DOCSLIB.ORG

Harkema, Kiana. the Road to Cyber

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Harkema, Kiana. the Road to Cyber Defending Democracy: The Road to Cyber Global Governance in Safeguarding Elections Kiana Harkema International Affairs Program College of Arts and Sciences University of Colorado, Boulder Defended March 31, 2021 Honors Thesis Defense Committee Dr. B. Clara Park, Primary Advisor Department of Political Science Dr. Douglas Snyder, Honors Council Representative International Affairs Program Dr. Nolen Scaife, Thesis Committee Member Department of Computer Science Technology, Cybersecurity, and Policy Program DEFENDING DEMOCRACY Abstract Since Russian interference into the 2016 United States Presidential Election, the need for stronger safeguards against cyberattacks upon elections has never been more apparent. Cyberattacks transcend national borders and require international cooperation if effective deterrence measures are to be established - this means establishing acceptable and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace. While progress had been made in this endeavor, it is unclear whether nations are successful in translating the normative values they hold domestically to an international framework. My research investigates the cybersecurity practices the United States exercises, in safeguarding its election infrastructure, to understand what norms the United States internalizes and how influential those norms have been internationally. The United States has been a vocal actor in the norms formulation process, as well as one that has participated in a variety of ways thus making it an informative case study. By analyzing the extent to which the United States is successful in promoting its domestic normative values on the international stage, it may be possible to not only better understand the process of cyber norms development, but also understand where the future of cyber global governance is headed. ii DEFENDING DEMOCRACY Acknowledgements Thank you to the members of my committee for offering your expertise in support of my research. Thank you, Dr. Park, for helping guide my research topic from the very beginning and challenging me to think deeply about the intersection of technology and governance. Dr. Snyder, thank you for helping me articulate my ideas in a way that improved my abilities as a researcher immeasurably. All the while, your enthusiasm for my research was greatly appreciated. In spite of my unorthodox interests as a computer science student, thank you, Dr. Scaife, for being so accommodating and encouraging my interests in your class, research group, and beyond. And finally, thank you Mr. Russell for encouraging me to join your cybersecurity club when I was a freshman in high school and being a relentless advocate for me ever since. I owe my passion for cybersecurity to your continuous support - including that which you have offered in direct support of this research. iii DEFENDING DEMOCRACY TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: FRAMING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ................................................ 6 SECTION 1.1: BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 6 Subsection 1.1.a) Threats to the Electoral Process .................................................................... 6 Subsection 1.1.b) State of International Law and Cyber Norms ............................................. 9 Subsection 1.1.c) The United States' Institutional Methods of Protecting Elections ............... 12 SECTION 1.2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................. 15 Subsection 1.2.a) Domestic Engagement with International Law and Cyber Norms ........... 15 Subsection 1.2.b) Private-Public Partnerships in Safeguarding Elections ............................. 18 SECTION 1.3: METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 20 Subsection 1.3.a) Keywords in Context (KWIC) Analysis ....................................................... 20 Subsection 1.3.b) Thematic Analysis ........................................................................................ 22 CHAPTER 2: ANALYSIS OF ELECTION CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES ................. 25 SECTION 2.1: THEME 1 - ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ....................... 27 Theme 1a) Standardization of Election Cybersecurity Practices ........................................... 28 Theme 1b) Risk Management and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework ....................................................................................................... 33 SECTION 2.2: THEME 2 - SECURING ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES ............................................... 37 Theme 2a) Decentralized Accreditation .................................................................................. 39 Theme 2b) Software Independence .......................................................................................... 45 SECTION 2.3: THEME 3 -PRIVATE-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN MANAGING MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION ............................................................................................................................ 50 Theme 3a) Multi-stakeholder Engagement and Information Sharing: An Elusive Solution 51 Theme 3b) The Role of Internet Freedom ................................................................................. 57 CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT .............................. 61 SECTION 3.1: THE UNITED STATES AND THE UN GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ..................... 64 Subsection 3.1.a) Protecting Critical Infrastructure ............................................................... 64 Subsection 3.1.b) The Applicability of International Law and Voluntary Standardization ...................................................................................................... 68 SECTION 3.2: TENSIONS WITH RUSSIA - ELECTORAL INTERFERENCE AND THE UN OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP........................................................................................ .................................................... 72 Subsection 3.2.a) International Law of State Responsibility and Cyber Attacks as "Armed Attacks" ................................................................................................................... 73 Subsection 3.2.b) International Humanitarian Law and Internet Freedom ........................ 76 SECTION 3.3: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN NORM DEVELOPMENT - A FRACTURED MULTI- STAKEHOLDER FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................... 79 Subsection 3.3.a) The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace ................................. 80 Subsection 3.3.b) The Global Commission on Stability in Cyberspace .................................. 83 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................... 88 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................ 92 APPENDIX ..................................................................................................................................... 100 iv DEFENDING DEMOCRACY Introduction In 2017, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations was published. It was a step forward in understanding how international law is applicable in an era of cyberwarfare and was lauded as being vital toward a more secure, predictable global society. By offering interpretations of how traditional international laws and norms such as sovereignty, jurisdiction, and the legal responsibility of states applied when conducting and responding to cyber operations, it appeared progress was made toward establishing deterrents to such malicious cyber activities. Of these malicious activities, digital interference and influence into a state's elections is one of particular importance and one whose progress is inexorably tied to the development of international norms in cyberspace, and not just those related to international law. The United States' methods of election protection were forever altered by Russian interference and influence in the 2016 Presidential Elections. Discovery of activities like Russian social media accounts spreading misinformation and disinformation and the breaching of voter registration databases shook voter confidence to the core. Unfortunately, the Unites States is only one of many countries who have suffered at the hands of such cyber operations. Questions formulated regarding the best way to deter states and other actors from participating in activities that degrade the fundamental core of democracy: free and fair elections. While publications like the Tallinn Manual seek to address these questions, the purpose of my research is to understand the road to global governance through the lens of a nations' cybersecurity practices and its corresponding normative values. The road to global cyber governance in safeguarding elections is paved by international organizations that are seeking to establish norms. Like the Tallinn Manual, 1 DEFENDING DEMOCRACY these norms are proposals for how international law should play a role in establishing conduct in cyberspace, as well as other guidelines for behavior. My
Load more

Recommended publications
  • FROM the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’S Challenges
    FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES FROM THE G7 TO A D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig (United States) With Tobias Bunde (Germany), Sophia Gaston (United Kingdom), and Yuichi Hosoya (Japan) ATLANTIC COUNCIL A Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Democratic Order Initiative This report is a product of the Scowcroft Center’s Democratic Order Initiative, which is aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. The authors would like to acknowledge Joel Kesselbrenner, Jeffrey Cimmino, Audrey Oien, and Paul Cormarie for their efforts and contributions to this report. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. © 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews.
    [Show full text]
  • Transatlantic Collective Identity in A
    THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE FUTURE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE ISSN 2281-5252 WORKING PAPER 45 | OCTOBER 2014 Social constructivists have always thought of September 11, 2001, reveals that the repre- NATO as the institutionalization of the trans- sentatives of NATO member states often voice atlantic security community, based quite different understandings of their on a collective identity of a collective identity. While there community of liberal is still a lot of agreement democracies. Unfor- among the speakers, the tunately, most re- debates also reflect searchers have Transatlantic Collective a heterogeneous just postulated “identity terrain”, this collec- shaped by diverg- tive iden- Identity in a Nutshell. ing conceptions tity without of constitutive studying its Debating Security Policy norms, differ- content and ent interpreta- contestation tions of NATO’s in detail. An at the Munich Security purpose, various analysis of the interpretations speeches given Conference (2002-2014) of its relationship at the annual with other actors, Munich Security and diverse cogni- Conference, often Tobias Bunde tive models concerning dubbed the “transat- diplomacy and the use of lantic family meeting”, since force. THIS PROJECT HAS RECEIVED FUNDING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME FOR RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION UNDER GRANT AGREEMENT NO 290454 T ransatlantic Collective Identity in a Nutshell Debating Security Policy at the Munich Security Conference (2002-2014) Tobias Bunde* NATO Security Elites Summits Transatlantic relations Introduction Social constructivists have long argued that the transatlantic security partnership and its institutional embodiment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are more than just another military alliance based on common interests. Instead, it should be considered as a “security community” built on a shared collective identity (Risse-Kappen 1996, Gheciu 2005).
