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ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE TO POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES

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everal colleagues, Madeline Williams, and Kimberly friends, and experts Mahling Clark. have been of indis­ I have no words to thank the well­ pensable help in com­ known scholars who wrote the six pleting this evaluation. country case studies: Enrique Baloyra While it is not possible (El Salvador); Rafael Lopez-Pintor to mention aU of them, (Nicaragua); J. Michael Turner, Sue I must acknowledge a Nelson, and Kimberly Mahling Clark few whose support (Mozambique); Frederick Brown has been criticaL (Cambodia); Marina Ottaway (An­ gola); and John Harbeson (Ethiopia). The summary versions of their excel­ Larry Garber, acting administrator lent papers are being published for USAID's Policy and Program separately. Coordination Bureau and a pioneer in international electoral assistance, CDIE organized a workshop on prOVided guidance throughout the November 14-16, 1996, that brought evaluation process. Without his together a core group of people to timely intellectual leadership, this discuss the case studies. The discus­ evaluation would not have material­ sants--Tom Beyer, Horacio Boneo, ized. Gerald Britan, director of the Charles Costello, Terrence Lyons, and Center for Development Information Mark Schneider-provided valuable and Evaluation, Michael Calavan, insight based on their own expertise. former director of the Programs and Contributions were also made by Operations Assessment Division of other participants, including Todd CDIE, and Susan Merrill, the current Amani, John Anderson, Murl Baker, director of POA, have been unwaver­ Rick Barton, Gwen Bevis, Harry Blair, ing in their support and provided me Polly Byers, Andy Castonguay, the necessary resources to conduct Nadereh Chahmirzadi, Clinton the evaluation. Doggett, Dina Esposito, Elizabeth Fetter, Judy Gilmore, Michael The design for the evaluation was Henning, Gerald Hyman, Keith Klein, made final in an April 1996 work­ Scott Lansell. Daniel Lesmez, Michael shop attended by technical experts Magan, Heather McHugh, Ned and USAID officials. I very much McMahon, Johanna Mendelson, benefited from the thoughtful com­ Deborah Mendelson, Norman Olsen, ments and suggestions of Rafael Cambodian ballot and Jeanne Pryor, Kathleen Smith, Ed photographs of a rally in Lopez-Pintor, Ron Gould, Patrick Stewart, Charles Stonecipher, George Nicaragua and voting in Merloe, Tom Beyer, David Hirshman, Vickers, Richard Whelden, Jennifer Ethiopia on cover, courtesy of Johanna Mendelson, Amy Young, International Foundation for Windsor, and Amy Young. Election Systems. I am also grateful to Thomas monograph. Marina and I have very Carothers at the Carnegie Endowment much profited from the valuable for International Peace for sponsoring comments from many colleagues, a half-day session to discuss a paper including Sergio Guzman, Sue in which I outlined a set of lessons Nelson, Susan Reichle, Sara based on a comparative analysis of Steinmetz, and Jim Vermillion. We the case studies. A group of promi­ could not dream of better editors nent experts on elections and war­ than Laurie Denton and Ross torn societies-including Nicole Ball, Bankson. Santiago Canton, Betsy Clark, Jeff Fischer, Steve Griner, Patrick Merioe, Finally, I wish to thank my former Tim Reiser, Nicholas van de Walle, colleague Carolyn Knapp, who and George Vickers-participated in assisted me throughout the conduct this workshop, which helped to of this evaluation with remarkable shape our thinking on the subject. skill and efficiency.

I am especially grateful to Marina KruSHNA KUMAR Ottaway, who coauthored the present U.S. Agency for International Development For word

n 1996, USAID initiated a chore of drafting a new constitution. program of evaluation Finally, "free and fair" elections can studies to examine the open a window of opportunity for the further democratization and roles that international reconciliation of these societies. assistance plays in the democratic reconstruc­ The report examines three areas: tion of postconjlict societ­ the planning, conduct, and outcome ies. of postconflict elections; the role of international electoral assistance; and The studies are designed to the effects of elections on subsequent draw policy and programmatic democratization and reconciliation lessons, which can be used by processes. The study draws from a USAID and other donor agencies to series of in-depth analyses of develop and implement their assis­ postconflict elections in six countries tance programs in postconflict situa­ (Angola, Cambodia, EI Salvador, tions. The framework for these Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicara­ evaluations was initially articulated in gua) commissioned by USAID's Rebuilding Societies After Civil Wat:5, Center for Development Information which was edited by Krishna Kumar and Evaluation (CDIE). The case and published by Lynne Rienner in studies were prepared by eminent 1996. scholars who had the opportunity to observe firsthand the elections under From Bullets to Ballots presents the consideration and who used a com­ findings of the first program evalua­ mon framework in conducting their tion undertaken in this series. The analyses. Krishna Kumar, who is study looks generally at elections leading the overall evaluation for held after the signing of a peace CDIE, and Marina Ottaway, a political accord. These elections are often scientist and author of one of the critical to the political reconciliation country studies, deserve considerable of war-torn societies. They are credit for synthesizing the various designed to settle the contentious experiences reported in each of the issue of political legitimacy: ballots, case studies, as well as incorporating not bullets, should determine who information from other postconflict represents the people and who elections. governs the country. Moreover, in countries where a constitutional The authors have identified many framework for democracy does not important lessons and have proposed exist, those elected in a postconflict precise recommendations. As the election are often given the critical study demonstrates, postconflict elections are not a panacea. The straints, are often immense and divert political and practical challenges that resources from other critical areas of must be overcome to ensure a posi­ economic and political reconstruc­ tive outcome are enormous. More­ tion. over, as recent events in Cambodia illustrate, the risks of backsliding A final comment about events in following a seemingly successful Cambodia, which have taken a electoral process remain for quite serious turn for the worse since the some time. body of this report was completed. In developing lessons for the future, Although the magnitude and we must avoid applying a superficial intensity of international engagement analysis to the overall impact of may not necessarily be the same, international involvement during the support for democratization processes critical period surrounding the 1993 in postconflict settings should not be elections. More important, the inter­ terminated simply because a reason­ national community, including the ably successful election has occurred. United States and the United Nations, At the same time, we should not lose should not use setbacks as an excuse sight of the opportunities afforded by to avoid further engagement in peace accords and the fact that postconflict peacemaking. While the elections with significant international risk of failure in these politically involvement are an important tool sensitive situations must be acknowl­ available to policymakers and nego­ edged from the outset, isolationism tiators. and abstention are not viable alterna­ tives in today's interdependent world. Recognizing the constructive role Rather, we must attempt through elections can play in a postconflict studies such as the present one to situation, the authors correctly shift learn from our experiences so as to attention to considerations of timing, minimize the prospects of failure in modalities, and costs. Meaningful the future. postconflict elections cannot neces­ sarily be organized to coincide with a I congratulate COlE for this excel­ military exit strategy. Nor does it lent study, which I hope will receive make sense to compromise basic urgent consideration by the interna­ democratic principles if a key goal of tional community. the postconflict election is to lay the basis for the evolution of a demo­ LARRyGARBER cratic sOciety. Finally, the expendi­ Acting Assistant to the Administrator tures required for a successful Bureau of Policy and Program postconflict election, particularly Coordination where there are scheduling con- -~tions ar-torn Societies

CHAPTERl that war would not necessarily achieve their objectives. Peace accords have been signed and carried out in countries as umerous factors have diverse as Angola, Cambodia, contributed to the and Nicaragua. There is, more­ resolution of civil wars over, new hope for the peaceful the world over. Among settlement of many existing them: the end of the conflicts. Cold War, growing war fatigue, decline of war An essential element in all peace support from superpow­ accords signed to end internal con­ ers, international flicts has been the provision for "free and fair" elections. The warring mediation, and the realization factions, often under outside persua- by leaders of warring factions Pre ared by Krish «umar, Center for DevelopmentInformation and

Evalua~ on,U •. Agencyfor International Development, and MarinaOttaway, Johns HopkinsSchool for Advanced International Studies.

Chapter 1: Elections in War-torn Societies ....••...... •...... •••.•.••...••.....•...... 1

Chapter 2: The Country Context...... •....•.•.••....•...... ••...... •..•.... 7

Chapter 3: Conduct and Outcome of the Elections ...... 15

Chapter 4: Consequences .....•.••.••...•.•.•••...... ••..••.....•••.••• 25

Chapter 5: Factors Affecting the Elections and their Outcomes....••••••...... • 33

Chapter 6: International Electoral Assistance .....•...... •....•...... •.•••••...... 37

Chapter 7: Lessons and Recommendations...... 43

References...... ••.••••••.••...•••••...... •..••••••....•••••....•••••••.....••••••.....• 51

sion and pressure, agree that the elections could also promote recon­ contentious issue of political legiti­ ciliation among former warring macy would be settled by ballots and politicornilitary groups. Consequently, not bullets and that elections would postconflict elections have been held determine who should represent the in the past and are likely to be held people and rule the country. Further­ in the future in postconflict societies.) more, in cases where an appropriate constitutional framework for democ­ The international community has racy did not exist, elected representa­ generally supported such elections tives would draft the new constitution. with enthusiasm and hope.2 It has It was universally assumed that by provided technical and financial paving the way for democratization, assistance to plan and conduct them.

1 The expression postconflict societies refers to countries in the aftermath of civil war. Such wars could end as a result of a peace accord Signed by the warring parties, as has been the case, for example, in El Salvador and Mozambique. Or they could end out of outright victory of one party over the other(s), as happened in Ethiopia. The essential feature is that civil war is over for all intents and purposes. The term war-torn society is treated here as a synonym for postconflict societies. 2 The term international commullity here refers to all bilateral and multilateral agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, philanthropic organizations, relief agencies, and private sector fIrms involved in development, conflict resolu­ tion, and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, it has sent observers to promotes the best use of the limited monitor elections to ensure their resources available to donors. integrity and transparency. It has also intervened to resolve disputes among In late 1996, USAID's Center for contesting parties, to pressure reluc­ Development Information and tant parties to accept election out­ Evaluation (COlE) conducted a comes, and to promote a smooth program evaluation to fill this gap. transition of power. International The evaluation was the first compre­ assistance has undoubtedly been hensive attempt to analyze critically critical to the successful conduct of the experience of USAID and other elections. international organizations in sup­ porting postconfIict elections. It concentrated on six countries in Why This Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Evaluation ? The evaluation asked the follow­ The all-encompassing involvement ing three sets of questions about of the international community in postconflict elections: postconfIict elections has led to a The much better understanding of the • Planning and conduct of elec­ international special problems and challenges tions. Who took the initiative for these elections entail. Many reports elections? What were the objectives c mu ·ty cover specific programs or elections. and expectations? How were the But whereas they provide good elections planned and conducted? h s generall detailed information about individual What problems attended the plan­ supported cases, they usually lack a compara­ ning and implementation processes? tive perspective. Furthermore, most What were the results of the elec­ su h election evaluations were written immediately tions? How were they perceived and after the completion of a specific accepted by the contending parties? • h program or immediately after an enthusiasm election. They thus cannot examine • International assistance. What the program's effect on subsequent was the nature of international and hope. developments in these countries. assistance? How did the assistance affect the conduct and outcome of As a result, large gaps remain in elections? What problems did the our understanding of the nature and international community encounter effectiveness of electoral assistance in delivering its assistance? What programs and the impact such have been the strengths and limita­ programs have on subsequent politi­ tions of international assistance cal developments and the overall programs? reconstruction process. In fact, members of the international commu­ o Effects of postconflict elections on nity, particularly bilateral and multi­ democratization and reconciliation. lateral agencies, have at hand little How did elections promote or hinder empirically grounded knowledge these processes? What factors and they can use to formulate their conditions affected the impact of overall policies and design programs elections on democratization and in this area. Such a situation hardly reconciliation processes? This synthesis report presents the scapes of the countries in the after­ findings, conclusions, and lessons of math of civil war are hardly condu­ the six country evaluations conducted cive to democratic contests for power. by CDIE and a subsequent review of Politically, these societies are highly those evaluations in a November polarized, with deep mutual distrust 1996 workshop organized by CDIE. and antagonisms among former adversaries. The transformation of politicomilitary movements into viable Contexts political parties remains at best incomplete at the time of elections. And Features Often ex-combatants are not demobi­ Postconflict elections are more lized, posing the threat of revived complex than routine elections, hostilities if one of the parties to the because they are designed to achieve conflict is not satisfied with the multiple objectives. Furthermore, they elections outcome. In many cases, are held under much more difficult parts of the country remain under the Postconflict conditions. Postconflict elections are administrative control of a rival elections are meant to militia, impeding the free movement of people. • Consolidate peace, by providing the former combatants with a legiti­ The norms of free press and media mate arena for competition hardly exist, and access to electronic media is often controlled by the • Create a legitimate government government. Most important, the that can be recognized internation­ commitment of the leaders of the ally, thus facilitating the flow of rival political groups to the demo­ outside assistance for reconstruction cratic process remains at best ques­ and development tionable; the signing of peace accords does not necessarily signify a change • Further the cause of democracy in deeply held beliefs, attitudes, by enabling people to choose their perceptions, and patterns of behavior own government and also by educat­ of the leaders of the warring factions. ing the citizenry about the meaning and practice of democracy Harsh economic realities put an additional strain on a fragile political These objectives are interrelated, system in the aftermath of a peace but they are not always mutually accord. High inflation, massive compatible, at least within a limited unemployment, food shortages, and a time frame. For example, in societies shattered institutional and physical deeply divided along ethnic lines, infrastructure tend to erode public elections may aggravate existing confidence in political institutions. tensions rather than promote recon­ The high-and often unrealistic­ ciliation, even while paving the way expectations generated by the peace for the installation of a democratically accord remain unfulfilled, contribut­ elected government. ing to widespread frustration.

