“Artificial Islands” of the Future: The Seasteading Movement and the International Legal Regimes Governing Seasteads in EEZs and on the High Seas

Ryan C. Schmidtke *

I. SEASTEAD DEVELOPMENT AS A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL SEA LEVEL RISE ...... 1 II. SITUATING THE SEASTEAD MOVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW ...... 5 III. BACKGROUND ON THE SEASTEADING MOVEMENT AND THE FRENCH POLYNESIA “FLOATING ISLANDS” PROJECT ...... 6 IV. OPPOSITION TO AND CRITICISM OF THE PROJECT ...... 12 V. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE FLOATING ISLANDS PROJECT ...... 13 VI. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION CASE STUDIES ...... 15 VII. SHORT AND LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TSI AND BLUE FRONTIERS ...... 24

I. SEASTEAD DEVELOPMENT AS A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL SEA LEVEL RISE “How inappropriate to call this planet Earth when it is clearly Ocean.” - Arthur C. Clarke, Nature, 1990 The oceans of the world make up 97% of the planet’s water and over 70% of Earth’s entire surface area.1 Throughout history humans have desired to collect, utilize, and harness water as an essential resource.2 Humans gradually adapted and took advantage of bountiful aquatic resources, initially as a means of necessity to build and control complex aqueduct infrastructure, and more recently for economic profit as water has

* Ryan C. Schmidtke is an international law student at Stetson University College of Law in Saint Petersburg, Florida and is expected to graduate in May 2020. Mr. Schmidtke is also a graduate of East Carolina University with a background in history and Hispanic studies.

1 Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., How Much Water is in the Ocean?, NAT ’L OCEAN SERV. (last updated June 25, 2018), https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/oceanwater.html.

2 A Brief History of Water and Health from Ancient Civilizations to Modern Times, INT’L WATER ASS’N PUBL’G, https://www.iwapublishing.com/news/brief-history-water- and-health-ancient-civilizations-modern-times (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 2 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 become synonymous with luxury. This latter trend is especially evident in the United States, where oceanfront property is usually reserved for the wealthy.3 Those throughout history that failed to adapt were left to face the unyielding power of the world’s oceans, as was true with the Great Galveston Hurricane of 1900, Typhoon Nina of 1975, and Hurricane Mitch of 1998.4 As the threats of climate change and sea level rise become more urgent, humankind has been dealt a new series of water-related problems requiring creative solutions.5 Once again, humankind must adapt or face potentially devastating consequences.6 Island nations like Tuvalu and Kiribati have already undergone geographical and demographical changes as a result of sea level rise, even as residents of low-lying outer islands within Kiribati’s national boundary retreat inward.7 Another consequence of climate change that is likely to be felt, particularly in Hawai‘i, is habitat degradation to low-lying land masses and the coinciding habitat loss of various endangered and threatened species.8 One proposed solution is found in “Seasteading,” a promising alternative to traditional, terrestrial

3 See Christopher Flavelle, Why Coastal Living Is Becoming Affordable for Only the Rich, INS. J. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2018/04/24/487144.htm.

4 The Galveston Hurricane of 1900, NAT ’L OCEAN SERV. https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/features/sep13/galveston.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2019); Long Yang et al., Typhoon Nina and the August 1975 Flood over Central China, 18 J. HYDROMETEOROLOGY 451, 467 (2017), https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/JHM-D-16-0152.1; William Smith, Hurricane Mitch and Honduras: An Illustration of Population Vulnerability, 1 INT’L J. HEALTH SYS. & DISASTER MGMT. 54, 54 (2013), http://www.ijhsdm.org/text.asp?2013/1/1/54/122460.

5 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, 39-40, 95 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_Low_Res.pdf .

6 See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, "Half Seas Over": The Impact of Sea Level Rise on International Law and Policy, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 175-81 (1991), for consequences of global sea level rise on international law. See also William C. Burns, Global Warming - The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 147, 147-50, 165-70 (1997), for more specific consequences to island nations.

7 Justin T. Locke, Climate Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and Long-Term Developments, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 171, 171-80 (2009), for the impact on the Republic of Kiribati and Tuvalu increasing burdens on urban central islands and their infrastructure.

8 Jason D. Baker et al., Potential Effects of Sea Level Rise on the Terrestrial Habitats of Endangered and Endemic Megafauna in the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, 2 ENDANGERED SPECIES RES. 21, 26-28 (2006) (predicting the impact on Hawaiian fauna); Celine Bellard et al., Potential Impact of Sea Level Rise on French Islands Worldwide, 5 NATURE CONSERVATION 75, 84 (2013). 2019] Schmidtke 3 governance to vulnerable island nations like French Polynesia. According to the Seasteading Institute (TSI), the organization leading the charge for the first large-scale Seastead, the concept name “comes from homesteading, which means making a home for oneself in new, uninhabited places. It generally has associations with self-sufficiency and a frontier lifestyle. Seasteading is reminiscent of that idea, but at sea.”9 TSI is pursuing formal relationships with other coastal nations and has established a working relationship with the non-governmental organization Blue Frontiers.10 The Seasteading Institute (TSI) and Blue Frontiers are the leading NGOs behind the first Seastead, named the Floating Islands Project (FIP), that would be constructed, operated, and tentatively located in the territorial waters of French Polynesia.11 The short-term goal of the FIP would involve the habitation of various connected, floating platforms with the capability to reconfigure modules in the future.12 The plan is for the Seastead to consist of small residential structures, shops, sustainable energy development infrastructure, and aquaculture projects all within the project boundaries.13 The short-term goal of TSI and Blue Frontiers is to construct a Seastead within the relatively calm waters of French Polynesia or an island nation with similar geographic, climatic, and infrastructural characteristics.14 In January of 2017, TSI and the French Polynesian government published a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which detailed plans to investigate and research the viability of the pilot Seastead project in the Tahitian reef system.15 Additionally, the MoU laid out a plan

9 Frequently Asked Questions, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) (describing general background information on the pilot project). The Floating Islands Project or FIP will be used interchangeably with “Seastead” and “the Seastead project” for the remainder of the paper.

10 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9; see Welcome to Blue Frontiers, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Blue Frontiers is an NGO focused on seasteading and other innovations. Other Projects, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/otherprojects (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). Blue Frontiers has collaborated with TSI on environmental and economic studies. Id.

11 See Floating Islands Project in French Polynesia, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/floating-islands-project-in-french-polynesia/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019) [hereinafter Floating Islands Project]; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9. According to TSI, a seastead is “a community living at sea and largely responsible for setting its own rules and culture.” Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9.

12 Floating Islands Project, supra note 11; see Modular Seastead Design, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/modular-seastead-design/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).

13 See Floating Islands Project, supra note 11.

14 Id.

15 Memorandum of Understanding for the Agreement of Intent, French Polynesia- Seasteading Inst. 6-8 (Jan. 13, 2017); Seasteading in French Polynesia and Beyond, BLUE 4 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 for a “special governing framework” and an “innovative special economic zone” for the proposed project.16 The MoU addressed the overall issue of climate change and the specific threat to French Polynesia, as well as the opportunities to mitigate this threat through the potential development of the FIP in the region.17 Although this MoU expired in December 2017 and is no longer on the table, TSI and partners in French Polynesia are considering the possibility of identifying another potential site for future construction and development.18 What could have been a fatal blow to the FIP in French Polynesia has not caused the involved organizations to lose optimism nor hindered progress in other areas. For example, TSI and Blue Frontiers finalized the FIP’s initial public presale funding on July 14, 2018.19 Keeping this in mind, the long-term goal of TSI and other like-minded NGOs still remains in their sights: the development of Seasteads on the high seas. Their goal would be to give Seasteads as much political and legal autonomy as possible, compared to the amount they would likely have within the territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a particular host nation and its legal regime.20 This paper examines the support for the FIP—including the potential of TSI’s proposed Seastead project in French Polynesia, information relating to the concept of Seasteading generally—and the

FRONTIERS (July 9, 2018), https://medium.com/@bluefrontiers/seasteading-in-french- polynesia-and-beyond-316ae07060c5.

16 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 15 at 6-8.

17 Id. at 6.

18 Media Archive of 2018/10/25: A Plan to Build Islands Off the Coast of Tahiti is on Hold, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/media (last visited Oct. 7, 2019) [hereinafter A Plan to Build].

