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Home , Branko Horvat, Gora (region), Gusle, Kingdom of Serbia, Kosovo field (Kosovo), National myth

Historical and the Invention of Political Folklore in Contemporary Karl Kaser University of Graz, Graz Joel M. Halpern, University of Massachusetts

In one of the years after 1389 the Serbian medieval Serbian despot2 Stefan Lazarevic ordered the construction of a marble column on the polje () with this inscription to memorialize his father, who died there in battle:

Oh man, stranger or hailing from this soil, when you enter these Serbian lands, whoever you may be ... when you come to this field called Kosovo, you will see all over it many bones of the dead, and with them myself in stone nature, standing upright in the middle of the field, representing both cross and flag. So as not to pass by and overlook me as something unworthy and hollow, approach me, I beg you, oh my dear, and study the words I bring to your attention, which will make you understand why I am standing here ... At this place there once was a great autocrat, a world wonder and Serbian ruler by the name of Lazar, an unwavering tower of piety, a sea of reason and depth of wisdom ... who loved everything that Christ wanted ... He accepted the sacrificial wreath of struggle and heavenly glory ... The daring fighter was captured and the wrath of martyrdom he himself accepted ... the great Prince Lazar ... Everything said here took place in 1389 ... the fifteenth day of June3, Tuesday, at the sixth or seventh hour, I do not know exactly, God knows.4

More than half a millenium late in 1989, it was possible for the first time for the contemporary political version of the ancestral Serbian medieval state to have a centenary celebration of these events on the original site known as the "Field of Blackbirds." A century earlier, in 1889, the Kosovo field was then still part of the . It had been an Ottoman army that had won the battle there against a Serbian coalition force on June 23, 1389. It was at the beginning of the 20th century, in 1912, that the region was finally reconquered and

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integrated into what was then the Kingdom of Serbia. The memory of this defeat been an integral part of the Serbian cultural heritage. This defeat was memorialized as a national holiday in pre-World War II Kingdom of . The year of 1989 was a significant marker in Serbian contemporary history. The early summer of that year was a time of dramatic political transition in the then Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia reflecting trends throughout Eastern as a result of the disappearance of the USSR as a political entity. The constituent Serbian Republic under the leadership of its communist president, Slobodan Miloševic, and his communist Party associates wanted at this time of transition to consolidate their grip on power. They saw their way to do this by asserting Serbian at a time of the disintegration of the existing communist state. The symbolism inherent in this 600th anniversary celebration became a useful political tool. This was in consonance with trends throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In this part of Europe individual , drawing their strengths from the past, replaced discredited and failed communist of universalism and future oriented achievements. The first strong signs of the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia, with its emphasis on regional political autonomies, went hand in hand with the coordinated unification of the then autonomous but Serbian controlled regions of and Kosovo. This structure became the basis for the new Republic of Serbia, as the central part of the now truncated state of Yugoslavia. What had once been six federated republics split into new national states -- , , and a contested . Only ethnically similar remained with Serbia. But Vojvodina and Kosovo, unlike the core area of Serbia were not homogeneously Serb in ethnic character. Vojvodina had large Hungarian, as well as Romanian, Croat affiliated and other national groups. In Kosovo, despite its being the heartland of the medieval Serbian state, its was approximately 90 percent Albanian.5 Kosovo with its historical legacy, reflected in its many Serbian churches dating from that period, was an area overburdened with its history and symbols. In that fateful year of 1989 it became the stage for a spectacular political-historical celebration. Thus the significance of what happened on June 28, 1989 on this field of Kosovo cannot be understood from the inscription alone. It needs to be seen as a celebration of a resurrection and embellishment of the of the Serbian State. This manifestation was probably one of the most, if not the most, significant political ritual in modern Serbian history. The public