Postconflict elections are held A further problem is that war-torn under very difficult conditions. The societies usually lack even rudimen­ political, economic, and social land- tary institutional infrastructure for elections. In many countries, elec­ an indication of the direction of tions were never held in the past; in change. others, elections took place but were usually manipulated. So election Second, all three developing laws, voter registries, electoral regions--Africa, Asia, and Latin commissions at the national and America-had to be represented. local levels, and administrative Such a geographic dispersion was structures to manage elections are required to identify distinctive cul­ virtually nonexistent. Little or no tural and contextual variables that technical expertise exists in the might impinge on both the conduct country for planning and conducting and outcomes of elections. Thus, two elections. Therefore, an institutional countries in Latin America, one in infrastructure has to be created from Asia and three in Africa were in­ scratch within the stipulated time cluded in the sample. As Africa has frame. experienced such a large number of civil wars, half of the case studies Under such difficult conditions, looked at this region. the possibility of massive fraud and cheating is always present, as is that Third, relevant records, documents, War-torn of a return to violence. Postconflict and other material had to be available. elections thus require significant Before selecting case study countries, international involvement and high COlE conducted computer searches to visibility to promote transparency. locate material on elections in differ­ ent postconflict societies. Evaluation Design After careful analysis, COIE selected Angola, Cambodia, EI Salvador, Ethio­ And Methodo logy pia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua for its In designing this evaluation, CDIE case studies. COIE then prepared a considered the features and contexts comprehensive research design. It was of transition just listed. Three criteria discussed in a workshop in early 1996 were used to select the countries. attended by 10 international experts with rich experience in postconflict First, elections had to have been elections. The research design was held in the country at least two years revised and expanded in light of those before the study. There is often a discussions. period of euphoria after elections that can prevent an objective assess­ COlE commissioned well-known ment of electoral assistance. Interme­ scholars from the academic commu­ diary organizations as well as out­ nity to prepare case studies. All but side experts are often too involved one had observed the specific elec­ to reexamine their assumptions and tion for which they prepared the case evaluate their conduct. This criterion study. The experts relied on three was also necessary to examine the additional sources of information. impact of elections on democratiza­ First, they used published and un­ tion and reconciliation processes in published reports, documents, and the country. Two years are not a other information COlE identified sufficient time for a definitive analy­ and gathered through computer sis of such effects, but they can give searches and individual contacts. Second, they conducted interviews The case studies were presented with informed individuals. Finally, and discussed in a workshop in they themselves possessed extensive November 1996. They were later documentation and information revised by the authors to incorporate because of their own interest and criticisms and suggestions. involvement in the countries. CHAPTER 2 The Country Context

The six case-study countries support predominantly from the more shared one common characteristic: rural southern part of the country. they had all experienced a protracted period of civil war, which came to an The movements also differed in end through a negotiated agreement their ideological orientation and in five cases and through a military organization. The MPLA was a Marx­ victory in the sixth (Ethiopia). In all ist-Leninist movement, but it was too countries, the elections marked a wracked by internal conflict to transition not only from authori­ successfully establish the centralized tarianism to potential democracy, but organization typical of such parties. also from war to peace. But beyond Unita presented itself as an anticom­ these limited, though important, munist, prodemocracy organization similarities, the countries varied but was centralized and authoritarian. significantly in the nature of the Its leader, Jonas Savimbi, dominated conflict, the character of the compet­ the movement. ing political groups, the level of foreign intervention and influence, External support for the rival and the degree of experience with groups complicated the Angolan civil democracy. war. The MPLA received Soviet and Cuban assistance, including Cuban troops. South Africa in turn supported Angola Unita with troops and materiel. The United States also assisted Unita. A potentially wealthy oil- and Congress suspended aid to the diamond-producing country, Angola movement in 1976 but restored it in has been at war since 1961, when a liberation struggle against the Portu­ 1985. guese first broke out. There had In December 1988, an agreement never been any elections, either between Angola, Cuba, and South under Portuguese colonialism or after Africa was reached with the help of independence, until 1992. the United States and the Soviet Union. It led to the withdrawal The Angolan anticolonial move­ of Cuban troops from Angola. The ments were unable to create a united agreement de-internationalized the liberation front at the time of inde­ civil war, but it did not bring it to an pendence in 1975. War broke out end because of continuing enmity immediately between the two major between the MPLA and Unita. After movements competing for power, the two years of difficult negotiations, Movimento Popular de Liberta~aode both sides Signed a peace agreement Angola (MPLA) and the Uniao on May 31, 1991. The United States, Nacional Para a Independencia Total the Soviet Union, and Portugal acted de Angola (Unita). The MPLA, an as facilitators in the negotiations and urban-oriented movement that drew later monitored implementation of much of its support from better the agreement. (The place of the educated Angolans, took control of Soviet Union was eventually taken by the government. Unita drew its Russia.) The agreement called for Rouge members, and other Cambodi­ demobilization of MPLA and Unita ans who had sought refuge in troops, formation of a new joint Vietnam. national army, and the holding of elections no later than September Resistance to the new government 1992. of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) grew rapidly. In Despite a United Nations presence 1982 an alliance of communist and (the UN Angola Verification Mission noncommunist opposition groups -UNAVEM), the combatants never was formalized as the Coalition completely demobilized, and that Government of Democratic created a dangerous imbalance. Kampuchea. The Khmer Rouge International assistance removed the dominated the coalition because it logistical obstacles to elections but had the strongest army. The monar­ could not change the political situa­ chist Unified National Front for an tion. Elections were thus held under Independent, Peaceful and Coopera­ extreme political tension, with Unita tive Cambodia (Funcinpec) was also leader Jonas Savimbi stating openly a significant member. that he would not accept elections results if he lost. When initial election The Cambodian conflict was results showed the MPLA was win­ deeply enmeshed in the Cold War ning, Unita returned to war. and the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia. Since the Vietnamese government, and thus the People's Republic of Cambodia Kampuchea, enjoyed Soviet support, China backed the Khmer Rouge. The From its independence in 1955, United States and the Association of Cambodia managed to maneuver its South East Asian Nations (Asean) way through the turmoil in the region backed the noncommunist opposi­ with minimum damage under the tion. Since the communist and leadership of Prince Norodom noncommunist opposition to the PRK Sihanouk. But in March 1970, were united in the coalition govern­ Sihanouk was deposed, and the ment, the United States, China, and country's sovereignty, already vio­ Asean were on the same side of the lated by North Vietnam with its struggle. U.S. support, therefore, sanctuaries and staging areas, was benefited the Khmer Rouge as well. shattered by American air strikes and Furthermore, the United States by the incursion of American and refused to extend diplomatic recogni­ South Vietnamese troops in the east. tion to the PRK and to allow its In 1975 the radical communist Khmer representative to be seated at the UN. Rouge seized power, proclaiming the By default, the United States was country Democratic Kampuchea. forced to continue recognizing the After 42 months of sanguinary rule toppled Khmer Rouge government of that led to the death of about one Democratic Kampuchea. fifth of the population, the Khmer Rouge fell to the Vietnamese in Attempts to negotiate an end to December 1978. The Vietnamese­ the conflict proceeded on two levels: installed government included a 1) bilateral negotiations between united front of ethnic Cambodians Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun living in Vietnam, disaffected Khmer Sen of the PRK, beginning in 1986, and 2) multilateral negotiations lized only 42,000 men, many of including all Cambodian parties as whom remained in village militias. well as the UN and representatives of Funcinpec and other groups demobi­ other involved countries in 1988. The lized only token numbers. Yet despite end of the Cold War and the multilat­ these and other problems that forced eral negotiations led to the Compre­ a postponement, the elections were hensive Political Settlement in Cam­ held successfully in May 1993. The bodia (known as the Paris Agree­ Khmer Rouge boycotted the voting ment) of October 21, 1991. but did not try to disrupt it.