19 Varyon: Increasing Variation in Governance, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue- frontiers.com/en/varyon (last visited Oct. 12, 2018); see Media Archive of 2018/08/06: Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million to Build SeaZone Cities for Life on Water, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue-frontiers.com/en/media. Blue Frontiers conducted an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) of their very own cryptocurrency, “Varyon (VAR)”, that will be the official currency of future associated Seasteads. The ICO raised 3100 ETH (Ether, the official cryptocurrency of the Ethereum blockchain network) or approximately $1.3 million. Varyon, supra note 19; Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million, supra note 19. Blue Frontiers has specified that VAR has and will operate with Smart Contract technology on the Ethereum blockchain that could prove to be an interesting case study for legal, finance, and political science research in the near future. Following this funding phase, Blue Frontiers determined that they did not issue the requisite amount of VAR. BF has since postponed VAR as their primary funding source while refunding some of the VAR token to early purchasers. Blue Frontiers, What’s Next for Blue Frontiers: Keep Calm and Varyon, MEDIUM (Oct. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@bluefrontiers/whats-next-for-blue- frontiers-keep-calm-and-varyon-348f8d619031 (last visited Oct. 7, 2019); see A Plan to Build, supra note 18.

20 See Vision/Strategy, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/about/vision- strategy/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). 2019] Schmidtke 5 political, economic, and technological theories involved in initial Seastead development. This paper also analyzes the hindrances and opposition to the French Polynesia project and Seasteading in general. Next, this paper analyzes the international legal regimes guiding the short-term project within territorial seas and EEZs of coastal nations, comparing and contrasting the Seastead concept to various artificial island constructions, vessels, and barges. Lastly, this paper presents recommendations for TSI, Blue Frontiers, and similar NGOs to ensure compliance with international law should the organizations realize their long-term goal of moving on to the high seas. In the alternative, these NGOs might take a more realistic, nearshore approach by creating a unique legal framework within an existing nation’s territorial sea or EEZ.21 II. SITUATING THE SEASTEAD MOVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW The Seasteading Institute’s proposed initial Seastead project, located in the territorial waters of French Polynesia, will need to follow the guidelines of international maritime law.22 Among the relevant treaties and conventions, Articles 56 and 60-62 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will have the most significant impact on the proposed Seastead project, as these articles regulate the territorial sea or EEZ of French Polynesia, the likely location of the Floating Islands Project.23 In the long-term, Seasteading project developers, TSI, and other organizations will need to comply with the constraints of Article 87 of UNCLOS and respect relevant international maritime agreements on the high seas depending on any association they might have with a host or parent nation.24 Furthermore, the applicability of these laws depends on whether the structural design and classification of a Seastead is either an

21 See infra Section VII, p. 24. Although it is almost certain that the pilot project will be constructed nearshore in a location with less risk of storm damage or disruption to construction, the initial architectural plans explain that the most suitable design would include a surrounding breakwater device to protect the connected platforms. KARINA CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., SEASTEADING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 7, 12, 75-77 (2013), http://seasteadingorg.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/DeltaSync-Final- Concept-Report.pdf. The question of permanence and fixation to the seabed compared to possibilities of mobility and propulsion technology and how they relate to international legal regimes will be analyzed further in Section VII. See infra p. 24.

22 At this point in time, this paper considers French Polynesia to be the most likely short-term project construction and harboring site because of the relationship established with the French Polynesian government through the MoU and the development of the aforementioned Varyon fundraising. See supra pp. 3-4. For Section V of this paper, the analysis will be limited to international and regional legal regimes to which French Polynesia or France is a party. See infra Section V, p. 14.

23 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 418-422 [hereinafter U.N. Convention].

24 See id. at 432. 6 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 artificial island, vessel, or barge.25 A full discussion of how the international legal framework affects organizations’ decision-making, with regard to the future of Seasteading, will be explored below. III. BACKGROUND ON THE SEASTEADING MOVEMENT AND THE FRENCH POLYNESIA “FLOATING ISLANDS” PROJECT Global mean sea level rise as a result of the thermal expansion of seawater and melting land ice is a growing threat with a current projected increase of between 0.26 meters to 0.77 meters that will specifically impact the livelihoods of people inhabiting coastal areas.26 For many residents of coastal and island nations like French Polynesia, coexisting with the power and unyielding nature of the ocean has been and continues to be an integral part of their daily lives as a source of cultural and economic importance.27 As the ocean continues to encroach on the limited terrestrial space available to nations like French Polynesia, people of the world search for creative solutions to preserve any connection to the geographic areas and cultural practices with which they are familiar.28 People from island nations, within the Pacific especially, have already moved to more protected upland and inland countries, fleeing the flow of ever expanding tides as climate refugees.29 Leaving everything behind and starting anew in a foreign and geographically or politically distinct country from one’s own should be the last resort for those facing the imminent threat of global sea level rise. Considering the potential consequences of global sea level rise and its drastic nature, it is necessary to give sincere thought to possible adaptations regardless of their architectural form or ideological origins. The proposed solution offered by TSI and Blue Frontiers is the Floating Islands Project (FIP). According to preliminary plans, the project

25 See id.

26 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 511 (Jerry Melillo, Terese Richmond, & Gary Yohe eds., 2014); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL, supra note 5, at 178.

27 See generally Colin Richards, The Substance of Polynesian Voyaging, 40 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 206, 210 n.2 (2008) (describing the history and culture of the Polynesian seafaring tradition).

28 SONIA GSIR & ELSA MESCOLI, INTERACT, MAINTAINING NATIONAL CULTURE ABROAD COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, CULTURE AND DIASPORA 1, 7 (2015), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35881/INTERACT-RR- 2015_10_Culture.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

29 See generally Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur, & Privatma Singh, Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation – A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji, in CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION IN PACIFIC COUNTRIES: FOSTERING RESILIENCE AND IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE 19 (2017) (for a specific Melanesian study of climate refugees). 2019] Schmidtke 7 would have 12 connected platforms holding various housing structures, restaurants, shops, aquaculture sites, a waste treatment system, utility connections, and an external breakwater device.30 TSI and Blue Frontiers have consulted with a Polynesian architect to produce draft designs for the FIP that minimize any impact on sight lines for the local community and blend in with the surrounding Pacific waters while maintaining aesthetic and cultural appeal.31 More relevant to this paper than the appearance, however, is the overall design including the functional anchoring and/or propulsion mechanisms of the FIP.32 For the short-term development of the FIP, the construction process of the Seastead requires: the calmness provided by shallow waters with depths of less than 300 meters, the lowest likelihood of oceanic storms possible, moderate temperatures, and the assurance of a low environmental impact in oceanic areas while anchored to the seabed.33 Following the complex construction process, it is unlikely that the FIP will be anchored in any form except temporarily by moored cables to keep breakwater devices in place.34 Although the exact method of stabilization is yet to be determined, a study conducted by TSI and the Dutch nautical architecture firm DeltaSync analyzed what would be the most and least practical designs for a Seastead.35 Among these options, DeltaSync found that connected, semi- submersible platforms of a particular size that linked to the semi-permanent breakwater device would be the most successful method to keep the project stable within an EEZ that has an atoll or reef system like French Polynesia.36 This would also mean the Seastead would have access to established trade

30 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 7, 12, 15, 26, 31-33, 37-38; Blue Frontiers (EN), The Floating Island Project in French Polynesia Explained, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPIKR8UDDgo (for a visual representation and explanation of project goals and prospective design plans).

31 Blue Frontiers (EN), supra note 30.

32 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 17, 26. Note that anchoring and/or propulsion mechanisms help differentiate whether the Floating Islands Project is a vessel, artificial island or barge. See id.

33 See SHANEE STOPNITZKY ET AL., SEASTEADING LOCATION STUDY: SHIP-BASED AND LARGE-SCALE CITY SCENARIOS 2, 6 (2011), http://seasteadingorg.wpengine.com/wp- content/uploads/2015/12/Seasteading_Location_Study.pdf. The authors of this location study considered the water depth of potential locations around the world for both “shipstead” and “metropolistead” seastead plans. Id. at 37. For the purposes of this paper, a “shipstead” is considered to be most similar to the Floating Islands Project due to likely size and population characteristics.

34 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 12, 15, 20.