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dissatisfaction with the political situation at this time provided the Serbian state, and specifically Miloševic, with the opportunity to revive the Kosovo Myth as the principle national myth. It liminalized "the " as an eternal, divine category of , of shared Srpstvo ("Serbianess"). Preparations for the celebration were difficult because a state of emergency had been declared for the province. This had followed large-scale rioting and political by the Albanian majority which had been recurring since the early eighties. The Albanian population therefore did not participate in the officially proclaimed celebration which had been declared a national holiday. It is probable, however, that Albanian draftees served in the Serbian military forces. Policemen and military units from all parts of Serbia were concentrated in Kosovo in order to provide security for the festival. This festival needs to be described in superlatives. Some million and a half came from the Diaspora, among them migrants to Australia, Canada and USA, to gather on this historic battlefield. About a thousand journalists were accredited. Some six thousand buses and about forty thousand private cars brought participants to this southern province. There were vendors with pictures of historic battle scenes and portraits of medieval Serbian rulers as well as of Milo?evi? who was then president of the still existing Yugoslavia. Other politicians present included the former Yugoslav president and contemporary Slovenian Prime Minister, Janez Drnovšek, and the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, a Croat.6 For weeks the Serbian had bombarded the population with programming about the historical and contemporary importance of the event. During the first half of 1989 a specific kind of political folklore was invented. It was one that was congruent with the well- established idea of the Serbs as a unique and martyred people, most notably as manifested in their defeat at Kosovo. While propagated from above this idea found resonance among the general population. This view was also congruent with the general political climate which favored keeping the dispersed Serbian in one state as had been the case in Socialist Yugoslavia. Fears associated with the then imminent dissolution of Yugoslavia inspired ordinary citizens to focus on this historical event.7 Both academics and popular writers contributed to the nationalistic rhetoric and related historical mythology. One of the most prominent Serbian historians of the second half of the 20th century and long-time president of the Serbian Academy

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of Sciences and Arts, Radovan Samardzic, explained the significance of the forthcoming event: "The may be regarded as one of the most important events in world history... Ever since the fifteenth century, the writings of learned humanists have classified it as one of the turning points in world history."8 One cannot but wonder how many such "turning points" might exist from his perspective. The day of celebration began early. At 7 AM there was a liturgy in the monastery of Gracanica. This monastery is located near the provincial capital of Priština. Then the celebration moved to the site of the historic battlefield. The Serbian public seemed moved by feelings approaching a mass hysteria. The events of 1389 were commemorated and political and ecclesiastical leaders draw conclusions for the future of contemporary Serbia. In his speech Milosevic left little doubt that he saws himself as a kind of secular Messiah who will preserve the holy Serbian land for its people in that year and in that place. The land was lost 600 years before because of discord and betrayal. He remarked that Serbia's socialist leaders had betrayed their people. He suggested that the concessions which had been made by Serbia would not have been accepted by "any other people in the world." He contrasted this discord and betrayal with the heroism justly celebrated in and national history. Miloševic suggested that the heroism displayed on the battlefield of Kosovo had already inspired six centuries of creativity. The brave army had remained honorable even in defeat."9 The idea of a Messiah or a historical hero who will return back to earth to liberate an enslaved people is both widespread in human history and not new to Serbian literary tradition. Thus the Serbs under Ottoman domination expected by the end of the 16th century the messianic return of their first medieval archbishop and mythic hero, the Holy Sava (1219-1233). After several uprisings the remains of Sava were burned by the Ottomans. But this act did not lessen the widespread in his Messianic return. The Serbian people have also expected the return of other mythical figures of Serbian history. One of the most prominent of these "sleeping" heroes is the historical figure of "Kraljevic Marko", the king's son Marko, whose real name was Marko Mrnjacevic and who lived in the 14th century. Historically he was not important and he died as a vassal of the Ottoman emperor in a military campaign against the principality of Valachia. Nevertheless he is the hero in many Serbian epic songs. He even placed in the historical context of the battle of Kosovo. The legend was spread that the hero had only temporarily left his earthly existence. He was said to be

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slumbering in a cave or on an island awaiting the appropriate opportunity to lead the Serbian people to freedom. At the beginning of the 20th century the popular Serbian poet Radoje M. Domanovic contributed his "Kraljevic Marko, The Second Time Among the Serbs." This was a popularized picture of the return of the Messiah. Kosovo plays an important role in the narrative. But at the same time he left space for a critical reflection on the myth of the Messiah, recognizing a strong tension between the myth and the social . But it is not quite clear whether the author is critiquing the social role of or the "weakness" of contemporary Serbs as compared to their heroic predecessors.10 Aside from this picture of the sleeping hero who will act at the proper historical moment, the question remains as to why a record of so-called discord and betrayal in the medieval past of more than half a millenium ago remains so real in the present. Briefly stated, a self-confident army was defeated under seemingly honorably circumstances some 600 years ago. Yet the shared memory of this event apparently can develop sufficient power to explain the fact that one and a half million people undertook a pilgrimage to this historic battlefield. But this observation alone cannot explain the full role of this historical myth and the related function of invented political folklore in Balkan politics at the end of the 20th century. In this paper we plan to analyze four aspects of this phenomenon. First, what actually happened in 1389? Second, how is it possible that a battle without significant historic impact reappeared as a reinvigorated national myth in the last decades of the 20th century? Third, the historic battle was enriched by dramatic epic events e.g., the military leaders on both sides, the Serbian prince Lazar and the Ottoman sultan Mehmet were killed. Nevertheless, the battle ended with the defeat of the Serbian army. The question arises as to how and perhaps why the Serbian memory is structured in order to actualize a defeat as a heroic, powerful and memorably event? Fourth, and finally -- how is political folklore created?