The settlement created a transi­ tional Supreme National Council, EISalvador including six members of the Cambo­ The civil war in El Salvador devel­ dian People's Party (which had been oped against the background of rural installed by the Vietnamese as the dislocation, landlessness, and poverty governing party to replace the Khmer resulting from economic transforma­ Rouge) and six members represent­ tion. As in many Central American ing the resistance groups. The Su­ countries, a socialist-oriented insur­ preme National Council delegated to gency developed on the one hand the UN Transitional Authority in and a military counterinsurgency, Cambodia (UNTAC) all powers alternating between repression and necessary to ensure implementation reform, on the other. The endemic of the Paris Agreement. UNTAC was conflict escalated during the 1970s, responsible for demobilization of the pitting clandestine left-wing organiza­ combatants, organization of the tions against paramilitary groups elections, and supervision or control formed to prevent labor organization of administrative structures. Its and strikes. mandate would expire after the elected Constituent Assembly ap­ During the 1980s the conflict proved the constitution and trans­ intensified into civil war with the formed itself into a national assem­ creation of a Cuban-supported bly. The role of the United Nations military alliance of guerrilla groups, was much broader in Cambodia than the Frente Farabundo Marti para la in any of the other countries under Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) and the discussion. resurgence of right-wing death squad violence. The victims of the conflict Organizing the elections was a were mostly civilians. An estimated major logistical undertaking, given 75,000 people died during the civil the destruction of infrastructure and war. In the mid-1980s 427,000 people the large-scale displacement of the were internally displaced and 250,000 population. The complete absence of were living in Mexico and other a democratic tradition made free Central American countries. Perhaps a elections even more difficult. Further­ half million more fled to the United more, demobilization failed. The States. Khmer Rouge refused to allow UNTAC in the areas it controlled, and At the same time, a regime transi­ it demobilized no troops. The gov­ tion was taking place, with elections ernment army, estimated by the UN playing an increaSingly important role to number about 130,000, demobi- in the country's politicS during the 1980s. The Christian Democratic Party many problems that arose during and the rightist Alianza Republicana implementation of the agreement. By Nacionalista (Arena) were the major late 1992 demobilization had been parties in this period. But electoral completed. The FMLN was registered politics did not put an end to the civil as a political party pledged to respect war. The leftist insurgency continued, the constitution. despite the reformist policies of the Christian Democrats and the repres­ Elections were held in March 1994 sion by Arena. So did the work of the (and runoffs in April). Organizing death squads. Although it was the and implementing these elections party most closely associated with the was difficult. The climate of suspicion death squads, Arena could not between former enemies led to a completely control them. slow, cumbersome process with multiple checks and balances at Despite the severity of the war, a every step of the way. This "institu­ base of electoral politics existed on tionalized distrust" marked the which a plural democratic system issuance of identity papers to citi­ could be built once the fighters zens, voter registration, setup of agreed to lay down arms. Negotia­ polling stations, and every other step tions started after the defeat of the necessary to hold elections. Christian Democrats in the 1988 legislative elections and the inaugura­ tion in 1989 of President Alfredo Ethiopia Cristiani of Arena. After a long pro­ The Ethiopian postconflict elec­ cess and several intermediate ac­ tions were unique among these case cords, the final peace agreement was studies in that they followed not a ratified on January 16, 1992. The negotiated peace agreement but a most difficult issues in the negotia­ military victory. Contrary to all other tions were land distribution and cases, elections were held not nation­ reorganization of the military and the ally at first, but at the local and police. The general change in the regional levels. The Tigrean People's world political climate encouraged Liberation Front (TPLF), with minimal the progress of negotiations. Specifi­ help from other ethnic liberation cally, the Procedure for the Establish­ movements, won the war against the ment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Central America, signed by the With Mengistu fleeing into exile and Central American presidents in 1987, his army routed, the victorious TPLF symbolized the change in the re­ contended in the elections not gional political context. UN mediation against its former enemy, but against also contributed to the conclusion of its weak former allies. Virtually all the agreement. political parties participating in the process were organized along ethnic There was no rush to hold elec­ lines-with rival pro- and anti-TPLF tions. First, more than two years were organizations competing to represent allocated to carry out the peace each ethnic group. The pro-TPLF agreement, demobilize the FMLN parties were grouped into the Ethio­ guerrillas, and purge and reorganize pian People's Revolutionary Demo­ the armed forces and the police. The cratic Front (EPRDF), tightly con­ process proceeded more or less on trolled by the TPLF. schedule. Bargaining resolved the In May 1991 troops of the TPLF parties were often prevented from occupied Addis Ababa, as Mengistu registering their candidates. These fled the country and his army disinte­ factors helped prompt the Oromo grated. In a meeting in London Liberation Front to withdraw from the before the overthrow of Mengistu, elections on the eve of the balloting followed by a second meeting in and to decamp its troops. Elections Addis Ababa inJuly, political parties went ahead anyway, but they were agreed to the formation of a govern­ not competitive multiparty elections. ment of national unity dominated by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A transi­ Mozambique tional charter was also approved. The Presidential and legislative elec­ parties agreed that municipal an? . tions of October 1994-the first local elections would be held wIthin multiparty elections in the country's three months, followed by elections history-consolidated the end of a for a constituent assembly, approval civil war that lasted some 15 years. of a constitution, and, finally, parlia­ They were primarily a contest be­ mentary elections. The local and tween the two organizations that had regional elections were subsequently been locked in war: the Marxist­ postponed until June 1992. Leninist Frelimo (Frente de Libertat;ao de Mot;ambique) and the South Although Mengistu's army had Africa-supported Renamo ceased to exist, rival armed groups (Resistencia Nacional Mot;ambicana). remained in the country. The TPLF/ Frelimo led Mozambique to indepen­ EPRDF controlled the largest military dence and then continued in power force, which had defeated Mengistu. as the sole legal political party. The Oromo Liberation Front, the Renamo was a guerrilla group that most important of these armed had engaged in a war of destabiliza­ groups, had a much weaker army. In tion without scoring a decisive addition, smaller armed groups victory. It was a purely military operated in various parts of the movement without a political struc­ country. While the July 1991 agree­ ture. It was ill prepared to participate ment called for the cantonment of in democratic elections. rival troops before the elections, it provided that a part of the TPLF A peace agreement signed in troops would serve as the national October 1992 made the elections army during transition. EPRDF took possible, after years of negotiations in advantage of this provision to assert which intermediaries-in Africa, its military dominance. Europe, and the United States­ played major roles. Depriving the Political tension marred election Mozambican civil war of its old preparations. Institutions functioned ideological content and helping bring poorly, and the cantonment of troops the peace agreement to a conclusion was partial at best. The lack of past was the new international context of experience in competitive elections, the 1990s: what had started as an and the limited international involve­ east-west conflict between Frelimo ment compounded the situation. and Renamo had become a domestic Irregularities occurred in the registra­ struggle for power that no other tion of voters, and the opposition country was interested in financing. The peace agreement was signed UNOMOZ mission rather than risk a just as the elections and the peace disaster like the one in Angola. process in Angola were unraveling. From the outset, the international The delay, together with continu­ community was determined to apply ing assistance and pressure from the in Mozambique the lessons learned international community, enabled from Angola. It had unusual leverage successful elections to be held in in Mozambique because it fInanced October 1994. more than 60 percent of the Mozambican budget, fed a large part of the population, and even funded N icar agua the transformation of Renamo into a Like El Salvador, Nicaragua exem­ political party. Some $18 million was plilles successful postconflict elec­ eventually contributed to the Renamo tions that did not depend entirely on trust fund for that purpose. the intervention of the international community but built on prior experi­ The accord called for demobiliza­ ence with elections, though flawed tion of the Mozambican army and of ones. the Renamo guerrillas. It also pre­ · arag scribed reintegration of the combat­ In 1979, forces of the Marxist­ ants into civilian life, formation of a oriented Sandinista National libera­ exemplifie new army incorporating personnel tion Front (FSLN) toppled the dicta­ successful from both sides, and the holding of torship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. elections within one year. Implemen­ The Somoza family had ruled for 43 tation was to be monitored by the ostconfli years. The regime had long since UN Operation in Mozambique worn out any welcome not only (UNOMOZ), and also by four special among the FSLN but among Nicara­ commissions that included represen­ guan society at large. The tatives of the UN, the United States, Sandinistas, though, were the only and many European and some organized opposition military force. African countries. In addition, an Aid­ An alliance between revolutionary for-Democracy Group, which in­ and more moderate groups fell apart cluded the UN Development Program in 1981, leaving the Sandinistas in and various Western countries, power. supervised election preparations and coordinated donor assistance through During the 1980s, the economy an elections trust fund. took a sharp downturn owing to many factors. For one thing, the Despite ample fmancing and the country was still recovering from the overwhelming international involve­ devastation caused by a 1972 earth­ ment, implementation of the peace quake. Adding to that was the de­ agreement was plagued by lack of struction caused by the war against political will by the leadership of the Somoza, the economic policies of the two sides. Both Frelimo and Renamo Sandinista regime, the embargo were slow in cantoning their troops imposed by the United States, and and in opening up to the other party the war against the U.S.-supported the areas they controlled. The elec­ Nicaraguan Resistance-the contras. tions were thus postponed for a year, More than 15 percent of the country's with the international community population became displaced during deciding to foot the bill of the that time. The Sandinista government orga­ election and media laws to ease a nized multiparty elections in 1984, democratic transition. At the same but it sought to control the process time, civilian opposition groups and reduce competition. Some promised to call for the demobiliza­ opposition parties did participate, tion of the contras. winning almost one third of the seats. Observers, however, judged the The postconflict elections were elections to be substantively flawed, held in February 1990. Candidates though technically correct. were fielded by the Sandinistas, the National Opposition Union (UNO-a The changing international situa­ coalition of more than 10 political tion, a regional framework for peace organizations), and by a number of orchestrated by Central American smaller political parties. Violeta preSidents, and economic pressure Chamorro, presidential candidate of led the Sandinistas to open negotia­ UNO, had taken part in the resistance tions with the contras. The parties to Somoza and had thus cooperated The reached a cease-fire agreement in with the Sandinistas immediately after 1988. In early 1989 the UN and the Somoza's departure, although she Sandinista Organization of American States qUickly became disillusioned with pledged to prOVide observer missions their political approach. The elections =----''''= ent for the forthcoming, regularly sched­ were not a continuation of the mili­ uled elections. The United States tary confrontation by other means. agreed to stop military, but not The contras were so marginalized at humanitarian, aid to the contras. this point that demobilization was not considered a necessary condition for In August 1989, President Daniel elections. In fact, the contras did not Ortega agreed to changes in the even participate in the process.

process.

CHAPTER 3 Conduct and Outcome Of the Elections

All postconflict elections largely the Soviet Union and from the end of followed a similar pattern: The the Cold War, which removed the parties to the conflict entered into a international dimension from all these peace agreement, which included a conflicts. Outside powers no longer commitment to multiparty elections. had an interest in supporting one or ... Electoral institutions were orga­ another party. They were anxious nized.... An attempt was made to instead to see the strife settled. In demobilize or at least encamp the Central America, furthermore, re­ armed groups, including the govern­ gional agreements and organizations ment army .... Laws concerning created a new political climate for the elections, political parties, and the entire region. Specific pressures were media were enacted or amended .... exercised by countries and interna­ Voters and then candidates were tional organizations helping to medi­ registered. . . . Elections were held. ate the conflicts, conclude peace The international community pro­ agreements, and organize elections. vided major support for these tasks. The United States played an impor­ Despite these similarities, the conduct tant role in negotiating the peace of elections and their outcomes agreements and supporting the varied significantly among countries. election process in all case-study countries. intern Initiative Commitment to elections varied greatly among the local political pressure. For the Elections actors. Opposition groups with the In all the cases, the initiative for weakest military position generally the elections came from both internal supported elections most strongly. and international pressure. Internal By the same token, parties in power pressure came largely from two were in general more reluctant to forces: political parties and move­ enter a process that might lead to ments in the opposition that saw their defeat. Further, willingness to democracy as a way of gaining participate in the elections did not power, and organizations of civil automatically Signal willingness to society committed to the principles of accept democracy. Usually, the democracy and human rights. Signifi­ parties that lost the elections resisted cant though less concentrated pres­ accepting the outcome initially, sure also came from the population leveling accusations of fraud instead. at large. Exhausted by war and ready for change, the people were anxious to participate in elections. Timing International pressures were both Of the Elections generalized and specific. The gener­ In most cases, the timing was alized pressures derived from the unrealistic. Elections had to be decline and then disappearance of postponed in Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. In Angola the political system to a fair contestation timetable was rigidly locked into the they moved the elections forward to peace agreement, and elections took February. Since the country had held place as scheduled, despite the multiparty elections before, and the failure to demobilize. EI Salvador, one contras were not a significant threat of the two countries with the most to stability, the time was sufficient. successful elections, allowed the longest period-27 months--between The pressure for early elections the signing of the peace agreement came (depending on the circum­ and the elections. The short prepara­ stances) from either the opposition or tion time in Angola and Ethiopia, by incumbent government. In Angola, contrast, contributed to unsuccessful Unita originally negotiated for a one­ elections. year transition period, hoping to capitalize on the discontent of a Nicaragua was the only country to population exhausted by war. But the hold elections earlier than originally ruling MPLA wanted a three-year envisaged and also successfully. The transition to prolong its hold on scheduled election date was Novem­ power. In other cases, though, the ber 1990, but when the Sandinistas incumbent party was also anxious to Timing of accepted the need to open the have early elections--in Nicaragua, Agreements to prove its democratic good faith, and Elections

Monthsfrom Monthsfrom Agreementto Agreementto Date of Peace Scheduled Actual Elections Elections Country Agreement Election Date Election Date (Planned) (Actual)

Angola Bicesse agreement Late 1992 September Lessthan 18 16 signed in Lisbon on 29-30, May 31,1991 1992

Cambodia Paris Agreements earLy 1993 May 23-28, about 16 19 October 21, 1991 1993

ELSaLvador ChapuLtepec 1994 March 21, 1994 about 24 27 Agreements ApriL 24, 1994 January 1992 (runoff)

Ethiopia Transition October 1991 June 21, 1992 3 11 Charter of JuLy 1991

Mozambique GeneraLPeace October 1993 October 27-29, 12 24 Agreement 1994 October 1992

Nicaragua CentraLAmerica Peace November 1990 February 25, 1990 22 12 Plan signed February 15, by constitution 1989 (Esquipulas II) and in Ethiopia, to take advantage of level, the machinery consisted of its own superior organization and the polling-station officials, usually disarray of opposition groups. supported by representatives of the political parties. The impartiality of all The international community was these electoral institutions was, in anxious to terminate transition theory, ensured by the mutual con­ processes that often stretched over trols exercised by the party represen­ years of negotiations. This commu­ tatives and by the professional com­ nity also wanted to reduce the costs mitment of the technocrats to fair of a prolonged international pres­ elections. ence. Thus, it favored early elections and in some cases accepted an In reality, the functioning of the election timetable that was unrealistic electoral institutions varied consider­ even by its own assessment. This ably among countries. The need for happened in Angola and Ethiopia. representation of all political parties, coupled with the lack of expertise inevitable in postconflict elections, Design and Planning made electoral institutions cumber­ some everywhere. Two issues were Of the Elections particularly important: 1) the degree In all six cases, the elections were of neutrality of the electoral institu­ held under very difficult technical as tions and 2) the degree of involve­ well as political conditions. In five of ment of donor agencies and interna­ them, far-reaching international tional nongovernmental organizations support brought the logistical prob­ (NGOs). lems under control. That resulted in elections that were technically ac­ In general, neutrality was better ceptable, if not problem-free. In ensured by the reciprocal controls Ethiopia, however, where there was a exercised by representatives of much lower level of involvement by political parties than by the profes­ Box 1. the international community, the sionalism of the technocrats. In Unrealistic elections were administratively more Mozambique, for example, personnel Timetables problematic. of the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections were In late Maya preassessment mission to judged by foreign observers to be AngoLajointLy conducted more politicized than the national Electoral Institutions by the NationaLDemo­ Superficially, the electoral institu­ election council itself. Highly prob­ cratic Institute for tions established with the support of lematic, particularly in first-time InternationaL Affairs and the international community were multiparty elections, is the lack of the InternationaL RepubLi­ similar. In all countries, a national available elections officials committed can Institute concluded election council composed of the to the integrity of the process rather that lithe prospects for representatives of the major political than to a party. conducting meaningfuL parties and some supposedly neutral eLectionsas scheduLedfor technocrats was responsible for As a result, the more serious September 29 and 30, organizing the elections. Regional violations of neutrality arose when 1992, are dubious." and local elections councils (the electoral institutions failed to include NonetheLess,eLections were prepared in a few terminology varied from country to all major parties. Ethiopia provides months, Leavingno time the most extreme example. Local and country) were responsible to the for anything except the national organization. At the lowest provincial election councils were most basic tasks. formed far too late, leaving the legislature on a system of propor­ organization of the elections in the tional representation. Angola, El hands of government officials. Oppo­ Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicara­ sition parties were not represented in gua also held presidential elections. many cases; and at the local level the In Angola, El Salvador, and Mozam­ supposedly neutral "representatives bique the constitution required a of the people" on the three-person second round of presidential elec­ councils invariably turned out to be tions if no candidate received an politically close to the incumbent absolute majority in the first round. party. The runoff elections were never held in Angola, where hostilities resumed The international community was instead. highly involved in supporting the election process except in Ethiopia. The system of proportional repre­ In Angola, Cambodia, and Mozam­ sentation, as expected, encouraged bique, the elections could not have the participation of even small parties taken place within the designated and the formation of new ones time frame without external assis­ everywhere. In most cases, though, tance. The UN missions to these three the only real contestants were the countries, as well as U.S. and other organizations that had confronted NGOs, assumed leading roles and each other in war. In Angola, for responsibilities. The situation was example, 18 political parties partici­ slightly better in the two Central pated in the parliamentary elections American countries, where some and 13 candidates competed for the infrastructure for elections, though preSidency, but about 90 percent of flawed, existed. the vote went to the MPLA and Unita or their presidential nominees. Similarly, only Frelimo and Renamo Electoral Systems factored significantly in the The choice of electoral systems Mozambican vote count. Proportional war. generally has Significant political representation, in other words, did repercussions. An electoral system not change the nature of the contest can encourage all sides to abide by in the short run. elections results or aid the formation of a government of national reconcili­ In Nicaragua and Cambodia, the ation. Conversely, it can make recon­ elections were followed by unusual ciliation more difficult. The experi­ power-sharing compromises in the ence of the six cases shows, how­ formation of the new government. ever, that political conditions in the Parliamentary systems are considered country have an even greater effect to be more conducive to such com­ than the electoral system. promises. Nicaragua had a presiden­ tial system, but that did not prevent With the sole exception of Ethio­ President Chamorro from sharing pia, all countries held elections at the power by appointing a prominent national level, either for the legisla­ Sandinista to lead the restructuring of ture or for both the legislature and the military. In Cambodia the com­ president. (Some countries also held promise reached by the Cambodian local elections.) All elected their People's Party (CPP-the party installed by the Vietnamese to re- place the Khmer Rouge) and except for Cambodia, presidents. Funcinpec (a royalist party) went Ethiopia was the exception, starting beyond the normal formation of a the process of political transformation coalition government in a system of at the local and regional level and proportional representation. There, following it up the next year with two prime ministers were appointed. elections for a constituent assembly. The arrangement-with one prime This is an approach often suggested minister from the CPP and one from as suitable for countries emerging Funcinpec-if not unconstitutional, from conflict. The experience of was at least aconstitutional. Power­ Ethiopia raises questions about the sharing and compromise thus were downside of such a bottom-up the result of political expediency, not approach. The emphasis on local the design of the institutions. The politics strengthened parties with a long-term effects of the electoral narrow ethnic basis, virtually preclud­ systems may, however, be different. ing the emergence of national parties. The government also encouraged the ethnicization of politics as part of an Sequencing of National overall strategy to reorganize Ethiopia And Local Elections into a federation of ethnic states. As a Five countries held their first result, the Ethiopian elections were postconflict elections at the national very divisive. level, choosing new legislatures and, Table 2. Electoral Systems

