Beneficence, Street Begging, and Diverted Giving Schemes

PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918768031Political Research QuarterlyPérez-Muñoz research-article7680312018

Article

Political Research Quarterly 2018, Vol. 71(4) 923–935 Beneficence, Street Begging, and © 2018 University of Utah Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions Diverted Giving Schemes DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918768031 10.1177/1065912918768031 journals.sagepub.com/home/prq

Cristian Pérez-Muñoz1

Abstract In recent years, some cities and localities in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere have adopted or intend to adopt one potential solution to the difficulties inherent in addressing the needs of street beggars: diverted giving schemes (DGSs). A DGS is an institutional response designed to motivate people to donate money in charity boxes or donation meters rather than directly to street beggars. Their advocates believe that DGSs are both more efficient and more ethically permissible than direct giving to individual beggars. This article asks whether and how a DGS can be justified. It offers a normative evaluation of the main idea behind this policy, namely, that anonymous and spontaneous donations to charity boxes are in themselves an adequate policy instrument to address the problem of street begging. Ultimately, the paper argues against this idea and develops the case that DGSs can potentially compromise our ability to act on our moral duties toward truly needy beggars. Moreover, it explains why and under which circumstances this kind of program can potentially and seriously interfere with the freedom and opportunities of individuals in the begging population.

Keywords street begging, diverted giving schemes, beneficence

Introduction ability to act on our moral duties toward truly needy beggars. Moreover, it explains why and under which circum- In recent years, some cities and localities in the United stances this kind of program can potentially and seriously States, Canada, the United Kingdom and elsewhere have interfere with the freedom and opportunities of individu- adopted or intend to adopt one potential solution to the als in the begging population. As my analysis is mainly difficulties inherent in addressing the needs of street beg- normative in content, this paper does not pretend to offer gars: diverted giving schemes (DGSs). A DGS is an insti- a systematic and exhaustive analysis of current DGSs that tutional response designed to motivate people to donate are currently being debated and occasionally put into money in charity boxes or donation meters rather than practice around the world. Instead, its purpose is only to directly to street beggars (Hermer 1999; Johnsen and draw some insights from actual policies to illustrate the Fitzpatrick 2008; Lynch 2005; Scott 2003). Their advo- normative implications of this approach. cates believe that DGSs are not only more efficient and One question that arises is why we should analyze more ethically permissible than direct giving to individ- DGSs as a unique type of public policy. The first reason ual beggars, but also that DGSs constitute an adequate is that, while we know very little about this type of pro- institutional answer to street begging. Although surpris- gram implemented in several cities across the United ingly very little empirical and theoretical research has States and the United Kingdom, DGSs may have an studied DGSs, this type of institutional response to street important impact on the lives of many poor and marginal- begging has gained noteworthy political and public atten- ized people. Second, DGS programs are compatible with tion over the last few years. what has been described by others as illiberal (e.g., This article asks whether and how a DGS can be justified. It offers a normative evaluation of the main idea 1Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile behind this policy, namely, that anonymous and spontaneous donations to charity boxes are in themselves an Corresponding Author: adequate policy instrument to address street begging. Cristian Pérez-Muñoz, Institute of Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Ultimately, the paper argues against this idea and devel- Santiago, 8320000, Chile. ops the case that DGSs can potentially compromise our Email: [email protected] 924 Political Research Quarterly 71(4)

Waldron 1993) and “revanchist” policies (Smith, 2002). to respect and improve the efficiency and efficacy of vol- That is, a set of policies designed to regulate and control untary individual donations. This concern is completely homeless and street beggars’ behavior. Nevertheless, as I disregarded when we adopt a redistributive policy that will explain later on, DGSs present some particularities enforces contributions through the tax system. DGS that make them an interesting case of policy targeted at advocates could argue that a redistributive policy financed street beggars. by taxes neither recognizes the moral relevance of indi- This paper is organized as follows. The section vidual choice nor upholds the voluntary nature of dona- “Begging and Ad Hoc Individual Beneficence” describes tions. The analytical exercise proposed in this article the challenges of one-on-one beneficence at the street allows us to explain why voluntary individual donations level and explains why street begging requires an institu- given directly to street beggars can be preferable to DGS tional solution. The section “Justifications of DGSs” programs. summarizes the key characteristics of DGSs and reviews the principal arguments in their favor. The section Begging and Ad Hoc Individual “Normative Challenges to DGSs” presents four criteria Beneficence testing the permissibility of a DGS: (1) it uses permissible solicitation strategies to collect revenue sufficient to Begging is a phenomenon that highly varies from one cover the operational costs of assisting beggars, (2) it context to another. Therefore, it is not the same to com- serves as a transparent and accountable mechanism of pare begging practices that are carried out mainly to pro- solicitation and assistance, (3) it is not combined with vide funds to educate children (such as described by zero-tolerance or antibegging ordinances, and (4) under Swanson 2010 for the case of Ecuador), to begging prac- certain circumstances, it satisfies the demands of justice. tices carried out to simply survive. Since the goal of this The section “Discussion” is devoted to concluding paper is to normatively evaluate DGS programs imple- remarks and discussion. mented mainly in the United States and the United Before beginning, I will make note of a few important Kingdom, I rely on the salient characteristic of begging caveats about my approach. First, it is worth pointing out practices in those particular contexts. For example, dif- that begging is an elusive concept. It is usually associated ferent studies (Lee and Farrell 2003; Tillotson and Lein with homelessness and others activities such as selling 2017) have argued that the lack of social capital (e.g., small items (flowers, gum, etc.). Following Lee and family and friends), the ineligibility for social welfare Farrell (2003, 302), I define begging as “a public request policies, and the disconnection from the formal labor for money, food, or other goods with little or nothing of market explain why some people beg. Similarly, other value given in return to the potential donor.” Thus, a beg- studies suggest that street beggars typically live in gar is “a person who publicly and regularly requests extreme poverty and