IHS Jane's Terrorism Country Briefing

IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing Turkey

June 2013 ihs.com/janes

A product of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Turkey June 2013

Executive Summary 3 Operational Tempo 3 Distribution of Attacks 3 Counter-terrorism Rating 4

1. Country Profile 5 Overview 5 Physical Terrain 6 Human Terrain 8 Sub-State Threats 9

2. Operational Profile 12 Tempo 12 Distribution of attacks 14 Tactics 15 Targeting 16

3. Qualitative Analysis 17 OSINT Summary: PKK leader calls for ceasefire in Turkey 17 OSINT Summary: DHKP/C claims suicide attack on US Embassy in Turkish capital 18 OSINT Summary: Alleged PKK founding member among three women killed in France 19 Turkish government to hold talks with PKK 20 OSINT Summary: PKK announces strategy shift amid escalating operations 22 JTIC Brief: PKK comes in from the cold in Turkey 23

4. Counter-Terrorism Environment 28 Security Environment 28 Political Environment 29 Physical Envrironment 29

6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology 30

Will Hartley [JTIC Editor] [email protected]

Charles Lister [JTIC Analyst] [email protected]

Executive Summary Operational Tempo

Non-militant casualty trend (1 June 2012 - 31 May 2013) 60 Attacks Fatalities 50

0 June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May 2012 2013

Between 1 June 2012 and 31 May 2013, IHS IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded 214 damaging attacks in Turkey, representing a 10.3% increase from the preceding 12 month period when 194 damaging attacks were recorded. The vast majority of this violence took place in the first half of the reporting period and was attributable to the ethnic Kurdish insurgency in the country’s southeast waged by the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK).

The reporting period began with PKK operations at a high level, with 29 attacks recorded in June 2012 – 81.3% more than in June 2011. Amid increasing security force pressure on the PKK and its political front, the Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK), PKK operations continued to increase through July and into August, when 56 attacks were recorded across Turkey – 133.3% more than in August 2011. Most notably, the PKK killed eight security force personnel in co-ordinated attacks on military outposts in the Çukurca district of Hakkari province on 5 August. Violence fell in September, October, and November, reaching a level of only four attacks in December 2012.

While a Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) suicide bomber killed one person in Istanbul on 11 September, the period coincided with both the traditional decline in PKK operations over the winter months and also with increasing reports that Turkish intelligence officials had begun exploratory talks with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on the prison island of İmralı. This was confirmed in mid-November and in mid-March 2013 Öcalan called on PKK militants to withdraw from Turkey into northern Iraq and to observe a ceasefire with the Turkish government. As such, the traditional re-escalation in PKK operations in the spring of 2013 did not occur and Turkey witnessed notably lower levels of violence in the final months of the reporting period.

Separately, the DHKP/C carried out three attacks in February and March, while two vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks at Turkey’s Cilvegözü border crossing with Syria’s Aleppo governorate on 11 February and 12 May killed 65 people in total.

Distribution of Attacks

The vast majority of PKK violence was concentrated in southeast Turkey, along the border with Iraq and Syria. In particular the provinces of Hakkari (47 attacks), Sirnak (26 attacks), and Diyarbakir (24 attacks) saw the most violence and accounted for 45% of all violence nationwide.

Istanbul province witnessed 19 attacks, largely accounted for by minor small-arms and explosive attacks targeting police personnel in the city of Istanbul. Notably, two DHKP/C militants killed a police officer in the city on 16 June 2012.

While only six attacks were recorded in the capital Ankara, this included a DHKP/C suicide attack at an entrance to the United States embassy on 1 February 2013, which killed a Turkish security guard.

Distribution of attacks by province (1 June 2012 - 31 May 2013)

0 1-9 10-19 20+

Counter-terrorism Rating

Security Environment 3.5 Police, Customs and Intelligence 3.5 Military and Paramilitary Forces 3.5 Judicial and Penal System 4.0 Political Environment 3.0 Government Legitimacy 3.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 2.5 International Co-operation 3.5 Physical Environment 2.5 Geography and Terrain 1.5 Natural Resource Control 4.5 Weapons Proliferation 1.5

A Moderately Restrictive environment is defined as one in which the environment favours the government. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable in the long term, and have a credible prospect of achieving limited concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the short to medium term, but are unlikely to be able to maintain anything other than temporary control over any territory, and pose only a minor threat to the state.

1. Country Profile Overview

Turkey’s location between Europe and the Middle East; its position on the energy corridor carrying oil and natural gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia to the Western market; and its status as the only Muslim member of NATO ensure that the country remains a geo-strategically pivotal state.

However, the election of the moderate Islamist Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), or Justice and Development Party, in 2002 and its re-election in 2007 raised questions about the future not only of secularism in Turkey, but the country’s Western- oriented foreign policy. Such concerns were exacerbated when Turkey’s fading hopes of imminent European Union (EU) membership were dealt another blow by the EU decision in December 2006 to suspend negotiations on eight of the 33 chapters of the accession process.

Kurdish insurgents the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) pose the greatest potential threat to Turkey’s internal stability. From mid-2004 until early 2013, the PKK pursued a two front strategy, combining a rural insurgency in eastern Turkey with an urban bombing campaign in the west of the country. An escalation in PKK attacks in late 2007 increased the pressure on Turkey to strike at the PKK’s bases in northern Iraq and starting in December 2007 the Turkish military began launching air strikes and sporadic, limited ground incursions against PKK militants based in the Qandil mountains.

Rising tensions between the PKK and the government led to a mass hunger strike in mid-to-late 2012 being held mainly by Kurdish inmates, but also by sympathetic politicians. The hunger strike, which drew international criticism, added to the pressure on the government to seek a non-military solution to the Kurdish issue. The pivotal moment came when imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan responded to a request from the Turkish government and in November 2012 called an end to the hunger strike, which at that point had been ongoing for 68 days. This proved to be a pivotal point that laid the foundations for the current peace process and in mid-March 2013 Öcalan ordered the initation of a ceasefire in Turkey and the withdrawal of all PKK forces from Turkey into northern Iraq, which began in early May.

While a series of suicide attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 forced Turkey’s security forces to refocus their attention away from the PKK and towards the threat posed by militant Islamist groups, this threat has since diminished significantly. In addition to indigenous groups with an almost exclusively domestic agenda, such as Turkish Hizbullah which aims to establish an Islamic state in Turkey, there are a large number of groups and individuals providing logistical support and personnel for conflicts outside Turkey’s borders, notably in Syria since the anti-government uprising began in early 2011. There have also been several occasions when foreign jihadists have provided training and financial support for operations by Turkish Islamists against targets inside Turkey, most notably the 2003 Istanbul bombings. A series of arrests of alleged Al-Qaeda militants across Turkey throughout 2012 indicated that such groups continue to pose a threat to security.

Leftist groups have long constituted a far smaller but nonetheless serious threat to Turkish security, and the most powerful leftist group, Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C), carried out a series of small-scale but notable attacks against government buildings in 2012 and 2013.

