’s] theory, namely the application of Socialist theory on failure to put national issues in the forefront, saw the current situation as a failure of the DSAP’s the five been for thecriticizing past years had who Jaksch, perspective. broader election conference,its leaders took it upon themselves to examine their actions from a elections, the DSAP began to look at itself critically. In a speech at the party’s post- hardly be explained by a single mistake, or a single external factor. Following the in general. coalition government the and DSAP the of legitimacy the to danger German cities, would remain active and persistent in their nationalist politics, posing a mainly tothelargest German The base, largethe percent of vote. voter SdP’s restricted program of the DSAP, still the leading German party in the coalition with a mere sixteen a decadeearlier. 131 130 129 Wingfield, 132. Bachstein, 95. Wingfield, 133. The DSAP’s strong involvement in State politics and their struggle to The failure of DSAPthe maintain to its popularity between 1929 and 1935can 129 In yearsthe following the initial KP1934 offer, the 130 If the DSAP had accepted the Communist offer,it is 49 131 posed aserious threat to the ý repeatedly CEU eTD Collection DSAP’sleadership and program. and These unemployment. realizations wouldlead toadramatic change inboth the enough fight to SdP,whoappealed the psychology the to of a people by affected poverty the psychology people.” of psychology the the 132 Jaksch in quoted Bachstein, 83. 132 In other words, Jaksch felt that Socialist theory was 50 not CEU eTD Collection assimilate to the Nazi movement by drawing nearer to Berlin and actively cooperating actively and Berlin to nearer by drawing movement Nazi the to assimilate move closer toGermany. In the years that followed, the Henlein movement would parties,pro-State for struggled desperately survival. for annexation the of Sudetenlandthe Nazi to Germany, whiletheDSAP, among other parallel to the actions of Henlein and Hitler, who were busy constructing amaster scheme of 1938. Developments external DSAPto party between politics 1935 and 1938ran politics between 1935 and 1938,and, eventually, totheir losses enormous in electionsthe outside of the DSAP’s control, which posed increasing opposition to German activist inyears electoral followingIt was theirsuccess 1935. overwhelming factors, these pro-Germanit ideology,is important tounderstand how SdPgrewthe ever in stronger the I will later explore the response of the DSAP to the rising popularity of the SdP’s radical andideology, whichled toaperiod of confusion internaland party Whiledisagreements. politics its reassess to DSAP the for need the implying militant, and nationalist, radical, most popularGerman party. By political Sudeten 1935, popular sentimenthadbecome 135 1620, where agroup of Czech nobles were defeated by German Habsburg forces. 134 Jungaktivismus, IV: 1935-1938: DSAP in Response to theSdP: 133 Jaksch in quoted Bachstein, 101. Jaksch’s reference to the “White Mountain” alludes to the Battle of White Mountain in Jungactivismus With the election secured, Henlein and his party now had the political weight to For the first time in the Czechoslovakia’s history, the DSAP was nolonger the Henlein’s marchissurely leading to the White Mountain oftheSudeten from a blow that would bebigger than any suffered during the Hussite the interest of ourown people. We want tosave the Sudeten Germans German’s fate. Wenzel Jaksch, can be translated in “Young Activism” in English. Activism” in “Young betranslated can 133 Opposition, and Consequences and Opposition, 134 Tschechoslowakische Bäderzeitung His politics are national suicide. We oppose him in or Thirty-Years War. 51 135 , 29.April 1936 CEU eTD Collection History, andDiplomacy 140 139 138 Contemporary History (John Haag. “‘Knights of the Spirit: “The Kamaradschaftsbund.” the thirties was considered by Hitler to be against the teachings of National Socialism. “create an intellectual elite of spiritually superior leaders.” Affiliation with this group in which Henlein was a member, whose goal, according to historian John Haag, was to relationship with Henlein. Itwouldbe thismutually relationshipdependent whichwould states, 1938. After publicly responsibility accepting for ten the million Germans living inforeign Nazis was increasedHitler’s interest in Germans living outside the Reich,made public in Reich. tothe annexation Sudetenland of the desired complete the is practically impossible,” and that in the face of these differences, he and his party Henleinto Hitler wrote an stating that “understanding between Czechsthe andGermans advantages out of the hatred of Germany.” of hatred the of out advantages in Eger that he “[preferred] to be hated in company with Germany than to draw any elections, Henlein publicly admitted his support for the Nazi regime, stating, in a speech practical purposes) entirely to the whims of the German dictator. A year after the with Reich Nazis in subversive, anti-State activities, surrendering the movement (for all German nationalists created the semi-political organization semi-political the created nationalists German seen more as a spiritual Usingendeavor. Spannismas an ideological backdrop, Sudeten Bolshevism and taught that the German spirit could be rejuvenated if “Germanness” was liberal revolutionary and democracy to asanalternative hailed was as Universalism, rebirth of the Germans as masters of their own and Europe’s fate. Spann’s theory, known likephilosophy, Hitler’s, preached the superiority of Germanthe people andsought the personage in the development of such ideologies in postwar Czechoslovakia. His political 137 136 Kamaradschaftsbund, to Führerthe for his former adherence toSpannist teachings andhis membershipin the “No. 5:Reichstag Speech, February 20, 1938,” Ibid. 108. Viennese university professor Othmar Viennese university Spannwas perhapsprofessor themost prominent Konrad Henleinin quoted Luza, 93. Facing History 140 The most crucial step towards the total fusion of the Henleinists and the Reich all results of the hated Treaty of Versailles, Hitler initiated a very close , 95. 137 . Vol. 8, No. 3 . Vol. 8, (July 136-138) 1973). 25 May 2010. reaffirming his allegiance to Reich Nazism. Reich to allegiance his reaffirming 136 52 In June 1937,Henlein officially apologized Yale Law Yale Law School: DocumentsonLaw, Kamaradschaftsbund 139 Journal of 138 Months later, Months , for CEU eTD Collection leaders, the DSAP eventually fell victim to its determined strong-willed, face Despite internal party battles. forcingto the aseries of of the now powerful Third Reich.The DSAP’s response to these politics were mixed, suddenly facednot only with butradicals, Sudeten werealso by threatened full the force open acknowledgement of Sudeten and Reich German cooperation, the DSAP was itlaterhad Hitler’s than difficult beenin first With Henlein’sand before 1935. years the Czechoslovakia. leadill-fated tothe Munich Agreementand eventual the of dismemberment June 1935.Here,internal among conflicts leading members of DSAPfinallythe were yet division the party was only madeclear in intra-party disputes, true atthe congress produce thedesiredfailed to outcome. and secure place in the Czechoslovak government, and how these strategies eventually discuss the various strategies made by the DSAP to regain their voter base, popularity, Social Democracy in Czechoslovakia during the Nazi area. In the following pages, Iwill why the formerly most popular German party, the DSAP, failed to resurrect German depression in the Sudeten areas, led to the decline of the party,it still does notexplain Anschluss principles. Why was this fierce struggle notsufficientin fighting the threatening German stubbornlyleaders in continued tomaintaintheir struggle its democratic, socialist Agreement in September of that year. reduced vote, powerthe of DSAPthe andinduced its definitive by downfall Munich the successunexpected in 1938elections,the winning over ninety percent of Germanthe These developments made the DSAP’s struggle to resist Nazism ever more Nazism ever toresist madestruggle DSAP’s the These developments In monthsthe following the elections of 1935, the DSAP wasfaced by fierce in facedby despite obstacles numerous the DSAP finalyears,their the these Yet ? Although it is clear that the Nazi threat, coupled with the persistent economic the overwhelming external events. SdP’s events. external overwhelming the 53 CEU eTD Collection May 1936, Czech announced that “the difficult task [of destroying the capitalist system] in a speech broadcast In captive. evil Czechoslovakia true the holding was capitalism dangers of Henleinism and Nazism, but reminding them, as I mentioned earlier, that Czech held speeches and wrote articles