“Peace Now” As seen by three Israeli historians

Table of Contents

Introduction P. 3 - 5

Methodology P. 6 - 9

Israel: Historic Background P. 10 - 14 - Ottoman / British Mandate period - Political Zionism - Establishment of Israel - Israeli society

Israel: Historiography P. 15 - 18 - Zionist historiography - New Historians - Peace movement historiography - Peace Now historiography

The Israeli Peace Movement and Peace Now P. 19 - 25

Biographies authors P. 26 - 29 - Reuven Kaminer - Tamar Hermann - Atalia Omer

1978: The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Negotiations and Camp David Accords P. 30 - 39 - Reuven Kaminer - Tamar Hermann - Atalia Omer - Tarrow and Van Zoomeren, Postmes and Spears - Conclusion

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1982: The First Lebanon War P. 40 - 45 - Reuven Kaminer - Tamar S. Hermann - Atalia Omer - Tarrow and Van Zoomeren, Postmes and Spears - Conclusion

The First and Second Intifada P. 46 - 52 - Reuven Kaminer - Tamar Hermann - Atalia Omer - Tarrow and Van Zoomeren, Postmes and Spears - Conclusion

Conclusion P. 53 - 56

Bibliography P. 57 - 59

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Introduction

“Peace Now? I don’t think their office is around here…”, said a man on the balcony of an apartment building in a residential neighborhood in Tel Aviv. I had made my way from Jerusalem to visit the office of Israel’s most well-known peace organization, Peace Now (or in Hebrew: Shalom Achshav), though finding the office proved to be more difficult. I was on my way to interview a staff-member, it was mid-summer 2014, Operation Protective Edge was taking place, and the atmosphere was tense. Eventually I found the unmarked office of Peace Now in the basement of the same building where I had asked directions earlier. The man I had spoken to just before had unknowingly been living above the office of Israel’s most well-known peace organization.

During a prolonged stay in Jerusalem in 2014 my interest in Israeli peace organizations was sparked by Haaretz newspaper. Haaretz, Israel’s most politically left newspaper, featured a noticeable amount of articles and advertisements that expressed severe criticism of, and opposition to, Israeli policies regarding the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Israeli treatment of Palestinians in these territories. Frequent mention was made of peace organizations such as Peace Now. When contrasting this with the Jerusalem Post, a right-leaning Israeli newspaper, there was a noticeable difference in articles that were published and views expressed. Considering their diverging ideological foundations these differences in tone and content is understandable, yet it showed a schism in Israeli society that I, as a foreigner with relatively little previous insight into Israeli society, had not seen before. The existence of an array of Israeli organizations that diametrically opposed Israeli policies in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip led my perception of Israel as a monolithic entity to crumble, and rightly so. The existence of peace organizations in Israel raise the question as to how and why certain individuals are critical of Israeli policies regarding the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where others are not. Also, it raises the question as to how and why peace organizations were formed and what they have achieved. Of these organizations that voice opposition to Israeli policies, Peace Now is the most well-known and the largest, which is why it has my specific interest.

Peace Now is part of the Israeli peace movement, an umbrella term for a group of Israeli organizations that are ideologically diverse but have one thing in common: the aim to increase rapprochement between Israelis and Palestinians and end the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A broad-based Israeli peace movement emerged in the late 1970’s. The few Israeli peace initiatives before the late 1970s were based on the view that only the emergence of democratic, non- hostile governments in neighboring countries could bring a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict: ‘since Israel is surrounded by non-democratic, hostile, states which wish to destroy it … — the argument

3 went—, there was not much Israel could do to advance peace; rather, it had to mobilize most of its resources to ensure its survival.’ 1 When Israel’s largest, most powerful neighbor Egypt revealed itself to be a potential partner for peace and negotiations commenced between the two countries, the Israeli public realized the viable and potentially historic opportunity for peace. After a hopeful start in 1977, the negotiations stalled. It was in the wake of these difficulties that Peace Now emerged and played a leading role in mobilizing large parts of the Israeli public to encourage the government not to miss a chance at peace. Through organizing mass demonstrations Peace Now consolidated its name as a major player in the newly developed broad-based peace movement. It was Peace Now’s ability to mobilize the Israeli public to attend demonstrations that characterized its presence on the protest scene.

After I had found the Peace Now office, I learned from a staff member that the biggest demonstration in Israel’s history had not been in opposition to one of Israel’s many wars or in support of peace, but had been a demonstration in 2011 against the rising cost of living. After expressing surprise that, in a country where security issues and impending dangers are featured in the news daily, this was the issue that most people would demonstrate against, I was informed that ‘people in Israel don’t necessarily feel the occupation of the West Bank, what they do feel is their rent increasing.’ At present, a waning of public support is characteristic for most Israeli peace organizations, as their credibility has been systematically undermined and damaged by themselves and by, most significantly, the failing of the Oslo Accords, which destroyed the hope many Israelis had for peace with the Palestinians. This is also reflected in the relatively low level of political influence which Peace Now boasts nowadays. Considering Peace Now is widely credited as being the largest Israeli peace movement, and the organization boasting impressive achievements such as organizing rallies in 1978 and 1982 that hundreds of thousands of people flocked to, the organization has relatively little influence nowadays. It has redirected its policies towards watchdog tactics and monitoring rather than mass-demonstrations.

Oddly, relatively little has been written about Peace Now, which is remarkable considering Peace Now is widely credited as being the largest Israeli peace organization with impressive achievements such as organizing rallies in 1978 and 1982 that hundreds of thousands of people flocked to. Equally remarkable is the contrast between Peace Now’s initial surge of support from the general public in the late 1970’s and the widespread disregard with which the organization is treated today. It is against this background that this thesis aims to investigate the treatment of Peace Now in the works

1 S.Helman. "Peace Movements in Israel." Jewish Women’s Archive. Web. 4 of three Israeli historians, namely Reuven Kaminer, Tamar S. Hermann and Atalia Omer (hereafter Kaminer, Hermann and Omer). In doing so, this thesis will subsequently draw conclusions on the Israeli scholarly perception of Peace Now’s appeal, its activities and its impact.

The research question at the heart of this thesis is: ‘What has been written about Peace Now since its emergence?

To focus the research, the historians’ treatment of Peace Now will be analyzed in the context of three specific watershed moments in the recent history of the state of Israel. These moments are: the 1978 peace negotiations with Egypt and subsequent Camp David Accords, the First Lebanon War in 1982 and the First and Second Intifada. The thesis is, accordingly, divided into 3 chapters, preceded by a chapter on the historical background to the state of Israel, a chapter on the historical background to the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now, and a chapter on the historiographies of both the state of Israel and the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now. Lasty, the thesis is finalized with an overall conclusion.

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Methodology

Focus and scope This thesis is focused on answering the following question: ‘What has been written about Peace Now since its emergence?’ In answering this question this thesis shall conduct historiographic research by focusing on how Peace Now has been portrayed in three works written by Israeli historians. By investigating these works this thesis will gain insight into how Peace Now is portrayed by these historians. Specifically, the historians’ portrayal of the origin, dynamics and outcome Peace Now’s activities will be investigated. The three works which shall be form the basis of this thesis are:

- Reuven Kaminer: ‘The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada’ (1996). - Tamar S. Hermann: ‘The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream’ (2009). - Atalia Omer: ‘When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism and Justice’ (2013).

The works of Kaminer et al. were selected firstly because each of them is a professional historian and published by well-established academic presses. Secondly, the works focus solely on the Israeli peace movement and not on the broader history of Israel or general overviews on conflict resolution, in which Peace Now is sporadically mentioned but not elaborated upon. Therefore these works address the Israeli peace movement specifically and as a result Peace Now receives significant attention. Thirdly, the similar focus of the work provides an opportunity to draw comparisons and reveal contrasts between the respective approaches and analyses of these three historians.

To focus this thesis, Peace Now’s activities during three specific events in Israel’s history will be researched. These events have been selected because they constitute major political events in described by Kaminer et al. as watershed moments in Israel’s history, during which Peace Now played a part. The three events are:

- The Israeli-Egyptian negotiations and Camp David Accords (1978-1980) - The First Lebanon War (1982) - The First (1987-1991) and Second (2000-2005) Intifada

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In order to further focus the authors’ treatment of Peace Now during these events, a theory of collective action will be applied. This will be done to deepen insights gained into Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portrayal of Peace Now during these three events.

Theories of Collective Action To further investigate how Kaminer et al. have approached Peace Now during the events mentioned above, this thesis will keep two approaches to collective action in mind. One of these is the approach advocated by Sidney Tarrow in his National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States’, which argues that ‘the dynamics of social collective action are best understood in relation to the political process.2 The other approach is advocated by Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes and Russel Spears in their article ‘Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives’, wherein they identify three socio-psychological perspectives on collective action in the context of protest.3

As Tarrow argues in his work ‘National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States’, the study of collective behavior and social movements mirrors political events that take place. Tarrow argues that though there are differences between social movement and political groups, ‘the dynamics of social collective action are best understood in relation to the political process’.4 The study of collective action and social movement gained momentum from the 1960s and 1970s onward due to the so-called ‘disorderly politics of the 1960s’ in Europe and the United States. In Europe a ‘new social movement’ approach developed, focused on the structural causes of social movements, as well as on the collective identities they expressed and on their relation to advanced capitalism. In the United States a ‘resource mobilization’ approach emerged, focusing on individual attitude, the groups that organized mass protest and at the form of action they undertook.5 The European new social movement approach did not pay much attention to politics, it neglected the realm of politics in the study of social movements. The resource mobilization approach which developed in the United States focused on the psychological aspects of collective action and did not devote significant attention to the political process of collective action.6 In the

2 S. Tarrow. "National Politics And Collective Action: Recent Theory And Research In Western Europe And The United States." Annual Review of Sociology 14.1 (1988) P. 422. 3 M. Van Zomeren, T. Postmes and R. Spears. "Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action: A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-psychological Perspectives."Psychological Bulletin 134.4 (2008) P. 504.

4 Tarrow, P. 422. 5 Idem, P. 423. 6 Idem, P. 425. 7 course of the 1980s there developed an awareness among political scientists and sociologists in the United States and Europe that ‘conventional politics might provide the opportunity structure for collective actors’.7

Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears disregard the political aspect furthered by Tarrow and focus on three socio-psychological perspectives on collective action. The three key perspectives that predict collective action are stated as being: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and a sense of social identity. In order to further clarify these terms, injustice is defined as ‘perceptions of unfair treatment or outcomes. … feelings of injustice tend to be based on subjective perceptions of group-based inequity (i.e., some inequality or disadvantage that is perceived as illegitimate)’.8 Efficacy refers to ‘a sense of control, influence, strength, and effectiveness to change a group-related problem’, which includes political efficacy in this case.9 By social identity ‘the socially shared understandings of what it means to be a group member, and this typically includes stereotypes of in- and out-groups in relation to each other as well as appreciations of the relative status of those groups’ is meant.10 In this context, collective action is defined as ‘expressions of protest against collective perceived disadvantages’.11 The definition encompasses attitudinal support for protest as well as the protest intentions or behaviors of members of a social group that are directed at removing the perceived underlying causes of the group’s disadvantage or problem (examples such as signing a petition or participating in a demonstration are given).12 The model developed by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears applies to Peace Now, as it is an organization that expresses opposition to perceived disadvantages through actions such as demonstrations, directed at eradicating the perceived disadvantage.

The perspectives (or: predictors) of perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and social identity produce, sometimes in combination with each other, different levels of collective action. It is important to highlight that these predictors are defined as perceived and therefore as subjective. Collective action is at times approached as a response to objective (political, non socio-psychological) disadvantage, but Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears emphasize that though these objective conditions are important to consider, their connection to collective action, popular disturbance and mass violence is ‘elusive and weak at best.’13

7 Tarrow, P. 427. 8 Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, P. 512. 9 Idem, P. 513. 10 Idem, P. 505. 11 Idem, P . 512. 12 Idem. 13 Idem, P. 505. 8

Applying these theories to Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s works is a strategy employed to find specific characteristics in their accounts of Peace Now during these three watershed moments in Israel’s history. These theories, when applied, will provide further insight into answering the research question as to what these historians’ portrayed as the origin, dynamics and outcome Peace Now’s activities. Hopefully applying this research will yield valuable results and contribute to the study of Peace Now and to the study of the Israeli peace movement in general.

Considerations It is necessary to bear certain considerations in mind. This historiographical research is not focused on obtaining an objective ‘truth’. The aim is to identify the historians’ views regarding the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities. All three historians are Israeli nationals who have been involved with the peace movement, which undoubtedly indicates a political stance regarding Peace Now, the general peace movement and Israeli society and politics in a broader sense. Furthermore, their views will be compared and contrasted with Tarrow’s theory on collective action and the three socio-psychological predictors of collective action as defined by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears.

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Historical background Israel

British Mandate Period While the Ottomans ‘seemed likely to make themselves masters of Europe’ in the sixteenth century, the empire was considerably weak at the end of the eighteenth century.14 The empire was plagued by weak leadership, increasing decentralization, a prolonged economic crisis and external pressures from European powers.15 Proving incapable of ‘assimilating new discoveries in the art of warfare’, the Ottoman Empire became known as the ‘sick man of Europe’ at the end of the 19th century. The Sublime Porte’s waning power and influence, combined with an alignment with the Central Powers during the First World War and its loss in this war, proved to be the final blow to an already fragile empire. The subsequent division of large parts of the Ottoman Empire’s eastern territories among the war’s Allied Forces led to an increased European presence. While the French exerted their authority over Syria and Mount Lebanon, the British established a presence in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine.