PKK militants seen in northern Iraq’s Qandil mountains in 2011.

Physical Terrain

Turkey is comprised of 783,562 sq km of territory, making it slightly larger than the United States’ state of Texas, and slightly more than three times the size of the United Kingdom. Of this territory, 769,632 sq km is land and 13,930 sq km is water.

The country has 7,200 km of coastline and 2,648 km of land borders with Georgia (252 km), Armenia (268 km), Azerbaijan (9 km), Iran (499 km), Iraq (352 km), Syria (822 km), Greece (206 km), and Bulgaria (240 km).

The capital of Turkey is Ankara, located roughly in the centre of the country, with a population of 3,846,000 – making it the second largest city in Turkey. The largest city is Istanbul, located on the Bosphorus Strait, with a population of 10.38 million. Population density across the country averages 103.4 people per sq km, and around 70% of the population live in urban areas, with this figure projected to rise to 71.8% by 2015.

Much of the country is mountainous, although there is a narrow coastal plain, particularly in the west, and a high central plateau. This latter area becomes more mountainous to the east and southeast wherein lies the Kurdish heartland, and also has mountain ranges to its north and south. Many of Turkey’s peaks reach above 3,000 m and Mount Ararat is the largest mountain, peaking at 5,123 m

Along Turkey’s coastal regions, the northern Black Sea region is mostly characterised by densely forested mountainous terrain, interspersed with rivers. By contrast, the western Aegean Sea region is dominated by cultivated fertile lowlands, while the southern Mediterranean Sea region experiences a moderate climate similar to the Aegean Sea region.

Across Turkey as a whole, forest covers around 101,750 sq km, or 13.2% of total land area.

Turkey has approximately 352,046 km of roadway – compared to 394,428 km in the UK – of which 313,151 km, or 89%, is paved. The country’s transport infrastructure also includes an approximately 8,699 km long rail network – compared to 16,454 km in the UK. In addition, Turkey has a total of 98 airports – compared to 505 in the UK – of which 89 possess paved runways.

Human Terrain

In 2013, Turkey’s population was estimated to be 80,694,485 with the growth rate estimated at 1.16%. An estimated 25.9% of the population are under 14 years old, and the median age is estimated at 29.2 years. Infant mortality averages an estimated 22.23 deaths per 1,000 live births, while life expectancy at birth averages an estimated 73.0 years.

Turkey is a predominantly Muslim society, with Muslims accounting for 99.8% of the overall population. Around 80% of Turk- ish Muslims are Sunni, while the remainder are primarily Alevi Shia. In addition, around 0.2% of the population are Christian or Jewish. The vast majority of Turkey’s 25,000-strong Jewish and Christian community live in Istanbul.

There is a very strong tradition of secularism in Turkey, defended in particular by the military, and issues such as the wearing of headscarves by those in official positions are extremely controversial. The constitution recognises freedom of religion but bans religious communities from forming parties or establishing schools, however, the incumbent Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) is often categorised as a moderate Islamist party.

The question of ethnicity in Turkey is debated. The Turkish Constitution defines a Turk as anyone ‘bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship’, undermining the use of ethnic categories to define citizens. There are three officially recognised minorities: Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. These were recognised in the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 to settle the partition of the part of the Ottoman Empire that covered Anatolia.

Official census figures do not include ethnic or racial figures, however it is estimated that 80% of the population are ethnic Turks, with the remaining 20% of the population made up of 26 other ethnic groups. Kurds, who comprise an estimated 17% of the population, are the largest ethnic minority. Other ethnic groups include Arabs, Georgians, Greeks, Armenians, Circassians, Syrians, Lazs and Chechens. Successive governments have sought to diminish the significance of these ethnic groups, and the Kurds, were categorised in the 1930s and 1940s as “mountain Turks”, and their language considered to be a dialect of Turkish.

The official language is Turkish. A significant proportion of the population speaks Kurdish (in the southeast) or Arabic (in the south near Syria).

The Turkish labour force comprised an estimated 27,110,000 in 2011. Approximately 25.5% of workers are engaged in agriculture, 26.2% in industry and 48.4% in services. Around 16.9% of the population subsist below the poverty line, and vertical inequality (between rich and poor) is severe, with the richest 10% accounting for 30.3% of the country’s wealth. A significant proportion of economic activity occurs in the informal sector, with the World Bank estimating that the shadow economy accounts for 32.1% of the whole Turkish economy.

Sub-State Threats

Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK)

Name: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), or the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan.

Aliases: Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG), or People’s Defence Force; Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL), or Kurdistan People’s Congress; Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK), or Kurdish Communities Union; Kongra Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistan (KADEK), or Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress.

Scope: Domestic Orientation: Ethnocultural Objective: Reformist.

Status: Active since being founded in 1978.

Leader: Abdullah Öcalan (detained since 1999).

Summary: The Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) is a Kurdish group primarily based and operating in the east and southeast of Turkey, albeit with a significant rear presence in Kurdish areas across the border in northern Iraq. The group was founded in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan, and he remains the nominal leader of the group despite being arrested in 1999 and jailed for life. In practice, though, the day-to-day running of the PKK is handled by senior commander Murat Karayilan. Originally founded as a Marxist-Leninist group, the PKK subsequently embraced Kurdish nationalism and sought to create an independent Kurdish state from Turkey. However, the PKK has since abandoned its separatist objectives and currently aims to achieve greater cultural and political rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority. After launching its armed campaign in 1984, the PKK called a ceasefire in 1999 following the capture of Öcalan. Its armed campaign officially resumed in 2004, although there have been periodic unilateral ceasefires. The PKK is proficient in guerrilla warfare, and its operations in southeast Turkey are typified by small-unit ambushes involving small-arms and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Although security force operations against the group periodically inflict heavy casualties, the PKK’s operational tempo increased steadily, particularly across mid- 2012, and the group was assessed to pose a substantial local threat to government and security force targets throughout its key areas of operation. Nonetheless, Turkish authorities began negotiating with Öcalan in prison in October 2012, and in late March 2013 he announced a ceasefire which would be followed by the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey to northern Iraq. The withdrawal process subsequently began on 8 May, with the first fighters reaching Iraq on 14 May.

A February 2002 picture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. (EMPICS)

Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C)

Name: Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C), or Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front.

Aliases: None recorded.

Scope: Domestic Orientation: Marxist/Maoist Objective: Political.

Status: Active since being founded in 1978.

Leader: Unknown.

