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Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and in Ecuador

Article in Focaal · September 2012 DOI: 10.3167/fcl.2012.630107

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Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides

Abstract: This article analyzes the struggles of the petroleum labor movement against the neo-liberalization of the in Ecuador. Though orig- inally focused on defending collective bargaining rights, since the 1990s the move- ment has put forward a populist, nationalist critique of the state’s governance of petroleum. The article traces the roots of the movement and focuses on two con- tested terrains of petroleum politics, refineries and oilfields, to examine labor’s role in resource governance. The article argues that by strategically joining con- cerns over class and nation, over a number of administrations from the 1970s to the 2000s (from populist, military juntas, to neoliberal), the petroleum labor movement became a defining actor in petroleum governance. Keywords: Ecuador, labor activism, nation, neo-liberalism, petroleum

Resource-rich nations whose economies are de- shape the industry’s relationship with society, pendent on petroleum exports are often de- sometimes generating capital losses, violence, scribed as experiencing a “paradox of plenty” and political instability (e.g., Ellner 2005; Gled- (Karl 1997): as massive petroleum rents are ac- hill 2008; Mann 2007). The role of organized la- crued by states over decades, these gains do not bor in petroleum-society relations, however, is translate into long-term national well-being. often narrated from the perspective that labor Scholars seeking to understand this paradox, movements are class-centered and plagued by and not satisfied with resource-deterministic cronyism, corruption, and political interests. explanations of “resource curses” and “eco- Less is known about the structures and con- nomic diseases,” have highlighted how institu- junctures that shape the activism of labor and tional, socio-political, and cultural factors how these condition labor’s role in resource matter to petroleum’s governance (e.g., Apter governance. We use the case of the petroleum 2005; Coronil 1997; Reyna and Behrens 2008; labor movement in Ecuador to narrate the vicis- Sawyer 2004; Vitalis 2006; Watts 2004). Among situdes of petroleum governance through the these, studies of the relationship between labor eyes of labor, to argue for attention to actor-cen- and the petroleum industry show that conflicts tered analyses of strategic resources, and thus between workers, managers and employers contribute to an expanded understanding of the

Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 63 (2012): 69–82 doi:10.3167/fcl.2012.630107 70 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides sites and actors that animate the political econ- sponsibility toward the nation: to govern petro- omy of petroleum. leum, the people’s resource inheritance, and its Workers of Petroecuador, Ecuador’s state pe- rents, for the benefit of Ecuadorians, not for- troleum company, have played a crucial role in eign interests. Such constructions of the state’s petroleum governance. Since the 1980s, they petro-ethic and how and why industrial work- have used marches, protests, strikes, and occu- ers aligned with it are rich grounds for analysis. pations to decry the privatization of oil fields, We examine this articulation of nation, state, refineries, and the state company. One of the and petroleum among workers to detail how the main features of the movement is that their cri- petroleum workers movement came to defend tiques against sector privatization are not the structure and dynamics of the state com- overtly about class concerns, but publicly pany, their employer, and in the process, shaped framed as nationalist efforts to defend the peo- national petroleum governance. ple’s patrimony: oil. In 1995, for example, work- ers chained themselves to a replica of the nation’s main pipeline, the SOTE (Trans- The movement Ecuadorian Petroleum Transportation System), staged in Quito’s busiest gas station, to raise The petroleum workers mobilizing for national awareness about its looming privatization. They concerns are heterogeneous. Labor law classi- entered a hunger strike and even threatened to fies some workers as obreros (workers who use sever their limbs to emphasize that if the state limited “intellectual labor”) and others as was not going to defend the people’s property, obreros calificados (skilled workers who re- the workers would do it. Photographs and edi- ceived specialized training in their trade). Oth- torials in newspapers across the nation docu- ers are considered administración (manage- mented the strike and helped generate support ment), employees that perform administrative for anti-privatization claims (see, e.g., Narváez labor and are housed in the headquarters of the et al. 1996). The two-week protest was success- national company in the capital city of Quito. ful; as criticisms against it escalated the govern- According to the law, public sector obreros can ment shelved plans to privatize the pipeline. form unions but obreros calificados and man- Worker political activism also relies on the me- agement can only form committees, associa- dia to convey letters, reports, and editorials di- tions that represent social concerns such as rected at state officials, to protest privatization holiday celebrations and workplace fellowship, and suggest ways to “properly” manage petro- and not labor concerns such as collective bar- leum. Their aim is to instill “economic sense” by gaining for better contracts and wages.1 Thus, highlighting the costs that would be incurred by the law differentiates who can organize politi- Petroecuador and Ecuadorians if privatization cally and who cannot. As a response to this dis- is carried out (Cano, Villavicencio, and Jácome tinction in the right to organize, Petroecuador 2002). For example, in 2003, workers sent pub- workers created an umbrella organization, FE- lic letters to then-president Lucio Gutiérrez that TRAPEC (Federation of Petroleum Workers), outlined the economic benefits and pitfalls of which represents all worksite organizations— building a brand new pipeline to be financed unions and associations—and which workers and used exclusively by foreign operators. Sim- developed to maintain political unity within the ilar letters were sent to President Rafael Correa industry. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, FE- in 2007, regarding the privatization of oilfield TRAPEC represented about 4,000 full time em- operations. ployees that labored in distinct areas of the As movement leaders declare, their aim is industry, though this number has largely de- not to undermine state authority or stop the clined in the 2000s to about 1,000 employees.2 operations of the petroleum industry, but to re- Members of the movement also labor in dif- mind administrations of the state’s moral re- ferent technical and geographic areas. Some Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and petroleum in Ecuador | 71 have direct contact with the means of produc- oil concessions, pipelines, and refineries and tion and have a greater understanding of the reproduced via modern practices of oil explo- processes of refining crude oil into derivatives, ration, extraction, and transformation. Through- others have a better comprehension of foreign out the twentieth century, Ecuadorian govern- investment, company politics, and administra- ments encouraged foreign companies to search tion. Some are aligned with political parties of for oil in its territory. The first commercial re- the left, others with those of the right. Workers serves were identified in 1967 by a Texaco-Gulf also inhabit distinct spaces of the company. For consortium. Soon after, over thirty multina- example, one of our interviewees is an obrero tional companies sought to develop concessions calificado who has worked in the company for in the hopes of finding more petroleum. Tex- over thirty years, was a leader in the main refin- aco-Gulf built the SOTE—a 503-kilometer ery since its start and later a representative to pipeline—to transport crude from the Amazon the executive board of Petroecuador. Another to refineries built and owned by foreign opera- obrero calificado oversees pipeline maintenance tors, where it could be processed for consump- and has spent the last twenty-five years working tion in international markets. Because Ecuador out of the Shushufindi branch in the Amazon. lacked a national petroleum industry, it relied Another is an obrero who worked for the com- on a rentier political economy marked by a pany for a total of eight years between 1968 and politicized distribution of oil revenues (Fon- 2004, in infrastructure maintenance, the Es- taine 2007). meraldas refinery and in company headquar- As in Mexico and (Coronil 1997; ters in Quito. Yet another is an economist who Gledhill 2008), petroleum’s high rents featured specialized in administration for over twenty prominently in the populist making of the na- years in Quito, running a company-sponsored tional “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) store, overseeing budgets, and advising the en- in Ecuador. As Quintero and Silva point out, in vironmental oversight office. Ecuador, “all social sectors, all classes and polit- Despite differences in rights to organize, em- ical parties, all corporations and labor unions— ployment qualifications, and line of work, our from businesses large and small—as well as informants suggest that a common working labor associations and diverse government rep- ideology emerged as privatization talk in- resentatives centered their attention on how to creased in the early 1990s. Below, we first out- define this rich resource as a source of ‘eco- line the political economic contexts in which nomic development’” (1991: 342). In the late the national industry and the labor movement 1960s and early 1970s, major newspapers such emerged. Then we turn to worker narratives to as El Telégrafo, El Comercio, and El Universo examine labor’s perspective of how nationalist voiced concerns about the state’s petro-ethics by positions emerged. We draw on participant ob- dissecting debates on how the state should be- servation of public events (1995, 2003, and have in relation to the rentier petro-logic and 2011), seventeen in-depth key informant inter- on the need to establish the national means views with Petroecuador workers3 and consult- through which petroleum would benefit the na- ants to the movement (2007–2011), and tion (Quintero and Silva 1991). archival research. Following these nationalist debates on petro- leum governance, in 1971, a military coup na- tionalized the industry to allow the state to The state and the petro-nation better capture petroleum rents. The military government renegotiated contracts with foreign The political economy of Ecuador is largely operators to increase royalties and taxes, re- shaped by what Watts (2004) calls an “oil com- duced the size of oil concessions, and national- plex,” a configuration of firm, state, and com- ized the operations of the most productive munity that is territorially constituted through oilfields. It also implemented the Hydrocarbons 72 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides

Law to regulate the activities of foreign opera- 1995. By the early 2000s, privatization plans ex- tors and establish petroleum sovereignty, and tended to the same fields that three decades ear- created the first national company, Corporación lier had been nationalized as “strategic and Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE), to man- critical elements … [that determined] the very age the newly nationalized operations. Follow- existence of the State” (Jarrín, Minister of Natu- ing the nationalist agenda, the state took over ral Resources and Tourism 1974, quoted in the majority of shares of the SOTE in 1976 (62.5 Martz 1986 103). percent) and, by 1977, the first national refin- The proposed privatization of the state in- ery, Refinería Estatal Esmeraldas (REE), started dustry fueled criticisms, particularly among pe- operating. Under the nationalist plan, revenues troleum workers, who saw these as a round of captured by the state-owned industry made “primitive re-accumulation” of the nation’s pat- Ecuador feel modern; the state financed social rimony that needed to be stopped (Interview programs, provided credit for export agricul- with former administration employee, 21 Octo- ture and incentives for manufacturing and in- ber 2009). dustry, and financed equipment for the Armed Forces. During this period, state-led develop- ment created thousands of jobs in the public Laboring the nation: A petroleum sector, kept taxes relatively low for most citi- movement emerges zens, subsidized domestic consumption of pe- troleum products, and built highways (Carriére The creation of a national petroleum industry 2001; Gerlach 2003). in the early 1970s coincided with the growing The state accrued a significant debt based on politicization of workers in urban areas. In borrowing against the continuously high prices 1971, the main labor organizations in Ecuador— of petroleum to finance development. By 1982, the Catholic-influenced Ecuadorian Confeder- world petroleum prices stagnated and fell, and ation of Christian Syndical Organizations by 1984, structural