35 Id. at 7.

36 Id. at 15, 17-18. 8 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 routes and Internet infrastructure.37 The study considered the reality that there may be political or natural circumstances that could cause the Seastead to move out of necessity.38 Under these circumstances and for consideration in the overall design and construction process, the firm suggested the possibility of the platforms having the capability to link in a “train configuration, quite similar to barge tows” where they would be pulled by tugboats to a more stable environment in the event of a hurricane.39 This method of maneuverability aligns with the FIP design as seen in the Blue Frontiers video even though it would come at the expense of increased dependence on external services.40 At least for the short-term, though, TSI should remain optimistic about their goals as this initial lack of mobility gives them a viable choice to exist comfortably within a suitable EEZ of a host nation. This option gives the organizations time to develop and research new technologies while working out any of the kinks of the nearshore project before moving onto the less predictable high seas. Since the current nearshore project will be constructed and operated within the territorial sea or EEZ of a host nation, TSI has emphasized the importance of interaction with the host nation through the Anchor Zone specified in the MoU and otherwise in the initial implementation of the FIP.41 This would ideally promote friendly relations between the residents of the Seastead, likely to consist primarily of project funders, and the citizens of the host nation for the duration of the pilot project. TSI also analyzed various infrastructure criteria like access to land-based Internet and active data lines in considering potential viable sites for the project.42 TSI noted the positive characteristics of “Pacific Island atolls” included established air and water travel routes to major cities.43

37 STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 14-15.

38 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 9, 15.

39 See id. at 10, 52. Following this description, a visualization of the floating platforms linked together on the high seas as figurative “sitting ducks” comes to mind (albeit surrounded by a breakwater device). Along with this mental image, one can imagine a Seastead’s vulnerability to plunder by modern day pirates or collisions with cargo vessels. See STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 46. These issues have been considered by TSI and are part of the location site criteria considered in their studies. CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 21-22. This makes determining future sites complicated and limits the practical geographical range where a Seastead could operate but leaves many potential options around the world where a smaller-scale seastead like the Floating Islands Project and larger-scale project could ideally operate. STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 34.

40 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 10; see Blue Frontiers (EN), supra note 30.

41 Memorandum of Understanding supra note 15, at 7.

42 STOPNITSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 15.

43 RANDOLPH HENCKEN, SEASTEADING INST., THE FLOATING CITY PROJECT 29 (2014), http://www.seasteading.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Floating-City-Project-Report- 4_25_2014.pdf. 2019] Schmidtke 9

While total economic self-sufficiency may be an admirable goal, it is difficult to imagine any community of people or recognized nation-state maintaining a high standard of living without cooperation or interdependence between other states and the peaceful exchange of goods and services across borders. One way the FIP could attain a moderate degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency is by constructing and developing aquaculture projects within the boundaries of the project site.44 Just a few studies referred to by TSI related to aquaculture include the possibility of developing algae for biodiesel for both “domestic” consumption and export, the farming of various hydrophilic crops including seaweed and sea cucumbers, as well as farming various mollusk, fish, and crustacean species.45 TSI has studied the use of sustainable aquaculture to minimize the use of synthetic fertilizers and slow adverse environmental impacts caused by traditional farming like water loss.46 Statements from the involved organizations have emphasized the environmental benefits of aquaculture as the concept addresses critical issues of fossil fuel consumption, methane production, synthetic fertilizer use and runoff, and the ever-increasing issue of water cost and scarcity.47 One study, using similar algae harvesting processes cited by TSI as a technology to be implemented on a Seastead, analyzed the potential of vertical focusing for harvesting in comparison to traditional, basic surface harvesting of algal biomasses in order to mitigate oceanic hypoxia— “dead zones”—and reduce costs of algal harvesting in the Gulf of Mexico.48 The study states that “[its] estimates indicate that basic surface harvesting technology [the current practice] can harvest 1,596 metric tons in three months and reduce the [current estimated harvesting] net cost of $93,357,016.”49 “Vertical focusing [for harvesting] potentially could increase the harvest to 23,313 metric tons over three months and reduce the net cost [of the harvesting process] to $81,380,937.”50 The algal harvesting

44 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40.

45 See generally CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40; see also Sustainability (OASIS), SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/project-oasis/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018), for more specific information on the sustainability plans, the project’s OASIS concept (Ocean Aquaculture for Seastead Integrated Solutions) and links to numerous related studies.

46 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40.

47 Id.

48 Sustainability (OASIS), supra note 45; see also Chih-Ting Kuo, Harvesting Natural Algal Blooms for Concurrent Biofuel Production and Hypoxia Mitigation 2 (2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Graduate College of the University of Illinois) (on file with the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/18541/Kuo_Chih-Ting.pdf.

49 Kuo, supra note 48.

50 Id. 10 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 study alone may not provide a perfect solution to solve a problem plaguing the oceans of the world, but it is one more example of the positive environmental results TSI hopes to achieve through their project.51 The opportunity to interact and participate in the ever-expanding global marketplace with an idea as headline-grabbing as the Seasteading movement is one that is unlikely to be turned down, especially by the ideological and financial supporters of TSI and Blue Frontiers. The Seasteading movement is composed of a unique blend of individuals coming from various philosophical, political, and technological backgrounds.52 Among the wide variety of founders and figures leading TSI and Blue Frontiers are a former Google software engineer, a former Pixar consultant, authors, venture capitalists, a former assistant solicitor general, a law professor, and more.53 The selection of and interest from the listed advisors suggests that the involved organizations ended up with a smorgasbord of valuable skillsets to utilize for their project. A project as unprecedented as the FIP requires diverse and innovative perspectives if it wants a fighting chance at long-term success. In addition to the particular ideological communities finding common ground in the prospect of Seasteading, the movement has attracted funding from various outlets. The funding process utilized cutting-edge financing and fundraising methods that could also impact climate change mitigation and real estate transactions.54 In 2013, TSI and Blue Frontiers

51 Clean the Atmosphere, video in The Eight Great Moral Imperatives, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/videos/the-eight-great-moral-imperatives/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). This particular fact and study is relevant to cases like the “blue-green algae crisis” affecting Lake Okeechobee, Florida, USA as recently as August of 2018. See Karl Havens, What is Causing Florida’s Algae Crisis? 5 Questions Answered, CONVERSATION (Aug. 10, 2018), https://theconversation.com/what-is-causing-floridas-algae-crisis-5- questions-answered-101305 (for more information on the Florida situation); Donald M. Anderson et al., The Globally Distributed Genus Alexandrium: Multifaceted Roles in Marine Ecosystems and Impacts on Human Health, 14 HARMFUL ALGAE 10 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/eutils/elink.fcgi?dbfrom=pubmed& retmode=ref&cmd=prlinks&id=22308102.

52 Staff/Board/Advisors, SEASTEADING INST., https://www.seasteading.org/about/staff- board-advisors/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018); Advisors, BLUE FRONTIERS, https://www.blue- frontiers.com/en/advisors (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).

53 Staff/Board/Advisors, supra note 52; Advisors, supra note 52; JOE QUIRK & PATRI FRIEDMAN, SEASTEADING: HOW FLOATING NATIONS WILL RESTORE THE ENVIRONMENT, ENRICH THE POOR, CURE THE SICK, AND LIBERATE HUMANITY FROM POLITICIANS 348 (2017). These advisors include: Patri Friedman, Joe Quirk, Randolph Hencken, Lelei TuiSamoa LeLaulu, Susanna Dokupil, Lara Stein, Simon Chuang Liu, Tom W. Bell, and Robert Viglione, among others.

54 Ricardo Carrasco, How Blockchain Technology Can Help Mitigate Climate Change and Save the Environment, BITRATES (May 27, 2018), https://www.bitrates.com/news/p/how-blockchain-technology-can-help-mitigate-climate- change-and-save-the-environment (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); see Ioannis Karamitsos et al., Design of the Blockchain Smart Contract: A Use Case for Real Estate, 9 J. INFO. SEC. 177, 2019] Schmidtke 11 conducted an initial “crowd-funding” campaign raising over $27,000 to fund the program’s engineering study with an additional matching donation in the same amount coming from the Thiel Foundation.55 The contributions of both the Thiel Foundation and seed-funding from its namesake Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, have garnered the most popularity of fundraising sources to date.56 However, the funds raised from the recent Varyon Initial Coin Offering (ICO) will likely make the most direct impact on project development as Varyon will be the monetary device of choice for the FIP.57 The ICO of the Varyon cryptocurrency token, as mentioned earlier, raised approximately $1.3 million and will go to the creation of ownership and residency stakes in the project.58 The cryptocurrency will utilize the Ethereum blockchain which offers the novel feature of “smart contracts” or a contract that is “digital, stored within a blockchain and enforces all aspects of the agreement with cryptographic code. In other words, smart contracts are simply software programs, and like all programs, they execute exactly as they are supposed to by their programmers.”59 Cryptocurrency, much like the Seasteading movement as a whole, has earned its share of criticism from economists and government officials around the world regarding the transaction costs and the general instability of the cryptocurrency market.60

189 (2018).