designed to make the population aware of the seemed tobe motivated by Austro-Marxist traditional,the ideology of Bauer and Renner. Henlein be can considered somewhatdisorganized asatwo-pronged, approach. ideology on back-burner.the Thus, DSAP’s the politicalpost-1935 struggle against decided turn to rightthe by addressing pressingnational issues and putting Marxist newly appointed deputy chairman, began a campaign to rejuvenate the DSAP by a problems could eventually be solved byimproving the economic situation, Jaksch, as political DSAP’s the that conviction steadfast his maintaining consistently Works, Where Czech remained party leader and continued in his position as Minister for Public force. directly challenged the SdP and strove to become SdPandstrove “younger the directly to andmore a active” challenged and later referred toasthe referred later and year.that Another contingent ofmembers,led most prominently by Wenzel Jaksch, employmentprograms, they would eventually regain voters they the hadlost tothe SdP Furthermore, Czech arguedandhis supporters by that continuing their of support capitalism. enemy: primary constituency's their fighting thereby and counterparts insisted onmaintaining andnurturing the party’s relationship with their Czechoslovak ledmembers party,by the Czech, of The older conservative, forefront. to brought the 143 142 141 Wingfield, 141. Jaksch’s “allies” included Kessler,Richard and Reitzner, Rudolf Storch. Wingfield, 140-141. The first approach was that followed by the party leader, Ludwig Czech, who Thus, the party congress set the scene for the unofficial division of the party. Jungaktivisten, advocated an entirely new program which 54 143 141 political 142 CEU eTD Collection public jobs.service February memorandum,1937 which mandated proportional in ethnic representation all activist’s) German DSAP’s (andother as aresult success of of the twelve percent the numberperiod, of in serviceGermans wasincreasedfour positions from to public February memorandum pushed the SdP to the “provocative move of sending an official an sending of move “provocative the to SdP the pushed memorandum February equality.Bruegel the step as apitifully that Furthermore,suggests small towards frontproceeded to mock the DSAP’s economic and employmentpolicies, which they saw Germans by 1938, whohad already indoctrinated inbeen Nazi ideology. The Henlein yetSudetenland,sadly failed tochange mindset theof increasingly Sudeten the radical German companies began toprosper as a result of governmentcontracts. massive project railroad in 1937, giving 4,270Sudeten Germans temporary employment. increased number of Germans to government positions. Furthermore, Czech initiated a with of socialism and democracy by strengtheningeconomically thecountry. Czech,along hefutile approach hadpracticed in yearsbeforethe 1935,attempting build to strength the yearsthe following party the Czech’sgroup congress, steadily the somewhatcontinued fight capitalism and the fascism he connected with it by putting his ideas intoaction. In pointview.a Marxist of fascism wasbasedon towards attitude Czech’s negative it can be that surmised statement, only remaining crutch. Thus, Fascism is enemy number one!” if whichis becan Fascism, in capitalism’s only removing achieved we aresuccessful 146 145 Rundfunkansprache des Parteivorsitzenden Minister Dr. Ludwig Czech am1.Mai 1936. 144 Memorandum shown in Bruegel, in shown Memorandum Wingfield, Bruegel, 152-153, der Krieg!”ist das Faschimus, Warnung: Der “Eine Ludwig erste Czech, ý SDSD ministers, began an affirmative action program which began appointing an appointing began which program action anaffirmative began ministers, SDSD These actions all combined to significantly improve the economic situation inthe situation economic the improve significantly to combined all actions These From a practical viewpoint, Czech, now Minister for Public Works, continued to 146 Czechoslovakia before Munich, Czechoslovakia Ludwig Czech, 55 191-193. 144 From the above 148-149. 145 In the same CEU eTD Collection the central central the European question an“exceptional by minorities granting political and cultural to Sudeten Nazism was to satisfy the popular Sudeten desire to find a “federal solution to his in 1935.as Presidentlate of position Czechoslovak who assumed Edvard Beneš, statesman Czech anti-German andfamously conservative, relatively the persuade and push andconsistently party, members of the conservative the of requiredhim of course, other and the more specifically, towards attaining German self-government in the Sudeten region. This, cooperating with State tofindthe adefinite solution nationalities’to the problem, and democratic basis of basis State.” of the democratic stance, even Jaksch, according toBruegel, was not prepared to “tamper with...the hisrelatively radical Yet despite politics. rightist-nationalist tomoderate was devoted Unlike Czech,proposed fighting who the SdP leftistthrough measures, socialist Jaksch seemed to be the only leading DSAP member who was willing to “fightfire with fire.” Henlein.” makingpolitical at hima“moremudslinging,” therefore to opponent effective was “morethan adept Czech out, Wingfield points Jaksch, as Furthermore, early thirties. assumed some of more national the whichissues helped leadtoHenlein’s in success the be the DSAP’s only remaining hope in hope remaining only DSAP’s be the of of the DSAP. and Germany together; closer unintended andundoubtedly harmful anti-Nazi the to aims SdP delegation Nazi the to Party Rally in Nuremberg, 149 148 Will.” 147 Bruegel, Wingfield, 152. Made world-famous by Leni famousRiefenstahl propaganda film “Triumph of the Jaksch’s The second approach The second by was embodied approach Jaksch’s 148 With his reputation as a vain, excessively ambitious politician, Jaksch Czechoslovakia before Munich before Czechoslovakia Jungaktivismus 149 held, above all else, that the only effective counterweight In his mind, the DSAP could accomplish more by Jungaktivisten directly , 148. 56 fighting the popularity of the SdP in that it , or young both , or oppose to activists, 147 symbolically theSdP pushing Jungaktivismus, which seemed to CEU eTD Collection establish a sounder German establish asounder base, democratic Agrarians andBourgeois,” suggesting acooperation with in Germanthe rightorder to in work from isolation cannot the socialism in that “mandates Czechoslovakia 1935, trying times. “The law of self-preservation,” Jaksch pointed out at the party congress in minded program. Jaksch also held that Social Democracy could notact alone in these loyalty despite Jaksch’s reflects State Such a the hiscontinued statement nationally to deputy chairman. In general, Jaksch preached the necessity of avoiding war at all costs, largelyin manifested reconciliation, his speechesandactions in as party’sthe parliament whom Jaksch inherently from distrusted, proposedthe political alliance,. 154 enemy.” concept of the “popular front,” a broad political cooperation formed to fight a“common 153 152 people.or Jaksch in argued a 1936 peaceful, progressive relationship with their Czech counterparts. “It is finally time,” between activist nationalist politics and Nazi-inspired nationalism in order to maintain a line dividing clear a in consolidating invested was movement Jaksch the right, the position” 151 150 idea he called Jaksch as quoted in Bachstein,95. 84, This alliance never came to be. Here, Jaksch applied the newly-born, communist Jaksch in quoted Bachstein,Italics 98. added. Jaksch in quoted Bachstein, 69. Volkssozialismus Between Between 1935 and 1938,Jakschlaunched national alarge-scale program towards 150 in other words, he sought to procure self-government for minority areas, an national cooperation. national of chance any endangering foothold, a gain will German] and Czech divisions, Czech mistrust will these rise and nationalism recognize to fail on both Germans sides [thatof Sudeten is, majority the as long of the Third Reich, and to draw a sharp line between adventurous youths, paid agents and spies Volkssozialismus. denotes a type of socialism which concentrates on German on the concentrates which atypesocialism of denotes Sozialdemokrat 152 151 true Although national politics [in Czechoslovakia]. So Czechoslovakia]. [in politics national article, 57 153 Jungaktivismus implicitly excluding the Communists, the excluding implicitly advocated adecided to turn advocated 154 volk CEU eTD Collection 1937,” 157 156 Abgeordnetenhaus von1930-1938, Stenographer’s 26. dubnaNotes], [April] 1936,” appears a full page picture of missiles bearing swastikas and wearing the wings of doves, be by peaceoffers will followed “...Andhis ‘doves of there Hitler’s caption peace,’” photographsother andillustrations, one particular warning stands Alongout. with the the Party, Democratic messages. With the help of hundreds of refugees from Germany, mostly from the Social warnings of consequencesthe of a Sudeten alliance with Germany its blatantanti-Nazi accommodation within the existing Czechoslovak State system. constructive a through rather but Hitler, with alliance an through not achieved parliamentary speeches. Germans need a better, equal position in the State. This can be discussion,” that a practical solution to the national problem can be found in the arena of politicians February the “reenforced supported [the DSAP’s]1937 resolutions, conviction Czech leading the that fact The nationalities. country’s the among understanding Jaksch was hopeful solutiona future of Sudetento the problem, by created mutual in Slovaks State, the freedom Czech or as the inshare same not, the fact, do Germans carry.”now forthey burden thedifficult parties] activist parties, and therefore now sought “understanding from the Czech parties for the [German past, the Germanactivists hadbeen the denied support of the ruling Czechoslovak the the same time, however, Jaksch turned his attention to the Czechoslovaks,insisting that in the only solution to which was, according toJaksch, a“unanimous creed of peace.” 