constitute a highly stigmatized pop- money or goods for personal use in a face-to-face manner ulation (e.g., Dean 1999; Lankenau 1999). Finally, some from unfamiliar others without offering a readily identifi- studies reject the hypothesis that beggars earn large able or valued consumer product or service in exchange amounts of money and report that beggars spend their for items received” (Lankenau 1999, 187–88).1 Second, income on “food, followed by tobacco, then alcohol and/ the goal of this paper is not to justify a moral duty to or illicit drugs” (Bose and Hwang 2002, 478).3 assist street beggars.2 Instead, its aim is to evaluate the From the perspective of an individual donor, it is not a permissibility of DGSs as one instrument of many to simple task to determine what we should do whenever we potentially discharge that duty. Thus, my argument is encounter a beggar asking for money in the street. Even if built on the assumption that we have a moral duty to help one is altruistic and assumes a moral obligation to help needy beggars. others in need, there are three challenges that affect our Finally, this paper attempts to explain why DGSs may capacity to act on that obligation: (1) distinguish needy be even less efficient and ethically permissible than direct beggars from those who engage in subterfuge in the solic- giving to individual beggars. This analytical strategy itation of donations; (2) determine who, among the needy does not derive from the assumption that direct giving is beggars, should receive our help in the first place; and (3) preferable to other forms of institutional responses, such decide whether our direct aid to beggars—rather than as redistributive policies financed through taxation. some other form of indirect aid—is a morally desirable Instead, the comparison between individual giving and way to act on our moral obligations. Let us consider these DGSs is solely intended to contrast two similar responses three challenges in turn. to street begging that share the same key defining ele- First, it is difficult for individual donors to assess and ments: voluntariness and individual choice. Donor volun- distinguish truly needy beggars from fraudulent ones. tariness is a crucial normative concern for DGSs Individual donors can infer that given certain conditions advocates. The policy is defended as a better mechanism (e.g., the nature of the welfare policies in place), more or Pérez-Muñoz 925 less truly needy beggars are asking for money in the directly to a beggar.” It is not necessary to argue that it is street. Yet this calculation is complicated by a number of always morally right to give money to beggars, but it suf- constraints (Pérez Muñoz and Potter 2014). To begin, fices to show that it is not always morally wrong to do so street donors do not have access to information sufficient (Radford 2001, 293). to successfully engage in this type of ad hoc evaluation. A final problem for individual donors is that even Second, even if we solve the first problem by correctly when they overcome the first two challenges, they need identifying a number of needy beggars, we next have to to evaluate to what extent their direct donations constitute face the difficult task of deciding who should be the an effective and desirable form of aid. In particular, recipients of our donations. Since their resources are typi- donors need to rule out the possibility that their donations cally finite, most potential street donors cannot help all do not have (unintended or collateral) negative effects on the truly needy beggars they might come into contact beggars.5 For example, donations that are subsequently with. They require some type of rule or other heuristic to expended on alcohol and illegal substances are com- guide the allocation of their limited resources. monly identified as an important example of misuse of One may object that this argument is only valid with the provided aid.6 Likewise, donors should be concerned respect to moral obligations that are more demanding or with the possibility of creating a structure of incentives straightforward than street-level responses to solicitations that makes street begging even worse (Hardin 1990, 88). from beggars. When our obligations are imperfect, we are This can happen when, for instance, the overall level of not required to follow any particular rule that can improve donations is sufficiently large that it makes the practice of the effectiveness and fairness of our donation. Any help begging seem attractive to more people (thereby expand- we can provide will suffice to discharge our moral duties ing the population of beggars) or seem comparatively toward beggars. But this argument is disputable. Even if more attractive to its current practitioners than wage- our moral obligations toward beggars are imperfect ones, based labor (thereby reinforcing the behaviors of those we should not necessarily assume that they could be sim- who are already members of the begging population). ply discharged with any type of help—no matter how There is an additional point that makes direct dona- scant—we may provide. Similarly, we should not assume tions morally troubling: by giving money directly to beg- that our obligations are met by merely helping the first gars, we are indirectly damaging their self-respect (Allais beggar we meet in the street (Moen 2014). According to 2014; Kant 1997). As Margalit (1996, 231) puts it, “beg- Bradford (2001), the main problem that arises in this situ- ging for alms is humiliating.” This activity generates an ation is that it is impossible to have a universal moral prin- unequal relationship between donors and beggars, and ciple or command that guides our actions. It seems hard, the result of such an asymmetric power dynamic is often in the first place, to adopt a moral command such as humiliation (Margalit 1996, 231; Sypnowich 2006, 186– “whenever you encounter a needy beggar, you should help 88). This asymmetrical relationship challenges the value her” or “you should always give money to the first beggar of equal citizenship. If we are committed to build a more you encounter in the street.” It is easy to find situations in egalitarian society, then we should be concerned about which morality requires us to break those rules due to con- participating in this practice. One-on-one beneficence, siderations of scope or magnitude. therefore, can be “a flawed form of egalitarian rectifica- Even a consequentialist position might encounter tion” (Sypnowich 2006, 193). problems in the course of elucidating this moral dilemma. These arguments show that the adoption of an institu- There may be relevant information that is neither avail- tional solution—such as a DGS—may be a better way to able nor inferable. Moreover, we may not have the time deal with street begging. Given the difficulties associated and resources to make accurate assessments of the situa- with potential donors idiosyncratically assessing each tion (Radford 2001, 290). The very idea of including all street-level begging solicitation on its own merits, the of these calculations and evaluations cuts against the better solution might rather lie in adopting an institutional thought that street charity should be a spontaneous enter- mechanism that coordinates donors’ altruist efforts, that prise (Radford 2001, 291). Another possibility is to adopt is, an institutional mechanism that helps donors in per- the principle of never giving money to a beggar. This fecting as much as possible the inherent imperfection and principle is practical and easy to follow.4 However, there indeterminacy of their moral obligations toward beggars. are many situations in which our donations can readily In line with these considerations, the following sections help street beggars. As Hardin (1990, 101) puts it, “my evaluate the case of DGSs. action makes negligible difference to the hope of chang- ing the general condition of these street people, but it Justifications of DGSs could make a real difference for a while to one of them.” Thus, it is difficult to find a strong reason to justify a DGSs can be defined as the set of programs aimed at moral principle stating that we “never should give money diverting donations from street donors to human service 926 Political Research Quarterly 71(4)

