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RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R11T0016 MAIN TRACK DERAILMENT CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY FREIGHT TRAIN 220-24 MILE 105.1, MACTIER SUBDIVISION BUCKSKIN, ONTARIO 26 JANUARY 2011 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Railway Investigation Report Main-Track Derailment Canadian Pacific Railway Freight Train 220-24 Mile 105.1, MacTier Subdivision Buckskin, Ontario 26 January 2011 Report Number R11T0016 Summary On 26 January 2011, at approximately 0310, Eastern Standard Time, as Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) freight train 220-24 was travelling southward at about 45 mph, one of its cars derailed at Mile 105.1 of the CP MacTier Subdivision, near Buckskin, Ontario. The train continued on to the Buckskin north siding switch at Mile 103.7 where an additional 20 cars, including dangerous goods tank car PROX 33743, loaded with non-odorized liquefied petroleum gas (UN 1075), derailed. Some of the derailed cars side-swiped northbound CP freight train 221-25, which was stationary in the Buckskin siding, derailing its lead locomotive, and damaging the second locomotive and the first 9 cars on train 221. As a precaution, 15 families from the nearby area were evacuated. There were no injuries and no loss of product. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. - 2 - Other Factual Information Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) and Canadian National (CN) operate parallel trans-continental rail routes throughout the area. Under a bidirectional running agreement, both railways operate primarily empty trains northbound on CP track between Mile 20.1 and Mile 112.7 of the Parry Sound Subdivision, and loaded southbound trains on CN track between Mile 146.2 and Mile 247.5 of the CN Bala Subdivision, respectively (see Figure 1). -
Railway Investigation Report R07d0111 Crossing Collision
RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R07D0111 CROSSING COLLISION VIA RAIL CANADA INC. PASSENGER TRAIN NUMBER 35 MILE 23.57, CANADIAN NATIONAL KINGSTON SUBDIVISION PINCOURT/TERRASSE-VAUDREUIL, QUEBEC 17 DECEMBER 2007 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Railway Investigation Report Crossing Collision VIA Rail Canada Inc. Passenger Train Number 35 Mile 23.57, Canadian National Kingston Subdivision Pincourt/Terrasse-Vaudreuil, Quebec 17 December 2007 Report Number R07D0111 Synopsis On 17 December 2007, at approximately 1549 eastern standard time, VIA Rail Canada Inc. passenger train No. 35, travelling westward at 62 mph on the south main track of Canadian National’s Kingston Subdivision, struck an empty tractor-trailer that was immobilized on the 3e Avenue level public crossing located at Mile 23.57, near Pincourt/Terrasse-Vaudreuil, Quebec. The tractor-trailer was destroyed; the locomotive was damaged and was unable to continue. Subsequently, 76 passengers were transferred to another VIA Rail Canada Inc. train and rail traffic was delayed for up to 3 ½ hours. The truck driver sustained minor injuries. There was no derailment and no track damage. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. © Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2009 Cat. No. TU3-6/07-1E ISBN 978-1-100-12406-3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Factual Information ....................................................................... -
The VIA 1-4-10 Plan a Recovery Strategy for Canada’S Rail Passenger Service
The VIA 1-4-10 Plan A Recovery Strategy for Canada’s Rail Passenger Service For Transport AcAon Canada By Greg Gormick On Track Strategies November 6, 2015 Table of Contents Acknowledgements.....................................................................................................iv Execu:ve Summary......................................................................................................v 1.0 Se@ng a New Course for VIA.................................................................................1 2.0 The Founda:on of VIA’s Recovery.........................................................................3 2.1 A New Rail Passenger Ac:on Force...................................................................4 2.2 A Reformed and Informed Board of Directors...................................................6 2.3 Managerial Redirec:on.....................................................................................7 2.4 A Clear Legisla:ve Mandate............................................................................10 3.0 Overhauling the Freight Railway Rela:onship.....................................................15 4.0 Modernizing VIA’s Fleet.......................................................................................23 4.1 Rolling Stock...................................................................................................26 4.2 Mo:ve Power.................................................................................................30 4.3 Fleet Procurement..........................................................................................33 -
Railway Investigation Report R16t0162
RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R16T0162 Main-track train collision and derailment Canadian Pacific Railway Freight trains 235-21 and 118-18 Mile 3.3, North Toronto Subdivision Toronto, Ontario 21 August 2016 Transportation Safety Board of Canada Place du Centre 200 Promenade du Portage, 4th floor Gatineau QC K1A 1K8 819-994-3741 1-800-387-3557 www.tsb.gc.ca [email protected] © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2017 Railway Investigation Report R16T0162 Cat. No. TU3-6/16-0162E-PDF ISBN 978-0-660-09197-6 This report is available on the website of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada at www.tsb.gc.ca Le présent rapport est également disponible en français. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Railway Investigation Report R16T0162 Main-track train collision and derailment Canadian Pacific Railway Freight trains 235-21 and 118-18 Mile 3.3, North Toronto Subdivision Toronto, Ontario 21 August 2016 Summary On 21 August 2016, at approximately 0517 Eastern Daylight Time, Canadian Pacific Railway freight train 118-18 was crossing from the north to the south track at approximately Mile 3.3 on the North Toronto Subdivision in Toronto, Ontario. Freight train 235-21, proceeding westward with 2 locomotives only, collided with the tail end of train 118-18. Four of train 118-18’s intermodal cars (10 platforms) were struck and damaged. -
Metrolinx Annual Report 2011-2012 Cover Photo: Glass Panel Installation at Union Station As Part of the Revitalization Project, April 2012
Metrolinx Annual Report 2011-2012 Cover photo: Glass panel installation at Union Station as part of the Revitalization project, April 2012. Table of Contents MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIR 4 MESSAGE FROM THE CEO 5 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 6 OUR VISION, MISSION, VALUES 7 TRANSFORMING TRANSPORTATION 8 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS 9 Rapid Transit Implementation 9 Air Rail Link 9 GO Transit Infrastructure 10 Union Station 10 Acquiring Rail Corridors – More Ownership, Greater Control 10 Substainability 10 SERVICE EXPANSION 11 CUSTOMER SATISFACTION 12 PLAN 14 Regional Planning 14 GO Planning 14 Mobility Hubs 15 INNOVATION 16 INVEST 17 SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL RESULTS 18 AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 34 2011-2012 • METROLINX ANNUAL REPORT 3 Letter from the Chair The 2011-12 fiscal year was another transformative one for Metrolinx and the organization made significant progress towards reshaping transportation in this region. Metrolinx is committed to the three cornerstones of strategic focus: planning, investing and delivering. Over the past year, the continued work on building our infrastructure projects, planning for the future connectivity of the region and ensuring we’re investing in the communities we serve are directly aligned to these areas. Demonstrating our commitment to building major regional rapid transit projects, we started construction on the Eglinton Crosstown LRT; a project that is one of the most transformative transit projects in Toronto’s history, and one of great focus over the next decade. Our work continued with our partners on rapid transit in York Region and dedicated bus lanes in Mississauga. Our continued commitment to the GO Transit passenger experience was exemplified with more service to new regions, providing more riders with different transit options. -
Railway Investigation Report R04t0013 Main-Track
RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R04T0013 MAIN-TRACK DERAILMENT CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY FREIGHT TRAIN NO. 104-18 MILE 24.83, MACTIER SUBDIVISION BOLTON, ONTARIO 22 JANUARY 2004 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Railway Investigation Report Main-Track Derailment Canadian Pacific Railway Freight Train 104-18 Mile 24.83, MacTier Subdivision Bolton, Ontario 22 January 2004 Report Number R04T0013 Summary At approximately 0315 eastern daylight time on 22 January 2004, southward Canadian Pacific Railway freight train 104-18, travelling at 56 mph, derailed 2 locomotives and 26 cars at Mile 24.83 of the MacTier Subdivision. The derailed cars included 14 loads of general freight and 12 intermodal flat cars loaded with containers. One container was carrying a regulated product. The derailment occurred immediately south of a rural level crossing, approximately five miles west of Bolton, Ontario. There were no injuries and no release of product. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. - 2 - Other Factual Information Train Information Canadian Pacific Railway (CP Rail) freight train 104-18 (the train), comprised of 3 locomotives and 43 loaded freight cars, was en route from Edmonton, Alberta, to Toronto, Ontario,1 and was proceeding southward on the MacTier Subdivision (see Figure 1). It was 4284 feet long and weighed 5077 tons. The crew, a locomotive engineer and a conductor, had taken control of the train at MacTier. They were familiar with the territory, qualified for their positions, and met fitness and rest requirements. -
N E W S L E T T E R O F T H E U P P E R C a N a D a R a I L W a Y S O C I E