Country Election Type Electoral System

Angola PresidentiaLand LegisLative For president: simpLemajority. For Parliament: proportionaLrepresentation

Cambodia Legislative (Council of Minis­ For National Assembly: proportionaLrepresentation ters to come from parties represented therein)

ELSaLvador PresidentiaL, LegisLative, For president: baLLotage(runoff between two candidates with largest municipaL,and CentraLAmeri­ pLuralityin case no one has majority). For Legislative Assembly: propor­ can Parliament tionaL representation (method of successive residuals). For munidpals: aLLseats to party obtaining pLuraLity.For Central American Parliament: based on at-Large nationaL deputies

Ethiopia RegionaLcouncils and district For coundls: first past the post councils

Mozambique PresidentiaLand Legislative For president: simpLemajority. For National Assembly: proportionaL representation

Nicaragua PresidentiaL, NationaL For presidential: simple majority. For National Assembly: proportionaL AssembLy,municipaL, and two representation. For munidpal: mixed majority-proportionaLrepresenta­ regionaLAutonomous Councils tion formula Problems government's military and administra­ In Elections Preparation tive control in Ethiopia. This created Organizers faced three kinds of a paradox: a logistical feat by the problems in planning elections. First, international community made strictly logistical problems were due possible elections that would have to poor physical infrastructure and otherwise been prevented by the weak government administrative political conflict. However, the structures. The expertise and re­ elections could not solve the underly­ sources of the UN, bilateral donor ing political problem. This led to agencies and international NGOs renewed conflict in Angola, a politi­ solved these problems in an impres­ cal deadlock in Ethiopia, and a sive fashion. political compromise in Cambodia.

Second, certain issues had political implications directly related to the Conduct holding of elections: registration of Box 2. voters, legalization of political partieS, Of the Elections In El Salvador, registration of candidates, and train­ Four countries did not meet an 'Institutionalized essential condition for elections­ Distrust' ing of polling-station officials and monitors. Most such disagreements demobilization of the competing armies and creation of a unified On the eve of the 1994 and tensions were resolved with elections, President appropriate technical solutions. The military force. Ethiopia and Angola Alfredo Cristiani remarked experience of the international held elections while the major parties that the electoral frame­ community in other transition societ­ were still heavily armed, and this work of the 1980s had ies proved valuable in preventing contributed to the resumption of been based on distrust. minor disagreements from becoming hostilities after elections. In Cambo­ Proof of this can be seen major political conflicts. The lack of dia, demobilization was also incom­ in 1) cumbersome proce­ trust among parties led many coun­ plete, but the international presence dures for registration; 2) tries to adopt unwieldy procedures. maintained peace until the two major an exaggerated agglom­ parties formed a joint government. It eration of voting stations In EI Salvador, for example, the "institutionalized distrust" that sur­ is important to note, however, that into an insufficient the de facto control of the military by number of voting pre­ rounded the elections made it cum­ the Cambodian People's Party pre­ cincts; 3) a requirement bersome and time consuming for that people vote where ordinary citizens to vote. cluded the formation of a govern­ they are registered, not ment that was not acceptable to it. where they live; and 4) Finally, there were ongoing politi­ Nicaragua also held elections before public transportation cal conflicts among major parties. The the demobilization of the contras had being unavailable on peace accords in Angola and Cambo­ started. But it did not pose serious election day. These dia, and the formation of a transi­ security problems, because the obstacles contribute to tional government in Ethiopia before contras had lost much of their power erosion of the one-person, the elections, left major contentious and credibility by that time and other one-vote principle by parties were committed to the elec­ making it more difficult problems unresolved. To some extent this was also true for Mozambique. toral process. In any case, the limited for ordinary citizens to progress in demobilization and vote. It is institutional­ Formal preparation could continue in reintegration in four countries was ized distrust that lurks all cases, because of international behind many of the supervision in Angola, Cambodia, hardly conducive to the conduct of idiosyncracies of the and Mozambique and the free and fair elections. Salvadoran electoral system. Voter Registration rival parties. Violence and intimida­ Voter registration was a difficult tion were also used to keep candi­ technical task as well as a bone of dates from campaigning freely every­ contention among the competing where. In Angola, Cambodia, Ethio­ parties. Practically all countries pia, and, to a lesser extent, Mozam­ lacked even adequate census data, bique, the existence of "no go" areas much less voter registries. The controlled by a single party was a problem was compounded by the major problem. vested interest political parties had in excluding certain segments of the Familiar forms of electoral fraud population-usually members of such as buying of votes and stuffing ethnic groups or social strata more ballot boxes were much less impor­ likely to support the opposition. tant, or at least unreported by observ­ International organizations demon­ ers. It is possible such forms of fraud strated a remarkable ingenuity and require a degree of organization and skill in overcoming these barriers and funding not available to parties in in establishing a reasonably fair these postconflict elections. system. They often succeeded in persuading the concerned countries This pattern of voter intimidation to maintain the openness of the voter has implications for the optimum registration process by extending the international mOnitoring of deadline. postconflict elections: the interna­ tional community needs to center its Voter registration required striking attention less on election day and a balance. The tightrope was be­ more on early assessments of the tween, on the one hand, the need for ongoing preparations. strict documentation to ensure that only those who met the agreed criteria could register, and, on the Outcome other, encouraging wide participation through an accessible system. EI Of the Elections Salvador, which insisted on strict Citizens in all case-study countries documentation and required its demonstrated a remarkable eagerness citizens to go through a long, cum­ and enthusiasm to vote. Voter turnout bersome registration process, had was very high everywhere, ranging lower voter participation. Case from a low of 85 percent of regis­ studies indicate that despite obvious tered voters in Nicaragua to a high of problems, a substantial proportion of 92 percent in EI Salvador. This is eligible voters was registered. even more impressive when consid­ ering that voters often had to walk long distances and then wait for long Violence and Intimidation periods, as inexperienced polling­ In all six countries, violence and station officials tried to move the intimidation were a bigger problem crowds through the process. Ques­ in the months and weeks before the tions have at times been raised about elections than during the voting. In the extent to which people in these many cases, political parties tried to countries comprehend the process. It control the voters' registration pro­ is clear from these elections that they cess, so as to exclude supporters of understood the value of making a choice, even though they may not Five elections were accepted by have been familiar with the opera­ the international community as "free tions of a democratic system. and fair" or at least reasonably so under the conditions of a war-torn The outcome of the elections can society. The elections in Ethiopia be analyzed at two levels, technical were not formally certified by the and political. Table 3 provides the international observers, whose only elections results. role was confidence-building. But foreign diplomats in Addis Ababa Technically, with the possible accepted the results, although the exception of Ethiopia, elections were elections had not been competitive. a success. Despite extremely difficult An evaluation report by the National situations surrounding these elec­ Democratic Institute issued after­ tions-ranging from the destruction wards painted a less than satisfactory of physical infrastructure and records picture of the elections. to the legacy of bitterness and hatred rooted in civil war--elections were In all elections, however, irregulari­ held with reasonable fairness and ties occurred and were reported by little violence during the voting. the international observers. Unfortu- TechnicalSucce Elections Resu (Ufoof Votes)

Country Presidential Results Legislative Results Local Results

Angola MPLA(dos Santos)-49.57 MPLA-53.74 Unita (Savimbi)-40.07 Unita-34.1

Cambodia Funcinpec-45.47 CPP-38.23

El Salvador (second-round results) Arena-46 Municipal Arena-68.32% CO-FMLN-MNR-26 Arena-79 coa-FMLN-MNRb-31.68% POC-21 POC-l1 CO-FMLN-MNR-6 PCN-4

Ethiopia EPROFcoalition won 95.8% of the seats

Mozambique Frelimo (Chissano)-53.3 Frelimo-44.33 Renamo (Ohlakama)-33.7 Renamo-37.78 UO-5.15

Nicaragua UNO(Chamorro)-54.7 UNO-56 (% of seats) (oj mayors) FSLN(Ortega)-40.8 FSLN-42 (% of seats) UNO-75 FSLN-24

aConvergencia Oemocratica bMovimentoNacional Revolutionario nately, reporting by the media and By contrast, the elections in Angola even statements issued by foreign and Ethiopia seem to have ended in governments and international organi­ failure. The former precipitated a zations did not always reflect the return to civil war, whereas in Ethio­ complexity of the situation. The "free pia the most important opposition and fair" deSignation received more parties, including the Oromo Libera­ attention than the more nuanced tion Front, pulled out of the process a evaluations by the observers. few days before the elections be­ cause of their frustration with govern­ ment recalcitrance. The elections thus Political Outcome consolidated the power of the Ethio­ Except in EI Salvador, the losers pian People's Revolutionary Demo­ were initially unwilling to accept the cratic Front as a de facto Single party. election results. The major parties, That left the country with neither a when defeated, at first claimed fraud. power-sharing government nor a International pressure, however, loyal opposition. prevailed on all parties to accept results in most cases. In Mozam­ Elections in Mozambique and bique, for example, Renamo sensed Cambodia require a more nuanced defeat and threatened to pull out of evaluation. In Mozambique the the electoral process on the eve of formal political outcome of the the voting. But strong diplomatic elections was positive. However, the pressure and an extra $1 million degree of intervention by the interna­ contribution to the Renamo trust fund tional community, the dependence of persuaded it to stay in. In Angola, by Renamo on foreign funding, and the contrast, Unita utterly refused to intense pressure that had to be accept defeat. Its leader, Jonas exercised by the international com­ Savimbi, expected from the outset to munity to keep the election process win the elections. He declared on target-these all raise questions repeatedly that only massive fraud about the political will of could deprive him of victory. He Mozambican leaders and the techni­ returned to war when election cal capacity of Mozambican institu­ returns showed the MPLA had won. tions to sustain democracy indepen­ dently. Politically, the elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua were a clear In Cambodia the outcome of the success. The outcome was accepted elections was exceedingly complex. by the opposition, and democratically Funcinpec won the largest number of elected governments were formed. In seats and theoretically could have Nicaragua the new government made formed a coalition with smaller concessions to its erstwhile adversar­ parties, leaving the Cambodian ies: it signed a "protocol of transition" People's Party in the opposition. But and appointed a Sandinista as head the CPP controlled the civilian admin­ of the armed forces to oversee the istration and the military, and it was demobilization of the contras, allevi­ not inclined to play the role of loyal ating the Sandinistas' security con­ opposition. A tense and dangerous cerns and contributing to their impasse was resolved with the surrendering political power. nomination of Norodom Sihanouk as head of state and the formation, In conclusion, in all countries the temporarily, of a joint government by political parties' commitment to a Funcinpec and CPP, characterized, democratic transition remained weak oddly, by the appointment of two in the immediate aftermath of the prime ministers. Adoption of a new elections. The role of the interna­ constitution invested the arrangement tional community was crucial in the on a permanent basis. early days in persuading all political parties to accept the election results, even when the vote counts did not Outcomeof live up to their expectations. Elections

New GovernmentFormed 'Free and Fai( by Accordingto Democratic Country International Observers Losers'Reaction Principles

Angola yes reject and return to war no

Cambodia yes negotiate power-sharing pact ?

El Salvador yes accept yes

Ethiopia no formal certification opposition withdraws before elections, fighting ?

