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IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon

Operation Barbarossa

My attempt to describe the between Nazi and the 1941-1945 in a few pages is laughable in its inadequacy. The attempt, however inadequate my time, scholarship, and ability to convey human experience may be, must be made.

The war is the largest, bloodiest, most savage war fought in human history.

Fundamentally, and were defeated in Russia, not in North , Italy, or France.

The result of that war shaped the map of Europe for 40 years.

The experience of that war profoundly shaped Soviet foreign policy during that time period.

The real heroes of what the call The Great Patriotic War are the people of the Soviet Union. The Russian peoples were faced with a race . They responded to terrible privation, suffering, and misery with epic courage, endurance, tenacity, and determination.

I. Origins of the War A. Once Adolf Hitler became Führer, there was no question whether he would attack Russia, but merely of when. 1. This section will discuss Hitler's fundamental motivation, which are ideological rather than economic or political. The next section will take up the question of timing: why did he attack Russia when he did? B . 1. Hitler was quite open about his desire for "living space" in the east. All of the following quotations are from , written while in Landsberg prison and published in 1925. Please bear in mind the date at which Hitler wrote this. Then compare his ideas with what he actually did. 2."One blood demands one Reich. . . . Only when the Reich borders include the very last German, but can no longer guarantee his daily bread, will the moral right to acquire foreign soil arise from the distress of our own people. Their sword will become our plow, and from the tears of war the daily bread of future generations will grow." (Hitler 3) 3. "What form must the life of the German nation assume in the tangible future . . . ?" (131) 4. "Germany has an annual increase in population of nearly nine hundred thousand souls. The difficulty of feeding this army of new citizens must grow greater from year to year and ultimately end in catastrophe, unless ways and means are found to forestall the danger of starvation and misery in time." (Hitler 131) 5. ". . . anyone who wants to secure the existence of the German people by a self- limitation of its reproduction is robbing it of its future." (Hitler 133) 6. "Without doubt the productivity of the soil can be increased up to a certain limit. But only up to a certain limit. . . . " (Hitler 133) 7. ". . . only those races are stricken with such suffering [hunger] which no longer possess the force and strength to secure for themselves the necessary territories in IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Page 2

this world. For . . . there are . . . immense areas of unused [sic] soil, only waiting for the men to till them. But . . . Nature as such has not reserved this soil for the future possession of any particular nation or race; on the contrary, this soil exists for the people which possesses the force to take it and the industry to cultivate it." (Hitler 134) 8."No one can doubt that this world will some day be exposed to the severest struggles for the existence of mankind. In the end, only the urge for self- preservation can conquer." (Hitler 135) 9. "The acquisition of new soil for the settlement of the excess population possesses an infinite number of advantages. . . the possibility of preserving a healthy peasant class as a foundation for a whole nation can never be valued highly enough. Many of our present-day sufferings are only the consequence of the unhealthy relationship between rural and city population." (Hitler 138) 10. "It must be said that such a territorial policy cannot be fulfilled in the Cameroons, but today almost exclusively in Europe. . . . .If this earth really has room for all to live in, let us be given the soil we need for our livelihood. True, they will not willingly do this. But then the law of self-preservation goes into effect; and what is refused to amicable methods, it is up to the fist to take." (Hitler 138-9) 11. "For Germany, consequently, the only possibility for carrying out a healthy territorial policy lay in the acquisition of new land in Europe itself." (Hitler 139) 12. "The talk about the 'peaceful economic' conquest of the world was possibly the greatest nonsense which has ever been exalted to be a guiding principle of state policy." (Hitler 143) 13. "Never yet has a state been founded by peaceful economic means, but always and exclusively by the instincts of preservation of the species. . . . " (Hitler 153) 14. "Here ["the relation of Germany to Russia"] perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs. . . ." (Hitler 641) 15. "The foreign policy of the folkish state must safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the nation's population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality of its soil on the other hand." (Hitler 643) [italics have not been added; they are Hitler's] 16. "Only an adequately large space on this earth assures a nation of freedom of existence." (Hitler 643) 17. ". . . in addition to its importance as a direct source of a people's food, another significance, that is, a military and political one, must be attributed to the area of a state." (Hitler 643) 18. "If the National Socialist movement really wants to be consecrated by history with a great mission for our nation, it . . . must find the courage to gather our people and their strength for an advance along the road that will lead this people from its present restricted living space to new land and soil, and hence also free it from the danger of vanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave nation." (Hitler 645-6) 19. "The National Socialist movement must strive to eliminate the disproportion between our population and our area--viewing this latter as a source of food as well as a basis IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 3

for power politics. . . . And in this it must remain aware that we, as guardians of the highest humanity on this earth, are bound by the highest obligation, and the more it strives to bring the German people to racial awareness, . . . the more it will be able to meet this obligation." (Hitler 646) 20. "The demand for restoration of the frontiers of 1914 is a political absurdity of such proportions and consequences as to make it seem a crime. Quite aside from the fact that the Reich's frontiers in 1914 were anything but logical. For in they were neither complete in the sense of embracing the people of German nationality, nor sensible with regard to geo-military expediency. They were not the result of a considered political action, but momentary frontiers in a political struggle that was by no means concluded; partly, in fact, they were the results of chance." (Hitler 649) 21. "Today it is not princes and princes' mistresses who haggle and bargain over state borders; it is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his domination over the nations." (Hitler 651) 22. "we National Socialists must hold unflinchingly to our aim in foreign policy, namely, to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitled on this earth." (Hitler 652) 23. "The soil on which some day German generations of peasants can beget powerful sons will sanction the investment of the sons of today, and will some day acquit the responsible statesmen of blood-guilt and sacrifice of the people, even if they are persecuted by their contemporaries." (Hitler 652) 24. "State boundaries are made by man and changed by man." (Hitler 653) 25. "Much as all of us today recognize the necessity of a reckoning with France, it would remain ineffectual in the long run if it represented the whole of our aim in foreign policy. It can and will achieve meaning only if it offers the rear cover for an enlargement of our people's living space in Europe. For it is not in colonial acquisitions that we must see the solution of this problem, but exclusively in the acquisition of a territory for settlement, which will enhance the area of the mother country, and hence not only keep the new in the most intimate community with the land of their origin, but secure for the total area those advantages which lie in its unified magnitude." (Hitler 653) (emphasis added) 26. "The right to possess soil can become a duty if without extension of its soil a great nation seems doomed to destruction. And most especially when not some little nigger nation or other is involved, but the Germanic mother of life, which has given the present-day world its cultural picture. Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany." (Hitler 654) 27. "And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy of our pre-War period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago." [the , a surge of colonization eastwards against Slavic peoples and other groups, like the Prus--who gave Prussia their name--who were exterminated. The drive was ultimately blunted by Alexander Nevsky's victory over the Teutonic Knights. It left a very large German population in what is now and the ] (Hitler 654) IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 4

28. "If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states." (Hitler 654) 29. "Here Fate itself seems desirous of giving us a sign. By handing Russia to , it robbed the Russian nation of that intelligentsia which previously brought about and guaranteed its existence as a state. For the organization of a Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slaves in Russia, but only a wonderful example of the state-forming efficacy of the German element in an inferior race. . . . For centuries Russia drew nourishment from this Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata. Today it can be regarded as almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been replaced by the Jew. Impossible as it is for the Russian by himself to shake off the yoke of the Jew by his own resources, it is equally impossible for the Jew to maintain the mighty empire forever. He himself is no element of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The Persian empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. We have been chosen by Fate as witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the mightiest confirmation of the soundness of the folkish theory." (Hitler 654) 30. "Our task, the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our own people to such political insight that they will not see their goal for the future in the breath-taking sensation of a new Alexander's conquest, but in the industrious work of the German plow, to which the sword need only give soil." (Hitler 655) 31. "An alliance whose aim does not embrace a plan for war is senseless and worthless." (Hitler 660) 32. "The present rulers of Russia have no idea of honorably entering into an alliance, let alone observing one. Never forget that the rulers of present-day Russia are common blood-stained criminal; that they are the scum of humanity." (Hitler 660) 33. "In Russian Bolshevism we must see the attempt undertaken by the Jews in the twentieth century to achieve ." (Hitler 661) 34. "The fight against Jewish world Bolshevism requires a clear attitude toward Soviet Russia. You cannot drive out the Devil with Beelzebub." (Hitler 662) II. Immediate Origins of the German Invasion of the Soviet Union A . Josef Stalin and the Marxist-Leninist View of Foreign Policy 1. There is a very high degree of coherence to Soviet foreign policy under Stalin. There is strong continuity between Stalin's foreign policy in the 1930s prior to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, to his policies between the Pact and Operation Barbarossa, and to his foreign policy following Barbarossa to his death. The extent of that continuity does not seem to have been appreciated by many Americans who should have known better: diplomats and revisionist historians. 2. That foreign policy has two important components: historic Russian and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Orthodox Western historians of the Cold War will tend to emphasize the latter; Revisionist historians a bizarre form of the former (as you may possibly have guessed, it so happens that I don't agree with the Revisionists). The two strands cannot, actually, be separated. Stalin was more powerful than any Tsar and he pursued a foreign policy that any Tsar would recognize; he was also a Communist IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 5