adjustment measures were (CEDOC), the Marxist influenced Ecuador’s applied to curb the inflation that resulted from Worker Confederation (CTE), and the Confed- reduced petroleum revenues. Deregulation, pri- eration of Employees in Semi-State Bodies and vatization, and foreign investment—the neo- Banks (CESBANDOR)—along with retired liberal agenda—featured prominently as the military personnel, and despite institutional ri- remedy. Government representatives also under- valries and ideological differences, agreed to scored that corruption, bureaucracy, and politi- form the Workers United Front (FUT) to face cal interventions made the state company inef- the strong anti-labor climate in the industrial ficient and justified its privatization (Treakle and manufacturing sectors. That year, the FUT 1998). To set the neo-liberal agenda in motion, called its first strike, framed as a “progressive” the government restructured CEPE into a hold- and “nationalist” effort to confront the entre - ing company in 1989, Petroecuador, and frac- guista (sellout) model of then-president Velasco tured its production sovereignty by reorga- Ibarra, and established industrial workers as ac- nizing its activities into independent filiales tors that sought to “solve national problems” (branches) that managed exploration and trans- and “transform society” (Muñoz and Vicuña port, refining, and commercialization separately. 1985). Although largely centered in the urban The Ecuadorian government also proposed to areas, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the open up the petroleum industry to private in- FUT—influenced by the Communist Party of vestors—termed an apertura petrolera (petro- Ecuador—matured and developed supporters leum opening)—to increase efficiency and throughout Ecuador. Many of the first refinery production, and put forward plans to partially operators and workers of the petroleum indus- privatize the REE in 1992 and the SOTE in try were supporters of the FUT, using its net- Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and petroleum in Ecuador | 73 works and tactics to improve their place in the of the company.” As a former REE floor man- industry and better their status. According to a ager put it, “if the private owner decides to close former president of FETRAPEC, this kind of la- the company, he can do it. The state cannot do bor organizing was extremely successful in se- so without giving away its patrimony” (Inter- curing substantial worker benefits in the oil view, 31 August 31 2007). industry (Interview, 4 December 2009). To “sweeten” the move toward privatization, The apertura petrolera along with new legis- industry executives introduced the option of lation in 1991 that established labor flexibil- “voluntary resignation” with substantial payoffs ization in the public sector generated new anxi- for those who agreed to leave the company. eties among petroleum workers. As Herod Many workers that voluntarily resigned re- (2001) suggests, the reorganization of the ceived thousands of dollars in bonuses and life- spaces of production, through privatization and time salaries, paid for by the national industry.4 changes in labor conditions, not only affects the Others saw this moment of disarticulation from accumulation and circulation of capital, but the industry as dangerous. By reflecting on pri- also threatens workers’ abilities to socially re- vatization through a lens that drew on past re- produce themselves. Indeed, petroleum work- pression, job insecurity, and socialist ideals of ers saw privatization and flexibilization as likely their role in transforming society, a number of to lead to a loss of the benefits and status they workers stayed on to fight privatization. had negotiated with the state. Private manage- Politically organizing against privatization ment was not obliged to recognize the claims of required a larger scale of action. Movement organized labor and would certainly use labor leaders thus refocused tactics that had previ- flexibilization to depoliticize the workforce. Fur- ously secured benefits and salary increases into thermore, the erosion of worker rights opened tactics for securing the workplace, the national the possibility for a return to the legal repres- industry, and re-imagined their public role as sion of previous administrations (Quintero and protectors of the industry that generated na- Silva 1991; Ycaza 1995). As a former employee tional well-being. Instead of a framework based of the Esmeraldas refinery described: on class-centered rights, they used protests, strikes, and the media to shift to a larger scale of When Sixto Durán Ballén became president [in labor politics that questioned the entire eco- 1992] and announced that he was going to nomic model that governed petroleum (Inter- modernize the state, he told us he would give us view with former FETRAPEC leader, 4 Decem- the chance, one year, to make ourselves more ef- ber 2009). This is not to suggest that claiming to ficient. ‘If not,’ he said, ‘I will privatize you.’ protect the interests of the national company From Esmeraldas [the refinery] we reflected was seen as equal to protecting the interests of upon the effects of this privatization… A deep workers, but that protecting company sover- concern over what privatization … would entail eignty was pivotal to protecting their relevance for the oil worker—the operators, technicians, within it. Class-consciousness can, in times of engineers -formed and that is where the per- crisis, be conjoined with the concerns of a larger spective was shaped. (Interview, November 24 imagined community such as the petro-nation; 2008) a scale-jumping strategy that aligns worker-in- dustry concerns (e.g., how the company’s struc- As this informant suggests, the shift from a ture and organization affects workers) with state-led to private-led industry was perceived concerns beyond it (e.g., the means and mode as a moment of crisis for the labor force. Ac- by which the company generates wealth). For cording to a former leader of FETRAPEC: “we movement leadership, this qualitative jump in had to forget about labor-based claims and be- the scale and focus of action was fundamental gin a new process, one centered on the survival to company survival.5 74 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides

Refineries and metabolic transformations Akin to the concept of metabolism, a dy- namic process through which the materials of Petroleum workers’ consciousness of petroleum nature are appropriated by labor to transform sovereignty appears to have roots in the con- the environment and simultaneously (human) junctures and political economy that shaped the nature (Marx [1939] 1973: 489), refinery opera- nascent industry. Though movement affiliates tors suggest connections between socialist share a common view on the need for a state ideals of transformation and their own labor ex- company, it was in the refineries, particularly periences. As a former Esmeraldas operator ex- Esmeraldas, where a “sense of politics” in rela- pressed: “Everything can be known in the tion to the industry developed (Interview with refinery. There is action and reaction, immedi- former REE floor manager, 31 August 2007). As ately … because the [worker] is involved in the a former employee of CEPE, now a canton ma- transformation, he understands. The worker in jor, commented, “the refineries were more the oil field extracts petroleum, other workers politicized. They helped us organize our com- buy and sell, they work in the national process mittees, guided us in the process of political or- but they don’t live [the transformation]. The re- ganization so that we could develop political finer, on the other hand, makes the commodity, committees in each filial” (Interview, 6 October generates the transformation … He has an eas- 2010). ier time understanding the significance … To Such politicization of the refineries occurred think about it differently: a person can buy a through the very processes that formed the bottle of wine, drink it, cork it. How much does budding industry. When the Esmeraldas refin- he transform? On the other hand … [because of ery was created, there were few qualified what I do], I make the wine” (Interview, 28 July Ecuadorians to run it. The first operators, many 2009). A former operator apprentice in the of them in their late teens and early twenties, Shushufindi refinery in the Amazon echoed went to train in ECOPETROL (Empresa this sentiment of the joining of matter and pol- Colombiana de Petróleos), Colombia’s national itics: “the refinery was the site of transforma- petroleum company. One hundred Ecuadorian tion, this was the place where things happened, workers were chosen to train in the Colombian you could not miss it” (Interview, 1 June 2011). refinery of Barrancabermeja, which had been The importance of the transformation of pe- nationalized in the early 1950s and had one of troleum into national wealth became even more the strongest petroleum labor unions in Latin significant in the political context of the time. America. By the time the Ecuadorians arrived, As a former refinery operator explained, the Barrancabermeja was experiencing clashes be- Left had a strong presence within the refineries, tween the labor force and a foreign-dominated particularly the Communist Party, which management bureaucracy (Havens and Ro - shaped how workers viewed the links between mieux 1966).6 the production process and social transforma- Labor training for the Ecuadorians thus in- tion (Interview, 28 July 2009). Many labor or- volved both the transference of technical ganizers were Party members who believed that knowledge and an appreciation for political ac- the proletariat was responsible for protecting tivism. As one of these original refinery trainees national resources from capitalism and its high- described, “the [military] Ecuadorian state … est form, imperialism, and saw the need to sent the very first national workers to the epi- counter the apertura petrolera. The Esmeraldas center of unionized petroleum workers politics, refinery became a transforming actor in this one of the most powerful in the continent. We process, influencing unions in other sectors of trace some of our strategies to our informal and the industry to join in their cause. The first formal training there, this is where our con- worker association developed in Esmeraldas, sciousness was polluted” (Interview, 14 June among the obreros calificados that had gradu- 2008). ated from Colombia’s refinery. As one of the Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and petroleum in Ecuador | 75 members of this group reflected about the expe- country to restore the rational and sustainable rience, this “nucleus of technicians [graduates management of its natural resources so that the from Colombia], who knew about refining pe- revenues derived … are destined to meet the troleum and how to start the refinery, mobilized basic needs of the population as well as restore the labor force and marked the vision of what it the productive apparatus of the nation, and means to labor for the national petroleum com- don’t go exclusively to benefiting the transna- pany … They had a clear idea of the role of the tional companies” (FSNP 2008).7 worker in society … from the refinery, we syn- Workers also did not miss the fact that disar- dicalized the rest of the labor force to change ticulating petroleum and nation minimized the terms of capitalism” (Interview, 14 June their roles, rights, and responsibilities within 2008). the industry. As a former movement leader ex- Indeed, in the early stages of the movement, plained, the petroleum worker had to acquire a refinery operators sought to educate other political vision that extended beyond the spaces workers on the connections between the of labor and that generated support across other process of refining oil into energy power and sectors of the industry, if the labor force was to the political and economic power that oil brings remain a critical agent in the industry (Inter- to the nation. As a former refinery floor man- view, 14 June 2008). ager commented, it is in the refineries, where la- While these quotes suggest that the national bor and petroleum mix to generate wealth, that company had become a defining space for artic- a consciousness of petroleum politics emerged: ulating worker concerns (local and national), “those that learn about refining, learn about the such politics also intersected with party politics economy … all the possible variables in life are at the national level, which turned the petro- there, in the refining process, in the process of leum workplace into a microcosm of these transformation … this schools you, turns you struggles and added further complexity to into a social transformer” (Interview, 28 July worker-state-nation relations. According to a 2009). The first president of the refinery work- former movement leader, ers association similarly described his role in the transformation of nation. Using containers, The apertura petrolera, the Washington physics, and towers, he described how: “from Consensus, the neoliberal approach pushed by Esmeraldas we educated the rest … It started in the Right were all against the goals of the Left, 1976 until the 1980s, when CEPE was restruc- the social transformation, that which we had tured into Petroecuador … we had an incompa- aligned ourselves with and the visions of na- rable militancy: 140 communist militants