Mozambique yes accept, but election-eve crises yes

Nicaragua yes obtain concessions, then accept yes CHAPTER 4 Consequences

The international community democratization over the longer term. supported postconflict elections on Reconciliation in countries emerging the assumption they could not only from civil war does not imply either settle the contentious issue of politi­ absence of conflict or elimination of cal legitimacy in war-torn countries the causes of conflict, both of which but also ease the transformation of are likely to remain Utopian ideals. countries with a long tradition of Rather, it is the transformation of authoritarian regimes into pluralistic armed conflict into political conflict. democracies. This chapter examines And further, it is the containment of this underlying assumption by dis­ this political conflict within the limits cussing the consequences of the of what is permissible under the law elections for democratization and and does not undermine the institu­ reconciliation processes in the six tions. It means commitment to cap­ countries. ture political power through ballots and not by bullets. Democratization and reconcilia­ tion are processes, not events. De­ We should, at the outset, mention mocratization can be viewed as the two caveats about the consequences process through which countries with of elections for democratization and authoritarian systems (and in the reconciliation. First, postconflict case-study countries with a history of elections are only one part of a armed conflict) contain the competi­ complex set of factors and conditions tion for power within the limits that affect the democratization pro­ established by representative institu­ cess in a war-torn society. These tions and the law. For countries with include as well the process and scope a history of authoritarian government of the peace accord, existing political and no tradition of rule of law, this is structures, social and cultural tradi­ a difficult transition and is bound to tions, the nature of the political take time. Designing new democratic leadership, and the interests and institutions, adopting new laws, and involvement of outside powers. holding elections are part of this There is no way to isolate the effects process. The most difficult part, of elections from those of other however, comes after the elections, factors and conditions in a policy­ when the parties have to undertake oriented evaluation study. Second, their activities within the limits democratization, especially in the prescribed by the law and the institu­ conditions of war-torn societies, is a tions, even if they lost the elections. long-term process, beset with ups and downs, progress and stagnation, In postconflict societies, democrati­ and even regression. The countries zation and reconciliation processes that seem to be making visible are intertwined. In fact, reconciliation progress at present may turn into can be viewed as an integral part of failures, and vice versa. DemocraticaUy Although Vnita has again signed a peace agreement with the ruling Elected Governments party, its real intentions remain In all cases, elections contributed suspect. The situation is not very to the establishment of elected different in Ethiopia, where the ruling governments. All case-study countries party's intransigence and the major lacked democratic traditions. The opposition parties' boycott of the notion of competitive, multiparty transition and subsequent elections elections was alien to most of them. have prevented the evolution of a Although EI Salvador and Nicaragua genuine multiparty democracy. had competitive elections during the 1980s, these were open to govern­ ment manipulation (in Nicaragua) or Building did not encompass the entire political spectrum (in EI Salvador). All the And Strengthening remaining countries were one-party A Democratic Base states. Postconflict elections were In addition to installing elected Most of the competitive and judged "free and governments, case studies indicate fair" in five countries. Only in Ethio­ that postconflict elections have pia did a combination of government helped create minimal institutional repreSSion and boycott of the elec­ structures for the functioning of tions by the opposition parties keep pluralistic democracies. Three institu­ the elections from being competitive. tional developments deserve special Given the conditions from which mention here. these countries started, this success rate was no small achievement. Transformation Even more significantly, the elected governments have survived Of Political Parties under heavy odds-with the excep­ And Politicomilitary tion of Cambodia. There, an uneasy Movements coalition between the CPP and The preparation for and conduct Funcinpec broke down, and Hun of elections aided in the evolution of Sen, the second prime minister, political parties in most of the coun­ staged a coup in July 1997, ousting tries. The authoritarian ruling parties the first prime minister, Prince had no alternative but to be more Norodom Ranariddh. While no one open and participatory. For example, can contend that they have fully the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the CPP adhered to the norms and values of in Cambodia, and Frelimo in Mozam­ Western democracies, few would bique tried to broaden their mass deny that most of them have main­ base. All accepted democratic plural­ tained a semblance of democratic ism and underwent organizational system. However, political develop­ transformation to adjust themselves ments in two countries have been to the new realities. disquieting. In Angola progress toward democracy has been reversed More important, politicomilitary abruptly by Vnita's decision to return movements such as the FMLN in El to war rather than acting as the loyal Salvador and Renamo in Mozam­ opposition in the elected parliament. bique transformed themselves into political parties. In general, such Box 3. Evolution of Democratic Parties in Cambodia movements appeared more willing to do so when they saw no realistic Cambodia illustrates the nature and process of the evolution of hope of a military victory. But when political parties as they relate to elections. To adhere to the terms of politicomilitary movements enter­ the peace accord, the ruling KhmerPeople's Revolutionary Party tained the hope they could use their underwent a drastic transformation before the elections. In an military power, as was the case with extraordinary congress held in October 1991, it changed its name to Unita in Angola, they were not the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and made radical changes in its willing to solely become political organization and style of functioning. The party committed itself to parties. In Ethiopia the political multiparty democracy and embraced economic Liberalization, eschew­ evolution of the EPRDF into a politi­ ing communist dogma. Since then, it has solidified its base and has cal party remained ambiguous: emerged as the most powerful party in the country. having won the war, the organization Funcinpec, which got a plurality of seats in the 1993 elections, was could become a political party while hardly a coherent political party before elections. It lacked a provin­ retaining its army under the guise of cial political cadre, well articulated ideology, and national program a national army. for economic and social development. It came into power primarily because of the people's distrust of the CPPand because of its The international community identification with the popular KingSihanouk. But the party has not provided financial assistance to been able to consolidate its organization and develop leadership at resource-starved existing, as well as the local levels. Dissatisfaction with the leadership style of First newly formed, political parties to Prime Minister NorodomRanariddh, divisions among the top leaders, enable them to contend in elections. and limited attention to party building by the leadership have It also gave them technical assistance prevented it from emerging as a dominant political force in Cambodia to build their capacity to select today. candidates, organize election cam­ The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP),the third largest party, paigns, and monitor election out­ has its origin in the refugee camps in Thailand. It derives its support comes. In Mozambique, for example, from expatriate communities in the United States and France. It has two trust funds were established-an brought into the government some of the best-trained expatriate $18 million fund to help Renamo, the staff but has suffered from leadership splits. Manyof its members principal opposition group, and a $3 have defected to other political parties. Recently, breakaway members million fund to help other small, have organized a splinter faction more closely allied to the CPP. registered political parties. Access to these funds not only aided the organizational transformation of these parties but also provided additional rule of law. These NGOs received inducement for them to participate in technical and financial assistance elections. In all cases, political parties from the international community, gained experience in political organi­ and especially from the United States. zation and competitive elections. Moreover, many of them actively collaborated with international organizations in civic education, voter Emergence of NGOs training, and other democracy­ Promot ing Dem ocracy promoting activities. Such collabora­ And Human Rights tion gave them valuable experience Peace accords and subsequent and expertise. election activity spawned the growth of nongovernmental organizations Cambodia, for example, has seen a committed to promotion of human remarkable growth of democracy­ rights, political liberalization, and the promoting NGOs, partly through the support of overseas Cambodians. Growth of Free Media These Cambodians had moved to Before elections, neither the three Western countries during the civil African countries nor Cambodia had war, internalizing democratic values an independent press. Whatever and norms, which they wanted to newspapers and periodicals existed implant in the Cambodian society. were either owned or censored by Two human rights organizations, Ad the government. The situation was Hoc and Lichado, have a combined only slightly better in Nicaragua. One membership of more than 100,000. essential prerequisite for elections But Cambodia is not unique. Human was freedom of the press. Conse­ rights organizations have emerged in quently, governments in all case­ every case-study country. Political study countries had little alternative freedom, an independent press, and but to abolish press censorship and Radio continual contacts with international permit the emergence of indepen­ broadcasts human rights organizations have led dent or party-controlled newspapers to heightened concern with human and periodicals. reach even rights, benefiting local organizations. Freedom of press has largely There are indications that the survived the postelection period. The emphasis of many donor agencies two Central American countries and international organizations on continue to have a vibrant press. Up gender parity indirectly strengthened to the coup of July 1997, Cambodia the position of NGOs working for also enjoyed a free press. An inde­ women. In Mozambique, for ex­ pendent press is still also accepted in ample, several organizations such as the African countries, but intimida­ the Organization for Mozambican tion, harassment, and extralegal Women; Women, Law and Develop­ sanctions on critical journals are not ment; the Women Lawyers Associa­ necessarily concerns of the past. In tion; and the Rural Women Associa­ Ethiopia, for example, the govern­ tion were involved in voter education ment routinely arrests reporters and news. and the political mobilization of editors as a warning. women. Because of high illiteracy, trans­ But democracy-promoting NGOs portation bottlenecks, and the rela­ remain fragile in many countries. tively high cost of newsprint and Many have little grass-roots support printing machinery (which are often and tend to operate only at the na­ imported), the printed media reach tional level. Some remain dependent mostly urban populations. By con­ on the international community for trast, radio broadcasts reach even the fmancial support, with little prospect remote corners of a country because of becoming self-sufficient. As initial of the easy availability of transistor enthusiasm and outside support radios. In rural areas of Africa and waned, many organizations disap­ Asia, the radio is generally the only peared. Those that survived and source of political news. Elections managed to diversify their source of have helped achieve an opening, if funding, however, are likely to remain limited, of radio and television to a lasting force in their country. political parties and political dis­ course. During election campaigns, state­ owned radio and television stations Box4. Growthof Independent Medfain Mozambique provided time to various political parties to articulate their ideology Mozambiquehas seen the emergence of an independent media since and programs. In this way, the the signing of the peace accord in 1992. At that time, a faxed news monopoly of the ruling party to sheet, Media/ax,sent to subscribers Mondaythrough Friday,was the electronic media was undermined, only example of an independent newspaper. Electoral activity­ though not eliminated. Taking Nica­ particularly the growth of political parties, election campaigns, and civic and voter education programs-created opportunities for the ragua as an example, political parties emergence of a free press. were given access to channel 2, the state-owned television station. Such Nowthe country has two regular weekly newspapers and a series of access was undoubtedly a significant news magazines, including a monthly journal published by Renamo. development in a country where Provincialand regional newspapers are also beginning to appear, with publicly owned electronic media had Manicaprovince serving as home to a regional newspaper serving been largely an instrument of politi­ central Mozambique.In addition, the Catholic Churchand different cal propaganda and manipulation for Protestant evangelical churches have financed and developed a series the ruling clique. Moreover, many of local radio stations, broadcasting in Portuguese and different local restrictions on privately owned radio languages. Manyof these stations broadcasted civic education and and television stations were relaxed, voter training programs during elections. enabling them to contract freely with political parties. During elections, each radio station in Nicaragua was obligated to guarantee each party a assistance of international experts. It minimum of three minutes a day. covered requirements of registration Privately owned television and radio of voters, candidates, and parties; the stations now exist in Cambodia, EI role of election commission and Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and administration; voting systems; and Nicaragua. general election procedures. In most cases, the electoral law was designed Many international donor agencies for the sole purpose of administering have provided technical assistance to postconflict elections. Even then it help make the print and electronic served as a reference point for future media more professional, exposing elections. them to the norms of freedom and objectivity. Second, the establishment of autonomous and semiautonomous national election commissions was a Building major innovation in Angola, Cambo­ dia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. In EI An Electoral Salvador and Nicaragua, the Supreme Infrast ructure Electoral Councils too acquired additional resources and expertise; Elections also helped build or following the Latin American model, strengthen the institutional infrastruc­ they were accepted as the fourth ture for elections in practically all branch of the government. Further countries. First, in most of the coun­ postelection reforms were made in tries, new legislation was passed or the operations of election commis­ the old drastically revised to permit sions in EI Salvador, Ethiopia, and democratic participation. Such legis­ Nicaragua. lation was usually crafted with the Third, postconflict elections re­ significant had the international sulted in developing voter registries. community paid greater attention to Whereas serious deficiencies existed sustainability. As indicated earlier, in the voter registries in El Salvador international assistance was usually and Nicaragua, others had no voter more geared toward conducting registries at all. Postconflict elections elections than toward building long­ helped correct these deficiencies. In term institutional capacity. fact, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Nica­ ragua have taken further steps to improve and update their voter Public Education registries. Little has been done since the elections to update registries in In Democracy Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. There is little doubt that In Mozambique, for example, the postconflict elections exposed the Technical Secretariat for Electoral population to the nature of demo­ Support has not attempted to register cratic contestation. The civic and new voters after the 1994 elections. It voter education programs were the has not transferred provincial regis­ first attempts in the history of the tries and documentation to the three African countries and Cambodia headquarters, nor has it systematically to seriously explain the nature of monitored them in provincial and democratic engagement to voters. district locations. The result: a loss of The turnout rates in sample countries valuable information. have been unusually high, indicating the population's yearning for peace Box 5. Electoral Finally, elections have contributed as well as an interest in change. The Capadty-Building in to building some technical expertise defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua Ethiopia in most of the countries. Thousands demonstrated in the most concrete of election workers received training sense the truth that in democracies, The postconftict elec­ in voter registration, managing ballots can be more powerful than tions in Ethiopia, which polling booths, and counting ballots bullets. left much to be desired in each country. For example, the UN in their planning and Transitional Authority in Cambodia implementation, had one trained more than 50,000 Cambodians positive effect: accep­ Elections and the as election officials. These people tance by the government and donor agencies of constitute a good resource for future Reconciliation the need for electoral elections. Unfortunately, little has Process been done in Cambodia and the capacity-building. The In the aftermath of postconflict international community three African countries to provide elections, three countries (El Salva­ provided generous election officials additional training or dor, Mozambique, and Nicaragua) postelection assistance keep them involved in ongoing have made significant progress for this purpose. programs for the promotion of toward reconciliation. The former Ethiopia now has the democracy. In fact, in these countries warring groups have been more legal and infrastructural there has been little contact with or less integrated into the emerging capacity to conduct trained personnel. A fresh start will multiparty elections pluralistic democratic system. They have to be made for future elections. freely, fairly, and continue to follow democratic means effectively-when to capture political power. In the two Although the overall effects of multiparty democracy Central American countries, several postconflict elections seem to be returns to Ethiopia to factors contributed to this successful put this capacity to test. positive in building infrastructure, these effects could have been more outcome. They include exposure, Premature Closing though limited, to democracy; ab­ Of Democratization sence of deep ethnic or geographic And Reconciliation cleavages; genuine commitment to A word is necessary here about the peace process; and the positive premature closing of the democratiza­ influence of and pressure from other tion process as a result of postconflict states. In Mozambique, successful elections. Ethiopia offers a good demobilization and reintegration of example. Following the 1992 elec­ armies, heavy dependence on foreign tions, the dialog between the EPRDF assistance, war fatigue, and discon­ and the opposition virtually ceased. tinuation of outside support to rebels Parties that were members of the appeared to be major contributing transitional government before the factors. elections stopped cooperating and went back to war. Several interna­ In Angola, fighting erupted imme­ tional efforts at reopening talks diately after the voting. Having lost failed to achieve results. the election, Unita tried to capture power through military victory. As it The failure of an election does not had managed to keep its fighting always completely stop democratiza­ force largely intact despite initial tion and reconciliation. Despite demobilization, it was able to mount serious setbacks-failed elections and a large-scale, though ultimately the resumption of war-the MPLA unsuccessful, offensive against the and Unita in Angola have never government. However, as Unita still completely closed the door to dialog. controls rich mining areas, it is in a Negotiations led to the signing in position to prolong civil war. Unlike 1994 of the Lusaka Protocol, which Angola, Ethiopia enjoys relative seeks to build on what was accom­ peace but without reconciliation. The plished in the past and restart the intransigence of the ruling party and process where it came to a halt. the opposition's boycott of the Progress in implementing the agree­ elections have undermined both ment has been painfully slow, and democratization and reconciliation. relations between the parties remain difficult. As long as discussions The case of Cambodia is more continue, however, complete closure complex. The Khmer Rouge, who has not occurred. refused to participate in the elections, remained commited to a violent In conclusion, the overall effects of overthrow of the government. Gradu­ postconflict elections have been ally, though, they became marginal­ positive on both democratization and ized because of internal strife and reconciliation. EI Salvador, Mozam­ defections. However, the uneasy bique, and Nicaragua can be cited as coalition between CPP and successful examples. However, Funcinpec also disintegrated. The elections have failed to consolidate second prime minister, Hun Sen, either democracy or peace in Angola staged a coup ousting the first prime and Ethiopia. Cambodia remains a minister, Prince Ranariddh. The question mark. But even in the situation has been confused since countries where elections have not then. succeeded, they have helped redefine the notion of political legitimacy, broaden the limits of political free­ election cannot transform the politi­ dom, and create a framework for cal culture of a society, nor can it coexistence that can be adopted in resolve deep-rooted social and the future. economic conflicts. At best, it can implant the idea of democratic Often the frustration with contestation in countries lacking such postconflict elections, particularly in traditions and give impetus to efforts Africa, results from unrealistic expec­ to build a society based on the rule tations entertained by the interna­ of law and respect for human rights. tional cOOUTIunity. By itself, a single CHAFfER 5 Factors Affecting the Elections And Their Outcomes