    [Show full text]
  • Security of Voting Systems Ronald L
    Security of Voting Systems Ronald L. Rivest MIT CSAIL Given at: GWU Computer Science Dept. November 9, 2009 Voting is Easy… ??? "What's one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one and one?" "I don't know," said Alice. "I lost count." “She can't do addition," said the Red Queen. There are three kinds of people working on elections: 1. those who can count 2. and those who can’t. ? Outline Voting technology survey What is being used now ? Voting Requirements Security Threats Security Strategies and Principles New voting systems proposals: “Twin” and “Scantegrity II” Voting Tech Survey Public voting Paper ballots Lever machines Punch cards Optical scan DRE (Touch-screen) DRE + VVPAT (paper audit trail) Vote by mail (absentee voting) Internet voting (?) New voting methods (“end-to-end”), involving invisible ink, multiple ballots, scratch-off, cryptography, and other innovations… Public Voting The County Election. Bingham. 1846. Paper Ballots Lincoln ballot, 1860, San Francisco “Australian ballot”, 1893, Iowa city Lever Machines Invented in 1892. Production ceased in 1982. See “Behind the Freedom Curtain” (1957) Punch card voting Invented 1960’s, based on computerized punch card. Now illegal, by HAVA (Help America Vote Act) of 2002. The famous “butterfly ballot” A “dimpled chad” ??? Optical scan (“opscan”) First used in 1962 DRE (“Touchscreen”) Direct Recording by Electronics First used in 1970’s Essentially, a stand-alone computer DRE + VVPAT DRE+Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail. First used in 2003. Vote By Mail Often used for absentee voting, but some states use it as default.
    [Show full text]
  • VVSG Comments
    Before the U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION In the Matter of ) COMMENTS SUBMISSION ) VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM ) Pursuant to 84 FR 6775, Doc. No.: 2019-03453 ) GUIDELINES VERSION 2.0 ) Wednesday, May 29th, 2019 ) DEVELOPMENT ) EAC Offices, Silver Spring, MD PUBLIC COMMENTS SUBMISSION OSET INSTITUTE COMMENTS LED BY GLOBAL DIRECTOR OF TECHNOLOGY EDWARD P. PEREZ REGARDING THE VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES VERSION 2.0 PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES Comment #1 Issue: Principles and Guidelines vs. Functional Requirements Reference: Overall VVSG 2.0 Structure The OSET Institute applauds the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (hereinafter, “EAC”) for making efforts to ensure that the future Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) certification program is more flexible and agile than it has been in the past. With increasingly faster advances of technology matched by newly emerging cyber-security threats, it is essential for the VVSG to support regular adaptation and modification. Toward that end, VVSG 2.0's initial distinction between "Principles and Guidelines" versus "Functional Requirements" is well placed and laudable. In order to deliver on the promise of such a distinction, the OSET Institute believes that the following programmatic requirements must be adhered to: • “Principles and Guidelines" reflect policy statements, and any modifications to the Principles and Guidelines should require approval of EAC Commissioners. • Functional Requirements (and VSTL test assertions) do not represent policy statements, and their modification should not require approval of EAC Commissioners. Functional Requirements are simply the technical means to operationalize or implement the achievement of policy goals represented in the Principles and Guidelines. • Functional Requirements must support the policy goals represented in the Principles and Guidelines.
    [Show full text]
  • Usma Class of 2006 War Studies Conference Potential Disruptors of the ‘American Way of War’
    USMA CLASS OF 2006 WAR STUDIES CONFERENCE POTENTIAL DISRUPTORS OF THE ‘AMERICAN WAY OF WAR’ 04-06 NOVEMBER 2018 The views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. Class of 2006 War Studies Conference Potential Disruptors of the ‘American Way of War’ This was the third annual Class of 2006 War Studies Conference, sponsored by the Modern War Institute, a research center housed within the Department of Military Instruction at the United States Military Academy. The event allowed distinguished representatives from the private sector, government, academia, think-tank community, and the joint military services to debate and discuss issues related to modern war and warfare. This year’s conference explored the issue of next-generation warfare and potential disruptors to the “American way of war.” Specifically, the conference explored the following questions: • What are the current and future megatrends that will reshape our military effectiveness? • Can new technologies like AI reduce the fog and friction of the battlefield? • How do they fit into America’s larger strategy to win its future wars? • How can the Pentagon and Silicon Valley partner more seamlessly to foster military innovation? The above themes will inform a future edited conference volume, coauthored by a select group of participants and other experts, which is intended to frame a conversation with policymakers, senior military leaders, and other decision makers in the years ahead. The War Studies Conference volume will identify ways in which to move the current discussions on next-generation warfare forward to prepare ourselves for tomorrow’s battlefields.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Accounting for Foreign Disinformation: National
    ACCOUNTING FOR FOREIGN DISINFORMATION: NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATORY PROPOSALS FOR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS AND FALSE SPEECH ¨ Jonathan A. Schnader I. INTRODUCTION The ubiquity of social media in modern society carries with it a host of national security concerns, some of which require new approaches, new legal frameworks, and new policies to adequately address them. The current major national security concerns in the social media space are the active measures and disinformation campaigns.1 Most notable among them are the ones led by Kremlin-backed elements. These campaigns not only lead to interference in Western democratic institutions, but they also cause panic through fake news stories amplified by bots and trolls. All of these efforts ultimately feed into a disinformation feedback loop. Two examples of successful Russian disinformation campaigns are particularly noteworthy. First, in the Incirlik Air Base incident, false news about terrorists overtaking the United States’ base circulated worldwide, causing a small protest outside the gates of the base.2 Second, the false story ¨ Jonathan A. Schnader lives in Washington, D.C. He earned his bachelor’s degree in Psychology and Classical Humanities from Miami University of Ohio. He earned his J.D. cum laude from Syracuse University College of Law with a Certificate of Advanced Study in National Security and Counterterrorism Law. Following law school, he worked as an Assistant Public Defender in Rochester, NY for five and a half years, handling Just under four thousand criminal cases. In addition to being licensed to practice law in New York and Washington D.C., he is a Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist.