in a tionalism that had given origin to the national refinery of 600 workers” (Interview, 13 June industry … The other element that helped us 2008). The petro-nation, within the refinery, situate our political fight was the Marxist, Com- was imagined through a consciousness of the munist, Leninist Party of Ecuador [MCLP].8 worker as carrying out the transformations that They had a constituency in the industry but articulate petroleum’s natural body with the na- they were not interested in the welfare of the tion’s body politic (e.g., Coronil 1997). nation … they were in for securing a political Thus, workers interpreted the proposed pri- base in the national industry, for their own ben- vatization of the Esmeraldas refinery in the efit. We [the workers] were caught in the mid- 1990s, which disarticulated labor politics from dle because both the Right and Left, but the industry, as introducing a rift in the labor- particularly the MCLP, had infiltrated the in- oil-nation metabolic. As the Social Front for the dustry at this point … The Right started creat- Nationalization of Petroleum (FSNP) put it ing their own associations to compete with our years later, a sovereign petroleum policy “starts leadership, discredit our position, and sway the the nationalization of petroleum and ends en- workers into acquiescing to the neoliberal, cap- treguismo [selling out resources] and allows the italist paradigm … the MCLP, on their side, 76 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides promised favors and puestos [political posi- drocarbons Law to reduce state monopoly over tions] to those that were loyal to the party … the crown jewels and introduced new contracts Luckily, we already had a large militant team that increased foreign operator activities within built from our technical and political training them. Critics argued that these reforms were a that was able to maintain the direction. But continuation of entreguismo, as the new con- both the Right and the MCLP strongly influ- tracts created ideological, political, and legal enced our capacity to act … they still do so to- conditions for transforming the national petro- day. (Interview, November 24 2008) leum industry into a foreign-controlled one (Cano et al. 2009). Indeed, party affiliations have played a piv- Ballén set up the contracts to privatize the otal role in the Ecuadorian national industry, crown jewels, but the confrontations between shaping patronage networks, clientelism, and nationalist and neoliberal positions on petro- cronyism. As a former general secretary of the leum governance escalated during the Gutiérrez Syndical Workers Association of Petroecuador administration. Soon after assuming the presi- reflected in 2010, the associations not only dency in 2003, Gutiérrez, pushed by the IMF, meant political power within the industry but agreed to denationalize the crown jewels in ex- also economic power, as they handled a per- change for a renegotiation of Ecuador’s foreign centage of the pension contributions by work- debt. To facilitate denationalization, these fields ers. As he described, “internal fights” and were relabeled as “marginal” and the state com- “alliances” that mirrored national politics devel- pany portrayed as unable to improve their out- oped in matters of who handled those funds, put without foreign intervention (LatAm which filial they represented, and which politi- Energy 2003). According to leaders of the pe- cal interests they served. As these examples of troleum movement, the crown jewels were labor concerns in refineries suggest, labor poli- nowhere close to marginal. The Hydrocarbons tics and party politics intersect and mirror each Law deems national fields as marginal when other in the struggle over petroleum sover- they contribute less than 1 percent of the total eignty. petroleum revenues, are far from national infra- structure, or have low quality crude. In compar- ison, the crown jewels are significant to the state Entreguismo: Selling the crown jewels budget, hold crude oil of high quality, and are located in close proximity to Petroecuador’s in- The 1971 nationalization of the oilfields discov- frastructure (Cano et al. 2008; Llanes 2006; ered by Texaco-Gulf was crucial to establishing Villavicencio 2009. Despite opposition, Gutiér- sovereignty over petroleum. These oilfields, rez pushed forward. The fields were to be oper- commonly referred to as the “crown jewels,” are ated by foreign companies and profits would be located in the Amazon region and hold the last shared 50-50 between the operator and the state known reserves of high quality petroleum in (Llanes 2006). Labor movement leaders be- Ecuador, 1.5 billion barrels, estimated to be lieved this set-up would limit the state’s ability worth close to US$100 billion (Cano et al. to manage rents in favor of Ecuadorians, as 2009). Petroecuador currently extracts about prior to the agreement Petroecuador received 170,000 barrels per day from these fields, an 100 percent of revenues from these fields (Inter- equivalent of US$12 million per day. Over the view, 24 November 2008). A “proposal for a bet- past forty years, these oilfields have financed 39 ter state,” one that is sovereign over petroleum percent of the national budget (Fontaine 2007), affairs was needed, not the retreat of the state and thus are considered national patrimony of from its most profitable oilfields (Interview with strategic importance. former FETRAPEC leader, 31 August 2007). In 1992, when President Durán Ballén initi- To make their point clear, in June 2003 ated the apertura petrolera, he amended the Hy- work ers started a slowdown of their activities, Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and petroleum in Ecuador | 77 which eventually led to an interruption in the in order to seek change in the governmental functioning of the SOTE and some refineries. structure. Out of the 9,000 Petroecuador employees, 4,500 In a presidential campaign aired on Radio did not go to work as a sign of protest against Luna in 2006, Correa further distanced himself the then minister of energy Carlos Arboleda from Gutiérrez: who had led the proposal to privatize refineries and the crown jewels (Langa 2003). Arboleda Privatizing Petroecuador’s oilfields is suffi- requested militarizing Petroecuador to safe- cient motive to send Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez guard operations and fired workers that home. That is treason to the Patria [Fatherland] protested. In August 2003, workers wearing T- … [Handing the crown jewels] to private com- shirts with the slogan “petroleum belongs to the panies is a bargain we are extending to the pri- people, NOT the IMF” and carrying signs of vate companies. Those [fields] have to be for the “NO to petroleum privatization,” publicly country. The fields already in operation, those protested the “marriage of convenience” be- that only need the treatment of the wells to im- tween Gutiérrez and the IMF, sealed by selling prove production, those have to be 100 percent the nation’s patrimony: the crown jewels. When for the Ecuadorians … Why do these “patriots” protesters publicly denounced Gutiérrez’s strat- want to give away these wells to the private egy as illegal manipulations of the Hydrocar- companies? They say that we nationalists who bons Law and deceitful misrepresentation of oppose [privatizing] politics have a Stalinist vi- revenue distribution, his administration ac- sion of the situation. That is completely false … cused them of interfering with the “natural In truth, they have been boycotting Petroe- process of development” (Business News Amer- cuador, saying that it doesn’t operate well and icas 2004; Langa 2003). While workers man- wanting to sell its oilfields at sickly low prices. aged to stall the privatization of the fields, the (Correa, quoted in Cano et al. 2009) intense defamation campaigns carried out by the media and government weakened the pub- The labor movement welcomed this nation- lic’s support for workers. By the time Gutiérrez alist articulation of petroleum sovereignty, was ousted in 2005, sixty people had been fired, though leaders still questioned Correa’s poten- accused of terrorism and sabotage, nine of them tial as a post-neoliberal candidate (Interview leaders, and mobilization among the ranks with a labor movement consultant, 28 July shaken (Interview with FETRAPEC adviser, 5 2009). They eventually decided to support Luis November 2009). Macas, the indigenous-backed presidential con- Confrontations between the labor move- tender, as they saw a greater affinity to his proj- ment and government have continued during ect and shared his critique that Correa, despite the Correa administration (2007–), though in a his nationalist rhetoric, did not represent a fun- different way. While a presidential candidate, damental break from the neoliberal past (Inter- Correa’s view on petroleum seemed aligned view with a former FETRAPEC leader, 25 May with that of the labor movement. In his 2006 2011). electoral campaign, he traveled through small, Despite the intense nationalist campaign re- impoverished Amazonian towns close to petro- garding the crown jewels, in 2008 Correa leum infrastructure, and used slogans such as changed his stance. At a meeting with the la patria vuelve (the Fatherland returns) and Petroecuador executive board in May 2008, pasión por la patria (passion for the Fatherland) Correa said that “after 15 months of experience to underscore his distance from Gutierrez [with Petroecuador], believe me, I am becom- and neo-liberal projects, as well as to align with ing a privatizer. All my life I have fought priva- the concerns of the Revolución Ciudadana (Cit- tizations but now I am beginning to understand izen Revolution), the coalition of political and those who want to privatize” (Correa, quoted in social movements that brought down Gutiérrez Villavicencio 2009). Correa’s change in position 78 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides could be largely related to reports of corruption pipelines to increase production (Cano et al. in the contracts of Petroecuador (Diario Hoy 2009). This, according to movement leaders, 2009). For example, letters in 2008 from two ex- could lead to a loss of 30 percent of the state’s presidents of Petroecuador appointed by Correa petroleum labor force, as there are no provi- to “clean up the house,” and the National Intel- sions in the contract for the employment of ligence Secretary, denounced irregularities in Ecuadorians by PDVSA. the contracts for oilfields operated by private Moreover, when national fields are desig- national and foreign companies. These letters nated “marginal,” the cost of production of a denounced that employees of Petroecuador hid barrel of oil produced by the new operator and altered documentation provided to the State would be higher, as it would require new extrac- General Attorney’s Office, and accused mem- tion technologies (Diario Hoy 2009). Produc- bers of administration of accepting bribes and tion costs also increase to account for taxes and political favors for facilitating exploration, ex- services provided by the foreign operator—re- traction, and distribution contracts (El Universo ducing the revenues received by the state com- 2009). This and the labor movement’s intense pany. According to a former movement leader, public criticism of entreguismo have shaped now frequently cited in the media as a “petro- Correa’s more recent discourse, which is now leum analyst,” this would turn Sacha into one of aiming to eliminate the burocracias doradas, the most expensive fields to operate in the “golden bureaucracies,” from the company.9 country, comparable only to those operated by Following Correa’s change of position, the foreign firms that exploit heavy crudes (Villavi- government officially leased, for ten years, the cencio 2009). According to critics, the proposed operation of the Sacha oilfield, which con- changes translate into a direct loss of revenues tributes 29 percent of Petroecuador’s daily pro- for Petroecuador and diminish the company’s duction and is the most emblematic crown importance in the operation of national fields. jewel, to a mixed company called Rio Napo, Critics characterize this “denationalization” as composed of Petroproducción (70 percent; a unpatriotic and propose that to reverse this branch of Petroecuador) and PDVSA (30 per- trend, the administration should focus on im- cent), Venezuela’s national company, ostensibly proving the capacities and operations of the to optimize extraction.10 Critics argue the trans- state company so that “national sovereignty can fer of operations demonstrates Correa’s disre- be safeguarded” (Saltos 2009). gard for petroleum sovereignty. They argue that The Rio Napo contract also has supporters. the operations transfer is illegal, as it occurred For example, the current director of Petroe- without a formal bidding round (as stipulated cuador, who defends the new contract because by the Hydrocarbons Law), and “mistaken,” be- the Rio Napo partnership supports an agree- cause contractual forms meant for securing ment of cooperation between the governments non-operation services were used to set field of Ecuador and Venezuela in matters of energy operations by private parties (Interview with development, which is a national priority (Di- FETRAPEC adviser, 21 October 2009). The ario Hoy 2009). Similarly, a former leader of FE- transfer also assumes that the fields are mar- TRAPEC, now