and his view of the world is determined by Communist ideology. a. There is an argument about Stalin's real commitment to Marxism-Leninism. He never hesitated to flip flop ideological arguments in order to gain an advantage. Some Marxists believe that Stalin betrayed the Revolution. It is unnecessary for me to try to answer that argument here. Whether Stalin was a true believer or a cynical power mad dictator, he certainly interpreted the world using the thought structures of Marxism-Leninism, and that conditions all of his decisions. 3."Soviet foreign policy was founded on the basis of Marxism-Leninism which propounded that capitalist and communist systems and states were incompatible and could not permanently endure side by side, a collision between the two being inevitable and resulting in a final and complete victory for . The capitalist nations were to be hastened to destruction by subversion and intended to discredit their governments and social systems and sap the morale of their peoples. Differences between capitalist countries were to be accentuated and fomented in order to weaken their resistance and to establish communist states on their ruins. The Soviet Union was both the stronghold of communism and the springboard for the launching of world revolution and, as it later transpired, new foreign communist states as they emerged were to be subjected by to strict and rigid control over both foreign and domestic affairs." (Seaton 2) (emphasis added) a. The above quotation is not much in vogue in the halls of academe today, filled as they are with Political Correctness. It sounds like an apologia for J. Edgar Hoover's The Masks of Communism, which used to be required reading in the bad old days of the Evil Empire. It (my quote) is however, an extremely accurate description. Its defense is that it is true. And it should be obvious that, if it is true, then a Cold War was inevitable regardless of whatever policy the U.S. might or might not have pursued. It was inevitable because Stalin was already fighting it. George Kennan understood that perfectly, and pointed it out in the Long Telegram. 4. Lenin was forced to mute this hostility to the capitalist world in the mid-20s because he needed Western assistance to rebuild his shattered country (sound familiar?) 5.Fifteenth Party Congress 1927 a.Stalin returns to the classical line, saying that the "period of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet and the capitalist states was coming to its end." (Seaton 2) Stalin established two important principles: (1) "The first was that the Soviet Union, as the foremost communist state and bastion of the movement, was to be kept strong and intact ready to overthrow tottering capitalism." [a fairly obvious rationale for Russian expansion and ] (2) "The second aspect was the confirmation of expansionist aims by subversion and the spread of communism, although the USSR was unlikely to embark on direct aggression if this involved any risk to itself." (Seaton 2) (emphasis added) (3) These policies must be borne in mind when evaluating Western attitudes towards the USSR in the 1930s. Western diplomats tended to regard the Communists as a species of adder. As we all know, "Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean that they aren't out to get you!" IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 6

B . Josef Stalin 1. It is my opinion that Josef Stalin is among the top three candidates for the dubious title of "Most Evil Man in History." I tend to put Hitler first, with Stalin second. The full story on Stalin is not known. Perhaps, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it will be known, but my guess is that much has been irretrievably lost. 2. "[There is no possible doubt that Stalin was in complete and undisputed control of the government within the Soviet Union and that he alone formulated all important policy, taking a close and personal interest in its execution." (Seaton 4) a. Stalin possessed a persecution complex that was pathological. He saw enemies everywhere. b. He was profoundly deceitful in all relationships, even within his immediate circle. c. Stalin possessed the kind of "brutal will-power" that Hitler admired. d. Stalin was cunning, devious and intelligent. e. Stalin was dogmatic and narrow on economic, political, or social matters. f. Stalin was capricious, obstinate, and malicious. g. His immediate entourage lived in constant terror. (Seaton 5) C. A Chronology of Events Up to Barbarossa 1. The Munich Crisis a.Hitler's point of view has already been dealt with. Stalin's policy seems to have been pious, and duplicitous. Stalin made assurances of support to which could not have been fulfilled (the USSR had no contiguous border with Czechoslovakia). Those assurances were deliberately vague. He apparently was hoping to embroil the capitalists in internecine strife. Later on, Stalin successfully portrayed himself as having sought collective security against Hitler with Great Britain and France only to be disillusioned by the weak-kneed policy of appeasement. This supposedly forced him to reconsider his options. A collective security agreement with capitalists against another capitalist would however be out of keeping with his ideology. A close examination of Soviet diplomacy supports this skepticism. 2.The Eighteenth Party Congress March 10, 1939 a."Stalin spoke out clearly and unequivocally when he confirmed that at all costs he was not going to involve the USSR in war for the benefit of others. This political line was taken up by the Soviet press which said even more explicitly that the USSR was not going to be dragged into a war against Germany by the machinations of Great Britain and France." (Seaton 7) (italics added) 3.March 15, 1939 Germany absorbs Bohemia and Moravia while becomes a German . (Bell 250) 4. March 23, 1939 Lithuania is forced by Germany pressure to cede Memel. (Watt 157, Bell 250) 5. April 15, 1939 Talks begin between the British Ambassador to Moscow and Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov. Stalin however begins parallel talks in secret in Berlin 6. May 3, 1939 Stalin provides an opening for Hitler by replacing Maxim Litvinov, who was a Jew, with Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. 7.May 1939 Japanese troops from the radical Kwantung Army crossed the Manchurian border at Khalkin Gol into Soviet territory. This is their second major incursion. The IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 7

campaign is largely unknown in the West (although recently a study has been published). The Japanese forces seized territory and dug in for a defensive , forcing the to come to them. Forces available give a slight advantage to the Soviets--35 rifle battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 500 tanks and 500 aircraft to 25 rifle battalions, 17 cavalry squadrons, 180 tanks and 450 aircraft. The rule of thumb is that an attacker needed a 3:1 advantage; the Japanese felt confident. 8. August 11, 1939 Hitler discusses the Polish situation with Jacob Burckhardt, the League of Nations high commissioner for Danzig. Hitler told him that he planned to destroy Poland quickly. He then added, remarkably, "Everything that I undertake is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to grasp this, I will be obliged to come to an understanding with the Russians, to defeat the West, and then after its downfall to turn my assembled forces against the Soviet Union." (Rich 126) (emphasis added; note the date; as with his statement to Eden prior to the , Hitler has already made up his mind as to his course of action) 9. August 20, 1939 Hitler forces the pace, sending Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop to Moscow with powers to sign a nonaggression pact and an economic agreement. 10. August 20-31, 1939 Future Marshall Georgi Zhukov launches a double envelopment of the Japanese at Khalkin Gol, inflicting casualties in a ratio of 4:1, and driving the Japanese across the border. (Messenger 122) 11. August 22, 1939 At the Berghof Conference, Hitler collected his generals and told them of the imminent Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. "Now we can strike at the heart of Poland--I have ordered to the East my Death's Head units [of the SS] with the order to kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish race or language. . . . [The speech was interrupted at this point by Göring leaping upon a table to dance in Lederhosen ] There is no time to lose. War must come in my lifetime. My pact was meant only to stall for time, and, gentlemen, to Russia will happen just what I have practiced with Poland--we will crush the Soviet Union." (Clark 25) (emphasis added) The recorded reactions from the generals include disapproval of Göring's antics but not of Hitler's declared policy. 12. August 23, 1939 Announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. a. If either became involved in a war, the other would remain neutral. Secret provisions divided Poland into halves. Russia received a free hand in Finland, Estonia and Latvia; Germany in Lithuania. Russian interest in Rumanian Besserabia was recognized; Germany declares that it had no interest in Rumania and the Balkans. b. The economic agreement provided that the USSR would supply grain, oil, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. These provisions would go far toward reducing Germany's vulnerability to British blockade. In addition, Russia could prove a conduit for other vital materials, such as rubber, which Russia itself did not supply. c. Stalin must have been well-satisfied. He expected that Germany would now become embroiled in a war with France and Great Britain, which he expected would be long and bloody. In the meantime, he could exert Russian control over the Baltic. Furthermore, the economic provisions would tend to make Germany IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 8