The Historical Context for the 1389 Battle of Kosovo

We begin by contextualizing the events surrounding the Kosovo battle in 1389. In the beginning of the 13th century a Serbian feudal state under the leadership of the Nemanjici

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dynasty was established in the area of Kosovo. This state extended its territory towards south and southeast at the expense of the and smaller Albanian principalities. The area of the Kosovo was a part of this expansion. At the time of one of the most successful Serbian emperors, Stefan Dušan (+ 1355), he reigned over a considerable portion of the European part of the Byzantine Empire. By the middle of the 14th century Serbia, along with the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire, became one of the most powerful countries in the . These Christian powers were threatened, however, by the expansion of Muslim Ottomans who, originating in Anatolia, began to expand their domain in the Balkans. Some eighteen years before the battle of Kosovo the Serbian army suffered a severe defeat. This was one of the consequences of the increasing feudalization of Serbia. After the death of Dušan, his successors were forced to cede authority to the high-ranking nobles. Thus the power of the Serbian state was considerably weakened and the regional nobility strengthened. One of these regional potentates was Lazar Hrebljanovic who became known to later generations as Prince Lazar. He was able to establish an independent principality on the northern fringes of the state with the seat of his power located in the fortress of Kruševac. His castle was situated not far from the field of Kosovo. In the spring of 1389 the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet decided to pursue further territorial advances. The Serbian Prince Lazar responded by recruiting an opposing army. This force included both Bosnian and Albanian troops. The two armies were lead by their respective rulers, who were then both about 60 years old. The two armies met in the morning of June 28 on the field of Kosovo. We don't know details about what happened; no report of a witness of the events exists. What we do know is that the two military commanders were killed and that the Serbian army again suffered a heavy defeat. In Western Europe for the first half of the following year the opposite was believed. Wrong messages were conveyed and only after some time did the truth emerge. The battle of Kosovo represented a defeat of the Serbian army, but only one in a series of defeats both before and after 1389. It does not appear to have been a strategically crucial battle. But there was a dramatic effect since at Kosovo both commanders were killed. A Serbian nobleman with a dagger, who was able to get close, probably killed the Ottoman sultan Murad. Lazar was captured and probably executed by one of Murad´s sons and successor. As it is very often the case with defeats, thoughts of the defeated turn to betrayal a point Milosevic referred to

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600 years later. From an analytical historical perspective, the battle was not a turning point in Balkan history to say nothing of the broader perspective of world history. The only consequence was formal recognition of Ottoman supremacy by the surviving Serbian feudal nobility who did not as yet have Ottoman troops garrisoned on their territories. A half a century later, in 1439, additional Serbian lands were conquered and occupied. A quarter of a century later, in 1463, the last Serbian stronghold, the fortress of on the Danube fell to the Ottomans. Between the time of the first Serbian defeat in their war with the Ottomans in 1371 and the final one in 1463 almost a century had passed. In this setting Kosovo was only one among a series of battles. Why the battles of 1371, 1439 or 1463 did not also become the setting for national myths is not quite clear. But viewed in comparative perspective it seems clear that mythical settings and strategic significance need not coincide. Myths require the creation of a dramatic setting in which events can be concisely symbolized. Myths while sometimes open to varying interpretations cannot by their nature deal with subtle shades of meaning or bureaucratic and administrative complexities.

The Framework for Myth Making: Myth as Historic Capital

Following up on our third point, we can view myth making as the accumulation of historic capital. Not every European society has a predisposition for the creation of and subsequent commemoration of historical myths. What is the concrete theoretical and historical framework for myth making? We think that in this concrete case an extraordinarily high proportion of historic capital was accumulated, which, at a certain level, turns into a national myth. Thus we see myth creation as closely related to what we consider here as "historic capital." This can be seen as a variation of what, following Mauss, Bourdieu calls, "symbolic capital." accumulated within a given cultural framework.11 This capital is based on the valued memories of a group in a dramatic form which can be capable of evoking strong affect. Such affect derives from their links to individual and group identity. This memory capital or historic capital can be drawn on in the future to mobilize social action and enhance political cohesion. It is important to note that this capital is held in the form of liminal memories. That is memories which exist in a timeless liminal framework outside of a sequence of events in a linear

