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Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception1

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Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception1 In Philosophy Compass vol.3, no.5, September 2008: 933-955. Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception1 Thomas Kelly Princeton University The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety. Here I briefly survey some of the more important ideas to have emerged from this tradition of reflection. I then look somewhat more closely at an issue that has recently come to the fore, largely as a result of Williamson (2000): that of whether one’s evidence supervenes on one’s non-factive mental states. 1. Terminology and Fundamental Concepts Consider some scientific theory that currently enjoys widespread acceptance among members of the relevant scientific community—for example, the theory of continental drift. What makes the theory of continental drift worthy of being believed by contemporary geologists? A plausible and popular answer is that the evidence possessed by contemporary geologists strongly suggests that it is true. Paradigmatically, those theories that are worthy of being believed enjoy such status in virtue of the availability of evidence sufficient to justify belief in their truth. Evidence that supports or tells in favor of a given theory confirms that theory. On the other hand, evidence that tells against a theory disconfirms that theory. Of course, a given piece of evidence might confirm or disconfirm a theory to a greater or lesser degree. The term ‘verification’ has traditionally been used to signify the maximal degree of confirmation: evidence verifies a theory in the relevant sense just in case it conclusively establishes that the theory in question is true. At the opposite end of the 1For helpful comments on an earlier version, I am indebted to David Christensen. 2 spectrum, falsification signifies the maximal level of disconfirmation: evidence falsifies a theory just in case it conclusively establishes that the theory in question is false. Just as different pieces of evidence can confirm a theory to different degrees (i.e. some pieces of evidence which confirm a theory might confirm it more strongly than other pieces of evidence which also confirm it), there are interesting and important differences among the ways in which theories are confirmed by evidence. Thus, a given piece of evidence might lend support to a theory directly (as when the theory provides a particularly good explanation of that piece of evidence), or more indirectly, by, e.g., disconfirming or falsifiying some otherwise formidable rival theory. Thus, the observation that certain substances gain weight upon undergoing combustion constituted particularly strong evidence for the oxygen theory of combustion, inasmuch as the phenomenon in question seemed to strongly disconfirm its main rival, the phlogiston theory of combustion. As this example illustrates, there is no simple relationship between how strongly a given piece of evidence confirms a given theory and the directness or indirectness with which it bears on that theory (at least in the intuitive sense of ‘directness’ at issue here): some of the strongest evidence for a theory might bear on the theory rather indirectly, while evidence that bears more directly on the theory might be relatively weak. In considering questions about how a given body of evidence bears on a theory, it is crucial to distinguish between the balance of the evidence and its weight. Intuitively, the balance of the evidence concerns how decisively the evidence tells for or against the theory. On the other hand, the weight of the evidence is a matter of how substantial the evidence is. As one acquires more evidence which bears on the theory, the weight of one’s evidence increases; this may or may not make a difference to the balance of one’s evidence, or to what it is reasonable to believe on its basis. Suppose that I select a coin at random and flip it twice; it lands ‘heads’ on the first toss and ‘tails’ on the second. I am then informed that the same coin will be tossed again exactly one year from now. How much credence should I give to the proposition that the coin will land heads on that occasion? Given the evidence available to me, it would seem reasonable to invest credence .5 in the relevant proposition. Suppose that I subsequently flip the coin several thousand more times. I carefully keep track of the outcome of each flip; it turns out that 3 the proportion of ‘heads’ to ‘tails’ is well within the range that one would expect on the assumption that the coin is fair. How much credence should I now give to the proposition that the coin will land heads when it is flipped one year from now? Answer: .5, for the balance of my evidence has not appreciably changed. However, although the balance of my evidence has not changed, its weight has increased significantly. As this example suggests, while the balance of one’s evidence with respect to a given proposition is typically reflected directly in how confident it is reasonable for one to be that that proposition is true, the weight of one’s evidence is not. Informed of what someone believes about some question on the basis of her evidence, and assured that she is reasonable in believing as she does, one is typically in a position to draw inferences about the balance of her evidence but not about its weight. (That is, one has no way of knowing how many times I have seen the coin flipped, told only that I reasonably give credence .5 to the proposition that the coin will land heads when it is flipped one year from now.) However, although the weight of one’s evidence is not directly reflected in what it is reasonable for one to believe about the target proposition, it often manifests itself in what it is reasonable to believe when additional evidence is acquired. Thus, imagine that the coin is flipped seven consecutive times and lands ‘tails’ each time. Taken by itself, this sequence suggests that the coin is biased in favor of ‘tails’. If prior to observing the sequence my credence for the proposition that the coin will land heads when it is flipped in one year’s time stood at .5, how much should I reduce my credence in the light of this new information? Not much, if my prior credence was based on having observed several thousand flips during which the coin behaved in the manner of a fair coin. More, if my prior credence was based on having observed a mere two trials during which the coin behaved as though it were fair. The general moral: the weight of one’s evidence with respect to some proposition tends to manifest itself, not in how confident it is reasonable for one be that that proposition is true, but in how it is reasonable to respond when one acquires additional evidence which bears on the question.2 2 An excellent, technically sophisticated recent discussion of the distinction between balance and weight, the relationship between each and rational belief, as well as related issues is Joyce (2005). A classic account of the distinction is Keynes (1921). Among 4 In some cases, the available evidence might underdetermine the choice between rival theories in a way that makes suspension of judgment among them the reasonable response. Some cases of underdetermination are uncontroversial. When my evidence suggests that the coin is fair, my evidence underdetermines the choice between the hypothesis that the coin will land heads the next time it is flipped and the rival hypothesis that the coin will land tails the next time it is flipped. Given that my evidence underdetermines the choice between these two rival hypotheses, the uniquely reasonable response to this state of affairs is for me to suspend judgment on the question of whether the coin will land heads or tails on the next flip. Presumably, much experimentation within the sciences is designed and conducted with an eye towards eliminating underdetermination of this general kind—although typically with respect to questions of greater theoretical interest and importance. Not all underdetermination claims are uncontroversial. A favorite tactic of skeptics is to claim that our evidence will inevitably underdetermine the choice between our ordinary, common sense views and various skeptical scenarios to which he calls our attention. Thus, the skeptic about our knowledge of the external world maintains that one’s evidence (understood, perhaps, as the totality of one’s current experiences) does not favor one’s ordinary, common sense views about one’s surroundings over various skeptical alternatives (e.g., the hypothesis that one is hallucinating in an undetectable way). Other traditional epistemological skepticisms—about, say, induction, or other minds--can also be illuminatingly reconstructed as arguments from underdetermination and are sometimes explicitly presented as such. Controversial and far-reaching underdetermination claims also figured prominently in much 20th century philosophy of science. For example, a recurrent theme in the writings of W.V.Quine is the claim that any possible body of observational data will inevitably underdetermine the choice between rival theories. (See, e.g., Quine (1980)). Sympathy for such claims has contributed significantly to the popularity of various non-realist accounts of science. Of course, both the plausibility and interest of claims to the effect that evidence inevitably underdetermines theory choice in some domain depend on exactly what is other relevant discussions, see especially Skyrms (1980) on the ‘resilience’ of credences in the face of additional data. 5 meant by ‘underdetermine’. The weakest interpretation of those that sometime seem intended is that our evidence will inevitably logically underdetermine the choice between theories, in the sense that there will always be more than one possible theory that is logically consistent with our evidence.
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