agencies, charities, and other groups that serve the home- immediate needs. DGSs can help distinguish needy beg- less and begging populations.7 Street donors are asked to gars from those beggars who misrepresent themselves. donate to DGSs instead of giving spare change directly to Likewise, a DGS can help eliminate the advantage that beggars. Examples of these types of policies include the some beggars may have over other beggars at the time of use of collection boxes in the street,8 the use of mechani- collecting donations. The location and their ability to get cal parking meters that also serve as collection boxes,9 the attention of passersby are important variables that and programs that raise money via Internet and other affect the success that a beggar may have for collecting standard solicitation methods.10 These programs share money. For instance, a DGS can avoid the problem of the common goal of diverting donations to collection donating to those beggars who are more likely to receive boxes (material and virtual) instead of street beggars the most from donors. As Moen (2014, 74) argues, “when themselves. you give money to a beggar, you are statistically likely to DGS can be implemented and administered by four give the most money to the ones with the locations, looks, different actors: (1) public institutions (e.g., local govern- and tricks that prompt people to give.” The logic of DGS ments), (2) private nonprofit agencies or organizations, programs is to eliminate the advantage that some beggars (3) business organizations, and (4) some combination of may have for collecting money, and to distribute dona- public and private agencies. For example, The City of tions more fairly among all the needy beggars.17 Lawrence, Kansas, implemented and paid for a donation Second, supporters of DGS present this policy as a meter program whose funds are collected by the city itself good instrument to motivate people to be more charitable and provided to local nongovernmental organizations and caring than they commonly are. On the one hand, (NGOs) that support various policies for beggars and the even some altruistic people may prefer not to interact homeless.11 Other programs such as Change for the directly with beggars in the street. On the other hand, Better12 implemented in Spokane, Washington, are DGSs may promote the value of unilateral personal giv- mainly promoted by local business owners looking for a ing aimed at the disadvantaged. As a manifestation of way to drive beggars out of downtown areas. The third personal generosity and kindness, private giving is alternative can be found in programs such as Denver’s socially valuable. However, some authors believe that the Road Home13 in Denver or Art of Change14 adopted in institutionalization of social welfare policies has dis- Chattanooga, Tennessee. These are cases in which both placed and eroded individual private giving (e.g., Obler private and public actors assume responsibility for the 1981, 17). With a DGS based on spontaneous and anony- implementation of the program. mous donations, donors have the possibility to practice In some cases, the adoption of a DGS is accompanied and perfect the habit of helping others. by legislation that restricts beggars’ activities in various Third, there is a freedom-based justification of DGSs. fashions. Some DGSs are adopted together with antibeg- The argument, in brief, is that DGSs may facilitate indi- ging ordinances that penalize beggars for soliciting dona- vidual private giving without compromising donors’ lib- tions from passersby.15 For instance, begging is a criminal erty. The voluntariness that defines DGSs allows donors offence in Exeter, the United Kingdom, where a DGS is to act beneficently toward beggars in a discretionary and used to deal with begging practices.16 An important dis- indeterminate way. In contrast to a scheme of compulsory tinction to draw when thinking about this issue is that cit- redistribution, a DGS would protect donors’ rights to ies do not necessarily need to implement zero-tolerance make gifts to needy people. The key point is that this pol- policies to strongly regulate begging practices. To give an icy does not focus exclusively on recipients’ rights. example, even though the city of Fayetteville in North Instead, it also takes into consideration the freedom of Carolina does not explicitly prohibit begging, it regulates donors, namely, the voluntary agency to give something to the areas and the time of the day in which begging can be someone or to give nothing (Nozick 1974, 168). practiced. By contrast, other DGSs only launch cam- Fourth, by reducing the direct interactions between paigns to persuade donors. That is the case, for example, street beggars and individual donors, DGSs may diminish of the Oxford Begging Initiative adopted by the Oxford the dynamic of humiliation and damage to beggars’ self- City Council in the United Kingdom. respect inherent in street begging practices. DGSs give It is possible to identify five main justifications for donors the chance to help beggars without participating DGSs. First, DGSs help finance NGOs that have better in this kind of asymmetrical relationship. Since DGSs infrastructures and broader perspectives than do individ- promote donations that are impersonal in nature, individual donors when it comes to effectively helping beggars. ual donors do not need to engage in undesirable one-to- This policy allows specialized agencies to do the work of one interactions. classifying and distinguishing among various categories The last justification is based on the idea that this type of beggars. This gives some certainty to donors that their of scheme might reduce street begging. The reasoning is money is used to truly help beggars in the relief of their that DGSs should create disincentives for people to beg Pérez-Muñoz 927 on the street. If most donors exclusively make donations bility of a DGS depends on achieving the outcomes sug- to DGS programs, then street begging will likely become gested by its advocates. a less profitable activity. The harder the chances of col- First, according to its advocates, one of the main ben- lecting donations on the street, the fewer the people efits of DGSs is that through well-organized collective inclined to solicit donations from passersby. action, these programs can achieve more efficient and It is worth emphasizing here the importance of study- normatively permissible outcomes than uncoordinated ing DGS programs. The first reason is that, although and idiosyncratic acts of charity on behalf of unorganized these programs affect the lives of many people, they are individuals. Not surprisingly, one question that arises is understudied in the empirical and normative literature. to what extent a DGS typically manages to solve the col- We know very little about them. Second, DGS programs lective action problem so sufficiently that it crosses some can be understood as a type of program that