Summary: Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) is a left-wing militant group committed to the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state in Turkey. The DHKP/C emerged from a factional split in the militant group Devrimci Sol, and since its formation in 1978 it has carried out a series of assassinations and bomb attacks targeting government, security force, and foreign economic targets. The group also espouses an anti-imperialist ideology, and has accordingly attacked United States and United Kingdom targets in Turkey. Despite being politically active in Western Europe, where the senior hierarchy of the group is alleged to be in hiding, the vast majority of DHKP/C attacks have been carried out in Turkey, with a primary focus on the urban centres of Ankara and Istanbul. In recent years the DHKP/C’s capabilities have been considerably undermined by the extensive penetration of the group by the Turkish intelligence services, by the self-inflicted erosion of its personnel through a campaign of hunger strikes, and by the death in 2008 of its charismatic founder and leader, Dursun Karatas. The DHKP/C’s continuing threat was underlined in April 2009, though, in an attempted suicide attack targeting a former minister of justice in Ankara, although only the bomber was hurt. The group carried out no further substantive attacks until 11 September 2012, when a DHKP/C militant threw a grenade into a police station in Istanbul before detonating an explosive vest, killing a police officer. The DHKP/C’s use of suicide tactics continued into 2013, when a member of the group detonated an explosive vest at the US embassy in Ankara on 1 February, killing a Turkish security guard. The DHKP/C carried out two further attacks in Ankara on 19 March, targeting the Ministry of Justice and the headquarters of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), wounding two people.

Emergency personnel shown outside a side entrance to the US Embassy in the Turkish capital Ankara several hours after a suicide bomb attack on 1 February 2013 (PA)

Turkish Hizbullah

Name: Turkish Hizbullah, or Turkish Party of God.

Aliases: None recorded.

Scope: Domestic Orientation: Sunni Islamic Objective: Revolutionary.

Status: Active since being founded in 1982.

Leader: Isa Altsoy.

Summary: Turkish Hizbullah is a predominantly Kurdish Sunni Muslim militant group based and operating in southeast Turkey, primarily in the provinces of Diyarbakir, Batman, and Van. Turkish Hizbullah aims to establish an Islamic state in Turkey, and during the 1990s it waged a violent campaign to eliminate potential rivals to its influence, including both radical Kurdish separatist groups, such as the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), and moderate Islamists. The group has not launched any major attacks since a series of police raids in 2000 and 2001 resulted in the death of the group’s founder, Huseyin Velioglu, and the deten- tion of over 3,000 alleged members and sympathisers. Instead, Turkish Hizbullah has concentrated on increasing its political and social base through non-violent means. Nevertheless, the group has repeatedly reiterated its willingness to use violence in pursuit of its goals and it has also rebuilt its organisational network under a new leadership while retaining a considerable quantity of arms in hidden caches. As such, a return to violence in the future cannot be discounted.

2. Operational Profile Tempo

Over the 12 months between 1 June 2012 and 31 May 2013, IHS IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded a total of 214 damaging attacks in Turkey, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption. These attacks represented a 10.3% increase from the 194 attacks recorded in the preceding 12 month period, and equated to an average operational tempo of 17.8 attacks per month. A total of 219 confirmed non-militant fatalities and 596 non-militant wounded was also recorded in the reporting period in Turkey. Non-militant casualties include all security forces and civilians killed or wounded, whether by insurgents or as collateral damage in counter-insurgency actions. The deadliest single month was May 2013, with 57 non-militant fatalities and 104 non-militant wounded, although this was nearly entirely attributed to one attack in Hatay province on 12 May, which killed 52 people.

Non-militant casualty trend (1 June 2012 - 31 May 2013) 60 Attacks Fatalities 50

0 June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May 2012 2013

The reporting period began with violence at a high level, with 29 attacks recorded in June 2012 resulting in 29 non-militant fatalities. This represented a level of violence 81.3% higher than that seen in the same month in June 2011 and came during a sustained escalation in sub-state violence in Turkey, dominated by the insurgency waged by the ethnic Kurdish Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in the country’s rural southeast. Violence increased further over the following months, with a total of 34 attacks recorded in July and then a total of 56 in August – the latter representing an increase of 133% from August 2011 and the highest monthly total recorded by JTIC in Turkey in the reporting period. A total of 36 non-militant fatalities were recorded in August, which included several notable attacks. On 5 August, six soldiers and two Gecici Koy Koruculugu (GKK) paramilitary village guards were killed and 21 other people were wounded when PKK militants launched a number of co-ordinated small-arms and suicide attacks on security outposts in the Çukurca district of Hakkari province. Then, on 20 August, 10 people were killed and 68 others wounded in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack near a police station in the Sehitkamil district of Turkey’s Gaziantep province. The attack was attributed variously to the PKK and fellow Kurdish militant group Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kürdistan (TAK), or Kurdistan Freedom Falcons. The PKK officially denied involvement in a statement issued to the pro-Kurdish Firat News Agency on 21 August.

The level of violence in Turkey began to decline in September 2012, when a total of 31 attacks were recorded, although the month witnessed the second highest level of non-militant fatalities across the reporting period, with 55 recorded. This was largely attributable to four large attacks by PKK militants in the provinces of Sirnak, Bingol, and Tunceli, and on the border between Bingol and Mus provinces, which caused 35 non-militant fatalities. Most notably, 10 security force personnel and 20 PKK militants were killed in a series of co-ordinated militant assaults on checkpoints in the Beytussebap district of Sirnak province on 2 September. The month also saw the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) carry out its first substantive attack since April 2009. A member of the group threw a grenade into a police station in the Sultangazi district of Istanbul before detonating an explosive vest, killing a police officer and wounding seven other people.

Violence steadily declined through October (24 attacks and 20 non-militant fatalities), November (10 attacks and 10 non-

militant fatalities), and December (four attacks and two non-militant fatalities). While this coincided with the traditional seasonal decline in PKK operations – when the onset of winter sees the group largely transfer its forces to safehavens in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq. The decreasing operational tempo also corresponded with increasing reports of government peace talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on the prison island of İmralı. It was subsequently confirmed in mid-November that Turkey’s domestic intelligence agency, the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT), had begun engaging in preliminary talks with Öcalan in October.

Despite the confirmation that preliminary peace talks were underway, the PKK maintained a low-level operational tempo over the winter months, although this reached a nadir in December. The final two attacks of 2012 both came in the city of Istanbul on 8 and 11 December, when unidentified militants separately killed one police officer and wounded two others. Although the attacks were not publicly attributed to any specific group and no claims of responsibility were made, the attacks seemed to fit the profile of previous DHKP/C operations in the city.

January 2013 witnessed the lowest number of recorded attacks in Turkey in the reporting period, although notably 12 PKK militants were killed in retaliatory fire after launching what appeared to be a cross-border assault from northern Iraq targeting a security outpost in the Çukurca district of Hakkari province on 8 January. Later that month, on 16 January, PKK militants killed a police officer in Mardin province and were also blamed for an explosive device attack that damaged a section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline in Mardin on 19 January.

February saw a total of six attacks recorded and only one non-militant fatality. However, this fatality was a Turkish security guard killed in a DHKP/C suicide attack on the United States embassy in the capital Ankara on 1 February. Three Turkish nationals were among the 13 people killed in a VBIED attack at the Cilvegozu border crossing with Syria’s Idlib governorate on 11 February, although the attack took place within Syrian territory. No claim of responsibility was issued for the attack, although Turkish authorities blamed it on elements within Syrian intelligence. The attack may also have been a manifestation of tensions between rival Syrian anti-government militant groups Kataib al-Farooq (which retained strong links to local smuggling networks) and a close alliance of Kataib al-Muhajireen, Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen, and Jabhat al- Nusra over access to Turkey.