an economic dependency of Russia, which Stalin could revoke at will. As it turned out, Stalin was so unprepared for Barbarossa because he simply could not believe that Hitler would attack his economic life-line while he was still involved in a war in the West. d. Hitler, however, was also well satisfied. He had ordered Ribbentrop to pay whatever was necessary. Once he had accomplished his immediate goals, Hitler would simply break the agreement. Hitler had cleared his front of the Russian threat for the moment, and genuinely believed that, with Russia out of the equation, Great Britain and France would not fight for Poland at all. 13. The Kremlin then assured Poland of its benevolent neutrality and promised assistance in the event of war. Such duplicity could only have been aimed at encouraging Polish resistance and bringing about a general war. (Seaton 10) 14. September 16, 1939 A truce is signed between the Soviet Union and Japan. Japan is shocked at the Nazi-Soviet Pact. After Khalkin Gol, the Japanese are extremely wary of challenging the Red Army. This has long-term effects. a. Hitler failed miserably to coordinate his strategy with Japan with regard to Russia. A simultaneous attack by Germany and Japan in 1941 might have toppled Stalin. Instead, Hitler did not even inform his nominal ally of his decision. For their part, the wing within the Japanese military which advocated expansion toward the south and east (Indochina, Dutch East Indies, China, Philippines) won the fierce debate with those who saw Russia as the great enemy (China and Manchuria). In other words, Japan turned their attention in the direction of the United States and its interests. b. However, the Japanese Army maintained very large forces facing the Russians throughout the war--among them their best Army divisions, thus making them unavailable to face the United States. They began transferring these units late in the war (to the Philippines and Okinawa), and then found that their loss of control of the sea made it difficult to transfer them at all. c. Furthermore, the Japanese refused to interfere with the shipment of supplies from the United States (with whom Japan was at war) to Russia (with whom they were not at war) via Vladivostok. This is despite the fact that Japan's geographical position would have made it very difficult to use that route. The Pacific route proved to be the most reliable supply line for Lend-Lease to Russia. d. Russia, for their part, began transferring much of their Siberian Army to face the Germans once they were convinced that the Japanese would not attack. These Siberian units were decisive in the defense of Moscow in 1941-42. e. Hitler's diplomacy toward Japan is grossly mishandled. 15. September 17, 1939 Stalin orders the Red Army to invade Poland. Germany and Russia complete a partition of Poland along the line of the Bug. 16. October 10, 1939 Russia imposes treaties on the Baltic States, forcing them to grant military basing privileges to the Red Army. (Calvocoressi 593, Liddell Hart I 43) 17. The Kremlin places pressure on Turkey to grant joint-control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Stalin will return to this following World War II; it will precipitate the Truman Doctrine. 18. November 30, 1939 Stalin demands a "mutual aid pact" of Finland similar to those of the Baltic States. Specifically, he demands the Karelian Isthmus (which placed the IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 9

Finnish border within range of Leningrad), the Finnish shore of Lake Ladoga, transit to the nickel mines at Petsamo, and basing privileges at Hangö on the Baltic. a. At the risk of defending a man like Stalin, a close examination of the demands leaves little to fault him with, provided that we assume that he is brutally interested in defending the USSR without regard to the tender sensibilities of his neighbors. The bases and the Karelian border are rationally related to the defense of Leningrad. In particular, the new proposed border for left the Finnish Mannerheim Line intact. Stalin offered territorial adjustments that would actually lead to a net gain in Finnish territory (albeit mostly swamp and forest). b. The Finns, however, rejected the demands. They are deeply suspicious of the Russians, with good reason. The USSR invades. c. The first campaign is a disaster for the Red Army. The Finns proved themselves to be superb soldiers. Fighting in their own swamps and forests during winter, the Finns prove to be without equals. Although hopelessly outnumbered in men and equipment, they cut the Red columns to pieces. d. The Red Army learns from the disaster. Greater forces are deployed, and much more attention given to proper preparation. The Red Army attacks in meat- grinder fashion in hopelessly overwhelming force. Despite their heroism, the Finns are beaten. On March 6, 1940, the Finns sue for peace. e. Stalin increases his demands to include all of Karelia as well as additional territory. He does not push it as far as he might have. He is glad to release 1,000,000 soldiers from the front when danger threatens in Poland. (Liddell Hart I 46) 19. June 22, 1940 France's capitulation shocks Stalin. He realizes that the USSR is now in real danger. 20. Mid-June 1940 Russia occupies and absorbs the Baltic States: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This included part of Lithuania that had previously been assigned to Germany. (Rich 133) 21. June 27, 1940 Russia seizes Bessarabia and Northern from Rumania. Bessarabia had been covered by the Nazi-Soviet Pact; Bukovina had not. To make things worse, Hitler was unaware that Ribbentrop had declared Germany's "disinterest" in the Balkans. Bukovina placed the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania, threats to which Hitler was extremely sensitive, within reach of the Red Air Force. a.The combination of these actions placed Stalin in a position to threaten Hitler's access to Petsamo nickel and Swedish iron ore, both of which were vital to Hitler's war effort. They could also threaten the Ploesti oil fields. Rumania produced 7 million tons of oil out of Germany's war-time requirement of 12-20 million tons. (Rich 182) b. Other economic interests potentially threatened were 23% of world bauxite from Yugoslavia and Hungary, 20% of world chrome from Turkey, 10% of world antimony plus copper and lead from Yugoslavia, plus cotton, flax, wool and food from the region in general. (Rich 182) 22. June 30, 1940 German Chief of Staff Franz von Halder records that Hitler spoke of IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 10

turning to the east. (Seaton 36) 23. July 22, 1940 Halder's diary outlines a Russian campaign. (Seaton 36) 24. Late July 1940 Hitler tells his generals "Russia need say no more to England than that she does not want Germany to be great. Then the English, like a drowning man, will have reason to hope that things will be entirely different in six to eight months. Should Russia, however, be smashed, then England's last hope is extinguished. The elimination of Russia would also eliminate Britain's other great hope, the United States, because the Americans would then be left alone to face the enormously increased power of Japan in the Far East." (Rich 209) 25. July 29, 1940 At the Bad Reichenhall conference, Chief of Staff of the German High Command of Armed Forces (OKW) quoted Hitler as having decided on a preventive attack on Russia. Formal planning begins. (Seaton 36, Clark 24) 26. August 1940 Hitler secures an agreement with Finland to allow transit to and from northern Norway, and to quarter German troops in Finland. 27. August 30, 1940 The Vienna Award. Hitler solves a long standing territorial dispute between Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania by awarding part of Transylvania to Hungary, Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and guaranteeing Rumania's borders against all further incursions. German troops transit Hungary to enter Rumania to secure the oil fields. Russia, despite consultative clauses in their pact, is not consulted or informed. Hitler ignores their protest. 28. September 27, 1940 between Germany, Italy, and Japan is signed. Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis is now formed, which the Kremlin regards as aimed at them. Stalin is not unduly perturbed however, since Hitler is doing what Stalin expected him to do and what he, Stalin, would do in Hitler's place: duel over control of Finland and the Balkans. He did not believe Hitler would attack him until the war in the West was settled because Hitler was economically too dependent upon Russia. (Seaton 13) 29. October 26, 1940 Stalin occupies islands at the mouth of the Danube. This could only have been seen as a provocation. 30. October 28, 1940 Mussolini invades Greece. Hitler did not know of this plan, and was very unhappy about it. The Greeks stop Mussolini cold, but request aid of the British, who are more than eager to offer it. This will place the RAF potentially within striking distance of Ploesti. Hitler describes that prospect to the Duce as "terrifying." (Rich 197) Hitler must now take steps to secure his southern flank. Hitler is still an evil man; in this instance, however, he would have greatly preferred to have maintained indirect control over Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia. He had no desire to invade Greece; it was a rational defensive response to events. German occupation in Yugoslavia and Greece was especially brutal. 31. November 1940 Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 18 confirming orders already given verbally "irrespective" of negotiations with Molotov. (Clark 24) 32. November 12, 1940 Molotov goes to Berlin to talk to Ribbentrop. He ignored German proposals to turn Russian attention to the Persian Gulf. He responded with "a long monologue in which he repeated the well-known Soviet aspirations in Finland, Southern Bukovina and the Dardanelles Straits. Molotov wanted German troops out of Finland, and Japan to renounce her concession rights to coal and iron in North Sakhalin. He further proposed that the Soviet Union should issue a guarantee to Bulgaria, similar to that given by Germany to Rumania, with the additional right to set up bases capable of IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 11

controlling movement through the Turkish Straits. . . . [Later that night] Molotov revealed his secondary spheres of interest, which included Greece, Yugo-Slavia, Hungary and Poland and the control of the Baltic Sea." (Seaton 13) (italics added) 33. November 1940 Rumania signs the Tripartite Pact. 34. January 9, 1941 Hitler tells his generals, "The Russians promise to supply us with the quantities of nickel required, but only so long as they please." and "Russia can turn the Rumanian oil fields into an expanse of smoking debris . . . and the life of the Axis depends on those oil fields." (Rich 206-7, 211) 35. March 1, 1941 Hitler forces Bulgaria to sign the Tripartite Pact as an ally. German troops enter Bulgaria. 36. March 25, 1941 Hitler forces Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact. 37. March 27, 1941 A coup d'etat in Yugoslavia overthrows the government and installs a military regime hostile to Germany. Russia signs a Treaty of Friendship with the new government, making assurances of military assistance. 38. March 30, 1941 Hitler addresses senior commanders and tells them they would wage a "race war without pity." "The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion; the struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. All officers will have to rid themselves of obsolete ideologies. I know that the necessity for such means of making war is beyond the comprehension of your generals but . . . I insist that my orders be executed without contradiction. The commissars are the bearers of ideologies directly opposed to National Socialism. Therefore the commissars will be liquidated. German soldiers guilty of breaking . . . will be excused. Russia has not participated in the Hague Convention and therefore has no rights under it." (Keegan Second World War 186) (emphasis added) "The responsibility for the occupied territories was to be handed to the SS, and order was to be maintained by the deliberate spreading of terror. This was to be achieved by mass murder, torture, and confiscations irrespective of sex or age. . . . [Hitler's] intention was to prepare his commanders psychologically for the new pattern of ideological war, complete in its totality, a war which would be fought by both sides without compassion or mercy, without honor or decency. . . . [These orders were followed by others ] forbidding the surrender of Leningrad and Moscow, and ordering the encircled cities to be razed to the ground by shell fire and bombing. The female population of Stalingrad was to be transported and the males destroyed." (Seaton 54-5) (emphasis added) 39. March 1941 Plans were well along for the economic exploitation of the Soviet Union, under the direction of Göring, Rosenberg, and Himmler (all of whom fought each other viciously for turf). Göring's plans envisioned short-term economic benefits, with an emphasis upon rebuilding necessary transportation, and restoring oil and grain production. No other reconstruction was to be undertaken. "According to the estimates of German economic experts, it was quite possible that as a result of the proposed German economic policies in the Soviet Union millions of Russians would starve to IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 12