155 Wenzel Jaksch, “Vertrauen in die eigene Kraft: Rede im Abgeordnetenhaus, 3Dec, im in Abgeordnetenhaus, Rede Kraft: eigene Wenzeldie “Vertrauen Jaksch, Ibid, 110. Wenzel Jaksch, “P Jaksch, Wenzel: RedenvordemAbgeordnetenhaus von 1930-1938, Propaganda from from Propaganda that this reflects period of early the inits implicitthirties 157 rather than in war. Jaksch’s path to a solution is made clear in his Ĝ Allgemeine Illustrierte Zeitung iloha kt Č snopisecké zprávé v Praze [Addendum tothe snopisecké vPraze zprávé 109. 58 Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden vordem Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden was published in Prague. Among 156 While admitting that the that admitting While 188. 155 At CEU eTD Collection 1938, theDSAP wasalone the andisolated, strong-willed Jaksch theirhope of only not. It had not even struck important alliances with other German activist parties. By early organizing, and strategizing. Hitler and Henleinhad come upwith a plan. The DSAP had busy dealing with its own problems, the SdP and their Nazi allies had been amassing, turmoil led to the lack of a cohesive, comprehensive party program. While the DSAP was part of DSAP.the failed The 1935elections ledtoinner turmoil among party. the This agreement. Munich infamous the before months in the and beginfinal their againstoffensive theSdP,which would shape take in 1938electionsthe living in foreign states, 1938 speech in hewhich publicly responsibility accepted for the millionten Germans Anschluss DSAPthe would choose tofollow. Inlate March 1938,given alarmingthe Austrian conservative elements, was innow position pursueto Jaksch’s executive committee, signaling a definite change in the party. The party,largely rid of its retirement of several older DSAP leaders and the establishment of a new,younger chairman, an supported by appointment Beneš himself. Jaksch’s election the prompted new astheparty’s elected and wasduly Jaksch asparty chairman Czech resigned to pursueastronger defense against the ReichNazis and Henleinists. the Under pressure, potential whatvoters a SdP Sudeten- Hitler alliance couldlead to. uncover the true meaning of Hitler’s definition of “peace,” namely war, and warns headingdestroy down to of a crowd bewildered onlookers. History, andDiplomacy 159 158 “No. 5:Reichstag Speech, February 20, 1938,” SeeFigure 4. The years between 1935 and 1938weremarked byadisappointingfailure on the It would be the anti-Nazi, pro-reform path of Jaksch and the tothe German Reich earlier that month, and, not tomention Hitler’s February 159 the DSAP’s executive committee decided that the party party needed decided the that committee DSAP’sexecutive the 59 Yale Law Yale Law School: DocumentsonLaw, 158 Such propaganda serves to Volkssozialismus Jungaktivisten, and that CEU eTD Collection undemocratic SdP. in no same speedasthe breakneck way atthe compete could Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak politics during this period. The slowness of the democratic reform in only under a certain acertain pressure.” only under “democracies are used to acting slowly and hesitantly, carrying out even overdue reforms survival in increasingly the Sudetenland.As radical J. W. Bruegel out, points 160 Bruegel, Czechoslovakia before Munich before Czechoslovakia 160 This was not only the case of the DSAP, but also of , 147. 60 CEU eTD Collection fought on foughtlevel on the of tore-popularizepolitics Sudeten activism integrity the and attack of leadership, nowunderthe control of foughtJaksch, their on fronts. battle three They fight in Sudeten politics since the foundation of the Republic in 1918. The DSAP Sudetenland Reich.the to Thisfinal stage wasthemost extreme, violent, and desperate Republic, namely that against the eventual Munich Agreement and the annexation of the intensity of the elections, they would end in the SdP’s enormous electoral victory in 1938. Sudeten Germans, Czechoslovakia, and of Europe in its hands. Despite the veritable of 1938 were the elections in May, which,in hindsight, seemed to hold the fate of the battlelost firstThe DSAP’s appeasers. French and andBritish war-fearing Germany, the powerful will of Hitler’s the leadership, Czechoslovak of conservative hands the German Social Democrats, reveals a strong and determined battle which failed at the closer look behind the scenes in 1938, and especially intothe antifascist efforts of Germans worked as a whole to destroy the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. A mistake, as I alluded to in the introduction of this essay, to assume that the Sudeten absorption of Sudetenland,the eventually and, Czechoslovakia it proper, would bea by party,represented SdP,did Hitler elected the fortheir the offer agolden opportunity Germans, as a whole, as “Hitler’s fifth columnists.” While the Sudeten Germans, as year, history has largelyignored this struggle andon concentrated rolethe Sudeten the of V: 1938: Towards the End 161 “Letztes Manifest,” from a post, mid-September 1938 from Fiedler, 75. See Figure 5. The DSAP’s second battle of battle of beThe DSAP’s lastreal theirsecond 1938 would in battle First the that events extra-political and politics Sudeten of character turbulent the Despite historic decision. It is about the life or death of our people! The gateto Everything isat stake! The SudetenGermans are standing infront of a a peaceful solution of the Sudeten Germans iswide open! -DSAP document, September 1938 61 161 CEU eTD Collection on out, be an outright“fighting party.” announced the DSAP would nolonger be an “appeasement party,” but would, from here impending communal elections in late May. As the newly elected chairman, Jaksch, for Czechoslovakia the toprepare in campaign andthroughout Sudetenland the than itsmore previous “rightest” launched under leadership, publicity alarge-scale 5. 1 The Communal Elections of 1938 of Elections Communal The 1 5. community. international the and government SdPandthe Hitler, and they sought understandingand supportfrom Czechoslovakthe resigned in protest. Franz Spina, formerly Minister of Labor, and Minister Erwin Zajicek of the Clerical party 163 162 April 5, Jaksch declared that “German Social Democracy is and will remain an innovator since the early thirties to combat the German extreme right. In a parliamentary session on out the duplicitous politics of the Henleinists, the same tactic which the DSAP had used a steady attitude of Czechoslovak cooperation, while at the same time attempting to point maintained Jaksch parliament, In else. all over stability economic and in peace investment State. lack from Czechoslovak members, a and of the support party its diehard opponents, the SdP and its Nazi backers, and, as argued by some historians scale election campaign. Itsfailure, however, was ultimately the result of external factors: Sudeten annexation to the Reich. The DSAP, despite theirisolation, carried out a full- in voicedfor who now calls openly irredentists, andGerman for theagainst State fight movement, leaving the DSAP isolated, save for ahandful of German communists, in the parties and Clerical German the Agrarian German the While these parties joined the ranks of the SdP, prominent Agrarian activist politician Jaksch as quoted in Bachstein, 152. Beginningin March 1938, the DSAP, nownewly organized and significantly In the two months before the elections, the DSAP strongly manifested their By endof the March 1938,Czechoslovakia’s onlytworemaining activist parties, 162 62 163 , had joined the Henlein CEU eTD Collection before 1935, focused alternatively on the positive aspects of the DSAP and the negative spread the elections, the DSAP also manifested both its distaste for Nazi politics and its desire to by who SdPupon those the didnot support their cause. fearlessly reaffirms the party’s values and at the same time uncovers the wrath unleashed Sudeten Sudeten politics. asaminority speak for right of no theSudeten intheirpopulation because to party status whoabuptly furtherand without explanation spurts out Jakschthe islying, worse, has or Within his speeches, Jakschis by constantly interrupted Dr. Neurath, SdPdelegate the 166 165 Abgeordnetenhaus von1930-1938, war.” people with unashamed extortion, based on their economic dependency and fear of inraging Sudetenland,the “the claiming that SdPhas targeted Germanthe democratic currently SdP, of the unfair methods to the attention calls Jaksch sameIn the speech, Stenographer’s 5.Stenographer’s Notes],” dubna [April] 1936,” of of freeunderstanding between and equalnationalities.” 