May 2013

Monthly Forecast

2 Status Update since our Overview April Forecast 3 In Hindsight: Horizon Scanning Briefings Togo will preside over the Security Council in Peacebuilding Office in the Central African 4 Peace and Security in May. Republic (BINUCA); Africa Togo’s President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé • the Secretary-General’s consolidated report on 5 Mali will preside over a debate on “Peace and Security Guinea-Bissau by the Special Representative in Africa: the challenges of the fight against terror- of the Secretary-General and head of the UN 7 Libya ism in Africa in the context of maintaining inter- Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea- 8 Guinea-Bissau national peace and security” with the Secretary- Bissau (UNIOGBIS) José Ramos-Horta; and 10 Democratic Republic of General providing a briefing. • the situation in the Middle East, by Under- the Congo The quarterly debate on Kosovo with a brief- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey 12 Central African ing by Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of Feltman. Republic the Secretary-General and head of the UN Inter- Briefings in consultations are likely on: 13 UNOCA/LRA im Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), • developments in the Democratic Republic of 14 Sudan and South and the semi-annual debate on Bosnia-Herzegov- the Congo, by the Secretary-General’s Special Sudan ina, with a briefing by the High Representative Envoy Mary Robinson; Valentin Inzko, are also expected. • Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice, most 15 Sudan/Darfur Briefings are expected on: likely by, respectively, the Secretary General’s 17 Somalia • the work of the Organization for Security and Special Envoy Haile Menkerios and Assistant 18 Kosovo Cooperation in Europe by its Chairperson-in- Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Opera- 19 Bosnia and Office Leonid Kozhara; tions Edmond Mulet; Herzegovina • the work of the counterterrorism subsid- • the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei 20 Lebanon iary bodies—the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanc- (UNISFA) by Mulet; 22 DPRK (North Korea) tions Committee; the 1373 Counter-Terror- • the implementation of resolution 1559, by ism Committee; and the 1540 Committee Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen; 24 Notable Dates on weapons of mass destruction—by their • Sudan sanctions, by the chair of the 1591 respective chairs, Ambassador Gary Quinlan Sudan Sanctions Committee Ambassador (Australia); Ambassador Mohammed Lou- María Cristina Perceval (Argentina); and lichki (Morocco); and Ambassador Kim Sook • the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Republic of Korea); (DPRK) by the chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanc- • the Secretary-General’s report on the Lord’s tions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas Resistance Army and on the UN Regional (Luxembourg). Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) by Abou Formal sessions will need to be held to adopt Moussa, the Special Representative of the Sec- resolutions to: retary-General and head of UNOCA; and • establish a new UN assistance mission in • on the situation in Libya and the proceedings Somalia; of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by • renew the mandate of UNISFA; ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda. • revise the mandate of BINUCA; and Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on: • renew the mandate of UNIOGBIS. • the Secretary-General’s report on the inte- A wrap-up session in a private meeting is grated strategy for the Sahel by the Special planned by Togo at the end of the month. 1 May 2013 Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel Throughout the month, Council members will This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. Romano Prodi; be following closely the developments in Syria, • the Secretary-General’s report and develop- and a meeting on this issue may be scheduled. • For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please ments in the Central African Republic by Mar- subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” garet Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. Representative and head of the UN Integrated

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 1 Status Update since our April Forecast

Afghanistan the root causes” (S/PV.6946). Louise Mushi- Peace and Security to consider the Secretary- On 4 April, the Council issued a press state- kiwabo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and General’s annual report on sexual violence in ment in which it condemned a terrorist Cooperation of Rwanda, presided. A concept conflict (S/2013/149) following a briefing by attack that occurred in Farah Province in the note for the briefing had previously been cir- the Secretary-General and Zainab Bangura, western part of Afghanistan, which caused culated as an annex to a letter to the Council his Special Representative on the issue (S/ numerous deaths and injuries, mainly to on 2 April (S/2013/204). The Council was PV.6948). In addition, Saran Keïta Diakité— civilians (SC/10967). briefed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; the President of the Women, Peace and Secu- Tekeda Alemu, Permanent Representative of rity Network of the ECOWAS region, Mali— Yemen Ethiopia to the UN, representing the Chair- spoke on behalf of the New York-based On 4 April, Council members received a person of the AU; and Elliott Ohin, Minister NGO Working Group on Women, Peace briefing in consultations by the Secretary- for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo. and Security. There was no outcome follow- General’s Special Adviser on Yemen, Jamal The Council adopted a presidential state- ing the debate, however, Bangura said that Benomar, mainly on the National Dialogue ment at the conclusion of the meeting (S/ she hoped the Security Council would show Conference that opened on 18 March. On 12 PRST/2013/4). resolve in June 2013 and adopt a new resolu- April, the Council issued a press statement tion on sexual violence in conflict focused on welcoming Yemen’s reorganisation of the mil- Côte d’Ivoire accountability and prevention. itary and calling on “all parties to support On 16 April, the Council was briefed (S/ the President’s decrees and to work to ensure PV.6947) by Assistant Secretary-General Syria their prompt implementation,” (SC/10969). for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet on the On 18 April, the Council received briefings Secretary-General’s special UNOCI report on the humanitarian situation in Syria from Western Sahara (S/2013/197). In the subsequent consulta- Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian On 11 April, the Council held a closed meet- tions, Council members also discussed the Affairs Valerie Amos, High Commissioner for ing with the troop and police-contributing final report of the Group of Experts assisting Refugees António Guterres, Special Repre- countries to MINURSO (S/PV.6945). On 22 the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Commit- sentative of the Secretary-General on Sexual April, the Special Representative of the Secre- tee (S/2013/228). On 25 April, the Coun- Violence in Conflict Zainab Bangura, and tary-General and head of MINURSO, Wolf- cil unanimously adopted resolution 2101, Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen- gang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany), and the renewing for a period of 12 months the sanc- eral on Children and Armed Conflict Leila Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for West- tions regime on Côte d’Ivoire and the man- Zerrougui (S/PV.6949). Amos described the ern Sahara, Christopher Ross (US), briefed date of the Group of Experts (S/PV.6953). situation in Syria as a “humanitarian catas- Council members in consultations on MIN- The resolution rolls over most of the mea- trophe”. Guterres asserted that the refugee URSO’s activities and recent developments sures in resolution 2045, namely an arms crisis had become an “existential threat” to since the Secretary-General’s latest report embargo, a ban on diamond exports and tar- some of Syria’s neighbors. Bangura detailed (S/2013/220). In his briefing Ross covered geted sanctions on a number of individuals. instances of sexual violence alleged against his visits to North Africa from 18 March to It also includes a change in the notification both the opposition and forces loyal to Syrian 3 April and from 8 to 11 April. On 25 April, system by which member states delivering President Bashar Al-Assad, adding that her Council members adopted resolution 2099 non-lethal law enforcement equipment to message to the perpetrators of such abuses and extended the mandate of MINURSO the Côte d’Ivoire security forces may notify is that “justice may be delayed, but it will for another year. A draft resolution prepared the Committee of any shipment to ensure not be denied”. Finally, Zerrougui drew the by the US, the penholder on Western Saha- the Committee keeps track of the material Council’s attention to the fact that more ra, had been discussed earlier by the Group delivered. than three million children inside Syria had of Friends of Western Sahara (France, Rus- been affected by the conflict, and more than sia, Spain, the UK and the US) and between Myanmar 600,000 children had been counted among the US and Morocco in bilateral consulta- On 16 April, Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary- the refugees in the subregion. Representa- tions. The initial draft apparently included General’s Special Adviser for Myanmar, tives of Syria, Lebanon and Turkey also made language giving MINURSO a mandate to briefed Council members in consultations. statements. Closed consultations followed monitor and gather information on human It was Nambiar’s first briefing to the Council the briefings, after which the Council Presi- rights violations and included a reference to since 20 June 2012. He had visited Myanmar dent read elements to the press at the media human rights monitoring in the camps near several times since then and updated Council stakeout in which Council members strongly Tindouf, Algeria, but by the time the draft members on the situation on the ground in condemned incidents of sexual violence and was distributed to all Council members, this Myanmar. violence against children; urged all parties language had been withdrawn. to protect civilians and respect international Women, Peace and Security humanitarian law; and “underlined the need Prevention of Conflicts in Africa On 17 April, Louise Mushikiwabo, the For- to facilitate the provision of humanitarian On 15 April, the Council held a briefing on eign Minister of Rwanda, presided over the assistance … including where appropriate “Prevention of conflicts in Africa: addressing Security Council’s open debate on Women, across borders in accordance with guiding

2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Status Update since our April Forecast (con’t) principles of humanitarian assistance.” On 19 Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Guinea April, UN-Arab League Joint Special Repre- Jeffrey Feltman highlighted the destabilising On 25 April Council members received a sentative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi briefed effects of the conflict in Syria. He identified briefing on Guinea under “any other busi- Council members in consultations on his own the need for “quick, concerted action” on ness” from Under-Secretary-General for efforts to facilitate a political solution to the Syria and added that “Action must also be Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on the 25 Syrian conflict. Speaking to the press follow- taken on the Israeli-Palestinian issue… There April demonstrations in Conakry and the 23 ing the briefing, Brahimi denied rumors that is now an opening to develop a meaningful April joint declaration of non-violence signed his resignation was imminent and reiterated initiative to achieve the negotiated two-State between the main Guinean stakeholders. On his position that the situation in Syria required solution.” Following Feltman’s briefing, Pal- 29 April, the Council issued a press statement action by the Council. The Syrian conflict also estine, Israel, the Permanent Observer of the expressing concern over the volatile situation dominated statements made during the quar- League of Arab States and 41 other nations in the country, welcoming the joint declara- terly open debate on the Middle East, held on made statements. tion and calling upon all parties to cooperate 24 April (S/PV.6950 and Resumption 1). At with Special Representative Said Djinnit with press time, it was anticipated that Prince Zeid Peacebuilding a view towards national dialogue and free, fair, Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein, Ambassador of Jordan, On 25 April, the Council was briefed by transparent and inclusive legislative elections would address the Council in a private meet- Ambassadors Abulkalam Abdul Momen in Guinea (SC/10992) ing on 30 April to seek the Council’s determi- (Bangladesh) and Ranko Vilović (Croatia), the nation that the influx of Syrian refugees into former and current chairs of the Peacebuild- Wrap-Up Session Jordan represents a threat to international ing Commission (PBC), on the sixth annual On 30 April, the Council held a “wrap-up peace and security (S/2013/247). report of the PBC (S/2013/63), covering the session” of Rwanda’s April presidency under period from 1 January to 31 December 2012 the agenda item “Implementation of Note Middle East (S/PV.6954). There was no outcome to the S/2010/507 (Wrap-up Session)”. Non-Coun- On 24 April the Council held a quarterly open meeting. cil members were invited to attend the private debate on the Middle East (S/PV.6950 and meeting. Resumption 1). In his briefing to the Council,

In Hindsight: Horizon-Scanning Briefings

From November 2010 through March 2012, factors. B. Lynn Pascoe, the former head Analysis of Issues Covered in Horizon- with a break in December 2010 during the of DPA who conducted 14 of the 16 brief- Scanning Briefings US presidency of the Council), “horizon-scan- ings, tended to inform Council members of The horizon-scanning briefings ranged from ning” briefings by the Department of Politi- the topics only a couple of days before the covering just one issue to more than nine. cal Affairs (DPA) were a regular feature of the meeting. Many Council members wanted A number of issues that have since needed programme of work of the Security Council. more time to prepare. At the start these ses- sustained attention by the Council—such The UK initiated these briefings to provide sions were more interactive than the aver- as Gulf of Guinea piracy, Tuareg activity in the Council with information that might allow age Council consultations, but they became northern Mali and the instability in Guin- for better preventive diplomacy and conflict more formal over time, with Council mem- ea-Bissau following the death of President prevention. Additionally it was hoped that this bers reading statements. Malam Bacai Sanhá—were first raised at format would allow for an unscripted exchange During 2012 some members began these briefings. of ideas. to question the usefulness of the brief- These sessions were also a useful forum After a strong start, the cycle was once again ings and whether they needed to be held to discuss emerging crises such as Libya, broken by the US presidency in April 2012. every month. Although never spelt out, it Syria and Yemen. Although these issues fea- During the next three months Azerbaijan, Chi- seems that these members may have been tured in other Council meetings, all three na and Colombia also chose not to have these uncomfortable with the lack of control were regularly on the horizon-scanning briefings. France and Germany temporarily the Council had over the issues covered. briefings, allowing the Council to be updat- revived the practice in August and September In April 2012, the US circulated a non- ed on fast-changing situations. These brief- 2012, but there have been no horizon-scanning paper on guidelines for the briefings, which ings also allowed for issues not discussed so briefings since. It seems that Rwanda, before included suggestions on the purpose, top- regularly, such as Iraq, to be covered. its presidency in April of this year, showed ics, members’ participation and frequen- More controversial for some members some interest in reviving this practice but could cy. However, some members disagreed was having the situation in countries such not find sufficient support for it. with the text, effectively killing the idea. as Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives or Mex- The change in attitude was due to several ico discussed during the briefings. In these

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 3 In Hindsight: Horizon-Scanning Briefings (con’t) cases the briefings served as a way of alerting Council members reacted well to the brief- for his preventive mandate. Council members to situations that had the ings at the start. But more critical views began Past Secretaries-General have brought potential for instability. However, some mem- to be expressed by mid-2012. Among the issues to the attention of the Council in other bers were not comfortable with this, feeling complaints was that while in theory a good ways. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld it could give the appearance that these issues idea, in practice the briefings had been disap- in 1959 brought the matter of a letter from were on the Council’s agenda. Focusing on pointing. There were calls for more analysis Laos before the Council but specifically stat- elections in particular regions, such as Africa rather than information already in the public ed that he was not acting under Article 99 and Latin America, also generated negative domain. Objections were raised about some and Rule 3 of the Provisional Rules of Proce- reactions. And raising situations such as Israel/ of the issues covered, with certain members dure. Instead, he said he wanted to raise the Palestine and Myanmar made some members attempting to influence the agenda. In 2013 issue because he felt it was personally neces- unhappy. Some members may also have found the positions of those against these briefings sary, but he was leaving the Council the option it difficult to justify discussing Camp Ashraf appear to have hardened, making it difficult of deciding whether or not to place the issue (now Camp New Iraq) for three consecutive to get consensus on having them at all. Few on its agenda (S/PV.847). In the 1990s, there months in 2012. members seem willing to put the matter to a were daily high-level comprehensive situation The rationale for including issues such procedural vote at this point. briefings provided by the Secretariat to Coun- as the financial implications of political mis- The horizon-scanning briefings are very cil members during informal consultations. sions, political field missions and problems much in line with Article 99 of the UN Char- Suggestions for other ways to apprise the with appointing sanctions experts may also ter, which provides that the “Secretary-Gen- Council of emerging issues have included the have been questioned. It is less clear how eral may bring to the attention of the Secu- “Any Other Business” part of Council consul- these issues fit in with the concept of conflict rity Council any matter which in his opinion tations, and the once-a-month Secretary-Gen- prevention. may threaten the maintenance of international eral’s lunches and Council wrap-up sessions. Trips made by the head of DPA were also peace and security.” Resolution 1625, adopted While these are useful forums to raise issues, often covered. Pascoe briefed Council mem- on 14 September 2005 following a summit- none of them currently serve the Council as bers on his visits to Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon level meeting on conflict prevention, encour- early-warning mechanisms. With scant con- and Tunisia, and following AU meetings, often aged the Secretary-General to provide infor- flict prevention mechanisms in place, ensur- in relation to ongoing situations in the Middle mation to the Council on developments in ing that horizon-scanning sessions are truly East or Africa. regions at risk of armed conflict. The 2008 informative and interactive might be worth Reactions to these briefings had clearly and 2011 Secretary-General’s reports on pre- the effort. changed by mid-2012. With a few exceptions, ventive diplomacy cite Article 99 as the basis