In this chapter we identify some of new governmental institutions, such the factors and conditions that seem as parliaments, work more smoothly. to have affected the elections and Equally crucial was the role of the their consequences. international community in encourag­ ing major parties to continue dialog and mutual adjustment. International Involvement Democratic International involvement was a critical factor in the success of peace Traditions negotiations, the organization of The second factor was the pres­ elections, and the acceptance of the ence or absence of democratic outcome. The end of the Cold War traditions. The existence of participa­ and increased cooperation between tory social institutions was particu­ the former Soviet Union and Western larly relevant. These included local democracies contributed to effective political units, voluntary associations, interventions by the UN and other an emerging middle class economi­ multilateral organizations. Above all, cally independent on the state, a a renewed commitment to peace and relatively independent media, and democracy by major powers de­ competitive elections. prived the warring factions in the six countries of the flow of economic The two Central American coun­ and military assistance that had tries, which had some limited experi­ prolonged these conflicts. The exter­ ence with democracy, seem to be nal powers, which in the past had making satisfactory progress toward sustained these conflicts, began to democratization and reconciliation. exert pressure on the clients to The remaining four countries had no resolve them and promote democ­ democratic tradition at all in the racy. management of the state and little tradition of free participation in The case studies suggest that democratically organized voluntary without continual pressure and associations. In all these countries, persuasion from the international the progress toward democratization community, the march toward de­ has been halting, and many authori­ mocratization and reconciliation tarian tendencies are still evident. would have been slowed, if not However, none of these countries has derailed. USAID and other donors yet totally reverted to a totalitarian were aware of the need for continual system. That suggests that some involvement. Consequently, immedi­ progress toward more open political ately after elections, they were qUick systems can also be made in those to put in place a variety of programs war-torn societies with practically no to continue strengthening organiza­ democratic traditions. tions of civil society and to help the Ethnic Cleavages Ethnic cleavages do not seem to prevent completely democratization Significant ethnic cleavages existed and reconciliation. The yearning for in at least in four countries, and they peace, the promise of pluralistic affected elections and consequent democratic institutions, the attempts political developments. In Ethiopia, to restructure the polity to accommo­ ethnic tensions had escalated from date ethnic identities (as was the case the mid-1970s on. Virtually all politi­ with Ethiopia), and the international cal organizations were constructed presence and assistance-these all along ethnic lines by the time of the may have militated against the elections. In Angola the MPLA and potential disruptive effects of ethnic Unita had different ethnic constituen­ cleavages in Ethiopia, Mozambique, cies, although neither movement and Cambodia. The situation in could be considered strictly ethnic. Angola remains uncertain. The situation was not much different in Mozambique. In both these coun­ tries, ethnic divisions were reflected in voting patterns. The role and Economic Growth power of ethnic Vietnamese was a The expectation that democratic major issue dividing the Vietnamese­ stability would promote economic supported CPP and the other parties growth, and thus alleviate poverty in Cambodia. Although there were and economic stagnation, helped the some ethnic tensions in Central democratization process. Moreover, America, these were less important the leaders that came into power than the class cleavages that existed. after elections were fully aware that future international assistance de­ pended largely on their adherence to essential democratic norms.

Box 6. Different In three countries (Cambodia, Countries, o;fferent Outcomes Ethiopia, and Mozambique) the benefits of political stability were In El Salvador, war helped make the elections relevant. International immediate and tangible. All these assistance and the determination of Salvadoran democrats made the countries are essentially subsistence election foolproof. The outcome of those elections made the peace economies, and the end of conflict process possible as it instaLLedlegitimate governments and helped create contributed to the revival of agricul­ a dialectic of peaceful competition between government and opposition. This process put in place a valid interlocutor for the guerrillas to make ture. Service and industrial sectors peace with. also grew. The case of the two Central American countries has been The 1992 elections in Ethiopia undermined reconciliation between the slightly different. In EI Salvador and two sides in the war, between opposition parties and the government, Nicaragua, economic reforms, which and among the ethnic communities. It is clear that these elections were essential for long-term growth, disappointed Ethiopians as well as donors and external observers in this entailed significant social costs. The regard. conditions of many vulnerable groups worsened as a result of In Angola the reconciliation process started unraveling before the structural adjustment and economic elections, with the failure of the demobilization process. It was further liberalization, and that put a strain on threatened when Unita's leader, Jonas Savimbi, began asserting that only democratization and reconciliation. massive fraud could deprive him of victory. By the time the elections The adverse effects the reforms were heLd,the reconciliation process had broken down. of were partly alleviated, though, by massive U.S. and other economic dian People's Party remains lodged assistance and by huge remittances principally in its control of the mili­ sent by Salvadoran expatriates. tary rather than in the votes it re­ ceived during the elections. Demobilization And Reintegration Continual Dialog Of Armies And Negotiat ions Continual dialog between political It is difficult for organizations that parties in the period before and after started as armed movements fighting the elections was another factor each other militarily to tum into affecting the political success of political parties willing to limit their elections. All postconflict elections rivalry to electoral competition and were preceded by negotiations and a the enactment of laws. This is almost peace agreement-this is what made impossible if the parties remain the elections possible in the first armed and thus have the option of place. But in the period between the turning to force to achieve their signing of the peace agreement and goals. Significant progress toward the holding of elections, countries demobilization and reintegration of differed widely in the extent to which the conflicting forces is thus para­ open channels were maintained mount to the success of elections and among the major parties. democratization. o In Angola contacts between Unita • Case studies indicate that demobi­ open 1 and the MPLA appear to have been lization and reintegration remained a minimal and formal. Thus the mutual ...... I'rW....:= weak link in these postconflict .-- r- distrust was not lessened in any way, elections. In Angola and Cambodia, a factor that also made it extremely productive. demobilization failed despite UN difficult for them to conduct postelec­ supervision. In Ethiopia the pact tion negotiations. By contrast, opposi­ between the government and Oromo tion parties constantly negotiated Liberation Front was not respected with the ruling party in Nicaragua to and the fighting continued. The resolve mutual disagreements and to examples of Angola and Ethiopia deal with potential conflict. They also suggest that forging ahead with were therefore in a position to strike elections when the military option is a mutually satisfactory bargain after still open is counterproductive, the elections. The situation was not because it can precipitate the re­ much different in Cambodia, where sumption of fighting. The conse­ formal and informal contacts between quences of failed demobilization the CPP and Funcinpec continued were not as drastic in Cambodia, during the elections. These contacts because war has not resumed. facilitated bargaining for power­ Democratization nonetheless suffered sharing arrangements between them. a setback: the power of the Cambo-

CHAPTER 6 International Electoral Assistance

International assistance played an credibility to the elections, making it important role in five of the six difficult for any party to withdraw countries. Although elections could from the process or question the have been held without international results. Second, it improved the assistance in El Salvador and Nicara­ technical quality of the elections, gua, countries with prior election particularly of voter registration, thus experience, they would have had less broadening political participation. credibility. In Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique there would have been In Ethiopia the international no elections without international community played an ambiguous assistance. In Ethiopia the interna­ role. It was not deeply involved, had tional community played a much less no official role in certifying the important role. elections, and thus had little leverage. At the same time, it encouraged the The governments of Angola, process and provided some help. In Cambodia, and Mozambique did not the end, the international community have the administrative and financial gave an endorsement, though a luke­ capacity to organize elections on warm one, to a noncompetitive their own, particularly since the election. destruction of much infrastructure during the wars made the physical The situation in Ethiopia was very task of moving election material different from that in the other five around the country both complicated countries. Elsewhere, governments and very expensive. Demobilization and insurgencies unable to crush of combatants could not have taken each other had finally been forced to place at all without UN supervision; it sign a peace agreement with interna­ remained difficult, and in Angola and tional mediation. In Ethiopia the Cambodia was ultimately unsuccess­ government represented the armed ful, even under supervision. Finally, insurgents who had won a resound­ international assistance was needed ing military victory. Such a govern­ in these countries to bolster the ment was not inclined to risk losing political will of the parties to remain at the polls what it had won on the in the process. In Angola, even battlefield. Elections were thus a tool international intervention was insuffi­ to legitimize the new government cient to persuade Savimbi to accept rather than to apportion power election results. among the competitors. Indeed, the question needs to be asked whether The Salvadoran and Nicaraguan it was realistic to expect that in a governments had the capacity to country without any democratic organize elections without interna­ tradition, a political movement that tional assistance. Such assistance, had just won a war would agree to nevertheless, remained important. compete on a level playing field with First, it gave much greater political organizations whose role in defeating the common enemy was marginal at possible to hold them. It included best. The question also needs to be helping set up and providing techni­ raised whether international involve­ cal support to electoral institutions, ment could be expected to accom­ training polling-station officials, and plish anything under the circum­ transporting election material around stances. the country. In some cases, as in Mozambique, the international community did most of the work in Types these areas. In countries with a stronger administrative structure, the Of International international community assisted Assistance domestic institutions. All cases revealed the very considerable International assistance was technical expertise of international broadly divided into three categories organizations and NGOs in the in all countries: technical and logisti­ organization of elections. In Angola cal assistance, political assistance, and and Cambodia, in particular, the financial assistance. international community accom­ plished remarkable logistical feats.