working for PDVSA, also ginal and that the national company needs for- suggests that the goal is to foment energy al- eign partnerships to operate them due to lack of liances. Indeed, PDVSA is welcomed to invest resources, a discursive framing that critics ar- in the energy sector of Ecuador; plans to build a gue will bring more “invisible privatizations” of new refinery in collaboration with PDVSA are national fields (Interview, 7 November 2009). in place, though the project is still under devel- Critics also point out that PDVSA does not have opment. Some labor movement leaders suggest the appropriate technology, but will subcontract that the Rio Napo private-public enterprise may to build the necessary towers, pumps, and be part of a broader regional geopolitical refor- Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and petroleum in Ecuador | 79 mulation that brings Ecuador and Venezuela dustrial vanguard has continued to lose its foot- closer and that petroleum is the resource that ing in the company. A diminished leadership, binds such an alliance. Others believe that there lack of willingness to put their jobs on the line is no significant change, as PDVSA subcon- for nationalist ideals, and Correa’s petroleum tracts to other transnational companies to fur- politics have decreased overt opposition within ther process oil and thus continues to feed into the industry. the reproduction of imperial capitalism. De- spite differences in opinion, critiquing new in- vestments and contracts that allow foreign Conclusions participation in what are seen as sovereign op- erations—extraction and refining—serves to Focusing on a broad range of sites and mo- raise questions about what counts as and who ments in the petroleum industry, we have ex- defines “national priorities,” and how this is amined how labor-state relations shape the shaped by geopolitical relations versus social ethics of petroleum governance and how the contracts between the state and the body politic characteristics of the oil complex—who oper- (e.g., Bebbington 2009). ates which fields and how state and companies While the labor movement’s criticisms could share profits—also shape social relations. We be interpreted, on the one hand, as overtly tech- used labor’s perspective to explore terrains nical and economistic; on the other hand, they within which struggles over petroleum play out could be read as objective and rational reasons and contextualized worker political actions for maintaining sovereignty over operations. within the conjunctures and forces that shaped They are using what they call a “politics of de- the industry. Our intention is not to privilege nouncing the facts of covert neo-liberalism” to narratives of struggle as the only determinant of critique Correa’s nationalist compass. Move- the actions of workers but to underscore how ment leaders see Correa as set on de-structur- the “oil complex” has become a matter of na- ing Petroecuador and getting rid of what he tional concern among the labor force in Ecuador. calls the “petroleum mafias” that impede this The focus on the labor movement offers in- process (Interviews, 11 and 16 October 2009). sights into how labor politics matter to national In their view, the government’s continued firing affairs. Diverse spaces of the “oil complex” have of workers who criticize the state’s petroleum become arenas of contestation over the defense policies, via changes in labor laws limiting po- of workplace and nation. The analysis also litical activism and by accusations of conflict of shows how, in refineries, metabolic understand- interest and treason, demonstrates that workers ings of the relationship between petroleum and are a target in the industry’s streamlining. Lead- society are fundamental to the movement’s ac- ers have also denounced increasing scrutiny tions. For refinery workers, specifically, largely over the activities of workers as a state-backed influenced by socialist ideals, refining petro- strategy to break down class unity (Diario Ex- leum grounded their vision of the worker as preso 2008). The Correa administration, mean- responsible for overseeing and protecting na- while, has restructured the upper echelons of tional resources. Just as narratives of the laborer administration in an effort to bring management as a social transformer are fundamental to ac- under state supervision; the semi-autonomous tivism, so is the use of modern technical knowl- filiales, which used to have their own boards, edge and economic sense to argue against mea- now respond to a centralized board of directors. sures disrupting the oil-as-national-patrimony Tellingly, while prior to restructuring a member ethic. As the case of the crown jewels illustrates, of FETRAPEC had a place at the board, in the these oilfields are publicly defended as the pat- current structure the labor force does not have rimony of the nation and thus their operation representation. Under these conditions, the in- and profits should be solely governed by the 80 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides state. Workers contested their privatization by With a significant number of leaders retired or stealth as detrimental to the nation. employed elsewhere, a new leadership—trained Although the actions and politics of labor in a different political economic context—is have been successful to some extent in stalling emerging, and possibly a new direction in la- privatization, there is no guarantee that this will bor-state relations. Recent demonstrations of continue in the future. Their power to influence solidarity with the struggles of other public em- petroleum politics depends on their ability to ployees indicate a realignment with the broader publicly denounce illegalities and economically sphere of worker activism, and a distancing unsound plans of petroleum governance (Inter- from the approach of the petroleum industrial view with a FETRAPEC leader, 16 October class of the 1990s and early 2000s. 2009). However, because of their hardliner cri- tique against the Correa administration, to- Gabriela Valdivia is Assistant Professor of Ge- gether with highly publicized evidence of ography at the University of North Carolina at corruption and juicy retirement deals—an Chapel Hill. Her research examines the inter- Ecuavisa news program publicized in 2008 that sections between development, identity, and 226 voluntary resignations in Petroecuador natural resources in Latin America. She focuses amounted to $31 million dollars of “the people’s on questions concerned with the identification, money”11—they have lost support among a larger public that supports Correa’s administra- appropriation, and management of socio-bio- tion, as the most recent popular poll in 2011 physical