95 chronology i.e. as myths. Thus the memory, the myth, of Kosovo exists alone apart from a specific historic context of chronologically oriented events as in the case of the battles which preceded Kosovo and followed it. In evoking the historic capital of Kosovo that day in 1989 Milosevic was, in effect, attempting to reconstitute the of the Serbian people, an identity which had been purposely supressed in the days of socialist Yugoslavia. An illustration of the dynamics of this process can be seen among patrilineally oriented descent groups. In this case capital is accumulated in the form of ancestral honor which can be transmitted over the generations. In the Balkans this is reflected in the of which was still vital in the years after World War II. Oral tradition can be seen as a kind of myth making but one which is never static but constantly being reinterpreted and reshaped over the generations. This kind of historic capital can then be drawn on for purposes of social mobilization, it can also be linked to a strategy of survival during times of oppression. What is common both to the process of historical capital accumulation and the accompanying creation of myth is the shared liminal time frame. It evokes a time out of time, a notion of time suspended. Thus the oral tradition of the epic cycle connected with Kosovo battle does not deal with a series of linear, chronologically paced events but rather with a many times told tale in which glorious deeds are recounted and defeats rationalized. A myth is not based only on a single historical event but is accumulated historic capital and has to be seen as linked to the further historic fate of a people or nation. The perception of sacredness in a myth is reached when it becomes contextualized in a narrative dealing with the core ethos of a group or a nation. It is reinforced in group consciousness by its repetition, performance on specified holidays or anniversaries. Since the celebration of the particularities of one group or nation reinforces a dichotomy of self and others such activities are always laden with potential political meaning. Thus this historic capital can also be seen as an ideological weapon as witness the case of Miloševic speech on the Kosovo Field of Blackbirds (Bezistan) with its overt text of reinforcing the Serbian consciousness and polity and constricting that of the . But such activities are double edged since the Albanians too are very much part of the Balkan oral tradition. Conflict then takes place simultaneously on several levels. There is that of the competing oral traditions which generate conflicting myths in liminal space. This is paralleled by political actions in a linear frame as occurred with autonomy was withdrawn from Kosovo in 1991. Finally in 1998

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these political actions of exclusion have provoked a violent dissent as in the shooting of police officers by Albanian gunmen followed by Serbian police raids on villages. National myths never exist in a neutral space. are always defined with reference to others. The characteristics of these others are never neutral. Questions of moral and military superiority and inferiority are always implicit and usually explicit in mythological world view. Such myths and their heroes achieve a formal sacralized state when they become incorporated into national religious systems as saints and their existence becomes part of a holy account and their iconographic representations appear in churches. The medieval Serbian churches in Kosovo are such repositories of national historic myths. On these church walls the story of Christ is depicted along with he lives lived in the Balkans a millenium and a half later. Myth then is a special kind of historical remembrance. Thus mythological remembrance reshapes the sometimes meager historic reality and creates a new, an elevated reality. Above all myth serves to represent historical continuity and enforce the consciousness of the ethnic or national community. Those who are initiated into and accept this created historical heritage come to feel strongly linked to their liminalized mythic ancestors. In the case we are considering here, that of Serbia, the projected effect is that of a spiritual group, sanctified by history and with an eternal history. The ritual of remembrance symbolizes for many Serbs the ethnic entity of Serbdom, being Serbian and the fight for survival. An essential meaning of Kosovo field is that survival does not depend on victory even a defeat can be mythologized as a the beginning of a period of the never ending struggle for survival, one's folk against all others: "Who cries out and denies that Kosovo is not Serbian, where our churches and monasteries as witnesses to history lie."12 These symbolic myths were given a contemporary meaning when Miloševic as the political leader of Serbia declared at the Kosovo field, the long ago battle was now filled with a new meaning: "Our most important battle today is related to the creation of economic, political, cultural and social prosperity...".13 The evocation of a liminal event by a politician operating in a linear chronological frame is not simply a classical epiphany and invocation of the ancestors. There has to be a cultural readiness, a time of perceived crisis in which the existing system is not felt to be working and there is a search for alternatives. It is here that the concept of historical capital becomes pertinent. The historical capital needs to be viewed in terms of both content and form. That is the

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idea of a cultural readiness to use oral traditional and infuse it with a new content which establishes a link with a revered past. Thus, concretely there materializes the establishment of a connection between the Serbian president Slobodan Miloševic and the Kosovo events of 600 years ago as in:

Slobodan, your sharp sword, will soon the battle of Kosovo prepare We call Strahinic, brave and wise, the nine Jugovici, the old Jugovici or Boško, who carries our banner and mows the Kosovo fields with his saber. Warm blood in streams will flow,where every year peonies sprout If woe piles on woe, then just a word, With rifle bullets we will appear.14