Technical In some of these war-to-peace And Logistical Assistance transitions, technical assistance This assistance was aimed at extended to the demobilization and facilitating elections or making it reintegration of combatants. Interna­ tional agencies demonstrated less expertise in this difficult area than in Box 7. Mediation in Nicaragua organizing elections. One problem was that they conSistently underesti­ Formerpresident Jimmy Carter's mission to Nicaraguaconcentrated on mated the time necessary for demobi­ conflict resoLutionrather than on technicaLaspects of the eLectionprocess. lization and reintegration of ex­ Carter met severaLtimes with government and opposition Leaders,before combatants. and after the elections. He was most instrumentaLin heLpingresoLve contentious issues (such as the release of u.s.government funds to the NationaLOpposition Unionand the return of MiskitoIndian Leadersto participate in the eLection).He also heLpedwith transition arrangements. Assistance To Improve The Political Context This included training of political Box 8. In Angola, Curtailed Political Assistance party officials, promoting civic education, and strengthening Because of the very tight scheduLe,the NationaLELection Commission and prodemocracy NGOs in general, and the internationaLcommunity concentrated exclusiveLyon the basic Logisti­ caLtasks. There was no time to attempt broader democratization projects in particular those capable of supply­ such as deveLopingcivic organizations, promoting an independent press, or ing monitors for the elections. In carrying out a programof civic education. u.s.NGOs carried out small some cases it involved promoting projects: three weeks of poLiticaLparty training by the NationaLDemocratic further negotiations among rival Institute and the InternationaLRepubLican Institute jointly, and a voter parties to solve conflicts that arose education programby the InternationaLFoundation for ELectoraLSystems. during the preparation of elections. By and Large,though, the internationaLcommunity directed its effort at overcomingthe LogisticaLprobLems of moving peopLeand materieLaround a Some of the countries that most country with a destroyed infrastructure. needed improvement in the political climate received very little assistance in this regard. In Angola and Cambo­ Postconflict elections in war-tom dia, for example, demobilization and countries will always be expensive, logistical problems absorbed most of particularly when all electoral institu­ the attention of the international tions have to be built from scratch. community. Political tasks fell to But some of the costs were probably second priority. Similarly, the short too high and established unrealistic time frame given for election prepa­ expectations and standards for the ration also caused the international next elections. Polling-station officials community to concentrate their were in some cases paid salaries that efforts on technical tasks. It is under­ were high in relation to the country's standable why this happened, but it per capita income. And air transport is also unfortunate. was used frequently to expedite the process. Such expenditure levels can create a dangerous precedent. Financial Assistance The narrow technical and broad The United States contributed political tasks undertaken by the significantly to all aspects of these international community and the transitions. It was involved to some electoral institutions of the six coun­ degree with the negotiations of the tries were underpinned by interna­ peace agreements in all cases and tional financial assistance. The later supported the election effort international community also fi­ through international organizations. nanced demobilization. A major component of bilateral U.S. electoral assistance in all countries In Angola, Cambodia, and Mozam­ was support for what can broadly be bique the cost of the transition was defined as civil society. USAID, very high. But comprehensive, and through organizations such as the above all comparable, figures are National Democratic Institute, Inter­ unfortunately unavailable. The cost national Republican Institute, and for Cambodia has been estimated at International Foundation for Electoral $2 billion-including the cost of Systems, promoted voter and more UNTAC. In Mozambique the cost of broadly civic education. It also the elections alone has been esti­ provided training for personnel of mated at $85 million, with larger local human rights and democracy amounts spent on the UN mission NGOs, political party officials, and and demobilization. The Angolan election monitors. When the situation transition was probably cheaper up allowed, these activities continued to the time of the elections, because after the elections, becoming part of a the UN mission was kept small and sustained effort at promoting democ­ the process lasted only 16 months. racy. The failure of the elections, however, produced further high costs for the international community (and of Issues course to Angolans). The UN mission Three issues need to be high­ is still operating in Angola in early lighted concerning international 1997. This suggests that in evaluating assistance to postconflict elections: whether the costs of elections are too time frames, political intervention, high, the cost of failure should also and sustainability. The latter is poten­ be considered. tially the most serious. Time Frames education projects can do more than As discussed, in most cases not teach voters how to cast their vote. enough time was allocated to carry Democracy NGOs are aware that civil out the tasks envisaged. Although the society programs take time, and they international community did not prepare to follow up after the elec­ always establish the timing, it did tions. It is important, nevertheless, contribute to the problem by its that preelection programs be specifi­ willingness to compress election cally tailored to what can be effec­ preparations into a short time frame. tively done to help the transition in a In Angola, for example, a September short time. For example, an intensive 29-30, 1992 date was chosen at the campaign to make sure that voters insistence of Unita during negotia­ understand how to mark and foid a tions. But no elections would have ballot may be more important in the taken place at that time without the last few weeks before elections than international community's decision to broader civic education programs or make them happen despite insuffi­ training for party officials. cient political preparation.

Less dramatically, the problem of Political Intervention time also played on the effectiveness Assistance aimed at improving the of the broader democratization political context had to tread a fine measures undertaken by donors. For line between promoting democracy example, it is doubtful that training and promoting particular political for political party officials done a few parties. In Mozambique, for example, weeks before elections will have the international community set up a much impact, or that rushed civic trust fund to finance the transforma­ tion of Renamo from a guerrilla movement into a political party. It Box 9. Cost of Elections was argued that there could be no credible elections if Renamo did not The MozambicaneLections were expensive. U.S. Ambassador Dennis Jett make the transition. It was further referred to them as "goLdplated." Some of the inflated costs were avoidabLe. asserted that Frelimo enjoyed all the advantages of incumbency, including A more realistic timetabLefor the impLementationof the eLections couLd control of the state and its institu­ have eliminated the need for some of the costLyhelicopter transport. tions. For the same reason, the However, this wouLdhave increased security concerns. Ballots wouLdhave international community provided had to have been distributed earLierto the polling sites, then requiring support in Nicaragua not only to monitors and security. A trade-off was made that sacrificed cost-effec­ prodemocracy NGOs but also to the tiveness for getting the eLectionsover and done with before the rainy National Opposition Union. Again, season with maximumsecurity measures. under the circumstances, there were ••• valid reasons for this assistance

In Cambodia, polling pLaceswere staffed by some 50,000 citizens trained Many U.S. programs have strong by UNTAC'seLectoraL component and supervised by UNTACpersonneL. political implications, with U.S. NGOs Many of these officials were drawn from the ranks of LocaLschooL princi­ engaging in broad democratization pals and teachers; they were trained for two or three months and received efforts. Support for democracy NGOs saLaries of $800 for eLectionboard "presidents" to $200 for officials who is often seen by the incumbent verified voter cards, appLiedindelibLe ink to voters' fingers, or otherwise government as support for the assisted in the voting process. opposition. But failure to support that their initial expertise will be opposition parties and NGOs also strengthened rather than lost. has political implications, because it can further strengthen the ruling Another issue, a delicate one, is party's power monopoly. The coun­ whether civil society organizations tries where a democratic transition is that were fostered by the interna­ more problematic (because of chaos tional community during postconflict reigning in the country, weakness of elections can become self-supporting opposition parties owing to earlier within a reasonable time frame. This repression, or control by previous relates not only to the many NGOs single parties over all government that carry out civic education (and resources) are also the ones where which draw their support exclusively prodemocracy programs more easily from the international community) acquire partisan overtones. Clear but of political parties as well. The criteria need to be established con­ question is pertinent concerning cerning the more political forms of Renamo--an organization that re­ assistance. quired a large amount of international fmancing and other support to function as a political party. Sustainabllity Box 10. Using Leverage in Mozambique The far-reaching role of the inter­ The most difficult question con­ cerns political sustainability. The national community raises a question A principal means for long familiar to agencies involved in more the success of the elections was Mozambique'sCommis­ economic development programs, due to international intervention, the sion for Supervision and that of sustainability. Is the political more fragile the outcome. The results Control and the interna­ development represented by these of the Angolan elections were not tional community to elections sustainable? Or will democ­ respected. In Cambodia, Funcinpec ensure that Renamo and ratization projects suffer the fate of had to accept the de facto power that Frelimo respected their many concerned with development the Cambodian People's Party de­ commitments under the assistance-namely, fold once out­ rived from its control over the admin­ Peace Accords process side funding dries up? istration and the military. Without was by using donor continued international involvement, resources as leverage. The question of sustainability has it is doubtful competitive elections The Renamo trust fund will be held in 1998 and thereafter. several facets. First, many of the was established in May country studies point with alarm to 1993 to help that the disappearance of electoral institu­ In postconflict elections, the organization with its tions funded at great expense for the tendency by the international com­ transformation into a postconflict elections. Further, the munity has so far been to do what­ political party and to limited expertise acqUired by polling­ ever possible to make the elections a counterbalance Frelimo's station officials and election observ­ success. Unless sustainability is taken access to public re­ ers should be preserved and rein­ into account in designing programs, sources for election forced for the next election and used future elections may still require purposes. Renamo had to in continuing democratization ef­ exorbitant amounts of international believe that it could forts-poSSibly as civic educators-so support--or be doomed to failure. compete in the elec­ tions, or it was feared it would return to using force to obtain its objectives. Fourteen donors contributed to the $18 million fund.

CHAPTER 7 Lessons And Recommendations This chapter presents selected technical assistance, which the lessons derived from the experience countries desperately needed because of elections in case-study countries. It of lack of experience and expertise. emphasizes policy and not technical Finally, the international community issues. A set of recommendations, provided political assistance in which follow from these lessons for restructuring political parties and USAID and other donor agencies, is strengthening organizations of civil also presented. society; at the same time, it enhanced the integrity of the electoral process and the credibility of its outcome by International deploying international monitors. Electoral Assistance In a climate of deep mutual dis­ Is Essential trust and antagonism, the interna­ tional presence helped prevent gross The international community made irregularities and widespread fraud. It a crucial contribution to these strengthened the legitimacy of na­ postconflict elections in many scent democratic groups and pro­ different ways. It promoted peace vided a reasonable assessment of the negotiations. It helped maintain situation to others in the international peace and security in most countries community. However, in countries by establishing a UN mission. It where one of the major parties supported demobilization of combat­ lacked the will to abide by election ants. And it played a major role in results, international monitoring was organizing the elections themselves. ineffective (as in Angola) or even This section deals specifically with served to lend legitimacy to noncom­ the organization of elections. petitive elections (as in Ethiopia).

