Naval War College Review Volume 65 Article 15 Number 1 Winter

2012 Battle of urS igao Strait Richard Norton

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Recommended Citation Norton, Richard (2012) "Battle of urS igao Strait," Naval War College Review: Vol. 65 : No. 1 , Article 15. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss1/15

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172 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEWNorton: Battle of Surigao Strait

Sikorsky, Frank Piasecki, and Arthur Walter Boyne has delivered a timely Young. The narrative offers a tip of the study that asks difficult, important hat to the Marine Corps, acknowledg- questions about the future of military ing that institution’s decision to cham- aviation, especially in an era when the pion this emerging technology, as well nature of combat operations is rapidly as the parts played by the Navy and evolving. For these questions alone, it is Coast Guard, but the strength of this a worthwhile read. The lucid analysis of book resides in its examination of the the technological issues and the com- helicopter’s influence on combat over pelling stories of the pioneers and war- land. riors who brought the helicopter to TheVietnamWarservesasthelens prominence are icing on the cake. through which the rapid development K. J. DELAMER of helicopter-borne operations is stud- Naval War College ied. Anecdotes about operational lead- ers whose vision married capabilities provided by industry with the arduous conditions of the Southeast Asian bat- tlefield provide evidence of how mod- Tully, Anthony P. Battle of Surigao Strait. Bloom- ern warfare was changed. Anecdotal ington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009. 329pp. $18.45 evidence is supported by statistics de- The sprawling battle of Leyte Gulf was tailing the number of troops and the fought from 23 to 26 October 1944, and amount of material transported within nearly seventy years later it still has the the theater, as well as the grim losses power both to fire the imagination and suffered in accomplishing these mis- to provide enduring military lessons. As sions. Within the Vietnam context, the drama goes, the battle (or more pre- tactical and operational impacts of rotary- cisely, a series of engagements, each wing aircraft are clearly demonstrated. deserving a name of its own) is an ap- The argument revolves around the parently bottomless cornucopia of postwar failure to maintain the wartime personalities, desperate gambles, and momentum. heroism, as well as of enough “what-ifs” The discussion of the post-Vietnam de- to spawn a cottage industry of alternate velopments asks difficult and uncom- histories. In at least one way, Leyte Gulf fortable questions. Delving into the has similarities to Gettysburg. Both bat- fiscal disparity between the research tles have been written about so exten- and development efforts supporting sively that some authors focus on the fixed-wing, tactical aircraft and similar smaller engagements that together com- efforts for the benefit of rotary-wing plete the picture of the larger conflict. aviation, the author reaches conclusions The basic story of Leyte is a familiar that may be disconcerting for advocates one. Faced with growing U.S. naval of traditional airpower. This critique of power, a steadily weakening fleet, and overspending on fixed-wing research initial American landings in the Philip- and development at the expense of sur- pines, Japanese naval authorities initi- vivability, lethality, and capability for ated a bold stroke. Using their precious rotary-wing aircraft gives the book a remaining carriers as bait, they drew off controversial edge. Admiral William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 1, Art. 15 BOOK REVIEWS 173

while they attempted to reach the U.S. been a matter of conjecture. The next beachhead with powerful surface forces mystery is the sinking of the Japanese approaching through the San Bernardino destroyer Michishiro. In this instance and Surigao Straits. The majority of there is uncertainty regarding the claim power would be contained in Admiral that USS Hutchins (DD 476) sank it. Fi- Takeo Kurita’s Central Force, which nally, Tully seeks to discover the exact would force the San Bernardino Strait manner in which the Japanese destroyer and approach the U.S. transports from Yamashiro was sunk. By Tully’s own the east. Two smaller but still poten- admission, these issues are military mi- tially deadly forces, commanded by Ad- nutiae, but they are important to him. mirals Shoji Nishimura and Kiyohide He obviously wants to know where U.S. Shima, would attempt the Surigao torpedoes struck the doomed Yamashiro Strait and attack the Americans from andwhathappenedtoFuso. the south. Kurita’s force came closer to Tully’s writing style, for the most part, victory, but, due in part to a gallant de- is pleasant, analytical, and temperate, fense by inferior U.S. forces, and with although from time to time the neutral the counsel of his own forces, Kurita tone of the distant observer shifts to a turned back on the doorstep of success. more impassioned vernacular, particu- In contrast, Nishimura never had a larly when Tully is arguing a position or chance. Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf describing some especially dramatic turned the Surigao Strait into a killing moment. However, the result is not sack. As Nishimura drove deeper into problematic. It is Tully’s personal pas- the strait, his forces were treated to sion for the subject that elevates this wave after wave of attacks that ended in book above many naval histories, along a crescendo of firepower, as Oldendorf’s with his eagerness to present the Japa- main battle line put an end to the Japa- nese point of view. This is a perspective nese southern attack. that with few exceptions is lacking in Rather than write only about the big Western accounts. picture, Tully puts Surigao Strait under RICHARD NORTON a microscope. Drawing extensively Naval War College from little (or never) -accessed Japanese records, he painstakingly pulls together his account of the battle. Each Japanese ship is discussed in detail, each com-

manding officer is subjected to scrutiny, Busch, John Laurence. Steam Coffin: Captain Mo- and communications are reviewed. The ses Rogers and the Steamship Savannah Break the result is impressive: what emerges is a Barrier. New Canaan, Conn.: Hodos Historia, convincing and incredibly detailed ac- 2010. 726pp. $35 count of this segment of the battle. One of the great events in American, In re-creating the battle, Tully takes on and indeed world, maritime history oc- several “mysteries” that have endured curred in the summer of 1819, when the since 1944. The first is the fate of the American steamship Savannah, com- Japanese battleship Fuso. It is known manded by Captain Moses Rogers, be- that the ship was destroyed, but the ex- came the first steam-powered vessel to act circumstances of its sinking have cross the Atlantic Ocean. Its pioneer

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