March was most notable for the announcement by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, in a letter read out in the town of Diyarbakir on 21 March, ordering all PKK militants to observe a ceasefire with the Turkish government and to withdraw from Turkey into northern Iraq. As such, the traditional spring re-escalation of PKK operations did not occur and Turkey witnessed considerably lower levels of violence in March, April, and May when compared to previous years – 17 attacks in total, compared to 44 in the same three month period in 2012. Nonetheless, the period witnessed a significant attack on 12 May, when 52 people were killed and 100 wounded in a double VBIED attack on the Turkish side of the Cilvegozu border crossing in Hatay province, near the town of Reyhanli. While the attack was likely linked to the conflict in neighbouring Syria, Turkish authorities blamed the attack on far-left militant group Türkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (THKP/C) and its splinter faction, Acilciler – who authorities claimed had a presence in Syria. However, no evidence for this was provided and the attribution could not be independently substantiated.

Distribution of attacks Distribution of attacks by province (1 June 2012 - 31 May 2013) Number Province Attacks

28 1 Hakkari 47 4 2 Sirnak 26 29 20 25 3 Diyarbakir 24 22 4 Istanbul 19 11 12 14 5 Van 19 8 13 17 6 Tunceli 16 26 24 7 5 7 Bitlis 9 3 27 16 21 10 8 Hatay 7 19 2 1 9 9 Mardin 6 15 18 23 10 Siirt 6 8 11 Ankara 5 0 1-9 10-19 20+ 12 Agri 4 13 Bingol 4 14 Erzincan 2 The highest level of violence in the reporting period was recorded in Turkey’s Hakkari governorate, where the total of 47 attacks equated to a significant in- 15 Gaziantep 2 crease from the preceding 12-month period, when 23 attacks were recorded. 16 Kahramanmaras 2 17 Mus 2 High levels of violence also occurred in the provinces of Sirnak and Diyarbakir, where 26 and 24 attacks were recorded respectively. However, unlike Hakkari, 18 Sanliurfa 2 both these figures represented approximately the same level of violence as was 19 Adiyaman 1 seen in the previous 12-month period. 20 Amasya 1 21 Batman 1 The primacy of Hakkari, Sirnak, and Diyarbakir – accounting for 45% of violence nationwide – was largely attributable to them being the predominant area of op- 22 Erzurum 1 erations of the PKK. However, the level of violence in the southeast region that 23 Mersin 1 was attributed to the PKK was notably more intense in the first six months of 24 Izmir 1 the reporting period when compared to the latter six months. This was primarily 25 Kars 1 attributable to the PKK’s entering into peace talks in late 2012 and then subsequently entering into a ceasefire in March 2013. 26 Kayseri 1 27 Nigde 1 High levels of violence were also recorded in the provinces of Istanbul (19 at- 28 Sinop 1 tacks), Van (19 attacks), and Tunceli (16 attacks). While Van and Tunceli are also 29 Trabzon 1 prominent areas of operation for the PKK, with the group notably killing seven soldiers in a VBIED attack in Tunceli’s provincial capital on 25 September, 15 of the 19 attacks recorded in Istanbul were unattributed to any specific armed group. While one of the remaing four attacks was attributed to the PKK, the three others were carried out by the DHKP/C. The most notable of these was a suicide attack outside the entrance to a police station in the city’s Sultangazi district on 11 September, which killed one police officer and wounded seven other people.

Tactics

Principal Tactics Jun 12 - May 13 Ambush

The most commonly utilised tactic by militants in Turkey between 1 June 2012 and 31 May 2013 was ambush, with the tactic used on 109 separate occasions, accounting for 44% of all tactics employed by militants. This represented a notable overall decrease from the 148 instances of the tactic’s use in the preceding 12 months, and also a proportional decrease in the tactic’s use, indicating that the change was a consequence of a decreased preference for the use of ambush tactics in militant operations.

Small-arms ambushes represented the dominant form of the militant use of ambush tactics, but there were several other different forms. While ethnic Kurdish Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) militants frequently carried out small-arms ambushes targeting security force patrols in the southeast of the country, the group also sporadically used landmines or improvised explosive devices (IED) in conjunc- Ambush 109 44% Explosive device 73 30% tion with small-arms ambushes. Unidentified militants also carried out a notable Fire attack 23 9% number of minor small-arms ambushes of security force personnel in the city of Hostage 18 7% Istanbul and the capital Ankara. Stand-off Weapons 11 5% Other 4 2% Assault 4 2% Assassination 2 1%

Explosive device

The second most commonly employed tactic by militants in Turkey was explosive device, with a total of 73 recorded instances of the tactic’s use during the 12-month period, representing 30% of all tactics employed. The most numerous militant use of the tactic came in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), frequently employed in conjunction with the use of ambush tactics. Other explosive devices, such as grenades and stun grenades, were also used periodically by unidentified militants, mainly in the city of of Istanbul and in the capital Ankara.

In addition, there were also six recorded instances of the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), two of which were attributed to the PKK in Tunceli and Hakkari provinces. Of particular note in this regard were two large VBIED attacks in Hatay province at the Cilvegozu border crossing with neighbouring Syria, near the town of Reyhanli. While one VBIED killed 13 people and wounded 30 others on 11 February 2013, a second VBIED attack on 12 May killed at least 52 people and wounded more than 100 others. Neither attack was claimed by any group, although authorities variously attributed responsibility to the far-left Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) or to alleged members of Syrian intelligence – although no evidence was made public to substantiate either accusation.

Targeting

Principal Targets Jun 12 - May 13 Military

The most common target of sub-state violence during the reporting period was military personnel and facilities, with the 78 attacks on the sector accounting for 36% of all sectors targeted. This represented a slight decrease from the 82 instances of the sector being targeted in the preceding 12 months, and a 1% proportional decrease, indicating that the militant preference for the tactic’s use had not changed.

The military was a primary target of PKK militant operations in Turkey’s southeast due to its pivotal counter-insurgency role in representing and sustaining the rule of the Ankara-based government in the Kurdish regions. As such, targeting the military provides the PKK with at least an appearance of legitimacy in the eyes of its target constituency: the Kurdish population of southeastern Turkey. How- ever, the large majority of these attacks resulted in less than three military fatalities, Military 78 36% which is consistent with the PKK’s strategy of avoiding decisive engagements with Law Enforcement 52 24% the Turkish military, and its preference for the hit-and-run tactics of low-intensity Other and Residential 28 13% guerrilla warfare. A particularly notable attack targeting military personnel came Government and Diplomatic 18 8% NGO and Education 16 7% on 18 September 2012 when PKK militants fired small-arms and rocket-propelled Industrial and Energy 12 6% grenades (RPGs) at a convoy of military transport buses containing unarmed sol- Infrastructure and Transport 12 6% diers returning from leave between the provinces of Bingol and Mus, killing 10 and wounding 70 others.