164 points out resign themselves to the new strain in Sudeten politics.“It is a difficult, glorious task,” he as the SdP continually maintained, but social realities. levelthe of radicalism in Sudetenland.the The problem,he suggests, is notpolitical bias, and rates unemployment high continuing between connection the consider to government Ibid, 52. Ibid,Italics 39. added. Wenzel Jaksch, “P 166 Apart from parliamentary affirmations of the party’s strong stance before the Finally Jaksch announced the DSAP’s givedesire neverto into pressurethe and In these parliamentary madespeeches, by public JakschDSAP publications, Volkssozialismus when so many have abandoned this banner... democratic belief, and the European policy of peace in the hard days, task, that that the last party of German activism [the DSAP] has set for itself: the someone Ĝ iloha kt through its through widespread propaganda campaign,like which, has to be there to carry the banner offreedom, Č snopisecké zprávé v Praze [Addendum tothe snopisecké vPraze zprávé 36. 63 Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden vordem Jaksch, Wenzel: Reden 165 164 Alternatively, Jaksch urged the Jaksch Alternatively, CEU eTD Collection “Germanized Czechs.” “Germanized March 1938 hadidentified DSAPits and supporters as “non-Germans”as or asearly as propaganda press and Recent Henleinist Czechoslovakia. anddemocratic free nationality of its constituency and its responsibility as a nation to safeguard its place in reflects both the German and the social democratic character of the party, appealing to the Party.” Worker’s Democratic Social for German the votes violence, and democracy, who supports social reconstruction, [and] who rejects institutionalized worker-friendly policy.“Every good German,” the poster reads, “who treasures freedom the DSAP not out of fear of war orHitler, but because of their progressive, peaceful, and destruction possible should the SdP be elected. suggesting just the opposite. Social Democrats, not Nazis, are property. cabin, of unaware agiganticlabelled “war” boulderkill about to him his and destroy uses samethe idea. Thepicture shows a hardworkingman plowing his field nexttohis with picture, caption itpopularthe propaganda Germans,will“Sudeten getyou first!” Another Sudetenland. destroy the peaceof eager the to creature, demonic a soulless, number). a swastika and a caption reads “defend the homeland and vote list 6”(DSAP’s most village,picturesque likely portray intended to rural Sudetenland. On hisforeheadis menacinglyskeleton holding atorch andhis gnarly, grabbing, hand held over a consequences of voting for the SdP. One particularly eerie election poster depicts a State...” (Henlein quoted in (HenleinState...” quoted Bruegel, the German Social Democrats can nolonger be counted among the Germans of this 170 169 168 167 In the In SeeFigure 8. SeeFigure 7. SeeFigure 6 On a more positive note, another DSAP pre-election poster urges voters to vote for 168 167 Prager Tagblatt This picture, like the first one described, suggests the imminent and utter The message of this poster is clear: the Henlein/Hitler front is comparable to 170 The message of this poster counters such accusations, on on March 23, 1938,Henlein is quotedsaying,“In particular, Czechoslovakia before Munich before Czechoslovakia 64 real Germans, and Germans, 169 , 171.) This message real CEU eTD Collection presented, and, as a result, party meetings were increasingly unannounced or even or unannounced increasingly partymeetings were and,asaresult, presented, Republikanische WehrRepublikanische strong, members. establishmentin 1926, had,by intoa 1937, grown strong, organized force of 7,000 not interrupted by interrupted not SdP’s the theSudetenland. various throughout andtowns cities posters. thedistributionof extendcampaign to local duetopressureexerted on houses. printed publishing undermined by In SdP supporters. Böhmisch Leipa, for example, could posters not be propaganda, it is a sound historical fact that the distribution of the material was severely DSAP’s the individuals to of reaction the hardly ascertain can historian While the violence. political against andaclear stance consciousness freedom, social demand Germans (Munich: Brücke,1982),78. Die 175 173 elections. the 172 171 Wehr, resulted in violence, the DSAP was not undefended. By 1938, the by posed militantincreasingly their Whilemost adversaries. public demonstrations to as the as to 174 Gemeinde Friedrich Kürbisch, PitFiedler, SeeFigure 9for apicture of demonstrationthe in EgeronMay 1, 1938,in midst the of Wingfield, 169. German for “Republican Defense.” Uponits foundingin 1926, this groupwas referred 174 173 The DSAP’s campaign extended to mass political rallies scheduled to be held at The DSAP’s proactive campaign was severely undermined by external factors. Rote Wehr Rote the DSAP’sthe ownparamilitary force which had been fairly inactive since its was determined to continue its campaign despite the threat of physical danger 175 (Munich: Eckhard Verlag Bodner, 2009),72. While stationed at party meetings and demonstrations, the presence of the Die Sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten: VonderDSAPzurDie SudetendeutschenSozialdemokraten: Seliger or “Red Defense.” failed toevade theinevitable violence which the Chronik der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokratie: 1863-1938 Volkssport members, the DSAP,still members80,000 65 172 While they were more often morethan Whilethey often were 171 Such pressure didnotjust Republikanische Volkssport CEU eTD Collection account of the late thirties, Maria Lippert, a DSAP memberin Eger, claims that she never Inheralsovoters. but toordinary active DSAP to restricted campaigners, political [Henleinists] could consider himself an emigre.” 1938, Henlein coldly in announced a newspaper article“anyone that not votingfor the they did not join the party in advance. Henlein hardly denied this tactic. In mid-May employers threatened to fire non-SdP members, or refused to hire them in the first place if of SdP. the terror-tactics maintaining ageographically widespread candidacy with constantthe interference and In this statement, Jaksch expresses the difficulty, oreven the nearimpossibility of cancelled. 178 177 176 effectiveness of tactic. of this effectiveness Jaksch describes the terror faced by DSAP supporters in 1938 and, sadly, the toscarepeoplehoped into from the of away welcomingactivism arms theirparty. own leaders SdP alike, businesses and families, individuals, terrorizing In Germans. apolitical widespread offensive against DSAPmembers, and supporters, politically undecided or between the Czech majority and the German minority, the SdP had launched a not fascism would eventually solve the economic plight and the unequal balance of power probably served tointimidateDSAP would-be or supporters. attendees Henlein in quoted Wingfield, 169. Jaksch in quoted Bachstein, 161. Wingfield, 175. While the DSAP wasbusy campaigning, spreading theirbelief democracy, that 176 their positions before elections.the abdicate day, election the before terror Henlein ofthe pressure dreadful municipalities, smaller many or,in in other cases, the candidates candidates [DSAP] had to, given the nominate to unable were we invasion of Hitler, they will be massacred. Under these circumstances, ...Every day oursupporters are told afterthat the supposedly imminent Thefailure of these demonstrations, which were intended tobe peaceful, Furthermore, as visible from several firsthand accounts, many SdP 66 177 178 Thus, the Henleinst terror was not just CEU eTD Collection explained he threefactors,” hopes “Weseton our terror. in anti-DSAP SdP’s the intervene militarily the “apprehensive paralysis of [the