Due to British conquests in the southern Ottoman empire during the First World War, the newly formed League of Nations approved the British mandate over Palestine in 1922 which went into effect in 1923. Before and during the mandate period in Palestine, the British had cleared the path for the establishment of a Jewish national home through the Balfour Declaration and Sykes-Picot Agreement with France and the Churchill White Paper of 1922. In the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, Great Britain and France had established a plan determining their respective areas of influence in the Levant. Through the Balfour Declaration of the following year Great Britain expressed approval of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which was affirmed by the Churchill White Paper in 1922 despite violent objections from within Palestine.16

The British mandate period in Palestine saw a continuation of increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. Between 1922 and 1939 Jewish settlements increased from 47 to 200 and Jewish land- holdings more than doubled. This caused fear and resentment among Arabs living in Palestine and led to sporadic uprisings against the British and the Jews.17

14 A. Hourani. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London: New York, Toronto, 1962) P. 38. 15 Idem, P. 38. 16 C. Beckerman-Boys. "Third Parties and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Poliheuristic Decision Theory and British Mandate Palestine Policy." Foreign Policy Analysis 3rd ser. 10 (2013) P. 226. 17 P. Mansfield. A History of the Middle East. (New York: Viking, 1991) P. 207.

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The outbreak of the Second World War made Palestine expendable to the British Empire. Soon after the war, the cost of maintaining an overseas presence in India and Palestine, as well as lending military and financial support to Turkey and Greece, meant straining a nearly bankrupt Britain.18 Coupled with Zionist ambitions and increasing Zionist attacks on British personnel and establishments in Palestine, the British sought to relinquish their responsibilities and referred the issue of maintaining order in Palestine to a United Nations Special Committee. This committee proposed partitioning the land into Jewish and Arab states, which was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1947. 19 The indigenous Arab population of Palestine had, from the outset, rejected their country being overwhelmed by foreign immigrants. This partition plan never achieved fruition. Upon the end of the British mandate on May 14th 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel was declared the next day by David Ben-Gurion, head of the Zionist Organization and president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

Political Zionism The developments in Palestine are interwoven with the rise of Zionism as a political ideology in Europe. Theodor Herzl, an Austro-Hungarian Jew born in 1860, is known as the father of political Zionism. Herzl felt that Jewish assimilation in Europe had failed and he proposed a solution to the so- called ‘Jewish Question’ in his most famous work ‘Der Judenstaat’, published in 1896. The answer to the question lay in the establishment of a Jewish state, ‘a corner…where they can live in peace, no longer hounded, outcast and despised…a country that will be their own.’20 His political activities and diplomatic endeavors, among which was the establishment of the World Zionist Organization, aimed at making the establishment of a Jewish national home a political reality. Herzl’s description of Zionism was as follows: ‘a political expression of an old idea’. It aimed at solving the ‘Jewish Question’ by modern means, but its foundation was to realize the centuries-old desire to return to Zion.21 It is this political Zionism, furthered by Herzl and also other Jewish activists and thinkers from the late 19th century onward, that proved to be the ideological basis for the establishment of the State of Israel. In order to understand the Israeli politico-social landscape, it is of crucial importance to keep in mind that the foundations of the Israeli state, and the central assumption of the political landscape, lie in the acceptance of the legitimacy of the Zionistic ideology.

18 H.M. Sachar. Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998.) P.3.

19 Sachar, P. 4. 20 I. Friedman. "Theodor Herzl: Political Activity and Achievements." Israel Studies 9.3 (2004) P. 47. 21 Idem, P. 68. 11

The political Zionism that Herzl and the World Zionist Organization furthered did not call on Jewry to move to Palestine to establish a national home. What was of essential importance was Jewish sovereignty over a concrete, tangible piece of land.22 Zionist immigration to, and settlement in, Palestine had been taking place since at least 1882, ten years before Herzl’s ‘Der Judenstaat’. These immigrants, or so-called ‘practical Zionists’, went to Palestine to found colonies and work on the land.23 Compared to the number of Jews moving to the United States or to Western Europe, these practical Zionists constituted a relatively small number. Between 1882 and 1903 (otherwise known as the first wave of immigration or ‘First Aliyah’ to Israel) about 25,000 Jewish immigrants settled in Palestine, initially in the coastal plain and Jerusalem and eventually spreading out to the north and south.24 This immigration, partly due to religious, economic and political reasons, significantly increased with the development of political Zionism and due to Russian pogroms and the rise and spread of Nazism in Europe. Between 1903 and 1948 almost half a million Jews immigrated to Palestine and in the five years following the establishment of the State of Israel, over 700,000 Jews immigrated to the newly formed state.

The Establishment of the State of Israel Following the establishment of the State of Israel on the 14th of May 1948, forces from Transjordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon invaded the newly formed state the following day. Israeli forces managed to defeat the Arab forces in the ‘War of Independence’ as it is known in Israel. To Palestinians known as the Nakba (Arabic: the catastrophe). Besides exerting authority over the territory allotted to a Jewish state, Israeli troops also consolidated power over a significant amount of land initially meant for an Arab state, according to the UN partition plan. Mandatory Palestine was now divided into three entities, Israel, the Jordanian West Bank and the Gaza Strip, controlled by Egypt.25 From its inception onward Israel faced attacks from Arab states on Israeli territory and on the territory it had seized in the 1948 war, the Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Besides defensive wars, Israel was also involved in offensive operations, such as the unsuccessful initiative in 1956 with France and Britain to oust Nasser in the Sinai campaign, the seizure of the Golan Heights and the West Bank in 1967, the Lebanon wars in 1982 and 2006, and the frequent military campaigns in the Gaza Strip.26 Also, Israel faced and continues to face frequent opposition from the Palestinians living in Israel (the so-called Arab-Israelis) and more directly from Palestinians living under Israeli

22 Mansfield, P. 161.

23 Idem, P. 160. 24 A. Soffer. “Demography and the Shaping of Israel’s Borders” Contemporary Jewry 10.3 (1989): 91-105. Springer Link. P. 93

25 I. Pappé. The Modern Middle East. (London: Routledge, 2005), P. 24. 26 Idem, P. 29. 12 occupation in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian frustrations reaching a fever-pitch have led to two mass civilian uprisings, the First and Second Intifada (Arabic: shaking off). The First Intifada started in December 1987, to which Israel responded with mass arrests and deportations, among others. After two years 50,000 Palestinians had been arrested, 7,000 had been wounded and more than 500 were killed.27 The suppression of this civilian uprising cost Israel dearly, it was damaging to the morale of the military and to its international reputation. With regards to Israeli actions against the Palestinian uprising Peter Mansfield stated: ‘…it became an accepted international truism – shared by the United States government and much of the Israeli public – that any purely military solution would be ineffective.’28 The Second Intifada, otherwise known as the Al- Aqsa Intifada, starting in 2000 and ending in 2005 and also cost the Israelis dearly. This Second Intifada, besides leading to deaths, injuries and arrests on the Palestinian side, also resulted in the Israeli destruction of much of the West Bank’s infrastructure.29

Besides these external and internal threats, Israel experienced exceptional economic growth which allowed it to prosper as a nation. As Ilan Pappé highlights in his book ‘The Modern Middle East’, Israel’s exceptional economic growth has been impressive in light of the political instabilities it faces. Pappé highlights that this ‘exceptional status is and was won by massive American financial aid and equally important support from Jewish communities around the world.’30 The Israeli economy has been able to develop differently than the economies of surrounding Arab states due to this aid, and successive Israeli governments have used this aid efficiently to further their local agendas.31

Besides its strong economic development, Israel also stands out in that it is a fully-functioning democratic state in the Middle East. This is, compared to other countries in the region, an exceptional feat. Israel’s government is elected through transparent elections and there is a variety of political parties to choose from. The 8 million people living in Israel, of whom Arabs make up almost 2 million, enjoy a relatively varied media landscape with a relatively high level of freedom of expression. But, it must be said that Palestinians with an Israeli passport, the so-called Arab-Israelis, face widespread discrimination in Israel. Though all citizens get to vote, citizenship has been imposed upon a large part of the Arab-Israeli inhabitants and racism is abundant. The institutionalized racism is exemplified by Benjamin Netanyahu’s comments on the eve of the Israeli election in March 2015

27 Mansfield, P. 317.

28 Idem. 29 Pappé, P. 122. 30 Idem, P. 46. 31 Idem, P. 292. 13 during which Netanyahu attempted to boost his campaign at the last-minute by spreading the message ‘Arabs are flocking to the polls!’ in an effort to push those on the Israeli right, his supporters, to the voting stations. It can also be argued that a modern state that is in defacto occupation of its neighbors’ territory, including more than two million inhabitants, can hardly claim to be ‘democratic’.

Israeli society The Israeli political landscape is now divided into two camps, the right which is headed by the Likud party and which stands unfavorably towards territorial concessions, protects Jewish interests more than universal rights and which stands favorably towards religion. On the other hand, the left-wing camp is headed by the Labor party and contains the Zionist Left and the Arab parties. Its main pillars are the ‘the partition of Israel to keep Israel Jewish, the defense of general values, and the restriction of the role of religion in public life.’32 In terms of their attitude towards the Palestinian question, the rightist camp believes that Israel should hold onto as much or most of the land occupied in 1967. The leftists camp, however, believes that a territorial compromise with the Palestinians is preferable, on conditions that such an arrangement be made from a position of strength. The division between the two camps is ethnically marked, most Ashkenazim support the Labor camp, whereas most Mizrahim support the Likud camp. Interestingly, the control of both parties is in hands of Ashkenazim. Additionally, all social movements that have come with new political messages and gathered political clout, of which Peace Now and Gush Emunim are the most important, are Ashkenazi movements.’33

32 U. Rebhun and C. I. Waxman. Jews in Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns. (Hanover: Brandeis UP, 2004) P. 59. 33 Idem.

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Israel: Historiography

Overview Historiography Israel In order to place the works by Kaminer et al. in their proper context, it is necessary to devote attention to an existing Israeli historiographic tradition regarding Israel’s history, that is to say the historical narratives written by Israeli historians on the establishment of the state and subsequent events. As Kaminer, Hermann and Omer are all Israeli historians writing about Israel, they are inextricably linked to this tradition and should be viewed in this context.

Zionist historiography In the first few decades of Israeli statehood, Israeli historians writing about Israel focused on the achievements and triumphs of Zionism.34 In his work ‘The History of Zionist Historiography: From Apologetics to Denial’, Yoav Gelber argues: ‘The story of Jewish awakening in the diaspora and the Zionist experiment in Palestine during the first third of the twentieth century was transformed, in the next third, into a tale of Zionist triumph. But the enormous toll paid for victory was consistently avoided by Zionist historians.’ 35 During these first few decades of Israeli statehood the Central Zionist Archives, the Israeli state archives and the IDF Archives were not yet open, which resulted in historians relying largely on interviews with those involved in the events researched. Historians were, as Gelber puts it: ‘susceptible to the saw of the actual makers of history.’36 This led to historians writing about how the events had been remembered instead of how they took place, accounts which were challenged by the New Historians from the 1980s onward.

New Historians It is the opening of the archives that led to the emergence of a new trend among Israeli historians. As Anita Shapira (whom Avi Shlaim refers to as ‘The Princess of Zionist History’) writes in ‘Politics and Collective Memory: The Debate over the “New Historians” in Israel’, a new school of Israeli historians has taken form from the early 1980s onward.37 These historians, among whom are Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Simha Flapan and Ilan Pappé, made up the first Israeli historians to systematically challenge the ‘official’ history of Israel furthered by ‘Old Historians’. The emergence of this new school of

34 Y. Gelber and B. Morris. Making Israel: The History of Zionist Historiography: From Apologetics to Denial (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2007) P. 8. 35 Idem, P. 54. 36 Idem, P. 58. 37 A. Shapira. "Politics and Collective Memory: The Debate over the "New Historians" in Israel." History and Memory 7.1 (1995) P.9. 15 historians, who all initially wrote about the founding of the State of Israel and the War of Independence, was no coincidence. Archive material in Israel is declassified after a period of 30 years, which led to new historical research into the War of Independence at the end of the 1970s.38 Benny Morris was the first to name those engaging in this new trend of historical writing as ‘New Historians’. He adds that these New Historians arose as a result of a new generation of scholars who had experienced, as adults, the 1967 war, the 1973 war, the 1982-1985 Lebanon war and ‘decades of rule over an embittered, rebellious Palestinian population in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.’39 Shlaim attributes an equal amount of responsibility to the opening of the archives as to a changing political climate after the Lebanon War in 1982, which started a debate in Israeli society on it being ‘a war of choice or a war of no choice’.40 As he writes in his work ‘1948 And After’, the ‘old’ tradition highlighted the establishment of Israel as a result of pressures and persecution, while downplaying episodes of violence and Arab displacement.41 This old tradition emphasized the hostile environment in which Israel was founded and the Arabs’ rejection of compromise and peace. This old narrative has been supplemented by a new history, the writers of these histories are described by Morris as: ‘…looking afresh at the Israeli historical experience, and their conclusions are often at odds with those of the old history.’42 Central myths to this old history are identified by Simha Flapan as, among others, that the Israeli War of Independence ‘was waged between a relatively defenseless and weak (Jewish) David and a relatively strong (Arab) Goliath, that the Palestinians fled their homes and villages either ‘voluntarily’ – meaning for no good reason – or at the behest/orders of the Arab leaders; and that, at the war’s end, Israel was interested in making peace, but the recalcitrant Arabs preferred a perpetual war to the finish.’43 Like Flapan, Morris also adds that the Arab invasion in May 1948 was not aimed at destroying the Jewish state, instead it was an attempt by each country to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian State and grab land for itself.