death. This was an eventuality which the Nazi leadership was evidently perfectly willing to face." (Rich 217) (emphasis added) 40. April 5, 1941 Russia backs away from their pledges of military support. 41. April 6, 1941 German troops invade Yugoslavia and bomb Belgrade. Yugoslavian resistance disintegrates. The campaign is a "military promenade." The Yugoslavian army surrenders on April 17. (Rich 194) 42. April 1941 The Soviet Union, in accordance with their treaty obligations, deliver 200,000 tons of grain and 90,000 tons of petroleum to Germany. (Seaton 15) 43. Beginning of June 1941 The US embassy in Moscow delivers intelligence to the Kremlin of an impending German invasion of Russia. 44. June 10, 12, 13 The British brief the Russian Ambassador on three occasions of the German build-up in the East. a. Stalin dismisses the warnings (including, as well, extremely accurate reports from Richard Sorge, his spy in Tokyo). "Stalin, cautious and doubtful, continued to appraise the situation coolly and logically. The mistake he made was to put himself mentally into Hitler's place and view the European and world situation through his own communist eyes, rather than to study the German dictator's mentality and appreciate what he, the Führer, was likely to do in a given set of circumstances. Stalin could not bring himself to believe that the Germans would defy all reason and enter into a war on two fronts. . . . His communist logic told him that the obvious salvation of the British lay in provoking a war between Germany and the Soviet Union by intrigue and lies." (Seaton 20-21) III. The Leaders A. German Leaders 1. The Russian campaigns are dominated to a very high degree by Adolf Hitler. By the end of the war, Hitler was maneuvering platoons. 2. Other important leaders include: a. Chief of the Army General Staff Franz von Halder b.Chief of Staff German High Command of Armed Forces (OKW) Alfred Jodl c.Col. General , commander of the Second Panzer Group. Guderian is the architect of the , the one man in Europe who understood armored war the best, and whose strategic views provided Germany's best hope for victory. d. Field Marshall , Commander in Chief, . Rundstedt was regarded by his peers as the epitome of a German soldier. B. Russian Leaders 1.Josef Stalin completely dominated his generals as well, and took a detailed interest in operations. We do not know the full details. He evidently made a lot of mistakes, as did Hitler. However, surviving Russian generals were more than reluctant to criticize him in their memoirs. It is clear, however, that Stalin established a more realistic and competent relationship with his generals than did Hitler. The fact is, that after the initial catastrophe, the quality of Russian strategic operations was much better (usually) than that of the Germans' at the same level. German superiority lay at the operational and tactical level. Had Hitler given a free hand to Guderian, Manstein, Rundstedt, Höppner, or Kleist, etc., it might have been different. On the other hand, had Stalin given a free IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 13

hand to Zhukov, Rokosovsky, Vatutin, or Chuikov, it would have balanced out. At any rate, Stalin was as incapable of giving his generals free rein as Hitler was. 2.Marshall G. K. Zhukov, who is used as Stalin's fireman. If the won-lost record is a test of a general's greatness, then Zhukov is the greatest soldier of World War II. He never lost a battle, and he was sent where it was hottest--Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad. A difficult personality (great soldiers often are), he displayed a consistently high degree of skill, iron nerve, and a profound understanding of the nature of his weapon: the Red Army and the Russian soldier. IV. Balance of Forces A. The 1. In 1941, the Wehrmacht was the finest army in the world, and stood at its greatest strength vis a vis potential enemies. It was not, however, invincible, and there were weaknesses within its structure. 2. Strength: a. In June of 1941, the field army consisted of 180 infantry, 12 motorized, and 20 Panzer divisions. b. Total strength of the army was about 5,000,000. c. Total strength of the Luftwaffe was 1,700,000 d. The Navy absorbed 400,000 men e. The Waffen SS stood at that time at 150,000 men. f. 25% of all German males were in uniform (Keegan Second World War 173-4) 3. Experience a. This army had experienced unbroken and spectacular success in Poland, , France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. To its superb training had been added invaluable combat experience. b. Down to the lowest levels, German units displayed great skill, daring and initiative. c. The officer corps and noncommissioned officers in particular were of a very high quality. d. Casualties to date had been quite low: 17,000 dead in Poland, 3600 in Scandinavia, 45,000 in France, 151 in Yugoslavia, 5000 in Greece.(Keegan Second World War 173) 4. Weapons and Equipment a. German weapons were generally of outstanding quality. In some areas, their equipment was not bettered by the Allies. b. The mainstay of the tank force was the Pz Mark III, now up-gunned to a 50 mm L42 (it had, however, not been mounted with the long 50 mm L60 Hitler had ordered; this cost the Pz III its technical edge by 1943;. there is no explanation for the use of the shorter gun). It mounted 50 mm of frontal armor, later increased by 29 mm of spaced armor. It was a very good design, and a fine all around tank. (Seaton 72) c. The other German tank generally used was the Pz Mark IV. By 1943, this becomes the mainstay tank. Larger, and also a fine design capable of numerous improvements to the chassis, it mounted a 75 mm L24 gun that gradually became longer and more powerful--to 43, 48, and 70 calibers (one factor in the range, accuracy, and penetrative power of a tank gun is the length of the barrel. A 75 IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 14

mm L43 possessed a barrel 43 x the length of its diameter.) It mounted 60 mm of armor. The Pz IV was more or less a match for the Sherman tank, which had not yet been designed. d. All German tanks carried radios. Formations were controlled by division, corps and army commanders in mobile field headquarters through special command vehicles. e. German tank crews were beyond all question the best in the world, and remained the best in the world throughout the war. f. The German light machine gun was probably the best of its type during the war. Mounted on a bipod, it was a light MG. On a tripod, it was a medium MG. It provided great firepower in a highly mobile form for the infantry. g. The Schmeisser machine pistol was also the best of its type, and the forerunner of all the machine pistols being used to massacre your fellow citizens in the streets today. h. The assault rifle was invented by the Germans for their paratroopers. It combined the rate of fire of a machine gun with the range of a rifle. (The disadvantage of a machine pistol is poor range. You need to get really really close to Bambi before you can hit him. The NRA likes this because it encourages the development of stalking skills in all the sportsmen who love to hunt rabbits and deer with Uzis and Rugers.) i. German artillery was plentiful, very accurate, and extremely flexible in fire control. This last became critical after 1943 as they defended ground with artillery since they didn't have enough infantry. j. The "potato masher" hand grenade was better than the ones used by the Allies. It carried a larger charge, and the stick permitted better leverage for throwing. k. The quick-firing 20 mm FLAK gun (sometimes in quad configuration) was not only good for its intended purpose, but also quite good against infantry and unarmored vehicles. l. The famous 88 mm FLAK gun was the finest weapon of the war. A heavy caliber, high velocity anti-aircraft gun, Erwin Rommel desperately turned it against the British counter-attack at Arras, since German anti-tank guns could not defeat the Matilda tank. He discovered the supreme tank killer of the war. In range, accuracy, and penetration, the 88 mm was simply unmatched. A well- sited 88 could massacre a massed tank attack. The famous German Pz Mark VI "Tiger" tank mounted the 88 in its turret. m. German optics were the best in the world. This allowed German tanks and gunners to stand off and destroy the enemy at ranges at which the enemy could not reply. (1) Properly used, this is an advantage that can be devastating. In the Gulf War, the US faced the Soviet T-72 for the first time in direct combat. The T-72 was, until recently, the first-line battle tank of the USSR (it has been supplanted by the T-80) and was touted as the equal of the US M1A1 Abrams. The T-72 mounts a 125 mm gun with a higher muzzle velocity than the gun mounted by the Abrams. This suggests greater range. However, the targeting system of the T-72 is quite inferior to that of the Abrams. It could neither see nor hit a target much beyond 1700 meters. In Iraq, the US 1st Armored Division first engaged the IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 15