55 Randolph Hencken, Designing the World’s First Floating City, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/designing-the-world-s-first-floating-city#/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).

56 Leanna Garfield, A Pilot Project for a New Libertarian Floating City Will Have 300 Homes, Its Own Government, and Its Own Cryptocurrency, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/floating-city-plans-seasteading-institute-peter-thiel- blue-frontiers-2017-12; Prachi Bhardwaj & Taylor Nicole Rogers, The Life and Rise of Billionaire Investor Peter Thiel, The PayPal Cofounder Who Called Google 'Seemingly Treasonous,' Wants to Get Injections of Young People's Blood, and is Trump's Biggest Silicon Valley Supporter, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/peter-thiel-facebook-trump-biography-2018-2.

57 See Varyon, supra note 19. Again, this has since been postponed as the primary funding source and the funders were partially refunded for their Varyon investment. See Blue Frontiers, supra note 19; Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million, supra note 19.

58 Blue Frontiers Receives $1.3 Million, supra note 19.

59 J.R. Gutierrez, What are Smart Contracts and How Do They Work? Examples & Challenges, CRYPTOVEST, https://cryptovest.com/education/what-are-smart-contracts- and-how-do-they-work-examples--challenges/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019); see Varyon, supra note 19; see also Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain Technology that will Replace Lawyers, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/smart-contracts/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).

60 Paul Krugman, Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/opinion/transaction-costs- and-tethers-why-im-a-crypto-skeptic.html; see also Janet Yellen, What Bitcoin Critics and Supporters Around the World Have to Say About Crypto, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), 12 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

IV. OPPOSITION TO AND CRITICISM OF THE PROJECT The French Polynesian government allowed for the expiration of the 2017 MoU specific to the Tahitian reef project at the culmination of local opposition to the project.61 Local politicians presented arguments against “tech colonialism”, citing a purported lack of involvement in the development processes, especially as the importance of the issue was renewed by French Polynesia during a contentious election season.62 The local opposition to the FIP pointed out the fact that the MoU was “outdated and non-binding.”63 Although the project and MoU explicitly stated that TSI and Blue Frontiers did not need and did not ask for financial contributions from the French Polynesian government and their citizens, the local citizens were concerned about their country being used as a tax haven or falling victim to a large project with no benefit to the local economy.64 It appears that the initial plan to construct the project within the calm waters of this specific Tahitian reef system is on hold as a possible construction and operation site for the foreseeable future.65 In addition to local opposition to the Seasteading movement, there are other political and moral arguments presented by at least one international journalist and political theorists. These critics view the movement with a great deal of skepticism. One critique highlights the Seasteading movement’s theoretical philosophies of governance and the arguably idealistic nature of the organizations and some of their funders.66 One journalist argues against the self-regulation espoused by TSI and Blue Frontiers and predicts that the lack of a firm government-enforced https://www.bloomberg.com/features/bitcoin-bulls-bears/.

61 Julia Carrie Wong, Seasteading: Tech Leaders’ Plans for Floating City Trouble French Polynesians, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/02/seasteading-peter-thiel-french- polynesia; see Hettie O’Brien, The Floating City, Long a Libertarian Dream, Faces Rough Seas, CITY LAB (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/design/2018/04/the-unsinkable- dream-of-the-floating-city/559058/.

62 O’Brien, supra note 61; Melia Robinson, A Silicon Valley Billionaire’s Dream of a Floating Libertarian Utopia May Have Finally Been Killed, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/libertarian-peter-thiel-utopia-seasteading-institute-2018- 3; see French Polynesia Sinks Floating Island Project, RADIO N.Z. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/351420/french-polynesia-sinks- floating-island-project.

63 O’Brien, supra note 61.

64 Wong, supra note 61.

65 Robinson, supra note 62.

66 See Conor Lynch, Welcome to “Libertarian Island”: How these One Percenters Are Creating a Dystopian Nightmare, SALON (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.salon.com/2015/03/16/welcome_to_libertarian_island_how_silicon_valley_ billionaires_are_creating_a_capitalist_nightmare/. 2019] Schmidtke 13 regulatory structure within a potential Seastead will cause the project to be unsuccessful, resulting in various sorts of harm to the residents of the Seastead.67 It appears that, in theory, the environmental practices and techniques cited by TSI could have a net positive effect on the global supply-chain for certain agricultural products—or improve the local environment, at the very least.68 However, some critiques speculate that a lack of firm governmental regulation for a project of this size could have an overall negative environmental impact. Criticism for projects of this size are not unwarranted. FIPs are novel and have yet to show proof of concept in their ability to partner with a host country, let alone a Seastead existing on the high seas as a complex, floating structure with a unique new form of governance. Although countries and private entities have constructed numerous artificial island, vessel, or barge projects in the past, none seem as ambitious and technologically advanced as the FIP.69 V. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE FLOATING ISLANDS PROJECT This paper analyzes the domestic and international legal regimes guiding the short-term project within the territorial sea and EEZ of coastal nations and compares and contrasts the likely regulation of the Seastead to the legal regimes governing artificial islands, vessels, and barges. This analysis follows the definitions of these categories as articulated in international caselaw and analyzes a few relevant examples that garnered publicity, specifically the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court. At least the vessel or barge determination depends largely on the engineering specifications and the purpose to either transport goods/people or to provide temporary/permanent occupancy.70 This is a difficult determination to make on the surface as TSI, Blue Frontiers, and other involved parties consistently identify the project as “The Floating Islands Project” while using similar nomenclature involving the word “island” or “islands.”71 It is apparent that the project is not a traditional terrestrial island and will not be attached to

67 Id.

68 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 13, 38-40.

69 Lucy Wang, This Hand-Built Island is the Start of Copenhagen’s “Parkipelago” of Floating Public Spaces, INHABITAT (Mar. 14, 2018), https://inhabitat.com/this-hand-built- island-is-the-start-of-copenhagens-parkipelago-of-floating-public-spaces/. More examples of artificial island projects created by sovereign states are discussed within note 134. See Xue and Subramanian, infra note 133. The scale of these projects is generally limited to artificial land masses and dredged material used to provide living space. Id. Few, if any, have used complex floating platforms described in the Floating Islands Project design plan for temporary or permanent residential occupation. Wang, supra note 69; CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21.

70 Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121, 142-43 (2013).

71 See Floating Islands Project, supra note 11. 14 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 land or the seabed, excluding the fact that the project may utilize temporary anchoring mechanisms.72 The determination will help clarify the applicable legal regulations to the FIP should the project proceed in French Polynesia. The determination of whether the Seastead in question should be classified as an artificial island, vessel, or barge depends largely on the particular jurisdiction that it finds itself in. There is no general definition of a “vessel” within UNCLOS and the definition varies from country to country. The term has recently been defined in a United States Supreme Court opinion.73 A more restricted definition is found in the case Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach.74 In a 7-2 decision, the Lozman Court determined that an immobile houseboat with no engine and no functioning steering or navigation system could not be considered a vessel because it was not designed for transportation on water.75 The Court also specified that an “artificial contrivance . . . capable of being used . . . as a means of transportation on water. . .” would be considered a vessel per statute 1 U.S.C. § 3.76 In conjunction with this statement, “transportation” is defined as a “conveyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.”77 Another category under which the Seastead could be classified and regulated is an “artificial island.” Artificial islands are not explicitly defined in UNCLOS; however, a standard “island” is defined as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”78 “Naturally formed” can be interpreted as being formed “by natural processes, without human intervention, as in the case with dumping of sand and stones in shallow waters.”79 With these reference points in mind, there are various sections of UNCLOS wherein artificial islands are referred to and the exclusive rights to construct, maintain, and protect artificial islands are recognized.80 Artificial islands may be constructed within internal waters and archipelagic waters of a coastal nation, within the territorial sea of the nation

72 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9; CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 17-18, 52.