is compatible threshold of resource acquisition and service provision? and complementary to other policies used to regulate and To deliver on its promises, of course, a DGS needs to be control beggars’ behavior—that is, as a program that is an able to collect enough money to properly fund the opera- expression of a larger phenomenon. To begin with, DGS tional costs of the organizations in charge of assisting policies are often implemented together with regulations beggars. Therefore, a first condition is that, by using per- to prohibit or seriously limit street begging. DGSs are missible solicitation strategies, a DGS should be able to commonly presented as initiatives capable of eradicating collect enough money to sufficiently fund the provision some undesirable behaviors. Thus, DGS programs can be of reliable relief to beggars. as an expression of the “revanchist city” initially Second, DGS advocates argue that this policy can pro- described by Smith (1996) and developed by many others vide more certainty to individual donors through coordi- (e.g., Aalbers 2011; Atkinson 2003; Blomley 2010; nation than can be derived through idiosyncratic Mitchell 1997). Roughly speaking, Smith (1996) refers to individual donations. Individual donors may not only a revanchist city as a set of revengeful urban policies struggle to distinguish truly needy beggars from fraudu- directed against various populations accused of stealing lent ones, but they may also have problems determining from the city. To make the city safe for gentrification, dif- whether their donations are truly helping beggars. In most ferent measures are taken to clean the city, make it safe cases, they do not know how beggars make use of the for business, and remove those who are out of the market monetary donations they receive. DGSs instead provide (Smith 2002, 442). The zero-tolerance policies that I dis- donors with more accurate and transparent information cuss later on in the section “DGSs and Anti-begging about the impact of monetary donations. In consequence, Policies” are a clear example of “revanchist” policies to be permissible, DGSs should be managed transpar- (e.g., Ellickson 1996). Likewise, DGS programs can also ently and include mechanisms that allow their decision be seen as a “reaction against the supposed ‘theft’ of the makers to be held accountable for their activities and for city” (Smith 1996, 207). the allocation of the money they receive. Yet, in contrast to other “revanchist” policies, a DGS Finally, DGS advocates believe that this policy fosters can also be defended as a program aimed to improve fairer relationships between donors and street beggars. street beggars’ lives. We could depart from the “revan- The remaining two conditions account for this point. On chist” type of justification and rather support DGSs as the the one hand, this may happen by reducing the one-to-one right policy to provide better help to beggars and not nec- interactions that potentially produce humiliation and essarily to those who benefit from a street free of beggars. harm beggars’ self- respect. However, to fulfill this goal, Put another way, revanchist policies are typically I argue that DGSs should not be implemented along with defended as policies aimed to protect citizens from anti- antibegging policies. On the other hand, under certain cir- social behaviors that take place in the city, but DGSs may cumstances, some DGSs should meet demands of justice. be conceived not only to prevent antisocial behaviors but That is, the principles of justice regulating the main gov- mainly also to provide real help to those in need. So this ernmental institutions of society should directly regulate possibility makes DGSs a particular policy within the the activities of these organizations. spectrum of regulatory and punitive programs against Needless to say, the list of conditions does not pretend street beggars. to be exhaustive. It only counts crucial conditions that affect the moral case for DGSs advanced by their own Normative Challenges to DGSs advocates. A failure to meet these conditions not only compromises our ability to act on our moral duties toward In this section, I discuss the permissibility of DGSs as an truly needy beggars but also interferes with the freedom institutional response to street begging. I list four condi- and opportunities of individuals in the begging populations that are related to the supposed advantage of DGSs. tion. My main objective in this section is to explain why For the sake of the argument, I assume that the permissi- DGSs often encounter serious problems in meeting each 928 Political Research Quarterly 71(4)

of the conditions outlined earlier. I do not claim that all becomes expensive in terms of one’s own utility to refrain DGSs are equally vulnerable to the same problems. from transfers under any course of action taken by other Instead, this exercise is intended to illustrate why these individuals (Stark 1985, 326). The key is to design insti- policies are more complex and difficult to justify than tutional mechanisms that bring about mutual altruism and many of their advocates seem to recognize. promote the altruistic nature of altruists. If not, the level of transfers to beggars via DGSs can be quite limited. DGSs and the Challenge of Collecting Successfully implementing such mechanisms, however, is more difficult than one might initially expect for two Sufficient Funds notable reasons. Some authors have pointed out that DGSs have not been First, DGSs that only collect money via charity boxes particularly successful in soliciting substantial donations or donation meters are, therefore, based on anonymous (Hermer 1999; Lynch 2005). For instance, in his study of and spontaneous street donations. This approach to donat- a DGS implemented in Winchester, the United Kingdom, ing can negatively affect donors’ signaling motivation by Hermer (1999, 203) observed that the funds collected by limiting their possibilities to signal their prosocial behav- that program were considerably insufficient to cover the ior. Donations can be used to satisfy donors’ desire “to be operational costs of the charity organizations in charge of liked and respected by others and by one’s self” and to addressing beggars’ demands and needs. This result does “signal to others that one is good” (Ariely, Bracha, and not seem very surprising. Even in a community of altru- Meier 2009, 544). Indirect street donations to charity ists, there may be potential collective action problems at boxes or donation meters, however, do not provide oppor- the time of implementing this kind of scheme, and these tunities to engage in such signaling. Given the presence problems would be difficult for even well-designed DGSs of signaling motivations, it is expected that prosocial to overcome (Stark 1985). For example, a successful behavior occurs more frequently in public than in private DGS has to mitigate against what is known as an “assur- situations. That may explain why people and organiza- ance problem.”18 This problem refers to the possibility tions rarely make anonymous donations to charities that many donors may be not willing to collaborate with (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009, 544). a DGS unless they have the reasonable assurance that Second, DGSs based on anonymous and spontaneous most people will simultaneously (and independently) donations also fail to provide sufficient extrinsic motiva- elect to do their fair share as well. tion for donors. The contingent rewards associated with To illustrate this, assume there were only two donors this method of donation—such as