The findings of the New Historians have been subject to severe criticism from other Israeli historians. Efraim Karsh states in 'The Unbearable Lightness of my Critics' that not only did the new historians produce nothing specifically 'new', they were repeating 'the standard Arab narrative of the conflict in an attempt to give it academic respectability.44' In addition to criticizing New Historians as furthering a pro-Palestinian agenda, Karsh accuses Morris of having made limited use of state archives and

38 Shapira, P.9. 39 B. Morris. “A Second Look at the ‘Missed Peace’ or Smoothing Out History: A Review Essay.” Journal of Palestine Studies 24.1 (1994) P. 79. 40 A. Shlaim "The War of the Israeli Historians." Oxford University Website, Jan.-Feb. 2004. 41 B. Morris. 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) P. 4. 42 Idem, P. 6. 43 Idem, P. 9. 44 E. Karsh. "The Unbearable Lightness of My Critics." Middle East Quarterly 9.3 (2002) P. 63. 16 questions findings in Morris’ book ‘The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949’ due to him not having had access to IDF and Haganah archives when writing the book. The criticism of Karsh extends beyond Morris alone, as he states: '...an examination of the documentation used by several key 'new historians', as well as sources withheld from their readers, led to the disturbing conclusion that Moris' distortions ...typified the modus operandi of a sizeable group of academics, journalists and commentators, who had predicated their professional careers on rewriting Israel's history.'45

In an interview in 2012, when asked the question regarding why New Historians are faced with such criticism, Shlaim answered: “I often ask myself, why are critics so angry? Because there have been many historical arguments before, but they are rarely so emotionally charged. The question is: “Why are the old historians so hot under the collar”? I think the answer lies in the politics of identity. Not in the realm of colleagueship, evidence and documents, but in the realm of the politics of identity, in other words: self-image. The image is of a liberal, decent and democratic Israeli society. Above all peace-loving, really dedicated to making peace, confronting a fanatical and deeply hostile Arab world. Theirs is the image of the victims. This is in the context of the holocaust. Three year before this ordeal, six million Jews were annihilated in the center of Christian Europe. That was the huge psychological burden to have to cope with. The new ordeal of the war with the Arabs has to be seen, and was experienced at the time against the background of their very recent history.”46

Additional Palestinian and Israeli historiographic genres In addition to Zionist historiography and the works of the New Historians, other historiographical genres have also developed. Among Palestinian historians there developed a Nakba historiography, which focused on the Palestinian loss and exile from the Nakba in 1948 onward.47 This historiographical genre has been criticized along the same lines as the Israeli Old Historians were criticized by the New Historians. These Palestinian historians were dependent on memories and memoirs, which led to them being accused of insufficient objectivity and distance from the histories they were writing.48 Reasons for this lack of reliable documentation is, among others, the lack of institutions and the stateless nature of the Palestinian people. This means that ‘…ironically, only a relatively small number of Palestinian historians have researched the Nakba, leaving the field of

45 A. Naor. "A Matter of Distoriography: Efraim Karsh, the "New Historians" of Israel, Their Methodology and Perspective." Israel Studies 6.2 (2001) P. 143. 46 T.O. Westbye. "The Historiography of Israel's New Historians; Rewriting the History of 1948." Dissertation: University of Bergen (2012) P. 20. 47 Idem, P. 20. 48 Idem. 17 academic discussion to the Israeli historians’.49 Besides the Nakba historiography, there is also the Socialist / Communist genre of Israeli historiography which interpreted the Arab-Israeli conflict in the framework of Marxist history. The trend in this genre was to see the Arab-Israeli conflict as a result of ‘an imperialistic colonial project and ignoring the unique circumstances of the Jewish people in the aftermath of the Holocaust.’50 Additionally, there is a genre of ‘Revised Labor-Zionist historiography’ which developed from the 1960s onwards when leaders of the Yishuv were passing away and which led to an increasing academic freedom to study and criticize the Yishuv period and its leadership.51

Besides these other historiographic genres, the histories of the New Historians that emerged from the 1980s onward represents a specific paradigm shift that revealed myths and assumptions regarding the history of Israel which had previously been largely undisputed. In the context of the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now this genre of challenging the mainstream assumptions proves an interesting parallel. Additionally it is valuable to explore the works of Kaminer et al. with the Israeli historiographical tradition as backdrop.

49 Westbye, P. 21. 50 Idem. 51 Idem, P. 22. 18

Historical Background Israeli Peace Movement and Peace Now

Surprisingly little focused historical work has been written on the Israeli peace movement. In renowned historical works on the history of the state of Israel, little attention is paid to the Israeli peace movement and even less mention is made of Peace Now. However, the works that do discuss the peace movement provide this thesis with valuable insights into the tradition of collective, political protest during the Yishuv (pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) and early-state years up to the emergence of Peace Now in 1978.

Pre-state and early-state years Before the emergence of the so-called Israeli ‘peace movement’ in the late 1970s, there were several organized Israeli calls for peace with Arab neighbors and voices promoting a conciliatory approach to Palestinian demands. In the pre-state Yishuv period binationalism was advanced by the Covenant of Peace (in Hebrew: Brit Shalom) and the Union (in Hebrew: Ihud). The peace and rapprochement with Arabs, which these two Jewish organizations called for, seemed a legitimate Zionist option at the time.52 The Covenant of Peace was established in 1925 and is credited as the first peace group in Palestine and can be seen, to some extent, as a precursor of Peace Now. The Covenant of Peace emphasized the centrality of peace with Arabs on the basis of moral rather than geopolitical considerations and emphasized the centrality of this issue to the entire Zionist endeavor in Palestine.53 The organization’s impact was limited. It was strongly criticized by the Zionist establishment, never numbered more than 100 people from the same socioeconomic background and dissolved in 1933.54 The Union’s position in society preceding its collapse is characterized by Kaminer as : ‘a voice crying in the political wilderness.’, illustrating its standing and impact.55 In the wake of the Covenant of Peace and the Union several other similar organizations arose such as The League of Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and the Young Watchmen (Hebrew: Hashomer Hatzair). These organizations also encountered staunch opposition from the Zionist establishment. Organizations such as the Covenant of Peace, the Union and others, opposed certain elements of

52 A. Omer. When Peace is not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), P. 26. 53 Idem. 54 Idem, P. 29. 55 R. Kaminer. The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada. (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 1996) P. 3.

19

Zionist expansion and worked towards Arab-Jewish rapprochement, though they still operated in a Zionist framework. The ‘right of the Jews to immigrate to Palestine and settle there’ was not criticized.56 Small, organized calls for peace and reconciliation sporadically emerged in Israel’s first three decades of existence, but only in the late 1970s were the conditions ripe for a broader based movement to develop.

Development of the general peace movement The development of the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now are inextricably linked and, in many ways, the same. The Six-Day war in 1967 had unexpected ramifications in Israeli society. The military defeat of Syria, Jordan and Egypt and the subsequent Israeli land grabs of the Golan heights from Syria, the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, and the West Bank from Jordan, led to an increased polarization of Israeli public opinion.57 Several small protest movements arose opposing the use of the territories won in 1967’s Six-Day war as ‘bargaining chips’ in negotiations with Arab countries, which led to the development of the ‘Land for Peace’ formula.58 This formula was advocated by those that called for a return of most territories won by Israel in the 1967 war and who promoted a conciliatory approach to Israel’s Arab neighbors as well as the Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the other side of the political spectrum were the supported of the Greater Israel movement, which called for incorporating the newly won territories into Israel and settling them with Jewish populations.59 Since 1967 there has not been a uniform Israeli consensus on what to do with these territories, though those in the peace movement have always opposed the Greater Israel movement. The Six-Day war provided those advocating peace and rapprochement with a framework to work from, namely a ‘Land for Peace’ formula accompanied by a strong opposition to those who pledged for an incorporation of the occupied territories.

The ‘Land for Peace’ formula took hold among the public in the late 1970s when the visit of Egypt’s President Anwar al Sadat in 1977 made a peace agreement with Egypt seem a viable option. Besides the peace agreement with Egypt becoming a realistic possibility and the ‘Land for Peace’ formula spreading to different sectors in Israeli society, a reshuffling of Israel’s political dynamics had taken place. In 1977 the Labor party lost power in the Knesset after thirty years and those advocating the Greater Israel ideology took control. This contributed to the conditions that led to the emergence of a mass peace movement.60 Once the peace negotiations with Egypt reached a deadlock, the

56 Omer, P. 31. 57 A. Shlaim. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000) P. 286. 58 S.Helman. "Peace Movements in Israel." Jewish Women’s Archive. Web. 59 Idem. 60 Idem. 20 sentiment that the Israeli negotiators were missing a chance at peace due to a commitment to the Greater Israel ideology became widespread. This sentiment was channeled into a peace movement, initially headed by one group, that, without professing any political affiliation, wanted one thing: Peace Now.

David Frank writes in his article ‘Shalom Achshav: Rituals of the Israeli Peace Movement’ that the general Israeli peace movement developed as a response to a so-called ‘peace-ritual’.61 Frank argues that the Israeli perception of the Middle East was dramatically changed by the Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, which contained several ritualistic elements.62 Firstly, Sadat’s visit and speech to the Knesset made the Israeli public see a peace treaty with Egypt as a realistic possibility, and secondly, it showed Israelis that there were mutual interests to be considered, as well as shared cultural and religious norms with Egypt.63 These developments, termed ‘ritualistic’ by Frank, led to a fundamental shift in the worldview of many Israelis resulting in a climate that allowed a broad-based peace movement to emerge.64Frank traces the peace movement back to the ‘Movement For a Different Zionism’, established in Jerusalem two weeks after Likud-leader Menachem Begin became Prime Minister in the summer of 1977. Begin represented the dominant view in Israeli society that favored maintaining the status quo as well as the settlement and annexation of territories won in the 1967 war.65 Those involved in the ‘Movement for a Different Zionism’ paired up with a group from Tel Aviv in their opposition to Begin, and drafted a letter to be spread around Israel to garner mass support for their cause (which included support for Palestinian autonomy and flexible negotiation policies).66 This movement evidently set a precedent for those that initiated the development of Peace Now.

Development Peace Now Peace Now has its roots in the widespread Israeli discontent that accompanied the stalled Israeli- Egyptian peace talks in 1978 and the public’s desire for peace with Egypt. As a result of this discontentment, almost 350 Israeli military reservists signed the following letter which was published in several Israeli newspapers.67 It is the founding document of Peace Now:

61 D.A. Frank. “Shalom Achshav”- Rituals of The Israeli Peace Movement Communication Monographs 48.3 (1981) P.7. 62 Idem, P.8. 63 Idem, P. 9. 64 Idem, P. 9. 65 Idem, P. 10. 66 Idem, P. 10. 67 T. Hermann. The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream. (New York: Cambridge UP, 2009), P. 302. 21

‘Dear Sir,

Citizens that also serve as soldiers and officers in the reserve forces are sending this letter to you. The following words are not written with a light heart. However at this time when new horizons of peace and cooperation are for the first time being proposed to the State of Israel, we feel obliged to call upon you to prevent taking any steps that could cause endless problems to our people and our state.

We are writing this with deep anxiety, as a government that prefers the existence of the State of Israel within the borders of “Greater Israel” to its existence in peace with good neighborliness, will be difficult for us to accept. A government that prefers existence of settlements beyond the Green Line to elimination of this historic conflict with creation of normalization of relationships in our region will evoke questions regarding the path we are taking. A government policy that will cause a continuation of control over million Arabs will hurt the Jewish-democratic character of the state, and will make it difficult for us to identify with the path of the State of Israel.