Czechoslovak] democratic system,” in their failure to party. elected, essentially turning their backs on DSAP, who at this point was still a coalition Berlin they accommodatethat were prepared to the demands of should SdP, the they be Czechoslovak leadership, as early as the spring of 1938, made it clear toemissaries from was told by general manager. the factory run primarily by members in SdP 1938. “No one wants you in their office,” she of the German City of Odrau, reports being openly rejected for asecretarial position in a Czechs and the non-Henleinist Germans residents there.” residents Germans non-Henleinist the and Czechs the both endangering thus areas, border in the liked they what generally do to Henleinists] the government during the elections, Nancy Wingfield notes, was to “allow [the of attitude general The morally. militarily backor theDSAP to reluctance government’s for theDSAP. voting of oftheconsequences or terrified for anannexation eager inpeople either with a region isolated andutterly outnumbered, defenseless, DSAPleadership was the With scare-tactics, these phenomena. steadfast allegiance to the DSAP. tothe allegiance steadfast husband, she wasunable reports, build to acareer in fieldhis desired because of his felt repressed by the Czechs, but rather by her fellow Germans, the Henleinists. Her 182 181 179 180 Hoffnung, Bachstein, 155. Wingfield, 169. Maria “Von Lippert, den eigenen in unterdrückt” Volksgenossen “Herta Sedla “Herta 182 Another obstacle to a successful campaign was the Czech-dominated wasthe campaign a successful to obstacle Another At theSocialist Worker International Conference inMay 1938, Jakschlamented 67. þ kova,” Sie Blieben derTschechoslowakei treu Sie Blieben 180 179 These are just Theseareexamples of a well-documented two Another active Social Democrat, Herta Sedla Herta Another activeDemocrat, Social 67 181 Furthermore, the , 21. Helden der þ kova CEU eTD Collection 187 Bachstein, 160. trade union system). in (aleading intellectual J. Watt the and Robert Secretary), Parliamentary British (future 186 185 184 183 wouldmost likely firstDSAP target members. Sudeten border mightindicate the coming of a full-fledged Henleinist uprising which Sudetenland, and mentioned that he feared that a rumored German mobilization on the in Brussels inMay 1938. InBrussels, Jaksch commented on politicalthe incrisis the party, with Jaksch as its representative, appealed to the Socialist International which met inleaders. of was disappointed political the character Czechoslovak As demonstrated here, at crucialthe inturning point Sudeten politics in mid-May, Jaksch election campaign or in the months which followed. which months in the or campaign election served to peripherally support the party, and did not, in a significant way,interfere in their derived moral support from the backing of the International, the organization merely principles of personal freedom and democracy.” the “loyalty to DSAPfor theirthe which recognized a resolution International passed the speakers speak to on DSAP’sthe behalf theirduring election campaign. and, throughout nextthe few supplied weeks, the party internationalwith popular oppressors. actual SdPthemselveswerethe that the that beingoppressed, not were Henleinists the press, international inthe reports to contrary that community socialist international Wingfield, 170. Speakersincluded Richard Crossman Politician),(British Labour Philip Noel-Baker Wingfield, 170. Wingfield, 169. Jaksch in quoted Bachstein, 160. With the reluctance of the Czechoslovak government to fully back the DSAP, the DSAP, the back fully to government Czechoslovak the of reluctance the With 185 the Czech people’s desire for freedom. on and spirit; democratic a by inspired officers excellent by led is that army, an on undisputed; be should resolve and courage whose Beneš, on Inturn, International the intensity recognized the DSAP’sthe of struggle 68 184 183 187 Furthermore, he to pronounced the While DSAP leaders may have 186 Furthermore, CEU eTD Collection to the largest electoral victory of a party victory electoral largestto the on andledpopulation blind-eye turned by Sudeten the the government Czechoslovak the publicundisturbed voice forum to and their concerns hopes for SudetenGerman future, extortionist methods of the Henlein party, the failure of the DSAP tofind a proper opportunist, oruncaring citizens and politicians. Combined, the terrorist,violent, and become reality, DSAP the and wastruly a lonely surrounded by hostile,group inevitable? by as foreign troops marched across the borders and into their country. But was this fate leaving choiceSudetenland, little recoiled, Czechoslovakia buttosurrender andidly sit of the for possession Czechoslovakia wage waragainst Hitlerto wasready that convinced who, “appeasers,” British and French the of hands the at failed efforts their State, the of integrity territorial the maintain to battle a life-and-death fought communists of the country by Germany. Yet while the Czechoslovak leaders, the DSAP, and a handful of German Czechoslovakia hadtobe reformed to defend probablethe against invasion of leadersCzechoslovakmembers andleadingDSAP currentgeopolitical the that situation Hitler drafted the plans for the destruction of a atate that had taken twenty years to build. democratic Czechoslovakia, and the DSAP did not intend tosit idly by as Henlein and smaller counties. 189 129.)1974), East Central Europe between the two World Wars, (Seattle : University of Washington, German (Joseph vote. Rothschild, 188 Demise DSAP’s the and Munich 2 5. percentof Germanthe 90.4 vote. Wingfield, 170. Including forvotes theCommunist party, the SdPhad eighty-five percent of the When the election results arrived,it is clear that none of Jaksch’s hopes had With the enormous success of the SdP in the 1938 elections,it became clear to Could 189 it have been prevented? In the following pages, Iwill discuss the Yet struggle the wasnot TheSudetenland over. wasstill part of 188 The DSAP only won the majority of votes inseveral votes of majority the won only DSAP The ever 69 in Czechoslovak history, SdPwinning the CEU eTD Collection run,in the interest of the State to rule over an unsatisfied minority group.” Jaksch urged Czech leaders to “finally tell their people the truth, that it is 192 191 Inan of in the Juneedition article the Czechoslovakia. of Germans German consideringself-government, the dangerous radical mood which had gripped the events. For one, they stressed the need for areform concerning the question of Sudeten years. ten almost for had lasted ended the DSAP official connection to the government in Prague, a relationship which membership in governmentthe was ‘absolutely intolerable and disturbing.’” continued and Social the Democrat’s Germans of Sudeten the representatives authorized DSAP were involved. Their party,members of the SdP pointed out, were “the only dismissed from parliamentin response to SdPs refusal to cooperate in State affairs if the intimidation. There intimidation. fear, lies,and wasbasedon electoral SdP’s success the that population, and Sudeten the of representative werenot SdP that the Czechoslovakia show to determined on both a domestic and an international front. On the domestic front, the DSAP was to influence thepolitics of a rapidly changing Europe DSAP’s role in their final attempt to preserve Czechoslovakia, and their very last chance 190 possible.” them wherever andeliminate all DSAP] of influence todeprive [the their utmost Nazism and all that it stood for. Jaksch in Jaksch Ibid. Bruegel, Still, the DSAP assumed the responsibility of countering this disastrous turn of The DSAP to struggled overcome theirloss devastating in May the 1938 elections This approach This approach was compromised by SdP,who, the according toBruegel, “did 190 Czechoslovakia before Munich, before Czechoslovakia Eventually, through pressure exerted on the Czech leadership, the DSAP was Sozialdemokrat, were , the DSAP set out to prove, Sudeten Germans who rejected 5. June 1938from ItalicsBachstein, added. 162. 