For Western European societies the use of historical myth for political purposes is differently structured. Hitler's use of Aryan and Germanic mythological models to glorify German nationalism was not done on the basis of a still existing oral tradition. Rather the Nazis in the 1930s relied on historical sources to reshape materials for desired racist ends and, ultimately, to justify policies of extermination in the pursuit of the linked objectives of racial purity and political hegemony. All these factors have been present in the actions of the Serbian state in the 1990s but they have been constituted in different ways. Serb objectives have, of course, been more limited reflecting both their restricted power-political base and the limited efficiency of their bureaucracy. Most important, unlike the Nazis who were the source of the conflict both the Serbian government and communist bureaucrats such as Miloševic were, of course, repositioning themselves following the collapse of the dominant communist power, the USSR. It is also of the greatest significance that the Nazis, despite their abundant use of medieval symbols in their uniforms, flags and party insignia, were, above all, reacting to an event within living memory i.e. their defeat in . Despite their talk of a thousand year Reich and Hitler's grandiose plans for an imperial capital in Berlin the Nazis led a thoroughly industrialized people rooted in a linear time. One of the unique aspects of the horror of the Holocaust was its technically planned aspects founded on an industrial model for killing and exploiting treasure. As described in UN and other international reports, the killings in Bosnia involved killing usually in a more direct and personalized fashion of individualized torture and

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murder. Killing with knives, or even machine guns, and artillery and mortar as in Bosnia tends to be more limited than destruction by the cattle car train load in gas chambers where attempts were made to pacify people prior to execution. This former model so widespread in Bosnia had been rejected early on by the Nazis because it was clearly inefficient viewed from the perspective of an industrialized model. To utilize 600 year old tales and symbols requires not only a cultural readiness founded on oral tradition but a familiarity derived from frequent repetition. Here the amplification of the role of the traditional bard, the guslar accompanied by his single stringed becomes significant. The overt commercialization of this medium was evident even in socialist Yugoslavia with numerous recordings and public performances on ceremonial occasions as well as an abundance of popular . One can view the temporal setting in Serbia in a three dimensional time frame with the presence of linear (chronological, event oriented), cyclical and liminal components. In the Serbian case we can clearly see the cyclical tied to the liminal in that the Serbian oral tradition is inseparable from a patriarchal social setting. Here the notions of patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence underlie the patriarchal setting. The implementation of a patriarchal framework, of course, implies a cyclical view of existence with the fundamental social dynamic being that of male succession, son succeeding father. Such notion are not strange to the Western European social setting but these modes have not in historically recent times been dominant or exclusive. Even their role in the historic time of the Early Modern period has been questioned e.g. the ultimate role of the extended family as a dominant social form. While there is some question as to the extent to which the ideal of the patriarchal extended family household (the zadruga) was achieved by Serbian peasants there is no doubt about the extent to which it functioned as an ideal. Here we can rely on demographic documentation of fertility behavior. The patriarchal model as an ideal had not entirely disappeared from 1990s Serbia even though it had become a recent memory among much of the urban population. One cannot say that early 1990s Serbia was a society in which a dominating cyclical time perception pushed the linear chronological order into the background or that Western societies were entirely reliant on a linear time frame. But we do have a conjunction of these three interacting time frames articulating in a different way in the Balkans. One might also say that the Orthodox church as an avowedly national church and keeper of the national tradition is also a

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key element. Its role as preserver of key historic symbols, including use of churches and graveyards for the hallowed dead past and present, provide direct links to national identity. One might even call it the curator of liminal symbols. These then directly link up with the expectable cyclicity in family structures. On the level of belief and ceremonial structures one sees these linked in the Serbian , the feast day of the lineage's patron saint on which occasion the priest is called to the family household to bless the preparations. In this cyclical time of the lineage the liminal past becomes a part of cyclical life and inscribes itself into the life and psyche of succeeding generations. "The Kosovo field is at the heart of Serbian identity ..."15 The Serbian epics often use kin terms to express ancestral connections. Ancestors of principal figures are called "great- grandfathers" and contemporaries are referred to as "brothers" and "sisters" "sons" and "daughters" as well as other variations which include "little son" or "my children". Such uses do, of course, stress the sense of community in a wide variety of settings. Serbia is the common house for all Serbs and the mother the ancestral mother: "One stone is to another, a brother to a brother, all were given birthby their common Serb mother."16 A sense of common identity is also reinforced by a shared genealogy. This sense of shared collectivity is based on a common memory structured by the medium of an oral tradition. An oral tradition does not function through memorization but rather through the recreation of events allowing for a process of adaptation across generations. Modern historiography with its emphasis on scholarly methods tends to demystify romantic myths.17 But such historiography is never entirely free of national bias. So one can hardly oppose traditional myth to modern objectivity. Also as much of modern scholarship in the humanities and social sciences with its concern with deconstructing texts has repeatedly emphasized, the role of individual perception and creation is emphasized. But certain of the preconditions for the accumulation of historic capital are, however, a given in the Serbian case where shared historical experience and a perception of common identity are emphasized. The way in which historic capital is initially created is exemplified in the recounting of the Kosovo battle and in the process transforming a relatively unspectacular event into an historical myth.18 The myth of Kosovo is not based primarily upon the battle as such, but on the figure of Prince Lazar and secondarily on another feudal lord, Miloš Obilic. Lazar's purported mortal