    [Show full text]
  • A Secure, Transparent, Auditable, and Reliable Voting System
    USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS) Volume 1, Number 1 • August 2013 STAR-Vote: A Secure, Transparent, Auditable, and Reliable Voting System Susan Bell, Office of the Travis County Clerk Josh Benaloh, Microsoft Research Michael D. Byrne, Rice University Dana DeBeauvoir, Office of the Travis County Clerk Bryce Eakin, independent researcher Gail Fisher, Office of the Travis County Clerk Philip Kortum, Rice University Neal McBurnett, ElectionAudits Julian Montoya, Office of the Travis County Clerk Michelle Parker, Office of the Travis County Clerk Olivier Pereira, Universite´ catholique de Louvain Philip B. Stark, University of California, Berkeley Dan S. Wallach, Rice University Michael Winn, Office of the Travis County Clerk STAR-Vote is a collaboration between a number of academics and the Travis County (Austin), Texas elections office, which currently uses a DRE voting system and previously used an optical scan voting system. STAR-Vote represents a rare oppor- tunity for a variety of sophisticated technologies, such as end-to-end cryptography and risk limiting audits, to be designed into a new voting system, from scratch, with a variety of real world constraints, such as election-day vote centers that must support thousands of ballot styles and run all day in the event of a power failure. This paper describes the current design of STAR-Vote which is now largely settled and whose development will soon begin. 1. INTRODUCTION A decade ago, DRE voting systems promised to improve many aspects of voting. By having a computer mediating the user’s voting experience, they could ostensibly improve usability through summary screens and a variety of accessibility features including enlarged text, audio output, and specialized input devices.
    [Show full text]
  • Clint Watts Testimony Russia
    Clint Watts Testimony Russia Sapid and peatiest Osbert advert her overrulers outworks while Wake Christianizes some lowers indecorously. Hair-trigger Taite intwines frontlessly or blow-outs Jesuitically when Brewster is hemimorphic. Geophilous Ferdinand plebeianizing, his crosshatches defend cudgel dependently. The private sector, and clint watts is currently there are you post and changed it difficult time to play all three active measures We talked a little bit about it with Jaron Lanier. Actually going numb to face forward and pictures and image those sorts of things. United states heading next day and clint watts testimony russia say the testimony. Most people talk like public bodies, russian female primary concentration on actual perpetrators that parties and clint watts testimony russia and to take this soviet journalists produce reports on your testimony. You were israel than at andrews air base, baltimore and protection, would make and incite tension in a particularly convincing these terms. Galeotti notes and so? And a stabilized westernoriented ukraine as clint watts testimony russia launched a reliable information operations to me here is very much higher chance that worked at that? Watts served in the United States Army as an officer in your infantry. United States stop publishing the AMWG reports accusing the Soviet Union of conducting active measures. Clint Watts describes the skinny of Russian Active Measures, back how the gym with Clint Watts. Congress or push notifications on how can now with a testimony will resume once a networked systems would you to protect sources from clint watts testimony russia to. As Clint Watts explained in his testimony while the Senate Select Committee on.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Publication
    68 AICGSPOLICYREPORT MOVING BEYOND CYBER WARS: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE Karsten Geier Andreas Nick Inger-Luise Heilmann Andrea Rotter Jackson Janes Maximilian Rückert Kent Logsdon Bret Schafer Gregor Kutzschbach Matthias Schulze Sarah Lohmann Scott W. Tousley Reinhard Meier-Walser AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY Table of Contents About the Authors 3 The Transatlantic Cybersecurity Partnership: The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies strengthens the German-American rela- Matters of Urgent Priority tionship in an evolving Europe and changing world. Foreword by Jackson Janes 8 The Institute produces objective and original analyses of developments and trends in Germany, Europe, and the United States; creates new transatlantic networks; and facilitates dialogue War in the Cybersphere: The Polyvariant Threat Needs among the business, political, and academic International Cooperation! communities to manage differences and define and promote common interests. Foreword by Reinhard Meier-Walser 10 ©2018 by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies The Future of War? ISBN 978-1-933942-64-3 Kent Logsdon 12 ADDITIONAL COPIES: Additional Copies of this Policy Report are available for $10.00 to cover postage and handling from Countering Threats Together in the Cybersphere the American Institute for Contemporary German Karsten Geier 13 Studies, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036. Tel: 202/332-9312, E-mail: [email protected] Please consult our website for a list of online publications: http://www.aicgs.org Confidence Building in an Era of Distrust: The views expressed in this publication are those Baby Steps Toward a Stronger Cyber Defense of the author(s) alone.