making contributions and a larger number of beggars where the donors have to tax deductible—are rather limited. There is no external decide whether or not to anonymously donate money via intervention that can induce people to contribute to this a DGS. Imagine also that every donor in the community program. As a consequence, in the absence of signaling harbors symmetrical preferences over actions and out- or extrinsic motivations, the financial viability of DGSs comes. In a sense, this situation is analogous to the classic rests on the possibility of having intrinsically motivated prisoner’s dilemma. First, a donor prefers that all other donors—that is, when donors are motivated to contribute donors engage in transfers rather than himself/herself. anonymously to DGSs without the possibility of receiv- Second, a donor prefers an arrangement where all the ing any apparent reward except for the act of donating donors engage in transfers. Third, a donor is worse off if itself (Frey 1997). none of the other donors make a transfer, and finally he or DGSs can use three strategies to overcome these prob- she is worst off if he or she alone gives to the beggar lems of collective action. First, as briefly mentioned pre- whereas none of the other donors do so. As Oded Stark viously, they can be implemented along with antibegging (1985, 326) rightly points out, in this kind of situation— policies that prohibit or seriously limit street begging. when the transfer game is played in noncooperative fash- The idea here is that once beggars are displaced or ion—the only stable equilibrium point is a nontransfer to removed from the streets, donors who want to help beg- the beggars; in addition, this equilibrium is clearly not gars can do so via DGSs. I discuss this strategy in more pareto-optimal. Stark argues that the prisoner’s dilemma detail in the following section. Second, DGSs can be charity problem disappears in the presence of institu- implemented along with communication campaigns that tional schemes that generate mutual altruism among the persuade people to donate to these programs instead of donors. Put another way, the existence of pareto-improv- directly donating to beggars. The viability of this strategy, ing (mutually beneficial) contractual arrangements can however, depends on, among other things, successfully transform self-interest into “tempered altruism” or persuading donors that giving indirectly to a DGS is more “enlightened self-interest.” That is—as Andreoni sug- efficacious than giving directly to beggars. The problem gests—a step removed from pure selfishness (Andreoni here appears when DGSs appeal to some contestable 2006, 1204). In the presence of mutual altruism, it facts about begging practices. These campaigns usually Pérez-Muñoz 929 claim that beggars misuse the money they obtain, that correct, then we need to ask several questions related to most beggars are idle or undeserving of financial charity, the procedures and capacity that DGSs have to collect that some beggars make a decent amount of money with sufficient funds to minimize street begging and truly help this practice, and that charity organizations always pro- street beggars. vide better help (services and goods) to beggars than that which they can procure by themselves with the money they obtain from donations. For instance, the communi- Transparency and Accountability cation campaign that was used to support Chip in at the To be permissible, DGSs should be managed transpar- Box in Indianapolis said, ently and include mechanisms that allow their decision makers to be held accountable for their activities and for Do not give money to people on the street. Giving money to the allocation of the money they receive. Accountability panhandlers only encourages more panhandling. Most is usually understood as “a relationship in which an indi- panhandlers are not homeless. Many panhandlers are scam artists. Many panhandlers have alcohol and/or drug vidual or agency is held to answer for performance that addictions. Giving money to panhandlers often feeds drug or involves some delegation of authority to act” (Romzek alcohol addictions and may deter individuals from seeking and Dubnick 1998, 6). In this case, the agencies that the help they need.19 receive the funds via the DGS can be accountable to the donors and their beneficiaries. Transparency consists of This kind of rhetoric is not uncommon in the promotion “mandated public disclosure by corporations or other pri- of DGSs. Depicting street beggars in this way reinforces vate or public organizations of standardized, comparable, their stigmatization and negative stereotypes. To be and disaggregated information, regarding specific prod- sure, one might imagine, in the abstract, a set of com- ucts or practices to further a defined public purpose” munication campaigns designed to communicate less (Fung, Graham, and Weil 2007, 6). The disclosure of disputable arguments about the nature of begging prac- information about the performance and characteristics of tices. Unfortunately, this is typically not the approach DGS is needed to improve the fairness and quality of taken by DGS promotional campaigns. those policies. The idea is that both donors and beggars Third, DGSs can be used as a general strategy that can use the disclosed information to make more informed includes nonanonymous and nonspontaneous donations. In choices and to highlight specific risks or performance a nutshell, this is a scheme that combines charity boxes or problems. This would, in turn, also have the effect of donation parking meters with more standard forms of encouraging the disclosers of this information (i.e., the direct donation to charity organizations. There are, how- decision makers in charge of the DGS) to improve their ever, two additional concerns with adopting a nonanony- policies. Unfortunately, at present, we know very little mous approach. The first is again related to the strategies about how DGSs work. employed to motivate donors to donate to this kind of Although some programs have presented some data21 scheme. As I mentioned before, communication campaigns about the money that is collected and the services that are that reinforce stigmatization and stereotypes on beggars provided, this is not the case for most DGSs. For the and the homeless are morally wrong. DGSs should be able majority of these programs, the only available informa- to persuade donors to use these schemes without blaming tion about their performance can be found in newspaper needy beggars and reinforcing their stigmatization articles. This is exceptionally problematic since this pol- In addition, DGSs that appeal to nonanonymous dona- icy is commonly justified precisely due to its potential to tions do potentially generate extrinsic motivation for provide more certainty to the donors than they can get donors in the form of tax incentives. Thus, while the use through individual donations. For instance, in his analysis of tax-exemptions for donations to DGSs implicitly sub- of the DGSs adopted by the City of Winchester in 1995, sidizes this type of policy, this situation raises fundamen- Hermer (1999, 210) found no available information on tal questions with respect to the normative and practical how much money the program raised and how much of merits of addressing this problem through individual tax those funds effectively went to those in greatest need. expenditures versus direct government expenditures According to Hermer, the leaders of that DGS made no (Reich 2013).20 If the state itself can deliver services and effort to monitor how the collected money was adminis- goods to beggars more efficiently than DGSs, then we tered and used. need to rigorously scrutinize the adequacy of the DGS From a donors’ perspective, there are two important solution to street begging. Nonetheless, the main attrac- points to consider in relation to the transparency and tive feature of DGSs is their promise of collecting money accountability of DGSs. First, donors need to know to help needy beggars via spontaneous, anonymous and whether or not their moral obligations are properly dis- voluntary donation in the street. If my arguments are charged through donating to a DGS. That would 930 Political Research Quarterly 71(4)