Tawakalna Republican Guard division at a range of about 2700 meters. At that range, rounds from the Abrams were passing completely through the T-72, even through frontal armor. Typically, the T-72 had the turret blown off and the engine blown out when internal ammunition and fuel exploded. Evidently, US tank crews hit their target with extraordinary frequency (up around 90%). The terrain in the desert accentuates such an advantage, but superior optics contributed very significantly to the massacre. 1st Armored lost 2 Abrams' and 4 Bradleys for 440 Iraqi tanks and 485 armored personnel carriers. 5. Doctrine and Practice a. I have already discussed Blitzkrieg. The Germans really invented it, and everyone starts by studying them. b. The German Army displayed amazing operational flexibility. German soldiers were usually trained to perform the job one grade above their own. This allowed them to put together ad hoc units which then fought with great skill and tenacity, or allowed units to maintain coherence even after the loss of many officers. Someone else just stepped up. The fact is that a company of clerks and cooks often fought as well as any elite unit. c. The so-called "Battle Group" was a common feature. The Germans would assign units to a temporary battle formation. These often consisted of whatever mauled or fragmentary units were available. They were named after whoever was put in charge. Kampfgruppe Schmidt would therefore be such an ad hoc formation whose commander was named Schmidt. 6. Weaknesses a. The army was still two-tiered. Most of the Wehrmacht relied on its feet to move and on horses for transport. The cutting edge of the army was small in comparison to the total force. That armored fist was now 20 divisions, but this was achieved by reducing the tank regiments in half. The result was to dilute the punching power (a violation of Guderian's principles) while increasing the administrative component--weakening the ratio of "teeth to tail." To compound matters, the armored divisions relied on wheeled transport rather than all-terrain transport on caterpillar treads (300 tracked vehicles to 3000 wheeled vehicles) (Liddell Hart I 158) b.War production was inadequate. Hitler will pay for having prepared Germany for short rather than long ones--breadth rather than depth. The German armed forces were ill-prepared for a war of attrition. For example, Germany produced 5,664 Pz IIIs and 8000 Pz Ivs during the war; the US produced 49,320 Shermans and the Russians produced 40,000 T-34s, the finest tank of World War II. Germany produced about 25,000 tanks in the war; Great Britain 28,000, the US 76,000, and the USSR 83,000. (Wheal 358,464, 468,) c.Despite the size of the Wehrmacht, it was not large enough for the task set before it. The spaces of Russia were huge. The Wehrmacht was committed on other fronts. Eventually, manpower losses bled it white. B. The Red Army 1. The Red Army in 1941 was an unknown quantity. In the end, Hitler and his generals grossly underestimated it. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 16

2. The Red Army in 1941 was the largest in the world. a. Its strength stood at about 4,200,000 (Seaton 17) It possessed about 24,000 tanks, the largest tank park in the world. Those troops were divided among 230- 240 rifle divisions, 50 tank divisions and 25 mechanized divisions. (Keegan Second World War 178) b. The Red Air Force was also the largest in the world, with 10,000 aircraft. (Keegan Second World War 179). 3.Weapons a. Russian small arms were generally of good quality, and comparable to German counterparts. b. Soviet artillery was of very good quality, received the best recruits, and was used with great effectiveness. The Soviets kept large parks in reserve. In pre-planned barrages, it could be very deadly. The Katyusha multiple rocket launcher became both famous and feared by the Germans (the "Stalin Organ"). Katyushas were still in use in the 6 Day War. c. Tank design (1) By Barbarossa, the Russians were introducing 2 very formidable tanks which made all German models obsolescent. (2) The T-34 is the first and most important. It weighed 28 tons and carried 45 mm of sloped (60 degrees) armour (giving the equivalent protection of 90 mm of unsloped armor) and a 76.2 mm gun. The turret mounted 100 m of armour, also sloped. It had very wide tracks, which lowered the ground pressure per square inch and provided superior off- road agility--a very important quality in Russia. It was not built for comfort, but was easily the best design in the world at the time. It was easy to produce and maintain, rugged and reliable, agile, fast, well- gunned, superbly armored, and had a low profile. Later versions added an 85 mm gun. This is the finest tank of World War II, and as a weapon rivals the 88 mm as the finest of the war. (3) The KV-1 and KV-2 was a heavy tank of 48 tons with a 76.2 mm gun and even heavier armor. Later up-gunned with an 85 mm gun. (4) Enormous numbers of these tanks were produced, especially the T-34. The T-34 is the premier tank of World War II. 4. Weaknesses a. Not only Hitler but his top generals believed that the Red Army was of poor quality and could not fight a modern war. b. The Red Army and Air Force was very seriously deficient in communications equipment of all kinds. Radios were in severely short supply and of poor quality. This has a crippling effect on all operations, especially tanks, artillery, and air force. (1) For instance, in the Air Force, only squadron leaders possessed a radio. Planes could not communicate with each other, with base, or with ground troops. (Seaton 87) (2) This same weakness prevented flexible fire from artillery. Barrages went into pre-arranged targets regardless of whether anything was there or not. (3) Tanks could not communicate with each other. Only the lead tank had IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 17

radio. This helps explain the ability of the Germans to ambush Russian tanks so successfully. c.Lack of good command and control cannot be overemphasized as a weakness. US doctrine today stresses attacking command and control. Without it, an army may be huge but is uncoordinated. d. Much of the equipment was obsolescent or obsolete. About 80% of the Air Force was obsolete. (Seaton 86) Almost all of the tanks actually in service at the time of the invasion were as well (only 1500 T-34s and KV-1s in June) (Seaton 93). e.Effects of the Purge (1) "Where Hitler had tamed his officer caste, Stalin had killed his." (Calvocoressi 188) (2) Stalin shot 3 of 5 Marshalls, all 11 Deputy Commissars for Defense, 75 of 80 members of the Military Soviet, all commanders of his military districts, 13 of 15 army commanders, 57 of 85 of the corps commanders, 110 of 195 division commanders, 220 of 406 brigade commanders and 20-40 % of officers below brigade level. (Calvocoressi 189, Clark 34, Keegan Second World War 175) The first to go was Tuchachevsky, chief architect of the Red Army. Most of the generals who conducted the court martial were also shot. It was a massacre that exceeded war- time losses. For ruthlessness and thoroughness, I cannot think of any parallels. To have done this in 1937-38, with the threat from Hitler growing is practically suicidal. (3) To say that the Purge was disruptive of doctrine, organization and training is putting it very mildly. Tukhachevsky's death led to a repudiation of his doctrine of Blitzkrieg. The Red Army reverted to infantry tactics. They drew the wrong conclusions from their experiences in Spain (Gen. Pavlov, the tank expert, noted that Italian armored assaults failed to dislodge infantry and relegated tanks to a purely supportive role; the German observers merely noted that the Italians were incompetent. Stalin shot Pavlov in 1941 for cowardice, by which he meant failure.) (4) The Fall of France led to a frantic reorganization of the Russian tank force. The reorganization was botched. Training was very poor, doctrine confused. The reorganization had not been completed by the time the Germans invaded. 5. The Russian Soldier--the real hero of the Soviet Union a. No one who has fought the Russian soldier has anything but respect and praise for him. Clark writes about "primeval love of 'Mother Russia'" and "fatalism, and that readiness to accept terrible sufferings that are essential Russian qualities." (42) Keegan writes "The fighting potential of a Russian army--Red or tsarist--was never in doubt. Russian soldiers had proved brave, hardy, and patriotic fighters. . . . As artillerymen they stuck to their guns--and the quality of Russian artillery material had always been excellent. As infantrymen they were tenacious in defence and aggressive in attack. Russian armies, when they had failed, had done so not because their soldiers were poor but because their generals were bad." (177) Seaton writes that Russian soldiers were "tenacious," IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 18