    [Show full text]
  • Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Moscow, Russia [email protected]
    1 Co-joint Convention of the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA) and the International Studies Association (ISA) 23rd-25th June 2016 – Ljubljana, Slovenia The Politics of International Relations The Influence of Cyberspace Communication on Social and Political Life (paper in progress) Mariya Granovskaya, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Moscow, Russia [email protected] Cyberspace in XXI century is one of the most important spaces of human communication. It should be noted the growing importance of the effects of communication in cyberspace. The networks have become the models of development in such phenomena as international terrorism or global hacker organizations as widely known organization Anonymous. The organization has become an influential force in modern communication sphere and their activities aimed at the struggle of justice. Their main enemy today is a terroristic organization IS. In this case we are faced with phenomenon of cyber warfare, which is defined as informational confrontation in cyberspace. The paper researches such phenomenon as communication in cyberspace and its influence the on global public opinion. The methods of the modern cyber warfare are being analyzed in this paper. Key words: cyberspace, communication, Anonymous, IS, cyber warfare Author`s name: Mariya Granovskaya Author`s Address: 36, 218, Frunzenskaya nab., Moscow, Russia Author`s Affiliation: Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Author`s e-mail: [email protected] 2 Introduction The research presented seems rather crucial today as communication in the cyberspace manifests, primarily, political boom (growing social protest and civil defiance, social networks used to stir riots and recruit terrorists) and affects the current global policy in (WikiLeaks activity, Edward Snowden’s case, actions of Anonymous hackers).
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber-Enabled Information Operations
    S. HRG. 115–426 CYBER–ENABLED INFORMATION OPERATIONS HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION April 27, 2017 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.Govinfo.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 34–175 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019 VerDate Nov 24 2008 11:34 Jan 17, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\34175.TXT WILDA COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida DEB FISCHER, Nebraska CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JONI ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut THOM TILLIS, North Carolina JOE DONNELLY, Indiana DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii DAVID PERDUE, Georgia TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama GARY C. PETERS, Michigan CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota, Chairman DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BILL NELSON, Florida DAVID PERDUE, Georgia CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 11:34 Jan 17, 2019 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\34175.TXT WILDA C O N T E N T S APRIL 27, 2017 Page CYBER-ENABLED INFORMATION OPERATIONS .........................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Conversation in a Clothes Closet
    LEDGER Odds mul Ends ENTRIES Here mid There and ALTO SOLO Pithy Poiuti Picked Up and Being • Collection of Various Patiy Put By Our Peripa- Topics of Local and FORTY-FIRST YEAR LOWELL, MICHIGAN, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19,1933 tetic Pencil Pusher General Interest NO. 22 Carlton Runciman, son of Mr. RLTHI-KSS HUNTER'S DEED Rock ford Bank Loses Three Fingers and Mrs. C. 11. Runciman has had TV tHILE going through his LIS. GRIDDERS To Reopen Soon SMALLER SPUD In Hunting Accident Potato Farmers Boys Farm Club the honor of being elected one of \\/ sheep pu.slure yesterday I the members of the student sen- morning Clarence Klahn of ale, a student governing board of South i.owell found one of his The work Incident to getting May H. Whiteside, 26, of Flint, ()livel college. fogistered ewM lying deadt ihol GLORIFIED IN all the certificates ready for the AND BEAN YIELD shot and hadl.N mangled his right Trying Irrigation On Soviet Pattern through the eye. Every Indira reopening of the Rockford Slate hand Monday noon while hunt- The Prince of Wales sold his Mank has made it necessary to ing on Ihe Whiteside farm about farm because he could not afford tion mrints to the deed ns that of One Grower Rpports His Yield a ruthless hunter, postpone the opening until some- four miles southwest of Lowell, And Every Member Is An Officer. lo continue losing money on it. It is no wonder that fanners HOLLAND GAME lime in the week of October 23. IS ESTIMATED He was taken to St.
    [Show full text]