Peace and Security in Africa

Expected Council Action situation on the Sahel, and Togolese President Sahel, responsible mainly for the development In May, the Council is expected to be briefed Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé will preside. The of this strategy. in consultations by the Secretary General’s chairs of African subregional organisations are In a 10 December presidential statement, Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, also likely to attend. A presidential statement the Council reiterated the urgent need for on the Secretary-General’s report on the Sahel. is the anticipated outcome. an integrated UN strategy for the Sahel and The much delayed and anticipated UN inte- for enhanced cooperation and coordination grated strategy for the Sahel requested by the Key Recent Developments between states of the Sahel and the Maghreb Council in resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012, is In resolution 2056 the Council asked the Sec- in collaboration with relevant UN entities and annexed to the report. retary-General to develop and implement, in regional and international partners, in order The Council also expects to hold a debate consultation with regional organisations, a to combat Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb on “Peace and Security in Africa: the challeng- UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region (AQIM) (S/PRST/2012/26). The statement es of the fight against terrorism in Africa in the encompassing security, governance, develop- said this coordinated effort was necessary to context of maintaining international peace and ment, human rights and humanitarian issues. prevent further progress by AQIM elements security” with a briefing from the Secretary- On 9 October 2012, Prodi was appointed as and affiliated groups in the Sahel and Maghreb General. The debate will probably highlight the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the regions and beyond, as well as to tackle arms

UN DOCUMENTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2056 (5 July 2012) expressed full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the interim government in Mali in trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/26 (10 December 2012) recognised the importance of a comprehensive approach encompassing security, development and humanitarian issues to address the immediate and long-term needs of the Sahel region. Security Council Press Statements SC/10887 (18 January 2013) condemned the terrorist attacks in In Aménas, Algeria. SC/10878 (10 January 2013) expressed grave concern regarding the capture of the city of Konna, Mali, by terrorist and extremist groups. SC/10984 (23 April 2013) condemned the terrorist attack on the embassy of France in Tripoli, Libya. USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE N. Chowdhury Fink and R. Barakat, Preventing Conflict and Terrorism: What Role for the Security Council? Policy Brief, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Spring 2013.

4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Peace and Security in Africa (con’t) proliferation and transnational organised terms terrorist attacks in the region, including such as the AU Commission, the African crime, including illicit activities such as drug In Aménas, Algeria, (SC/10887) and on the Centre for Study and Research on Ter- trafficking. French embassy in Tripoli, Libya (SC/10984). rorism (ACSRT) and the Committee of As stated in both resolution 2056 and the It also expressed its grave concern regard- Intelligence and Security Services in Africa presidential statement, the security dimension ing the seizure of the city of Konna, Mali, (CISSA), among others; has been key in signalling the need for a com- by terrorist and extremist groups in January • requesting the Secretary-General and his prehensive strategy that blurs the traditional (SC/10878). Special Envoy to elaborate an action plan regional boundaries between West Africa and Togo, as President of the Council in May, for the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel; the Maghreb. would like the discussion to be focused on the and The Sahel region has recently been the focus specifics of the terrorist phenomenon in the • making full use of the 1566 Working Group, of increased attention by the Council and its Sahel and the Maghreb. The debate may pro- which is mandated to examine practi- subsidiary organs, in particular the 1267/1989 vide a space to discuss such issues as insuf- cal measures that could be imposed upon Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. The four indi- ficient regional cooperation, lack of resourc- individuals, groups or entities involved in viduals listed so far in 2013 by the Commit- es from affected states and linkages between or associated with terrorist activities, other tee all operate in the Sahel. The two last enti- organised criminal networks and terrorist than those designated by the 1267/1989 Al- ties listed are Mouvement pour l’Unification et groups. Qaeda Sanctions Committee. le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine (5 December 2012 and 19 March Key Issues Council Dynamics 2013 respectively). A special meeting of the A key issue is how much leeway the Council Although terrorism is a matter of grave concern Committee was held in March on the situation has to get involved in structural prevention and for all Council members, a debate on a broad in Mali. From 13-15 March, the Counter-Ter- how much added value it offers as opposed to region can show differences in their under- rorism Committee Executive Directorate and these topics being discussed at the CTC and standing of terrorism, its causes and the most the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task addressed through the CTITF. appropriate ways to address it. In the wake of Force (CTITF) held a conference in Rabat, An immediate issue is the lack of regional resolution 1973 and the downfall of the Qad- Morocco, on border-control cooperation in the cooperation and trust among some countries dafi regime in Libya, the issue of arms prolif- Sahel and the Maghreb. The 1373 Counter- in the region, especially when it comes to shar- eration in the Sahel and their use by terrorist Terrorism Committee (CTC) decided to hold ing intelligence. organisations polarised Council discussions. in the fall a special meeting open to the wid- Ensuring that prevention does not under- In a region where some terrorist groups claim er UN membership on the topic “enhancing mine state sovereignty, or is used as a cover for political objectives and some political move- cooperation and technical assistance to states human rights violations is another key issue. ments have violent outlets, Council members in the Sahel region to strengthen their capacity may become divided over the categorisation in the global fight against terrorism”. Options and definition of which groups are considered Under the auspices of the AU, there have In the adoption of a presidential statement, terrorists. been initiatives to encourage synergies in coun- options for the Council include: In the past, Council members have also terterrorism in the region. A ministerial-level • requesting the Secretary-General to devel- been divided regarding references to the pay- meeting held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on op an early-warning mechanism to alert the ment of ransoms for hostages of terrorist 17 March was aimed at operationalising the Council of possible terrorist threats (“hori- groups. African Peace and Security Architecture in the zon scanning” briefings by the Department Council members have had high expecta- Sahelo-Saharan region. On 18 April a meeting of Political Affairs, which have called the tions regarding the integrated UN strategy for of the heads of the intelligence services in the attention of the Council to situations of the Sahel. As it has gone through several drafts region was held in Bamako, Mali. concern, could be used for this purpose); over the last ten months, most of them have The Council has issued several press state- • asking the CTITF and its entities to expressed some degree of frustration regard- ments in 2013 condemning in the strongest enhance cooperation with regional bodies, ing the successive deferrals of its presentation.

Mali

Expected Council Action Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (AFISMA), at press time Mali Following the adoption of resolution 2100 Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to take over was not likely to be on the May programme of on 25 April, which established the UN from the African-led International Support work of the Council. However, the situation in

UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2100 (25 April 2013) established the mandate for MINUSMA. S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012) authorised the deploy- ment of AFISMA for one year. Security Council Letters S/2013/231 (26 March 2013) included a letter from the President of ECOWAS asking for the re-hatting of AFISMA into a UN stabilisation mission and the establishment of a parallel force. S/2013/230 (29 March 2013) included a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali endorsing the second option of the Secretary-General’s report. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/189 (26 March 2013) contained the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a UN mission in Mali.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Mali (con’t)

Mali might be addressed in the broader con- also requested the Secretary-General to re- 30 casualties. text of the Sahel in the upcoming briefing by hat AFISMA’s military and police personnel In the context of the political roadmap the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for appropriate to UN standards. Within 60 days approved by the National Assembly of Mali the Sahel, Romano Prodi, and discussed in of the adoption of the resolution, the Council on 29 January, on 30 March the interim gov- the consultations that will follow, as well as will review the timeline for the deployment of ernment appointed former Defence Minister during the debate on the challenges of the MINUSMA depending on the security situ- Mohamed Salia Sokana to chair the Com- fight against terrorism in Africa (both cov- ation in Mali. mission of Dialogue and Reconciliation. The ered in a separate brief in this issue of the The resolution authorises a force struc- interim authorities also appointed two vice Monthly Forecast). ture of 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 chairs and 30 commissioners. AFISMA’s authorisation expires on 20 police personnel to: The Support and Follow-up Group on the December 2013. • stabilise key population centres and sup- situation in Mali held its fourth meeting in port the reestablishment of state authority Bamako on 19 April, under the auspices of the Key Recent Developments throughout Mali; UN, AU and ECOWAS. The conclusions of The 26 March Secretary-General’s report on • support the implementation of the transi- the meeting noted the steps that had been tak- Mali included two options for the establish- tional roadmap; en towards the consolidation of state authority ment of a stabilisation mission (S/2013/189). • protect civilians and UN personnel; and the security of liberated areas, as well as The first one envisaged strengthening the • promote and protect human rights; and the implementation of the political roadmap. current multidimensional presence in Bama- • support humanitarian assistance, cultural They also pointed out the main challenges ko and transforming it into an integrated preservation and national and interna- Mali is facing, mainly regarding the reconcili- political presence with a better-resourced tional justice. ation and political processes, the allegations of AFISMA. AFISMA would transition to a The resolution also authorises French violations of human rights, the reform of the UN stabilisation mission once certain criti- troops, within the limits of their capacities Malian Defence and Security Forces, the pres- cal benchmarks were met. The second option and areas of deployment, to intervene in idential and parliamentary elections scheduled proposed an integrated stabilisation mission support of elements of MINUSMA when for 7 and 21 July 2013 and the lack of state with a military strength of 11,200 under under imminent and serious threat and control in the city of Kidal. Chapter VII alongside a parallel force to con- upon request of the Secretary-General. It duct counterterrorism operations beyond the also includes a request for France to report Human Rights-Related Developments scope of the UN’s mandate. to the Council on the implementation of this The Human Rights Council (HRC) in resolution 22/18 of 21 March established a mandate for an On 29 March, the interim Foreign Minis- mandate in Mali. independent expert on the situation of human ter of Mali, Tiéman Coulibaly, noted a pref- Even though Opération Serval, which rights in Mali. The expert will be appointed during erence for the second option in a letter to the France launched on 11 January, success- the 23rd session of the HRC (27 May-14 June). Secretary-General (S/2013/230). Along the fully rolled back the gains of the terrorist On 4 April, the first ten of 50 human rights same lines, Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, Presi- and insurgent groups that seized northern observers to be deployed to Mali by the AU Peace and Security Council and ECOWAS arrived in dent of the Commission of the Economic Mali shortly after the 22 March 2012 coup Bamako. The observers—from Benin, Burkina Community of West African States (ECOW- d’état, combat operations are still ongoing, Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, AS), had asked in a 26 March letter to the particularly in the Adrar des Ifoghas moun- Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Secretary-General that AFISMA be trans- tains, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Although Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone—completed a formed into a robust UN stabilisation mis- governors have returned to Timbuktu and three-day training program before their deploy- ment to Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal to monitor the sion working alongside a parallel force with Gao, starting the restoration of state author- human rights situation there. the capacity to “dislodge any regrouped ter- ity in northern Mali, it seems the authorities rorists or insurgents” (S/2013/231). have not been able to establish a presence in The options were discussed by Council Kidal yet. Key Issues members in consultations on 3 April which Also, the transfer of control over the secu- A key overarching issue is to stabilise the included briefings by the Under-Secretary- rity situation from French forces to AFISMA security situation in northern Mali in order General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, in the north has been hindered by terrorist to minimise the threats to the UN stabi- and the Under-Secretary-General for Peace- attacks and delays in the arrival of African lisation operation. A related issue will be to keeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous. Coun- troops. Following a suicide bombing, which ensure that the operations of both the French cil members agreed on pursuing the second resulted in at least three casualties in Kidal, forces and MINUSMA remain independent. option. President Idriss Déby of Chad announced Ensuring that AFISMA has adequate After three rounds of negotiations, the on 14 April that Chadian troops would financial and logistical support to fulfil its Council adopted resolution 2100 on 25 April, retreat, claiming that they are ill-equipped mandate until 1 July is another key issue. authorising the establishment of MINUS- to engage in guerrilla warfare. Although not Ensuring that all AFISMA troops operate MA, for an initial period of 12 months, and part of ECOWAS, Chad deployed the largest within the UN human rights due diligence the transfer of authority from AFISMA to AFISMA contingent, amounting to almost policy is a related issue. MINUSMA on 1 July 2013. The Council 2,000 troops and having suffered more than The provision of electoral support in a

6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Mali (con’t) timely manner will be an important issue, imposed upon individuals, groups or enti- be and the limits of its robust mandate. Some taking into account that MINUSMA will be ties involved in or associated with terror- Council members introduced language that deployed at the earliest on 1 July and that ist activities, other than those designated tightened the mandate, namely regarding the presidential and parliamentary elections are by the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions circumstances of the use of force and the def- scheduled as early as 7 July . Committee. inition of ‘stabilisation’. They also successful- Addressing the potentially destabilising ly pushed for a clear mention in the preamble spillover effects from Mali on an already frag- Council Dynamics reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeep- ile region will be an ongoing issue. Council members have been rather unified ing, including consent of the parties, impar- in the process leading to the adoption of tiality, and clearly defined circumstances for Options resolution 2100. From the beginning they the use of force, with the intention of being After the establishment of a UN stabilisation appeared in agreement that an integrated more precise in distinguishing between tradi- operation, immediate options for the Council UN stabilisation operation, working along- tional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. include: side a parallel force, responded better to the At the earlier stages of the negotiations, • requesting the Secretary-General to pro- needs in Mali than AFISMA under its cur- it seems that some Council members had vide basic financial and logistical support rent configuration. concerns as to how to define the relationship to AFISMA to ensure its ability to operate However, there have been issues that have between the French forces and MINUSMA until the transfer to MINUSMA starts; divided Council members. Although France as well as the role of the Council with regards • establishing a Group of Experts to inves- and other members wanted to accelerate the to their mandate. Consequently, the resolu- tigate the identity and activities of those transition towards a stabilisation operation tion mentions the role of French forces sup- involved in transnational and organised by establishing a clear timeline and deadline, porting MINUSMA when under imminent crime in Mali and the Sahel, with the pos- Russia and others preferred to receive a clear- and serious threat and upon request of the sibility of imposing targeted sanctions, er assessment of the situation on the ground Secretary-General and establishes a report- as recommended in the latest Secretary- and prioritise a benchmark-driven process ing requirement for the French forces to the General’s report; and before deploying MINUSMA. Council. • making full use of the 1566 Working During the negotiations, views also dif- France is the penholder on Mali. Group, which is mandated to exam- fered on the kind of actions MINUSMA was ine practical measures that could be tasked to undertake, how proactive it should