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remnants still exist and provide a material symbolic link with the now distant medieval past. Until 1391 his remains were first preserved in a monastery near Priština, not far from the scene of the battle. They were then transferred to the monastery in Southern Serbia. But prior to the conquest of this region by the Ottomans Lazar´s well-traveled remains were brought to the then safe monastery of Vrdnik in the region of Fruška , northwest from . Here they could rest for centuries. But in 1941, when Croatian Ustashi threatened this region, Lazar was transported to Belgrade, where he found his final place in front of the main altar of the Orthodox cathedral, where his remains can be visited today. Crucial to the creation and subsequent enduring vitality of the Kosovo myth was the decision of the to canonize Lazar a few years after his death. His placement in the annual religious calendar of observed holy days reinforced his liminal status by linking it with a cyclical dimension of observance. Thus every year on the day of his death services of divine liturgy were held throughout Serbia. These actions, in effect, institutionalized his deeds whether real or fictive. Significantly, a further reinforcement of the status of the myth was provided by the fact that Lazar was not only canonized but raised to the status of a martyr. The central theme of his martyrdom was the conviction that he gave his life for both his people and their church. He was seen as sacrificing himself in order to save Serbia. This status was accentuated by the recounted epic element that on the evening before the battle he manifested his awareness that death awaited him. This further confirmed his heroic status for subsequent generations. He was thus pictured as arming himself for battle aware of his impending certain death. Lazar was thus portrayed as following the pattern by his emperor-forefathers, fatefully putting his life in god's hands. This action made the defeat of the Serbian army into a dramatic event. Defeat was turned into martyrdom and became a symbol of Christian resistance to Moslem Turkish oppression and the salvation of a people. This defeat then became the symbol of the national salvation of a Christian people. The historic capital was thus maximized as the oral tradition carried cyclically the liminal elements of the myth. Its precise linear chronological setting became irrelevant. After the final of the remaining Serbian lands culminating in the fall of Smederevo on the Danube in (1463) the autochthonous Serbian Orthodox Church organization was dissolved in the 1530s and integrated into the archbishopric of . As a consequence the Greek clergy obtained a predominant position in the hierarchy of the Serbian church

101 administration. They were not interested in promoting the worship of a Serbian prince. This did not mean the end of the ritual worship of Lazar, but its character changed. Lazar became even more popular among the ordinary people. This situation was reinforced by the fact that following the Ottoman occupation a large number of the Serbian population migrated from the plains and valleys into the then remote mountainous zones of the Balkans. At a rough estimate this movement affected about 300.000 people. Only toward the end of the 18th and into the 19th century did their descendants return to the plains. This was a dramatic watershed event in the life of the Serbian people and mythologically linked to the Battle of Kosovo. A significance part of the oral tradition was that future generations recollected the Battle of Kosovo as the reason for the flight of their putative great-grandfathers. Kosovo thus became a critical turning point in the . It marked the transition from liberty to , from life in their to movement to foreign regions. Serbian society was transformed from a viable medieval state with a history of partial dominance in the Balkans with an existing nobility and church hierarchy based in the lowlands to an essentially peasant society. This was accompanied by an ecological shift emphasizing pastoralism compatible with their predominant shift into the uplands. It was, however, a society with an acute sense of identity tied to an elaborate oral tradition. At the center of this tradition was the Kosovo epic and its hero Prince Lazar with its associated epics it became known as the Kosovo epic cycle. These became the core of the Serbian national myth conveyed by the guslari bards. The compositions are patterned, one line consisting of ten syllables, the deseterac, one section consisting of 14 to 16 lines. The first written collection of these songs was published at the beginning of the 18th century. These songs from Montenegro and the , entitled "Stories about the battle of Kosovo", became very popular.19 The most important collection of Kosovo poetry was prepared by the famous philologist and folklorist, Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, in the first half of the 19th century. He transformed oral tradition into written poetry: "The emperor and the empress Milica," "The fall of the " or "The Kosovo girl." In this way the Kosovo myth became known beyond the confines of Serbian society. This tradition inspired the famous Montenegrin prince-bishop, poet and politician, Petar Petrovic Njegoš, who lived in the first half of the 19th century. His "Gorski vjenac" (Mountain Wreath) became very popular among a growingly literate Serbian population.