"usually patriotic with a strong love for native land," "he had no great love for the life of a soldier, which he endured with patient stoicism." (Seaton 97) (1) In order to be balanced, Seaton also criticizes them, stating that unless forced, they had poor military efficiency and "became dirty, indisciplined, and unruly or apathetic." Their performance was erratic and subject to violent mood changes. They "tended to be slow-witted, ponderous and cautious, and they suffered from the age-old curse of passivity and the lack of originality and initiative." (97) (2) The perspective of German Maj. Gen. F. W. von Mellenthin, who fought in Poland, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, North Africa, Russia, and Normandy, is worth noting. Von Mellenthin is a German general and his views reflect assumptions that we would reject. They also are based on extensive and intimate experience fighting them. It is apparent to me that he wrote his memoirs in large part to provide a textbook for the West on how to fight the Red Army. He is a certifiable expert in panzer warfare. He refers to them as "Asiatics" and asserts that no Westerner can understand them. (349)He notes their tendency to swing from one extreme to another. "He is patient and enduring beyond imagination, incredibly brave and courageous--yet at times he can be a contemptible coward. . . . He is essentially a primitive [I don't have the German text, he probably used the prefix Ur- in a compound; a student of German literature will recognize the influence of Friedrich Schiller's Naive and Sentimental Poetry here, and that he doesn't mean here quite what he seems to mean] being, innately courageous, and dominated by certain emotions and instincts. His individuality is easily swallowed up in the mass . . . A feature of the Russian soldier is his utter contempt for life or death [I disagree here, and will return to this] so incomprehensible to a Westerner [this is from the viewpoint of an officer in the army of Nazi Germany!] For him life holds no special value; it is something easy to throw away. . . . With the same indifference the Russian soldier endures cold and heat, and the pangs of hunger and thirst. Unheard of hardships make no impression on his soul." (350) Mellenthin notes that prisoners often showed distrust and hatred of the Communist Party, but notes that Stalin had given the Russian army "unshakeable discipline." [which is certainly true] Mellenthin is very emphatic on one thing: "The Russian solider is a past master of camouflage, of digging and shoveling, and of building earthworks." (352) Elsewhere he stresses the Russians' ability to infiltrate lines and the phenomenal speed at which field works could be constructed and concealed. Bridgeheads had to be attacked instantly and violently or else entrenchment and reenforcement would make them too strong to dislodge. He thought they showed aptitude for technical warfare. He notes, like Seaton, "dullness, mental rigidity, and a natural tendency towards indolence" but notes that they constantly improved. (352) He thought highly of the top command: "They became adaptable, energetic, and ready to take decisions. Certainly in men like Zhukov, Koniev, Vatutin, and Vassilevsky Russia possessed army and army group commanders of a very high order."(352-3) Junior and middle IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 19

commanders showed the effects of the Purge, were clumsy, lacking originality and initiative [the Red Army system continued to crush initiative in officers; rigid obedience to the plan was the law]. He contrasts the strengths of "the Western soldier lies in his personal qualities, his moral and mental training, his initiative and his high standard of intelligence." (353) He believed that the Red Army High Command knew the weaknesses of its army very well and took them into account. His overall portrait is of a terrible opponent. b. Seaton addresses the issue of the Russian contempt for life, and I think he is certainly correct. "The Soviet soldier might have been careless of the lives of prisoners of war or even of those of the population of occupied territories, but there is no doubt that he valued his own. It was Stalin and the members of the government organ of the Soviet Union who viewed life so cheaply. Millions of Russian and Soviet lives had been sacrificed during the Civil War and at the times of the enforcement of collective agriculture, merely in order to achieve a political aim." (90) (italics added) c. The Soviet Union, Seaton notes, did not sign the Geneva accords and regarded POWs from a purely utilitarian point of view. They were used in the slave labor camps that were so essential to Stalinist Russia. Few German POWs returned from the war. d. Stalin was equally uninterested in the fate of Russian POWs. He regarded all of them as traitors. The Germans were even more brutal toward their prisoners than the Russians. They captured a total of 5,700,000 Russians, of whom 3,300,000 died in captivity. (Keegan Second World War 187) e. Stalin "held the soldier's family as hostage for his conduct in battle. The relatives of those taken prisoner could be, and in many cases were, sentenced to long terms of imprisonment." (90) f. Hitler looked at the various weaknesses of the Red Army, and told Gerd von Rundstedt, "You have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down." (Clark 43) V. The Plan A. The German plan of attack went through several variations. One problem was that it provided only very loose objectives: the destruction of the Red Army and a geographic line Archangel to the Caspian. (Clark 46) This reflected strategic indecision at the highest levels. B. Hitler deployed about 3,000,000 men, 3300 tanks, and 7000 guns for the actual attack. (Keegan Second World War 184) C. : Field Marshall Ritter von Leeb, with (under Höppner), and 23 Infantry, 3 Panzer and 2 MotorizedDivisions. This Group invaded along the historic route of Germanic knights, the Baltic coast (Manstein and Guderian were descended from ) aiming at Riga and Leningrad. D. : Field Marshall Fedor von Bock, with 2nd Panzer Army (under Guderian) and 3rd Panzer Army (under Hoth), including 32 Infantry, 9 Panzer, and 5 Motorized, and 1 Cav and 1 SS Regiment. This Group provided the main thrust, as its weight shows. It was to advance along the axis used by Napoleon: - Smolensk toward Moscow. E. Army Group South: Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt with 1 Panzer Army (under Kleist) and 3 Panzer divisions, 32 Infantry divisions, plus a Panzer Reserve of 2 Panzer, 2 Motorized and 2 SS Panzer divisions and 33 Allied infantry divisions (Rumanian, Hungarian, and Italian) (Clark IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 20

12) This group was separated from the others by the 40,000 square miles of the Pripet Marshes, which is impassable for modern mechanized operations. It would advance into the toward Kiev. The Ukraine provided the best tank country. F. The German commanders were in sharp disagreement about the best strategic approach. Some wanted to fight a series of great to destroy the Red Army. This was the orthodox solution. Guderian wanted a very deep penetration toward Moscow, at least until the Dnieper before turning. This is more Napoleonic, promised a more sudden and dramatic victory, but carried a greater risk that the spearheads would be cut off. The advocates of this plan were convinced after the war that this is what they should have done, despite its risks and difficulties. I am inclined to agree. The Germans had to overcome space by time, and to do that, they had to run some substantial risks. You will remember that the Manstein plan that defeated France was a similar deep thrust, and similarly was extremely risky. This should (in my opinion) have been the same sort of thing, on a much larger scale. G. Russian Deployment 1. Stalin's deployment was absolutely idiotic. The Red Army had constructed an incomplete line of fortifications in . When Stalin occupied the Baltic States and Poland, he moved his army forward. Then he insisted on defending every twist of the border. Formations were packed forward tightly. 2.Stalin refused to believe indications that the attack was imminent. The Red Army was in a state of total unpreparedness when the storm struck. The Germans achieved absolute tactical surprise. VI. Operation Barbarossa: June 22, 1941 A . Initial Stage: The Break Through 1. The German attack punched holes in the Russian lines at will. The Luftwaffe caught the Red Air Force on the ground and destroyed 1200 aircraft in the first day. Russian response was panicky and uncoordinated (Moscow provided no guidance whatever) Reserve units advanced blindly to the front only to be caught in march by the Luftwaffe. The Panzers smashed through with shocking speed. 2. Army Group North a. Leeb's drive was not especially well handled. There was steady friction between himself (trained in an earlier era and conservative in outlook) and Höpner, his tank commander, who was much bolder and who understood the new weapon. b. More serious was the terrain--a mixture of swamp and forest with few roads and fewer maps. The Germans had failed to study the topography adequately (inexcusable, since so many Baltic Germans were available to them.) The terrain negated tank advantages and enhanced the effect of rear guard actions. Even small numbers of resolute defenders could hold up the advance. Even so, the tanks quickly outstripped the infantry. But this meant that, even when the Panzers forced the Dvina river, they were incapable of holding the Russian infantry in a net. For this, infantry was needed. Therefore, the Panzers advanced slowly, and the Red Army though beaten, escaped. (Please note that tanks alone are inadequate; also note that terrain can negate tanks.) c. Hitler also interfered with the tactical deployment. He had no comprehension of actual conditions. Coupled with the existing argument between Leeb and Höpner, the result was wasted time and indecisive axes of advance (which sounds like a technicality, but modern armies live and die on logistics, which IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 21

must pass over the axis of advance.) d. It was not clear to Leeb, Höpner, or Manstein (commanding 56 ), the three leading personalities in the group, whether the first priority was the destruction of the Red Army in the Baltic, or the capture of Leningrad. This is crazy. e. Leeb continues to try to close the ring on Leningrad. The Finns apply pressure from the north, but they refuse to cross the original Russo-Finnish border. They have no desire to provoke the Russians any more than necessary. Hitler tried to employ pressure to coerce them, but the Finns were impervious. In Finland, the Finn was superior to the German soldier. Hitler had little leverage on them. f. Stalin sends Zhukov to conduct the defense of Leningrad from September 11 to October 8. Resistance stiffens. g. Leningrad remains in perilous straits. The supply line to the city must run over Lake Ladoga, as Leeb succeeded in cutting the rail line (until a new one was laid). The sufferings of the people of this city (1,000,000 citizens died) is one of the great and tragic epics of the war. h. On the other hand, Leeb's spearheads were never strong enough to seize the city by assault. With its numerous canals and built amidst a swamp, Leningrad's defenses are inherently stronger than most cities'. The Panzers could not have held the city against infantry infiltration. Only infantry can hold ground. Leeb was never strong enough in infantry to storm the city properly. Leeb could only win by . 3. Army Group South Rundstedt ran into a very good general in Kirponos (his commissar was , and one tank commander was the really exceptional K. K. Rokossovsky). Kirponos applied the absolutely correct response--attack the spearheads by pincer attacks. Especially stubborn was 5 Army under Potapov, which fell back against the Pripet Marshes and attacked the flanks. The attacks could not be coordinated however, and the Germans destroyed them in detail. Ewald von Kleist, commanding , Rundstedt's armored fist [this is the same von Kleist quoted in your DBQ on the Night of the Long Knives] drove to Lvov and continued relentlessly to drive on Kiev. Kirponos counted on further support as he fought his armies to pieces and found himself in an enormous potential trap. Soviet resistance in this sector is fierce, and the fighting often confused as well as bitter. Ultimately, one feels a bit sorry for Kirponos. Hampered by the collapse of communications, using a weapon that was not capable of following his directions, ultimately betrayed (it appears) by Stalin's incompetence, he handled his men as well as anyone could have done. 4. Army Group Centre a. The Russian line jutted westwards into the German line, forming a natural . Field Marshall Fedor von Bock, commanding the bulk of the armored forces, chose the obvious solution of breaking through above and below the salient. When the armored jaws closed around Minsk, 250 miles from the border, the Red Army would be trapped. Stalin had assisted by idiotically pushing the mass of his forces into the salient. Bock's Panzers were led by Col. Gen. Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army and Col. Gen. 's 3rd Panzer Army. b. June 24, Pavlov, the tank "expert" from the Spanish Civil War, orders his IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 22