necessarily include information about the services that individuals in the begging community becomes all the are funded through the donations to help beggars. more dependent on the performance of the DGS in place. Second, donors need to know to what extent the overall Since beggars can be penalized for asking for money in magnitude of donated money is enough, in the aggre- the street, their chances to obtain the services and goods gate, to help beggars as a subpopulation of the country’s sufficient for survival are very much limited to people’s citizens. Some of the most frequently mentioned justifi- donations to DGSs. cations for donating to DGSs directly are that direct giv- In addition, most of the literature specializing in anti- ing does not provide us the certainty that the donations begging ordinances in the United States suggests that this are used for a good use and that the money is allocated to type of policy violates the constitutional right to freedom people in real need. However, if the information about of speech. As Calvert (2015, 254) points out, courts gen- the way these programs work is not easily available, erally recognize begging as a form of expression that is donors cannot be sure that this particular policy fulfills protected by the First Amendment. This Millian-inspired these important goals any better than their own idiosyn- argument emerges repeatedly in the literature. Begging is cratic patterns of giving to individuals in the street. a form of speech that “provides information about poverty and lives of poor people” (Hershoff and Cohen 1991, DGSs and Antibegging Policies 898). The very presence of street beggars contributes to “the interchange of ideas regarding homelessness” In recent years, many cities around the world have (Millich 1994, 275). The practice of street begging helps adopted antibegging policies. These policies range from transmit an important message: namely, that the safety prohibitions against begging in certain places and at cer- net may not be doing a proper job. The presence of street tain times to a complete ban of this activity. As some begging is a strong signal that our welfare institutions are studies report, cities in the United States are increasingly failing to protect some people in dire need. If successful, enforcing more regulations on street beggars’ activities. antibegging policies have the potential to eliminate that For instance, since 2006, the National Law Center on message (Adler, Bromley, and Rosie 2000, 209; Dean Homelessness and Poverty (NLCHP) has surveyed dif- 1999, 1). ferent regulations for the homeless and beggars in 187 Moreover, even if the presence of beggars can cause cities across the United States. In its most recent report, some distress for ordinary pedestrians, this “spectacle of the NLCHP found that while 27 percent of cities prohibit another suffering is good rather than evil” (Waldron 2000, panhandling citywide, fully 61 percent of cities prohibit 379). It is better that this suffering “be seen and that peo- this activity in particular places (downtown, commercial ple be distressed by it rather than it remains invisible to areas, etc.). This implies a 43 percent increase of citywide all but the immediate sufferers” (Waldron 2000, 379). Let prohibitions and a 7 percent increase of particular places me simply note that in the case of DGSs, the message that bans since 2006 (NLCHP 2017, 25). beggars provide is also fundamental to making the In the United States, the Supreme Court has not issued scheme viable. It could reasonably be argued that the a clear and standard definition of “aggressive panhan- absence of visible beggars will negatively affect donors’ dling.” As a consequence, even though the Constitution proclivities to donate to these programs for lack of a per- protects begging as a form of speech, some states and cit- ceived problem (Adler, Bromley, and Rosie 2000; Dean ies have been able to declare “aggressive begging” an ille- 1999). In this case, the potential damage is twofold: anti- gal activity (Szanto 2010, 524). Likewise, in the United begging ordinances limit beggars’ abilities to obtain Kingdom, the government has stressed the importance of money in the streets by themselves and DGSs will have reducing the harmfulness and offensiveness of antisocial additional difficulties in collecting the donations neces- behavior (Baker 2009, 212; Whiteford 2013). Begging has sary to the provisions of goods and services beggars need. recently been regulated by some enforcement interven- Johnsen and Fitzpatrick (2008, 194) suggest that “the tions such as the “Anti-social Behavior Orders” intro- use of enforcement measures, when accompanied by duced in 1998 by the Crime and Disorder Act. These civil appropriate support can, in fact, lead to beneficial out- orders prohibit and restrict the practice of begging through comes for some individuals involved in begging.” But the adoption of behavioral and spatial conditions. The vio- this, of course, depends on the possibility that beggars lation of these conditions can lead to harsh punishments, have easy access to appropriate support. As Jeremy even including prison sentences (Johnsen and Fitzpatrick Waldron (1993, 2000) has persuasively argued for the 2008, 193). The most extreme versions of this type of pro- case of the homeless, the condition of not having an hibition, known as zero-tolerance policies, indicate that allowed place to stay and engage in basic functions both aggressive and passive forms of begging are prose- (sleep, urinate, eat, wash, etc.) seriously limits the home- cutable as criminal offenses. When a DGS is comple- less population’s freedom. Although not all beggars are mented with an antibegging ordinance, the welfare of homeless (Lee and Farrell 2003), a parallel argument can Pérez-Muñoz 931 be made with the case of a DGS that is implemented Under these circumstances, both donors and beggars alongside antibegging policies. Under these circum- face a basic challenge. Some donors, for example, may stances, the only opportunity beggars have to obtain help prefer not to donate money to a DGS that is exclusively lies in those organizations that are funded through the implemented by a given NGO that imposes certain behav- DGS. If those organizations lack the resources to help ioral conditions to beggars asking for help. In this con- beggars, they will then be deprived of access to the most text, beggars can also be affected. They not only are basic services and goods. banned from asking for money in the street, but their only Some may argue that this type of scenario is actually choice for help may also be reduced to a single NGO that beneficial to beggars since they will be forced to make asks them to behave in a particular way. One could sim- their living through wage labor. The expectation is that ply reply with the slogan “beggars cannot be choosers.” beggars can assume greater responsibility for their lives But that principle is morally troubling. The fact