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He was also one of the greatest interpreters of the Kosovo epic poetry. The mythological remembrance of Kosovo, however, continued to dominate.20 Following an almost half century of socialist-communist dominance in which national themes were deemphasized these epic songs have achieved a new popularity in the 1990s due, in part, to their politically endorsed propogation. It is now somewhat less than a century (1912) that Kosovo has again become part of a Serbian state. The fact that the region now has an overwhelming Albanian majority (90%) has made it an arena of conflict between these two peoples. In this context the Kosovo myth remains alive. In a way it is both fascinating and tragic that a New York Times discussion group on contemporary Kosovo contains more than a few detailed and controversial discussions of medieval history. In the late 19th and 20th centuries the myth of Kosovo was substantially embellished. This was done by an outpouring of books, articles, poems, songs, and dramas. This activity has been reinforced by the contemporary significance of the day of Lazar's death, the 28th of June. Many important events in recent Serbian and ex-Yugoslav history occurred on this day. One of the most dramatic was the assassination of the successor to the Austrian emperor's throne. This occurred in in 1914 and precipitated events which led directly to World War I. Austria- had assumed control over Bosnia as a result of the Conference of Berlin in 1878 when the Ottomans ceded their control over the area. The large Serbian population in Bosnia became a source of tensions between the Austrian administration and the Serbian political leaders. The assassin was a young Serbian student. The Kosovo myth with its emphasis on Serbian heroism and national identity certainly served to reinforce notions of national identity and separateness on the part of the Bosnian Serbian population. The existence of an independent Serbian state, newly emerged from Ottoman control, further accentuated the tension. Clearly World War I wasn't "caused" by the Kosovo myth but the breakdown of three multinational empires, the Ottoman, Austrian and Russian meant that Serbian national identity had to be reinterpreted. After World War II instead of the marble cross to mark the spot, the new Yugoslav state constructed a tower to mark the now mythical place of this now considered historic act. Ironically in the mid 1990s Serbian mortars and siege guns destroyed the museum erected by the post World War II Yugoslav socialist government to commemorate not the Archduke but his Serbian assassin. In Serbian historiography of the second half of the 20th century "the battle of Kosovo [became] one of the most important events of world history." 21 This elevation of self to

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center, marginality to mainstream can be seen not solely as a projection of egoism but an exclusive focus on one's own strongly perceived national identity. Manifesting itself in a Balkan context to the exclusion of others. Like most national myths the story of Kosovo does not easily lend itself to the tactics of compromise.

How to combine myth and political folklore in contemporary Serbia?

A good point of departure to discuss this question prepairs the Serbian ethnologist I. Colovic. He connects the revival of the historical myths since the end of the 1980ies to the established political folklore. The first music cassettes of the new genre were issued during the months before the anniversary by the music house "Beograd Ton". One of the title songs was "Oj Serbia, your pieces will soon become a whole". This and a series of political popular songs of the following years was inspired by the "new" politics of the Miloševic-regime. Many authors participated in the revival of the national-patriotic rhetoric and mythology in order to enact political folklore.22 One of them was Zoran Mišic, a famous poet, established once again a bridge between myth and historic capital in his own way:

The epic of Kosovo is founded not only on the conqueror's pride, but also on the pride of those who defeat the conqueror with a spiritual weapon. Because of this, it does not endanger anybody, nor threaten anybody. The myth of Kosovo goes far beyond the limits of a national myth; by its essence it ranks with the highest creations of human spirit, collected in the imaginary museum of a unique European culture.23

In order to understand the invented political folklore one has to take into consideration that from the beginning of the modern Serbian state in the first half of the 19th century and the political life the Serbian village, the Serbian peasant with his set of values and traditional mythology belonged to the main symbols of politics. Rural symbols, like the opaque, the gunjac or the gusla have always played a significant role in political communication.24 S. Naumovic knows five reasons for this: 1) Serbia has overcome its rural status not before the second half of the 20th century, 2) it was therefore the population of the countryside which shaped the modern

