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YUGOSLAVIA Is There a Crack in the Iron Curtain?

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YUGOSLAVIA Is There a Crack in the Iron Curtain? YUGOSLAVIA Is There a Crack in the Iron Curtain? A Radio Discussion by HAROLD FISHER ANATOLE MAZOUR and WAYNE VUCINICH Including a Special Supplement on THE COMINFORM versus YUGOSLAVIA 749TH BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY NUMBER 538 *** JULY 11,1948 Around the Round Table ... HAROLD H. FISHER, chairman of the Hoover Institute and War Library and professor of history of Stanford University ANATOLE MAZOUR, visitiug associate professor of Russian history at the University of Chicago WAYNE VUCINICH, assistant professor of Balkan and Near Eastern history of Stanford University A Supplement on the CominForm versus Yugoslavia I. "Political Trials in South-East Europe" 11 By KENNETH MATTHEWS, B.B.C. Balkans correspondent II. The Cominform Declaration on the Yugoslav Communist Party Leadership 16 III. The Reply by the Yugoslav Communist Party 23 The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entire­ ly without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and ex­ change data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting COmpa1JY. The supplementary information in this pampMet has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE speakers. The University of Chicago ROUND TABLE. Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; full-year sub­ SCt'iption, 52 issues, three dollars. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago 37, ll/i­ nois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. COPYRIGHT, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1948 YUGOSLAVIA Is There a Crack in the Iron Curtain? MR. FISHER: Is the split between *Yugoslavia's conduct is inappropriate Marshal Tito and Marshal Stalin a to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy split in international communism, or and is suitable only to nationalists. is it a phony? If there is a real cleav­ There follows a long list of what is age between Yugoslavia and Russia, regarded as instances of Bukharin should the United States act as if opportunism. They say that Yugo­ nothing had happened or give moral slavia's peasant policy is encouraging and material aid to Yugoslavia? In to the kulaks. But it is particularly any case, American foreign policy the leniencies toward the West-that faces a new crisis or, perhaps, a new is the important thing. opportunity in these unexpected de­ MR. FISHER: What is this Buk­ velopments. harin opportunism? Let us hear how the problem looks to the Russians and then how it MR. MAZOUR: They refer to the looks to the Yugoslavs, before we get opportunist policy of the Bukharin around to considering the issue from type, which means believing in the the broader international point of peaceful transformation of capitalism view and from the point of view of into socialism without any civil strife. the United States. Mazour, I wonder whether you would be willing to give MR. VUCINICH: It seems to me, if us a summary of the Russian accusa­ I understand the Soviet situation tions against Marshal Tito and the correctly in regard to the earlier leadership of the Yugoslav Commu­ Soviet developments, that Tito is now nist party. being accused of the very same thing that Stalin at an earlier period was MR. MAZOUR: The charges make accused of and stood for in the Soviet up a very long list, but I shall mention Union. only a few of the most important ones. The first is identification of the MR. FISHER: I think that that is the Yugoslav foreign policy with that of case. The very policy which the the imperialistic powers. The second Yugoslavs are now adopting is a accusation is that Yugoslavia is guilty policy not unlike that which was of slanderous Trotskyist propaganda adopted in Russia in the early years to the effect that the Soviet govern­ after the Communists had won ment is degenerate. The third is that power. 