73 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 118.

74 Id. at 121.

75 Id. at 122.

76 Id. at 121.

77 Lozman, 568 U.S. at 121; Transportation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 424 (2d ed. 1989).

78 U.N. Convention, supra note 23, at art. 121.

79 NIKOS PAPADAKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS 93 (1977).

80 See U.N. Convention, supra note 23, at art. 60. 2019] Schmidtke 15 in question, within the EEZ of the nation in question, and within the continental shelf of that nation.81 Having these options gives a coastal nation a great deal of nautical territory to work with and consider in their construction of artificial islands, installations, or structures pursuant to Articles 56 and 60 of UNCLOS.82 Particularly relevant to TSI’s long-term goals of moving onto the high seas, section VI of UNCLOS grants nations the right to construct artificial islands on the high seas.83 According to these definitions, and taking into account the U.S. domestic interpretation of the houseboat in Lozman, a Seastead could arguably fall in either of these categories although it does not seem to fit comfortably in either one. Further insight regarding how FIPs fit into these categories can be gleaned from several high-profile examples. VI. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION CASE STUDIES There are several case studies that offer valuable comparisons to the FIP. These include: (1) the situation in the South China Sea with respect to the “Nine-Dash Line” and the Chinese government’s desire to expand the territorial sea and EEZ of the People’s Republic of China through the development of artificial islands, (2) the Netherlands, which has constructed the largest artificial island project in the world, (3) the controversial Sealand located off of the coast of the United Kingdom, (4) the failed Republic of

81 Id. at art. 56(1)(b)(i), 60, 80.

82 Id. at art. 2, 40-41, 46-51, 56, 57, 60, 80. Article 56 states: (1) In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds. Id. at art. 56. Article 60 states: (1) In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: (a) artificial islands; (b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone. (2) The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations. Id. at art. 60.

83 See id. at art. 87(1)(d) (this section of UNCLOS delineates a universal geographical rule to determine the control coastal nations retain over territory on a continental shelf and the rights to build, extract resources, and more on the continental shelf). 16 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

Minerva once located in a remote reef system in the Pacific Ocean, (5) Australia’s now defunct “floating hotel,” and (6) the international definitions of and laws governing barges.84 First, the “Nine-Dash Line” situation was recently addressed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in a dispute between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, where the panel ruled that newly created landmasses did not expand China’s EEZ.85 The arbitral panel discussed the geological nature of the “islands,” including some that would be considered rocks and land masses submerged by the sea except at low-tide.86 The panel also discussed how the expansion of these existing formations through land reclamation (Chinese sand-pumping and the movement of other material from the seabed to the surface, followed by building atop the newly added material) would not change the nature of the rocks and the once semi-submersed land into a legally recognized island capable of expanding the Chinese EEZ.87 The Chinese government argued that these and other maritime features would therefore expand China’s territorial jurisdiction throughout the South China Sea, adding mileage to their territorial sea and EEZ, thus conferring them sovereign rights within these boundaries.88 The arbitral panel ruled against the Chinese land reclamation efforts as expanding their sovereign territory (although they technically created artificial islands over time) and determined that the Philippines had a rightful claim to the contested Spratly Islands.89 Even though the FIP will not be constructed by

84 See generally Ekrem Krokut & Woo Hyun Kang, China’s Nine Dash Line Claim in Light of the Ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 5 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 425 (2017); Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 98 (2013); see cases cited infra n. 86 for background on the Nine-Dash Line. For Flevoland/Flevopolder in the Netherlands see infra at p. 20-21 and nn. 96-99. For Sealand see infra at pp. 21-22 and nn. 100-105. For the Republic of Minerva see infra at pp. 22-23 and nn. 106-10. For the “floating hotel” see infra at pp. 23-25 and nn. 111-18. For the international law governing barges see infra at pp. 25-28 and nn. 119-31.

85 In re S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-9, 471-77 (2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086.

86 Id. at 129-32, 278.

87 Id. at 473-74, 476.

88 See id at 130, 195, 290.

89 Id. at 471-77. This decision is yet to be acknowledged by the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan. See Shi Jiangtao & Jun Mai, China’s Xi Jinping Rejects any Action Based on International Court’s South China Sea Ruling, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy- defence/article/1988990/chinas-xi-jinping-rejects-any-action-based. It has also been determined that coastal nations have the sovereign right to conduct land reclamation efforts within their territorial waters and EEZ so long as they do not cause marine environmental damage to the interests of adjoining states as was determined in Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.). Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor 2019] Schmidtke 17 land reclamation processes, a host nation must recognize that, according to UNCLOS and the PCA ruling, the construction of a Seastead will not expand their EEZ or maritime jurisdiction. A less controversial but relevant example of an artificial island is the Flevopolder, part of the province of Flevoland, Netherlands, which was developed in the 1960s and remains as the largest artificial island in the world.90 The Flevopolder was built in a nation that has dealt with floods, rising sea levels, and other aquatic threats throughout history.91 The Netherlands created Flevopolder through land reclamation projects in response to constant lake flooding in a province that now covers over 955 km2 and has a population of around 396,000 people.92 This artificial island is less contentious legally because it is within the boundary of Dutch territorial waters, and the island’s construction is expressly permitted by UNCLOS because it lies within the Dutch EEZ; the Dutch have not yet claimed that the land reclamation efforts from the Flevoland construction process will expand the breadth of their territorial sea or EEZ.93 The case could also be made that this territory has remained uncontestably Dutch throughout the recent past, especially upon the signing and ratification of UNCLOS, so the country has neither gained nor lost any territorial sea/EEZ territory since UNCLOS was signed. For these reasons, Flevoland is readily distinguishable from the South China Sea Spratly Island scenario but is still relevant to the Seastead movement because the FIP will be created within the recognized maritime jurisdiction of a nation without the intention to add on to the territorial sea or EEZ it controls. It seems apparent from the examples examined thus far that many of the artificial islands recognized in the domestic law of various nations and defined by UNCLOS are constructed through land reclamation efforts and have an integral natural element to them, i.e., that they are made with local geological features such as rocks, sand, and soil. The purpose of Flevoland could not be more different than the “island-building” in the

(Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, 12, 28, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_12/12_order_081003_en. pdf.

90 Flevoland, VISIT HOLLAND (last visited Oct. 20, 2018), http://www.visitholland.nl/flevoland.

91 Flevoland, supra note 90; M. VanKoningsveld et al., Living with Sea-Level Rise and Climate Change: A Case Study of the Netherlands, 24 J. COASTAL RES. 367, 367, 374 (2008), https://www.jcronline.org/doi/pdf/10.2112/07A-0010.1.

92 See Netherlands: Administrative Division, CITY POPULATION, https://www.citypopulation.de/en/netherlands/admin/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). Note all municipalities except Noordoostpolder make up the Flevopolder.

93 See U.N. Convention, supra note 23, at art. 56(1)(b)(i); Provincial Councils, GOV’T NETH., https://www.government.nl/topics/provinces/provincial-councils (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). 18 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

South China Sea. However, both artificial island examples share the feature that they were constructed with the intention of staying in one place throughout time or maintaining relative geographic permanence. A more contentious example of an artificial island is a former British anti-aircraft gunning platform built during World War II known officially as “Fort Roughs Tower.”94 This platform exists within the territorial sea of the United Kingdom or, depending on whom one asks, independent from the United Kingdom as the Principality of Sealand. This “principality” was founded in 1967 by Roy Bates; he and his family, among others, have intermittently occupied the abandoned platform following its military decommission.95 In 1978, the platform/Sealand was brought into the international spotlight in German administrative courts.96 A German citizen plaintiff holding the title of “Foreign Secretary and President of the State Council of the so-called Duchy of Sealand” challenged a German court to recognize his acquisition of citizenship in Sealand and his abandonment of German citizenship.97 The German court rejected his claim on the grounds that, “International law lays down three essential attributes for Statehood. The State must have a territory, that territory must be inhabited by a people and that people must be subject to the authority of a Government . . . . The ‘Duchy of Sealand’ fails to satisfy even the first condition as it does not possess a State territory within the meaning of international law.”98 Thus, the court determined that the platform, although abandoned for military purposes, was not an independent state; the court denied the existence of the aspiring micro- nation and the plaintiff’s citizenship claim.99 This peculiar situation is relevant to the FIP as the Principality of Sealand is a platform fixed to the seabed within United Kingdom’s territorial sea and differs from the previous examples of artificial islands developed through land reclamation processes. This is also the only example thus far among the examined scenarios that included the desire to found a new nation and eventually receive recognition from the international community, which is similar to the long-term aspirations of TSI and Blue Frontiers. Although similar in this regard, the FIP can be contrasted with the Principality of Sealand in multiple aspects. First, TSI

94About the Principality of Sealand, SEALAND, https://www.sealandgov.org/about (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).