Libya

Expected Council Action UNSMIL’s mandate by 12 months and the Libya, including through the issuance of end- In May, the Council is due to receive the mandate of the PoE for 13 months. The reso- user certificates. semi-annual briefing by International Crimi- lution called upon Libya to continue to coop- While welcoming such positive develop- nal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Fatou Bensou- erate fully with, and provide any necessary ments as the 7 July 2012 elections, the resolu- da, who is expected to update the Council assistance to, the ICC and the Prosecutor tion also expressed concern about continuing on recent developments concerning cases in as required by resolution 1970. The sanc- reports of reprisals, arbitrary detentions, tor- Libya. tions regime was modified by removing the ture and extrajudicial executions and called The mandates of the UN Support Mis- requirement that the Sanctions Committee for the release and safe return of all foreign sion in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Panel of approve the use of non-lethal military equip- nationals illegally detained in Libya. Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanc- ment and assistance for humanitarian or The work of the General National Con- tions Committee expire on 16 March 2014 protective use. It also removed the need to gress (GNC) was seriously impeded in and 16 April 2014, respectively. notify the Committee about non-lethal mili- March by a series of violent demonstrations tary equipment being supplied to the govern- that besieged its building and attacked sev- Key Recent Developments ment for security or disarmament assistance. eral members, including President Moham- On 14 March, the Council unanimous- The resolution also urged the government to med Magarief. The violence was appar- ly adopted resolution 2095, extending improve the monitoring of arms supplied to ently in support of a political isolation law

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2095 (14 March 2013) extended the mandates of UNSMIL and the PoE. S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a PoE. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC and established a Sanctions Committee for the arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze imposed by the resolution. Secretary- General’s Report S/2013/104 (21 February 2013) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6934 (14 March 2013) was the latest briefing by Special Representative Tarek Mitri.S/PV.6855 (7 November 2012) was the fourth briefing by the Prosecutor of the ICC.Security Council Press Statement SC/10984 (23 April 2013) condemned the terrorist attack against the Embassy of France in Libya. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL Tarek Mitri (Lebanon). UNSMIL Size and Composition Strength as of 28 February 2013: 139 international civilians; 62 local civilians; two police officers.UNSMIL Duration 16 September 2011 to present.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Libya (con’t) currently under discussion in the GNC that Human Rights-Related Developments conflicting views of Libya and the ICC regard- would bar Qaddafi-era officials from holding Addressing the Human Rights Council (HRC) on ing the trial of the two ICC indictees and the public office. 20 March, the then-UN Deputy High Commis- role, if any, of UNSMIL in this context. sioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, stat- As highlighted by the Special Represen- ed that Libya was still facing considerable chal- Another issue is to ensure the coordina- tative of the Secretary-General, Tarek Mitri, lenges and remained at a critical juncture. She tion between the sanctions regime and the during his 14 March Council briefing, respect said that the Human Rights Section of UNSMIL international criminal procedures currently for the rule of law continues to be a challenge focused its support to the transitional authori- in place in order to allow information-sharing in Libya. Although some measures have been ties and civil society on five priority areas: ending regarding listed individuals and prevent differ- conflict-related detention and preventing cases of taken to tackle this issue, mistreatment and torture and ill-treatment; strengthening the rule of ent procedures from undermining each other. detention without due process of several thou- law; encouraging relevant treaty ratifications and sand people in militia-controlled detention commenting on draft laws; moving forward with Options facilities continue to be a problem. a comprehensive strategy on transitional justice; Options for the Council include: Relations between Libya and the ICC and promoting a human rights culture. • receiving a briefing and taking no action; The following day, the HRC adopted a reso- have been tense following the request by the lution urging Libya to continue to investigate all • issuing a statement that would aim at ICC to try Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and former violations of human rights, to guarantee fair trials, enhancing sanctions effectiveness by intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi in The to continue its efforts to prevent cases of arbi- encouraging Libya to assign a focal point Hague as per the ICC referral contained in trary arrest and ill-treatment of detainees, to take structure through which all security assis- resolution 1970. Libya challenged the admis- further steps to protect freedom of religion and tance procurement should be channeled, as belief and to expedite the return of all persons sibility of both cases on 1 May 2012 claiming recommended in the final PoE report; and displaced by the conflict since 2011 (A/HRC/ that they were already under investigation in RES/22/19). • asking member states to submit designa- Libya. After the ICC ordered Libya on 6 Feb- The UN working groups on enforced or invol- tion proposals to the Sanctions Committee ruary 2013 to surrender al-Senussi, Libya filed untary disappearances and on the use of merce- relating to those assisting listed individuals a second challenge to the admissibility of the naries are due to visit Libya from 8-17 May and designated under the asset freeze measures, from 20-25 May, respectively. case on 2 April. An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber as recommended in the final PoE report. is expected to rule in due course regarding the challenges. (Qaddafi appeared before a local Key Issues Council Dynamics court in January and was tried on charges of An overarching issue is the fragile security sit- Arms proliferation in Libya and its conse- undermining state security and attempting to uation and the impact of regional instability quences in the region have been a source of escape from prison. At press time, he had not on Libya due to the deficient control of its contention among Council members since the yet been tried on charges related to crimes porous borders. According to the final report fall of the Qaddafi regime. allegedly committed during the uprising.) of the PoE, most former revolutionary bri- Regarding the venue for the trials of al- On 23 April, a terrorist attack against the gades remain in control of the weapons they Senussi and Qaddafi, it seems unlikely that French embassy in Tripoli resulted in sever- used during the revolution. the Council will pronounce itself in favour al injuries and severe damage. The Security Halting the proliferation of weapons stock- of Libya or The Hague, despite its referral of Council issued a press statement condemning piled in Libya into the Sahel and beyond is a the situation in Libya to the ICC. In April, the attack in the strongest terms (SC/10984). closely related issue for Council members. there have been controversies in the Council At press time, armed militiamen had A pressing issue is ensuring respect for the about references to the ICC in the presidential blockaded and attacked at least four minis- rule of law and reforming the legal institutions statement on conflict prevention in Africa (S/ tries in support of the political isolation law. In (justice system, law enforcement mechanisms PRST/2013/4) as well as in resolution 2100 response to the pressure, the GNC suspended and correctional facilities) in order to generate on the situation in Mali. In this context, it is its sessions until 5 May when the law will be trust in the political and legal system, as well unlikely that the seven Council members that debated. as to prevent retaliatory actions aimed at nam- are parties to the Rome Statute would push ing and shaming alleged wrongdoers without for a Council decision. due process. The UK is the penholder on Libya. A related issue for the Council is the

Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action Secretary-General’s consolidated report due which expires 31 May. In May, the Council expects a briefing by 30 April that will cover UNIOGBIS and José Ramos-Horta, the Special Represen- the restoration of constitutional order in Key Recent Developments tative of the Secretary-General and head Guinea-Bissau. On 22 February, the Council reautho- of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office The Council is likely to adopt a resolu- rised UNIOGBIS in resolution 2092 for a in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) on the tion extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS, period of three months, thus allowing for a

8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Guinea-Bissau (con’t) substantive re-evaluation of the mandate in reform, impunity for human rights violations, the 12 April 2012 coup. May based in part on a forthcoming assess- drug trafficking and socioeconomic decline. Regarding the humanitarian situation, ment by Ramos-Horta. The Council last dis- The joint report emphasised the urgent on 26 March the World Food Programme cussed Guinea-Bissau in consultations on need for a pacte de régime (a combined and (WFP) announced that it had been forced 6 March, following the 28 February report revised transition pact and political agree- to temporarily suspend food aid for an esti- of the Secretary-General on the restoration ment) ensuring the inclusivity and legitimacy mated 278,000 people (more than one-sixth of constitutional order (S/2013/123). The of required governance reforms. The report of Guinea-Bissau’s population of 1.6 million) Council was apparently divided on whether also called for the re-engagement of the inter- due to a lack of funding. WFP had not yet or not to consolidate the reporting cycles for national community in Guinea-Bissau, with received donations to support the $7.1 mil- UNIOGBIS and the reports on the resto- particular attention to modes of coordination lion annual country budget. Guinea-Bissau, ration of constitutional order (requested in and harmonisation. ranked 176th out of 187 countries surveyed resolution 2048). Proponents cited increased The UN also conducted a separate tech- by UNDP’s Human Development Index, is efficiency while opponents suggested more nical assessment mission (TAM) in Guinea- one of the poorest countries in the world, frequent meetings would signal greater Bissau from 16-27 March. The TAM—com- with 69 percent of the population living on Council interest. posed of officials from UN offices in Brindisi, less than two dollars a day and 33 percent The Economic Community of West Dakar, Geneva and New York—held meet- living on less than one dollar per day. African States (ECOWAS), the AU and ings with various national stakeholders and the UN have each recently called for leg- international partners. The principal objec- Key Issues islation for the restoration of constitutional tive of the TAM was to make recommen- The principal issue before the Council in order. ECOWAS issued a communiqué on dations regarding potential changes to the May will be determining the preferred man- 28 February encouraging interim President mandate, structure and strength of UNIOG- date, structure, strength and duration of Manuel Serifo Nhamajo to propose a fea- BIS. Based on the preliminary findings of the UNIOGBIS. sible transitional roadmap for the conduct of TAM, UNIOGBIS may be restructured, but The restoration of constitutional order free and fair general elections during 2013, the mandate and resources of the mission are remains a key area of concern for Council urging the National Assembly to promptly less likely to be considerably altered. members. adopt the plan and extending the transition- In a move with potentially significant ram- Organised crime, especially in the form of al period until 31 December. On 14 March, ifications for the political transition process drug trafficking, has become a conspicuously Ramos-Horta publicly called for the adop- in Guinea-Bissau, on 2 April the US Drug high-profile issue and may draw increased tion of a roadmap for the transition by the Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested attention in the Council. end of the month. Similarly, on 22 March the former chief of the Guinea-Bissau navy, the AU Peace and Security Council urged Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto. He Options local political actors to accelerate efforts to was charged with conspiracy in an arms- One option for the Council would be to propose and adopt a transitional roadmap. for-cocaine deal, in which DEA informants authorise an expansion of UNIOGBIS, The transitional roadmap is currently under impersonated Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio- including increased staff and resources, in consideration by the National Assembly. narias de Colombia (FARC) rebels. Guinea- light of the recommendation in the joint On 23 March, the AU released the report Bissau’s top intelligence official, Serifo Mane, assessment report for the international of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN was suspended in the aftermath of Na Tchu- community to substantially re-engage in Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau, which to’s arrest. In a subsequent indictment on Guinea-Bissau. was based on a trip to Guinea-Bissau from 18 April, the US also charged Armed Forces An additional option for the Coun- 16-21 December 2012 by representatives of Chief of Staff General Antonio Injai with cil would be, in line with its intention sig- the five organisations. The joint mission con- four counts of conspiracy related to import- nalled in resolution 2092, to strengthen the sidered a wide range of issues facing Guin- ing cocaine from Colombia and exporting sanctions regime by increasing the number ea-Bissau, including a stalled transition and arms intended for the FARC. Injai is also of people targeted, broadening the type of electoral process, the need for security sector currently under UN sanctions for his role in sanctions beyond a travel ban, establishing a

UN DOCUMENTS ON GUINEA-BISSAU Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2092 (22 February 2013) renewed the mandate of UNIOGBIS until 31 May 2013. S/RES/2048 (18 May 2012) imposed a travel ban on coup leaders and established a new sanctions committee. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/15 (21 April 2012) was on the coup in Guinea-Bissau. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/123 (28 February 2013) was on the restoration of constitutional order. S/2013/26 (11 January 2013) was on UNIOGBIS and events since 17 July 2012. Security Council Letter S/2012/974 (31 December 2012) concerned the appointment of José Ramos-Horta as Special Representative and head of UNIOGBIS. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6924 (22 February 2013) was the meeting record during which resolution 2092 was adopted. S/PV.6915 (5 February 2013) was on UNIOGBIS and events in Guinea-Bissau. Security Council Press Statement SC/10857 (13 December 2012) expressed serious concern over the lack of progress in the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. Sanctions Committee Document S/2012/975 (31 December 2012) transmitted the annual report on the Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee’s activities from 18 May to 31 December 2012. OTHER DOCUMENTS ON GUINEA-BISSAU PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXI) (22 March 2013) was a communiqué of the AU PSC. 053/2013 (28 February 2013) was a commu- niqué of the ECOWAS Authority. Report of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau (23 March 2013), http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/ report-of-the-joint-ecowas-au-cplp-eu-un-assessment-mission-to-guinea-bissau. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS José Ramos-Horta (Timor-Leste). UNIOGBIS Size and Composition Strength as of 28 February 2013: 61 international civilians, 52 local civilians, two military advisers, 13 police, seven UN volunteers. Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco). Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peacebuilding CommissionAmbassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil). ECOWAS Mission in Guinea- Bissau (ECOMIB) Size and Composition Strength as of 29 November 2012: 677 soldiers and police from Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Senegal.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Guinea-Bissau (con’t)