Newsletter of the Upper Canada Railway Society THIS MONTH IN RAIL AND TRANSIT PARRY SOUND Scenery, trains, and more trains: a guide to the Sound 6 RIDE 'EM BEFORE THEY'RE GONE: TWO VIA TRIPS IN QUEBEC NUMBER 537 - SEPTEMBER 1994 Scenic VIA trips that you shouldn't put off to next year. 8 PUBLISHED BY COMMONWEALTH GAMES nieiiu^lettenr Upper Canada Railway Society "SPIRIT" BUSES RO. Box 122, Station A Transit in Victoria commemorates the Toronto, Ontario M5W IA2 Commonwealth Games, by Gray Scrimgeour. ATLANTIC CANCELLATION 9 Shortly after CP's plans fell through to sell, EDITOR RESEARCH AND REVIEWS intact, its Sherbrooke-Saint John line, VIA Pat Scrimgeour RAILWAY ARCHAEOLOGY . made the official announcement that the tri• 250 Queens Quay West #1607 . RE.I. Railway memories Atlantic weekly Montreal-Halifax via Saint Toronto, Ontario M5J 2N2 . Railway stations in southern Quebec John overnight train will be discontinued. E-Mail: 731 [email protected] INFORMATION NETWORK . The timing is a coincidence, and the . Bygone passenger train speeds train's cancellation is not unexpected. CP has CONTRIBUTING EDITORS 12 made it clear that it has no use for the John Carter, Art Clowes, TRANSCONTINENTAL shortest railway between Montreal and the Scott Haskill, Don McQueen, THE RAPIDO CAR sale surprise east coast, and has been actively trying to sell Sean Robitaille, Gray Scrimgeour, . CP's offer for CN In the east all or part of the line. The route is approved Chris Spinney, Gordon Webster . VIA's winter timetable for abandonment from the beginning of THE PANORAMA Amtrak in B.C. -
Bowmanville Rail Service Extension Initial Business Case Update February 2020
Bowmanville Rail Service Extension Initial Business Case Update February 2020 Disclaimer This Initial Business Case evaluates the case for implementing rail service to Bowmanville on the Lakeshore East corridor through various alignments and service patterns. The options presented are based on Metrolinx’s initial view of achievable alignments and service patterns on a shared rail corridor, and the infrastructure requirements to enable the service extension. Variations in the preferred alignment’s infrastructure scope and/or service pattern will be assessed through a Preliminary Design Business Case. This business case uses the future GO Expansion electrified service on the Lakeshore East corridor to Oshawa as the baseline for analysis. As this project advances through the business case lifecycle, future analyses will consider the effects of re-baselining the existing service levels. All figures within this Initial Business Case Update represent preliminary results. Forecasted costs, revenues and ridership figures are at a high level and will be subject to refinement as analysis of the Bowmanville Rail Extension proceeds to the Preliminary Design Business Case phase, and later analyses in the Business Cases lifecycle. Bowmanville Rail Service Extension Initial Business Case Update February 2020 Contents Executive Summary vii Introduction vii Options for Analysis vii Method of Analysis x Ridership x Business Case Results xi 1. Introduction 1 Background 2 Business Case Overview 2 2. Problem Statement 5 Introduction 6 Case for Change 6 3. Investment Options 14 Introduction 15 Study Area 15 Option Development 16 Option Scoping 18 Service Patterns 20 New Stations (All Options) 20 iv 4. Strategic Case 21 Introduction 22 Strategic Evaluation: Alignment with Objectives 22 Strategic Evaluation: Alignment with Goals 24 Strategic Case Summary 43 5. -
Railway Investigation Report R03t0157 Main-Track
RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R03T0157 MAIN-TRACK DERAILMENT CANADIAN NATIONAL TRAIN NUMBER A-450-31-21 MILE 68.9, BALA SUBDIVISION GAMEBRIDGE, ONTARIO 21 MAY 2003 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Railway Investigation Report Main-Track Derailment Canadian National Train Number A-450-31-21 Mile 68.9, Bala Subdivision Gamebridge, Ontario 21 May 2003 Report Number R03T0157 Summary At 1144 eastern daylight time on 21 May 2003, Canadian National (CN) train A-450-31-21, travelling southward from North Bay, Ontario, destined for Toronto, Ontario, derailed 49 rail cars south of the Highway 12 public crossing in the village of Gamebridge, Ontario, Mile 68.9 of the CN Bala Subdivision. The derailed equipment included 21 tank cars loaded with sulphuric acid, 2 empty box cars, and 26 box cars loaded with paper. Approximately 250 tons of sulphuric acid was released from three tank cars. An underground fibre-optic cable on the west side of the track was severed, disrupting service for 16 hours. Highway 12 was closed in the vicinity of the derailment area until the morning of 26 May 2003. Some 50 people were evacuated due to the toxic nature of the released product and to ease clean-up operations. Two firefighters suffered minor fume inhalation, and a local citizen suffered minor acid burns to his feet. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. - 2 - Other Factual Information The Accident On 21 May 2003, Canadian National (CN) freight train A-450-31-21 left North Bay, Ontario, proceeding southward on the Bala Subdivision, destined for Toronto, Ontario. -
Railway Investigation Report R07t0110
RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R07T0110 MAIN-TRACK DERAILMENT CANADIAN NATIONAL TRAIN M36321-26 MILE 264.94, KINGSTON SUBDIVISION COBOURG, ONTARIO 28 APRIL 2007 The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. Railway Investigation Report Main-Track Derailment Canadian National Train M36321-26 Mile 264.94, Kingston Subdivision Cobourg, Ontario 28 April 2007 Report Number R07T0110 Summary At approximately 1044 eastern daylight time on 28 April 2007, westward Canadian National freight train M36321-26, travelling at 46 mph, experienced a train-initiated emergency brake application and derailed at Mile 264.94 of Canadian National’s Kingston Subdivision in Cobourg, Ontario. A Herzog track maintenance machine and 21 empty multi-level cars derailed. During the derailment, the fuel tank on the Herzog multi-purpose maintenance-of- way power unit was punctured, spilling approximately 9084 litres (2400 gallons) of diesel fuel. The fuel ignited, setting fire to approximately 1000 feet of track structure, including the Burnham Street level crossing. The local fire department responded and extinguished the fire. There were no injuries. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. - 2 - Other Factual Information On 28 April 2007, at 0440 eastern daylight time, 1 Canadian National (CN) freight train M36321-26 (train 363) arrived at Belleville, Ontario, destined for Toronto, Ontario. A crew change was made, and the empty Herzog multi-purpose maintenance-of-way equipment (Herzog machine), composed of a 430-foot articulated flat/gondola car combination (HZGX1750) and a Herzog locomotive (HZGX175), was marshalled at the head end of the train behind three high-capacity dynamic brake (DB) locomotives 2 and ahead of 45 empty multi-level cars. -
Uinta Basin Railway Project
PROPOSAL Professional Services for Engineering, Environmental, Permitting, Right-of-Way Planning, and Related Services Seven County Infrastructure Coalition Uinta Basin Railway Project November 1, 2018 November 1, 2018 ATTN: Mike McKee, Executive Director Seven County Infrastructure Coalition via secure link upload RE: Uinta Basin Railway Project Dear Mike McKee and Selection Committee Members: HDR is eager to help the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition deliver railroad service to the Uinta Basin by December 1, 2023. We know you need to complete your railroad with the least engineering, permitting, and construction cost, and the fastest possible environmental clearance. HDR has the vision and the proven methods to deliver your desired results. We understand the strategic value of speed to market. Our team has the experience and drive to accomplish this. From the 1,500-mile Alberta to Alaska Railway to the 150-mile CN-EJ&E merger to the 30-mile New Orleans & Gulf Coast, we have successfully delivered Surface Transportation Board (STB) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) environmental approvals, grants, loans and engineering for the largest freight railway projects across North America. Our team has been assembled for its experience, commitment, and performance. We possess the right blend of local knowledge and national expertise. We have partnered with Johansen & Tuttle Engineering, Juliano Consulting, Sunrise Engineering and other specialty consultants who also have deep Uinta Basin project experience and stakeholder understanding. Our outstanding Project Manager, Mark Hemphill, is a client-oriented professional with a proven track record in all of the skills needed to plan, engineer, permit, and construct a large greenfield railway. -
Rail Transportation Safety Investigation Report R19c0002
RAIL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT R19C0002 NON–MAIN-TRACK COLLISION AND DERAILMENT Canadian Pacific Railway Yard Assignment CW11-06 Alyth Classification Yard Calgary, Alberta 06 January 2019 ii | TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA ABOUT THIS INVESTIGATION REPORT This report is the result of an investigation into a class 3 occurrence. For more information, see the Policy on Occurrence Classification at www.tsb.gc.ca The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. TERMS OF USE Use in legal, disciplinary or other proceedings The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act states the following: • 7(3) No finding of the Board shall be construed as assigning fault or determining civil or criminal liability. • 7(4) The findings of the Board are not binding on the parties to any legal, disciplinary or other proceedings. Therefore, the TSB’s investigations and the resulting reports are not created for use in the context of legal, disciplinary or other proceedings. Notify the TSB in writing if this report is being used or might be used in such proceedings. Non-commercial reproduction Unless otherwise specified, you may reproduce this investigation report in whole or in part for non-commercial purposes, and in any format, without charge or further permission, provided you do the following: • Exercise due diligence in ensuring the accuracy of the materials reproduced. • Indicate the complete title of the materials reproduced and name the Transportation Safety Board of Canada as the author.