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Communiqué No. 118 March / April 2008

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Communiqué No. 118 March / April 2008 Taiwan Communiqué Published by: Formosan Association for Public Affairs 552 7th St. SE, Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel. (202) 547-3686 International edition, March / April 2008 Published 6 times a year 118 ISSN number: 1027-3999 Ma Ying-jeou wins presidency On Saturday, 22 March 2008, Taiwan held its fourth presidential election since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. The KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou won with 58.4% against 41.6% for the DPP’s Frank Hsieh. The voter turnout rate was approx. 76%. A total of 7.65 mln. votes went to Mr. Ma, while Mr. Hsieh garnered 5.44 mln. votes. The election process itself went smoothly, with no reports of disturbances or election fraud. This shows that Taiwan now has a mature democracy, although the playing field is still heavily tilted in favor of the Kuomintang due to its huge financial resources (it is still reported to be the richest party in the world), and its control of a major section of the news media Copyright: Taipei Times The election result means that the KMT has regained control of the Executive branch, after eight years of DPP rule. Since the party also gained ab- solute control of the Legislative branch in the Legislative Yuan elections in January 2008, the Kuomintang now controls both branches of govern- ment, which does not KMT party-state fish gobbles up voter, saying: bode well for checks "Welcome back to the womb." Taiwan Communiqué -2- March / April 2008 and balances in Taiwan’s political system. On the other hand, the KMT is now fully responsible and will be held accountable by the electorate. Below, we will first examine the reasons for the defeat of the DPP, to be followed by a look at the implications for Taiwan itself. The underlying reasons for the DPP defeat In the international press the election was primarily portrayed as being about Taiwan’s relations with China: a vote for the KMT – so we were told — was a vote for closer relations with China, while a vote for the DPP would lead to a continuation of tension, although Frank Hsieh was portrayed as “more moderate” than President Chen. However, for many people in Taiwan it was apparently more about a) the economy, b) clean government, and c) prospects for a “better” life. On all these three points, the KMT propaganda machine (fueled by its huge party assets) and the pan-blue controlled press were able to present the image that during the past eight years the Chen Shui-bian government had a) brought the economy to a standstill (more on that below), b) was inefficient and corrupt, and c) and that vote for Hsieh would be a continuation of the confrontations with China. On a) the economy is actually doing quite well -- 5.7% economic growth -- but this is not being evenly distributed: as the New York Times wrote on 22 March 2008, “…but middle-class and working-class incomes have stagnated as an affluent elite has grown prosperous, often from investments in China.” On b) The Chen government tried to take many initiatives for reforms, but was continuously obstructed by the KMT-controlled Legislature, which conducted a “scorched earth” policy by opposing almost anything the government was proposing. Still, the Chen Administration was effective in completing a number of major projects, like the High Speed Train and the Kaohsiung Rapid Transit . On the issue of corruption: there were indeed several high-profile cases, but overall the DPP was much cleaner than the KMT ever was. During the KMT’s earlier repressive reign, there was rampant corruption, but the judiciary was not independent, and cases of corruption were swept under the carpet. A case in point is Mr. James Soong, who is reported to have pocketed some US$ 400 mln. in the purchase of the Lafayette frigates from France, but never brought to trial. Taiwan Communiqué -3- March / April 2008 On c) whether the Taiwanese will have a “better life” if the island moves closer to China remains to be seen: it depends very much on China’s own attitudes and actions. Better relations with China? Not if it continues to bully ... The win by Mr. Ma is being touted by many in the news media as a prelude to improvement of relations with China. This may not necessarily be the case, and will depend very much on how China itself behaves: if it acts as a “responsible stakeholder”, then better relations are possible. Copyright: Taipei Times However, if it continues to bully its neighbors, per- petuates its crackdown in Tibet and the lack of free- dom and democracy in China itself, while continu- ing to threaten Taiwan mili- tarily, then the prospects for improvement are slim. During the last week of the campaign both parties