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Serbian national state, 3) the Serbian farmer laid the foundation of economic wealth through the production and export of agrarian goods, 4) the agrarian strata of Serbian society has never been politically rewarded for their efforts and accomplishments, 5) by using rural symbolism to demonstrate Serbia's greatness the rural strata of society could be easily pacified so that they accepted the political dominance of the urban strata. In this political rhetoric the farmer is not only the transmitter of the Serbian myth but he represents himself his own myth. He stands for the golden age in Serbian history, for uprisings and wars of liberation; for a democratic spirit which is the result of a patriarchal and egalitarian culture; for the modest cultural hero upon which all the cultural, economic, political and military achievements of the nation rests. Thus political folklore of the 1990ies is invented, but invention rests upon a solid and emotionalized basis, the Serbian village and the village population. The elements can be grouped into three categories: To the first group belongs the folkloric rural language and its figures. This is a powerful category since in the 19th century the language of the ordinary people was codified and not the artificial educated language of the poets. To the second category belong elements of popular culture: elements of material culture as already mentioned above, then social organizations of the peasantry like the zadruga, popular religion, the patriarchal ethos and the popular music. The third category is represented by psychical characteristics of the peasantry: the creative genius of the peasants and his high mental capabilities go hand in hand with high moral qualities. Dobrica Cošic, poet and former president of the new Yugoslav Republic formulates the emotional occupation of the Serbian peasant as ideological symbol in a very significant way: "Deep down in my soul it came to a big split: The truth belonged to the village and the peasants, the untruth to the town and its inhabitants... To be more precise: I became a communist because of the rural poverty and because the poverty of the peasant women ... There was no female martyr which was like a peasant woman. There was no social humiliation, which was like the humiliation of the peasant women: emotional and related to work and nature. It was because of these female martyrs that I joined the revolution, about which I thought it would have changed their lives. Thus it was not the working class and the expropriation that inflamed me for the movement."25

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It seems to be clear that the Serbian peasantry is the mediator in the process of the usage of the historical myth to enact political folklore in contemporary Serbian society. Coming to a conclusion one has to ask why the mythology is still powerful in contemporary Serbia and why this historic-symbolic capital can be activated in a society which is not any longer a pre-modern but a relatively modern and developed producer and consumer society. One has to assume that in the 1980s the politics of socialistic modernization has overcome with the cyclical time perception, genealogical memory and the historical mythology. Maybe the political crisis in ex-Yugoslavia since the early eighties was responsible for a temporary domination of traditional elements, of elements that lead far back to Serbian history. Therefore we should discuss this problem within the of the synchronism of the asynchronic in modern Serbia and modern society in general. In any case we should be careful not to identify the potential of actualization of historical mythology with the retrogression of a whole nation into a stormy medieval heroism.

Notes

1. This article is a preliminary version, a report in , from a larger research project.

2. Serbian imperial title, originally the Byzantine title for a high-ranking imperial civil servant.

3. June 28 according to the new calendar.

4. Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich: The Saga of Kosovo, Columbia University Press, New York 1984:18p.

5. For the so-called Kosovo problem see, e.g., Dragnich and Todorovich; Branko Horvat: Kosovsko pitanje, Mladost, 1989; Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti: Studies on Kosova, Columbia University Press, New York 1984.

6. "Vjesnik", June 28/29, 1989.

7. Ivan Colovic: Bordell der Krieger. Folklore, Politik und Krieg, Osnabrück 1994.

8. Alek Vukadinovic (Ed.): Kosovo 1389-1989. Serbian Literary Quarterly 1989. Special edition on the occasion of600 years since the Battle of Kosovo, Srboštampa, Beograd 1989:9p.

9. "Vjesnik", June 29, 1989.

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10. Trian Stoianovich: Balkan Worlds. The First and Last Europe, Sharpe, Armonk 1994: 168 pp. Radoje Domanovic:Izabrane pripovjetke, Zagreb 1946.

11. Pierre Bourdieu: Le sens pratique, Paris, Les éditions de Minuit, 1980; Marcel Mauss: `Essai sur le don´, in: L´Année Sociologique, N.S. 1/1923-24:30-186.

12. Colovic:154.

13. "Vjesnik", June, 29, 1989.

14. Colovic:22.

15. Colovic:142.

16. Colovic:143.

17. Jacques Le Goff (Ed.): Histoire et mémoire, Paris, Gallimard, 1986; Jack Goody: The logic of writing and the organization of society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

18. The following is based on Emmert.

19. Emmert:82.

20. Albert Lord: `The Battle of Kosovo in Albanian and Serbocroatian Oral Epic Songs`, in: Arshi Pipa and Sami Repishti (Ed.): Studies on Kosovo: 65-83.

21. Vukadinovic:9.

22. Colovic.

23. Zoran Mišic: ´What is The Kosovo Commitment´, in: Alek Vukadinovic (Ed.): Kosovo 1389-1989. Serbian Literary Quarterly 1989. Special edition on the occasion of 600 years since the Battle of Kosovo, Srboštampa, Beograd 1989:168.

24. Following ideas are based on Slobodan Naumovic: `Ustaj seljo, ustaj rode: Simbolika seljaštva i politicka komunikacija u novijoj istoriji Srbije´, in: Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju, Beograd 2,1/1995, 39-63.

25. Slavoljub Cukic: Covek u svom vremenu. Razgovori sa Dobricom Cošicom, Beograd 1989:16p.

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