Panel of Experts and explicitly adding organ- However, there is also a difficult legacy implications this may have for the political ised crime and drug trafficking as designation of rivalry between ECOWAS and CPLP in transition in Guinea-Bissau. To what extent criteria. Guinea-Bissau to overcome, pre-dating the this might affect US positions in the Council Alternatively, the Council could authorise Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau is also an open question. the addition of enhanced institutional capac- and the 12 April 2012 coup. Finally, there is a degree of optimism ity for UNIOGBIS to tackle drug trafficking The UN, AU, EU and CPLP have also among Council members and other key and organised crime in collaboration with the differed with ECOWAS on the issue of recog- stakeholders regarding the appointment of UN Office on Drugs and Crime. nising the transitional government. ECOW- Ramos-Horta as the Special Representative. AS has requested the AU to lift its suspen- It is hoped that his experience and standing Council and Wider Dynamics sion of Guinea-Bissau’s membership and may help bridge differences among critical The successful conduct of a joint assessment asked the international community to ease actors. by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS and the the sanctions imposed on the country Togo is the penholder on Guinea-Bissau, Community of Portuguese Speaking Coun- The arrest of Na Tchuto and the indict- and Morocco is the chair of the 2048 Guin- tries (CPLP) could be an encouraging sign of ment of Injai suggest the US has given ea-Bissau Sanctions Committee. increasing cooperation among international new emphasis to targeting drug trafficking and regional actors. in West Africa, but it remains unclear what

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action development and the rule of law in order to of armed groups and for neutralising and dis- In May, the Security Council may be briefed in establish state authority in the eastern DRC, arming them. It would include three infantry consultations by the Secretary-General’s Spe- an area controlled by different rebel groups. battalions deployed by SADC states. The spe- cial Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary It also asks the DRC to enhance the disarma- cial report also reiterated the importance of Robinson, following her first trip to the region. ment, demobilisation and reintegration pro- efforts to begin transferring responsibility for A press statement is a possible outcome. cess and for countries to cooperate by agree- MONUSCO’s tasks to the UN Country Team The mandate of the UN Organization Sta- ing not to assist rebel groups operating in the (UNCT) in areas not affected by armed con- bilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) DRC. The UN, the AU, the Southern African flict, underlining the intention to eventually expires on 31 March 2014. Development Community (SADC) and the withdraw the mission from those areas and to International Conference on the Great Lakes maximise the use of resources. The Secretary- Key Recent Developments Region are to act as guarantors of its imple- General informed the Council on 15 March On 24 February, the “Peace, Security and mentation. Later that day, Council members of his intention to appoint Robinson as Special Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the issued a press statement welcoming the sign- Envoy and on 25 March notified the Council Region” was signed in Addis Ababa by the ing of the Framework (SC/10924). that the implementation of his recommenda- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), The Secretary-General briefed the Council tions regarding the intervention brigade would Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, on 5 March on his 27 February special report cost an additional $140 million (S/2013/200). Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, (S/2013/119) on possible options and their The Council adopted resolution 2098 on Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia in the pres- implications for reinforcing the capability of 28 March, establishing, for an initial period ence of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The MONUSCO (S/PV.6928). He recommend- of one year, an intervention brigade consist- agreement obligates the DRC to implement ed that the Council establish an “intervention ing of three infantry battalions and auxiliary security, government and structural reforms brigade” under the command of MONUSCO forces under MONUSCO command based and to take steps towards democratisation, and operating alongside it. This brigade would in Goma. Its key task is to carry out offen- decentralisation and enhancing economic be responsible for preventing the expansion sive operations to neutralise armed groups in

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2098 (28 March 2013) renewed the mandate of MONUSCO until 31 March 2014 and created the intervention brigade. S/RES/2078 (28 November 2012) extended the DRC sanctions and the GoE to 1 February 2014. S/RES/2076 (20 November 2012) was on future responses to the M23 threat. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/22 (19 October 2012) was on the unrest caused by the M23. Security Council Press Statements SC/10956 (22 March 2013) welcomed the arrest of Ntaganda. SC/10924 (24 February 2013) welcomed the signing of the Framework. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/119 (27 February 2013) was on pos- sible options and their implications for reinforcing the capability of MONUSCO. S/2013/96 (15 February 2013) was the latest report on MONUSCO. Latest Group of Experts Report S/2012/843 (15 November 2012) was the annual report. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6928 (5 March 2013) was on the Secretary-General’s special report. S/PV.6925 (22 February 2013) was a briefing by Meece. Security Council Letters S/2013/200 (25 March 2013) and S/2013/201 (28 March 2013) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary- General and the President of the Council on MONUSCO’s budget. S/2013/166 (15 March 2013) and S/2013/167 (18 March 2013) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary- General and the President of the Council on the appointment of a Special Envoy. S/2013/1 (2 January 2013) and S/2012/967 (28 December 2012) were from the Secretary-General on the appointment of the GoE. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission Roger Meece (US). MONUSCO Force Commander Lieutenant General Chander Prakash (India). MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission Strength as of 28 February 2013: 17,273 troops, 507 military observers, 1,380 police, 985 international civilian person- nel, 2,902 local civilian staff and 591 UN volunteers. Approved budget (1 July 2012-30 June 2013): $1. 4 billion. Mission Duration 30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 March 2014.

10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Democratic Republic of the Congo (con’t) order to reduce the threat to state and civil- which had stated in the sanctions commit- fulfilment of the commitments made by the ian security. In light of differences among tee its refusal to cooperate with two of the parties in the Framework. Council members regarding the robust peace experts. The GoE’s latest annual report Another issue is to oversee the deploy- enforcement mandate given to the brigade, (S/2012/843) accused both countries of pro- ment of the intervention brigade and keep it was agreed that it was “on an exceptional viding support to the March 23 (M23) rebel- abreast of any collateral effects its exception- basis and without creating a precedent or any lion in the DRC. While in Rwanda, the GoE al enforcement mandate may have over the prejudice to the agreed principles of peace- visited Forces Démocratiques de Libération du peacekeeping mandate of MONUSCO. keeping.” In addition, the resolution autho- Rwanda (FDLR) detainment camps. They rises MONUSCO, through its regular forces also requested to interview Ntaganda at the Options as well as this new intervention brigade, to US embassy but were not given access. The Council can issue a press statement sup- carry out the following tasks: protection of On 22 March, the Council issued a press porting the Special Envoy and calling on the civilians, monitoring the implementation of statement welcoming Ntaganda’s surrender countries in the region to fulfil their obliga- the arms embargo and providing support to and expressing concern that Sylvestre Muda- tions and reiterating its willingness to take national and international judicial processes. cumura, commander of the FDLR, is still at further measures if commitments are not met. In monitoring the implementation of large (SC/10956). Another option would be a visit to the the arms embargo in cooperation with the On 23 March, Mai-Mai Kata Katanga region in order to support the implementa- Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the 1533 rebels clashed with DRC military in Lubum- tion of the Framework and show its strategic DRC Sanctions Committee, the resolution bashi, leaving 35 dead according to media approach and a resolve to hold the parties to places particular emphasis on cross-border reports. Approximately 245 rebels then their commitments. (The Council visited the flows of military personnel and arms, includ- took refuge in a MONUSCO compound. DRC on an annual basis between 2000 and ing by using surveillance capabilities such as MONUSCO assisted in negotiating their sur- 2010, but has failed to do so since its last vis- unmanned aerial systems. render to the military. iting mission on 13-16 May 2010.) The resolution authorises MONUSCO to contribute, in coordination with the UNCT, Human Rights-Related Developments Council Dynamics to various tasks and to transfer, as soon as On 8 March, the Secretary-General’s spokesper- During the negotiations over the resolution, son, Martin Nesirky, said that MONUSCO had feasible, any other tasks to the UNCT and and in particular the concept of the interven- information about the involvement of two battal- to shift its presence from western to eastern ions of the DRC military in mass rapes and other tion brigade, some of the troop-contributing DRC to the fullest extent possible. human rights violations committed in November countries on the Council (China, Guatemala, The resolution also demands that all par- 2012. In line with the human rights due-diligence Morocco and Pakistan) raised concerns about ties fulfil their obligations under the Frame- policy, the mission addressed two letters in Febru- the blurring of the lines between traditional ary to the armed forces chief of staff to initiate the work and calls on Robinson to lead its peacekeeping and robust peace enforcement, formal suspension of support to these units. implementation and establish benchmarks In March, the UN Joint Human Rights Office both as a matter of principle and because their to assess the implementation. The resolution (UNJHRO, comprising the Human Rights Division own peacekeepers lives will be at greater risk. states that the Council will take appropriate of MONUSCO and the Office of the High Commis- With the adoption of MONUSCO’s new measures in case of noncompliance. sioner for Human Rights in the DRC) published a mandate, Council members are aware of the report on deaths in detention centres in the DRC The resolution asks the Secretary-General need to follow closely the implementation of that had been confirmed as human rights -viola to report every three months, including on tions between January 2010 and December 2012. the resolution and the Framework. At this the implementation of the Framework and At least 211 persons died in the detention centres stage they will be interested to hear Robin- any risks posed to UN personnel stemming as a result of the direct action or negligence of the son’s first impressions after visiting the region from the actions of the intervention brigade. state or of its officers, including 54 in 2010, 56 in and her assessment of the ability and political It also expresses the Council’s intention to 2011 and 101 in 2012. These findings show that the will of the parties to implement the Frame- number of such deaths in detention almost dou- review progress in the implementation of the bled in 2012 compared to the previous two years work. In particular, Council members will be Framework following Robinson’s first visit to and that conditions have deteriorated since previ- interested in hearing her views on the capacity the region. ous reports in 2004 and 2005. Prison overcrowd- and political will of the DRC government to On 18 March, Bosco Ntaganda, for whom ing, malnutrition, absence or lack of appropriate undertake security sector and other reforms, there has been an International Criminal medical care and the insufficiency of budgets including the development of a “rapid reaction allocated to prisons, combined with the lack of Court (ICC) arrest warrant since 7 August transparency in how funds intended for detention force” that is to substitute for the intervention 2006, surrendered himself to the US embas- centres are managed, constituted the main causes brigade in due course. sy in Kigali, Rwanda. On 22 March he was of these deaths according to the report. A Council visit to the region, originally transferred to the custody of the ICC in The UNJHRO is also preparing a report on the planned for February and then rescheduled Hague. Ntaganda is facing charges of war human rights violations committed in Minova and to May, has been postponed, possibly to take in Goma in November 2012. crimes and crimes against humanity. place in October. In March, the GoE paid a planned visit Key Issues France is the penholder on the DRC. to Rwanda and Uganda. Only four (of six) The key issue for the Council is to ensure the of the experts were allowed into Rwanda, implementation of resolution 2098 and the

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Central African Republic

Expected Council Action elections within 18 months, and electing an regarding security and human rights in the In May, the Security Council expects a brief- interim president who would be forbidden country, and the lack of public order and the ing by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-Gener- to run in the ensuing presidential elections. rule of law”. After consultations, Council al’s Special Representative and head of the According to media reports, Djotodia accept- members adopted a press statement calling UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the ed the ECCAS framework. for the quick implementation of the ECCAS Central African Republic (BINUCA), fol- Vogt briefed the Council in consultations framework and expressing its concern of lowed by consultations on the latest Sec- via video-teleconference on 9 April. She told human rights violations in CAR (SC/10993). retary-General’s report on BINUCA. The the Council that the political and security report, originally due 31 March, was post- situations remained highly volatile and the Human Rights-Related Developments poned until 30 April to take into account humanitarian situation was dire. Vogt empha- On 12 April, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said more than 2,000 children have been recruit- recent developments. sised that the Libreville agreements were key ed by armed forces in the CAR since Decem- A resolution amending BINUCA’s man- to restoring order in the country. ber 2012. Also according to UNICEF, 1.2 million date, which expires on 31 January 2014, is On 13 April, at its first session, the people have been cut off from essential services. possible. TNC elected Djotodia as interim president. According to the UN High Commission for Refu- (Djotodia was the only candidate in the vote.) gees, 37,000 refugees have fled the country since December. In addition, some 173,000 people Key Recent Developments Another ECCAS summit was held in have been internally displaced over the last four Agreements between the Central African N’Djamena on 18 April with its final com- months. Republic (CAR) and the Séléka rebels (an muniqué reiterating that the transition peri- In a 16 April statement, the Secretary-General alliance formed by factions of the Convention od remains fixed, pending free elections. and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix, the Union ECCAS expressed its support for the ongo- Navi Pillay, expressed alarm at continuing reports of widespread human rights violations in the des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement ing political transitions in the CAR and for CAR—including targeted killings, arbitrary arrests, and the Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Tiangaye, who is to form a transitional gov- torture, child recruitment, rapes, disappearances Kodro) were reached on 11 January in Libre- ernment after wide consultations in accord- and kidnappings—since the December Séléka ville. In mid-March, the Séléka renewed fight- ance with the Libreville agreements. ECCAS offensive. Pillay called for the rule of law to be ing claiming that the government had not further emphasised that in addition to the restored and perpetrators of abuses to be held fulfilled its promises under the agreements. interim president, government ministers and accountable. Under the 11 January agreements President TNC members could not participate in the François Bozizé would remain in power until elections. ECCAS also declared it would Key Issues the end of his term in 2016, and a govern- deploy 2,000 additional troops to its Mis- The key issue for the Council is to play a ment of national unity—in which opposition sion for the Consolidation of Peace in the more effective and assertive role, especially leaders were to be given key posts—would be CAR (MICOPAX) to assist in stabilising the as the security and humanitarian situations formed to implement reforms and hold par- situation. remain volatile. liamentary elections within 12 months. The On 25 April, the Secretary-General’s Spe- Achieving synergy with subregional and rebels seized Bangui on 24 March, forcing cial Representative for Children and Armed regional actors in addressing the aftermath President Bozizé to flee to Cameroon and Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, issued a statement of the seizure of power by the Séléka is a BINUCA to evacuate most of its staff. expressing alarm about the use of child sol- related issue. The Economic Community of Central diers by the Séléka, indicating that “boys, uni- Another issue is finding a productive role African States (ECCAS) held a summit on formed and armed, have been seen patrol- for BINUCA in the new political reality and 3 April in N’Djamena, Chad, to discuss the ling, manning checkpoints and participating in light of the ongoing transitional process. CAR. The summit did not recognise Séléka in looting activities across the country”. leader and self-appointed interim President The Council was briefed in consultations Options Michel Djotodia, but allowed Prime Min- on the security, political and humanitarian The Council may consider the following ister Nicolas Tiangaye—appointed on 17 situation by Under-Secretary-General for regarding BINUCA: January in the aftermath of the Libreville Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on 29 April, • amending its mandate following receipt of agreements and subsequently designated by after his recent visit to Cameroon and CAR, the Secretary-General’s report; Djotodia to head an interim government—to where he met with Tiangaye, representatives • entrusting it with a more central role in attend on behalf of the CAR. The ECCAS of political parties and civil society and Vogt. mediating between the parties; and summit called for the creation of a Transi- In his meeting with Tiangaye on 20 April, • expanding its supporting role for the tional National Council (TNC) tasked with Feltman expressed the Secretary-General’s regional efforts of ECCAS. drafting a new constitution, preparing for “deep concern over the alarming situation Further options include adopting a strong

UN DOCUMENTS ON CAR Security Council Resolution S/RES/2088 (24 January 2013) extended the mandate of BINUCA until 31 January 2014. Secretary-General’s Report S/2012/956 (21 December 2012) was the latest report on BINUCA. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6899 (11 January 2013) was a briefing on the latest BINUCA report.Security Council Press Statements SC/10993 (29 April 2013) supported political efforts by ECCAS. SC/10960 (25 March 2013) condemned the seizure of power by the Séléka. SC/10955 (22 March 2013) called for the cessation of hostilities. SC/10948 (20 March 2013) condemned recent attacks by the Séléka and called on all sides to abide by their respective commitments. Security Council Letters S/2013/215 (2 April 2013) and S/2013/216 (4 April 2013) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council regarding the postponement of the BINUCA report. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUCA Margaret Vogt (Nigeria). BINUCA Size and Composition Strength as of 28 February 2013: 66 international civilians, 83 local civilians, two military advisers, two police and two UN volunteers. BINUCA Duration 1 January 2010 to present.