We are aware of the security needs of the State of Israel and the difficulties facing the path to peace. But we know that true security will only be reached with the arrival of peace. The power of the IDF is in the identification of its soldiers with the path of the State of Israel.’68

This letter, known as the ‘Officers’ Letter’, was addressed to Menachem Begin, the Likud Prime Minister of Israel at the time, and expressed the reservists’ doubts and fears when it came to the government’s attitude and intentions regarding the peace talks with Egypt. The sentiments articulated in the letter drew widespread attention and some 250,000 Israelis joined in signing it. The widespread support of the letter led to an organizational impulse, and Peace Now became an official player in the realm of protest. Peace Now quickly grew into Israel’s largest peace organization, as it was (and still is, though on a much smaller scale) able to mobilize the public and organize demonstrations on a significantly larger scale than other organizations. In their call for the government not to miss a chance at peace with Egypt, the organization won the endorsement of thirty Knesset members from six parties as well as support from the public on an unprecedented scale.69 The evening before the Israeli delegation left for peace talks with Egypt in the United States, Peace Now organized a demonstration in Tel Aviv which an estimated 100,000 people flocked to. This

68 Peace Now. The Officers’ Letter – March 1978. (http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/officers-letter-march-1978). 69 Shlaim. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.P. 371. 22 was the largest political demonstration in Israel’s history up to that point and sent a strong signal to the government.70

The peace agreements that followed the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations, the Camp David Accords, were signed in the United States in September 1978 and a definitive peace treaty between Egypt and Israel followed. The accords were met with demonstrations of support by Peace Now and counter- demonstrations by the nationalist camp opposing the accords.71 Besides the opposition of the nationalist camp, a public opinion poll conducted during that time showed that there was overwhelming support for the accords from almost 82% of the general public.72 Overwhelming support from the public aside, Begin had difficulties convincing Israeli parliament, the Knesset, that the Camp David Accords were in Israel’s favor. Upon his return to Israel from the United States, Begin was, among others, accused of presenting the Knesset with a ‘fait accompli’.73 Eventually, when the accords came to a vote in the Knesset, a 17-hour long debate resulted in 84 votes in favor, 19 against and 17 abstentions.74 The official peace treaty was signed in March 1979 in Washington D.C. and it was implemented relatively smoothly.75 Though the Israeli peace treaty with Egypt was a victory for the Israeli peace movement and Peace Now, it constituted a bitter disappointment to Palestinians. The initial intentions of the Egyptian camp to incorporate issues regarding Palestinians self-rule in the peace treaty were ultimately abandoned as a result of Israeli objections. As a result Sadat was frequently accused of betraying the Palestinians and striking a selfish deal with Israel in order to secure Egyptian interests.76

Though it is difficult to establish direct causal links between Peace Now’s activities and the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the mass support Peace Now managed to garner in 1978 indicated that it had a level of popular support and influence on the public. Several years later, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Peace Now managed to organize a demonstration in Tel Aviv that protested Israeli actions. Though Peace Now was relatively late in publicly denouncing the invasion of its northern neighbor, for which it was sharply criticized, it managed to put together a protest that was attended by an estimated 400,000 people. Again, Peace Now had been involved in organizing the largest demonstration Israel had ever seen.

70 Shlaim, P. 371. 71 Idem. 72 Idem, P. 377. 73 Idem, P. 376. 74 Idem, P. 377. 75 Idem, P. 381. 76 Sachar, P. 289. 23

More than ten years later, in the process leading up to the Oslo Accords in the mid 1990’s, Peace Now was on the margins of Israeli society. The organization had become politically ostracized and ignored, which it remains to this day. Henry Rosenfeld, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Haifa, wrote the following about Peace Now’s waning influence in as early as 1983:’…its activity was sporadic, and in recent years it was seen on the average very little, its original directness was restricted and became more ‘academic’ (its leadership is more and more influenced by certain university circles) and it did not succeed in attracting new supporters from among the youth…it has become less political.’77 Peace Now’s influence had seemingly waned due to a variety of factors after just a few years. The Oslo Accords in the mid-90s, which were welcomed warmly by Peace Now and the rest of the peace movement, did not lead to a comprehensive peace deal and resulted in a political stalemate, interrupted by outbursts of violence. The failed Oslo Accords and the subsequent bouts of Israeli and Palestinian violence had the result of diminishing the reputation and role of the peace movement and of Peace Now. Currently, Peace Now is often portrayed as a group of eccentric leftists, instead of an organization with a serious political platform.

Despite Peace Now’s position on the sideline of Israeli politics, it remains the largest peace organization in Israel. Currently the organization counts 10,000 members from the Middle East and around the world and states its mission as working towards the only viable option, being ‘the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories adjacent to Israel, which were occupied as a result of the 1967 war – A Two State Solution’.78 While Peace Now’s initial goal was to promote peace with Egypt, the organization has redirected its policies after the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Peace Now initiated a call for peace with the Palestinians, based on the two state solution formula. This formula has been publicly adopted by most mainstream Israeli political parties and become accepted by most Israelis, although the degree to which this view is held with any real conviction remains questionable. Some claim this is thanks to the Israeli peace movement, though again causal links are difficult to verify. Besides promoting the two state solution, Peace Now’s other main objective is ‘offering support to the right of Israel to exist within secure borders and the right of its neighbors to do the same.’79 Peace Now’s adherence to nationalist principles is evident in its objectives, though it is at times difficult to assess whether this is due to genuine conviction or to ensure wider public support of the organization.

In 2014 Peace Now was still able to organize demonstrations of several thousand people strong. This

77 H. Rosenfeld. The Missing Part in the ‘Unnecessary War’ (Journal of Palestine Studies, 01 October 1983, Vol.13(1), pp.196- 200) P. 197. 78 Peace Now. Who We Are. Web. 79 Peace Now. Who We Are. Web. 24 is, though, a far cry from the hundreds of thousands of people that showed up to protests in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Up to this day Peace Now operates through public campaigns, advertisements, petitions, conferences, dialogue groups and demonstrations, among others. However Peace Now’s role in the political sphere and its influence are much diminished.

25

Short Biographies Authors

This chapter features concise biographies of the historians whose work is central to this thesis, and provides an equally short introduction to their works. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer are all Israelis with personal links to the Israeli peace movement. All three have written historical accounts of the Israeli peace movement with significant references to Peace Now. Besides these similarities, all three have written from different theoretical approaches which provides for an interesting reading of the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities.

Reuven Kaminer Reuven Kaminer was born in Detroit in 1929 and immigrated to Israel in 1951, where he became a prominent commentator and activist on the Israeli left. Kaminer is a member of the ‘Democratic Front for Peace and Equality’, an organization that aimed to mobilize its supporters for peace in opposition to government policy of occupation, and has also been an active member of Peace Now. His personal convictions undoubtedly played a part in the scholarly pursuit of writing the book ‘The Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada’. Kaminer and his wife, a co-founder of the women’s peace group ‘Women in Black’, established ‘the Reuven and Dafna Kaminer Archive’ in the National Library of Israel, which is an archive of the radical left in Israel from the Six-Day War to the end of the eighties. According to the National Library of Israel, the Kaminers occupied central roles in different organizations of Israel’s radical left.80 Professionally, Kaminer held the position of Vice Provost of the School for Overseas Students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and currently practices law in Jerusalem. Kaminer’s book was published in 1996 and constitutes a political history of the general Israeli peace movement, with a focus on its main components, as they battle against the policy of their own government.81 His overarching view is that peace organizations illustrate a high level of political thinking and strategizing, which is overlooked by most. Kaminer answers questions as to how the protest movement in Israel emerged and grew in response to circumstances created by the First Intifada between 1987 and 1991. Kaminer’s focus on the peace movement during the First Intifada in particular is due to his assessment that this period saw an increased involvement of the peace movement in the political process, and an unprecedented level of cooperation and solidarity between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories.82

80 "Reuven and Dafna Kaminer Archive." The National Library of Israel. Web. 81 Kaminer P. xii. 82 Idem, P. xiii. 26

Kaminer states that he believes to have ‘presented a fair and accurate account of the Israeli peace movement’s response to the Palestinian Intifada’, though his personal peace activism should be kept in mind while reading his work.83 His personal affiliation with the peace movement and his definition of the movement as ‘…the sum of all the organized political forces which attributed a major degree of responsibility to Israel for the emergence and the continuation of the Israel-Arab conflict.’84 illustrate his view of the peace movement vis-à-vis the Israeli mainstream. Kaminer identifies forces as being part of the peace movement if they blame Israel for the Israel-Arab conflict. Given the fact that the book focuses on the First Intifada (then: the Palestinian Intifada, as the Second Intifada had not erupted yet) and that is was published in 1996, there is no mention of the Oslo Accords and their aftermath or of the Second Intifada.

Tamar Hermann Tamar Hermann is an Israeli who has lived, studied and worked in Israel for most of her life. After finishing her Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD degrees in Israel and spending time at Princeton University, Hermann took up academic positions in Israel. She is currently a professor of political science and Dean of Academic Studies at the Open University of Israel. In addition to this position, she co-directs the Peace Index project at Tel Aviv University, a project that evaluates Israeli public opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict through monthly surveys. Hermann also holds the position of senior research fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, which credits Hermann’s expertise in the areas of public opinion and the formation of national policy, as well as civil society. 85 She has written extensively about the peace movement and grassroots activism and is referred to by the Israel Policy Forum as ‘Israel’s leading academic pollster’ due to her work at the Israel Democracy Institute and the Peace Index project.86 Her book ‘‘The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream’ was published in 2009. In contrast to Kaminer, Hermann has written a history of the peace movement from the perspective of social movement theory, with a specific focus on the period preceding, during and following the Oslo Accords. The overarching question that guides her work is why so many Israelis like to hate the peace movement or ignore it altogether. The surprising premise of Hermann’s book is that the peace movement did indeed make a political difference, which is unexpected, given that the title of the book suggests a rather gloomy analysis of the peace movement’s impact. As Hermann focuses on the social history of the peace movement, the work focuses on the actions and ideologies of ‘collective

83 Kaminer, P. xiii. 84 Idem, P. xii. 85 The Israel Democracy Institute. "Prof. Tamar Hermann." The Israel Democracy Institute. Web. 86 S. Spiegel. "Tamar Hermann on Israeli Public Opinion." Israel Policy Forum. Web. 27 challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.’87 The Israeli peace movement, and hence Peace Now, constitute such a collective challenge. Due to the peace movement challenging the status quo, Hermann states that the wider Israeli public has identified the peace movement, from the late 1990’s onwards, as collaborating with outside forces that are critical of Israel. Hermann characterizes this treatment of the peace movement as a method of ‘scapegoating’ implying that the peace movement receives blame for the sins committed by the wider, Israeli community.88 In the introduction to her book she thanks peace activist friends and colleagues for enriching her work.89 Like Kaminer, Hermann’s connections to the Israeli peace movement undoubtedly play a part in her professional endeavors.

Atalia Omer Atalia Omer is an Israeli national who, after completing her military service, pursued higher education in the United States. She completed a BA in Islamic and Near Eastern Studies at the University of Santa Barbara in California in 2000, after which she pursued an MA in Theological Studies at Harvard University. After earning her PhD at Harvard, Omer went on to work at the University of Notre Dame where she is currently Associate Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peace Studies as well as Faculty Fellow at the Center for the Study of Religion and Society. The book ‘When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp thinks about religion, nationalism and Justice’ was published in 2013. The aim of the book, an extension of her PhD research, is to re- examine Israeli identities in the context of the Israeli peace movement so as to examine and enhance opportunities for peacebuilding. It was published by the University of Chicago Press in 2013, the same year in which she co-authored a book titled ‘Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook’. Omer researches and analyzes the Israeli peace movement from a socio-political approach. While looking at the construction and reframing of identities in the context of the Israeli peace movement, Hermann aims to look at different ways in which peace-making can be approached in a conflict that is defined by identity claims. 90 The reframing of identities is necessary to achieve a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, argues Omer, which implies that her book itself should be seen as a peace- building initiative. The author mentions being raised in Israel in a privileged, Ashkenazi environment that was highly critical of Israeli culture and of the religious coercion which was perceived in the Jewish nation-

87 Hermann, P. 14. 88 Idem, P. 2. 89 Idem, p. viii. 90 Idem, P. ix. 28 state.91 Having been active in the Israeli peace movement consistently throughout her life, Omer acknowledges a personal commitment to the overarching vision of the movement.

Conclusion As mentioned earlier, Kaminer, Hermann and Omer are all Israeli historians who have written historical accounts of the Israeli peace movement with significant references to Peace Now. All three authors write in English, have experience living and working abroad and have significant ties with peace activists and/or the peace movement. They originate from a politically left Israeli background, which is important to keep in mind when researching their portrayal of Peace Now. Also, Omer’s work, as it is the most recently published work, contains references to both Kaminer and Hermann. In turn, Hermann refers to Kaminer several times, which shows they were familiar with each other’s work. Kaminer’s book was published before Hermann and Omer’s books, and therefore does not contain references to either Hermann or Omer’s book. Besides coming from similar backgrounds and being aware of each other’s work on different levels, all three have written from different theoretical approaches which might lead to different perceptions and portrayals of Peace Now in their works. Additionally, the generational gap between Kaminer, Hermann and Omer is to be considered when assessing their portrayal of Peace Now.

91 Omer, P. 2. 29

1978 and the Camp David Accords

Introduction Events that unfolded in Israel in the late 1970s, specifically during the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, provide the focus of this chapter. The 1970s in Israel were characterized by, among others, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the 1977 defeat of the Labor party for the first time in Israel’s history, Operation Litani in 1978 against the infrastructure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon and the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, the Camp David Accords, in 1978 and subsequent peace treaty the following year. The Yom Kippur war launched by Syria and Egypt took Israel completely by surprise and signified a tipping point in Israeli policy.92 The Syrian and Egyptian attacks showed Israel that the occupation of the Golan, the West Bank and the Sinai was not a sustainable state of affairs that could be continued indefinitely.93 This Israeli realization, in combination with Egypt and Syria suffering vast losses, meant that all three states involved adopted a more realistic attitude towards each other than before.94 Besides this shift in attitude towards external states, Israel also experienced a shift in domestic politics four years later. The victory of the Likud party in the 1977 elections meant a dramatic shift from the Labor party’s pragmatic approach to the occupied territories. Where the Labor party emphasized the security considerations regarding the occupied territories, the Likud party based its actions on the ideological goal of holding onto and expanding “Greater Israel”.95 The peace negotiations preceding the signing of the historic agreement in 1978 at Camp David in the United States saw the emergence of a broad-based Israeli peace movement. Though Israeli organizations calling for peace with Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbors had existed before Begin’s and Sadat’s negotiations started in 1977, the scale of Israeli support for peace with Egypt when that opportunity actually arose was unprecedented. Organized calls for peace, such as by Peace Now, became part of a broader movement that gained momentum during the peace negotiations.

