Trust Deficit and Anti-Corruption Initiatives
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Trust deficit and anti-corruption initiatives Abstract This study explores the ways in which trust deficit undermines anti-corruption initiatives in a context with systemic corruption. Anti-corruption measures as panacea to systemic corruption are not new, but their effectiveness is debatable. Whilst understanding the causal relationship between corruption and trust remains germane to fighting corruption, a growing number of recent studies advocate better context sensitivity in developing anti- corruption initiatives. Consistent with this, we unpack the perceptions of a significant section of the population in which corruption is rampant to identify factors that could enhance trust in the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Using commentaries from Nigerian Netizens on two critical corruption incidents that are significant to corporations, we uncover poignant narratives of perception of incompetence, dishonesty and confusion that undermine the anti- corruption measures in the context. We argue that donors, international organisations and businesses must encourage and support beneficiaries’ governments to secure and sustain trust in the anti-corruption initiatives as a condition for better results. Keywords: Corruption; Anti-corruption; Trust; Netizens; Nigeria; Commentaries; Internet. 1 Introduction This study explores the ways in which trust deficit undermines anti-corruption initiatives in a context with systemic corruption. Anti-corruption measures as panacea to systemic corruption are not new, but their effectiveness is debatable (Zhu et al., 2017; Zhang, 2016; Cleveland et al., 2009; Lawson, 2009; Persson et al., 2013; Everett et al., 2006). Failure of anti-corruption initiatives not only mean additional danger for quality of life, it has far-reaching implications for corporations as corruption becomes ‘stronger’ (Schwartz, 2009; Dunfee and Donaldson, 2002; Dunfee and Hess, 2001). Empirical research presents evidence of bold and strategic initiatives conceived by many national governments to check its spread, with some involving partnership with businesses. According to the Global Integrity (2008), anti-graft institutional initiatives by key sub-Saharan African countries (e.g. Kenya and Uganda) are very strong and effective in theory but less successful in reality (Misangyi et al., 2008). There seems to be a clear mismatch between the huge resources expended in fighting corruption and the meagre palpable success stories of anti-graft reforms and citizens’ attitudinal change. The contemporary anti-graft initiatives by most African countries, rather than curb the scourge have seemed to create further avenues and incentives for corruption (Persson et al., 2013). Anti-corruption crusades are often viewed as constituting an existential threat to patrimonial domination of the political elites, posing a grave danger to the continuity of their production and survival (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Wrong 2009). Theoretically, the anti-corruption initiatives in many African countries are seemingly based on the principal-agent perspective, informing the reform agenda by donor countries and international organisations (Lawson 2009; Persson et al., 2013; Everett et al., 2006). These reform agenda which involved democratisation, bureaucratisation, privatisation, and accountability including the reform of the tax system are aimed to reduce discretion, limit the monopoly of decisions and enhance accountability (Klitgaard 1988). However, their effectiveness is so often undermined by the fissures in the context and the attempt to mollify donors in a vastly neo-patrimonial society where rent-seeking behaviours are enmeshed 2 even in the reformatory institutions themselves (Lawson, 2009). Thus, Persson et al. (2013) questioned the suitability of the principal-agent theoretical characterisation of corruption in such society, describing them as a collective action problem instead. They argued that in a highly corrupt context, there is no principled principal to hold agents to account and therefore the institutions and the reform agenda are doomed to fail since the monitoring authorities themselves are corrupt. This, according to Persson et al., partly explains the failure of anti- corruption initiatives in highly corrupt climes. They concluded by highlighting the fundamental role of trust in successful anti-corruption initiatives. Although several previous studies have examined the causal relationship between trust and corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010; Xin and Ruden, 2004; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Della Porta 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000), findings which are often based on econometric analysis remain inconclusive. For example, whilst Della Porta (2000) reported an inverse relationship between trust and corruption for Italy, France and Germany based on the data from the Eurobarometer survey on the perception of corruption and confidence in government, Morris and Klesner (2010) reported a mutual causality between the two variables based on evidence from Mexico. Others contend that it is corruption that undermines trust (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Della Porta 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000), suggesting that corruption by political elites and government functionaries signal wider acquiescence to it in a corruption invested environment, and reduces personal and institutional trust. Yet there is a general acknowledgement that trust matters for both personal, institutional and governmental effectiveness and in providing enabling environment for business-to-business, and public- private collaborations (Rousseau et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Lumineau, 2017; Yu et al., 2015; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). Trust can enhance government efforts to mobilise citizens and corporations to fight corruption and reduce public scepticism about government’s anti-corruption initiatives (Morris and Klesner, 2010). Along similar lines, several extant studies (Espinal et al., 2006; Warren, 2006; Job, 2005; Seligson, 2002) have 3 discussed the relationship between trust and corruption in the context of governmental legitimacy. They suggest that trust is fundamental to governmental legitimacy (Jackson and Gau, 2016; Tyler and Jackson, 2014), affecting citizens’ attitude to government information including on their policies and projects (Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006). According to Tyler (2006) legitimacy involves the belief that constituted authorities are trustworthy, honest and care about the welfare of the people, and that they ought to be accepted and people should voluntarily defer to their decisions and directives. However, when governmental legitimacy is challenged, due in part to trust deficit, citizens do not naturally defer to government policy directions, instead they doubt and question them, and in some cases blatantly disbelieve them (Morris and Klesner, 2010), affecting their effectiveness. Similarly, corporate involvement in government initiatives and their implementations may not be optimal if businesses consider that the government cannot be trusted. This could increase corporate uncertainty with impact on corporate strategic decisions as businesses plan to deal with the consequences of such uncertainty in addition to the well-established problems of corruption that corporations face (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Following a growing number of extant studies (Everett et al., 2006; Ekeh 1975; Lawson, 2009; Cleveland et al., 2009; Persson et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2017; Shepler, 2017; Collier, 2002; Misangyi et al., 2008) arguing that understanding the social context of a problem provides a better basis for the development of a holistic solution, we construe trust as an instrument for reducing corruption. This allowed us to generate a deeper perspective on the factors that inhibit trust in anti-corruption initiatives. In doing this, we unpack the perceptions of a significant section of the population in a jurisdiction where corruption is rampant to identify factors that could enhance trust in the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Understanding these factors is important considering how the internet is changing the interactions between people and their governments (Linders, 2012). Several extant studies note how the internet is providing citizens with greater access to government 4 information and enhancing their participation in governance (Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006; Welch et al., 2005; Chadwick and May, 2003). It also facilitates the online presence of many media outlets through which government policies are increasingly subjected to critical social discourse and evaluation with consequences on citizens’ perception of their trustworthiness (Santana 2014; Feenberg and Bakardjieva 2004; Graham and Wright, 2015). Nigeria provides an excellent context to explore alternative approaches to mitigating corruption. A deeply neo-patrimonial society (Lawson, 2009), Nigeria is consistently ranked amongst the Transparency International’s list of highly corrupt countries and has decades’ history of failed anti-corruption initiatives, despite this being a cardinal objective of all previous administrations. President Muhammadu Buhari’s (the President) government elected with similar objective in 2015 is considered different given his image of being a champion of the anti-corruption war. However, despite the several landmark steps and noticeable efforts to tackle corruption (including the establishment of the Presidential advisory committee on corruption, whistle-blowing regulation, production of orientation