Law Enforcement

The second most common target of sub-state violence during the reporting period was law enforcement personnel, with 52 such attacks recorded in the reporting period, accounting for 24% of all sectors targeted. This represented a negligible decrease from the 53 attacks on the sector in the preceding 12 months, while the proportion of the sector being targeted remained exactly the same, indicating that the militant preference for targeting law enforcement personnel had not changed.

With regards to the PKK insurgency in the southeast, law enforcement personnel included Gecici Koy Koruculugu (GKK) paramilitaries – Kurdish tribesmen employed by the government as village guards in the PKK’s area of operations. The GKK are particularly vulnerable to attack since they are comparatively poorly trained and equipped, and are typically based in remote villages in key PKK areas of operation. In addition to attacks targeting joint GKK-military patrols, PKK militants notably killed three GKK personnel in Bitlis province on 20 October 2012.

Police were also targeted in urban centres, including in the capital Ankara and in the city of Istanbul, such as on 16 June 2012 when two Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) militants opened fire on police officers eating their lunch on a roadside in Istanbul’s Gaziosmanpasa district, killing one officer and wounding another.

3. Qualitative Analysis

The following is a selection of recent IHS IHS Jane’s analysis covering sub-state violence in Turkey:

OSINT Summary: PKK leader calls for ceasefire in Turkey

22 March 2013

In a letter read aloud by pro-Kurdish politicians on 21 March, jailed Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan called for his group’s militants to withdraw from Turkey to northern Iraq and to observe a ceasefire with the Turkish state. “Let guns be silenced and politics dominate… The stage has been reached where our armed forces should withdraw beyond the borders… It’s not the end. It’s the start of a new era,” Öcalan’s statement read.

Turkish Minister of Interior Muammer Güler welcomed the statement as having represented “the language of peace”, but insisted that Turkey “needs to see it implemented”.

Öcalan’s statement came after six months of talks with Turkey’s domestic intelligence agency, the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT), and members of the Kurdish Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP), on the prison island of Imrali, which began in October 2012.

The initiation of talks followed a particularly intense summer of PKK operations in Turkey. IHS IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded a total of 162 suspected PKK attacks between May and September 2012, whereas 106 attacks were recorded in the same period in 2011. Most notably, the group was suspected to have carried out at least 55 attacks in August 2012 - 175% more than in August 2011.

Coupled with the emergence of the allegedly PKK-linked Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) in northern Syria in July and August 2012, the summer offensive appeared to lend momentum to the then nascent peace process. By November, Öcalan had underlined his continued authority over the PKK by ordering an immediate end to a hunger strike by several hundred imprisoned Kurds in Turkey. More recently, an Öcalan directive saw the release of eight Turkish hostages in Iraq’s northern Dahuk province on 13 March.

Although two minor attacks by left-wing Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) militants on Turkey’s Ministry of Justice and offices of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) in Ankara on 19 March were perceived by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an attempt to derail the PKK peace process, the uncharacteristic openness with which the negotiations have so far taken place have engendered notable optimism in Turkey.

PKK militants demonstrate in Diyarbakir in Turkey’s Diyarbakir province on 21 March 2013, shortly before a statement written by their leader Abdullah Öcalan was read aloud calling for a ceasefire (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

OSINT Summary: DHKP/C claims suicide attack on US Embassy in Turkish capital

4 February 2013

A Turkish security guard was killed when a Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) militant detonated a grenade and an explosive belt in a suicide attack at the side security entrance to the United States’ Embassy in the Turkish capital Ankara on 1 February.

In a statement issued on 2 February, the DHKP/C claimed responsibility for the attack, which it said targeted the “murderer of the people of the world”. The statement also condemned Turkey for allegedly allowing the US to train and arm “collaboration- ist looters… for [the] interests of imperialists”, who it claimed were sent back to “massacre Syrian people”.

Several hours after the attack, Turkish officials identified the militant responsible as Ecevit Sanli, thereby suggesting he was a known security threat. This was confirmed when authorities revealed that Sanli had been held in Ümraniye prison between 1997 and 2001 for his role in rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks on the Harbiye Orduevi military club and a police station in Istanbul in August 1997. However, he was diagnosed with Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome - a memory disorder caused by a severe lack of Vitamin B1, contracted during a mass hunger strike in Ümraniye in 2000 - and was released in 2001. Unverified reports claimed Sanli subsequently fled to Germany via Syria, where he lived until reportedly returning to Turkey in early January 2013.

The DHKP/C emerged in 1978 after a factional split in the left-wing militant group Devrimci Sol. Committed to the establishment of a Marxist-Lenininist state in Turkey and to combat perceived imperialism, the group has previously attacked targets representing the Turkish government and what it perceives to be foreign imperialist powers, especially the US and the United Kingdom.

Although DHKP/C attacks have been in relative decline since the early 1990s, a suicide bomber belonging to the group killed a police officer in Istanbul on 11 September 2012. Moreover, the attack on the US Embassy came only two weeks after Turkish security forces arrested a total of 85 people in counter-terrorism operations across the country for alleged links to the DHKP/C. Turkish courts subsequently remanded 38 people in custody over alleged DHKP/C links.

DHKP/C suicide bomber Ecevit Sanli, as shown in the group’s statement claiming the 1 February 2013 suicide bomb attack at the US Embassy in the Turkish capital Ankara. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

OSINT Summary: Alleged PKK founding member among three women killed in France

10 January 2013

An alleged founding member of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK), Sakine Cansiz, was found shot dead along with two other female Kurdish activists inside the Kurdish Institute of Paris in France early on 10 January.

Although the deputy chairman of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi: AKP), Hüseyin Çelik, alleged the attack had been part of an “intra-PKK” feud, Zübeyir Aydar, the leader of Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA- GEL), the parliamentary body of the supranational Kurdish separatist group Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK), claimed it had been retaliation for the PKK’s recent initiation of peace talks with Turkey.

A photo posted by a Kurdish activist on Facebook showing 12 senior Kurdish activists and PKK officials in Diyarbakir prison in Turkey’s Diyarbakir province in 1987. Sakine Cansiz is seen sat in the middle of the front row (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

Turkish government to hold talks with PKK

Key points:

• The Turkish government has stated it plans to hold talks with the PKK.

• Talks with the PKK could pave the way for a cessation in violence that has plagued the country for over two decades.

• The talks are based on fragile foundations and will require a substantial effort on the part of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to forge an agreement between Turkey’s nationalists, secularists and the country’s Kurdish minority.

21 November 2012

According to local news sources, Turkish Intelligence has been conducting negotiations with imprisoned Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan in order to build the foundations for public talks to start. The government’s willingness to conduct talks with the PKK appears to be the best opportunity since 2009 to resolve the Kurdish question.