70 172. Sozialdemokrat not 192 191 Such , in the long in the , Thus entire , CEU eTD Collection His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949), 408. eds., or of a Commision of Investigation or Enquiry,” in E.L Woodward and Rohan Butler, 195 109.) Nevertheless DSAP felt that they, as the last democratic German party, needed to,and (which means the German government) and the Czechoslovak government direct.” Germany convinced be that only would “Henleinbetween satisfiedan with agreement was government British The representatives. government Czech and leaders SdP with ingovernment Prague. Runciman mostand his team devoted of their consulting time to moresincebecome persistent progressively theirinitial in April),demands had demandsautonomy for SdP(whose the between relations situation negotiate andthe decided it was time to intervene, and sent an emissary, Lord Walter Runciman, toassess and borderlands increasinginterestGermany’s in British the Sudetenland, the finally international platform. Concerned about the rising level of violence on the Czechoslovak party. out of a “moral obligation,” because they were the last remaining, loyal German activist Prague Castle for talks with the President, who, according to Bachstein, only invited them warnings largely In ignored. were months,these DSAPleaders wasfrequently invited to Stasi.eu. as (Henlein issaying: quoted make“We must demands thatcannot be satisfied.” followed. which months in the country in the foreboding response, rejected any form of cooperation, creating an almost unbearable sense of conceded on a number of demands, the SdP, “perturbed”by the State’s unexpected tobemet. expectedanyof actually Though theCzech demands these government Henlein never in andthat Prague tension agitation of and an for creating atmosphere historians, and I believe rightly so, has judged these impossible demands to be a mere tool nationally the to minded Czech government, distasteful and byinherently design,were would notbe satisfied.Czechoslovakia, in Many autonomy political total SdP governmentin all Sudeten The regions. demands, which implicitly self- implied granting the complete for a stipulation prominently, most including, government Prague the 194 193 In April, Henlein, in close cooperation Hitler, put forth a list of conditions to be met by Bachstein, 162. William Strang, H. M. Emmissary in Berlin and Prague, “Appointment of an Observer Documents on BritishForeign Policy, Series, 1919-1939, Third Volume I 193 In July 1938, the DSAP had the opportunity to voice their concerns on an 71 20 Dec. 2009, Facing History 194 and the and (London: 195 , CEU eTD Collection identity.” national distinctive own their [retained] and nationalities other the with equality “full that reforms should be made which ensured that the Germans of Czechoslovakia enjoyed butregion of peace” the Sudeten of European interest remainCzechoslovakia,should part Runciman with a forty-three page memorandum. Therein, the DSAP insisted that “in the argued, “and wefeel, asa Germaninextricably party, bound to this fate.” his colleagues and Jaksch Germans,” the fate Sudeten of the will decide Czechoslovakia had the right to be heard. “Our opinion at a crucial turning point in the history of 196 197 (Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 154-155. 2003), self-administration. anddemocratic region, Sudeten the solution: proportionality in service,linguisticpublic equality,reinvestment government in his book probably dismissed the DSAP’s memorandum as unimportant. Historian Paul Vyšný,in DSAP, historians of the period have largely concluded that the Runciman delegation the with meeting Runciman’s mentions description, without and briefly, only period the moderation of Jaksch and his colleagues.” Yet while British foreign correspondence of Czechoslovakia and that not all Sudeten Germans were SdP supporters. R. G. D. Laffan,in in infact, Germans “other” were, Czechoslovakia, aware that there mission Runciman Czechoslovakia. Germans of roused the hadalready captivated now presenting a route less extreme than the demands of autonomy made by Henlein, who by a represented decided shiftin the finally,nationalitiesyet addressing officially problem, Paul Vyšný, Wingfield, 175. Therefore, on the second day of the mission, the DSAP, led by Jaksch, approached On the whole, the DSAP’s appeal Britainto did little but make members of the The RuncimanMission, 196 The memorandum fouroutlined points crucial in securing a Sudeten-Czech The RuncimanMissionto Czechoslovakia, 1938:Prelude to Munich notes (without citation) that “Runciman was impressed by the sanity and surmises that Runciman “probably DSAP]regarded [the 72 197 Basically, the DSAP’s proposal Crisis over Crisis CEU eTD Collection its authors suggestitsis authors imminent. Moreover, authorsthe pointout that Sudeten the Czech-German war,whichcan be without The documentproposes that equality achieved their strength for peace and freedom,for a better future, and for anew and equal Europe.” last cry for support. form and of flyers,posters which encouraged activestruggle against Henleinists the in a against random attacks onSocialrandom property. against attacks Democratic and had significantly fewer weapons, the DSAP’s the fewer weapons, andhad significantly written by foreign service officer Frank Roberts, officerFrank by foreign service written as somethingan irrelevance” based of in on his a documentof discovery archives the 203 202 201 74. in Fiedler, summarized Rehwald Franz 200 199 198 kidnapped. embodied by Communists and Social Democrats, were threatened, beaten, and even largely Antifascists, Democrats. andloyal communists, Social Jews, organizations, resemblebegan Czechs, Sudetenland to State targeted a civil war.Henleinsupporters we will see, would stop at little to nothing to prevent awar. international appeal to the European community failed at the hands of the British, who, as members of a democratic party, but rather as “troublemakers.” felt utterly ignored by Runciman, and felt that the British delegation failed to see them as longer“no count for much among the Sudetens.” memorandum as “a very reasonable document” and lamented the fact that but the DSAP “Letztes Manifest” “Letztes Wingfield, 177. Fiedler, 75. Opinions of Jaksch, DSAP General Secretary Siegfried Taub, and economic expert Vyšný, 155-156. Roberts was a junior official at the British Foreign Office at the time. Two weeks before the Munich Agreement, the DSAP released a statement, in the As the summer progressed, organized SdP violence and acts of terrorism in the 201 Despite the fact that they were grossly outnumbered by outnumbered grossly factwere they Despite that the 203 Therein, the DSAP urged all Sudeten Germans to “mobilize all 73 198 199 Republikanische WehrRepublikanische who praised the DSAP’s Even DSAP members themselves members DSAP Even 202 200 Thus, the DSAP’s Volksport bravely members, fought CEU eTD Collection himself had expressed his concerningdoubts the League,stating that avoid war, wary of the League’s effectiveness. Months before Munich, Chamberlain preserve peaceand the eagerto demands, before Hitler’s members, shrank powerful most post Versailles system and the League of Nations. France and Britain, as the League’s Czechoslovakia. of dismemberment the endorsing officially Agreement Munich the Sudetenland to Reich.the Justdays later, French and leaders British infamously signed the of annexation complete the for demands his rationalize to Czechs the and SdP the Hitler failed InSeptember, usedthe between negotiations proposals. annexation Hitler’s regions, Sudeten ceded the French rejected inplan this the and appeasers favorof British backers. While Beneš, by late September, had agreed to a “Fifth plan” which voluntarily definitive form, and there was no stopping their separatist demands or its powerful Nazi One week later they One weeklaterthey various publications. theirsuspended twenty years of activism within the Republic, unofficially from departed Sudeten politics. downfall with war.” With these words, with this ultimatum, the DSAP, after nearly the terror of the First World War. Readers are offered a choice,“equality though peace, or younger generation what the “hell of war” looks like, and reminds the older generation of Sudetens themselves will be the first victims. In gory detail, the document informs the Germans are being misused as a tool for “imperialistic expansionist goals,” of which the The British League Government, the of Nations and Sudetenlandthe in Question,” 205 204 Chamberlain as quoted in Peter J. Beck, “Searching for Peace in Munich, notGeneva: Out of fear of endangering its readers and subscribers. (Bachstein, 173) The signing Munichthe of Agreementpainfully failurethe demonstrated of the its had reached in Sudeten By Nazism Czechoslovakia endof September, the the be expected. can kind of the nothing that know [they] when accordingly, acting and aggression against League the by protected be will they that thinking and still more, [they] must not try to delude small weak nations, into for anybody...