that beg- (Whiteford 2013, 11). This reasoning is based on the gars are truly in need does not allow policymakers to assumption that beggars have real opportunities to stay respond with complete selective discretion to their out of the streets and go back to work. We should not demands. To take an example, it would be unfair if that assume without argument that this idea is sound. In gen- particular NGO gives primary attention and services to eral, beggars in countries such as the United Kingdom or those beggars who are willing to accept and follow its the United States are a vulnerable population with com- religious beliefs and values. plex needs such as psychiatric disorders, chronic medical It would probably be something of an exaggeration in conditions, and substance use and abuse (Dean 1999; this scenario to say that this NGO holds and exercises a Johnsen and Fitzpatrick 2008; Lee and Farrell 2003, 194). quasi-governmental power (Rubenstein 2015). However, It is unlikely that severe restrictions on begging and the it is not an exaggeration to suggest that this NGO holds implementation of DGSs will together compel most beg- and exercises a power that considerably affects the lives gars to participate in the job market. of beggars. The potential misuse of that power and the strategies for avoiding that misuse should be a chief con- DGSs and the Site of Justice cern as we evaluate DGSs. A crucial problem here is that NGOs may end up losing their voluntary nature. As As noted above, different actors can implement DGS Cordelli (2016, 925) says, demands of justice may apply schemes. When NGOs play an important role in the design, to NGOs when these organizations do not provide sub- implementation, and evaluation of this program, it is impor- stantive conditions for exit. This happens, for instance, tant to ask whether DGSs should be subjected to demands when an organization (or a group of them) monopolizes of justice. Some scholars believe that NGOs should not be the provision of a good or a basic service (Cordelli 2016, held to these demands (Rawls 2001, 10). Put differently, the 928). Such a scenario could plausibly characterize many argument implies that the principles of justice regulating the of the DGSs under consideration around the world. main governmental institutions of society should not Therefore, we can argue that at least in some cases, some directly regulate the activities of these organizations. But of the NGOs in charge of implementing a DGS should be that argument is not entirely convincing. There are good considered a suitable site of justice.22 That is to say that reasons to believe that, at least under certain circumstances, some DGSs should be regulated by principles of justice some NGOs should be required to meet the same require- (e.g., fairness, impartiality, freedom of conscience and ments of justice that are applied to the main institutions of speech, etc.) and not by the specific values, missions, and society (Cordelli 2016; Murphy 1998). beliefs that define the NGOs in charge of implementing Consider, for instance, the case of a DGS that is imple- these schemes. mented exclusively by a single NGO. Imagine that this NGO launches a communication campaign asking people Discussion to donate to DGSs instead of giving money directly to beggars. In addition, assume that the government adopts In this paper, I described DGSs and presented four stan- antibegging ordinance that criminalizes street begging. dards to evaluate their use. If my arguments are sound, we This situation is not uncommon. It is easy to imagine an should be worried about DGSs. Specifically, we should be NGO that has quasi-monopolistic control over the imple- aware that DGSs serve as highly limited mechanisms mentation of a DGS—that is, one that establishes the through which we might act on our moral duties toward allocation of collected funds, the nature of the communi- needy beggars. It is unclear to what extent DGSs can cation campaigns to attract donors, and the behavioral achieve their goals of (1) consolidating an effective form conditions that beggars should meet to access its services. of aid to beggars, (2) helping donors act on their moral In addition, we know that street begging is currently con- obligations, and (3) minimizing the potential social harms sidered a criminal offense in many cities. created by pervasive street-level begging practices. 932 Political Research Quarterly 71(4)

One could argue that I have overstated the importance Street begging is a problem that cannot be addressed and influence of DGSs. Given the modest scope of some through individual actions because it requires collective of these schemes, it is inaccurate to demand that all DGSs efforts. This, of course, is not a novel diagnosis. Kant meet the conditions I developed in the previous section. (1997) himself thought begging constituted a public prob- As a consequence, it could be objected that my argument lem that could not be solved through private interactions. overstates and misdiagnoses the potential problems asso- This is not only due to the lack of information donors may ciated with DGSs. While some of them involve many have, nor is it due to the type of humiliating relationship actors and restrict donors’ and beggar’ actions, others that this activity involves. Rather, begging reveals a fun- imply no more than the installment of few charity boxes damental structural injustice. As Lucy Allais (2014, 18) and modest communication campaigns. In brief, not all put it, “if there are genuine beggars, then there is structural DGS are equally vulnerable to my objections. While injustice of a sort which makes it impossible for you to there is certainly some force in this objection, there are relate rightfully to these individual encounters.” Genuine multiple counterarguments that prevent it from becoming beggars have been “wronged by the state’s defense of decisive. Even in the most innocuous contexts, however, property and its property distribution: they have been we have reasons to worry. For example, we may think in treated unjustly and they are lacking something to which the case of a DGS that (1) does not have government they have a basic entitlement under justice” (Allais 2014, endorsement, (2) is not backed with an enforcement pol- 15). A complete evaluation of alternative institutional icy (e.g., zero-tolerance, antibegging ordinances), and (3) arrangements to current DGS schemes, however, requires distributes the information about its collection procedures a broader analysis exceeding the scope of this article. and outcomes as well as its implemented policies trans- parently and publicly. Although in the particular situation Author’s Note described above, we are free to decide whether to give Previous versions of this manuscript were presented at the 2016 directly to beggars, the real options we might have are American Political Science Association (APSA) annual confer- highly contingent on the nature of the DGSs in place. ence and the 2016 Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference (ROME). Unless there are alternative DGSs that we can trust and agree with, we may still prefer direct giving. This solu- Acknowledgments tion is far from being optimal. If a considerable number of donors prefer direct giving to donating to DGSs, then I am grateful to the audiences at APSA (2016) and ROME the collective action problems of street charity will (2016) for their helpful feedback. I would like specifically to thank María José Álvarez, Chiara Cordelli, Alfonso Donoso, remain unaddressed. Anca Gheaus, Laura Levick, Juan Pablo Luna, Alejandra This study