95 In re Duchy of Sealand, Case No. 9 K 2565/77, 80 I.L.R. 683 (Admin. Ct. of Cologne 1978), http://www.uniset.ca/naty/80ILR683.htm; About the Principality of Sealand, supra note 94.

96 In re Duchy of Sealand, 80 I.L.R. 683.

97 Id.

98 Id.

99 Id. 2019] Schmidtke 19 has openly recognized the importance of a partnership with a host or parent nation to construct and operate the FIP peacefully within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the project is not hostile to a parent country like Sealand was to the United Kingdom. In addition, Sealand is an artificial island that is not constructed of natural or local materials but is fixed permanently to the seabed, differing from the proposed design plans of the Seastead. These facts blur any potential architectural and political similarities to the plans of the FIP. Also relevant to the long-term plans of the Seastead is the fact that any project with a high degree of autonomy would likely exist on the high seas, outside of the territorial sea or EEZ of a particular country, while at least temporarily cooperating with an associated country as necessary. Granting a higher degree of political and economic autonomy might be more palpable to citizens of a coastal nation if a Seastead distances itself geographically from the nation, thereby minimizing possible risks of immediate environmental damage or political strife with the host nation. The physical distance of a Seastead located on the high seas as opposed to anchored within a local reef system might symbolize to citizens of island nations that their local government is not pouring subsidies into a new project nor that new Seastead residents are requiring government benefits or attempting to take over historical territory. Another example to be compared and contrasted to the Seastead is the unsuccessful Republic of Minerva. In 1970, three friends with entrepreneurial and investment experience located the Minerva reef system approximately 260 miles from the mainland of the Polynesian island of Tonga.100 The three men had the goal of creating a new country atop the reef system, purchasing expensive dredging equipment that would pump sand and other material from the seabed in an attempt to build a landmass suitable to accommodate around 25,000 residents.101 The group laid claim to the land in a written communication to the U.S. Department of State.102 The Tongan government intervened about a month after the communication was sent to the Department of State and put a stop to the dredging and island- constructing process by announcing their historic ownership of the reefs and geological fixtures in question.103 The project was abandoned and the Republic of Minerva was never revisited by the impulsive entrepreneurs.104 Although the Republic of Minerva blatantly failed to become a micro-

100 Mary L.G. Theroux, The Quest for a New Tech Land of the Free, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/02/quest-new-tech-land-free/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).

101 Id.

102 Id.

103 Id.

104 Id. 20 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 nation, there are many lessons to be learned from its attempted establishment for the Seastead and similar future projects. First, it is critical for FIP proponents to have a firm understanding of any prospective site, including all political and historical claims in an area, as well as the particular geological features of that area. This is an important aspect to consider for TSI, as a long-term project could move onto the high seas where it may need to anchor or transport into calmer protected waters in the event of storms or rough seas. TSI must also avoid any construction that could damage reef systems claimed by existing nations for the sake of maintaining peaceful relations with their coastal neighbors and minimizing the obvious potential environmental impact. This does not seem a likely problem for TSI, as the Seastead platforms would all be constructed within the territory of a cooperating nation prior to moving onto the high seas, and the design of the platforms is not dependent on any natural element. Although geographically relevant, the FIP will not be constructed through land reclamation processes and will be built with the knowledge and approval of a cooperating nation. Finally, Australia’s floating hotel, discussed below, showcases the laws that currently govern barges in general and demonstrates the application of laws to barges on the high seas. The John Brewer Reef Floating Hotel commenced operation within its namesake reef in Australian waters in March of 1988.105 The Floating Hotel was only in operation for a year in these same waters before being transported to Vietnam, where it was sold and rebranded as the Saigon Floating Hotel, and finally, where it is currently harbored in the Port of Kumgang at the foot of Mount Kungang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).106 The purpose of the Floating Hotel was to provide a one-of-a-kind vacation experience for visitors from around the world.107 Vacationers could stay in a floating hotel wading in one of Australia’s world-renowned reefs without moving around from port to port like a cruise ship (although visitors needed to ferry to and from the Floating Hotel on speed boats).108 The specific construction process within the reef system involved the use of

105 THE JOHN BREWER FLOATING HOTEL: A CASE-STUDY IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 6 (Vicki Harriott & Peter Saenger eds., 1995), http://elibrary.gbrmpa.gov.au/jspui/bitstream/11017/246/1/John-Brewer-Reef-floating- hotel-1989.PDF.

106 Carl Smith, The Bizarre Story of Australia’s Floating Hotel and its 14,000km Round Journey to North Korea, ABC NEWS, https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-06- 14/the-bizarre-story-of-australias-floating-hotel/9849482 (last updated June 13, 2018).

107 Id.

108 Id. According to a former waitress, this was one of the reasons the Floating Hotel was unsuccessful; visitors would often get seasick on the choppy seas to and from the hotel or were forced to deal with delays caused by storms. Id. The now defunct Floating Hotel has a rating of 2.8 stars out of 5 on the travel planning website TripAdvisor.com. Id. 2019] Schmidtke 21

“Bommie cropping” to remove the top layers of the surrounding coral system and make more space for the Floating Hotel to safely occupy.109 While the death of coral directly caused by the Bommie cropping caused substantial damage, the environmental impact discovered at the operation site and the surrounding bay during and after its year-long operation was limited to a miniscule increase in salinity, copper and sediment presence, and a minor increase in fish aggregation at the Floating Hotel site likely caused by fish feeding activities.110 On top of the geographical relevance to the proposed Floating Islands Project, the construction of the FIP will likely take place within a reef system should the partnership with French Polynesia come to fruition. Even if the eventual site exists within the jurisdictional waters of another coastal nation, there will be a bilateral desire to minimize any environmental impacts caused by the project construction and operation. The Floating Hotel is a regional example for what to do and what to avoid in the construction and operation process, although the FIP will likely be more technologically advanced and employ more environmentally-friendly processes as discussed earlier. This can be compared to the Seastead as the Floating Hotel was immobile by itself.111 In order for the Floating Hotel to move onto the high seas and make its final moves from Australia to Vietnam and eventually to North Korea, the hotel likely relied on outside tug services since it did not have a propulsion mechanism, drawing another similarity to the Seastead plans.112 The Floating Hotel, much like the current FIP, could not move by itself and had no transportation capability. This complicates the legal regulation of both the Floating Hotel and the FIP in comparison to the earlier examples because the Floating Hotel was owned by an Australian citizen and operated within the territorial waters or EEZ of Australia, yet it avoided construction through land reclamation or other dredging processes. For these reasons, the Floating Hotel could not be considered a vessel or an artificial island in comparison to any of the examples discussed above. However, considering its immobility and sole purpose of temporary occupancy by employees and tourists, it seems more similar legally to the house boat in Lozman; that is, it will not be considered a vessel or a traditional artificial island according to UNCLOS and related cases. The reliance on tug services for transportation solidifies the fact that the Floating Hotel belongs in a separate category factually and legally as a barge. After considering artificial islands, structures, installations, and vessels, the most similar nautical structure to a houseboat in legally

109 JOHN BREWER FLOATING HOTEL, supra note 105, at 1, 9-11.

110 Id. at 37, 40-45.

111 See Smith, supra note 106.

112 CZAPIEWSKA ET AL., supra note 21, at 10, 26. see Smith, supra note 106; 22 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 recognized terms is a quarter barge. Following the definition proscribed in Lozman, a floating home with no capability to propel itself was not determined to be a vessel.113 A similar interpretation in the U.S. domestic case Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co. helps clarify that non-self- propelled nautical devices like a quarter barge are categorically distinct from vessels, although this interpretation only applies to non-self-propelled nautical devices in the 5th Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.114 Analogous to these cases, FIP’s plan does not include steering, propulsion, or rudder mechanisms, and its primary purpose is to accommodate temporary and permanent occupants, not to transport goods or cargo from one place to another. Although these are all U.S. cases, the common French definition relevant to TSI’s potential project in French Polynesia for “barge” is similarly stated.115 This linguistic cognate is translated to what is known to English speakers as a barge, or roughly translated as a “flat-bottomed boat with different modes of propulsion (sailing, tug, etc.), used in shallow water (canal, lake, river, river, estuary), similar to a houseboat.”116 This definition considers “tug” or “tug boats” as a mode of propulsion, although it is a realistic possibility for a barge not to be connected to a tug boat or any other vehicle for a particular period of time like the houseboat in Lozman, the quarter barge in Gremillion, and the Floating Hotel.117 The FIP matches the French definition, noting a “different mode of propulsion” like a tug would be needed for the FIP and would be considered a barge in French Polynesia following the common-language definition of the term. While artificial islands within EEZs are guided by UNCLOS and vessels are guided by numerous international treaties like UNCLOS, barges stay out of the regulatory limelight and are only mentioned in passing within one treaty on international pollution prevention from ships.118 While lacking

113 See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115, 121-22 (2013).

114 Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 290 (5th Cir. 1990).