12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Central African Republic (con’t) position on security and humanitarian issues, Libreville agreements to achieve stability, adhere to the ECCAS transitional framework, expressing support for the deployment of Council members are of the view that BINU- the Council should continue to take a back additional MICOPAX troops and taking a CA will have to be re-evaluated for the UN seat to ECCAS on the political front. They more aggressive stance towards the Séléka presence—and the Council—to be relevant feel that the Council should focus on the leadership. in efforts to solve the crisis in the CAR. Some security and humanitarian situation, rather members think that BINUCA’s mediation than the legitimacy of the interim govern- Council Dynamics role should be fine tuned to reflect recent ment, as there are signs of splits within the The Council has remained fairly passive in events and the transitional processes, but Séléka, which may lead to further instabil- recent months regarding the CAR, giving still within the framework of the Libreville ity. Council members will also be interested preference to the situations in the Demo- agreements. to hear more about the AU position, which, cratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. It Several Council members are cautious since suspending the CAR from the AU has for the most part addressed the crisis in about assigning blame for the crisis and pre- immediately after the Séléka takeover, has the CAR through press statements. fer to deplore the situation in general. They remained silent on the ECCAS initiative. While no major discussions have tak- feel that in light of the recent ECCAS state- en place on the failure of the 11 January ments and the apparent Séléka agreement to

UNOCA/LRA

Expected Council Action of UNOCA and on the LRA via a single the RTF has not been altered by the coup. In May, the Security Council expects a brief- report by 15 May 2013. In a press statement on CAR on 29 April, ing on the Secretary-General’s report on The implementation plan for the strategy Council members expressed concern over the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and on was submitted to the Council on 19 April the pause of operations in CAR and urged the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2013/240). It highlights priorities in five countries to resume their efforts as soon as (UNOCA) by Abou Moussa, the Special strategic areas of focus and specifies the divi- possible (SC/10993). Representative of the Secretary-General and sion of labour and coordination between the On 3 April the US announced a $5 mil- head of UNOCA. various UN entities in implementing the lion reward for information leading to the A presidential or press statement are pos- strategy. It also identifies the resources need- capture of LRA leader Joseph Kony, an Inter- sible outcomes. ed for specific projects and programmes. national Criminal Court indictee. UNOCA’s mandate expires on 28 Febru- Additionally, the implementation plan LRA activities in South Sudan were taken ary 2014. recalls that LRA-affected countries have off the list of parties to conflict that are credi- been contributing troops to the AU RCI- bly suspected of committing or being respon- Key Recent Developments LRA’s military component, the Regional sible for patterns of rape and other forms Moussa last briefed the Council on 18 Task Force (RTF), to fulfil its authorised of sexual violence in the Secretary-General’s December 2012, stressing the need to mobil- strength of 5,000 troops. In February the second report on sexual violence in conflict ise sufficient resources to implement the UN Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of 14 March (S/2013/149). LRA activities in regional strategy to address the threat posed contributed 500 troops to the RTF, adding the CAR and the DRC remain listed. by the LRA (S/PV.6891). The next day, the to the 2,860 deployed troops from the Cen- UNOCA, along with the UN Office for Council adopted a presidential statement tral African Republic (CAR), South Sudan West Africa, has also been active in assisting reiterating its support for the AU Region- and Uganda. South Sudan has committed the countries of Central and West Africa in al Cooperation Initiative against the LRA to provide 500 additional troops to the RTF. addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, in (AU RCI-LRA) and urged further prog- According to media reports, after the particular by assisting in the organisation of ress towards the implementation of its strat- Séléka rebels seized Bangui on 24 March, a regional summit for the development of an egy (S/PRST/2012/28). The statement also Uganda suspended its participation in the anti-piracy strategy, as requested by resolu- requested the Secretary-General to present RTF, claiming that the rebels have been hos- tion 2039 of 29 February 2012. A ministerial an implementation plan to support the UN tile towards its troops in southeast CAR. In a conference was held on 19 March in Benin, LRA strategy (S/2012/481) by 28 February. meeting with Moussa and AU Special Envoy where the Economic Community of Central It further requested the Secretary-General to for the LRA Francisco Madeira in Kampala African States, the Economic Community of keep the Council informed on the activities on 3 April, Uganda clarified that its role in West African States and the Gulf of Guinea

UN DOCUMENTS ON UNOCA AND THE LRA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2039 (29 February 2012) was on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2012/28 (19 December 2013) condemned LRA attacks and expressed support for the AU RCI-LRA. Security Council Press Statements SC/10993 (29 April 2013) was on the pause of operations in CAR. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/240 (19 April 2013) was on the implementation of the UN LRA strategy. S/2013/149 (14 March 2013) was the second annual report on sexual violence in conflict. Security Council Letters S/2012/657 (21 August 2012) took note of the Secretary-General’s request to extend UNOCA for 18 months. S/2012/656 (13 August 2012) was from the Secretary-General recommending the extension of UNOCA for a further 18 months. S/2012/481 (25 June 2012) contained the UN LRA strategy. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6891 (18 December 2012) was a briefing on UNOCA and the LRA.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 13 UNOCA/LRA (con’t)

Commission adopted three memoranda of brigade will not be deployed in LRA-affected support. understanding concerning the repression of areas as of now, but it could be of future sig- piracy. The memoranda are to be adopted nificance on this issue. Council Dynamics in a summit meeting to be held in Yaoundé, Council members generally support the UN Cameroon on 17-18 May. Options LRA strategy and are keen to see how it will Options for the Council include adopting translate into reality during its implementa- Key Issues a presidential statement or issuing a press tion and what gaps exist. Areas of particu- A key issue for the Council is to encourage statement that could: lar interest are the protection of civilians progress in the implementation of the UN • welcome progress in implementing the including regarding children; coordinated regional strategy and the role it can play in AU RCI-LRA strategy and the deploy- humanitarian assistance; the expansion of supporting UN and AU efforts to address the ment of the RTF; disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, LRA threat and ensure a sustainable solution. • welcome the efforts of affected govern- resettlement and reintegration programmes; A related issue is obtaining updated infor- ments and urge them to continue their and support in the fields of human rights, mation on the implementation of the AU contributions to the RTF despite regional rule of law and development to establish state RCI-LRA strategy and in particular the RTF. instability; authority in the relevant areas. Another issue is assessing how the 24 • express support for the UN LRA strategy Council members are in agreement on the March seizure of power by the Séléka in the implementation plan or request its further importance of cooperation between countries CAR may affect the regional strategy. elaboration; in the region and of a coordinated approach A broader future issue for the Council • request further reporting from the Secre- in addressing the threat of the LRA. They will relates to the recent decision to create an tary-General; and be keen to be updated by Moussa regarding intervention brigade charged with neutralis- • welcome the engagement of UN field mis- the role of Uganda the RTF. ing rebel groups as part of the UN Organiza- sions in the implementation of the UN The UK is the penholder on the LRA. tion Stabilisation Mission in the DRC. The LRA strategy and request their continued

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action said that the security situation in Abyei South Sudan. He noted that the ambush In May, the Security Council is expected to remained challenging, in large part because attack in Jonglei state that claimed the lives hold two meetings, likely in consultations, of tensions between the Misseriya and the of five peacekeepers and seven civilians on 9 on Sudan-South Sudan issues in accordance Ngok-Dinka communities. As such, he did April had been well-organised and included with resolution 2046. It will also likely dis- not think that it would be possible to divert more than 200 perpetrators. He said that cuss in consultations the UN Interim Secu- UNISFA troops currently in Abyei from their while the attack occurred in the area in which rity Force in Abyei (UNISFA) and renew its responsibilities to provide protection for the David Yau Yau operates, he could not confirm mandate, which expires on 31 May. JBVMM monitors and support staff. Tesfa- whether Yau Yau’s rebels were responsible. mariam expressed concern that inadequate (Yau Yau has denied any role in the attack.) Key Recent Developments protection would hinder the impact of the On 12 April, Presidents Omar Al-Bashir Council members held consultations on JBVMM, cautioning that without an effective of Sudan and Salva Kiir of South Sudan held Sudan/South Sudan and UNISFA on 11 JBVMM, Sudan and South Sudan might be a summit meeting in Juba. They reiterated April. They were briefed by UNISFA force tempted to re-enter the Safe Demilitarised their commitment to fulfilling the coopera- commander and head of mission, General Border Zone from which they appear to have tion agreements signed on 27 September Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam and withdrawn. (on oil sharing, cross-border trade, security Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeep- Mulet said that South Sudan had resumed arrangements, nationality issues and other ing Operations Edmond Mulet. Tesfamariam its production of oil and that it would be able matters). In a press release following the advocated for an additional 1,126 troops to to start exporting it through Sudan by May. summit, the AU said that the meeting rep- provide force protection for the Joint Bor- He said that 23 April had been established as resented the commitment of both parties “to der Verification and Monitoring Mechanism a date for direct talks between Sudan and the foster the normalization of relations between (JBVMM), reiterating the Secretary-Gen- Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North the two countries and promote the well-being eral’s request for these troops in his recent (SPLM-N). of their peoples.” report on Abyei (S/2013/198). Tesfamariam Mulet also touched on the situation in On 4 April, the World Food Program

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Secretary General’s Report S/2013/198 (28 March 2013) was the most recent report on Abyei. Security Council Letters S/2013/233 (16 April 2013) was a letter from Sudan containing a statement made by Bashir during the meeting with Kiir on 12 April. S/2013/232 (16 April 2013) was a letter from Sudan containing the joint communiqué of the meeting between Bashir and Kiir on 12 April. Security Council Press Statement SC/10968 (9 April 2013) was a press statement condemning the attacks on UNMISS peacekeepers.

14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

(WFP) announced that it had initiated food On 27 April, the Sudan Revolutionary are essential for UNISFA to support the distribution in the Geissan and Kurmuk Front (SRF), an umbrella group including JBVMM. areas of South Kordofan state in Sudan, several rebel movements, attacked Umm On Sudan-South Sudan issues generally, which has been greatly affected by the fight- Rawaba, North Kordofan state, roughly the Council could consider adopting a state- ing between Sudan and the SPLM-N. WFP 300 miles south of Khartoum. According to ment that: is hoping to distribute food to 39,000 people Sudan, the rebels destroyed a power plant, a • recognises progress made by the parties in in Kurmuk and 12,000 in Geissan. communications tower, and some gas sta- implementing the cooperation agreements While Adnan Khan, WFP Sudan Country tions during the attack, which also reportedly of 27 September; Director, referred to gaining this access as “a claimed the lives of nine Sudanese policemen. • urges the parties to expedite the estab- major breakthrough”, the SPLM-N down- The SRF withdrew from Umm Rawaba on lishment of administrative structures in played the initiative in a statement released the same day as the attack. Abyei, including the Abyei Area Police by its Secretary-General, Yasir Arman, on 5 At press time, the Council was scheduled and the Abyei Legislative Council; and April. Arman said that Sudan “allowed the to hold consultations on Sudan/South Sudan • reiterates its decision in resolution 2046 WFP to work in a limited area controlled by on 29 April. for Sudan and the SPLM-N to negotiate Khartoum and they made big news out of a settlement on the basis of the 28 June that”. He also said that Sudan had height- Key Issues 2011 Framework Agreement, which calls ened its aerial and ground attacks in the Blue A key issue for the Council is whether the for the parties “to work towards an inclu- Nile state during the last month and noted recent progress in relations between Sudan sive national process in the Republic of that Sudan “is denying access for humani- and South Sudan can be sustained and how Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform”. tarian assistance to… areas controlled by the the Council can build on this progress. SPLM-N in Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains”. Another issue is how the Council can fos- Council Dynamics Armed conflict continued in South ter constructive negotiations between Sudan Council members are encouraged by signs Kordofan in April. On 12 April, the SPLM- and the SPLM-N. of progress in relations between Sudan and N shelled Kadugli, killing three people and An additional key issue is how effective South Sudan. However, the Council remains wounding ten others, according to local offi- the JBVMM will be in maintaining security divided on how to approach Sudan-South cials. A spokesperson for the SPLM-N, Arnu along the Sudan-South Sudan border, given Sudan issues. Some members hold Sudan Ngutulu Lodi, said that the attack was con- that the border is nearly 2,000 kilometres largely accountable for its negative relations ducted in response to aerial bombardments long and the SPLM-N controls a large por- with South Sudan and are highly critical of by Sudan on 11-12 April of areas controlled tion of it. Sudan for the humanitarian and political cri- by the SPLM-N where there are displaced sis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. persons. Lodi also claimed that the SPLM- Options Others take what they perceive as a more N had seized the Dandor military base near The most likely option is for the Council to balanced approach. Among this latter group, Kadugli, on 15 April. It was reported in the renew the mandate of UNISFA for an addi- there are concerns that a Council outcome media that four SPLM-N rebels and 15 sol- tional six months. In doing so, the Council that is too critical of Sudan could under- diers from Sudan died in the fighting. could consider: mine rather than facilitate progress in Sudan- Sudan and the SPLM-N met for direct • maintaining the current force level; South Sudan relations. Since February, sev- negotiations on 23 April in Addis Ababa. The • authorising the additional 1,126 troops eral attempts by the Council to negotiate a talks ended on 26 April without progress on requested by the Secretariat; and statement on Sudan-South Sudan relations the humanitarian and political issues dis- • assessing the force structure of UNISFA have failed to achieve consensus. cussed, although media reports indicate that in three months, and assuming the Coun- The US is the penholder on UNISFA and there are plans for the parties to reconvene cil decides to increase the size of the mis- other Sudan-South Sudan issues. in May. sion, ensuring that the additional troops

