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Assessing the New Abe Administration in Japan

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ASSESSING THE NEW ABE ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN CENTER ON JAPANESE ECONOMY AND BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 26, 2006 Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi left a lasting impression as he left office earlier this year. He shook up the status quo in the political world by shifting the power from the Liberal Democratic Party headquarters to the prime minister’s office, decentralized the LDP power base, and forced out any potential threat to his throne. These moves were perhaps needed, but also left the new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, on a path that has never been taken before. Everyone agrees that Prime Minister Abe has some large shoes to fill. Does he have the same charisma that Koizumi displayed to continue with reforms, political, economic, or otherwise? Does his choice of cabinet members show what kind of leader he will be? With both the domestic and international media touting him as a nationalist, how will he fare in foreign diplomacy? The answers are still quite vague and more will be known next year. That said, Gerald L. Curtis, Burgess Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, shared his insight on Prime Minister Abe and his administration to a packed audience on September 26. Professor Curtis was joined by the moderator, Hugh Patrick, Director of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business and R.D. Calkins Professor of International Business Emeritus, Columbia Business School. This reports the highlights of Professor Curtis’ speech and the following discussion with audience members. The program was presented in partnership by the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and the Center on Japanese Economy and Business, which is celebrating its 20th anniversary. the past year and engaged in a TV zadankai (roundtable dis- cussion) with him, as well as having a number of private meetings. Prime Minister Abe was probably much too busy this last week to meet with Gerry, but it was probably only HUGH PATRICK GERALD L. CURTIS because Gerry was not going Director, Center on Japanese Burgess Professor of Political I think Gerry has to be in the Cabinet. I know Economy and Business; Science, Columbia University personally known R.D. Calkins Professor of we all look forward to learning hank you. I am delighted just about every International Business Emeritus, from Gerry about what Prime Columbia Business School Minister Abe’s policies will be, T to see so many people Japanese prime how they will be carried out, turn out today, a lot of old t is my honor and pleasure minister for the what will be the difficult chal- friends from outside Columbia, to introduce Professor Gerald last 30 years. I a lot of my students, and others. lenges he faces, and to learn Curtis, Burgess Professor of —Hugh Patrick more about his cabinet mem- This is a good opportunity for Political Science at Columbia bers and senior advisors. us to talk about the significance University. As you know, Gerry This is a special event of the emergence of Japan’s is a distinguished scholar of co-sponsored by the new prime minister. He is the Japanese politics and in recent Weatherhead East Asian first prime minister to be born years has spent every spring Institute in a series of events after the Second World War, semester in Tokyo, meeting that the Center on Japanese the youngest prime minister with political and business Economy and Business is in the past 65 years, and the leaders, engaging in research, holding to celebrate its 20th most hawkish prime minister and incidentally being inter- anniversary. I want to deny in some time. He follows very viewed by the media and the rumor that Prime Minister much in the tradition of his on TV a lot. He just returned Junichiro Koizumi decided not grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, yesterday from a week in to stay on for an extra year, but who was prime minister in the Japan. It seems that every time to leave at this time in order late 1950s. a new prime minister is being that Gerry could give this talk. I want to look briefly at the elected, Gerry somehow Anyway, Gerry, the podium is new Cabinet, the key issues arranges to go to Japan for a yours. that Shinzo Abe is going to week and when he comes back face, and the challenges that he has a lot to say about what he has to meet if he is going to the new prime minister will be be successful as prime minister. doing, his policies and so forth. First, a word about this election. As you know, Shinzo Abe was Abe won an overwhelming elected as president of the victory with 66 percent of the Liberal Democratic Party on vote, that is two thirds of all the September 20, and as prime Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) minister on September 26. members of the parliament and I think Gerry has personally those of the party rank and file known just about every who voted. There were two Japanese prime minister for the other candidates in the race last 30 years. He has met with and no one expected, including Shinzo Abe several times over the candidates themselves, that 2 Assessing the New Abe Administration in Japan anybody else might win. One to build a power base. Prime chief of staff. So Abe is of the other candidates, Foreign Minister Koizumi appointed untested. That does not mean Minister Taro Aso, did somewhat no faction head to his Cabinet. he might not turn out to be a better than had been expected, He went further down in the terrific prime minister, but at especially among the rank and factional hierarchy or chose this point the only thing you file. He is ideologically quite people who had no factional can say about Abe with confi- close to Abe and took pretty affiliation. Those who had dence is that he is a question much the same policy positions. power in the party when mark. There is uncertainty Abe has kept him on as foreign Koizumi became prime minister about what he is going to do minister, the only person that could do nothing but watch as on domestic policy, on China has been retained in the cabinet their power kind of wilted on relations and on foreign policy position that he held under the vine. Five and a half years more generally, and on how Koizumi. The other candidate, later, the only real candidate he is going to organize his Finance Minister Sadakazu was Koizumi’s candidate. administration. Tanigaki, came in third. Tanigaki Koizumi’s candidate was Abe. Prime Minister Abe has to took a different position from So he is popular almost, in a do three things in particular Abe and Aso on key issues. He way, by default. to be successful. The first thing favors raising the consumption You do not find many he has to do is to get people tax, ending prime ministerial politicians in the LDP who are not to compare him to Prime visits to the Yasukuni Shrine excited about Abe, who say, Minister Koizumi. Abe has to and putting greater effort into “This guy is just terrific, he is try to avoid having the media Japan’s Asia diplomacy. There really great.” What they do say remind the public that he does was somewhat more support is that he was the best option. not measure up to Koizumi and for Tanigaki’s policy prescrip- There is a wait-and-see attitude that he does not have the flare. tions than for Tanigaki himself. both within the LDP and the No one measures up to Koizumi He never really managed to public as a whole. Nearly in terms of style. Abe cannot grab the public’s attention. everyone, in the end, jumped croon “Love Me Tender” and Abe’s popularity needs to on the Abe bandwagon. And try to be cool like Koizumi. be distinguished from his pre- if he falters, they will jump on He cannot compete on style. decessor’s. Prime Minister Abe. So, he has to move fairly He has to compete on substance. Nearly everyone, Koizumi came into office riding quickly to establish his credibil- He has to get the public and a wave of real enthusiasm on ity as a leader. He is the first the media to focus their atten- in the end, jumped the part of the public. That LDP politician who has become tion on the kind of policies he on the Abe enthusiasm, as you know, con- prime minister without having is trying to push. The problem bandwagon. tinued to grow until he had held a cabinet position except is that he has no clear policy And if he falters, nearly a 90 percent approval for the one he held under agenda. This was partly the they will jump rating in the public opinion Koizumi as the chief cabinet consequence of there being no on Abe. polls a few months after being secretary. The chief cabinet real contest in the party presi- elected. Abe’s popularity is secretary is a crucially impor- dential election. Abe’s victory —Gerald Curtis more tentative. He is popular tant position, but it does not was a foregone conclusion because nobody else is popular. involve executive power. It and he was careful not to say For five and a half years, Prime does not involve running a line anything that might give his Minister Koizumi basically froze ministry. The chief cabinet sec- opponents an unexpected out the party’s bosses from retary is the government’s chief opening. So he never focused positions of power to prevent spokesman and the prime min- in the campaign on policies.
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