This chapter will focus on the views of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer regarding the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities during the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations. Firstly their accounts of the origins, dynamics and outcomes of Peace Now’s activities will be discussed. Secondly, their accounts will be placed in the context of Tarrow’s emphasis on the political component to

9292 Shlaim, P. 319. 93 Idem. 94 Idem. 95 Idem, P. 353. 30 collective action and in the context of the socio-psychological predictors for collective action as developed by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears.

Origins All three historians are in agreement that the Officers’ Letter, Peace Now’s founding document, emerged out of a period of widespread Israeli discontent regarding the political status quo. Menachem Begin’s Likud party, the sworn enemy of the Labor party, winning the elections of 1977 was a historic shift in Israeli politics. The Labor parties’ first electoral defeat in thirty years, paired with the Yom Kippur War, the rapprochement between Sadat and Begin and subsequent initially disappointing peace negotiations, created the conditions for a shift in international and domestic politics.96 The stalling peace negotiations and widespread Israeli discontent led to reservists drafting the Officers’ Letter and to it gaining the widespread support of the public. Some terms that Kaminer, Hermann and Omer use to this describe this letter are: ‘groundbreaking’, ‘spontaneous’ and ‘strategic’. All three historians credit the success of the letter to its strategic linkage of government policy to the morale of the Israeli Defense Forces. Their status as reservists made it impossible for the officers to be accused of disloyalty to the state. As Kaminer states, without this link, the letter merely mirrored ‘standard dove criticism of government policy.’97

Hermann expands her scope regarding the conditions in which the Officers’ Letter and Peace Now developed. She argues that Peace Now was able to emerge in the late 1970s because a more fertile ground for grassroots social movements had developed.98 Certain groups within Israeli society were pushed to a higher level of political awareness and involvement, which led to the development of the Officers’ Letter and Peace Now.99 With certain groups, Hermann means Ashkenazi groups in Israel. Her approach of the peace movement from a social movement theory framework leads to an increased focus on different groups in society and includes touching on the aspect of gender in Peace Now. Hermann mentions the absence of women in the group of reservists that developed and signed the initial Officers’ Letter. The letter’s credibility relied heavily on the prestige of the reservists. Their criticism of the government could not be undermined as being disloyal to the state. However, Hermann illustrates that the absence of women as initial signatories of the Officers’ Letter marks the letter, and Peace Now, as an exclusionary movement. The accompanying reference to a remark by Omri Padan, one of the founders of Peace Now, further elaborates on the issue: ‘I had no

96 Hermann, P. 88. 97 Kaminer, P. 22. 98 Hermann, P. 88. 99 Idem. 31 hesitation whatsoever about using our military ranks, as the very idea was to get the signatures of combat soldiers, so that Begin couldn’t stigmatize us as ‘leftists’, thereby pushing us aside. For the same reason, we refused to put women’s signatures on the letter.’ Hermann exposes the drafters and initial signatories of the letter as deliberately excluding women from the letter to accommodate gender-bases stereotypes that link men to the military, to prestige and to the homeland. Incidentally, Sara Helman, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari elaborate on the aspect of gender regarding Peace Now in their article ‘The Discourses of Psychology’ and the ‘Normalization of War’. They agree that there was an emphasis on the masculine superiority in the Peace Now movement. Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari argue that in the militarized state that is Israel, where conscription is mandatory, the highest role in the military hierarchy is the combat-role, for which men are more suited than women.100 Peace Now, being formed by army reservists who derived the legitimacy of their status and platform from their combat role in the Yom Kippur war, had a membership whose ‘right to oppose government policy derived from their officership and from epitomizing the warrior ethos.’101 Women were not allowed to sign the Officers’ Letter and men initially held leadership positions while women fulfilled organizational positions.102 Later a women’s movement emerged during Israel’s First Lebanon war and further developed between 1982 and 1985. Hermann identifies the underlying motivations for Israelis to engage in protest activities. As an aim of her work is to show the significant explanatory potential of social movement theories and theories that involve public opinion and national policy making, Hermann delves into motivations underlying participation in the Israeli peace movement, which manifests all features of a social movement.103 Hermann specifies that though Peace Now was a broad-based peace organization, it had been initiated by ‘certain (Ashkenazi) groups in Israeli society who were pushed to a higher level of political awareness and involvement, which in turn gave life to Shalom Achshav.’104

Besides the converging views on the context in which Peace Now emerged, the historians are also in agreement that Peace Now was ideologically limited from its inception onward. These ideological limitations, argue Hermann and Omer, were already evident in the Officers’ Letter. Omer states: ‘The letter shows that the primary target of the officers’ critique was the specific expansionist ideology of the Likud Party and the settlement movement. Their concern is centered on how the occupation of the Arab territories conquered in 1967 would contradict the identity of Israel as Jewish, democratic,

100 E. Lomsky-Feder and E. Ben-Ari. Militarism and Israeli Society (New York: State University of New York Press, 199) P. 298.

101 Idem. 102 S.Helman. "Peace Movements in Israel." Jewish Women’s Archive. Web. 103 Hermann, P. 29. 104 Idem, P. 88. 32 enlightened and ‘Western’. 105Omer’s focus on questions of identity is evident in her assessment of the genuine nature of Peace Now’s quest for peace. The ideological limitations of Peace Now are laid out in the letter, she states, as the letter illustrates an egotistical perspective on the occupation and shows Peace Now’s preoccupation with maintaining the purity of Israel’s identity, instead of genuinely adhering to universal values of peace. Additionally Omer states: ‘Thus, the letter did not depart in any significant way from the Zionist tenets already laid out in the Biltmore program. In fact, the letter defined Peace Now as a consensus Zionist movement.’106 This is a view that appears in the works of all three historians and each of them, in his or her way, sees this as a limitation. Peace Now is portrayed as having broad-based support from the public during the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, but the organization did choose to position itself within the mainstream Zionist framework. Kaminer links Peace Now’s broad-based support to the relatively generalist and uncritical platform that the organization promotes, a ‘liberal-Zionism’.107 Kaminer and Hermann see this as an incomplete commitment to peace, or as Omer puts it: ‘Peace Now traverses a limited political landscape’.108 Omer adds to her critique of Peace Now’s ideology by arguing that the organization ‘affirmed the construal of Israel’s Jewish character along ethnic or national rather than religious lines, highlighting the demographic imperative for striking a peace agreement and downplaying alternative modes of imagining Judaism vis-à-vis Zionism.’109 Peace Now was from the onset, in Omer’s view, unable to visualize any alternatives to Judaism and Zionism. She argues that ‘an axiomatic and narrow interpretation of Israeli Jewish identity has guided Peace Now’s conception of justice and peace.’110

Dynamics Kaminer characterizes Peace Now as a broad-based organization, different to radical left peace organizations, that fully set the wheels in motion for an Israeli peace movement. As Kaminer puts it: ‘…the full strength of the peace movement came into play with the mobilization of Peace Now, the chief mass-based section of the peace movement and the only force that could hope to bring tens of thousands of people to the street.’111 Peace Now is portrayed as being an organization of crucial importance to the development of the peace movement. Hermann mirrors Kaminer’s assertions, stating: ‘The Golden age of Israeli peace activism began in early 1978, with the emergence of Shalom

105 Omer, P. 46. 106 Idem. 107 Kaminer, P. 29. 108 Omer, P. 11. 109 Idem. 110 Idem. 111 Idem, P. 97. 33

Achshav…’112 The dynamics of Peace Now’s organization and activities are portrayed by Kaminer as being generalist and uncritical. Kaminer argues that Peace Now did not have a concrete vision of issues relating to Palestinian self-determination or statehood. As he states: ‘Peace Now, in its formative years, was extremely cautious about the Palestinian question.’113 Kaminer repeats this criticism of Peace Now as being preoccupied with achieving peace with neighboring Arab states, as opposed to a non-state actor like the Palestinians, later stating: ‘Even after the breakdown of the autonomy of peace talks between Israel and Egypt (1978-1979), Peace Now had no clear stand on Palestinian self- determination.’114 Besides nuancing the view of Peace Now’s founders, Hermann argues that those in Israel that were on the opposite side of the political spectrum viewed the peace organization with much distrust. They viewed Peace Now and the broader social movement as being anti-Likud and as being made up of people that supported this anti-government peace movement out of fear of losing their political influence.115 Additionally, Peace Now is portrayed as receiving further criticism from those on the right of the Israeli political spectrum, some of whom accused Peace Now of being anti-Zionist due to their willingness to make territorial concessions to the Arabs.116

Outcome Kaminer is adamant about Peace Now’s impact on the political developments leading up to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. He states, regarding Peace Now’s activities: ‘…the first instance in Israeli politics where the intervention of an extra-parliamentary peace movement had a clear and decisive influence on the course of critical political developments.’117 Hermann states in her introduction that the peace movement had a positive impact on the changing of public and political opinion, Peace Now must have contributed to this to some extent. Hermann goes on to argue that after 1978 it appeared that a single-issue organization was most effective, Peace Now’s conscious decision to continue to exist after the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty meant a refocusing of its activities.

Omer does not elaborate on the specific impact of Peace Now, she states that ‘the prestige of the officers and the substantial and unprecedented public support of their position allegedly led Prime

112 Hermann, P. 88. 113 Kaminer, P. 30. 114 Idem. 115 Hermann, P. 89. 116 Idem, P. 90. 117 Kaminer, P. 24. 34

Minister Begin to Camp David to concede eventual withdrawal of Israeli presence from the Sinai Peninsula as part of a peace agreement with Egypt.’118 Another outcome, besides the calls for peace with Egypt, was the emergence of Peace Now as the ‘most widely supported and influential peace organization in Israel.’119

Tarrow and Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears When examining the portrayal of Peace Now in the works of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer in the context of Tarrow’s theory, which states that social movements should be placed in the context of the political process, new insights are gained into their works. Tarrow’s criticism of the research mobilization approach to social movements that developed in the United States from the late 1960s onward is specifically poignant. He argues that ‘Despite their interest in policy, political scientists largely failed to “adequately explain or take account of the impact of social movements on the institutionalized political establishment”.‘120 Tarrow’s criticism extends to Hermann’s argument that the peace movement contributed considerably to the increasing acceptance of the two-state solution on the grassroots and leadership level, while she simultaneously states that this is impossible to either prove or refute.121 Besides this limitation, Hermann acknowledges the need for social movement students to incorporate a wider framework when conducting research to widen their operational context.122 Kaminer’s portrayal of Peace Now is fully dedicated to the incorporation of the realm of politics in the research of the Israeli peace movement. Kaminer fully incorporates elements that Tarrow considers of central importance, namely the ‘interactions amongst protestors, opponents, third parties, and the state – in other words, the political process of collective action.’123

It is interesting to apply the socio-psychological predictors of collective actions to the works of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portrayals of Peace Now during this period. The predictors of perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and social identity are present in their works to varying extents. Perceived efficacy, the perceived ‘sense of control, influence, strength, and effectiveness to change a group-related problem’, as a predictor of collective action is not mentioned in the works of Kaminer,

118 Omer, P. 45. 119 Idem. 120 Tarrow, P. 425. 121 Hermann, P. 6. 122 Idem, P. 8. 123 Tarrow, P. 425. 35

Hermann and Omer. Despite it not being touched upon, perceived efficacy is an aspect of crucial importance to Israeli society as well as to Peace Now and should not go unmentioned. A sense of efficacy provides the bedrock for all forms of protest action, including collective protest action. It is inherent in all forms of protest, Israeli protesters in 1978 were sure to have believed that their participation in the demonstrations might have an effect on the Israeli government. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer, as Israeli nationals, seem to have left this fundamental predictor of collective action out of their accounts of Peace Now’s origins, dynamics and outcome. Perhaps their oversight is due to being accustomed to life in a relatively transparent democracy, where a principle such as efficacy is inherent in the nature of the state. Perceived injustice, however, is evident in the accounts of all three historians. The direct cause which led to the emergence of Peace Now, the Officers’ Letter, addressed the perceived injustice that the Israeli delegation was inflicting upon the future of the state of Israel by adopting an uncompromising attitude in the peace negotiations with Egypt. A sense of injustice, defined by Van Zomeren as ‘perceptions of unfair treatment or outcomes. … feelings of injustice tend to be based on subjective perceptions of group-based inequity (i.e., some inequality or disadvantage that is perceived as illegitimate)’, is present in the context of Peace Now’s emergence.124Through their refusal to meet Egyptian territorial demands in any way, the Officers’ Letter stated that the Israeli government was placing the establishment and the maintaining of a Greater Israel above the greater interest of Israel itself and its people. The outcome of the peace negotiations, should this attitude continue, would be harmful to Israel’s security. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer all portray this perceived injustice as being the foundation of Peace Now’s initial raison d’être. Social identity, as defined by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears is ‘the socially shared understandings of what it means to be a group member’.125 The aspect of social identity is addressed by Kaminer, Hermann and Omer to varying extents. All three emphasize that the public acceptance and support of the criticism voiced in the letter was founded in the military background of those who wrote it. The public legitimization of, and identification with, these military reservists is an illustration of a shared sense of belonging to a group, a shared social identity. This shared social identity was politicized and subsequently mobilized by the Officers’ Letter. As Van Zomeren states, social movements, in this case Peace Now, can transform social identities into more politicized identities, which raises one’s motivation for collective action through a stronger inner obligation to act.126

124 Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, P. 512. 125 Idem, P. 505. 126 Idem, P. 524. 36

Conclusion While all three historians present similar views on the direct cause of Peace Now’s emergence lying in the public’s dissent regarding the stalling peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt, they are also in agreement that the political developments of the 1970s created the conditions for a broad- based peace movement to emerge. Also, all three historians are in agreement that Peace Now, though claiming to be a voice for peace, was ideologically limited. Besides these shared views on the political context that paved the way for the development of the Officers’ Letter and Peace Now, there are also several differences between the portrayals of Peace Now. These can be ascribed to the authors’ backgrounds, the time in which they wrote and the specific theoretical frameworks which they employed.