[and that the British] must not try to delude themselves, the League as constituted today is unable to provide collective security 205 74 204 The CEU eTD Collection himself eventually found refuge in England. Those DSAP who supporters remained in roughly one thousand officials DSAP to European emigrate western countries. Jaksch asylum. Jaksch, who had extensive contacts abroad and keen negotiating skills, helped andsome“rump Czechoslovak whichthe for otherEuropean State,” states provided them was now a disbanded and directly incorporated into disbanded andincorporated Reich’spolitical the structure. directly as afunctionalyears, Sudetenland act the would andReich territory SdPwould the be minority with group which they had entered Czechoslovakia in 1918. In nextthe six andits agenda. Asof early 1938, October Sudetensthe werenolonger historic the veritable change in nationalism popularSudeten fully to one subscribed toReich politics of of present-day Sudetenland, banners proclaimedSudetenland,“ banners swastikas, Hitler was widely hailed as the region’s liberator-Messiah. with plastered andtowns villages in of German idea.Greeted streets political Sudeten the country’s well-being, andnotnecessarily of that Europe. suggesting thatthe countriestwo abandoned the idea of Leaguethe infavor of their own Munich,notGeneva, The British and French, Peter J. Beck points out in his article “Searching for Peace in 209 208 10 and 11, also demonstrate the intensity with which Hitler was received. 207 206 (London, Portland OR:Frank Cass,175. 1999), Munich Crisis, 1938:Prelude to World War II formulation offormulation Nazi policy foreign Ronald M. Smelser, SeeFigure 12. This canbe in seen at several the videos Nazi propaganda liketime. Pictures, inFigure Ibid. 239. As a political DSAPorganization, the disappeared from Sudetenland,the which Hitler’s entry victorious into Sudetenland the showedhis dominationcomplete of Gau national of the Reich. Some members physically left the Sudetenland, some for ” “sought to ensure anassessment“sought [peace]evolved that according to to The SudetenProblem, 1933-1938;Volkstumspolitik andthe policy interests rather than doctrinaire internationalism,” doctrinaire than rather interests policy (Folkestone: Dawson,1975),240. Ein Volk, ein FueherEin Reich, Ein 75 , eds. Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein ,” 208 207 illustrating the 209 All over the 206 CEU eTD Collection where many lives.where many theirlost Reich’s concentration camps like Dachau, Flossenbürg. Mauthausen, and Buchenwald, the to transported immediately were Democrats Social ten thousand over annexation, their homes in the borderlands, were subject toHitler’s regime of terror. Upon Fiedler, 81. 212 211 ina house Czech becan formeron ghetto. seen the March 1942, where he died onlyfive months later inA August. plague commemorating Ludwig Czech, who was of Jewish origin, was deported to the Theresienstadt ghetto in 210 wiped off political map,the and would brutally been had DSAP the 1939, in March Czechoslovakia of invasion German the DSAP, a party which had been part of its political community for nearly twenty years. By With theCzech these words, simultaneouslycommunity thanked andsaid good-bye tothe antifascists, were terrorized and humiliated by Henleinists and Reich officials. wrote Ferdinand Peroutka, an acclaimed journalist and founder of the Czech weekly its politics from Ina abroad. sad “good-bye” tothelast remainingloyal German party, it would DSAP the invasion German proper, announcedthat of continue Czechoslovakia Ferdinand Peroutka (exact date (exact Ferdinand date unknown, Peroutka February late inin probably 1939)quoted SeeFigure 13. Fiedler, 78. In a last political meeting in Prague, in February 1939, just two months before the endured moreendured trouble the than Babylonian captivity. Social Democrats kept their movement alive...For five years, they the ideas they were created by. It was invaluable to the Republic that the against Germany’s imperialism... fight to They showedhesitate not did that parties that live party through German only the were they that No one will deny the German social democrats the merit they deserve, 210 Others, who were not immediately discovered as never 76 recover its position in its position recover Czechoslovakia. 212 211 3Ĝ ítomnost CEU eTD Collection must be viewed as an international phenomena. Interwar Czechoslovakia been often has Czechoslovakia Interwar international bemustphenomena. viewedasan for Hitler. this role played German Party exist and destruction the of Republic,the when ethnicgroup,asauniformthis group, implied the collective responsibility of an entire ethnic group for the Munich Agreement Beneš postwar expulsion decrees,whichmandated the the of German the population, tiny minority by itrefused1938, yield to tonationalist pressureuntil very the end. Thus, DSAP’sthe was struggle anda decideddownhillbattle, active its members hadbecome a those Germans whose quality of life had been threatened by the economic crisis.While Nazism through active cooperation in the State government bodies to improve the lives of of the and threat nationalism German fighting radical Czechoslovakia, of character country, by the mainly represented was DSAP. the democratic, antifascist German, which, as the last remaining democratic German party in success, as I demonstrated, does not negate the existence of another type of German, a the summer of 1938 the SdP had received over ninety percent of the German vote, their State, wereunablesolve to in decadeleadingthe up Munichto the Though agreement. by problem which the DSAP, given their already fragile position in the Czech-dominated a presented inpolitics, Sudeten of Germany interference Nazi risecrisis and the and economic the importantly most events, external The mistakes. internal and events external failure of the DSAP, as I have explored in this study, was dictated by a combination of German Social Democracy and, most importantly, its devotion to activist politics. The CONCLUSION . The Sudeten German population was not“Hitler’s fifth column:” the Sudeten The interwar struggles involving Sudeten The interwar struggles involving Germany,Germans,Sudeten and Czechoslovakia From 1929, the DSAP engaged in a full-scale struggle to maintain the democratic In this Ihave work, depicted evolution,the andstruggle decline, of Sudeten 77 did not CEU eTD Collection KP Czechoslovak Republic, after which the State became subject to the one-party rule of the 214 Crown Czechoslovakia. (i.e. Hugh Agnew’s definitive 17) and is still commonly used in and books, articles, studies surrounding interwar same it time accepted the Czech leadership of the country, and, eventually eventually partnership the and, of country, the leadership Czech the itsame accepted time sometimes contradictory political body. this State, which,in reality, was nota nation-State, the DSAP embodied a complicated, somehow contradictory notion that this country could be constructed as a nation-state. In Czechoslovakia became the victim its multinationalof population, and the popular, nationalism, of age the In boundaries. national than rather historic, along construction very State’s the itto understand is important escalated, crisis wassparkedand Sudeten regimes. and would, for the next fifty years, endure the presence of oppressive, dictatorial casualties, World first of War’s one Second became the and Czechoslovakia democracy, government and the antifascist German politicians failed to halt. Once a bastion of peace be of proved an force whichto Czechoslovak efforts the unstoppable combined the German nationalism and Nazism,strength whose had steadily been escalating since1929, foreign politics was inevitable.seemingly combination Thedangerous of Sudeten not was only economically, location central but nationally and connected population to its neighbors, and multinational so, theits infiltrationwith of Czechoslovakia, Europe.” andviolence of Europe. praised by historians for being “anisland of democracy” among the raging dictatorships “dismemberment of central Europe’s one island of democracy,” ( Henry R. Luce, in reference to the recent Munich agreement, lamented the 213 Excluding brief, the year three (1945-1948) period of short-livedthe Third This term was usedin as publishing early 1938,when as ý , and indirectly to the whims of the Soviet Union. , or Norman Stone’s While the DSAP was a national party with a specific national constituency, at the While one can point outside of Czechoslovakia’s borders to explain how the 214 213 If an island, it was hardly spared the radicalism of “mainland Czechoslovakia: crossroadsandcrises, 1918-88 78 The Czechs andthelandsof Bohemian Time -founder and journalist Time vol.1938, pp. 32, ). CEU eTD Collection democracy ingredient failuredemocracy and of asad First tothe Czechoslovakthe Republic. cooperation and to prevent Sudeten Nazism, the DSAP’s decline proved an affront to maintain ofitsto failure Sudeten-Czech Given Nazism. consequences the Sudeten government.established structure Czech-dominated by the appease theneeds of anddesires theframeworkwithin people of the democraticthe itsflexibility approach (perhaps belated)nationalitiesthe desireto issuedemonstrates to Its existence. of Czechoslovakia’s inits fierce defense democratic process to the devotion its reflects nineteen-thirties inthe politics fascist Henlein’s and DNSAP’s the of tide its main,most important ideological and The root. DSAP’s struggleresist to the rising emanating from Nazi Germany took hold of Czechoslovakia, the DSAP was stripped of embody one of them, their lifeline: democracy. So, when radical non-democratic politics “Czechoslovakism,” nor could itfully subscribe the international politics of communism. with the fully nationalist program of the SdP, commit tofully to the concept of national and socialist fusion, the DSAP, too, had failed. The DSAP could not compete dissolution of Habsburgthe monarchy had failed tofully achieve its dual program of a nor was it fully socialist. Therefore, like its predecessors, the Austro-Marxists, who by the Thus, during its nearly yearstwenty of existence the party was neitherfully nationalist, needsthe workingthe of man,the party distanced from itself Czechoslovak Communism. to catered and rhetoric socialist itespoused While Democrats. Social Czechoslovak of the On the whole, the DSAP can be seen as a democratic, if flawed, alternative to Of the many divergent words in its name, the DSAP only managed to 79 fully CEU eTD Collection Figure 1: andFiguresPictures Appendix: Sudetenfrage, 215 “Wie die Sudetendeutshen politisch wählten, 1920-1938,” How the Sudeten German Voted Politically ed, Fritz Peter Habel (LangenMüller: Munich 80 215 , 1984), 475. , 1984), Documente zur CEU eTD Collection Figure 3: Czech willbe speaking. disguised fascism [and] for Freedom and Bread: Party Chairman Comrade Dr. Ludwig Figure 2: nad Labem Ústí: Muzeum Mesto nad Labem,26. 2008), 217 216 “Propagandacollage der DSAP, Arbeiter-Jahrbuch, 1933,” V 1933,” derDSAP,Arbeiter-Jahrbuch, “Propagandacollage Fiedler, 54. “We are demonstrating on the fourth of November, 1934... against open and “Wenew arebuilding a world!” 216 217 81 ergessene Helden( Ústí CEU eTD Collection Figure 5: 219 nad Labem, 2008), 218 Fieldler, 75. “Nazi Peace Doves, 1936,” “Last Manifest” “Last , from Muzeum Mesto Ústí nad Labem 219 Vergessene Helden( 82 peace’” will be followed by his ‘doves of Figure 4: Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum MestoÚstí 218 “...And Hitler’s peace offers CEU eTD Collection Labem 221 nad Labem 220 Figure 6: Picture from “Anti-fascist Poster for the Communal Election in 1938,” from Muzeum MestoÚstí “Protect the homeland! the “Protect Allgemeine Illustrierte, 220 Figure 7 1938. Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum MestoÚstí nad : “Sudeten Germans, it will hit you first!” you hit will it Germans, “Sudeten : 83 221 CEU eTD Collection 223 nad Labem, 13. 2008), the big rally” (Eger) AtFreedom, and Socialism! Bread, Peace, Work, Figure 9: Party!” Figure 8: 222 Fiedler, 73. “Plakat der DSAP, 1938,” 222 1. May: Against War and Fascism! For: Worker’s forDemocratic Social theGerman German votes “Every good 223 Vergessene Helden( 84 Ústí Ústí nad Labem : Muzeum Mesto Ústí CEU eTD Collection Figure 11 : A Sudeten woman in Eger Greeting Entering 20 Dec. 2009. Hitler Greets Crowds in Eger, October 3, 1938 United States Holocaust MemorialMuseum, 85 > 20.Dec.2009. Wehrmacht 224 225 CEU eTD Collection 227 “I am betrayed Nazis” “I the am a scampwho Figure 13: photograph) Figure 12: Id=1891 226 D.C. Antifascists being humiliated: being Antifascists JubilantSudeten Germans welcome Nazi troops in 1938 (See title on top of 20 Dec. 2009.. 226 United States Holocaust MemorialMuseum, 227 86 CEU eTD Collection Fiedler, Pit. Fenet, Alain. “The Question of Minorities in the Order of Law,” in Epstein, Dr.Leo, ed. eds. andDavidWeber, Barbora Cermakova, English Historical Review Cornwall, Mark.“The Struggle on Czech-Germanthe Language Border, 1880-1940.” Volksbuchandlung, 1960. Bruegel, J.W. Acton, Lord. “Nationality.” Works Cited Beneš, Zdenek and Vaclav Kural, eds. 1999. World War League of Nations andtheSudetenland Question.” II the Geneva: Government, TheBritish not in Munich, for Peace J.“Searching Beck, Peter K. Martin Bachstein, Bruegel, J.W. Bottomore, Tom and Pratrick Goode, eds. Tom Bottomore, Goode, and Pratrick Tschechoslowakei. Bohman, Alfred. Blum, Mark E. Gemeinde Republik, relations in theCzech Provinces, 1948-1948 the AgeofNation-States Biographische Interviews mitdeutschen Antifaschisten. appeasement policy 1974. Verso,York: 1996. 1978. KN: The University ofKentucky,Press 1985. Die Sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten: Von der DSAPzurDie SudetendeutschenSozialdemokraten: Seliger , eds. Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein.London, Portland OR:Frank Cass, Czechoslovakia beforeMunich:the German minorityproblem andBritish Ludwig Czech: undStaatsmann Arbeiterfuehrer The Austro-Marxists, 1890-1918 Reichenberg: Gebrueder Stiepelm. Ges. b.H.,1923 . Munich: Eckhard Verlag Bodner, 2009. Menschen undGrenzen, 4: Band Bevölkerung undNationalitäten inder Koeln: Verlag Wissenschaftund Politik, 1975. Studien-Ausgabe der Verfassungsgesetze der Tschoslowakischen Wenzel Jaksch und diesudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratie. , Vol. 109, No. 433 (Sept, 1994). . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Mapping theNation. , Gerrard Chaliand, ed. London: Pluto Press, 1989. Facing History: TheEvolution ofCzech-German Austro-Marxism, 87 Sie biebender treu: Tschechoslowakei : Gopal Blakrishnan, ed. London and New A Psychobiographical Study . Prague: Gallery s.r.o, 2002. The MunichCrisis, 1938:Prelude to . Oxford: Clarendon Press, . Wien: Verlag der Wiener . Wien:der Verlag Minority Peoples in . . Lexington, Munich, The CEU eTD Collection Kural, Vaclav. Machonin. Pavel and Jaroslav Krejci, Kogan, Arthur. “Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg Milena. Jesenska, Leff, Carol Leff, Carol Skalnik. Lojko, Miklos, ed. Radomir. Luza, Lammich Siegfried, Karin “EinführungSchmid, inder Verfassungsordnung der Frommer, Benjamin. Frommer, Kürbisch, Friedrich. Jaszi, Oszkar. Hulicka, Karel. “The Communist Anti-Masaryk Propaganda in Czechoslovakia.” Hasenoerl, Adolf, ed. Peter. Glotz, Leser, Norbert. “Austro-Marxism: A Leser,Norbert. Reappraisal.” American Slavic American Review East European and State, 1918-1987. Beziehungen. Staat,1918-1938. Tschoslowakischen Staatsordnung der Tschoslowakei. Sozialistischen Republik: Zur Tschoslowakischen Enwicklung.” Munich: Brücke,1982. Die Gemeinde, 1983. Henlein und Hitler. Tschechoslowakei im Kampf gegen Sozialdemokraten: Dokumentationder deutschen Sozialdemokratenaus der Press, 1964 Publishing Company, Publishing 2004. System andCentral Europe, Change. Monarchy,” Press, 1961.Chicago Vol. 11, No. 2/3, Special Issue: Conflict and Compromise. Postwar Czechoslovakia. Postwar Die Vertreibung The dissolutionof theHabsburgMonarchy. Konflikt anstatt Gemeinschaft?: Tschechen anstatt undDeutscheim Konflikt Transfer ofthe SudetenGermansTransfer New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996. The Journalism of Milena JesenskaThe Journalismof “ . JournalofModernHistory, Nation ConflictinCzechoslovakia: TheMakingand Remaking of a Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Successor States. 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The Protection ofMinorities: TheWorking andScopeof the Minorities under The RuncimanMissionto Czechoslovakia, 1938:Prelude to Munich. USA: Noble Offset Printers, Inc., 1969. Muenchen: Aufbau . Verlagsgruppe. The SudetenProblem, 1933-1938; Volkstumspolitik andthe , Vol. 15, No. 45(Apr.,, Vol. 15, 1937),599-611. Helden derHoffnung: DieAnderenDeutschenausden Sudeten, Czechs andGermans:Study oftheStruggle A in theHistoric The Makingof aState: MemoriesandObservations, 1914- London: Christophers, 1928. Documents on the Expulsion oftheSudeten Germans Minority Politics in aMultinational State. . London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1949. Documents on British Foreign Policy,1919-1939, . Folkestone: Dawson, 1975. 89 London: MacMillan and Company Limited, (English version) (English > 15May 2010. The Slavonicand New York, , . 1936. CEU eTD Collection Seliger, Josef.“2. DSAP-Parteitag in Karlsbad (3.-7.October 1920),” printed in Protokoll der deutsche sozialistische Parteitag 1919 Arbeiterpartei, in Arbeiterpartei sozialdemokratischen 1928 der Tschechoslowakischen Republik, m 28.und29. Jänner 1928 in Prag Der Erst Kongress AllerSozialdemokratischen Parteiender Tschechoslowakei: Protokoll “Konrad Henlein.” Krebs, Hans. “Sudetendeutschland marschiert,” Jaksch, Wenzel, “Arbeiterfront gegen Henleinfront,” Jaksch, Wenzel of Sudetens." the for Liberation the “The Fight Konrad. Henlein, 16 Dec. 2010. , Dec. 1933. The TrialofGerman > 20 Dec. . Der