Ergin’s announcement came after the end of a 68-day hunger strike by more than 1,700 Kurdish inmates and a small number of politicians from the pro-Kurdish Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP). The hunger strike ended after Abdullah Öcalan appealed via his brother and BDP member Mehmet Öcalan to followers to end their protest. Despite being placed in solitary confinement on Imrali island, in the Sea of Marmara, Öcalan’s influence is still ever-present although it is still unknown if it extends to the operational leaders of the PKK and its military leader Murat Karayilan. Government attempts to curtail his ability to communicate to his followers have led to the arrest of more than 30 of Öcalan’s lawyers and independent journalists.

Difficult dynamics

The vice-chairman of the secularist opposition Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), Faruk Logoglu, has questioned the government’s negotiating strategy with the PKK. He told Reuters news agency: “We are all for talking to Öcalan and any other parties so long as it produces clear and concrete outcomes [but] the record of this government is such that they do not really radiate confidence that they are conducting these talks in a clear, results-orientated way without leading to unacceptable demands from the PKK.”

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has faced increased pressure to resolve the Kurdish problem since an increase in the number of violent attacks by the PKK against the Turkish military and the spillover from the neighbouring conflict Syria. The ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) has taken a more active role in acknowledging the problem of the continued alienation of the Kurdish minority, which constitutes approximately 30% of the population. For example, the AKP eased the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language by allowing it to be broadcast in the national media.

Although, the AKP’s Islamic roots provide a common ground for dialogue with the Kurdish minority, compared to the opposition Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) and secularist CHP, continued waves of violence have led to a hardening of voter positions on both sides, which has limited the AKP’s options. This has slowed the momentum gained early in 2009 when the AKP unveiled its “Democratic Opening” or “Kurdish Opening”, a publicised strategy to address the Kurdish problem.

Political ambitions

Turkey will hold its first direct presidential elections in 2014 and Erdogan, who is widely claimed to have presidential ambitions, will be hoping to reach an agreement that will boost his popularity ahead of the polls and capitalise on the support of the Kurdish vote. The ongoing military operations against the PKK in Turkey’s Kurdish region in the southeast of the country and the Qandil mountains in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq are likely to continue, at least in the short term. Erdogan may have to offer the BDP something substantive in order to keep alive the prospect of a breakthrough. Official recognition of the Kurdish language would be an important factor that may reduce tense relations in parliament and on the street. The BDP is not officially tied to the PKK, which has conducted an insurgency against the Turkish state since 1984, but

does share the PKK’s primary political demands, and as such the BDP remains an instrumental player in negotiating peace with the government.

Kurds will be wary of Erdogan’s intentions because an inconsistent government approach to dealing with the Kurdish issue has arguably sustained the PKK’s motivation to continue its armed struggle. This was demonstrated by Erdogan’s sugges- tion that Turkey should reintroduce the death penalty, which he stated in the context of the hunger strike that, something many observers - including EU officials - view as an indication of creeping authoritarianism. However, the key litmus test for the longevity of talks between the government and the PKK will be the drafting of the new constitution, which will require the consent of all parties. The nationalist MHP may seek to block AKP attempts to include a pluralist nation with the recognition of ethnic and religious minorities in the new constitution.

OSINT Summary: PKK announces strategy shift amid escalating operations

14 August 2012

The Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) has assumed a new strategy of “area control” in its campaign against the Turkish government, senior Workers’ Party of Kurdistan commander Bahoz Erdal said in an interview published by the pro-KurdishYeni Özgür Politika newspaper on 13 August. Erdal claimed that PKK attempts to hold territory by establishing checkpoints across vital roadways had sparked sustained clashes with security forces in Semdinli and Çukurca districts in Hakkari province. However, he denied a 7 August claim by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that 115 PKK militants had been killed in a military offensive in Semdinli since 23 July, instead claiming that only 11 had died.

Earlier, on 11 August, PKK spokesman Bakhtiyar Dogan claimed the group had full control of Semdinli. He said: “The Turk- ish occupation is eliminating Kurdish people. Therefore, we have adopted a new policy, which has started with controlling Shemzinan [Semdinli]. We will expand the war.”

The PKK has quantitatively escalated its armed campaign in recent months, with IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recording 13 attacks in June, 18 in July and 14 in the first 13 days of August. While most attacks have been relatively minor, the group has demonstrated an ongoing ability to launch co-ordinated assaults on military positions. For example, on the night of 4-5 August eight security force personnel were killed and 21 other people were wounded in several attacks on military outposts in Çukurca.

The PKK has also continued to carry out kidnappings - with 11 incidents recorded between June and August - which under- mine government claims of territorial control and emphasise the group’s pervasive presence in southeast Turkey. Notably, on 12 August PKK militants kidnapped an opposition member of parliament - Hüseyin Aygün of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), or Republican People’s Party - in Tunceli province. In response to the kidnapping, which was claimed by the PKK the following day, CHP parliamentarian Haluk Koç condemned the government for its failure to not only prevent such incidents but to rescue the “26 citizens, including state officials” currently being held hostage by the PKK.

A screenshot from a video statement by senior PKK commander Bahoz Erdal on an undisclosed date. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

JTIC Brief: PKK comes in from the cold in Turkey

Key Points:

• Operations by Kurdish insurgent group the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) have escalated in southern Turkey since April 2012.

• The group continues to demonstrate a capability to launch sophisticated cross-border operations from staging areas in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.

• The Kurdish issue in Turkey remains unresolved, as illustrated by the government’s ongoing crackdown on the PKK-led Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK)

28 June 2012

PKK operations in southern Turkey have escalated noticeably since April, underlined by co-ordinated cross- border attacks and the use of suicide tactics, reports Charles Lister.

Eight soldiers were killed and 19 others were wounded when approximately 100 Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) militants crossed from northern Iraq into southern Turkey and attacked three military observation points in the Daglica area of Yüksekova district in Hakkâri province early on 19 June. Eighteen militants were then killed in the subsequent military response.

The co-ordinated attacks highlighted the PKK’s operational escalation in southeast Turkey following the winter of 2011- 2012. Under heavy military pressure, and hampered by winter weather conditions, only four PKK attacks were recorded byIHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) between 1 January and 31 March, while at least 34 were then recorded between 1 April and 24 June. The PKK has also appeared willing to continue utilising suicide tactics, claiming responsibility for a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack in Kayseri province on 25 May.

This operational escalation serves to highlight the PKK’s ongoing capabilities, in spite of continuing and concerted military pressure on the group. Meanwhile, the government’s failure to resolve the politically sensitive Kurdish issue, combined with the sustained targeting of Kurdish political organisations, has enabled the PKK to maintain a certain degree of popular support and legitimacy among Turkey’s Kurdish population.