Case studies indicate that without In addition to direct assistance, the substantial international assistance, international community played elections would not have material­ ized in Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique, and they would have been less credible in EI Salvador and Box 11. Canthe DemocraticTransition Nicaragua. The Ethiopian elections, In CambodiaBe Sustained? MaybeNot which saw the lowest level of inter­ After the successful coup in July 1997, the future of democratic transi­ national involvement, were also the tion in the aftermath of elections is questionable. The CPPseems bent least credible of the six. on keeping the reins of power with total disregard for the democratic process. It has consolidated its hold on military and civilian bureaucracy. The international community provided three types of assistance. Because of a lack of leadership, Funcinpec, the party that gained the First, it provided financial assistance plurality of votes, has largely disintegrated. Although Second Prime for planning and holding elections. Minister Hun Sen has promised to hold elections in 1997, his promise Second, and equally important, was cannot be taken at face value. another vital though less visible role. elections left a bitter legacy, aggravat­ Diplomats, donor agency staff, and ing existing tensions and cleavages. technical experts constantly mediated between major contestants, exerted Case studies point to three mea­ subtle and not-so-subtle pressure for sures that can reduce the divisive ensuring "free and fair" elections, and effects of political contestation. First, in many cases persuaded major the experience of Nicaragua and contestants to accept the voters' Mozambique suggests that continual verdict. For example, without intense discussions, consultations, and international pressure, it is doubtful negotiations between the leaders and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the representatives of the rival parties CPP in Cambodia would have ac­ during the planning and conduct of cepted the election outcome. Diplo­ elections tend to promote a better matic interventions were as essential understanding and appreciation of as direct assistance. the opponent's perspective and can resolve many differences. Negotia­ Recommendation: In cooperation tions on elections rules and practices with other international agencies, are particularly important to reinforce USAID should continue to proVide commitment to elections and accep­ economic and technical assistance for tance of their results by all parties. postconflict elections to promote Postelection power-sharing is another s peace and democracy in war-torn issue that should be the object of societies. It should also step up preelection negotiations. Finally, efforts to promote dialog and recon­ whenever possible, parties should be ciliation among the parties. encouraged to enter into discussions concerning longer term policy issues. Strategies to Militate Second, developing and enforcing a comprehensive code of conduct Against the Divisive produces positive results. The pro­ Effects of Elections cess of formulating such a code involves a sustained dialog among In the absence of a tradition of rival political leaders, resulting in a democratic contestation, elections in broad consensus on complex and the aftermath of civil war can be controversial issues that may surface highly divisive. In practically all case later in elections. Moreover, a code study countries, political parties prevents isolated noncompliance of appealed to parochial loyalties to electoral regulations from developing gain votes. Appeals to ethnic identi­ into a major political issue. Finally, ties were successfully made in the and most important, it imposes much three African countries. In Cambodia, needed self-diScipline and restraint opposition parties openly talked of on the behavior of political activists. domination by the Vietnamese minority. Political leaders and parties Third, civic- and voter-education often advanced unfounded charges programs, when efficiently and against one another in the two effectively organized before elections, Central American countries. There is can help create a positive atmo­ little doubt that in many instances sphere. Recommendation: While plan­ the societies without experience with ning elections, officials should formu­ democracy, could not be initiated at late appropriate strategies to prevent all. Third, limited time partly contrib­ and control the divisive effects of uted to a lack of attention to sustain­ political contestation. Such strategies ability issues. Experts were under may involve 1) promoting an ongo­ more pressure to meet unrealistic ing dialog between rival political deadlines than to build institutions parties to plan and manage elections, and infrastructures that could be used 2) developing a code of conduct for in the future. Fourth, stringent time political parties, and 3) designing and frames inflated the overall cost of implementing extensive civic and elections by forcing reliance on air voter education programs, starting transport. Finally, the postponement before elections and continuing in of elections made necessary by their aftermath. unrealistic schedules created further confusion and misunderstandings. Adequate Time Although stringent time schedules are counterproductive, flexibility must And Flexibility not become an excuse for inaction, In Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, lest the momentum of the transition and Mozambique, the original time­ be lost. A longer timetable needs to tables for holding elections were include target dates for the comple­ based on unrealistic assumptions. tion of specific tasks, and pressure The planners underestimated the must be brought to bear on the roadblocks created by deficient palties to move forward. transportation and communication systems, the government's limited Recommendations: Planners capacities, difficulties in donor should budget adequate time for n coordination, and above all, the lack planning and conducting elections. of political will. Political leaders often The time frame should be based on advantages. harbored serious reservations about an in-depth assessment of the exist­ elections and did not hesitate to ing situation and not on unrealistic create obstacles to gain advantages. political expectations and should include intermediate target dates. Case studies suggest that stringent Flexibility should be built into the time frames had five adverse conse­ election calendar to deal with unex­ quences. First, demobilization could pected problems or seize fresh not be completed in several coun­ opportunities but must not be al­ tries. Second, voter education pro­ lowed to become an excuse for grams often could not be imple­ inaction. mented effectively. For example, intermediary organizations-which were engaged in voter education in High Costs Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique­ found it difficult to print necessary Of Postconjlict literature, train trainers, and reach out Elections to voters in remote areas within the stipulated time. In some cases, civic The cost of elections has been exceptionally high, given the wide- education, which was necessary in spread poverty and paucity of re­ Recommendation: Planning and sources in case-study countries. The conducting elections in war-torn total price tag for reconciliation societies is bound to remain an elections ranged from $40 million to expensive exercis bee use of shat­ several hundred millions of dollars. tered physical and institutional Questions have been raised about the structures and unfavorable environ­ wisdom of expending such enormous ments. Notwithstanding, USAID sums of money on a single event. In should take steps to reduce their the zero-sum game of international overall costs. The Agency should assistance, the funds for elections take a lead in undertaking a study to come at the expense of other activi­ examine the cost-effectiveness of ties that promote development and reconciliation elections and suggest democracy. Moreover, it is doubtful ways to reduce their overall costs that in an environment of ever without sacrificing efficiency and shrinking budgets for international effectiveness. The goal should be to assistance, considerable resources create electoral mechanisms the The total will be forthcoming for promoting national governments will be able to reconciliation elections in the future. support by themselves in the medium price tag for term. reco · iation The experience of case-study countries points to a few measures that can reduce the overall cost. First, ections ~Free and Fair ' as suggested earlier, the pressure to ranged fro organize elections within a very Elections limited time frame often results in Most international observer mis­ $40 millio wasted resources; thus, a reasonable sions have become increasingly and flexible time frame can result in sophisticated in evaluating elections, considerable economies. Second, issuing nuanced reports that assess election procedures should be de­ both progress made and continuing signed in line with the country's problems, and take into consider­ financial capacity to better ensure ation the perceptions of the major that subsequent elections can realisti­ parties and the general population. cally be carried out. Third, greater However, both the political pressures use of local manpower and expertise under which the international organi­ can save resources. The cost of hiring zations and foreign governments expatriate staff and consultants operate and the reporting by the usually consumes a major share of media often give the impression that international assistance. When indig­ elections are simply judged as "free enous experts are not available, and fair" or "not free and fair." Such donors can try recruiting them from assessments have little discriminatory neighboring countries. And fourth, value. EI Salvador and Nicaragua, for better donor coordination and, if example, maintained reasonably high possible, a division of labor among election standards, but there were major donors is needed. For example, serious misgivings among interna­ instead of many countries and organi­ tional observers about the freeness zations sending their own observers and fairness of elections in Ethiopia. to monitor an election, a few may, by The remaining countries fell between common agreement, be entrusted these two extremes. Yet, all these with the responsibility. elections were labeled free and fair by the international community and USAID made considerable invest­ the press. ments in democracy-promoting activities in El Salvador, Cambodia, Recommendations: First, efforts Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Most of to ensure that all international and the investments have yielded encour­ domestic observers rely on the same aging results. professional criteria in judging elections need to be continued. Since Recommendation: Assistance for legitimacy of the elections ultimately postconflict elections should be depends on their acceptance by the accompanied by a long-term strategy parties and observers, these should to nurture the democratization pro­ be publicized. cess and a firm commitment of resources by the international com­ Second, efforts need to be made to munity. increase the media's sophistication in reporting about elections. Preconditions Third, sometimes international organizations and foreign govern­ For Postconjlict ments have no choice but to accept Elections flawed elections. Not to do so might The experience of the case-study trigger more violence or undermine countries, as well as of other recent the progress that has been made. In war-torn societies, indicates that the such cases they should acknowledge success of elections requires both that, though flawed, the elections can technical and political preconditions. playa useful role in postconflict International assistance can make up situations. to some extent for the missing pre­ conditions, but this can be extremely costly. Poor conditions do not neces­ Long-Term Strategic sarily make it impossible to hold Interventions elections, but they greatly reduce the chances for lasting results. Elections provide only a window of opportunity for democratization in The following preconditions are a war-torn society. They are an crucial to the success of postconflict essential, though not sufficient, elections: condition for sustaining democratiza­ tion. Indeed, the experience of practically all countries studied • Existence of a state capable of performing the essential functions indicates that democratization re­ expected of it. To some extent, quires the following: continual international assistance can make up reconciliation among the former for the weakness of the state, as warring parties, reforms in security happened in Cambodia and Mozam­ forces, rebuilding of law-enforcement bique, although such assistance is agencies and the judiciary, obser­ extremely costly. If the very existence vance of human rights, strengthening of the state is in doubt, as is the case of civil society, and, above all, rapid with many failed states (such as economic development alleviating Bosnia, Burundi, Rwanda, and Soma­ poverty and unemployment. lia), international assistance probably cannot fill the gap, and elections • Significant progress toward cannot bring political stability or demobilization and reintegration of resolve conflicts. ex-combatants. In highly polarized societies, progress in this area is • A working consensus among the necessary to ensure that the losing former warring parties about national party will not be able to resume boundaries, the structure and func­ military hostilities in the face of an tioning of the government, and electoral defeat. Here, too, strong relations between national and international peace-enforcing mecha­ subnational units. A degree of dis­ nism could be a substitute in theory, agreement on issues other than but probably not in practice. national boundaries exists in all healthy democracies. However, if Recommendation: USAID and there is no working consensus on the other donors should provide techni­ essential outlines of a system of cal and material support for elections government, it is unlikely the losers only if 1) there exists a functioning will accept election results. A party state; 2) major political parties agree If the parties favoring a loose confederal system is about national boundaries, relation­

.....,...... ~Il!!t. ach unlikely to accept the electoral ships between national and victory of one favoring a highly subnational units, and structure and centralized system. If the parties functions of government; 3) warring cannot reach such basic consensus, parties demonstrate a commitment to international assistance cannot fill the implement a peace accord; and 4) l gap. If they are to work, international significant progress has been made in attempts to promote systems of demobilization and integration of government entailing a degree of armies belonging to conflicting power-sharing-from proportional parties. representation to full-fledged govern­ ments of national unity-require a working consensus. Interim Alternatives • A demonstrable political commit­ To Early Elections ment on the part of the major con­ Finally, the case studies, as well as flicting parties to carry out the the experience of Burundi and agreed-on peace accord or pact. Such BOSnia, suggest the need for fresh a commitment was not visible for thinking on holding elections in the Vnita in Angola, the Khmer Rouge in immediate aftermath of civil war and Cambodia, and the EPRDF in Ethio­ destruction. There are two reasons pia. The lack of commitment contrib­ why early elections in postconflict uted to a less-than-satisfactory out­ societies could be counterproductive, come to the electoral process. In postponing rather than accelerating theory, the international community democratization. could make up for the lack of com­ mitment by creating strong peace­ First, as indicated earlier, condi­ enforcing mechanisms. The cost of tions in many postconflict societies such an undertaking makes such a are hardly conducive to democratic solution unlikely. contestation. These countries are highly polarized and socially frag- mented. They possess limited institu­ trusteeship will not be discussed tional capacity for self-governance. In here. extreme cases, the state as an institu­ tion exists only on paper. The inter­ 4. Have as the end point the nal security situation remains precari­ holding of free and fair competitive ous because of unemployed ex­ elections. The time required to get to combatants, easy availability of arms elections will undoubtedly vary from and ammunition, and widespread country to country. social disorganization. Law-enforce­ ment agencies remain weak, if even The cases studied offer some they exist, and gross violations of indications of measures that could human rights often persist. Moreover, serve as interim alternatives to early these societies face pressing eco­ elections. For example, they indicate nomic problems that demand imme­ that the countries with the most diate action and adoption of policies successful elections were also the and programs that are politically ones in which a continuing process unpalatable. of negotiations took place between Thereare two the original peace agreement and the Second, elections can further elections. Such a continuing process reasons why polarize these societies, increasing helped solve specific problems. It ea rather than moderating political also consolidated the peace agree­ tensions. This happens because ment and helped develop consensus lections in parties and candidates appeal to on basic issues. And it helped the ethnic or tribal loyalties, real or parties learn to work with one an­ postconflict imaginary past grievances, and other before the elections. This sodetie narrow and sectarian interests to suggests that one functional alterna­ mobilize support. tive to early elections may be to u e continue negotiations on a broader In countries where preconditions range of issues than those reached in counter­ for elections are not met and elec­ the peace agreement. tions thus entail a high risk of failure, productive. functional alternatives to elections The example of Angola is relevant need to be considered. Such func­ here. After the failure of the 1992 tional alternatives would need to elections and the return to war, new satisfy a number of requirements: negotiations tried to address the problems overlooked the fIrst time. 1. Entail less risk of return to As a result, the provisions of the 1991 conflict or consolidation of authori­ peace accord were supplemented tarian regimes than early elections after lengthy negotiations by the 1994 held under unfavorable conditions. Lusaka Protocol. Negotiations are continuing in 1997. The attempted 2. Help consolidate the peace second Angola transition cannot be agreement and create an interim considered a success yet, because a mechanism for governing the country fmal settlement has not been until elections are held. reached. But even a stalled transition is preferable to a return to war; 1994- 3. Be sufficiently low cost to be 97 has been better for Angola than sustainable. For this reason, the 1992-94. possibility of a de facto international South Africa offers another ex­ period. Such a government would be ample of the importance of lengthy supported by the international negotiations in a successful transition community and would also share under unfavorable circumstances. responsibility on specific issues with South Africa took four years to get to transitional councils representing all its postconflict elections. There were parties. Some aspects of the South three functional alternatives to early African experience may be applicable elections. The first were the all-party elsewhere. negotiations, which brought about agreement on a new constitution and Transitional institutions need to on the necessity to form a govern­ initiate programs of political liberal­ ment of national reconciliation. The ization and economic reconstruction. second was establishment of peace Political liberalization requires pro­ committees. And the third was cre­ motion of the rule of law and respect ation of "transitional executive coun­ for human rights, creation of free Efforts to cils" to supervise certain governmen­ media, tolerance of opposition, con tal functions. transparency in governmental opera­ solidate tions, and promotion of civil society. peace and These measures helped consolidate Economic reconstruction should peace. They lent a degree of legiti­ concentrate on rehabilitating physical era a macy to the existing government that and institutional infrastructure, allowed it to continue administering reviving agriculture and industry, and consensus the country until elections with the stabilizing economic reforms. Such should be agreement of all parties. And they efforts are likely to create a more opened the way for further democra­ favorable environment to nurture adapted to tization. By the time the elections democratization. were held, widespread consensus e had been achieved on the rules of Given the risk entailed in early country's the political game. More important, elections in postconflict countries and a culture of bargaining had been the high domestic and international most urgent created. costs of failed elections (Angola is a reminder) functional alternatives needs. Circumstances vary from country to need to be considered more aggres­ country. Efforts to consolidate peace sively. and generate a consensus that will eventually allow elections should be Recommendation: In coopera­ adapted to each country's most tion with the State Department and urgent needs. For example, South bilateral and multilateral agencies, Africa (and to an extent even Angola) USAID should explore functional had a functioning government in alternatives to early elections in place. A country like Liberia, where a extremely polarized societies (such as power vacuum exists, faces a much Burundi, Somali, or Rwanda) for an more urgent problem of creating new interim period. During this time structures to govern the country until peace can be consolidated, essential elections are held. Formation of a state institutions can be rebuilt, and a caretaker technical government might climate for democratic contestation provide a mechanism in a transition can be created. References

(All published by u.s. Agency for Lopez-Pintor, Rafael. 1997. Electoral International Development, Washing­ Assistance for Elections in Post-Conflict ton.) Societies: Nicaragua.

Baloyra, Enrique A. 1997. Elections Ottaway, Marina S. 1997. Elections and Political Rehabilitation in War­ and Political Closure in Angola. Torn Societies: El Salvador, 1993- 1994. Turner, Michael; Sue Nelson; and Kim Mahling-Clark. 1997. Elections Brown, Frederick Z. 1997. USAID and Democratization in Mozambique. Assistance f07' Elections in Post-Conflict Societies: Cambodia.

Harbeson, John W. 1997. Elections and Democratization in Post-Mengistu Ethiopia.

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