115 Barge, CNRTL, https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/barge//1 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Please see reference ‘A’ from the French National Center for textual and reading resources, tools and resources for optimal treatment of the French language. Id.

116 A direct translation of the French dictionary definition by the author of this paper. Barge, CAMBRIDGE ENG. DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/barge (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Note the Cambridge English Dictionary definition “a long boat with a flat bottom, used for carrying heavy objects on rivers or canals”. Id. The Cambridge French-English dictionary has a similar French definition, defining the term as “bateau à fond plat” or a boat with a flat bottom. Barge, CAMBRIDGE FRENCH-ENG. DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/french-english/barge (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).

117 Lozman 568 U.S. at 121-22; Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 290; Smith, supra note 106 (floating hotel).

118 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, art. II, Nov. 2, 2019] Schmidtke 23 specific international guidance, barges are not generally defined within the domestic law of countries around the world.119 The French Polynesian legal code does not carve out specific regulations to classify barges distinctly from other maritime subjects.120 French Polynesia does not require barges to be registered like vessels as the term “barge” is not mentioned in the registry requirements.121 Where no provision applies to barges, there are codes for vessels.122 The applicability

1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/mventura/Projecto-Navios-I/IMO- Conventions%20%28copies%29/MARPOL.pdf.

119 Within the U.S. Code, barges are regulated within Title 46, topically focused on shipping. See 46 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The author researched the laws of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, England, the European Union, and others due to their geographical proximity to French Polynesia or political and legal relevance to French Polynesia and the author could not find legal definitions of barges.

120 See generally CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] (Fr.). See also CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L525-18 (Fr.). The French legal code is considered for research purposes of this project as some French laws are adopted in French Polynesia, although with local variations and ordinances due to French Polynesia’s legal status as an overseas collectivity of France. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. L940-1 (Fr.) (modified by Loi 2016-1547 du novembre 18, 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle [Law 2016-1547 of November 18, 2016 on the Modernization of the Judiciary of the 21st Century], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 19, 2016); CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. R940-1 (modified by Décret 2017-1163 du 12 juillet 2017 relatif à la déontologie, l’éligibilité et la discipline des juges des tribunaux de commerce [Decree 2017-1163 of July 12, 2017 Relating to the Ethics, Eligibility, and Discipline of Judges of Tribunals of Commerce], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 14, 2017); see Nicole Atwill, French Polynesia: New Law on the Functioning of Government Institutions, LIBR. CONGRESS (Aug. 16, 2011), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/french- polynesia-new-law-on-the-functioning-of-governing-institutions/. The researched local variations and ordinances did not reveal any rules applicable to the Floating Islands Project scenario.

121 See Loi 2005-412 du 3 mai 2005 relative à la création du registre international français, art. 2 [Law 2005-412 of May 3, 2005 on the Establishment of the French International Register, art. 2], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 5, 2009, p. 14696, repealed by Ordonnance 2010- 1307 du 28 octobre 2010 relative à la partie législative du code des transports [Ordinance 2010-1307 of October 28, 2010 in Relation to the Legislative Section of the Code of Transportation], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 3, 2010, p. 19645.

128 The update to the Law establishing the French international registry did not affect the registry requirements/exceptions to include barges. Id. The assertion that barges are not included in the requirements is still true even with the code modification since the modifications and abrogation apply to various types of vessels in Article 1, not Article 2. Id. at art. 1.

122 See Code De L’Environnement [C. ENVIR.] [CODE OF THE ENVIRONMENT] art. L218-10 (Fr.) (versions from Aug. 3, 2008-Oct. 23, 2010 and Oct. 23, 2010-Dec. 27, 2015); Code De L’Environnement [C. ENVIR.] [CODE OF THE ENVIRONMENT] art. L218-11 (Fr.) 24 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 of some laws to vessels is apparent; it is clear that vessels are regulated more thoroughly within the French legal code due to the absence of the term “barge” and any coinciding definition. The lack of depth and quantity in domestic barge regulation should be considered by the French Polynesian government if the FIP becomes a more likely possibility within its maritime jurisdiction. In order to assure locals and minimize the costs and confusion of potential retroactive compliance processes, the involved government should spare no time in rethinking its maritime barge laws while keeping the FIP in mind.123 In accordance with the overall analysis in this article, TSI’s FIP is most similar to a barge in its design, because it lacks a propulsion or steering mechanism and primarily serves to hold people for temporary or permanent occupancy. TSI and Blue Frontiers should continue developing their project for the short-term within the legal framework of a barge, most likely a quarter barge, a barge for the purpose of providing living quarters, as opposed to an artificial island or vessel.124 Although no law has yet to single out a “Seastead” specifically, any involved government should act as efficiently as possible in order to provide assurance to its citizens and clarity for the businesses developing this unique maritime project. VII. SHORT AND LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TSI AND BLUE FRONTIERS This paper presents recommendations for TSI, Blue Frontiers, and other similar NGOs to ensure compliance with international laws should the organizations realize their long-term goal of moving a Seastead to the high seas as barges similar to that of short-term, nearshore projects. There are three options presented for TSI and Blue Frontiers to consider that afford varying degrees of autonomy, geographic and political protection, and the security of legal clarity going forward based on the architectural and engineering specifications of the FIP. The first option for TSI and Blue Frontiers involves a Seastead staying within the territorial sea or EEZ of an existing nation that matches their site designation criteria. This option would mean the Seastead would operate under the legal regimes of the host or parent nation, ideally through

(version in force as of Dec. 27, 2015).

123 See Anu Lähteenmäki-Uutela et al., What Explains SECA Compliance: Rational Calculation or Moral Judgment?, 18 WMU J. MAR. AFF. 61, 66 (2019), noting the possibility of high compliance costs relating to the Sulfur Emission Control Act and rules taken from MARPOL.

124 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 2:12, 8 (5th ed. 2014); see supra Section VI (Legal Classification Case Studies).

2019] Schmidtke 25 the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) or Special Maritime Zone (SMZ) under the assumption that the host nation would grant a Seastead a large degree of political, economic, and legal autonomy. The second option for TSI and Blue Frontiers places more emphasis on political autonomy rather than geographic and legal certainty and involves towing and placing a Seastead in a pre-determined location on the high seas, deploying anchors or mooring systems for any breakwater device, and allowing the Seastead to float on its own. In addition, this Seastead would temporarily operate under the flag and jurisdiction of a less restrictive nation while maintaining good relations with a local, coastal nation to have a geographic safe haven in the event of a storm, hazardous eutrophic event, or accident. With this option, the initial plan would be explicitly stated to gradually transition or secede from the parent nation and go through the laborious process of creating a new, seafaring nation.125 The final option for TSI and Blue Frontiers to consider moving forward contemplates the desire for outright political and geographic independence. This recommendation entails towing and placing a Seastead on the high seas, anchoring or mooring a breakwater device to the seabed, and considering the Seastead a barge operating outside the authority of any associated nation. Of the three recommendations, the first option is the most desirable for TSI and Blue Frontiers. The first option involves the unique creation of a largely autonomous SEZ or SMZ in a parent nation that would keep the Seastead within its boundary and allow for potential future expansion within a parent nation’s existing territorial sea or EEZ.126 According to a World Bank study, the term “SEZ” “covers a broad range of zones, such as free trade zones, export-processing zones, industrial parks, economic and technology development zones, high-tech zones, science and innovation parks, free ports, enterprise zones, and others.”127 Additionally, these zones “normally operat[e] under more liberal economic laws than those typically prevailing

125 This possibility could have a global impact on international laws on secession. The author is aware of this and is refraining from discussing it at this time.