Kaminer’s roots as a political historian are evident when looking at the ideological foundation of Peace Now. He illustrates Peace Now’s ideological limitations by defining it as a ‘Liberal-Zionist’ organization that promotes an uncritical platform. In his account of the Israeli peace movement Kaminer, a political-historian, focuses on Israel’s politicians and places Peace Now largely in the context of political developments. This means that there is a disregard for socioeconomic factors which might have moved the reservists to write the Officers’ Letter or which played a part in mobilizing the public to Peace Now’s demonstrations. Focusing solely on the political players and political developments in the 1970s, Kaminer provides for a relatively simplistic reading of the context in which the Officers’ Letter developed and in which the peace movement and Peace Now consolidated their influence. By not mentioning the socioeconomic backgrounds of those that spearheaded the Officers’ Letter or of those that took part in Peace Now’s demonstrations in 1978, Kaminer presents them as being motivated solely by political considerations. This provides for a one- sided reading of a context which led to the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens to collective action through protest. Peace Now is presented as a monolithic organization, whose followers are motivated by political considerations only. This mirrors, to some extent, the criticism of research on collective action that Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears express. An analysis of Peace Now which focuses solely on objective conditions, for example the political dimensions of protest, implies a disregard of the subjective conditions and of the social and psychological dimensions of protest.127

Hermann and Omer delve deeper into the ideological foundation of Peace Now. Hermann credits

127 Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, P. 505. 37

Peace Now’s calls for peace while it exhibited ‘patriotism and adherence mainstream Zionism’ as hypocritical. Omer’s focus on identity leads to an interpretation of Peace Now as existing solely to maintain Israel’s Jewish, democratic, enlightened and Western identity. This leads to an interpretation of Peace Now as being egotistical by nature and its calls for peace, to some extent, as insincere. Hermann’s focus on social movement theory leads to her focus on certain social dynamics leading up to the Officers’ Letter. Besides acknowledging that Peace Now was formed due to certain, Ashkenazi, groups being pushed to a higher level of political awareness, Hermann further portrays Peace Now as exclusionary towards women. Women were not allowed to sign the Officers’ Letter and did not take up positions of leadership at first. Though the organization received broad-based support and had a positive impact on Israeli leadership and society, Hermann’s view is that it was an ideologically limited, exclusionary organization. The three historians are also in agreement that Peace Now had a significant impact on the 1978 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. Additionally, the view that Peace Now from that point onward, constituted the most well-known and broadly-supported peace organization is also shared.

Besides the differences and similarities between these works, the models of collective action as advanced by Tarrow and Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, provide interesting insights into Kaminer, Herman and Omer’s works. Tarrow’s critique of the research mobilization approach to collective movements apply to Kaminer, Hermann and Omer, as all are unable to provide significant insights into the actual impact of Peace Now on the political establishment. Understandably the impact of social movements such as the Israeli peace movement are impossibly difficult to measure, but this makes claims that the historians make regarding the impact of Peace Now problematic. The predictors of collective action, when applied to these works, uncover interesting aspects. Efficacy is not touched upon by the three historians, though the perceived sense of potential impact must have been present among those writing the Officers’ Letter and participating in the demonstrations. Additionally, the historians’ lack of appreciation for such a crucial aspect to collective action points to them being accustomed to living in a relatively transparent democracy where efficacy is a natural result of actions. The predictor of perceived injustice (‘perceptions of unfair treatment or outcomes’) mirrors sentiments expressed Officers’ Letter, such as: ‘we feel obliged to call upon you to prevent taking any steps that could cause endless problems to our people and our state’.128 This potential injustice perceived by the reservists’ as well as by a large part of the Israeli public, illustrates an

128 Peace Now. The Officers’ Letter – March 1978. (http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/officers-letter-march-1978). 38 unprecedented level of public opposition to Israeli government policy. It can be argued that this was the first time that the Israeli public, on a large scale, acknowledged governmental weakness by protesting a perceived potential injustice. The aspect of social identity when assessing the Officers’ Letter and the origin and dynamics of Peace Now, is illustrated by Hermann’s reference to the Ashkenazi majority in Peace Now. Those participating in Peace Now’s activities appear, at first glance, to be bound by their view of the direction which Israel should take politically, yet at second glance the participants are bound by another, socio-economic aspect. In addition, Omer applies the element of identity to her criticism of Peace Now, stating that the organization maintained and promoted a specific Jewish, Israeli sense of identity which was harmful to achieving peace.

39

First Lebanon War

Introduction On June 6th 1982 the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in what was to become known as Israel’s First Lebanon war. PLO rocket attacks into Israel from Lebanon had been a thorn in the side of Prime Minister Begin. Together with the Minister of Defense (and future Prime Minister of Israel) Ariel Sharon, Begin planned the destruction of PLO strongholds in Israel’s northern neighbor. Destroying these strongholds would also mean a weakening of the PLO in the West Bank and subsequently facilitate Israel’s complete occupation of this territory.129 Begin informed the Knesset, before the invasion, that the plan was for the Israeli army to secure a zone of 40 kilometers to the north of Israel’s border and to destroy PLO strongholds in this zone. But this quickly proved to be only half of the story.130 Sharon and Begin had conducted several secret meetings with Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Lebanese Maronite Falangist militia, one of the many militias active in the grim Lebanese civil war that was raging. Gemayel was, like Sharon and Begin, committed to weakening the position of the PLO in Lebanon. Out of strategic considerations Begin publicly likened the plight of the Christians in the Lebanese civil war to the plight of the Jews, both being the victims of Muslim Arabs.131 After initiating the invasion on June 6th 1982, Sharon proceeded to lead the Israeli forces as far north as Beirut, significantly further than the ‘mere’ 40 kilometers into Lebanon that constituted the original plan. From the first day of the Israeli invasion onward, there was opposition to the military operation within Israel, though at first it was not on a large scale. A turning point in the level of protest came when Israeli involvement was revealed in the Falangist massacres in two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, on the outskirts of Beirut in September 1982. This significantly increased the level of protest in Israel, leading to a demonstration organized by Peace Now in Tel Aviv which an estimated 400,000 people attended. This war, and the Sabra and Shatila massacres especially, constituted a watershed moment in Israel’s history, much like the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations and subsequent treaty. The international outrage and massive demonstrations in Israel, led by Peace Now, played an influential role in domestic politics. Besides being on an unprecedented scale, these demonstrations constituted the first time in Israel’s history that a war was being protested while it was being waged.

129 Shlaim, 398. 130 Idem, P. 406. 131 Idem, P. 398. 40

This chapter will focus on Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portrayal of the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities in the context of the First Lebanon War. As in the previous chapter their accounts will firstly be compared and contrasted. Secondly, their accounts will be placed in the context of Tarrow’s view on the important role of political processes in collective action, and in the context of the socio-psychological predictors for collective action as developed by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears.

Origin The context in which Peace Now responded to the First Lebanon War lies, according to Kaminer, Hermann and Omer in the unjustness of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. While Begin had presented this as a military operation aimed at destroying PLO strongholds and enhancing the security of Israel, it turned out to be a costly, long operation aimed at large-scale destruction in Lebanon in order to further Israel’s strategic position in the West Bank. Kaminer states that once the ‘true’ nature of the invasion became known, the opposition to the war spread and deepened.132 This true nature, argues Omer, was to destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon completely, further weakening the PLO in the occupied territories, allowing for an Israeli annexation of the occupied territories.133 Opposition to this military campaign during its first few days was unprecedented; for the first time in Israel’s history a war was being protested while it was being waged.134

It took Peace Now a relatively long time to respond to this war, compared to other peace organizations. In contrast to Peace Now’s slow reaction, Kaminer states: ‘the radical wing of the peace movement was in a state of mobilization before the war began.’ 135 Kaminer, Hermann and Omer all perceive Peace Now’s slow response as a result of the organization’s moderate views and its desire to maintain a broad support base. Omer adds that the reluctance to denounce the war swiftly is linked to Peace Now’s ideological foundation as a mainstream Zionist organization that aims to maintain a patriotic image at all times.136 Only after the newly formed ‘Committee Against the War in Lebanon’ organized a demonstration to which 20,000 people flocked, did Peace Now feel comfortable to organize a demonstration. Kaminer elaborates that Peace Now felt that since opposition to the war was spreading, the organization felt it could harness these sentiments. This shows that Peace Now’s response was not out of its own

132 Kaminer, P. 35. 133 Omer, P. 47. 134 Hermann, P. 92. 135 Kaminer, P. 35. 136 Omer 41 accord, but as a result of awareness that opposition was on the rise. The first demonstration against the First Lebanon War organized by Peace Now was attended by 100,000 people in July 1982. The main aim of the demonstration was to protest against the unclear information regarding the aim of the war and the increasing Israeli casualties.

Dynamics The overall dynamics of the protest landscape in 1982 was significantly different to this landscape in 1978, according to the three historians. Peace Now’s reluctance to quickly speak out against the war was met with harsh criticism from more radical peace organizations. This criticism is not mentioned by Kaminer, though he does elaborate upon the emergence and aims of the more radical organization Yesh Gvul, which advocated a refusal of military service. Where Kaminer devotes little time to the criticism of Peace Now by more radical peace groups, Hermann and Omer address it in detail. Hermann views the First Lebanon war was an especially trying time for Peace Now, as its peace platform clashed with its wish to remain part of the mainstream.137 The organization aimed to be the leader of the peace movement, but while other organizations responded immediately, Peace Now was reluctant to speak out while Israeli soldiers were engaged in warfare in Lebanon. This led to Peace Now suffering significant damage to its credibility which it was eve able to recover from.138 The organizations’ standing among other peace organizations significantly decreased. Omer identifies Peace Now’s reluctance to denounce the war on the outset as the point when Peace Now’s moral decline set in. Despite Peace Now’s slow response and the criticism which it received from other, more radical, peace organizations, it was still able to mobilize the largest crowds. The demonstration in September 1982 which 400,000 people attended testified to Peace Now’s continual appeal.

Outcome The impact of Peace Now’s activities is, oddly, not elaborated upon by the three historians. The demonstrations organized by Peace Now illustrate widespread public dissent regarding the First Lebanon war, though the impact on Israeli leadership is not discussed. Hermann argues that there was an impact on Peace Now, stating: ‘it left behind many of its earlier reservations and self- constraint; it accelerated its criticism of the government and in particular of the settlements, which now became its primary target.’ 139 Besides the organizations’ slow response, Hermann seems to assess the First Lebanon war as playing a significant role in transforming Peace Now’s earlier

137 Hermann, . P. 91. 138 Idem, P. 92. 139 Idem, P. 95. 42 cautionary tactics. The level of public support for anti-war demonstrations and the criticism from other peace organizations may have played a significant factor in Peace Now reorienting its strategy.

Besides arguing that other organizations’ perception of Peace Now changed as a result of the First Lebanon war, Omer also identifies Peace Now as suffering a ‘loss of innocence’ as a result of a Peace Now activist being killed at a demonstration.140 The death of Emile Gruenzweig and the wounding of nine others occurred as a result of a hand grenade being thrown into the crowd at a Peace Now protest against the war in Lebanon. As Hermann states, the assailant, a Jewish-Israeli man named Yona Avrushmi, was the direct perpetrator though many allocated blame to the right-wing leaders in Israel who spoke out fiercely against peace activism and incited hatred of Peace Now.141 Omer extends the allocation of blame further than this and argues that the violent incident reveals Peace Now’s failure to reach out to the non-Ashkenazi Israelis. The peace movement was dominated by Ashkenazi Israelis and the assassination of Emile Gruenzweig revealed a deep fissure in Israeli society. Peace Now is portrayed by Omer as a partisan organization that, besides being ideologically limited, is also limited in its inclusiveness.142 Following the murder of Gruenzweig, Peace Now responded by campaigning for legislation to be put in place against the racist platform advanced by a prominent right-wing leader, Rabbi Meir Kahane. Aiming to undermine Kahane, this legislation led to the delegitimization of not only racist propaganda but also the non-Zionist left.143 Those implicitly or explicitly denying Israel’s existence as a Jewish, democratic state would not be allowed to be elected to the Knesset. For the more radical Israeli peace activists the possibility to participate in national politics hereby became impossible.