1 2 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE MR. MAZOUR: Tito's present plan used to present to Stalin that there is reminds us a little of the National no democracy in the Russian Com­ Economic Plan. munist party and that most of the MR. VUCINICH: Yes, it seems to me members of the Politburo and others that it is almost the exact copy of the are co-opted rather than e1ected­ Russians' rather unsatisfactory and exactly the same accusation. unsuccessful experience. MR. FISHER: There is a good deal MR. FISHER: Well, Vucinich, what of this business of seeing the mote is the Yugoslav Communist reply to and the beam in a controversy of this that Russian charge, or Cominform kind, where the person who is mak­ charge, that Yugoslavia is pursuing ing the argument is the one who de­ a policy hateful to the Russians? fines the degree of democracy which exists in his own state. I have been MR. VUCINICH: In a rather lengthy interested in this matter from the document the Yugoslavs refuted all point of view of timing. It does not the charges and came to the conclu­ seem to me that there was any urgent sion, it seems, that they were all based necessity for the Russians to explode on incorrect, unfounded assertions. this particular bomb at this particular The Soviet technicians, for example, moment. were not so belittled and slandered. The Yugoslavs assert that they them­ MR. MAZOUR: I do not quite agree selves are the true interpreters of with you. To us it may seem a little Marxist-Leninist teachings; but the bit more serious than it would prob­ Russians themselves and other Com­ ably seem to a Communist. First of inform states are not. They say that all, the discussion there means to the Yugoslavs were not nationalist them really a strengthening of the and that anyone who had followed party rather than a weakening. It is their underground resistance and the so-called "self-criticism"; it is also postwar developments would have getting rid of some of the elements seen that very clearly. It is very inter­ that came into the party during the esting, too, that the Yugoslavs claim war and are now regarded as unde­ that there is more democracy and sirable. self-criticism within their Commu­ nist ranks than there is in the Soviet MR. VUCINICH: I am inclined to Union. They went into great detail think that this must have been brew­ in refuting the Cominform charges ing for some time past, and only as a one by one. last resort have the Communists de­ cided to come out into the open with MR. MAZOUR: It is interesting to this charge against Yugoslavia. note here that the idea of more or less democracy within the party ranks MR. FISHER: What do you mean by is exactly the criticism that Trotsky "last resort"? THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE 3 MR. VUCINICH: Well-thinking premiulll ceases to be on the number that this would do more to under­ of people in the party, and the prior­ mine the proletarian movement, the ity is then on the discipline and order workers' movement, arid Communist within the party itself. Now here we prestige in the world than anything have a kind of purging of the inter­ else-I am sure that they would not national party, just the way you had play exactly into our hands at this a purge of the Soviet Communist moment unless they were really party back in the thirties. forced to do it. MR. VUCINICH: I think that the MR. FISHER: I wonder whether we uniqueness of the Yugoslav position cannot find some reason for this par­ must be pointed out. Tito, for exam­ ticular explosion in the change of ple, found himself in Yugoslavia situation which I think most of us during the war and organized the have sensed in the past few weeks or underground resistance. He devised perhaps in the last two months? his own tactics and plans and emerged victorious with very little if MR. MAZOUR: Does not this Com­ any assistance from any outside inform indictment also indicate a quarters. This is somewhat unlike change in the general policy of the the situation in any other country. Soviet government? From about 1936 or so Russia followed more or MR. MAZOUR: Is it so, Vucinich? less a nationalistic policy. I wonder That is exactly what Stalin used to whether this is again a turn to the say to Trotsky. Trotsky was abroad old internationalist policy of world and Stalin was inside, and he knew revolution. better what to do with Russia than did Trotsky. MR. FISHER: I would like to look at it from the angle of Russian and MR. VUCINICH: Certainly Tito has international Communist party tac­ more reason to be proud of his tics. When you have a situation in accomplishments and successes than which there is a boiling-up of revo­ do Thorez, Togliatti, Pauker, Dimit­ lutionary ferment, there is a pre­ rov, Kolarov, Gottwald, and others mium on getting as many people as -all of whom were postwar importa­ possible into the Communist party tions. In Yugoslavia, Tito built a first­ and on developing wide contacts class army of six hundred and fifty through united fronts, popular fronts. thousand men. But aside from mere­ In the course of that process you ly the sense of power that Tito now bring in a lot of people who are re­ has, and perhaps justly so, there are garded as unreliable, who have too other differences-the economic con­ many ideas of their own, and who do ditions.
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