in Tai- wan strongly criticized China China (beating up on Tibet): "Didn't you see that for its crackdown in Tibet. Mr. the Taiwanese chose to stand by me?" Ma, who campaigned on a plat- form of closer business links with China, adopted a much more anti-China approach. He described China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s offer of peace talks with the Dalai Lama as “barbarically unreasonable, arrogant, absurd and self-righteous” and suggested an Olympic boycott if the violence continues in Tibet. What are the prospects? After an initial honeymoon with Mr. Ma, China will find that he does not have much room for maneuver either. China insists that Taiwan is part of its territory, while Mr. Ma’s KMT takes the position – like the DPP – that Taiwan is a sovereign, democratic nation, albeit under the old “Republic of China” moniker – which will be difficult for China to swallow. During the election campaign, Mr. Ma stated several times: ‘’Taiwan’s future will be decided by its 23 million people; (we) won’t let China interfere.’’ We hope he will stick to these promises. Taiwan Communiqué -4- March / April 2008 Mr. Ma has also made better ties with China dependent on the reduction of China’s military threat against the island, and has in particular argued for the removal of the 1000+ missiles aimed at the island. Furthermore, he has stated that improvement of relations depends on China’s democratization. Judging by recent events like the crackdown in Tibet there is no democratization visible on the horizon yet: if anything, China has become more repressive and adept at using new techniques such as the Internet to suppress democracy and freedom of expression. On the economic front, it will depend on how China’s economy develops. Until now the Chinese economic juggernaut has appeared rather attractive to interna- tional business and Taiwanese businessmen alike. But the present US economic recession is bound to have a major impact on the Chinese economy: less growth, more unemployment, leading to increasing social strife. This will make it less attractive to move closer to China. An example: in the industrial zone of Shenzhen – just North of Hong Kong – there were some 9,000 Taiwanese companies a couple of years ago. Now there are less than 5,000; the rest have either folded or moved away to other countries like Vietnam. Implications for Taiwan itself Mr. Ma’s election will of course mean a change of government after 20 May 2008, when the inauguration will take place. The fact that the KMT government now has full control of both the Executive and Legislative branch means less strife in the Legislative Yuan. During the past eight years there was continuous deadlock due to the fact that the KMT- controlled legislature blocked many of the reform initiatives of the DPP government. Now both branches are KMT controlled means that there will be less checks and balances, but also means that it will not be possible anymore to put the blame for mismanagement, economic downturn etc. on President Chen Shui-bian, who – particularly in the last two years of his government – became the scapegoat for many perceived ills, particularly on the economic front. The fact is also that “Taiwan identity” has become the mainstay of society in Taiwan. During the campaign Mr. Ma actually moved much closer to the DPP position than ever before: he had to expend major efforts to neutralize the fear he would sell Taiwan out. He had to learn to speak Taiwanese, went on a “long stay” in the South to familiarize himself with Taiwanese views, and – like the DPP – considers Taiwan a country in its own right. Taiwan Communiqué -5- March / April 2008 An eventful campaign Aside from the issues mentioned earlier, which apparently affected the voters’ views, there were several developments and events which occurred, and which affected the campaign … but not enough to affect the outcome. The first development, which had a major impact on the campaign, was China’s brutal crackdown in Tibet following the demonstrations by Tibetan monks which started on March 10th. Both Taiwan’s DPP government and Frank Hsieh’s campaign were quick to react, saying that — if Tai- Copyright: Taipei Times wan would move closer to China, as is being advocated by the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou – “what happens in Tibet today could happen in Tai- wan tomorrow.” The second development was the fact that on Sunday March 16th, the DPP was able to mobilize some 1.2 million people in an island-wide “counterclockwise” march, Hu Jintao (on tank): "Tibet today, Taiwan tomorrow." Ma Ying-jeou: "I am all set!" symbolizing the turn-the-tide theme of the Hsieh headquarters. The large, enthusiastic crowds reinvigorated the campaign and served as a major boost, especially among the younger generation.
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