Tarrow and Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears Van Zomeren’s article stresses perceived injustice as a predictor of collective action. The definition of injustice is, according to Van Zomeren’s article, ‘perceived unfairness of procedures, perceived undeservingness of collective disadvantage, and perceived collective mistreatment’.144 In this case, Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portray Peace Now’s reaction as a result of the public’s perceived unfairness of the governments’ war and military aims in Lebanon.

The perceived injustice of the war led to Peace Now organizing collective action in the form of demonstrations, though the demonstrations came relatively late. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer do

140 Omer P. 48. 141 Hermann, P. 92. 142 Omer, P. 48. 143 Idem. 144 Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, P. 512. 43 not, surprisingly, address the interesting follow-up question: ‘Why did Peace Now consider this an unjust war?’. The general principles of the justice of war are considered to be: having just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used.145 The phrase ‘War of Choice’ which was largely used to define the First Lebanon war, implies that there was no necessity for this war to be waged and that Israel did not possess just cause when invading Lebanon.

Interestingly, all three mention the Sabra and Shatila massacres in September 1982 as turning points in the level of opposition to the war. This is a turning point which involved Peace Now and massive demonstrations in Israel. As IDF complicity in these massacres, carried out by the Lebanese Falangist’s, became clear there was an outcry from the international community and Israel saw the largest demonstration in its history yet. What is interesting about all three authors mentioning the Sabra and Shatila massacres as the tipping point at which the Israeli public perceived a high level injustice, is that there were large-scale killings carried out directly by the IDF in this war which are not mentioned at all. As Shlaim writes in ‘The Iron Wall’, Israel engaged in massive bombardments in Lebanon. In the first week of July 1982 Israeli bombs had destroyed five hundred buildings in Beirut and one month later Begin ordered ‘unprecedented saturation bombings of Beirut’ which resulted in the deaths of three hundred people.146 Interestingly this was not a turning point for Peace Now, or mentioned as a reason to initiate a demonstration in Israel. These Israeli bombardments are not even mentioned by Kaminer, Hermann and Omer. By not mentioning these casualties before the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Peace Now is portrayed by them as an organization that, though late, has responded to the injustice of the First Lebanon war and that the organization’s response was triggered primarily by the massacres in the two Palestinian refugee camps. However, keeping these other killings in mind, Peace Now as well as Kaminer, Hermann and Omer themselves, betray a certain selectiveness. Perhaps, due to Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s personal relations with the peace movement, Peace Now’s reluctance to denounce other killings is not an aspect that they wish to touch upon. The sense of a social identity, ‘the socially shared understandings of what it means to be a group member’ is evident in varying extents in the accounts by Kaminer, Hermann and Omer. What becomes increasingly clear in all three accounts is that the shared social identity of those in the peace movement, unified in 1978 behind the Officers’ Letter, had gradually disintegrated. The relatively unified demonstrations of 1978 can be contrasted with an increasingly fragmented peace

145 S.A. Silverstone. "Just War Theory." Oxford Bibliographies. Web. 146 Shlaim, P. 413. 44 movement in 1982, during which Peace Now was increasingly criticized for its policies and actions (or lack thereof).

Conclusion The three historians are in agreement that the origin of Peace Now’s response to the First Lebanon war lies in their identification of the public’s opposition to the war. Parts of the public, perceiving Begin’s war of choice as being illegitimate, took part in demonstrations and called for an end to the military campaign. The historians’ view that Peace Now responded late, waiting for public support for its cause, implies that Peace Now acts only when it perceives it to be effective. This brings the predictor of efficacy for collective action to mind. According to Kaminer et al., the aspect of efficacy seems to be the main reason for Peace Now to take part in, or organize collective action. The universal value of peace is not of crucial importance to Peace Now, but strategic considerations regarding the level of support the organization will attain, is most important. This is illustrated by Peace Now’s disregard for the Israeli saturation bombings in Beirut which killed hundreds, because they were not met with large-scale protests, and Peace Now’s response to the Sabra and Shatila massacres which had generated widespread national and international condemnation. Peace Now is portrayed by Kaminer, Hermann and Omer as an organization that undertakes initiatives when it is of strategic value to them, which undermines their commitment to peace. Peace Now’s outrage is selective, as is their commitment to peace. Additionally, the historians’ selection of massacres to discuss in the context of the 1982 war also shows that they would rather focus on the faults of Peace Now, such as its ideological limitations and reluctance to engage, instead of also addressing Peace Now’s (and the public’s) inconsistent attitude towards addressing less well-known cases of Israeli violence (such as saturation bombings of Beirut).

45

The First Intifada

Introduction On the 9th of December 1987 a car-accident in the Jabaliya refugee camp in the Gaza strip set a series of events in motion that would lead to the First Palestinian Intifada.147 Unrest spread from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank and within a relatively short time the Palestinians in the occupied territories were engaged in a mass civilian uprising through spontaneous demonstrations and commercial strikes.148 This uprising led to the widespread recognition that the unresolved Palestinian question stood at the heart of relations between Israel and other Arab nations.149

The outbreak of the First Intifada (in Arabic: shaking off) was spontaneous, though the Palestinian Liberation Organization (the PLO) was quick to seize upon the opportunity to play a leading role. The Intifada’s aim was later determined in the course of the demonstrations and strikes. These aims, self- determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state, had its foundation in the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and was, to an extent, a war of Palestinian independence. As Shlaim states: ‘The Israeli- Palestinian conflict had come full circle.’150

The First Intifada led to a massive Palestinian loss of life, thousands were injured and countless Palestinians were placed in detention centers. Besides the loss of life and the injured on the Israeli side, Israel suffered an additional, very different loss. The images in the international media of Palestinians throwing stones, contrasted with the Israeli military machine, did very serious damage to Israel’s international standing. ‘Within a short time, (the reputation of) Israel sank to its lowest ebb since the siege of Beirut in 1982.’151

Because Kaminer’s work was published four years before the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, his portrayal of Peace Now during the Second Intifada cannot be discussed here. Neither does the Second Intifada receive much attention in the works of Hermann and Omer, which allows for little mention of Peace Now’s portrayal during this second Palestinian uprising against Israel.

This chapter will focus on Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portrayal of the origin, dynamics and outcome of Peace Now’s activities mainly in the context of the First Intifada. As in the previous chapters these aspects of Peace Now’s activities as they appear in the works of Kaminer et al. will

147 Shlaim, P. 450. 148 Idem, P. 541. 149 Omer, P. 36. 150 Shlaim, P. 451. 151 Idem, P. 454. 46 firstly be discussed. Secondly, the accounts will be placed in the context of Tarrow’s focus on the political component to collective action and in the context of the socio-psychological predictors for collective action as developed by Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears.

Origin Identifying its strength as deriving from its patriotic obedience to the law, Peace Now is portrayed by Omer as especially cautious when the First Intifada broke out. 152 Peace Now’s caution was contrasted by the activity of more radical organizations such as Yesh Gvul, The Twenty First Year and Women in Black, who quickly embraced the two-state solution which the Intifada called for. Peace Now was reluctant to abandon the ‘land for peace’ formula as this would potentially harm their standing among the wider Israeli public.

Kaminer also characterizes Peace Now’s initial response to the First Intifada as cautious. He views this as a result of Peace Now’s distinct organizational approach that only initiated action when ‘feelings of anger and indignation crystallized in its broad constituency’.153 Peace Now leadership would rather wait for calls from the public to do something, rather than initiate activities itself. Kaminer refers to a remark by a Peace Now spokesperson describing Peace Now as ‘a mood and not a movement.’154 Depending on the mood of the public, Peace Now chose to act or to refrain from action. The reason for this being mainly strategic, argues Kaminer, as the organization did not want to run ahead of its constituency. Peace Now viewed smaller demonstrations organized by peace organizations as cathartic expressions by peace activists, rather than effective demonstrations conducive to change.155 Despite Peace Now’s initial reluctance to act, Kaminer notes that it organized a demonstration in December 1987, less than two weeks into the uprising.156 This demonstration did not attract a significant amount of people, but it was the first of many demonstrations organized by Peace Now in the first year of the First Intifada.157 Later on Peace Now would organize larger demonstrations.

Hermann emphasizes the decrease in the status and image of state bodies preceding and during the First Intifada, which enabled a rapid development of grassroots, antiwar organizations. 158 Though she does not elaborate on the origin of Peace Now’s activities during this time, Hermann states that

152 Omer, P. 52. 153 Kaminer, P. 98. 154 Idem. 155 Idem. 156 Idem, P. 99. 157 Idem. 158 Hermann, P. 58. 47 the moderate peace groups and organizations found it difficult to deal effectively, ideologically and practically with the increase of Palestinian and Israeli violence during this time.159

Dynamics Kaminer portrays Peace Now’s activities as basically the same as before the outbreak of the Intifada, but in the context of different circumstances.160 Peace Now initially emphasized the ‘land for peace’ formula which it ultimately abandoned for the two-state solution. Following several protests, Peace Now organized a massive demonstration in Tel Aviv in September 1988, this was the largest demonstration since the 1982 demonstration against the Sabra and Shatila massacres in the First Lebanon war.161 Besides these demonstrations Kaminer views Peace Now as not providing any practical solution to the First Intifada, unlike other peace organization such as Yesh Gvul, Dai La’Kibush and The Twenty First Year. In comparison to these organizations, Peace Now had no concrete suggestions regarding the issue of Palestinian autonomy that was demanded by the First Intifada. Eventually, after the large demonstration in Tel Aviv, Peace Now drafted a five-point plan, which failed to gain legitimacy and ‘was helpful in proving that the government had no answer to the Intifada, but convinced few people that Peace Now did have such an answer.’162 Kaminer portrays Peace Now as being subjected to a significant level of criticism within the peace movement during the First Intifada. The First Intifada constitutes a time when radical elements within the peace movements, such as Yesh Gvul and The Twenty First Year specifically, challenged the dominance of the moderate Peace Now.163 Kaminer points to the ‘Twenty-First Year’ organization emerging in the first weeks of the First Intifada which publicly criticized Peace Now through jabs at the ‘nice Israeli’ in their foundational document.164 They criticized Peace Now for playing the role of ‘the nice Israeli’ who opposes what the military does in the Occupied Territories but does not oppose military service there.165 The ‘Twenty-First Year’ also rejected Peace Now’s ability to get results through protest.166

Omer seems to agree with this critique and states that Peace Now did indeed ‘acquiesce to the metahistorical and conceptual/spatial biases inherent in the Israeli ethos.’167 She positions Peace Now as an ideologically flawed peace organization that suffers from what she calls the ‘shooting and

159 Hermann, P. 99. 160 Kaminer, P. 99. 161 Idem, P. 100. 162 Idem, P. 101. 163 Idem, P. 48. 164 Idem, P. 55. 165 Idem, P. 57. 166 Idem, P. 56. 167 Omer, P. 51. 48 crying syndrome’, which is specifically present among economically and socially privileged Israelis.168 Omer, not only emphasizes its ideological shortcomings, but also portrays Peace Now as an hypocrisy-ridden organization led and followed by privileged Israelis. Her assessment of Peace Now’s response to the Second Intifada is that Peace Now responded in a ‘self-righteous’ manner.169

Hermann’s assessment of Peace Now’s activities are placed in the context of protests being so common during the time of the First Intifada, that peace organizations had to think of other ways to collectively oppose Israel’s response to the Palestinian uprising. 170 Though, states Hermann, the entire public was not mobilized, far from it. Especially moderate groups such as Peace Now had difficulty in determining an appropriate strategy when it came to protesting Israeli actions and Hermann quotes a former Peace Now leader, stating: ‘This was real trial by fire and Shalom Achshav was not really able to get through it unharmed.’171 In addition to its inadequate response to the First Intifada, Herman states that Peace Now was not compatible with the significant Israeli women’s peace groups and organizations that emerged preceding and during the Intifada in the late 1980s.172 The premise of these groups and organizations was that ‘women could be more successful in reaching out to the women of the other side, based on their shared experiences and feelings as mothers, wives and daughters and as women operating in patriarchal societies.’ 173 Peace Now, in this context, is referred to as an organization where women were kept out of leadership positions and whose voices were silenced, pushing them to form their own organizations.174 Additionally she mentions that Peace Now did not take part in the Women for Peace conference in 1989.175 Besides addressing women’s movements, Hermann also sheds light on the Arab-Israeli perception of Peace Now during the First Intifada. Most Arab-Israelis were disappointed, states Hermann, with Peace Now’s reluctance to take a forceful stand.176 They echoed, in a their own way, the radical left criticism of Peace Now.

Outcome The impact of Peace Now’s activities on Israeli political leadership is not clearly set out by Kaminer, Hermann and Omer.