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action briefing on the work of the Committee’s Key Recent Developments In May, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval work to Council members in consultations. On 7-8 April, the International Donor Con- (Argentina), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanc- No Council outcome is anticipated in May ference for Reconstruction and Develop- tions Committee, will provide the quarterly on Darfur. ment in Darfur was held in Doha, Qatar. In

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2091 (14 February 2013) extended the mandate of the PoE assisting the 1591 Sanctions Committee until 17 February 2014. S/RES/2063 (31 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 July 2013. S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/225 (10 April 2013) was the most recent quarterly report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6956 (29 April 2013) was the Council’s most recent briefing on Darfur. S/PV.6920 (14 February 2013) was the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution 2091 renewing the PoE’s mandate. Security Council Press Statement SC/10982 (19 April 2013) condemned the attack which killed one UNAMID peacekeeper and wounded two others.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Sudan/Darfur (con’t)

and detention. The Secretary-General underlined keeping with article 32 of the Doha Doc- killed 18 civilians after the towns were retak- that accountability remained a challenge. Of the ument for Peace in Darfur, a Darfur Joint en, while also accusing the militia of kidnap- 117 human rights cases documented by UNAMID Assessment Mission—including various UN ping, raping and torturing civilians. On 19 during the reporting period, 42 had been reported entities, the government of Sudan, the Dar- April, an AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Dar- to government authorities, but just eight of these fur Regional Authority and other interna- fur (UNAMID) peacekeeper was killed and cases are under investigation. tional development actors—had been estab- two additional peacekeepers were injured lished and produced a Darfur Development when they were shot by unidentified assail- Key Issues Strategy in preparation for the conference. ants near Muhajeriya. (Since its inception in A key issue for the Council is the deteriorat- This plan indicated that $7.2 billion would 2007, UNAMID has lost 44 peacekeepers.) ing security situation in Darfur, as evidenced be needed for reconstruction and develop- The Council issued a press statement that by numerous reports of inter-communal vio- ment of Darfur over the next six years. It also condemned the attack. lence and fighting between government forc- underscored three priority areas in need of On 12 April, the Office of the UN High es and rebels, as well as by the large numbers support: governance, justice and reconcili- Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of recently internally displaced persons. ation; reconstruction; and economic recov- announced that 50,000 people, mostly wom- Another key issue is the restriction on ery. Approximately $3.7 billion was pledged en and children, had fled across the border humanitarian access in areas affected by the during the conference, a figure that includes into Chad as a result of inter-communal conflict. (On April 16, Ali Al-Za’tari, the “renewed commitment and pledges” by violence in Um Dukhun, a town in western UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordina- Sudan of $2.65 billion, as described in the Darfur. UNHCR said that this was the high- tor in Sudan, released a statement in which Doha Document. Qatar, which hosted the est number of refugees from Sudan to enter he expressed his concern that humanitar- conference, pledged $500 million. Chad since 2005. ian organisations were not being permitted The Panel of Experts (PoE) of the Sudan The Justice and Equality Movement access to Labado and Muhajeriya to help Sanctions Committee, appointed in late (JEM)-Bashar faction, which formally made thousands of civilians impacted by fighting March, briefed the Committee on 18 April, peace with Sudan by acceding to the Doha there). requesting an extension of deadline for the Document in Qatar on 6 April, and the JEM An additional key issue is the fact that submission of their interim report to the clashed on 19 April in the Furawiyya area of Sudan has issued only single-entry visas to Committee. (Subsequently, the Committee North Darfur. The JEM-Bashar announced four of the five PoE members, even though agreed and extended the deadline set for 14 that Saleh Mohamed Jarbo, its deputy gen- resolution 2091 calls on Sudan to issue May, until 31 July.) The experts noted that eral commander, had been killed during an “timely multi-entry visas to all members of they had not received visas and thus had ambush by JEM forces while en route to the Panel of Experts for the duration of its been unable to visit Sudan to conduct their Furawiyya. mandate.” investigation. The SLA-MM released 21 Sudanese Another important issue for the Council The experts received single-entry visas Armed Forces soldiers—including 14 on 13 is what can be done to enhance the safety of from Sudan on 19 April except for the April and seven on 21 April—to Sudan. The UNAMID peacekeepers. finance expert, Ghassan Schbley (US), who ICRC served as an intermediary. had yet to receive a visa at press time. (Sudan On 29 April, the Council held a briefing Options has objected to Schbley, expressing concerns and consultations on Darfur. During the One option is for members of the Sudan about his activities when he was a member briefing, Under-Secretary-General for Peace- Sanctions Committee to visit Darfur to gain of the PoE for the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea keeping Operations Hervé Ladsous said that a better understanding of the current situa- Sanctions Committee. Schbley was prevent- he was troubled by the situation in Darfur, tion on the ground. (It appears that the Com- ed from entering Sudan when he arrived in referring to inter-communal violence, fight- mittee is planning such a trip in October. It Khartoum in December 2012 even though ing between government forces and rebel had originally planned to travel to Darfur in he had a visa at the time.) movements, and large numbers of civilians the second half of 2012, when Colombia was The security situation has remained vola- recently displaced by the conflict. chair, but the trip did not materialise, appar- tile in several parts of Darfur. On 6 April, ently due to scheduling challenges.) heavy fighting between Sudan and the Sudan Human Rights-Related Developments The Council may also consider requesting Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) According to the Secretary-General’s latest report a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General on UNAMID, covering January to March, the broke out in and around the towns of Labado for Humanitarian Affairs and the High Com- human rights situation in Darfur deteriorated in and Muhajeriya in eastern Darfur. The Office a manner commensurate with the intensification missioner for Human Rights on the impact of for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of conflict (S/2013/225). The overall number of the conflict in Darfur on civilians. reported that approximately 40,000 people documented human rights violations increased to An additional option, although unlikely, had been displaced as of 14 April. The SLA- 117 cases involving 347 victims (compared with 94 is for the Sanctions Committee to update cases involving 204 victims in October-Decem- MM seized Labado and Muhajeriya in the its consolidated list, which dates back to ber 2012). Of the 347 victims, 176 were victims of initial fighting, but they were forced to retreat violations of the right to physical integrity, 125 of 25 April 2006, by targeting indictees of the in mid-April as Sudan reclaimed the towns. violations of the right to life, 38 of sexual and gen- International Criminal Court for their par- Witnesses alleged that pro-Sudan militia der-based violence and eight of arbitrary arrests ticipation in perpetrating crimes in Darfur

16 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Sudan/Darfur (con’t) as permitted by paragraph 3(c) of resolution the limited humanitarian access and the dan- implement the provisions of the Doha Docu- 1591. gers faced by UNAMID peacekeepers. ment. (To date, the Liberation and Justice While supportive of the Doha process, Movement and the JEM-Bashar faction have Council Dynamics several members have criticised the slow signed the Doha Document, while the JEM, Several Council members remain concerned pace of implementation of the Doha Docu- the SLA-MM, and the SLA-Abdul Wahid about the difficult security environment in ment. However, some members are less criti- have not.) Darfur. In particular, they continue to be cal of Sudan than others, arguing that finan- The UK is the penholder on Darfur. alarmed by the toll of the conflict on civilians, cial difficulties have constrained its ability to

Somalia

Expected Council Action the areas of political affairs and mediation/ and trained security guards, the impending In May, the Council is expected to adopt a facilitation; rule of law and security institu- deployment of an AMISOM guard force in resolution creating a UN Assistance Mission tions; and human rights and protection. In Mogadishu and reliance on Somali National in Somalia (UNSOM). addition to these three core areas, multi- Security Forces (SNSF). If these are deemed disciplinary task teams are also envisioned. insufficient, UN Guard Units or interna- Key Recent Developments At the outset of UNSOM, the task teams tional private security companies could be On 6 March the Council adopted resolu- would cover: stability and recovery in former utilised. tion 2093 re-authorising the AU Mission in Al Shabaab areas, maritime issues, capacity The security situation in south and central Somalia (AMISOM) and asking the Secre- development and economic drivers of con- Somalia continues to be in a state of flux, par- tary-General to deploy a technical assistance flict. As for its structure, UNSOM will be ticularly regarding the status of about 2,500 mission (TAM), whose findings should be headed by a Special Representative of the Ethiopian troops allied to AMISOM and the submitted to the Council by 19 April, after Secretary-General, with a deputy Special government. On 17 March, Ethiopia with- which the Council would formally mandate Representative (and a second deputy as of drew from the town of Hudur in the Bakool the new mission to be deployed by 3 June January 2014), and will also be backed by a region, which ultimately allowed Al Shabaab (S/PV.6929). Under-Secretary-General for Director of Mission Support/Director UN to regain control. This prompted concerns Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). about a complete withdrawal of the Ethio- Council on the TAM report on 25 April. There will be a strong emphasis placed on pian contingent from Somalia. The prime From 17 to 29 March, the TAM travelled integration and coordination both within ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia held bilat- to Somalia, Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The UNSOM and with the UNCT. On 29 April, eral talks on 8 April, but they were apparently mission met with the UN Country Team Nicholas Kay (UK) was announced as the inconclusive. Widely reported comments by (UNCT) and international partners in Nairo- new Special Representative of the Secretary- the Ethiopian prime minister on 23 April bi and consulted with the AU in Addis Ababa. General for Somalia. seemed to suggest the country would with- In Mogadishu, it held meetings with senior The TAM report also highlights security draw its troops, while the following day the government officials, civil society and some as a critical challenge for UNSOM. As the foreign ministry was careful to clarify that this regional and international actors. The TAM report notes, “insecurity has many implica- was not the case. In the interim, on 3 April a also visited areas that had been recovered tions, both operational and political”, par- battalion of 850 troops began to arrive from from Al Shabaab in south and central Soma- ticularly in south and central Somalia where Sierra Leone in Kismayo allowing a Kenyan lia. Additionally, part of the team conducted recovered towns were described by local UN battalion to withdraw from AMISOM. meetings in Garowe, the capital of Puntland, staff as “islands, beyond which movement is Meanwhile, the US has officially signalled and Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland. nearly impossible”. its intent to militarily back the government According to the TAM report, UNSOM Partly in recognition of the difficult secu- in Mogadishu. On 8 April, President Barack will be guided by four broad principles: rity environment, UNSOM’s initial footprint Obama determined that Somalia is eligible national ownership, flexibility, collabora- will be light and then scaled up as conditions for US military assistance. The US was the tion and partnerships and risk management. permit. The TAM report also offers a few strongest proponent within the Council UNSOM will have substantive expertise in other options: use of local UN-contracted of a partial lifting of the arms embargo on

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2093 (6 March 2013) authorised AMISOM deployment until 28 February 2014 and partially lifted the arms embargo on Somalia. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/69 (31 January 2013) was the latest regular report on Somalia. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6955 conerned the Secretary- Generals’s letter to the Council on the TAM. S/PV.6929 (6 March 2013) concerned the re-authorisation of AMISOM. Security Council Letter S/2013/239 (19 April 2013) was from the Secretary-General regarding the findings and observations of the TAM.Security Council Press Statement SC/10972 (15 April 2013) condemned the terrorist attack in Mogadishu. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania). Size and Composition of AMISOM Authorised strength: 17,731 total uniformed personnel. The main contingents are Uganda (6,223 troops), Burundi (5,432 troops), Kenya (4,652 troops*), Djibouti (960 troops), Sierra Leone (850 troops) and 363 police from 8 countries. Special Representative of the AU and Head of AMISOM Mahamat Saleh Annadif (Chad). *Does not reflect Kenya’s withdrawal of a battalion offsetting Sierra Leone’s deployment.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Somalia (con’t)

Somalia, which was approved in resolution Key Issues south and central Somalia”. 2093. The central issue facing the Council is estab- In the worst incident in Mogadishu since lishing a mandate for UNSOM. Subsidiary Council and Wider Dynamics 2011, Al Shabaab attacked the courthouse questions concern the mission’s structure, Relations between the AU and the UN have on 14 April, leading to more than 50 civil- strength and timeframe. reportedly been strained since the adoption ian deaths, according to an estimate by the Somalia poses an extremely difficult secu- of resolution 2093 due to differing concep- Office of the High Commissioner for Human rity environment. Despite the very real opera- tions regarding the role of AMISOM (mul- Rights. The attack was condemned by the tional constraints—which the UN will need tidimensional peace support vs. counter- Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen- to address—there is a risk of negative public insurgency) and the scale and source of its eral for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, and the perceptions developing against the UN for a financing (enhanced support package from spokesperson for the High Commissioner “bunker mentality”. UNSOA vs. internal AU funds). Mutually for Human Rights. On 15 April, the Security Determining and managing the division of agreeing on a division of labour between the Council issued a press statement condemn- labour among the government, the UN and AU and UN will be critical. ing the attack, reiterating a willingness to take AU will be an evolving, complex challenge for The future of approximately 2,500 Ethio- action against those threatening stability in the Council and other actors. pian troops in Somalia remains ambiguous, Somalia and reaffirming Council resolve to Managing the apparently high expecta- with significant implications for the chang- support peace through the upcoming deploy- tions of the government with regard to capac- ing military equation in Somalia. The prime ment of UNSOM (SC/10972). ity-building and service delivery could also be minister of Ethiopia has expressed frustra- At a meeting of G8 foreign ministers in an issue for the Council. tion with the lack of progress by AMISOM London on 10-11 April, there was agreement and SNSF in assuming control over territory to offer high-level political support for Soma- Options captured by Ethiopia from Al Shabaab. He lia’s re-engagement with the World Bank, the The most likely option for the Council is to has also objected to the mounting cost of the African Development Bank (ADB) and the adopt a resolution authorising UNSOM to deployment in Somalia. Theoretically, Ethi- International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nearly be deployed by 3 June as outlined by the opia could maintain the status quo, re-hat half of Somalia’s $2.2 billion external debt Secretary-General in his 19 April letter trans- as AMISOM, obtain external financing, or is owed to the World Bank, ADB and IMF. mitting the TAM report (S/2013/239). withdraw from Somalia. On 12 April, the IMF recognised the Federal Council members may also wish to take The UK is the penholder on Somalia, Government of Somalia, allowing a resump- note of the Secretary-General’s observation while the Republic of Korea is the chair of tion of relations after a 22-year interval. The that AMISOM’s military and civilian compo- the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions UK has organised an international donor nents require “enablers and force multipliers” Committee. conference for Somalia in London on 7 May. and resources for “stabilization activities in

Kosovo

Expected Council Action Zarif characterised ongoing EU-mediated sought institutional autonomy for Serbs in In May, Farid Zarif, the Special Represen- talks between Serbia and Kosovo as an “his- the north, which Pristina resisted. When the tative of the Secretary-General and head of toric” opportunity and urged the Council to parties failed to reach agreement, Ashton then the UN Interim Administration Mission in support the negotiations. He also cautioned established 9 April as a deadline for Serbia and Kosovo (UNMIK), is scheduled to brief the that obstacles remained, particularly in north- Kosovo to accept the EU-mediated proposal. Council during a quarterly debate. Zarif will ern Kosovo where insecurity and ethnic ten- On 8 April, Serbia rejected the EU plan, update the Council on the Secretary-Gener- sions have been a problem. which was not made publicly available. Dačić al’s report due 29 April and on other recent On 2 April, EU High Representative for stated the principles proposed by the EU developments, particularly the outcome of Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton hosted the “do not guarantee the full security, survival EU-mediated talks in Brussels between Ser- eighth round of “Belgrade-Pristina” talks and protection of human rights to Serbs in bia and Kosovo. between Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia Kosovo”. Critical points of disagreement con- and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Koso- cerned control over the police and the courts Key Recent Developments vo. In exchange for recognition of Pristina’s in the north. Although Ashton had previ- When he last briefed the Council on 22 March, authority over northern Kosovo, Belgrade ously declared that the EU would no longer

UN DOCUMENTS ON KOSOVO Security Council Resolution S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/72 (4 February 2013) was a report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6939 (22 March 2013) was a quarterly debate on Kosovo. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIK Farid Zarif (Afghanistan). UNMIK Size and Composition As of 31 December 2012: 16 uniformed, 132 international civilian, 208 local, 27 UN Volunteers. Commander KFOR Major General Volker R. Halbauer (Germany). KFOR Size and Composition As of 12 January 2013: 5,134 troops from 31 countries. Head of EULEX Bernd Borchardt (Germany). EULEX Size and Composition Approximately 2250 international and local staff.