Left to right: Êrîş Gever (alias Cengiz Özek) and Andok Farqîn (alias Ramazan Yılmaz), the two PKK militants identified by the group as responsible for a purported suicide attack on a police station in Kayseri province on 25 May 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

Aims, leadership, and linkages

The PKK’s objectives have evolved over time with the shifting political climate in Turkey - from its founding in 1978 to promote communist revolution in the country to demands for a separate Kurdish state encapsulating territory from Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. The PKK’s aims are currently more moderate, as it seeks to obtain greater cultural and political rights for Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish minority, including amending the constitution to include an explicit recognition of a Kurdish identity. The release of imprisoned PKK president Abdullah Öcalan remains a perennial key objective.

Öcalan was detained by Turkish security forces in 1999 and is currently the sole inmate on the prison island of Imrali in the Marmara Sea. He initially continued to control PKK strategy through messages given to his legal team, but such legal access has been restricted. While Öcalan remains the honorary leader of the PKK, in practice the group is led by Murat Karayilan. Karayilan is the chairman of the executive council of the Koma Civakên Kurdistan (KCK), a PKK-led grouping of Kurdish representative committees and assemblies.

The PKK maintains close links to the Partiya Jiyana Azada Kurdistanê (PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish insurgent group active in northern Iraq and northwest Iran. Following PJAK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire with Tehran in September 2011, Turkish officials claimed that security forces had killed large numbers of Iranian Kurds in southern Turkey in October and November, leading to allegations that PJAK personnel had travelled to join forces with the PKK in the country. Furthermore, amid Syria’s ongoing anti-government uprising, the ethnic Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) has engaged in sporadic clashes with Syrian security forces - such as in Aleppo on 9 May - leading to Turkish media reports speculating that the PYD had accepted a PKK presence in northern Syria.

Screenshots taken from video statements given by active PKK commanders; clockwise from top-left: Nurettin Halef al-Muhammad alias Sofi Nurettin; Amed Delal; Bozan Tekin; Fehman Huseyin alias Bahoz Erdal. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

Annual winter retreat

The PKK has traditionally reduced its operational activity around October-November each year as militants withdraw from southeast Turkey to camps in northern Iraq before the winter snow blocks the mountain passes between the two countries. This was again seemingly demonstrated in late 2011, asJTIC recorded 35 PKK attacks in September and 25 in October, but just nine in November and only a further 12 between 1 December 2011 and 31 March 2012.

It was during this winter drawdown that Turkish security forces began a sustained crackdown on the KCK, which was likely in an attempt to weaken the PKK structure during a period of relative operational inactivity. While the KCK has been targeted by the government since early 2009, the Kurdish Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) claimed in late May that at least 3,895 people had been arrested on KCK-related charges since September 2011. With 29 seats in Turkey’s 550-seat parliament - although its candidates were forced to stand as independents during the June 2011 elections - the BDP has often been targeted itself, with members detained on suspicion of various PKK-related charges. Most recently, six local BDP mayors, including the mayor of the city of Van in Van province, were detained on 7 June and charged with membership of the KCK. While BDP chairman Selahattin Demirtas called on the PKK to disarm on 19 June, the party’s case for remaining non-partisan with regards to the PKK is not aided by statements such as that given by senior BDP official Pervin Buldan on 22 May, when she stated: “We, the Kurdish people, have always seen Öcalan as a leader.”

Although the counter-terrorism environment in the winter of 2011-2012 was dominated by operations targeting KCK suspects, the Turkish Air Force carried out sporadic air strikes targeting suspected PKK positions in northern Iraq in November and December 2011 and in February, March and April 2012. In addition, JTIC recorded the deaths of 97 suspected PKK militants in periodic ground offensives by the military across the southeast provinces of Turkey between 1 November 2011 and 31 March 2012.

A selection of images taken from a video showing PKK militants training in the Qandil mountains in northern Iraq. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

Coming in from the cold

The end of winter has traditionally led to a resumption or escalation of PKK operations, with greater mobility for cross-border operations once more possible with the melting of the winter snow. Such operational increases by the PKK were recorded byJTIC in both early 2010 and early 2011. The PKK began escalating operations in April, with at least 12 attacks carried out that month compared to only three in March. Among the attacks - typified by small-unit guerrilla operations, involving small- arms or improvised explosive device (IED) attacks - was a triple IED attack on a section of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, which transports crude oil from Iraq into Turkey, in Sirnak province on 5 April. The attack may have reflected PKK anger at the improving relationship between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, but a similar attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in Kars province on 29 May potentially indicated a broader campaign targeting energy infrastructure.

In May, there was a further increase in PKK attacks, the majority of which targeted either security forces or construction workers employed by local authorities in the group’s area of operations. In the most notable attack that month, two PKK militants carry out a purported SVBIED attack on a police station in Pinarbasi in Kayseri province on 25 May. The attack, which killed a police officer, was claimed three days later by the PKK’s armed wing, the Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG), which claimed the attack was part of the “Spirit of the 4th Strategic Period” and constituted the first action of the “Immortal Battalion”. While the attack was described by the HPG as a “suicide attack”, media reports speculated that the two militants had not intended to carry out a suicide attack but had resorted to detonating their explosives-laden vehicle when engaged by security forces.

The PKK appears to have maintained this relatively high operational tempo into June, with at least 13 attacks recorded byJTIC as of 24 June. The cross-border assault by the group on 19 June encapsulated the recent escalation of PKK operations and underscored the capacity of the group to intersperse regular low-level violence with larger and more sophisticated acts. Moreover, the targeting of the observations posts in Daglica was perhaps somewhat symbolic, as their principal responsibility is the prevention of militant infiltration from northern Iraq into Turkey. A similar attack by the PKK on the posts on 21 October 2007 left 12 soldiers dead.

Outlook

Beyond the PKK insurgency, the Turkish government shows no sign of resolving the wider Kurdish issue. The sentencing of Kurdish parliamentarian Leyla Zana to 10 years in prison on 24 May - which was deferred until after her parliamentary term finishes - for allegedly spreading PKK propaganda in nine speeches given between 2007 and 2008 is but the latest example used by Kurdish activists of government repression. Zana had previously been imprisoned for 10 years in 1994 for having spoken a line of Kurdish - illegal at the time - during her swearing-in ceremony in parliament in 1991.

So long as Kurdish demands for cultural and political rights remain unanswered, the PKK will be able to call on sufficient popular support and legitimacy from Turkey’s Kurdish population to maintain its insurgency. The current cessation of PJAK operations in Iran and the alleged shift of PJAK militants into the PKK’s ranks, along with the reported establishment of a PKK presence in northern Syria, have afforded the PKK opportunities to build upon its already substantial capabilities. After its regular winter retreat to northern Iraq and the resulting reduction in operations, since April the PKK has once more demonstrated that it retains the capacity to endure an effective military counter-insurgency and indeed escalate its own armed campaign.

4. Counter-Terrorism Environment

Between 1 June 2012 and 31 May 2013, IHS IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded 203 counter- terrorism operations in Turkey, representing a 21.1% increase from the preceding 12 month period when 271 counter- terrorism operations were recorded. The vast majority of these operations took place in the first half of the reporting period and targeted the ethnic Kurdish Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) insurgency in the country’s southeast.