processes to understand conflicts over demonstrates.12 Moreover, government changes natural resources. to labor laws and the restructuring of Petroe- E-mail: [email protected]. cuador are limiting the spaces from which workers can speak about the company and the Marcela Benavides is an Ecuadorian sociologist. people’s patrimony. She has taught at the School of Social Commu- As a representative of the Permanent Assem- nication at the Universidad Central del Ecua- bly for Human Rights explained in 2009, the dor. She works with political and social organi- petroleum labor movement grew out of a resist- zations and focuses on the study and projects of ance to neo-liberal policies and the extreme gender development, cultural diversity, human right. The Correa administration is neither or- rights, and public policy for inclusion. thodox neo-liberal nor a government of the E-mail: [email protected]. right. Further, paradoxically for the petroleum labor movement, calls itself a government of the left that champions the very nationalist and pat- Acknowledgments rimonial ideals that give meaning to the labor We acknowledge the financial support of the movement.13 Though Correa intervened in Geography Department at the University of Petroecuador, movement leaders have main- North Carolina at Chapel Hill. We are grateful tained an oppositional stance to the restructur- for the comments of the anonymous reviewers; ing of the industry, calling Correa a “closet their constructive and detailed suggestions sig- neo-liberal.” Such tactics have isolated the labor nificantly improved this article. Special thanks movement from former allies, such as indige- to Altha Cravey, Banu Gokariksel, Elizabeth nous and ecological movements, which are cur- Havice, Nina Martin, Sara Smith, Alvaro Reyes, rently seeking dialogue, not rupture with the and Erika Wise for their insightful suggestions. government. It has also distanced the move- In Ecuador, our special thanks to those who ment from Petroecuador workers fired under shared their life stories of petroleum-related the Correa administration in 2009, who are struggle and their contagious passion for social looking to be reinstituted and thus are not pub- justice and change. All errors of interpretation licly supporting criticisms of the government. remain ours. Mobilizing for the petro-nation: Labor and petroleum in Ecuador | 81

Notes tion to the hefty compensations for voluntary resignation outlined earlier, which far exceed 1. Although this changed with the constitution of those achieved by most public sector workers. 1998, where all obreros had the right to union- 10. Rio Napo, though composed of Petroecuador ize under Ecuadorian law, changes in 2009 to and PDVSA, is a private enterprise. The direc- labor laws now exclude obreros calificados from tor of Rio Napo is an ex-director of Texaco’s for- union organizing. mer branch in Ecuador, which fueled criticisms 2. Participating in collective decision making is a among petroleum workers. challenge. Worker associations use large, general 11. Although not all workers sought these compen- meetings to discuss worker interests. Due to dif- sation packages, public perception of the ferent work schedules and locations of work, Petroecuador workers is shaped by these high only small groups of workers are able to attend profile cases. assemblies at the same time. When assembly is 12. In the Enlace Ciudadano #221, Correa’s weekly called, some teams are not able to attend because governmental report, Correa went over the de- they are at work or they are just ending their tails of answers to a public poll about changes shift. A council of worker representatives was his administration was proposing in the judicial tried in the early 1980s but abandoned as con- system, regulation of the media, private enrich- flicts over political affiliations reproduced more ment, and public spectacles that involve the divisions over collective bargaining. death of animals. Correa received a majority 3. They include past and present movement lead- positive vote in all questions. ers, former refinery operators, apprentices, and 13. Note the paradox since Correa has stated that floor managers, a current fuel storage site man- he will purge the state company from politi- ager, former employees of the environmental cized workers. oversight department and commercialization, current maintenance employees, and current supporters of the workers movement. References 4. Although this politically enticing caramelo (sweet) at first was seen as a positive gain, once Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined communities: the payoffs were brought up to public scrutiny Reflections on the origin and spread of national- by the media, it tarnished the reputation of the ism. London: Verso. labor movement. Apter, Andrew. 2005. The Pan-African nation: Oil 5. In 1993, the movement officially broke off its af- and the spectacle of culture in . Chicago: filiation with the CTE because the latter “didn’t University of Chicago Press. understand” this change in strategy. Bebbington, Anthony. 2009. The new extraction: 6. Barrancabermeja has long been a hotbed of la- Rewriting the political ecology of the Andes? bor activism, radical populist politics, and NACLA Report on the Americas 42(5): 12–20. struggles over the provision of basic services. Business News Americas. 2004. Heads roll at Oil workers formed one of Colombia’s largest Petroecuador. 1 March. http://www.bnamericas and most powerful labor unions, the Unión .com/news/oilandgas/Heads_roll_at_Petroecua Sindical Obrera. dor. Accessed 11 October 2011. 7. The FSNP is a collective that includes labor Cano, Diego, Fernando Villavicencio, and F. Jácome. unions as well as civil society movements, such 2002. Petróleo: Desarrollo o dependencia? Quito: as the Coordinadora Por la Vida, Coordinadora FETRAPEC. de Movimientos Sociales, CONAIE, Diego Cano, Diego, Martha Roldós, Fernando Villavicen- Borja, Movimiento Polo Democrático and Ob- cio, and Henry Llanes. 2009. Letter to the Treas- servatorio de las Energías. ury Controller’s Office: Request to investigate 8. According to movement leaders, the ideological the implementation of the contract of specific rift between the Communist Party of Ecuador services for the operation of the Sacha field be- and the MCLP has debilitated militancy in the tween Petroproducción and the mixed Enter- petroleum industry. prise Rio Napo. 22 September. Quito, Ecuador. 9. The term “golden bureaucracies” is largely used Carriére, J. 2001. Neoliberalism, economic crisis, in reference to Petroecuador workers, in rela- and popular mobilization in Ecuador. In Dem- 82 | Gabriela Valdivia and Marcela Benavides

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