reserves into the salient, thereby running still more troops into the noose. (Stalin had him shot on June 30). c. By June 25, Bock was fighting 3 separate "cauldron battles,"--(1) at the fortress of Brest-Litovsk (2) Bialystok (3) Volkovysk. A 4th cauldron was formed by June 29 behind Minsk, trapping 15 divisions against the River. The Panzers had advanced 300 miles. (Keegan Second World War 186, Liddell Hart I 163-4)--a staggering distance. d. The Panzers were advancing 50 miles a day, but the infantry following behind covered less than 20. For the "poor bloody infantry," the advance was worse than Kluck's in 1914: Keegan notes that 12th Inf. Div. marched 560 miles in the first week, carrying 50 lbs. in the broiling sun. This yawning gap becomes a serious problem for the high command. This is in high summer. As the season advances, the agony of the infantry will escalate into epic suffering--from mud and rain, hunger, exhaustion, lack of sleep, shelter, or rest, then the terrible Russian winter. e. July 10 The pincers opened again to swallow up the next Russian line. Technically, the deployment has weaknesses, with the armored spearheads spread out over 200 miles, violating Guderian's dictum of concentration. Summer storms periodically turned the dirt roads into quagmires, slowing the advance. Guderian breached the Dnieper River and raced to encircle 25 divisions at Smolensk. The trap closes on July 16. However, Bock had to commit armor to cleaning up the since his infantry were now 200 miles behind. Resistance inside the pocket continued until August 5. 300,000 prisoners were taken. (Seaton 130) (1) The significance of reaching Smolensk is that it controls a "land-bridge" to Moscow. (2) At this point, Army Group Centre has driven 500 miles into the Soviet Union and achieved the initial goals. It stood 250 miles from Moscow. (3) Both Guderian and Hoth wanted to completely bypass the Red Army in the rear and continue a ruthless drive on Moscow. But Hitler now orders a halt for the best summer campaigning months. f. By August 8 Stalin had once more asserted control, consolidated even more power in his hands, and shaken up his government and staff. His State Defense Committee (GKO) consisted of himself Beria, Voroshilov, Molotov, and Melenkov. His military staff, (Stavka) consisted of himself and Molotov, Voroshilov, Budenny, Shaposhnikov, and Zhukov. Victory or defeat would be intimately associated with his personal survival. (1) Stalin ordered 9 senior generals shot. g.Stavka actually did a good job of collecting units and hurling them into the battle desperately. They are consumed like chaff before a furnace. But there were always new units forming up in front of the on-coming invaders. (1) By July 8, OKH figured it had destroyed 89 of 164 Russian divisions. Army Group Centre had already destroyed 2500 tanks, 1400 guns, and taken 300,000 prisoners. The surrender of Smolensk on July 19 consumed another 310,000 prisoners, 3200 tanks and 3100 guns. These are figures of unbelievable proportions. (Keegan Second World War 191) IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 23

B. The Crisis: July 23-August 24, 1941 1. Hitler botched the invasion at this point, abetted by the deep philosophical divisions within his officer corps. Make no mistake however, the decision was Hitler's. a. He tended to be mesmerized by the thought of huge cauldron battles. He also liked to see big chunks of Russian territory devoured on the map. 2. July 23, 1941 Hitler ordered the Panzers to divert and mop up Smolensk. a. Guderian is furious. His tanks had covered 440 miles in 6 weeks and stood only 220 miles from Moscow with the last dry weather before them prior to the autumn rains. (Keegan Second World War 193) Guderian deliberately involved himself in close action around Roslavl, then argued that disengagement was impossible. b.A series of confusing debates, orders, and counter-orders ensued. Halder and Brauchitsch both disagreed with Hitler but could not stand up to him directly. Bock agreed with Guderian, but used him as a stalking horse, although he was the superior officer. Guderian flew to face Hitler personally (there were only 3 generals who ever did this with any success--ever). Hitler rejected Guderian's arguments, insisting on economic objectives. c. When movement started again, a decision was made to turn the Panzers of Army Group Centre south to assist in encircling Kiev and north to help Leeb before Leningrad. Only then would then would they resume the drive on Moscow. d. A number of participants as well as historians belief that the campaign was lost here. I am inclined to agree. 3. By this stage, the Germans were beginning to see what was in store for them in Russia. Surprised, outmaneuvered, suffering from poor low level commanders, poorly trained, the Russian soldiers resisted fiercely if chaotically. Previously, enemy troops had surrendered in large numbers when the military situation was hopeless. The Russians had to be beaten in individual battles. C. The Kiev Cauldron 1. Kirponos was in a dangerous position, having stayed in position and fought it out long after he should have withdrawn. His reason was that he expected support. Russian accounts of what occurred in the cauldron are not to be considered reliable, since reputations were at stake in post-war memoirs. It appears however that Kirponos saw the trap and wanted to withdraw in good order, and that Stalin or Stavka (the same thing) refused). 2. Stalin sent in a counter-offensive with two armies into the region. This simply increased the potential bag. 3. Guderian's Panzers fought their way south 150 miles east of Kiev and met Kleist's fighting their way up to encircle 5 Russian armies and 50 divisions--665,000 Russian soldiers, the largest encirclement in history. The trap closed on September 16. Kirponos was killed in the battle. 4. Guderian was now too far south to take the role in the next stage that he should have taken. D. Operation Typhoon, the Drive on Moscow 1. Bock tried to reorder his forces for Typhoon. He retrieved Hoth from Leeb, and took Höpner's Panzers as well. He tried to replace casualties and refit the infantry. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 24

2. These gains are balanced by frantic Russian work. Stalin collected whatever forces he could to defend Moscow, and used hundreds of thousands of civilians (50% to 75% women) to dig enormous field fortifications in two lines, the Vyazma line and Mozhaisk line. 3. The Germans now face three enemies: the Red Army and Generals Mud and Winter. In late September or early October, the fall rains stop all military movement as roads disappear in bottomless mud. Snow usually falls in early December. 4. September 23 The first hoar-frost appeared. 5. September 30 Bock launched the offensive, catching Stavka by surprise, and breaks through for a double envelopment of 650,000 Soviets around Vyazma on October 7. There is another great cauldron battle. 6. It is not over until the end of October, however, and the German troops are reaching the end of their tether in physical endurance. On October 6, the first snow falls. It is two months earlier than usual. The snow melts, and turns to mud. All mobile operations come to a halt. (Seaton 181) After October 9, rain fell incessantly. German survivors have strained their vocabulary to describe the Russian mud to those who have never experienced it. Infantry tried to march in knee high and often waist high mud. Calf- length jack-boots were sucked off of feet. Boots disintegrated in the wet. Wheeled traffic was impossible. Only tracked vehicles could move, and only at exorbitant fuel costs. Fuel could not be brought up. Poor weather restricted air supply. All logistics-- food, fuel, ammunition, medicine, evacuation of wounded, clothing--came to a sudden halt, except for horse=drawn peasant carts. The horses died off in thousands due to exposure, overwork, and lack of fodder. 7. On October 7, Zhukov was recalled from Leningrad to command the defense of Moscow. He had about 90,000 men immediately available, and was given wider control than Stalin usually permitted. 8. On October 14, Hitler ordered that Moscow be invested but not occupied, and that all offers of capitulation were to be rejected. The people of Moscow were to die of starvation. (Seaton 186) 9. The October weather gave Zhukov the much-needed breathing space. The Red Air Force challenged the Luftwaffe in the air. He organized 9 field armies in front of the Germans and began thinning out the Far Eastern forces in . 10. "German movement for the very first time during the Second World War had been brought to a standstill, and it was halted in the second and third weeks of October by rain and by mud. Soviet historians tend to scoff at what they describe as German excuses and maintain that von Bock was halted by the valor and skill of the Red Army. Red Army resistance stiffened in late October, and to the west and south of Moscow it was bitter. Yet an examination of the evidence shows without doubt that the German advance, which at first promised to be as rapid and spectacular as any of those of the late summer, abruptly petered out because of the weather and the terrain. In the first fortnight of the Typhoon offensive Army Group Centre destroyed nearly 700,000 of the Soviet defenders at comparatively little cost to itself, and with another three weeks' dry, mild, and clear weather, it would inevitably have been in Moscow." (Seaton 190) 11. The success of Blitzkrieg was predicated upon mobility and firepower. Once mobility was lost, firepower was lost as well. 12. Mid-November found the winter setting in. "The autumn and winter of 1941 was IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 25