Counter-Terrorism Environment Rating

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

Highly Extremely Very Moderately Very Extremely Highly Lax Restrictive Insecure Lax Lax Restrictive Restrictive Restrictive Secure

The national counter-terrorism environment rating assesses the vulnerability of the state to campaigns waged by armed sub-state groups active in the country. The lower the rating, the more likely it is that groups active in the country will be able to sustain themselves and achieve their objectives.

The counter-terrorism environment in Turkey is rated Moderately Restrictive (3.0) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment (military and law enforcement), Political Environment (government and society) and Physical Environment (terrain and resources). A Moderately Restrictive environment is defined as one in which the environment favours the government. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable in the long term, and have a credible prospect of achieving limited concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the short to medium term, but are unlikely to be able to maintain anything other than temporary control over any territory, and pose only a minor threat to the state.

Security Environment

Assesses the capacity, capability and loyalty of state security forces – as well as the effectiveness of the judicial system – and the extent to which they are adapted to the threat posed by militant groups.

Security Environment 3.5 – Restrictive Police, Customs and Intelligence 3.5 Military and Paramilitary Forces 3.5 Judicial and Penal System 4.0

Turkey’s security forces have a highly developed intelligence capability. The main intelligence-gathering agency, the Millî Ìstih- barat Teskilâti (MIT), has enjoyed some important successes, including the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Turkey’s police forces total over 230,000 officers divided among national police and Police Special Forces, who have a special mission to carry out counter-insurgency operations against the PKK. Conversely, frontier security – which is the responsibility of the Gendarmie – is comparatively lax due to a lack of suitable levels of training and professionalism.

The armed forces, totalling over 517,000 personnel, also play a role in the counter-insurgency campaign and have led incursions into northern Iraq against the PKK. Significant progress has been made to professionalise the largely conscript military, and regular NATO deployments have increased professional standards. The Gendarmerie, which has over 150,000 troops and another 50,000 reserves, plays a major role in fighting the PKK. The force has its own intelligence section, Jandarma Istihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (JITEM), which is primarily used for intelligence gathering against the PKK. The Village Guards, or Gecici Koy Koruculugu (GKK), are comprised of mainly ethnic Kurds who are able to utilise their knowledge of the local terrain and their language skills to facilitate intelligence gathering, as well as participate in combat.

Turkey has enacted a raft of specific anti-terrorism laws under which suspects can receive lengthy sentences for merely belonging to an ‘illegal organisation’. The judicial system in Turkey has also traditionally favoured the state’s efforts to combat insurgents, prioritising concerns for national security and Turkish identity over individual liberties.

Political Environment

Assesses the extent to which the political environment, and the attitudes of the population, affect the state’s ability to counter the activities of militant groups operating in the country. Political Environment 3.0 – Moderately Restrictive Government Legitimacy 3.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 2.5 International Co-operation 3.5

Although Turkey is a secular democracy, governments have struggled to appease various competing interest groups. This has been particularly evident with the role played by Islam in public life. The decision by the ruling Islamist party, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) to nominate its Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as its presidential candidate in 2007 was welcomed by many although the move was vigorously opposed by others, initially raising fears of a military coup in defence of Turkey’s tradition of secular nationalism. Meanwhile, the AKP has alleged that secret ultra-nationalist groups such as Ergenekon are plotting to overthrow the government and install a more secular administration.

High unemployment has contributed to social unrest across Turkey particularly in the predominantly Kurdish southeast, where this disparity in living standards with the rest of the country has fostered resentment against the central government and facilitated PKK recruitment.

Turkey is a signatory to a multitude of international agreements on terrorism, including 58 bilateral agreements with 43 states, and has ratified all UN conventions related to terrorism. International cooperation against militant groups operating in Turkey is generally strong as most of these groups have targeted foreign interests in their attacks, although relations with neighbouring Syria have likely ceased altogether since the eruption of internal conflict there in mid-2011. While relations between Ankara and the government in Iraqi Kurdistan have been tense, particularly following Turkish incursions into Iraq’s Qandil mountains, the relationship has strengthened considerably and is now marked by greater cooperation and coordination.

Physical Envrironment

Assesses the extent to which characteristics of the local theatre affect the state’s ability to successfully constrain the activities of militant groups operating in the country.

Physical Environment 2.5 – Lax Geography and Terrain 1.5 Natural Resource Control 4.5 Weapons Proliferation 1.5

Turkey’s geography has significantly contributed to the ability of insurgents to sustain their campaigns and to the corre- sponding inability of the security forces to achieve a decisive engagement. The rough and inhospitable terrain of the Qandil mountains, along Turkeys borders with Iraq and Iran, provide ideal basing areas for the PKK and facilitate the infiltration and exfiltration of PKK operatives across the border into Turkey. In addition, security along the southern border with Syria has declined considerably since mid-2011, with Syrian anti-government militants, many belonging to explicitly Islamist militant groups, crossing into Turkish territory on a regular basis.

The PKK has long financed its campaign through the trafficking of drugs, among other sources of revenue. Other sub-state armed groups in Turkey are similarly unable to generate revenue from resources within their areas of operations, relying on funding from taxes on the local population or from sympathetic diaspora populations.

Turkey’s gun culture and geographical proximity and porous borders with countries such as Iraq have meant that there are a significant number of small-arms in circulation – both legally and illegally. Although recent legislation has sought to improve the tracking and ownership of small arms, the proliferation of weaponry persists, particularly through black markets in Iraq and likely also from conflict-ridden Syria.

6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology

JTIC Country Briefings are consolidated reports designed to pull together all existing and new IHS IHS Jane’s qualitative and quantitative intelligence in an effort to provide our clients with the most complete view of terrorism threats on a country-to- country basis.

The JTIC dataset, used to generate the incident and trend analysis in these reports, is compiled using reliable open-source intelligence (OSINT) collated from a comprehensive range of national and international sources, including: local, national, and international news sources; government and inter-governmental reports; and analytical articles. Every effort is made by JTIC analysts to verify the accuracy of reported events through detailed examining and cross-referencing of all available sources.

The dataset is updated with new information twice daily and event records are written and meta-tagged in accordance with the facts of an event as known at the time. JTIC regional analysts consistently review event records entered into the database, and records are amended and updated as additional information becomes available.

JTIC’s editorial and analytical procedures are designed to ensure that the maximum number of terrorism and insurgency events is recorded on the day those events occur. However, to ensure that all events are recorded, JTIC analysts periodically review the dataset on a country and group basis in an effort to capture any additional events that may not previously have been available in open-source. These events are backfilled into the dataset to allow for the most accurate statistical trend analysis.

As the JTIC dataset is compiled solely from available open-source intelligence, it is crucial to note that analysis of that data cannot be expected, in isolation, to provide a complete assessment of terrorism/insurgency trends. To achieve this, findings from the database should always be viewed in conjunction with qualitative intelligence provided by JTIC analysts in these reports, and gleaned from a multitude of sources in addition to available open-source.