opens up new avenues of research on both Mancila, Joshua Potter, Pierce Randall, and Carsten Schulz for the empirical and normative levels. First, it is important their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. In addition, I to provide comparative and comprehensive evaluations want to extend special thanks to all the anonymous reviewers of DGSs. At present, we know very little about the pro- for their valuable comments. cesses of designing, implementing, and evaluating this policy. As the section “Justifications of DGSs” showed, Declaration of Conflicting Interests DGSs are initiatives of a varied nature. We need to better The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with understand and account for this variation to assess the respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this results of this type of redistributive program. This will article. allow us to evaluate how various DGSs either fail or suc- ceed in meeting the criteria for moral permissibility I Funding have outlined above. The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support Second, this study shows that more normative work for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: is needed to unravel the ethical implications of both The final stages of manuscriptpreparation were funded by street-level charity and the adoption of programs aimed Chile’s Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico to deal with the collective action problems inherent to (FONDECYT #11160045). ad hoc beneficence. Thanks to the ongoing normative debate centered around notions of global justice, we Notes now have a better conceptual and theoretical under- 1. In this paper, I conceive of “begging” and “panhandling” standing of possible alternative ways to think about the as being synonymous with one another. For a discussion nature of our obligations of justice to the distant needy. about the conceptual problems associated with the defini- Moving forward, this debate can now be extended fur- tion of begging, see Lee and Farrell (2003), Adriaenssens ther to consider the normative considerations surround- and Hendrickx (2011), Brito (2013), and Pérez Muñoz and ing street-level charity. Potter (2014). Pérez-Muñoz 933

2. This, of course, is a debatable proposition. Unfortunately, Change for Change (Tempe, Arizona), Power of Change in a paper of this scope, I cannot seriously engage the ques- (Virginia Beach, Virginia), PVD Gives (Providence, Rhode tion of whether we have a moral obligation to aid street Island), Make a Change (Wilmington, Delaware), Tucson beggars. For the purpose of this paper, I merely assume we Change Movement (Tucson, Arizona). Some of these pro- do have that obligation. grams are currently inactive. Others, such as PVD Gives in 3. Street beggars’ patterns of spending money may differ Providence, were adopted during 2017. from one place to another. Different factors may explain 8. See, for instance, the “giving boxes” program imple- those discrepancies. For instance, the presence of welfare mented in Dublin, Ireland. http://www.wearedublintown. institutions (as in the U.K. case) may explain why U.K. ie/safer-dublintown/change-for-better/ nationals who beg in the street spend most of their mon- 9. Denver’s Road Home is the most famous DGS program ies on drugs and alcohol consumption (e.g., Johnsen and using mechanical meters. For more information, see http:// Fitzpatrick 2010). In contrast, it is reasonable to expect denversroadhome.org that street beggars in places with a limited safety net (such 10. This is the case of the Oxford Begging Initiative imple- as in the United States) beg for basic survival needs. I mented by the Oxford City Council. For an evaluation of thank an anonymous reviewer for offering this insight. this program, see Wahlstedt (2012). 4. We can follow the principle of never directly giving to a 11. For a description of this particular program, see http://law- street beggar and instead donating exclusively to a charity. renceks.org/donation_meter (Access: 3/1/2016) But as I will explain later in my analysis of diverted giv- 12. For more information, see http://www.downtownspokane. ing schemes (DGSs), this can also lead to some important org/documents/CHANGE_BETTER.pdf normative problems. 13. For more information about this program, see http://den- 5. Street begging is also an activity that can be harmful for versroadhome.org other individuals aside from the primary begging popu- 14. For more information, see http://www.uwchatt.org/down- lation. For a discussion of this point, see, for instance, loads/ArtofChangeRFPGuidelines.pdf Hopkins Burke (2000), Ellickson (1996), and Wilson and 15. For an account of antibegging policies in the United States Kelling (1982). and the United Kingdom, see, respectively, Szanto (2010) 6. It is debatable whether beggars spending money on alco- and Baker (2009). hol or drugs is in all cases a misuse of aid. Similarly, it is 16. For a description of this particular program, see http://www. debatable whether or not beggars who misrepresent them- exeter.gov.uk/index.aspx?articleid=14841&listid=11972 selves are acting morally wrongly. In line with most of the 17. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention. literature, and for the purpose of this paper, I assume that 18. For a discussion about how the free rider and the assurance this is the case. However, it is easy to find examples to the problems appear in the context of the discharge of duties of contrary. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to beneficence, see Buchanan (1996, 32–35) my attention. 19. http://www.indydt.com/PanhandlingYouHelp. 7. At least thirty-nine U.S. cities or counties have implemented cfm?&lm=db (Accessed 3/12/2014) DGS schemes since 2005: Albuquerque Donation Meters 20. In a paper of this scope, I cannot seriously engage the (Albuquerque, New Mexico), Make a Change (Annapolis, extensive literature on the provision of tax incentives for Maryland), Keep the Change (Arlington, Washington), charitable giving, so I will merely state that it is far from Give Change that Make Sense (Atlanta, Georgia), Make a clear to what extent the state should forego tax revenue Change (Baltimore, Bethesda; Maryland), Art of Change by allowing people to deduct contributions to DGSs from (Chattanooga, Tennessee), Change4youth (Chicago, their taxable income. Illinois), Make Change Count (Chico, California), 21. See, for instance, the case of Denver’s Road Home and the Donation Stations (Cincinnati, Ohio), Britto Meters (Dade Oxford Begging Initiative. County, Florida), Generosity Cleveland (Cleveland, Ohio), 22. It is worth noticing that not all DGSs are subject to this Keep the Change (Denver, Colorado), Detroit Donates criticism. For example, DGSs can be implemented by mul- (Detroit, Michigan), Chip in at the Box (Indianapolis, tiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that guaran- Indiana), Iowa City Charitable Meters (Iowa City, Iowa), tee to donors and beggars substantive conditions for exit. Give Change for the Change (Las Vegas, Nevada), Change for the Better (Little Rock, Arkansas), Power of Change (Macon, Georgia), Change Movement (Mesa, Arizona), References Keep the Change (Marysville, Washington), Adopt a Meter Aalbers, Manuel B. 2011. “The Revanchist Renewal of (Nashville, Tennessee), Give Change to Make Change Yesterday’s City of Tomorrow.” Antipode 43 (5): 696– (New Haven, Connecticut), Homeless Meters (Orlando, 1724. Florida), Giving Change for Change—Real Change Adler, Michael, Catherine Bromley, and Michael Rosie. 2000. 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