particularly cold. Temperatures of minus 20 and minus 25 degrees centigrade were common in daytime and minus 30, even minus 40, by night." (Seaton 219) Vehicles had to be chipped out of frozen mud with pickaxes. Fires were lit under oil pans and fuel tanks to melt fuel and lubricants in order to turn over the engines. Artillery, machine guns, and automatic rifles could not be fired because the lubricants in the recoil systems froze. Optical sights became useless. Neither winter clothing nor winter smocks had been provided to the German soldiers. (Brauchitsch refused to allow it since tht would imply lack of faith that the campaign would not be over by winter) Frost bite and exposure caused more casualties than the Soviets. By early December, temperatures at night of -30E C. were recorded [that's -22E F]; men on duty could stand only 1 hour before being withdrawn. 13. November 15 the advance continued. The Germans are now fighting weather as much as the Russians. 14. Zhukov formed 9 more armies east of Moscow and began using them in a series of counter-attacks. 15. The evidence of his personal war diary shows that Bock privately faced defeat on Dec. 1, having previously advocated a final surge to seize Moscow rather than fall back for the winter. 16. The attack ground to a halt 20 miles short of Moscow on December 2. On December 3, von Kluge ordered a withdrawal. There was a further withdrawal on Dec. 4, and Bock concedes failure on Dec. 5. 17. Hitler's best chance to defeat the Soviet Union is gone. E. The Soviet Winter Counter-offensive 1. Zhukov now attacked in his turn, using fresh Siberian divisions. These were well-trained troops who were well equipped for . The offensive was not a single, massive blow, but a series of smaller blows that built up in intensity even before the end of the German offensive. 2. Hitler issues a "stand fast" order on December 20. Each isolated German unit had to fight where it stood. 3. This was probably the best decision at the time. The Germans should have withdrawn a month earlier to a defendable winter line, and prepared winter quarters. Instead, they had not even collected winter clothing for the men (Brauchitsch forbade it because such preparations would imply doubt that they would beat Russia quickly). 4. A retreat under such conditions could easily have turned into a rout. 5. For Germans defending a lager, each battle meant the life or death of every single defender. If they were driven from their miserable winter shelter, they would all have died in the snow. The fighting is nightmarish and fanatical. 6. Zhukov's conception was perfectly sound: concentric attacks above and below the German salient in order to trap Army Group Centre in a cauldron battle in reverse. The pocket would be 200 miles in depth. He had available 16 armies. 7. The offensive is conventionally dated as beginning on December 5. At weeks' end, Halder recorded the situation as critical. 8. Despite the stand fast order, the Germans are driven back in desperate encounters. By the end of January, there was a real possibility of the trap closing on the Germans. 9. In the end, the Russian attacks faltered as a result of the same weather conditions, coupled with supply difficulties, that had stopped the Germans. The Red Army was also IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 26

not well trained enough to execute the sound conceptions given it, nor was it mobile enough to sustain an offensive more than 200 miles. 10. The arrival of spring mud in early April brought a final end to the assault. The Germans had yielded 150-200 miles. 11. The counter-offensive was finally stopped by the shaken Germans. How could the Russians still have the ability to attack? F. Shake up of the German Command 1. Rundstedt had reached Rostov on the Don, but, under the pressure of an effective counter-attack against his exposed northern flank, asked to withdraw to a winter line. Hitler refused, Rundstedt asked to be relieved, and Hitler complied on November 30. 2. On December 18, Bock reported himself sick and was replaced by Kluge. 3. On December 19th, Brauchitsch (who had already suffered a heart attack while dealing with Hitler and had already tried to resign once) asked to be relieved, and was granted his wish. 4. Leeb was relieved when he advocated a withdrawal from Leningrad to a stronger winter line. 5. Guderian was relieved on the day after Christmas for withdrawing some of his troops under heavy Russian pressure. 6. On January 8th, Höpner was relieved on the same grounds. 7.Hitler takes over direct strategic, operational, and often tactical control of all German forces in the East. G. The winter of 1941-42 found Hitler locked in a life-and-death struggle of cataclysmic proportions with the Soviet Union. He had gambled everything on the assumption that he could defeat the Soviet Union in 6 weeks. Now he must fight a war of attrition with an opponent potentially much stronger. Furthermore, he still has Great Britain at his back. 1. He has deliberately involved Germany in that old nightmare--a two front war. 2. To make the situation even worse--in fact, to make the situation downright fatal--Hitler declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941. "By that declaration of war Germany lost finally and irrevocably all hope of winning the war against the Soviet Union." (Seaton 214) (emphasis added) 3. Barring a revolutionary weapon (such as German development of the atomic bomb before Allied development), Hitler is now caught between two giant mill stones, and will be ground down to pulp. The only real question is how many millions of lives will be sacrificed to his rage and hatred. 4.Could Hitler have won a quick campaign? It is probable that he could have taken Moscow before winter, since von Bock captured Smolensk after only 23 days. But the loss of Moscow, Seaton argues persuasively, would not have meant the defeat of the Soviet Union. (215-6) 5.Hitler lost the campaign because Germany entered it with inadequate resources (in manpower, vehicles, equipment, economic mobilization, intelligence, and planning). 6. The Soviet Union survived the campaign chiefly because of weather, space, and geography. a. Seaton is sharply critical of official Soviet histories, which denigrate these factors in order to extol the superiority of the Communist system. b. Seaton points to Stalin's will-power as a secondary factor: "For Stalin and his associates no price was too great to pay in terms of lives and resources to ensure victory and the continued existence of communism. . . . The Red Army man IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 27

taken prisoner by the German, whatever the circumstances of his capture . . . was no longer regarded as a Soviet citizen and for him the end of the war usually meant confinement in a concentration camp where he might atone for his guilt. Worse still was the Soviet practice of incarcerating the family or dependents of captured soldiers . . . . In these circumstances, there was little reason for wonder that the Soviet soldier, apathetic or fatalistic, and often fortified by several hundred grammes of vodka, climbed over the heaps of the dead and dying and with apparent indifference strode forward to certain death." (220-1) He sums up the much-vaunted partisan movement with "The Communist Party's disregard for life and its contempt for any form of humanity and decency was one of the decisive factors in the recruiting and control of the partisan movement." (221) c. Seaton believes that Germany could have beaten the Soviet Union, but only with complete mobilization, careful preparation, avoidance of sideshows in Western Europe, Scandinavia, Africa and the Balkans, and avoidance of war with the United States. Furthermore, he believes that Hitler should have cultivated the captive peoples of the Soviet empire and utilized the hatred of Stalin. Such a policy would have been very effective, but the National Socialist state, based as it was upon racial and ideological terms, was fundamentally incapable of such a policy. For Hitler and the Nazis, the Slavic peoples of were Untermenschen, fit only for genocidal exploitation. The tragedy of the common people is that they were caught between Stalin and Hitler--between Beelzebub and Lucifer himself. As evil and murderous as Stalin was, Hitler was still worse. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 28

Works Cited

Calvocoressi, Peter, Wint, Guy, and Pritchard, John. : Cause s and Cours es of the Secon d World War. Vol. I, The Weste rn Hemis phere . Rev. 2nd Ed. New York: Panth eon Books , 1989.

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45. New York: Quill, 1985.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Boston: Ho ug ht on Mi ff li n, 19 71 .

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin, 1989. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 29

Liddell Hart, Basil H. History of the Second World War. 2 Vols. New York: Putnam, 1970.

Mellenthin, F. W. von. Panzer Battles. Transl. H. Betzler. New York: Balla ntine , 1956.

Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War 1941-45. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971.

Wheal, Elizabeth-Anne; Pope, Steven; Taylor, James. Encyclopedia of the Second World War. New York: Castle, 1989. IB Contemporary World History Mr. Blackmon Operation Barbarossa Page 30

Works Consulted

Barnett, Correlli, ed. Hitler's Generals. New York: William Morrow, 1989.

Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. Constantin Fitzgibbon trans. New Yo rk : Ba ll an ti ne , 19 57 .

Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Anthony G. Powell Transl. and Ed. London: Methuen & Sons Ltd., 1956.

Messenger, Charles. The Art of Blitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan Ltd 1991.

Perret, Knights of the Black Cross. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1986.

Werth, Alexander. Russia at War: 1941-1945. New York: Avon, 1964.