168 Omer, P. 50. 169 Idem, P. 62. 170 Hermann, P. 98. 171 Idem, P. 99. 172 Idem, P. 100. 173 Idem. 174 Idem. 175 Idem. 176 Idem, P. 106. 49

Kaminer and Omer are in agreements regarding the failure of practical issues that Peace Now was involved in, besides the demonstrations. The five-point plan it presented as a solution to the challenges presented by the First Intifada was not taken seriously, state Kaminer.177 Regarding Peace Now’s failures Omer mentions its encouragement of Israel’s Prime Minister Shamir to engage with the U.S. Secretary of State regarding talks about Palestinian autonomy. After these collapsed, Peace Now fully adopted the two-state solution.178 What Omer and Kaminer agree on is that the First Intifada brought Peace Now back on the map. Though Omer criticizes Peace Now’s ideological hypocrisy, she does position Peace Now as being reinvigorated by the First Intifada. The acceptance of the two-state solution made Peace Now, views Omer, stronger and reinvigorated the organization, encouraging it to further monitor settlement building in the Occupied Territories and open a dialogue with Palestinians.179 Kaminer mirrors this view by stating that the outcome of the First Intifada for Peace Now was renewed dominance in the peace movement. When Peace Now accepted the two-state solution and began advocating for Israeli negotiations with the PLO, which it accepted as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians, the main component that separated Peace Now from more radical peace organizations such as Yesh Gvul and The Twenty-First Year, fell away.180

Tarrow and Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears Peace Now’s reactions to political developments are portrayed by Kaminer as being founded in the amount of support it perceives from the public. First Peace Now waits for public calls for action, then it initiates demonstrations or a campaign. This relates to Tarrow’s view that social movements should be placed in the context of the political process. Tarrow elaborates on this view by stating that an assumption of resource mobilization theorists is that movements are ‘likely to emerge when resources outweigh constraints’. In the context of Peace Now’s strategy this can be seen as the organization acting only when its resources, its constituency’s support, outweighs the constraints. Peace Now’s relation to political developments is hereby shown as being reactive, and stands in contrast to peace organizations such as Yesh Gvul and The Twenty First Year, who initiate campaigns and demonstrations on a more independent basis. Also, it stands in contrast to the foundation of Peace Now, which emerged as a result of military reservists taking independent initiative and drafting and publicizing the Officers’ Letter.

177 Kaminer, P. 101. 178 Omer, P. 53. 179 Idem, P. 53. 180 Kaminer, P. 120. 50

The emphasis on the political opportunity structure, which Tarrow traces to developing from the 1970s onward, is also evident in the works of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer. An increasing amount of peace organizations arose during the First Intifada, which led to a very different protest landscape compared to 1978 add 1982. The emergence of various ideologically diverse peace organizations led to Peace Now being on the receiving end of a significant amount of criticism from organizations such as Yesh Gvul, The Twenty First Year and Dai’La Kibush. As Tarrow states in relation to the developing political opportunity structure regarding social movements: ‘Though political scientists stressed electoral constraints and opportunities, and sociologists were more sensitive to groups’ internal resources, both implicitly saw movements as strategizing actors, in contrast to the old “hearts and minds” approach in the United States and the macrostructural processes of the new social movement theorists.’181 Kaminer’s account of organizations such as The Twenty First Year refraining from taking part in a left-wing political alliance out of fear of being less appealing to the Peace Now constituency, further place Peace Now and other peace organizations in the realm of politics. Kaminer’s emphasis on the peace movement strategizing and thinking politically matches Tarrow’s theory in this aspect.

When placing Kaminer, Hermann and Omer’s portrayals of Peace Now during the First Intifada in the context of the socio-psychological predictors in the article of Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears, it appears that Peace Now only initiates action when it perceives efficacy. Additionally, leftists perception of Peace Now as being able to effect change diminished. The new peace organizations that arose during the First Intifada indicate an increasing awareness that there were other, better, ways to voice calls for peace than through Peace Now. The founders of The Twenty First Year are mentioned by Kaminer as not believing in Peace Now as an effective tool of protest.182 Besides this, Peace Now still remained the most popular peace organization, able to mobilize the largest amount of people to demonstrations. Besides Twenty First Year, Kaminer mentions Peace Now as being ideologically flawed due to it not linking the unjust First Lebanon war to the harsh Israeli suppression of the First Intifada. In contrast, Kaminer mentions Yesh Gvul as being aware that both were expressions of the same policy.

Though it is not possible to discern out of the works of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer if there was a changing sense of Israeli’s social identities, it is possible to determine that the political left experienced fragmentation. Besides the Israeli right as a main enemy, Peace Now had to contend with other peace organizations that sought to undermine Peace Now. The social identity of peace activists is portrayed by Kaminer, Hermann and Omer as being relatively more fragmented.

181 Tarrow, P. 427. 182 Kaminer, P. 55. 51

Conclusion The First Intifada is an especially interesting context in which to place Peace Now as the uprising constituted a Palestinian collective protest movement, to which the Israeli leadership responded through military suppression. Kaminer and Omer view Peace Now’s response as being cautious. Kaminer emphasizes the organizations’ initial lack of concrete responses to the uprising, after which followed several failed initiatives such as a five-point-plan and Peace Now’s open support for the Schultz-initiative. Additionally, Kaminer highlights Peace Now’s organizational approach to collective action as being reactive instead of proactive. Hermann does not make specific mention of Peace Now’s response to the First Intifada. But she views the First Intifada as a difficult time for all peace organizations as this period saw an increase in violence from Israeli and Palestinian sides. Peace Now experienced significant difficulties in responding adequately. Furthermore, she acknowledges that Peace Now was subject to increasing levels of criticism, especially from Yesh Gvul and The Twenty-First Year. Hermann positions Peace Now in the context of the First Intifada as an organization that ideologically failed women and Arab- Israelis, while experiencing severe difficulties in responding to the uprising.

Applying Tarrow’s theory to Kaminer’s work shows that the protest landscape had significantly changed and that the peace movement had been increasingly politicized. The emergence of various different protest organizations illustrated a fragmentation of the social identities of those involved in the peace movement. Yet besides this, the relatively large amount of people that attended demonstrations showed that Peace Now was still able to mobilize the public.

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Conclusion

The context in which the three historians have written their works is of the utmost importance in assessing their works. Israel, a state not yet 70 years old, found its origins in the ideology of political Zionism as furthered by Theodor Herzl, accompanied by waves of immigration to Palestine. Upon the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Israel marked out its territory and consolidated its power through a series of wars with its neighbors. Compared to other newly formed states, Israel has experienced enormous economic growth, which is partially due to the massive amount of aid it received from the United States. Despite its political instabilities, Israel has developed into a relatively stable and prosperous state.

Kaminer, Hermann and Omer, all Israelis, reaped the benefits of these developments. Kaminer immigrated to Israel from the United States, while Hermann and Omer are both born and raised Israelis. Though all three from different age groups, they share a critical look at the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and are connected to the Israeli peace movement. In the realm of the Israeli political landscape, all three historians are located on the left and oppose the Likud’s unfavorable stance towards territorial concessions. Besides their nationality, their political preference undoubtedly played a part in their choice to write about the Israeli peace movement. Kaminer’s personal involvement with Peace Now is mentioned in his book, Hermann expresses gratitude to peace activists for contributing to her book and Omer acknowledges her involvement with the peace movement her whole life, crediting her father as an inspiration, having spent his life ‘on the radical margins of Israeli society’.183

Placing these historians in the Israeli historiographic tradition is complex. They are certainly not Zionist historians, as all three express criticism regarding Peace Now’s blind acceptance of the establishment of the State of Israel as legitimate. This implies that they find this legitimacy questionable. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer betray qualities of the New Historians, though they do not aim to uncover and re-write the ‘old history’ with traditional myths regarding Israel’s establishment and development. The works of Kaminer, Hermann and Omer can be seen as the heirs to the New Historians. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer present a new genre of Israeli historical writing that has internalized the paradigm of the New Historians, exhibiting a critical stance towards Israel’s establishment and Israel’s policies towards its neighbors and towards the Palestinians, but whose main focus does not lie in undermining and bashing these aspects.

183 Omer, P. ix. 53

Shlaim’s view that the harsh criticism aimed at the New Historians was expressed by those that had constructed an image of themselves and of Israel as peace-loving in the context of the persecution of the Holocaust, when applied to the works of these historians, illustrates the historians’ separation from this period in history. Kaminer was born in the United States and moved to Israel in 1951, while Hermann and Omer were born later. All three did not experience the Holocaust or the War of Independence, which allows for a certain level of distance and connects them to the genre of New Historians.

The three historians all credit the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, the First Lebanon War and the First and Second Intifada as being leading in the development of the Israeli peace movement, and hereby in the development of Peace Now. However, the different theoretical frameworks that Kaminer, Hermann and Omer employ leads to them positioning Peace Now differently and to them highlighting and/or criticizing different aspects of Peace Now’s activities.

In the case of the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations, all authors agreed on the groundbreaking nature of the Officers’ Letter, while also highlighting the ideological limitations inherent in Peace Now’s ideology from its origin onward. Peace Now’s ideological limitations are emphasized in the context of the 1982 war. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer share the view that Peace Now espoused a moderate ideology to appeal to a broad section of the Israeli public, the desire to maintain this appeal prevented Peace Now from responding to the First Lebanon war in a timely manner.

Kaminer highlights the political struggle and political outcome of Peace Now’s activities, in line with his assertion that peace organizations have a high level of political thinking when it comes to policy and strategy. Though his criticism of Peace Now’s ideology is in keeping with his radical leftist ties, he does not criticize Peace Now to the same extent as Hermann and Omer. Besides his focus on the political elements to the peace movement, Kaminer is reluctant to pay significant attention to the socio-economic background of those active in the peace movement. Kaminer refrains from answering questions such as: ‘Who supports Peace Now?’ and does not delve deeper in to the underlying motivations regarding social or economic status. Neither does Kaminer elaborate on criticism which Peace Now received from other radical peace groups from 1982 onward.

Hermann’s approach leads her to emphasize the exclusionary nature of Peace Now from its inception onward, mentioning the gender inequality and the dominance of Ashkenazi leadership and support. Hermann also acknowledges the social divides in Israeli society when mentioning the murder of

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Emile Gruenzweig in the context of the First Lebanon war. Compared to Kaminer, Hermann presents a broad picture of the peace movement and is able to place Peace Now in the context of developments in Israel. This must, in part be due to her work at the Israel Democracy Institute and the Peace Index project, allowing her access to a wide scope of information regarding the Israeli population. Especially Hermann’s focus on the aspect of gender in Peace Now is remarkable, as this is not featured in Kaminer’s portrayal of Peace Now.

Omer’s focus on identity is the foundation of her main criticism of Peace Now, which is that the organization is based on a narrow interpretation of Jewish, Israeli identity. Besides this criticism, Omer views Peace Now as insincere in its adherence to universal values of peace, as its activities are aimed at attacking the Likud’s expansionist policy first and foremost, as this harms Israel’s pure character.

Interestingly, the historians betray a certain selectiveness when it comes to Peace Now and other Israeli peace groups. The deaths of hundreds of people as a result of Israeli bombings during the First Lebanon war, before the Sabra and Shatila massacres, are not mentioned by the three historians. While Sabra and Shatila was a turning point in Israeli peace activism, massacres which the Israeli military was indirectly involved in, direct involvement in the deaths of hundreds of civilians was apparently not sufficient to mark a turning point, or even important enough to be mentioned. Kaminer, Hermann and Omer, all having been active in the peace movement, might not feel comfortable in elaborating on these bombings and on the reasons for a lack of response from the Israeli public, as they have significant ties with this movement.

Overall, these three historians portrayed Peace Now as an organization that took the initiative at first, but later became cautious and reactive in order to maintain its support base. They are, in varying degrees, in agreement that Peace Now is ideologically flawed. Though managing to maintain its broad-based support throughout 1978, 1982 and the First Intifada, the organization did see an increase in criticism from other peace organizations and changed its strategy to supporting a two- state solution to accommodate the changing political context.

Additionally, when applying Tarrow’s theory that collective action should first and foremost be placed in the context of political processes, it becomes clear the neither of the three historians are able to provide concrete examples of Peace Now’s impact. Though they indicate, to varying degrees, that Peace Now and the peace movement did indeed have an impact on the public and on political leadership, they fail to bring forward evidence linking the peace movement or Peace Now to change.

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Though Kaminer agrees with Tarrow’s theory that the political processes involved in social movements and collective action are most important, Kaminer also does not link the peace movement or Peace Now to having directly created change. The broader peace movement and Peace Now are portrayed by Kaminer as reacting to political developments, instead of creating political change.

The focus on socio-psychological elements in collective action as developed by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears highlight Kaminer’s lack of attention for these factors in his assessment of the peace movement. The predictors of injustice, efficacy and social identity show an interesting side to Peace Now’s portrayal. Besides the initial Officers’ Letter, Peace Now’s response to the First Lebanon war and the First Intifada are triggered by the public’s perception of injustice, not Peace Now’s own moral compass.

Overall, these three historians paint a picture of Peace Now enjoying broad support among the public, though being led by an inherently flawed ideology. Their assessments vary according to their theoretical approaches and are in line with leftist views regarding the illegitimate occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Peace Now’s current status on the margins of Israeli society, being partially caused by the failing Oslo Accords, is portrayed as a result of an inhospitable political environment and due to the organizations’ inability to draw in a more diverse, non-Ashkenazi, following. However, over all, Peace Now and the Israeli peace movement have made an impact on the Israeli public, though this claim remains, sadly, unsubstantiated.

Should Peace Now want to attain wider support in the future, it is of the utmost importance that this organization reaches out to non-Ashkenazi Israelis and Israeli-Arabs. Then perhaps its office will become a hotbed of protest activity, instead of an unremarkable workplace in suburban Tel Aviv.

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