126 Carly Jackson, Seasteading! What about Regulations?, SEASTEADING INST. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.seasteading.org/seasteading-what-about-regulations/. There are many existing SEZs that demonstrate their accompanying possibilities like economic development and technology exchange. One notable SEZ to date is Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China. Gar-On Antony Yeh, Development of the Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen, The People's Republic of China, 52 EKISTICS 154, 154 (1985), www.jstor.org/stable/43622838.

127 DOUGLAS ZHIHUA ZENG, WORLD BANK, GLOBAL EXPERIENCES WITH SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: WITH A FOCUS ON CHINA AND AFRICA 3 (2015), https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Investing%20in%20Af rica%20Forum/2015/investing-in-africa-forum-global-experiences-with-special- economic-zones-with-a-focus-on-china-and-africa.pdf. 26 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1 in the country.”128 This would be similar to the framework discussed in the expired MoU between TSI and French Polynesia, although the SEZ would offer more autonomy to any Seastead involved.129 This would also likely provide benefits to a host nation that might otherwise disregard the Seastead concept. States may feel more compelled to partner with a Seastead in order to offset the economic and technological burdens that could come with taxpayer/state-funded SEZ development. Among the specific benefits offered by this recommendation is the fact that SEZs are legally recognized by countries around the world, with some located in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.130 Contrary to the elaborate process of writing a declaration of independence, forming a government from scratch, attempting to gain recognition by nations of the world, and more, under the SEZ route a Seastead would effectively exist as a new region within the legal framework of an existing nation. In order to be generally considered as an SEZ, a Seastead would need to offer some of the beneficial characteristics mentioned earlier, including a free trade zone, high-tech zone, or science and innovation park.131 In order to make this plan more realistic and easy to achieve, a Seastead SEZ could follow the model of existing SEZs (but seek more general legal, economic, and political autonomy). An example that further illustrates the SEZ model is included in the Zeng World Bank study, which describes that “[i]n China, the first SEZ legislation was formulated to govern the SEZs at the local level: in August 1980, the SEZ Act for Guangdong Province was passed by the National Congress at the same time when the Shenzhen SEZ was launched,” thus giving the project crucial national legal recognition.132 Allowing the

128 Id.

129 See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 15, at 6-8. This concept is discussed within the MoU through the creation of a “terrestrial Anchor Zone” and the “Floating Island Zone.” Id. These zones were envisioned to operate jointly in order to provide a Special Economic Zone for the nation of French Polynesia. This framework would also facilitate the relationship between the floating Seastead and a terrestrial “base.” Id.

130 ZENG, supra note 127, at 3. Compared to an unregistered Seastead on the high seas without any national affiliation, an SEZ is a legal status implemented by national governments.

131 ZENG, supra note 127, at 3. It is of the author’s opinion that the implementation of specific characteristics of an SEZ be negotiated beforehand to ensure the Seastead acquires the desired degree of autonomy. The author believes that an earlier agreement on these elements will result in clearly delineated responsibilities and fewer conflicts in the development and operation stages of a Seastead. Jackson, supra note 126; Tim Sandle, Building Sustainable Floating Islands in Special Economic Zones, DIGITAL J. (May 12, 2018), http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/building-sustainable-floating- islands-in-special-economic-zones/article/522016.

132 ZENG, supra note 127, at 10. 2019] Schmidtke 27 development of an SEZ through local involvement in combination with national recognition would give each party motivation to sustain a long- term positive relationship. The local government would have the consistent assurance that people, goods, and products could travel to and from this innovative marketplace without duties, taxes, or strict immigration concerns. The Seastead would have the protection and legal recognition of a host nation and a consistent market with which to interact. This option could be especially attractive to coastal nations at risk from sea level rise or coastal nations experiencing rapid urbanization.133 Following this line of thought, developing nations have a lot to gain from a mutually beneficial project of this nature. According to another World Bank study, developing nations “Vietnam, A.R. Egypt, Mauritania, Suriname, Guyana, French Guiana, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, The Bahamas, and Benin” have the population proportions most likely to be impacted by global sea level rise.134 At least according to comments from the Chinese Development Bank, “in some regions, industrial parks account for anywhere between 50% and 80 to 90% of growth in GDP. SEZs have also aided the increased openness and resource clustering by offering a vehicle and platform for the entry of capital, technology, talents and R&D activities from all over the world.”135 Assuming that at least similarly scaled impacts could be made on the economies in other at-risk developing nations, a Seastead SEZ or SMZ could gradually transform the financial outlook of struggling states. Creating greater economic stability and growth through a Seastead SEZ could encourage coastal citizens to stay in place instead of becoming climate refugees in unfamiliar nations or cultures.

133 See supra p. 18. This has already been addressed by the Netherlands as seen in their Flevoland project. Id. Nations like Denmark, Hong Kong, and Singapore also have already developed extensions of public spaces with floating island structures existing within their territorial sea or through land reclamation efforts. For Denmark, Wang, supra note 69, for Hong Kong, Charlie Q. L. Xue et al., An Urban Island Floating on the MTR Station: A Case Study of the West Kowloon Development in Hong Kong, 15 URB. DESIGN INT’L 191, 191 (2010), for Singapore, Samantha Subramanian, How Singapore is Creating More Land for Itself, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/magazine/how-singapore-is-creating-more-land- for-itself.html. This would allow particularly vulnerable populations the possibility to transition to a lifestyle on an expanding Seastead. See Daisy Simmons, As Sea Levels Rise, Are Floating Cities the Future?, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (June 8, 2017), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2017/06/as-sea-levels-rise-are-floating-cities- the-future/.

134 Susmita Dasgupta et al., The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis 41 fig.6b (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4136, 2007), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/156401468136816684/pdf/wps4136.pdf. Furthermore, according to the study, approximately 20% or more of wetlands in Vietnam, Jamaica, Belize, and Qatar will be impacted by global sea level rise. Id. at 43 fig.6f.

135 See ZENG, supra note 127, at 4 n.1. 28 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 21:1

While it is not a goal of TSI specifically, the addition of a Seastead- type SEZ can offer a developing nation the opportunity to move vulnerable populations away from land areas threatened by sea level rise while helping to maintain cultural identity and geographic proximity to familiar land and oceanic areas. Assuming the SEZ is a viable option for a particular country, the decision to either leave one’s gradually disappearing homeland to live in a new state with a different culture or government or staying in one’s homeland for as long as possible while developing adjacent floating platforms and a new economic zone (at the expense of opening the country to imports, new technology, and new workers) seems like an easy one to make. Partnering with NGOs like TSI and Blue Frontiers would ease much of the financial burden on host nations and would offer a successful cooperative model from which the host nation could build to its needs, modify to accommodate some of its cultural and political practices, and expand with any local population or economic growth. However, adapting to a new economic model and dealing with the demands of a new economic zone may be less desirable to some island nations that might otherwise prefer to preserve their already established economic systems and structures. In these situations, a Seastead may be developed without the involvement of an outside NGO or foreign individuals to attempt to maximize the self-sufficiency of an existing coastal nation. The balancing act between the involved parties will not be easy. It is essential for all parties involved to remember that every nation and every person has been or will be affected by global sea level rise in some way. Cooperation and innovation are necessary for humankind to develop solutions and adapt to this complex environmental phenomenon. In conclusion, the pilot Seastead project proposed in the waters of French Polynesia will be regulated as a barge under international law and the domestic law of French Polynesia. Additionally, should TSI and other NGOs eventually move the Seastead concept to the high seas, the Seastead will be regulated as a barge and governed by the laws of whichever nation’s flag it flies or is associated with. However, following the recommendations of this paper, the most viable option for a successful Seastead is to exist within the EEZ of a cooperative host nation through the creation of a unique maritime SEZ, offering geographic and climatic stability and legal certainty while affording the project a high degree of political, economic, and legal autonomy.