18 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Kosovo (con’t) mediate, Serbia and Kosovo called for fur- Kosovo in 2013 with the assistance of the press statement or a presidential statement ther talks, which Ashton eventually agreed Organisation for Security and Coopera- expressing support for implementation of the to broker. tion in Europe; and “First agreement on principles governing the After renewed bilateral and trilateral nego- • a commitment that neither Serbia nor normalisation of relations”. tiations on 17 April, the parties once again Kosovo will block each other’s respective If the Council determines that recent failed to reach agreement. Progress had “EU paths” (this represents a compromise progress in negotiations between Serbia and apparently been made on the interrelated with respect to earlier language that had Kosovo also signals a reduction in threats issues of autonomy for Serbs in northern referenced “international organisations”). to stability, then the Council could consider Kosovo and Serbia’s recognition of Pristina’s On 22 April, the European Commission lengthening UNMIK’s reporting cycle from authority in the region. However, the talks recommended that the European Council quarterly to semi-annually. ultimately broke down over point 14 of the approve negotiations on membership for Alternatively, the Council may choose to EU proposal, which required Serbia not to Serbia and talks on a Stabilisation and Asso- take no action, as with other recent quarterly obstruct Kosovo’s accession to “international ciation Agreement for Kosovo (a preliminary briefings on UNMIK. organisations”, implicitly meaning the UN. step toward EU membership candidacy). A Negotiations resumed on 19 April, when joint report submitted by Ashton and the EU Council and Wider Dynamics Dačić and Thaçi initialled a “First agree- Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, Kosovo has been relatively low profile for ment on principles governing the normalisa- concluded that since October 2012 Kosovo the Council, in part because of a clear divi- tion of relations”, in what may become an had made progress in the four critical areas of sion among members. Historically, the criti- historic act of reconciliation. Ashton con- public administration, rule of law, trade and cal split has been between France, the UK gratulated the parties for their “determina- protection of minorities. and the US (the three permanent members tion” and “courage” and suggested this rep- that have recognised Kosovo) and Russia resents a “step away from the past and, for Key Issues (which has consistently backed Serbia in the both of them, a step closer to Europe”. On The principal concern for the Council Council). 21 and 22 April, the parliament of Kosovo continues to be the maintenance of stabil- While Serbia stopped short in the EU- and cabinet of Serbia respectively approved ity in Kosovo. Opposition to the agreement mediated text of even implicitly recognising the agreement. between Serbia and Kosovo—by either Kosovo in a UN context, the agreement does The key elements of the 15-point agree- minority ethnic Serbs or majority ethnic signal its acceptance of Pristina’s authority in ment include: Albanians—could result in public protest. the north. Whether or not this development • the establishment of an association of Serb More generally, the Council will likely be will alter dynamics within the Council, per- municipalities with representation at the focused on how UNMIK could most use- haps even breaking a stalemate among mem- central government; fully assist with implementation of the EU- bers, remains to be seen. • a national police and judiciary but with mediated agreement. The penholder for Kosovo rotates on a provisions for a regional police command- monthly basis among the Contact and Draft- er in northern Kosovo and an appellate Options ing Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, court for Serb-majority municipalities; Given the significance of the pact, the UK and US). • municipal elections to be held in northern Council could consider issuing either a

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Expected Council Action November 2012, Inzko expressed concern Council authorised the deployment of the EU In May, the Council is due to hold a semi- regarding public statements by senior Repub- peacekeeping operation, EUFOR ALTHEA, annual meeting on Bosnia and Herzegovina lika Srpska officials that called into ques- for another year. (BiH). The High Representative for Bosnia tion commitment to the unity of BiH. Inzko On 22 March, BiH politicians attended and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko, is expected also noted his disappointment with the lack EU-brokered talks in Brussels on the failure to brief the Council. No outcome is expected. of progress toward meeting the five objec- by BiH to implement a 2009 ruling on the tives and the two conditions (“5+2 agenda”) Sejdić-Finci case by the European Court of Key Recent Developments required to close the Office of the High Rep- Human Rights, which affirmed the right of When last briefing the Council on 13 resentative (OHR). On 14 November, the BiH ethnic minorities who are not of the three

UN DOCUMENTS ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2074 (14 November 2012) reauthorised EUFOR ALTHEA until 14 November 2013. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6860 (13 November 2012) was a briefing from the High Representative, Valentin Inzko, discussing his report covering developments from 21 April to 26 October 2012. Security Council Letter S/2012/813 (6 November 2012) forwarded from the Secretary-General the report of the High Representative covering developments from 21 April to 26 October 2012. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina Valentin Inzko (Austria). Size and composition of EUFOR ALTHEA As of 3 December 2012: 600 troops from 18 EU states and 5 non-EU states.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 19 Bosnia and Herzegovina (con’t)

“constituent peoples” (Bosniak, Croat or Serb) discriminates against Serbs and has not been Options to run for political office. Citing a lack of prog- impartial. President Tomislav Nikolić of Ser- One option the Council could consider is ress in bringing the constitution and electoral bia, argued the ICTY makes unjust legal deci- adopting a press statement supporting the laws of BiH into alignment with the European sions under political pressure and based on work of OHR and the EU, re-affirming the Convention on Human Rights, the EU can- “untruths” resulting in what Serbs have report- territorial integrity of BiH, emphasising the celled a high-level dialogue scheduled to take edly termed “Hague justice”. The event was importance of progress toward Euro-Atlantic place in Mostar on 11 April. Štefan Füle, EU boycotted by many invited speakers and was integration and urging leaders to cooperate on Commissioner for Enlargement, stated that characterised as “unbalanced” and “inflam- 5+2 implementation. compliance with the European Convention on matory” by the US, which joined Canada and Another option the Council could explore Human Rights is one of the “pre-conditions Jordan in boycotting the debate. is discussing how and when OHR will close, for an application for EU membership to be including a potential re-assessment of the 5+2 taken into consideration” and that without an Human Rights-Related Developments criteria established in 2008. One trade-off the agreement on legal reform, “Bosnia and Her- From 29 October to 5 November 2012, the special Council could consider would be whether the rapporteur on violence against women, Rashida zegovina’s EU path would be frozen”. withdrawal of OHR would increase instabil- Manjoo, visited BiH. She will present a report with On 16 November 2012, appeals judges at findings and recommendations to the Human ity or facilitate domestic ownership over the the International Criminal Tribunal for the Rights Council (HRC) in June. future of BiH. former Yugoslavia (ICTY) overturned the On 12 March, Rita Izsák, the independent The most likely option is that the Council convictions of Croatian generals Ante Goto- expert on minority issues, presented to the HRC will take no action (as in May 2011 and May the report of her 17-25 September 2012 mission vina and Mladen Markač for crimes related 2012) until it is due to consider of EUFOR to BiH (A/HRC/22/49/Add.1 of 31 December 2012). to attacks on Serb civilians in the Krajina She underlined that the degree to which politics ALTHEA’s re-authorisation in November. region of Croatia in 1995. On 28 February, has been polarised by ethnic identity has blocked appeals judges overturned the conviction of progress in the country. She also stressed that Council and Wider Dynamics General Momčilo Perišić for aiding and abet- a high degree of ethnic segregation persisted in More than seventeen years after the Dayton the education system and that religion was also a ting crimes against civilians in 44 months of Peace Agreement, BiH is a low-profile issue dividing line in society. She added that Roma com- attacks on Sarajevo and the killing of more munities, who constitute the largest recognised for the Council. Nonetheless, divisions remain than 7,000 Bosniak men and boys at Srebren- national minority, were facing particular challenges among members, particularly between Russia ica in 1995. More recently, on 27 March the and stressed the importance of conducting a new on the one hand and the UK and the US on ICTY convicted Bosnian Serbs Mićo Stanišić census (the last one was in 1991). She stressed the other. Russia has been critical of OHR for and Stojan Župljanin, a former minister and that accurate data is essential to provide a basis its perceived anti-Serb bias and would prefer for policy and programme initiatives. former senior police official respectively of The special rapporteur in the field of cultural that it be closed, while the UK and the US Republika Srpska, for crimes against civilians rights, Farida Shaheed, is due to visit the country have maintained that OHR should remain and sentenced them to 22 years each in prison. from 13-24 May. in place until the 5+2 agenda has been fully The ICTY was a subject of discussion in implemented. the UN General Assembly on 10 April during Key Issues In practice, potential EU membership a thematic debate on the role of international Issues that may capture the attention of the has become the principal mechanism for the criminal justice in reconciliation, organised Council include: international community to wield influence in by Assembly President Vuk Jeremić of Ser- • whether factors such as chronically high BiH. Adjusting the constitution and electoral bia. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the unemployment and divisive political rheto- laws to comply with the Sejdić-Finci ruling work of the ICTY and the International Crim- ric could undermine stability; remains an obstacle to EU membership. Croa- inal Tribunal for Rwanda had helped estab- • the degree of progress toward completing tia’s pending EU membership, expected on 1 lish the foundation for an “age of account- the 5+2 agenda, which would then allow July, adds additional urgency. ability”. In contrast, Nebojša Radmanović, for the closure of OHR; and The penholder for BiH rotates on a month- chairman of the presidency of Bosnia and • to what extent Bosnia and Herzegovina ly basis among the Contact and Drafting Herzegovina, claimed there was a widespread has taken steps toward enabling integra- Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, UK perception among the Bosnian Serb public tion with the EU or NATO. and US). and Republika Srpska officials that the ICTY

Lebanon

Expected Council Action the implementation of resolution 1559 territory. In May, Council members expect to receive (S/2013/234). Adopted in 2004, resolution A press statement or similar outcome is the semi-annual briefing in consultations 1559 urged the disarmament of all Lebanese possible. from Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen on and non-Lebanese militias and the exten- the Secretary-General’s latest report on sion of government control over all Lebanese

20 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 Lebanon (con’t)

Key Recent Developments of Lebanese sovereignty. Additional cross- associated with Hezbollah published a con- The Council last met on Lebanon on 14 border incidents involving Syrian helicopters fidential list of 17 potential witnesses who March, when members heard a briefing in were reported on 21 March and 3 April. might be called to testify in the trial. A spokes- consultations on the implementation of res- Sectarian tensions in Lebanon escalated man for the STL has described the publica- olution 1701 from the Special Coordinator in March. On 17 March, four Sunni sheikhs tion as an effort to intimidate potential wit- for Lebanon, Derek Plumbly. Following the were attacked and beaten in two separate nesses. On 11 April the STL condemned the briefing, Council members issued a press incidents in predominantly Shi’a neighbour- publication online of a second list of alleged statement that expressed concern about hoods of Beirut. Although Hezbollah and witnesses by a group calling itself “Journal- cross-border incidents between Syria and Amal, the major Shi’a parties in Lebanon, ists for the Truth”, and added that the list Lebanon and about the impact of the con- quickly condemned the attacks, significant was inaccurate. flict in Syria on the stability of its southern protests took place around the country soon neighbour (SC/10941). The press statement after. Following the attacks, six people were Key Issues also encouraged relevant parties “to make killed and at least 48 people were wounded in The key issues in Lebanon addressed by swift progress to ensure that parliamentary sectarian clashes between residents of Sunni resolution 1559 are the fact that Hezbollah elections take place on a consensual basis”. and Alawite neighbourhoods in Tripoli. maintains a significant arsenal not controlled The impact of the conflict in Syria on On 4 March, President Sleiman and by the Lebanese government and that the Lebanon was raised again during an open Prime Minister Najib Mikati signed a decree delineation of the border between Lebanon humanitarian briefing on Syria on 18 April calling for parliamentary elections to be held and Syria has not taken place. and during the quarterly open debate on the on 9 June, despite the political deadlock over The National Dialogue—a series of talks Middle East on 24 April. During his remarks a new electoral law. Shortly after, the Minis- that started in 2006 during which political on 18 April, UN High Commissioner for try of Interior began accepting applications leaders have addressed the issue of Hezbol- Refugees António Guterres described the cri- from those wishing to register as candidates lah’s arms—has not resumed in the wake of sis in Syria as an “existential threat” to Leb- in the upcoming elections, even though an the assassination of the intelligence chief of anon, noting that Syrian refugees currently election supervisory commission (which was the Internal Security Forces on 19 October make up at least 10 percent of the population to have been established before registration 2012. of Lebanon. was opened) had not yet been established. At press time it was unclear whether Significant incidents along the border On 22 March, Mikati announced his res- Prime Minister Salam’s as-yet unformed between Lebanon and Syria continued in ignation following an impasse in the cabinet cabinet would be conducive to the resump- March and April. In a letter to Lebanon regarding the extension of the mandate of tion of talks. The 14 March Coalition had dated 14 March, Syria threatened to attack Internal Security Forces Chief Major General previously called for the resignation of the Syrian opposition forces inside Lebanon to Ashraf Rifi and the establishment of the elec- Mikati government and the installation of a prevent the smuggling of arms and gunmen. tion supervisory commission. On 23 March, neutral cabinet to oversee preparations for On 15 March, Syria appeared to be follow- President Sleiman accepted the resignation, parliamentary elections as prerequisites for ing through on its threat when several villages asked Mikati to head a caretaker government, returning to the National Dialogue. Current in northern Lebanon reportedly came under and appointed a Sunni, Tamam Salam, as discussions regarding the formation of a new fire from Syria. On 18 March the situation Prime Minister-designate on 6 April task- cabinet appear to be centred on the question continued to escalate when Syrian helicop- ing him with the responsibility for forming a of whether the cabinet should be a national ters reportedly fired rockets at two sites near new government. Both the pro-Syria politi- unity government that would be political in the city of Arsal that had allegedly been used cal factions (including Hezbollah) and the nature or whether it should be neutral and for smuggling. anti-Syria 14 March Coalition formed in the technocratic, charged primarily with oversee- In response to Syrian denials that the air- wake of the assassination of Prime Minister ing elections, as the 14 March Coalition has strikes had taken place, Lebanese President Rafiq Hariri in 2005 endorsed Salam in the called for. Michel Sleiman told reporters that the Leba- days leading up to his appointment. At press nese Armed Forces (LAF) had confirmed the time discussions were continuing regarding Underlying Problems strikes, which he described as “an unaccept- the formation of a new cabinet and the adop- The ongoing conflict in Syria will most like- able violation of [Lebanon’s] sovereignty”. tion of a new electoral law. ly indefinitely stall any effort to implement This was the first incident since the start of At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon resolution 1559 properly, especially in light the conflict in which Syria entered Lebanon’s (STL), after a postponement in February, no of the increased instability along the border airspace. On 20 March the Secretary-Gener- new date has been set for the start of the tri- between Lebanon and Syria and Hezbollah’s al expressed grave concern at the reports and al in absentia of four individuals charged with continuing support for the regime of Syrian called on Syria to cease all such violations assassinating Hariri. In January, a newspaper President Bashar al-Assad.

UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2064 (30 August 2012) extended the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon for 12 months. S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory. Security Council Press Statement SC/10941 (14 March 2013) expressed grave concern about the impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon and called for swift progress towards parliamentary elections. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/234 (18 April 2013) was a report on resolution 1559. S/2013/120 (27 February 2013) was a report on the implementation of resolution 1701. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6949 (18 April 2013) was an open briefing on the humanitarian crisis in Syria and its neighbours.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Lebanon (con’t)

Furthermore, the flow of armaments members are worried that a glut of press order to maintain political stability. across the border between Syria and Leba- statements might dilute their efficacy. Howev- non has contributed to the expansion of arse- er, since the security situation in Lebanon and Council Dynamics nals outside the control of the Lebanese gov- along the border with Syria has continued to The lack of significant controversy in negotia- ernment. Israeli officials have said they would deteriorate, the Council could adopt a state- tions around the 14 March press statement is intervene to prevent the transfer of chemi- ment reiterating its condemnation of cross- evidence of the consensus in the Council that cal weapons to Hezbollah and violations of border incidents and expressing concern the international community should support Lebanese airspace by Israel have continued for violations of Lebanese sovereignty. In a Lebanon in its efforts to contain and manage in recent months. Both of these constitute similar vein, a press or presidential statement spillover from the conflict in Syria. Though violations of resolution 1559 and Lebanon’s addressing the Syrian refugee crisis in the Council efforts to pronounce on any aspect sovereignty. country might also be an appropriate demon- of the situation in Syria remain controversial, stration of international support for Lebanon consultations in May will likely demonstrate Options given the challenges it is facing. Finally, the a dynamic similar to the short, consensual The Council is unlikely to take any action on Council could also issue a statement encour- consultations seen in March. Lebanon so soon after the press statement aging Lebanon to hold its parliamentary elec- France is the penholder on Lebanon in adopted on 14 March, as many Council tions on time and on a consensual basis, in the Council.

DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action or ballistic missiles. It tightened some of with the ROK, the last official direct link In May, the chair of the 1718 Democratic the existing sanctions provisions against between the two countries. People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanc- the DPRK and also imposed new measures. On 2 April, the DPRK said it would tions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas Additionally, it extended the mandate of the restart its Yongbyon nuclear complex, includ- (Luxembourg), is scheduled to brief Council PoE (which would have expired on 12 July) ing a plutonium reactor that was partially members in consultations. until 7 April 2014 while increasing the num- dismantled in 2007 as part of an agreement These quarterly briefings on the work of ber of experts from seven to eight. (For more under the six-party talks. (These talks, stalled the Committee tend to be technical in nature, details, please see our 6 March What’s in Blue since 2009, involve China, the DPRK, Japan, and no Council action is expected. The last story on adoption of the resolution.) the ROK, Russia and the US.) On 3 April, such briefing was held on 21 February. On 9 March the DPRK denounced the it blocked ROK workers from entering the The final report under resolution 2050 resolution in a letter to the Council, describ- Kaesong industrial zone, which had been of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the ing it as “clear proof that the Security Coun- seen as a symbol of Korean cooperation, and Committee is due on 12 May and is expect- cil was abused into implementing the hostile then on 9 April withdrew its own workers. ed to be discussed by the Committee in late policy of the US” (S/2013/141). The launch Tensions escalated further in April with May or early June. on 11 March of the annual joint US-Repub- the ROK warning on 7 April that the DPRK lic of Korea (ROK) military training exercise might launch a missile later that week and Key Recent Developments in the region seemed to further aggravate the Pyongyang reportedly warning foreigners in In a press statement on 12 February, Council situation as tensions on the Korean Peninsula the ROK on 9 April to prepare for nuclear members strongly condemned the DPRK’s escalated. war. The tensions seemed to subside, how- nuclear test that same day and said they Among a series of increasingly aggressive ever, following the anniversary on 15 April would begin work immediately on an appro- steps taken by the DPRK was the announce- of the birth of DPRK founder Kim Il-sung, priate response. ment on 11 March that it considered the with the DPRK responding to US and ROK Subsequently, on 7 March, the Council 1953 armistice agreement with the ROK offers for dialogue by scaling down its bel- in resolution 2094 again condemned the nullified. While the ROK said such a uni- ligerent tone. It rejected, however, a 25 April test and reiterated its previous demands that lateral nullification was not allowed under formal ROK proposal for talks on the future the DPRK retract its withdrawal from the international law, the DPRK in a 15 March of the Kaesong industrial complex amid Non-Proliferation Treaty and abandon all letter to the Council insisted it was no longer concerns about the humanitarian situation programmes aimed at developing nuclear bound by the agreement (S/2013/162). On of a group of ROK workers remaining at the weapons, other weapons of mass destruction 27 March, the DPRK cut a military hotline complex to safeguard the facilities. Following

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DPRK Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2094 (7 March 2013) tightened sanctions against the DPRK and extended the mandate of the PoE until 7 April 2014. S/RES/2050 (12 June 2012) extended the mandate of the PoE until 12 July 2013. Security Council Letters S/2013/199 (28 March 2013) was a letter to the Council from the Secretary-General on the re-appointment of the PoE. S/2013/186 (21 March 2013) was a letter from the Sanctions Committee chair informing the Council of the new reporting schedule of the PoE. S/2013/162 (15 March 2013) was a letter to the Council from the DPRK regarding the Korean armistice agreement. S/2013/141 (9 March 2013) was a letter to the Council from the DPRK regarding resolution 2094. Security Council Press Statements SC/10912 (12 February 2013) was a Council press statement condemning the 12 February nuclear test. Other S/2013/91 (13 February 2013) was a note verbale from the DPRK on the 12 February nuclear test.

22 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 DPRK (North Korea) (con’t)

the DPRK’s rejection of talks, the ROK adequate resources to produce a more complete option, including possibly making additional announced it would withdraw its remaining picture, qualify and quantify the violations, attri- designations. workers from Kaesong. bute responsibility to particular perpetrators and suggest effective courses of international action. The DPRK Sanctions Committee has met On 21 March, the HRC adopted a resolution Council Dynamics twice since the adoption of resolution 2094. establishing a commission of inquiry for a peri- Council members were united in their sup- The first meeting, on 15 March, focused od of one year comprising three members, one port for resolution 2094. As in the past, it on technical issues related to the renewal of of whom should be the Special Rapporteur (A/ was first negotiated between China and the the PoE mandate, such as its new report- HRC/RES/22/13). The commission is mandated US before being presented to other Council to investigate the systematic, widespread and ing schedule and the nomination process grave violations of human rights in the DPRK. The members. Although the US did not get all for its eighth member. (At press time, the resolution also extended the mandate of the Spe- of what it wanted included in the resolution, Secretary-General had yet to appoint the cial Rapporteur. the adopted text was seen as sending a strong eighth expert.) The chair transmitted the message, even more so with the support by new reporting schedule to the Council on 21 China. Council members are also united in March (S/2013/186). Key Issues their concern about the recent escalation on Discussions during its second meeting, on A key issue for the Council is the DPRK’s the Korean Peninsula but seem hopeful that 8 April, focused on cases of possible viola- continued defiance of all relevant resolutions. tensions have peaked. tions brought to the attention of the Commit- A related issue is the lack of progress in the It appears, however, that this unity does tee. Also, it seems the Committee, with the six-party talks. not necessarily translate into action in the assistance of the PoE, has started drafting the A broader issue is whether a continued DPRK Sanctions Committee. While the implementation assistance notice requested tightening of sanctions against the DPRK is atmosphere in the Committee is described by the Council in resolution 2094 regarding effective in changing Pyongyang’s behaviour. as constructive, recent discussions about the proper implementation of the provision At the Committee level, a key issue is the how to respond to reports of violations were in paragraph 22 that calls on states to pre- effective implementation of the sanctions still marked by divisions between more cau- vent the supply to the DPRK of any item regime, in particular how to respond to vio- tious Council members who want additional that might contribute to its nuclear or ballis- lations and whether to make additional desig- information before taking any action and tic programmes and to cease other activities nations as directed in resolution 2094. others who are pushing for a more proactive prohibited by relevant Council resolutions. approach. Options In the past the Committee has also been Human Rights-Related Developments In the Council, one option is to change the split in its response to the reports by the In a 1 February 2013 report presented to the format of the briefing by the chair of the PoE. The 2011 report was never made pub- Human Rights Council (HRC) on 11 March, Mar- Committee from a closed to an open meet- lic due to opposition from China. While the zuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, provided ing, as is the case for the 1737 Iran Sanctions 2012 report was seen as more balanced, the a comprehensive review of UN documentation Committee. Committee took up very few of its recom- and resolutions on the situation of human rights In the Committee, one option is to issue mendations. It therefore remains to be seen in the DPRK since 2004 and identified nine pat- the implementation assistance notice called how responsive the Committee will be to the terns of human rights violations (A/HRC/22/57 for by resolution 2094. Taking up some upcoming report. of February 2013). He said many of these might amount to crimes against humanity and called for or all of the recommendations likely to be The US is the penholder on the DPRK in the establishment of an inquiry mechanism with submitted by the PoE in May is another the Council.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013 securitycouncilreport.org 23 Notable Dates for May Security Council Report Staff Bruno Stagno REPORT DUE REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN MAY REQUESTING DOCUMENT Executive Director

Joanna Weschler 19 April ������������������������������� SG report on the implementation of resolution ������������������������������� S/PRST/2004/36 Deputy Executive Director & 1559 (Lebanon) S/RES/1559 Director of Research

29 April ����������������������������� SG report on UNMIK (Kosovo) ������������������������������������������������������������� S/RES/1244 Amanda Roberts Coordinating Editor & Senior Research Analyst 30 April ����������������������������� SG consolidated report on UNIOGBIS and the restoration ��������� S/RES/2092 of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau S/RES/2048 Shamala Kandiah Thompson What’s in Blue Editor & Senior 30 April ����������������������������� SG report on BINUCA (Central African Republic) postponed ����� S/RES/2088 Research Analyst from 31 March Astrid Forberg Ryan Senior Research Analyst & Early May ������������������������� Special Envoy’s report on an integrated Sahel strategy ��������������� S/RES/2056 Development Officer S/PRST/2012/26 Victor Casanova Abos Research Analyst 2 May ��������������������������������� High Representative’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina ����������� S/RES/2074 Charles Cater Mid May ����������������������������� Panel of Experts interim report to the 1591 Sudan Sanctions ����� S/RES/2091 Research Analyst Committee Nicole Rencoret Research Analyst 12 May ������������������������������� Panel of Experts final report under resolution 2050 ��������������������� S/RES/2050 to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee S/2013/186 Paul Romita Research Analyst

14 May ������������������������������� SG report on UNOCA/LRA (Central Africa) ������������������������������������� S/PRST/2012/28 Eran Sthoeger Research Analyst 17 May ������������������������������� SG report on UNISFA (Abyei) ��������������������������������������������������������������� S/RES/2075 Robbin VanNewkirk Publications Coordinator MANDATES EXPIRE RELEVANT DOCUMENT Dahlia Morched Research Assistant 31 May ������������������������������� UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau) ������������������������������������������������������������������� S/RES/2092 Laura Coquard-Wallace 31 May ������������������������������� UNISFA (Abyei) ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� S/RES/2075 Research Assistant

James Reed Ball III Research Assistant OTHER IMPORTANT DATES RELEVANT DOCUMENT Maritza Tenerelli 6 May ��������������������������������� Mary Robinson will brief Council members on the DRC for the first time in her new Administrative Assistant capacity as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region in Africa. Stevenson Swanson Editorial Consultant 7 May ��������������������������������� There will be an international donor conference on Somalia held in London. Security Council Report is a non- 8 May ��������������������������������� The ICC Prosecutor will brief the Council on Libya. profit organization supported by the Governments of Australia, Austria, 10 May ������������������������������� The semi-annual joint briefing by the chairs of the 1267, 1343 and 1540 Counterterrorism Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Committees is expected. New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland, 13 May ������������������������������� At the initiative of Togo, the Council will hold a debate on the challenges of the fight the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, against terrorism in Africa. International Development Research Centre and the William and Flora Mid May ����������������������������� An Arria Formula meeting on women, peace and security, organised by Council Hewlett Foundation. members Australia and Guatemala in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Design Point Five, NY Operations, is expected.

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24 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast May 2013